The Realtionship of Afghanistan's Illicit Narcotics Industry and its Impact on the Afghanistan Insurgency

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY
THE RELATIONSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN’S ILLICIT NARCOTICS INDUSTRY AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE AFGHANISTAN INSURGENCY
BY
CHRISTOPHER K. GREEN
INTL 699 C006 FALL 13
23 FEBRUARY 14
THE RELATIONSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN’S ILLICIT NARCOTICS INDUSTRY AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE AFGHANISTAN INSURGENCY
AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

1
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 2
Purpose Statement……………………………………………………………………….. 3
Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………4
Historical Afghan Poppy/Cultivation Trends………………………………………4
Governance in Afghanistan………………………………………………………. 10
Opium’s Impact on “Legitimate” Governance…………………………………… 12
Opium’s Effects on the Taliban…………………………………………………... 14
Counterinsurgency vs. Counternarcotics Operations…………………………….. 15
The Effects of Counternarcotics and COIN on the Lower Class………………… 17
Selective Counternarcotics Targeting……………………………………………. 20
Ethics and Legality of Military Involvement in Counternarcotics Operations…... 22
Power Networks………………………………………………………………….. 24
Alternatives to Counternarcotics…………………………………………………. 30
Methodology and Research Strategy…………………………………………………... 33
Limitations………………………………………………………………………... 35
Findings and Analysis………………………………………………………………….... 36
Counternarcotics Efforts………………………………………………………….. 36
Governance and Corruption………………………………………………………. 40
Objective of Counternarcotics…………………………………………………….. 41
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………43
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………… 45

2
Introduction and Research Question
Afghanistan is currently the leading opium producer in the world, supplying as much as
93% of the world’s opium in 2008.1
With the exception of 2001, the Afghan opium industry has
steadily increased from 2,693 metric tons in 1998 to 7,700 metric tons in 2008.2
As opium
production increases, so does its destabilizing effects on legitimate governance in the war-torn
Afghan region. As the United States continues to battle a growing insurgency, distinguishing
between insurgents, drug traffickers, farmers, and politicians becomes difficult. Afghanistan’s
informal networks of tribal alliances, familial relations, and ethnic diversity already intertwine
with formal power networks of the state. Supplanting all of these traditional and federal networks
is the growing power of opium wealth.
There is currently considerable debate over whether Afghanistan’s booming opium
industry is the cause or a symptom of instability in Afghanistan. How or even why International
Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) should combat Afghan opium is a strategic and ethical
debate, with different groups advocating poppy eradication, anti-corruption legislation, lethal
targeting of cartels in a war on drugs, targeting only opium traffickers that support the
1
Citha D. Mass, “Afghanistan's Drug Career: Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug Economy” (paper presented
to the Afghanistan Analysts Network from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, GE,
2010), 15, accessed December 29, 2013, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP04_mss_ks.pdf.
2
Ibid.

3
insurgency, etc. This paper will attempt to answer the question, what are the impacts of the drug
trade in Afghanistan, particularly on power networks?
Purpose Statement
This paper will examine the evolution of the opium industry in Afghanistan and its
destabilizing impact on governance, the Taliban, and regional politics. The focus of this paper
will be on the economic, geographic, societal, and criminal effects of opium that corrupt both the
legitimate government and the Taliban insurgency.

4
Literature Review
Historical Afghan Poppy/Opium Trends
Perhaps the most cited and accurate source of Afghanistan’s illicit opium market for the past
decade, with regards to raw data, comes from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC). Annually, UNODC publishes empirical studies on poppy and opium production
geographically and by weight/hectares. Virtually all studies referenced for actual production
come from this single source, making it one of the most important primary sources for statistic
analysis of the illicit economy. It is also one of the least biased documents available, as it does
not opine on the causality of the market.
One of the most significant findings in the 2013 opium survey is the dramatic increase in
production from previous years . Prior to 2013, the peak year for opium production was 2007
with 190,000 hectares devoted to poppy production. Following 2007, there was a drop in 2008 to
157,000 hectares, 123,000 in 2009 and 2010, a slight increase to 131,000 hectares in 2011,
154,000 hectares in 2012, and a record crop of 209,000 hectares in 2013 (a 49 percent increase
over 2012.3
Of significant note to this study is the finding that 74 percent of the Afghan opium poppy
cultivation occurs in Helmand (48 percent), Kandahar (14 percent), and Farah (12 percent).4
These provinces are also some of the least secure, confirming the correlation between poppy
3
“Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 Summary Findings,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Figure 1,
January 11, 2014, accessed January 11, 2014, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-
monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf.
4
Ibid, 6.

5
harvesting and lack of government control. The UNODC study supports this correlation “…by
the fact that the vast majority of opium cultivation remained confined to the country’s Southern
and Western provinces, which are dominated by insurgency and organized criminal networks.”5
Deepali Gaur Singh, a Banglaore-based academic and author, continued the study of why
narcotics production in Afghanistan exploded after the commencement of ISAF stability
operations. In Afghanistan – Center of Narcotics Production and Drug Trafficking, Singh
identifies four variables that led regions of low security and stability to become poppy producers.
He proposes that instability is the primary variable that correlates with poppy production, with
80 percent of poppy producing villages having very poor security conditions, and with only
seven percent untouched by violence.”6
The four variables Singh identified are deficient effective central control, ruination of the
agricultural economy and its infrastructure over two decades of war, the cultural acceptance of
poppy as an agrarian crop, and the thriving economy based off the opium trade.7
For Singh, the
opium problem began during the Russian war, where Soviet forces pursued a scorched earth
policy, effectively destroying centuries old agricultural programs, orchards, fields, and markets.
This scorched earth policy forced Afghans to grow a lucrative and fast growing crop to
compensate for lost revenues and livelihoods. Over time, poppy cultivation became culturally
acceptable and even built a shadow economy based on the opium trade.8
5
Ibid.
6
Deepali Gaur Singh, “Afghanistan - Centre of Narcotics Production and Drug Trafficking”, Himalayan and Central
Asian Studies 14, no. 3 (2010): 26-0_4, accessed January 22, 2014,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1315169054?accountid=8289.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.

6
Because poppy is a seasonal crop, growers and producers can move cultivation to remote
uncontrolled areas when threatened, as opposed to trees, orchards, and more fragile crops, which
require years to bear harvested product. Because of this, as ISAF increases control in an area, the
illicit growers can move their crop to new areas or unreachable areas. There simply are not
enough forces to secure the entire country, so ISAF will always chase its proverbial tail. In the
off chance that ISAF was able to drastically increase security in Helmand and other high growth
areas, growers could simply cross the border to Pakistan, where there is no government control.
Singh asserts that the true controllers of the narcotics industry remain in Pakistan where corrupt
former ISI agents maintain control of growers and trafficking and reap the majority of the profits
from the trade.
Citha Maass of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs studied the
changing economy of Afghanistan as it evolved “…from a war economy to a drug economy.”9
Maass details the growth of the opium trade from 1980 to 2008. She graphically displays the
growth poppy cultivation from slightly less than 75,000 hectares in 1984 to more than 150,000
hectares in 2008.10
The advancement of poppy cultivation to opium processing is further
evidence of the professionalization of the Afghan cartels. Maass concludes, “…the consolidated
post-war order is ruled by a peace deformed by crime.”11
She asserts that the corruptive influence
of the illicit narcotics industry has created a narco-based government, and that only a long-term
campaign (20-30 years), can reverse this trend.12
9
Maass, 3.
10
Ibid, 14.
11
Ibid, 27.
12
Ibid, 28.

7
Maass, like Gretchen Peters and many others, concludes the nature of the insurgency has
morphed to the extent that the illicit narcotics and greed have created a new generation of
warlords. It is ironic that the Taliban rose to power to bring peace and stability against brutal
warlords that fought for control of Afghanistan after the fall of the Russian forces. In essence,
these analysts assert that the Taliban was ultimately corrupted by that which they strove to
eliminate.
In Seeds of Terror, Gretchen Peters details the history of the opium trade in Afghanistan and
the crime networks that arose to supplant the country’s traditional power structures. Peters
asserts that the power of the opium trade is so influential that it altered the power dynamics in
Afghanistan through corruption and criminal greed to such a degree that the Taliban are
transforming from an Islamic nationalistic movement to a criminal cartel. She compares the
evolution of the Taliban from terrorists to narco-terrorists to the Fuerzas Armadas
Revulicianarias de Columbia (FARC) in Columbia. She states, “…the Taliban is following the
same pattern as the FARC, becoming more ruthless and violent over time. But their violence
now serves to further their financial ambitions as often as their political and strategic goals.”13
Peters has many valid arguments for how the opium market began and expanded from an
alternative revenue source to fund the anti-Russian insurgency in the 1980s, but she fails to offer
a theory on the Taliban’s long-term strategy. Other analysts contend that the opium produced is
still the means for the Taliban to fund an insurgency and post-ISAF civil war. Peters, like many
counternarcotic-focused writers view the opium cartels as the destabilizing factor and sees the
13
Gretchen Peters, Gretchen Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War (New
York: Picador, 2010), 12.

8
transition of Afghanistan to a narco-state as an end state. A military strategist may assert Peters’
bias against poppy ignores the reality that the opium industry in Afghanistan merely serves as a
financial/logistics asset to fund the continuing insurgency.
Peters published a second but related study on the nexus of crime and opium in Afghanistan
entitled Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan under the
Harmony Project in 2010. The Flaws in this aspect of Peters’ research are more readily apparent
than in her previous work. She states, “Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case
studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas,
track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent
and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory.”14
Based on this self-described methodology, one can logically opine that Peters is making broad
assumptions from relatively small and “anecdotal” evidence.
Peters puts forth challengeable assumptions about the evolving nature of the Taliban without
counterpointing herself, leading one to assert possible confirmation bias. Peters opines the Quetta
Shura Taliban (QST) “increasingly behaves like a traditional cartel”, citing a reshuffled and
centralized command structure, a new code of conduct to “exert control over unruly sub-
commanders, streamline the flow of drug and other criminal funds and attempt to improve
relations with Afghan civilians.”15
A COIN strategist may alternatively infer that the QST is
trying to maintain legitimate political direction while fighting its own internal corruption
disproving Peters’ assumption that the Taliban is behaving like a traditional cartel. It is important
14
Gretchen Peters, Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Harmony Project (West
Point: Combatting Terrorism Center, 2010), i.
15
Ibid, ii.

9
to note that Peters’ position is in sharp contrast with many Afghan counterinsurgency experts in
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and ISAF. Peters discounts involvement in illicit narcotics
(a means) to support a post-ISAF civil war for control of Afghanistan (the Taliban’s desired end
state).
The idea of a narco-focused Taliban remains challenged by authors such as Sean M.
Maloney, who postulate that the some analysts exaggerate the Taliban’s involvement in opium.
Maloney states that the Taliban made use of a smuggling and illicit market emplaced by
Pakistan’s Inter-service Intelligence (ISI) to fund the insurgency against the Russians, but the
Taliban never aligned ideologically with criminal entrepreneurs. Rather, the Taliban
supplemented its income with taxes on smuggling, with interest rates ranging from 10 to 25
percent.16
The Taliban, along with Hezb-e Islami and the Hekmatyer families were all deeply
involved in smuggling to replace funds that dwindled when the US stopped supporting the
Mujahedeen or the ISI played favorites with monetary distribution.17
In 2004, Karen Tandy of the DEA testified before Congress that the DEA had no sustainable
evidence linking terrorism and narcotics, and that many connections were speculative. All the
DEA could establish was possible relationships. Thomas W. O’Connell, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts confirmed that the narcotics
industry is fragmented and was not under the control of any specific organization. Personnel
with connections to the drug market include friendly militia commanders, disparate criminal
groups, local and national politicians, extremists, farmers, and seemingly every element of
16
Sean M. Maloney, “On a Pale Horse? Conceptualizing Narcotics Production in Southern Afghanistan and Its
Relationship to the Narcoterror Nexus”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 1 (8 April 2009): 203-14, accessed
January 22, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310802573640.
17
Ibid.

10
society.18
Maloney, like many analysts, concludes that Pakistan remains at the heart of the
Afghan drug problem, with cartels and refineries remaining safely sheltered away from ISAF’s
reach across the border. Much like the Taliban, illicit drug cartels maintain shelter in Pakistan.
Governance in Afghanistan
Afghan political analyst Kenneth Katzman’s review of Post-Taliban governance and the
international community’s attempts to stabilize Afghanistan presents a bleak future. To Katzman,
narcotics and corruption are symptoms of a highly independent and fractured confederation that
rejects any central authority. In his review of the counternarcotics efforts from 2005 to 2009, one
can see that the international community was quick to claim any victory in the war on the poppy,
when after a single dip in poppy production produced statements from UNODC such as “… the
opium flood waters in Afghanistan have started to recede.”19
The report proceeds to predict
poppy reduction will continue to fall in 2009. Richard Holbrooke, then Ambassador to
Afghanistan, claimed the opposite when he opined that the U.S. received “nothing” for its
counternarcotic efforts and ended eradication efforts that were “driving Afghans into the arms of
the Taliban.”20
Equally unproductive was the strategy to pay provinces to produce alternative crops. In 2008,
the U.S. paid over 38 million dollars to “good performer” provinces that reduced poppy
production. This shortsighted and poorly policed program essentially bribed provincial leaders to
prohibit opium. Without continuity or follow-up, the provinces continued to produce opium after
18
Ibid.
19
Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy”, International Journal of
Terrorism and Political Hot Spots 6, no. 1 (2011): 80.
20
Ibid.

11
receiving funds. In 2009, President Obama’s strategy did not mention counternarcotics, and
focused primarily on anti-corruption efforts and governance reform to stabilize the country.
In 2011, Frederick and Kimberly Kagan of the Institute For the Study of War asserted,
“Success in Afghanistan is the establishment of a political order, security situation, and
indigenous security force that is stable, viable, enduring, and able – with greatly reduced
international support – to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international
terrorists.”21
The Kagans view insurgent sanctuaries and corruption as the biggest threats to
stability, with opium profits enabling both the corruption and the sanctuaries of all power
brokers, not just the Taliban. The Kagans further opine, “…our challenge is not to eliminate
corruption in Afghanistan, but to help the Afghan political leadership behave sufficiently in
accordance with Pashtun norms that groups that now feel marginalized and preyed-upon see an
advantage in at least tolerating the new order.”22
For the Kagans, the money from illicit narcotics is part of a larger insurgent support network
that provides sanctuary and support against an unfair and predatory government that competes
rather than cooperates with Pashtun tribal authority. This is part of the reason for the prevalence
of opium production among the Pashtuns. It funds Pashtun independence. The Taliban are a
Pashtun resistance, not a regional or national resistance. This is why Kandahar is so important
for the insurgency. Kandahar is the cultural heart of the Pashtun south and controlling it is the
primary goal of the Taliban. It is important to note, if the Taliban were only interested in money
and power, they would focus on Helmand, the largest producer of poppy. They could preserve
21
Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War,
January 22, 2014, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/otherwork/defining-success-
afghanistan-%E2%80%93-isw-january-2011-newsletter-feature.
22
Ibid.

12
resources and still smuggle into Pakistan and Iran. Instead, they wish to make a political
statement by contesting Kandahar.
In 2009 and 2010, General Stanley McChrystal recognized Kandahar as the Taliban’s main
effort and made Kandahar his strategic goal.23
His strategy focused on establishing a security
“bubble” around Kandahar, promoting good governance (anti-corruption), with prioritization on
available resources and building the Afghan security forces. Of note, he does not mention
counternarcotics in his strategy at all. General Petraeus, who agreed that counternarcotics efforts
would strengthen the insurgency, later adopted his strategy.24
The Kagans, McChrystal, and
Petraeus all recognized that far more corrosive than the illicit narcotics economy to Afghan order
is an overly empowered and corrupt executive that can rule by decree and promote cronies to
political positions without interference from a powerless elected parliament. “The current
government structure…is fundamentally antithetical to traditional Pashtun expectations about the
relationship between local communities and the central government because it excludes the
communities from having a meaningful voice in almost any decision at any level.25
This is a
theme prevalent in many of the readings on this subject. So long as the Karzai government
operates within its own power structures interests, there will be a resistant, disenfranchised
insurgency.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.

13
Opium’s Impact on “Legitimate” Governance
Bulent Aras and Sule Toktas approach the macro-effects of instability and corruption in the
Afghan government and the need to establish a new political process to counter the influence of
illicit narcotics.26
Aras paraphrases Hamid Karzai, “…the opium trade has become a worse
cancer than terrorism and even worse than the 1979 Soviet occupation.”27
Aras details the extent
on which the entire banking system of Afghanistan is dependent upon informal “hawali” network
supported by the opium market, which provides relative market stability. Furthermore, the poppy
agricultural economy is more stable than any other economic system in place in Afghanistan and
provides predictable employment for a large percentage of the rural population.
If one accepts the theory of the stabilizing nature of the poppy harvest on the Afghan
economy, it logically follows that the eradication and anti-poppy programs supported by Peters
and Maass would have a detrimental effect on Afghan stability. Eradicating poppy would fuel
the insurgency, as indebted farmers would defend their crop against counternarcotic forces. If the
eradication programs threaten the rural farm economy with no reliable alternative crop, the
legitimate government will become the enemy of the rural masses, increasing their dependence
on the drug cartels.
The Taliban, by acting as a shadow government, is more capable than the lawful government
in one important area, dispute resolution. Peter Andreas and Joel Wallman highlight the
Taliban’s unique court system that resolves disputes more effectively than the Afghan
26
Bulent Aras and Sule Toktas, “Afghanistan's Security: Political Process, State-Building and Narcotics”, Middle East
Policy 15, no. 2 (2008): 39-52, accessed December 29, 2013,
27
Ibid, The Narcotics Problem.

14
government. As many Afghans are unable to address opium-based land disputes in a government
court, they often resort to violence. Andreas and Wallman state, “Illicit markets are inherently
more violent than licit markets – with no legal recourse, business disputes (or disputes with
authorities) are more likely to be dealt with by shooting than by suing.”28
The Taliban is able to
reduce this violence by arbitrating illicit disputes.
Opium’s Effects on the Taliban
The legitimate government is not the only political element corrupted by opium. Growing
profits from the illicit economy negatively affect the Taliban in some areas. Ahmed Rashid
studied the history and nature of the Taliban prior to September 11 2001. He published his
definitive pre-9/11 study of the Taliban in 2001 prior to the World Trade Center destruction. His
book, Taliban is essential reading in the US Army Central Command Joint Intelligence Center
(JICCENT) today. Rashid provides historical insight to the nature of the Taliban prior to the U.S.
invasion and ISAF stability operations. In the early years of the grassroots Taliban movement,
the Taliban supplemented its funds through illegal trucking mafias and poppy growers. They
rationalized poppy growth tolerance, viewing raw poppy as harmless, but refined opium as
sinful. They later rationalized opium processing as acceptable in Islam, as the opium consumers
were non-Muslim infidels. They imposed harsh punishments for any addicts in Afghanistan to
maintain this worldview.29
28
Peter Andreas and Joel Wallman, “Illicit Markets and Violence: What Is the Relationship”, Crime, Law, and Social
Change 52 (5 March 2009): 228, accessed January 22, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s10611-009-9200-6.
29
Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 0 ed. (New York: Yale Nota Bene
Books, 2001), 118-124.

15
Ekaterina Stepanova examines the evolution of the Taliban towards a narco-terrorist
organization but disagrees with Maass and Peters. Stepanova identifies four stages of evolution
of an insurgency towards narco-insurgents: “Activity appropriation and limited cooperation,”
“Unlimited Cooperation (all the way up to forming a symbiotic relationship with professional
traffickers / organized crime groups),” “Merger with organized crime (hybrid-type relationship),”
and “Full criminalization and political/ideological degradation.”30
Stepanova assesses that the
Taliban has not yet evolved to the final stage of full criminalization, and is still in the hybrid-type
relationship phase. Stepanova’s assessment supports the concept that the Afghan insurgency is
still a political movement with ties to narcotics for funding and mutual benefit, but it is not yet
completely reliant upon traffickers, as it now produces its own opium for funding.
Counterinsurgency vs. Counternarcotic Operations
As demonstrated above, there are different schools of thought on the nature of the illicit
narcotics trade and its impacts on instability that cover strategy in Afghanistan. One side asserts
that attacking the opium trade will reduce instability, while the other contends that the opium
trade is a large piece of a larger problem - the Taliban insurgency. Jorrit Kaminga and Nazia
Hussain support the former, while Major Edward Linneweber supports the latter.
Kaminga and Hussain support a counternarcotic surge in Afghanistan prior to ISAF
withdrawal to neutralize the growing illicit economy. They further insist that a non-military
element should conduct counternarcotic operations, operating under an umbrella of military
30
Ekaterina Stepanova, “Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan”, Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 2 (May
2012): 4-18, accessed December 8, 2013,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/stepanova-illicit-drugs/html.

16
stability prior to ISAF withdrawal.31
Their research details the countries most affected by the
Afghan opium flood, from south Asia to Europe, and asserts that these countries should be the
most involved in funding the counternarcotic surge. By reducing the poppy harvest in
Afghanistan, the regional destabilizing influence of Afghanistan can be contained, or at least
reduced.
One must understand the goal of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, which is currently to defeat
the insurgency and establish a stable Afghan government. To accomplish this mission, the
military is using the doctrine established in the Joint Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-
24. According to FM 3-24, the COIN fight is population-centric. Therefore, winning over the
support of the people trumps all other measures. FM 3-24 states, “COIN is distinguished from
traditional warfare due to the focus of its operations—a relevant population—and its strategic
purpose—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant
population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the
population as its focus of operations requires a different mindset and different capabilities than
warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.”32
Following this theory, the support of
the people is more important than morals and ethics of the people. If the people in a given area
support the poppy business, from a COIN standpoint, destroying the poppy industry separates the
31
Jorrit Kaminga and Nazia Hussain, “From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics
Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, UNISCI Discussion Papers 29 (May 2012): 92-93, accessed December 8, 2013,
http://www.jorritkamminga.com/sites/default/files/A87_JK_UNISCI.pdf.
32
Headquarters Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency: December 2006 (Washington D.C.: Paladin Press,
2006), III-4.

17
population from the government. As FM 3-24 routinely states, an adaptive frame of mind is
required to fight an insurgency.
The first objective in COIN is to establish security and safety. Rule of Law is not the primary
concern. Therefore, Peters’ model of fighting narcotics in an insecure environment is
counterproductive. Fighting counternarcotics would increase insecurity and decrease the safety
of the population, as farmers and traffickers would deny security forces access to terrain to
protect their crops. As noted above, ISAF must remain clear on its objective and follow the
appropriate strategy to avoid mission creep.
The Effects of Counternarcotics and COIN on the Lower Class
David Kilcullen’s influential theory of “The Accidental Guerilla” aligns closely with current
ISAF strategy and accounts for the negative second- and third-order effects of poor COIN
practice. Kilcullen provides a simplified model of his theory in four phases, which he purposely
relates to an infection: Infection, Contagion, Intervention, and Rejection.33
In the infection stage, an anti-government element (AGE) such as Al Qaeda (AQ) moves into
an ungoverned region where they are “outsiders” and begin to spread their message. In the
contagion phase, the AGE propagate the export of violence outside of their safe area and begins
spreading their ideology to an outside audience. In the Intervention phase, outside forces move in
and begin to attack the AGE in an area in which they are embedded. In the rejection phase, the
population sides with the AGE, who is now accepted in their community through ideology and
marital ties, and assists attacks against the intervention force (ISAF, for example).34
The
33
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, USA, 2009), 35.
34
Ibid.

18
Accidental Guerillas are not ideologically in-line with the terrorists, but are opposed to outside
intervention. As intervening forces attempt to impose their will, such as burning poppy crops to
deny funds to the AGE, they build more and more Accidental Guerillas. Kilcullen explains,
“…local people in tribal societies will always tend to side with closer against more distant
relatives, with local against external actors, and with coreligionists against people of other
faiths.”35
Pierre Arnaud Chouvy takes the second- and third-order effects of counterinsurgent
operations further in his study of the “unintended consequences of drug crop reduction.”36
Chouvy utilizes a taxonomy to layer the effects of consequences of actions, to include intended
consequences, direct unintended consequences (beneficial, harmful, and perverse), and collateral
unintended consequences (beneficial, harmful, and perverse). Chouvy further adds foreseen and
unforeseen as modifiers to the consequences. He explains perverse unintended consequences as
“…consequences of an action (direct consequence) or of the intended consequence of an action
(collateral consequences) that contradict the initial goal of a given purposive action – an increase
in cultivation caused by forced eradication or some of its consequences (e.g. poverty, debt
increase). 37
Chouvy and Kilcullen both highlight the need to establish security and approach issues such
as narcotics only after security in a region is established, and only in a soft-handed manner, such
as crop substitution or infrastructure investments, to avoid strengthening the insurgency by
35
Ibid, 38.
36
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, “A Typology of the Unintended Consequences of Drug Crop Reduction”, Journal of Drug
Issues 43, no. 2 (April 2013): 216-30, accessed January 9, 2014,
http://search.proquest.com.exproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1326442523/abstract/142CE7824E7796DE12B/29?accou
ntid=8289.
37
Ibid, 221.

19
pushing the population away from licit government and towards the AGE. Merrill Singer focuses
specifically on the population, being the center of gravity in counterinsurgency, in her article,
Living in an Illegal Economy: The Small Lives that Create Big Bucks in the Global Drug Trade.
For Singer, the drug “working class” is twice victimized, once by the cartels that compel them to
grow poppy and produce opium, and again by counternarcotic forces that prosecute them, much
like Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerilla. Singer describes the drug working class as, “…drug
workers, people whose often modest livelihoods and non-lavish lifestyles are fully or largely
dependent on growing drug plants, working in illicit factories, moving drug products, or selling
small quantities of drugs.”38
Counternarcotics operations tend to target these “low-hanging fruit”
in kinetic operations and fail to strike the true beneficiaries. These operations result in the double
victimization of a perpetual working class with no lasting effects on the leadership. After
production, “the second most important sector of the drug trafficking industry – in terms of [jobs
generated] - is private security and vigilance… including agents hired by the drug industry in
order to guarantee not only the appropriate completion of trade contracts but also to protect and
give personal security to smugglers.”39
By this rationale, the Taliban, along with many ISAF-
contracted security organizations, fall into this second tier, and not the actual leadership element.
David M. Catarious Jr and Alison Russell offer similar warnings on the risk of heavy-handed
counternarcotics operations and its propensity to harm indigenous workers. They warn that
improperly implemented counternarcotics operations, “taken to eliminate poppies could be
counterproductive to the stability and viability of both the central government and rural
38
Merrill Singer, William Tootle, and Joy Messerschmidt, “Living in an Illegal Economy: The Small Lives That Create
Big Bucks in the Global Drug Trade”, SAIS Review 33, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2013): 123-35.
39
Ibid, 128.

20
population.”40
They conclude that farmers have few realistic alternatives to planting poppy due
to their societal and financial weakness, yet counternarcotics teams victimize them the most
when they eradicate their crops. Eradication only forces the farmer further in debt to Afghan
moneylenders who may choose to confiscate the farmers land, take his children to settle a debt,
force deeper indebtedness, or force them to take up arms against eradication teams. They
conclude that counternarcotics forces should not pursue large-scale eradication without viable
poppy substitutions for farmers, security, and anti-corruption efforts.
James Piazza’s study on the correlation between violence, counternarcotics, illicit
production, and terrorism maintain the strong correlation between the illicit drug trade and
terrorism. His study, detailed in The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and
Terrorism, empirically supports the relationship between illicit narcotics and terrorism and the
impact of interdiction and eradication operations. His study concludes, “Illicit drug production
and opiate and cocaine wholesale prices are significant positive predictors of transnational and
domestic terrorist attacks, while drug crop eradication and drug interdiction are significant
negative predictors of terrorism.”41
While Piazza confirms a correlation between drug production
and terrorism, he does not find any cause and effect.
Selective Counternarcotics Targeting
For Blanchard, narcotics create a triple threat to stability. Narcotics corrupt the legal system,
reducing the efficacy and reputation of the law, they fund the insurgency, and the accompanying
40
David M. Catarious Jr. and Alison Russell, “The Impacts of Afghan and Us Counter-Narcotics Efforts On Afghan
Poppy Farmers”, Asian Journal of Environment and Disaster Management 2, no. 1 (2010): 45-52, accessed January
22, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3850/s179392402009000337.
41
James A. Piazza, “The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism”, Public Choice 149 (16 July
2011): 297, accessed January 22, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s11127-011-9846-3.

21
violence and corruption prevent reform. 42
The only effective operations Blanchard identifies is
the targeting of Nexus “kingpins”. This not only implies possible legal and ethical dilemmas, but
also may indirectly strengthen the insurgency. If corrupt officials direct attacks or provide
intelligence to target competitors, it can create an image that the U.S. is supporting one kingpin
over a rival. This may be the only way to proceed towards stability, but the tainted ethics are
undesirable.
In a 2010 study Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Governance in
Afghanistan by Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A. R. Kleiman, and Jonathan D. Kulick for the
Center on International Cooperation, the authors propose radical findings contrary to current
policy. Caulkins proposes “…counternarcotics policy in the context of a weak state facing
violent challengers is likely to aggravate rather than alleviate insurgency, corruption, and
criminal violence.”43
Caulkins’ assertion is, despite all counternarcotics efforts, Afghanistan will
remain the largest global producer of heroin and
(1) All attempts to disrupt the networks have resulted in increased profits, violence,
corruption, and instability.
(2) Selective enforcement by local power brokers increases the influence of illicit
narcotic cartels and insurgents.
42
Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (Rl32686) (Washington DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2009), 1, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf.
43
Jonathan P Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, and Jonathon D. Kulick, Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug
Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan (New York: New York University Center on International
Cooperation, 2010), 1-31, accessed December 29, 2013,
http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/sherman_drug_trafficking.pdf.

22
(3) Alternative livelihood programs targeted at insecure areas contribute directly to
funding the insurgency through taxes and levies by insurgents.44
To Caulkins, the illicit market is too strong to attack as localized illegal entity. The market is
flexible and global. Even if ISAF could secure all of Afghanistan, the illicit market would just
move to a less secure country, as it did in Asia and the Golden Crescent. Since it cannot destroy
the market, ISAF should target specific nexus players that deal with the insurgency while
allowing the pro-government cartels to continue operating. This controversial approach would
likely empower already corrupt government officials tied to opium, but cause the least harm to
low-level growers and farmers. Once stability is established, law enforcement, as opposed to the
international community, could begin tackling the illegal market. This approach is a pragmatic
albeit pessimistic approach to the illicit narcotics industry.
Christopher Blanchard highlighted to Congress the extent of the Afghan economy’s
dependence on opium, defined the narcotics network, and framed it in the context of insecurity
and corruption, and reviewed policy and its effects since 2001.45
Blanchard reports the 2008 –
2009 farmgate value of Afghan opium was 438 million dollars with an export value of 3.8 billion
dollars, equaling 33 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP. The money supports corrupt Afghan
officials, criminal groups and insurgents alike.46
Therefore, the government is unwilling to
engage in any meaningful counterdrug operations. For any progress in stabilizing Afghanistan,
44
Ibid.
45
Blanchard.
46
Ibid, 3.

23
something must be done, as “…narcotics trafficking [is] a primary barrier to the establishment of
security and …insecurity [is] a primary barrier successful counternarcotics operations.”47
Ethics and Legality of Military Involvement in Counternarcotics Operations
U.S. Army Major Edward Linneweber takes a different approach than most other authors
thus far, by offering a review of the legality and ethics of conducting military operations against
poppy producers. Linneweber opines that military targeting of traffickers is both illegal and
unethical. Analyzing Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, he concludes that
traffickers are not legal targets as, “…the material fails to make a direct contribution to the
military capability of the Taliban. Accordingly, the narcotics trade should not be considered a
valid military objective.”48
Linneweber further opines about the impact of targeting the illicit
economy and its ethics and impact on the insurgency, “U.S. kinetic targeting conflicts with
counterinsurgency theory. Under counterinsurgency doctrine, the Afghans should address the
narcotics trade as a criminal matter. Second, this methodology legitimizes economic-based
targeting, which potentially harms the United States in future conflicts.”49
Linneweber differs
from Peters and Maass, and insists that military targeting of the opium trade is unethical, illegal,
and is counterproductive, as it strengthens the insurgency in rural Afghanistan.
Like Linneweber, James Windle challenged the efficacy and legality of counternarcotics
operations and used counternarcotics exclusion from the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s
47
Ibid, 11.
48
Edward C. Linneweber Major, “To Target or Not to Target: Why 'tis Nobler to Thwart the Afghan Narcotics Trade
with Nonlethal Means”, Military Law Review 207 (2011): 201, accessed December 29, 2013,
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=a6715826-5ce8-4c6d-8576-
63a61e922513%40sessionmgr4004&hid=4112.
49
Ibid, 208.

24
jurisdiction, which includes crimes against humanity, human trafficking, genocide, war crimes
and crimes of aggression.50
Windle’s second objection to the inclusion of narcotics trafficking is
useful to this study; regional or lower level authorities are best for dealing with narcotics crimes.
Windle states, “The nature of narcotic trafficking makes it better suited to national investigation,
[in regards to extradition]… the punishable act must be defined as a serious criminal offence in
both the requesting and receiver states.”51
To date, Afghanistan has refused to treat drug
trafficking as a serious offence, which is unsurprising, considering how many politicians are
involved in it.
Power Networks
One of the most important and least understood aspects of Afghan networks is the
Patronage system. Patronage systems are networks tied to a patron, or key power broker, that
rewards loyalty of subordinates with positions and power. Patronage systems are common in
tribal-based societies, where a tribal “strongman” obtains power and promotes members of his
own tribe or network to formal positions beneath him to solidify loyalty and support for his sub-
group. Often misinterpreted as corruption and cronyism, patronage is an ancient concept found
throughout the world. In Beyond the Tribe, Ron Holt identifies various forms of patronage
common in the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) region to assist policy makers, civilians, and military
personnel in understanding the difference between corruption and traditional politics.52
50
James Windle, “Afghanistan, Narcotics, and the International Criminal Court: From Port of Spain to Kabul, Via,
Rome”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice 20 (2012): 297-314, accessed January 22,
2014, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1163/157181712X660203.
51
Ibid, 300.
52
Ron Hoit PhD., “Beyond the Tribe: Patron-Client Relations, Neopatrimonialism in Afghanistan”, Military
Intelligence Professional Bulletin 38, no. 1 (2012): 27-28, accessed January 22, 2014,

25
Holt describes the concept of a “qawm”, which is “based on kinship and patron-client
relationships; before being an ethnic or tribal group, it is a solidarity group, which protects itself
from the encroachments of the state and other qawm.”53
Qawm forms the basic glue that binds
many traditional Afghan power networks and reflects some of the xenophobia that Afghans,
especially Pashtuns, often demonstrate. It is a closed system of trust based on blood and regional
ties. Holt further emphasizes the nature of “neopatrimonialism,” where “patrons use state
resources to secure the loyalty of clients.”54
Analysts often mislabel Afghan patrons as warlords, and this creates a negative stigma
that encourages western governments to shun powerful patrons or treat them as corrupt. Holt
argues that continuing to shun patrons in favor of stronger central governments will fail in
Afghanistan. Instead, the international community should accept that this is the nature of politics
in Afghanistan, or risk instability as patrons continue to fight and compete for recognition. One
could argue that this is precisely what happens in Afghanistan every time Karzai bypasses the
Afghan parliament and holds Loya Jirgas to consult with tribal leaders. He recognizes where the
real political capital resides.
In Warlords, Patrimonialism and Ethnicity, Stig Hansen takes the contrary position and
insists that warlordism is a “medieval” concept where a powerbroker transforms his political
authority, which is backed by military might, into a means of controlling resources to create “a
fief.”55
Just by analyzing the language used by Hansen, it is obvious that he views patronage as
an antiquated and outdated form of strongman power. He states, “The medieval warlord system
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Stig J. Hansen, “Warlords, Patrimonialism and Ethnicity”, Peace Research 35, no. 2 (2003): 75-92, accessed
January 22, 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/213484149?accountid=8289.

26
was a product of a failing state; it was initiated as a strategy by weak rulers to offset the effects
of a weakening or entirely absent state.”56
Hansen argues that warlords compete with the state and each other for control of the
population and resources. Warlordism is a competing archaic form of government that
capitalizes on individual greed and corruption; Characterized by a parasitic and weak leader
monopolizing resources.57
Hansen fails to account for positive things warlords, or Patrons, do for
their supporters, such as build clinics and schools, promote social programs, and return profit and
benefits to his clients.
Hansen is not entirely off the mark when he highlights some of the negative and
competing aspects of patronage. Patrons will compete for resources and one of the largest
resources in Afghanistan today is contracts with ISAF. In Local Afghan Power Structures and
the International Military Intervention, Philipp Munch notes the negative effects of ISAF
support to some patronage networks and exclusion of others contributes to the insurgency. When
ISAF invests power and resources in favored groups, such as the Karzais, competing patrons rely
on non-ISAF groups, to include foreign services, international crime syndicates, and the Taliban,
to maintain power and legitimacy for their own clients. An example Munch uses to illustrate this
point is the German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. By allying with
government officials to award contracts, other patrons saw the Germans as empowering corrupt
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.

27
leaders and supporting a “ruling elite.” This, in turn, led to attacks against the Germans and
increased violence.58
Munch further contends, fiercely independent Afghans do not support the powerful
central government supported by western forces in Afghanistan. Any support to the Karzai
patron system is antagonistic to traditional authority and fuels the insurgency. Munch rejects the
negative term “warlordism”, as it implies the patron does not support peaceful and social
enhancements. Munch prefers the “patron-client” description of the historical norm for local
power brokers and political leaders. He further contends patron-client relationships act as
stabilizers for normal Afghan society. The over-empowerment of Karzai is the destabilizer, as he
still supports his own clients at the exclusion of other patrons. He does not share power with the
proper regional power brokers and forces them into a “shadow” government. To compete with
military and financial resources of the Karzai system, these shadow governments align with
narcotics traffickers and insurgents.
Munch presents some optimism for post-conflict governance. He uses the Ibrahimi family
of the Kunduz province to highlight that, for some, once restored to their position of power,
patrons no longer need the support of drug traffickers and cease producing. Instead, the Ibrahimi
family transformed its power to less violent political influence and reinvested capital into
traditional businesses.59
One could conclude that a portion of the instability and violence in
Afghanistan comes from disenfranchised patrons seeking only a return to the pre-ISAF norm.
58
Phillip Munch, “Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention,” Afghanistan Analysts
Network, January 22, 2014, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/local-
afghan-power-structures-and-the-international-military-intervention.
59
Ibid.

28
Once restored to their previous positions, they return to previous norms. This actually refutes the
hypothesis that narcotics trafficking is corrupting, but is instead simply a finance platform.
Carl Forsberg accounts for similar power struggles in Kandahar between the Karzai
patron network and competing networks in Afghanistan Report 5: Politics and Power in
Kandahar. Forsberg details President Karzai’s half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai’s network and
details how Ahmed Wali manipulates contracting and ISAF funds to benefit his network at the
exclusion of other networks. Furthermore, he illustrates how support for the Karzai strengthens
the insurgency and drives non-political powerbrokers to the Taliban for support.60
Competing
networks, denied legal means, work with illicit groups to finance their struggle against the
Ahmed Wali’s provincial take-over.
The Karzai family is consolidating power in a hostile takeover of industry in Afghanistan.
Instead of sharing power with local leaders they are attempting to replace them with loyal
subordinates with no connection to the population. Forsberg states, “Ahmed Wali Karzai has
grown isolated from the vast majority of the population of Kandahar and from the many local
powerbrokers who find themselves excluded from his commercial empire. The Taliban
insurgency has become the only viable means of political opposition left to those that Ahmed
Wali Karzai has alienated, and winning popular support for the government requires
fundamentally restructuring the nature of politics in Kandahar.”61
This illustrates that the current
power system in Kandahar goes directly against population-centric COIN strategy. One could
60
Carl Forsberg, “Afghanistan Report 5: Politics and Power in Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, January 22,
2014, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/politics-and-power-kandahar.
61
Ibid, 59.

29
conclude that misplaced empowerment in Kandahar is far more destabilizing than illicit
narcotics.
Trends similar to the power struggle in Kandahar occur in other regions of Afghanistan as
well. In Afghanistan Report 9: Reversing the Northeastern Insurgency, Anthony Bell, David
Witter, and Michael Whittaker examine the less-publicized insurgencies in Kunduz, Takhar, and
Baghlan. Bell identifies Kunduz as the center of gravity in the Northeastern insurgency due to
the major ISAF supply routes that run through it.62
Bell surmises that the Taliban tried to create a
false image of a nation-wide insurgency by exporting violence to a relatively stable and non-
Pashtun area. The highway between Takhar and Kunduz is a key smuggling conduit for ISAF
and illicit drugs in the north. Criminals compete with local powerbrokers in the area to control
the route, from which they can tax and/or conduct operations. Much like in Kandahar, corrupt
local powerbrokers tied to the Karzai government, but conducting hostile illegal actions, are
using this conduit to increase their own power. In 2010, ISAF conducted targeted operations to
defeat the Pashtun-minority-backed Taliban to reverse the insurgency.63
Much of ISAF’s success
was due to large amounts of support from the non-Pashtun groups that fought alongside ISAF to
drive the Taliban out of the area. In this instance, ISAF supported the local majority and,
Forsberg concludes, conducted a successful anti-Taliban campaign. The smuggling and
corruption remain in place, indicating that ISAF may have helped a criminally motivated group
defeat a politically motivated group. ISAF records a decrease in attacks and interprets that data
as stability, but one could argue that instead it empowered one negative element over another in
62
Anthony Bell, David Witter, and Michael Whittaker, “Afghanistan Report 9: Reversing the Northeastern
Insurgency,” Institute for the Study of War, January 22, 2014, accessed January 22, 2014,
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/reversing-northeastern-insurgency.
63
Ibid, 12.

30
the name of peace. Human trafficking and illicit narcotics smuggling remains rampant in
Kunduz, leaving doubt that ISAF achieved any lasting positive effects. Narcotics trafficking
continues, regardless of insurgency involvement, and the local powerbrokers profit from it, as
well as from ISAF.
Whether the ISAF is conducting counternarcotics or counterinsurgency operations, it
must understand the intricate networks in Afghanistan in order to attack systems and to predict
second- and third-order effects. The Taliban is far more extensively networked than many
understand. In Afghanistan, Networks and Connectivity, Jonathan Mendel argues common
academic perception that Afghanistan is a failed state due to lack of networks of globalization.
To the contrary, Afghanistan is highly integrated in global networks and is “… an example of the
substantial role which networks and connectivity can play in ‘failed’ states and of the
unpredictable outcomes that can result from such networks.”64
Many of these networks are illicit
and include insurgent networks, opium networks, and smuggling.
Mendel’s paper is a direct challenge to Thomas Barnett and his theory of the
Nonintegrating Gap, where failed states do not engage in Thomas Friedman’s globalization in
the “flattened” world. Mendel postulates that Afghan illicit networks “function globally and
transnationally in ways which escape many more ‘legitimate’ networks.65
Unlike many of
Afghanistan’s fledgling licit businesses, its illicit economy integrated into the global economy
and functions as a global business; the value and exchange rates of illicit goods interact with
market factors in Europe, Asia, and (partially) the U.S.
64
Jonathan Mendel, “Afghanistan, Networks, and Connectivity”, Geopolitics 15 (2010): 726, accessed January 22,
2014, http://dx.doi.org/ 0.1080/14650041003718333.
65
Ibid, 728.

31
Most notably, Mendel claims that globalized opiate networks “constitute a significant –
and, at the moment, perhaps indispensable – part of the Afghanistan’s economy.” 66
This is
because the drug trade provides income to a large agricultural labor force, backs the informal
hawali banking system, and opiate stores act as a stable backing for currency, much like gold in
Europe and the U.S.67
Eradication of the illicit economy would have devastating effects on the
rest of the fragile Afghan economy.
Alternatives to Counternarcotics
The primary debate on the nature of the illicit economy in Afghanistan is about the nature
of its causality and relationships between insecurity and illicit economies in ungoverned areas.
On one side are proponents of Peters’ theory that the illicit narcotics economy corrupted the
Taliban and other AGEs in Afghanistan. This theory asserts the Taliban evolved from insurgents
to cartels while counterinsurgents such as Linneweber and Kilcullen view the illicit economy as
a symptom of an over-arching insecurity issue. There is still no clear answer to the question, does
the illicit economy create fertile ground and strengthen an insurgency that requires ungoverned
areas to produce its product, or does an insecure and/or ungoverned area create a vacuum of
authority that promotes illicit activities. Much more research is required to assess which theory is
stronger.
Another aspect of the counternarcotic debate is how to approach the opium industry
during an insurgency. Some argue for eradication, which, according to Chouvy and Kilcullen is
grossly counterproductive, while others such as Linneweber argue that targeting illicit traffickers
with military forces is unethical and illegal under the laws of war. Peters would propose
66
Ibid, 744.

32
destroying the illicit economy would drastically weaken the insurgency by denying it funds and
influence, while COIN doctrine argues the impact would be counterproductive and decrease
security further.
Peter van Ham and Jorritt Kaminga offer a radical alternative to counternarcotic
operations in Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistan’s opium industry. Instead of attempting
to destroy a booming opium economy, van Ham suggests licensing and purchasing Afghan
opium for medicinal purposes. Since all forms of eradication seem to victimize Afghan farmers,
van Ham suggests, “rather than trying to wipe out opium poppy, Afghanistan should capitalize
on the expertise of poppy farmers by diverting part of the existing opium industry to the
domestic and international medicine markets.” Though likely to meet with objections, van Ham
continues, “It would be possible to set up a medicine-producing industry in the short term on a
small to medium scale. This project would also improve the security situation by drawing
warlords and Taliban into a legal economy. It would decriminalize the Afghan economy, raise
the government’s tax base, and erode the financial basis of organized crime and terrorist
groups.”68
Van Ham’s arguments sound familiar to marijuana legalization recently heard in the
United States and offers a non-kinetic, non-criminal approach that may yield real benefits in
terms of stability and the legal economy. By licensing growers that are friendly to ISAF and the
Afghan government, growers would have incentive to reduce violence levels. Van Ham points to
Turkey’s successful transformation from an illicit economy to a licit drug economy as a model
for transition in Afghanistan.69
68
Peter van Ham and Jorrit Kaminga, “Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistan's Opium Industry”, The
Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006-07): 71.
69
Ibid, 75.

33
Twelve years into the Afghan war, these questions can be disturbing, as we move towards
an increased security role for a highly corrupt Afghan government post-2014. ISAF still debates
the mission and goals in what many describe as mission creep in Afghanistan. Peters briefed her
theories in a symposium at CENTCOM in 2013 to an audience of counterinsurgents and
Kilcullen is responsible for training specially trained military advisors, or “Af-Pak Hands,” in
COIN before they deploy to Afghanistan. In essence, CENTCOM is providing conflicting
training to the audience tasked to stabilize Afghanistan. The military, U.S. government, and
ISAF must remain clear on their mission and adopt a program that fits its mission. If it continues
to change objectives every year, Afghanistan will continue to destabilize further.

34
Methodology and Research Strategy
This thesis attempts to prove that the destabilizing effects of the illicit opium industry
negatively affect the Karzai government, traditional power structures to include tribal and
patronage networks, and the Taliban insurgency. As narcotic cartels increase power through
illicit profits and purchased military might, the influence of traditional informal authorities,
indulging tribal authority and power brokers erode. The government’s authority diminishes
through corruption and inability to bring stability, and the insurgency itself evolves from a
political movement to a financial criminal empire.
This study relies on qualitative analysis of over ten years of academic writing on the
Afghanistan. Comparative studies of counterinsurgent theory, counternarcotic theory,
governance theory, and studies of the Afghan power networks, both formal and informal,
identify strengths and imitations of current policies is Afghanistan. Many of these theories have
fundamental clashes that lead to increased conflict and negative effects from operations. By
questioning key assumptions and offering counter-assertions, this thesis will identify
counterproductive logic from prominent theorists that influence policy.
The author attempted to gather relevant research through key word searches of EBSCO
and ProQuest databases to include, but not limited to, Afghanistan, narcotics, governance,
insurgency, networks, patronism, opium, poppy, counternarcotics, counterinsurgency,
corruption, and international crime. Additional resources include the Institute for the Study of
War, UNODC, and military doctrine.
The analytic techniques used in this thesis includes Devil’s Advocacy and Key
Assumptions Checks. These two techniques are essential for federal intelligence analysts to

35
identify logic flaws and identify bias in past research. Specific biases include biases of
perception of cause and effect, as identified by Richard Heuer.70
Richard Heuer states,
“…because of a need to impose order on our environment, we seek and often believe we find
causes for what are actually accidental or random phenomenon…” and “people often perceive
relationships that do not in fact exist, because they do not have an intuitive understanding of the
kinds and amount of information needed to prove a relationship.”71
This is particularly relevant
in Afghan illicit opium analysis, where analysts attempt to find cause and effect of the illicit
narcotics industry without understanding the many cultural nuances specific to Afghan culture.
Often, analysts use false models of the FARC in Columbia to compare illicit narcotics’ effects on
an insurgency, without incorporating the vastly different cultural aspects of Columbia and
Afghanistan. Variables such as Islam, Pakistani influence, U.S. support to the anti-Russian
insurgency, post-Russian Warlords, Pashtun Wali, and regional dynamics are significant
variables that affect model cross-cultural models for the Afghan scenario.
A Key Assumptions Check is a diagnostic analytic tool in which an analyst addresses key
assumptions held by researchers intuitively accepted as “true.”72
One such key assumption is that
the illicit opium economy is bad for Afghan stability. Theorists accept this key assumption as
“fact” due to a cultural bias against opium processing. Authors show, in some cases the illicit
economy is a stabilizing factor for a failing economy. Another key assumption would be the
concept that the Taliban are in fact bad for Afghanistan. Evidence suggests that for many
70
Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Langley: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 127.
71
Ibid.
72
“A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis,” February 16, 2014,
accessed February 16, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf.

36
Afghans, the government offered by the Taliban is favorable to the current government due to
extreme corruption and power monopolization by the Karzai family. In Afghan studies, this
author identified many challengeable key assumptions upon which many influential policies rest.
Devil’s Advocate is a contrarian analytic technique best used to challenge key
assumptions and identify weaknesses in logic. Proper Devil’s Advocate approaches include the
following steps: outline the main judgments of a paper, select key assumptions that are
susceptible to scrutiny, review major knowledge gaps, highlight evidence that could support an
alternative hypothesis or contradict current thinking.73
Much like Key assumptions checks, the
Devil’s Advocate identifies key assumptions that are possibly erroneous, challenges them, and
offer alternate conclusions.
Limitations
Lack of access to classified information in this thesis is a strong limitation. Inclusion
classified materials could provide better insight on the Taliban’s personal opinions of poppy
harvesting, better empirical data to funds and the importance of illicit narcotics to the Taliban’s
insurgency, and the extent of corruption in the current government. Network analysis of the
Karzai government and key power brokers would provide better insight to the extent of nodal
ties to the insurgency and to the illicit economy. Additionally, the author of this thesis is a
military counterinsurgency specialist. The author attempted to reduce personal bias as much as
possible, but some bias may remain.
73
Ibid.

37
Findings and Analysis
Counternarcotics Efforts
Reviewing the effects of the counternarcotic strategies in Afghanistan leads to a grim
conclusion. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke called the counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan
the greatest government waste he had ever seen, and with good cause. UNODC’s statistics show
no positive effects directly contributable to counternarcotics efforts. Despite the millions of
dollars spent trying to curb narcotics production, Afghan opium production in 2013 was the
highest it has ever been at more than 209,000 hectares.74
The international community has no
measurable signs of success for reducing Afghan narcotics production. Despite all efforts, the
Afghan illicit narcotic is growing faster than it ever has before.
Much of the evidence thus far reviewed indicates that ISAF is as much to blame as the
Taliban for the growing narcotics explosion through flawed and inconsistent approaches to
battling narcotics. As highlighted by Catarious, current counternarcotics operations, which focus
on eradication and targeting of low-level employees, separate the population from Afghan forces
and force them to support the Taliban out of self-preservation. This leads to increased support to
the Taliban and increased instability.75
This illustrates the clear positive correlation between
instability and the counternarcotics operations. James Piazza concludes “illicit drug prices, illicit
drug crop cultivation and drug eradication and interdiction strategies are significant predictors of
domestic and international terrorism.”76
This does not support a cause and effect relationship
between the illicit economy and instability, but rather counternarcotics operations and instability.
74
UNODC, 5.
75
Catarious, 49.
76
Piazza, 311.

38
One could therefore argue that where counternarcotics operations increased, so is the likelihood
of instability. Therefore, areas where ISAF has increased instability, through policy, military
actions, etc., it has therefore increased the likelihood of a growing insurgency and illicit
economy.
Violence does not universally correlate with the illicit economy, in the absence of
counternarcotic or competing forces, according to Andreas and Wallman. Many illicit producers
prefer stability, as it stabilizes the production cycle. The violence associated with the market
stems from the illegality of it, not an inherent nature of the actual product produced. Without
legal recourse to address grievances, violence and reprisals are the only means of settling
disputes. 77
By establishing traveling judges that adjudicate grievances in a shadow government,
the Taliban provides a means to settle disputes between illicit actors without violence. In this
manner, the Taliban may actually decrease violence in ungoverned areas more effectively than
the lawful government of Afghanistan.
Singh and others in this study identified lack of government control and security as a
prime variable for illicit narcotics growth. Singh states, “…the insurgents do not control the
trafficking activity [of drugs in southern and eastern Afghanistan]. While the drug trade provides
some funds for the conflict, more significant is the cover the conflict provides for the drug trade.
Those who profit most from heroin trafficking are professional criminals and their network of
corrupt officials.”78
Instability allows the illicit criminals to operate under an umbrella of
lawlessness, but does not operate because of the instability. There is a correlation between the
two, but not a causal relationship.
77
Andreas and Wallman, 228.
78
Singh.

39
Furthermore, opium is a mobile crop, meaning that it does not require years to grow and
develop. Growers can move the crop annually, as required. Understanding this, there is no clear
way for the Afghan forces to supply enough personnel to secure and govern the country. Even if
Afghan forces move to areas of high growth, the illicit farmers can simply move the crop to less
governed areas. From a labor perspective, the Afghans and ISAF appear incapable of providing
sufficient coverage to stop poppy growth. Afghanistan will maintain a narco-economy for the
near future under current strategy.
Maass argued that the Afghan economy is shifting from a war economy to narco-
economy. She states, “…the drug industry and drug trafficking form a powerful shadow
economy that transforms Afghanistan into a drug economy in which political decisions made by
the Karzai government are influenced by profit-seeking at the macroeconomic level and
hierarchical power structures all the way down to the local level.”79
This assumption that there is
only one shadow economy is erroneous.
Afghanistan maintains a continuing war economy, supported by ISAF contractors that
benefit from one of many competing power sources. As Forsberg states, “In the place of tribal or
mujahedeen leadership there has emerged a powerful new order built around a small number of
personal networks which for the most part are interconnected with their own hierarchies of
dependency. These networks gain their strength from a combination of arms, business interests,
control over government institutions, ability to control patronage, and influence over ISAF.”80
One could argue that the illicit opium economy persists in retaliation to the corrupt Afghan war
economy. The two economies compete and thrive off one–another. As the Afghan war economy
79
Maas, 23.
80
Forsberg, 27.

40
funds the powerbrokers such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, the illicit economy will continue to flourish
to support his opposition. Less ISAF involvement in Afghanistan could result in less funding for
Ahmed Wali Karzai, and a decreased need for opium profits to combat his network.
Gretchen Peters’ entire argument of the criminalization of the Taliban is questionable.
She asserts the Taliban is profit-motivated, but her own analysis points to flaws in her logic. As
she notes in Seeds of Terror, the Taliban gained much of its funding in its infancy from
protecting truckers moving from Spin Boldak at the Af-Pak border. The Taliban charged a tax to
provide security and used this tax to purchase arms and equipment, as it did not receive equal
funding from the Pakistan ISI as did the Haqqani Network or the Gulbuddin Hekmatyer.
Therefore, the Taliban has always used illegal funding to make itself self-sufficient. Taxing the
illegal opium economy is little different than taxing truck drivers in return for protection. The
Italian mafia used to use the term “protection racket” to describe similar activity.
Though it is true the Taliban has fluctuated its tax rates, it appears relatively consistent
between 10-20 percent to protect opium crops from government forces and/or competing
“warlords”. 81
There is no convincing evidence that the Taliban, itself, is deeply involved in
production and manufacturing of opium, though it is likely that some Taliban commanders
engage in the activity independently.
If the Taliban were solely interested in narco-profits, as Peters suggests, they would not
target the population for support as they clearly do. One of the Taliban’s biggest
accomplishments is the establishment of a mobile court system that travels to villages to
adjudicate disputes. The population views the Taliban courts as more trustworthy and expedient
81
Maloney, 206.

41
than the corrupt officials of the Afghan government. James Windle asserts the Taliban courts are
empowered by a weak government and lack of authority, “… conspicuous in the criminal justice
system; 80-90 percent of Afghans choose to use informal dispute resolution mechanisms, or even
the Taliban, rather than the formal criminal justice system, which is under-resourced,
undertrained and inefficient.”82
Nor would the Taliban focus such efforts on controlling
Kandahar city, when they could more easily bypass the city to continue drug production in less
fortified rural areas. The Taliban’s continued campaign for Kandahar indicates that it still is
politically motivated.
The political corruption in the Afghan government is possibly more sustaining to the
Taliban than the narcotics industry. The Taliban will continue to gain strength as long as the
Afghan government appears disconnected from the Afghan people and corrupt. To many
Afghans, especially Pashtuns, the Taliban is as a brutal but fairer alternative form of government
than the Karzai administration.
Governance and Corruption
As identified by Kattzman, the corruptive nature of the Afghan government is far more
destabilizing than the illicit opium trade. Many Afghans view the government as predatory and
acting against their best interests in favor of personal gain. So long as the Afghan government
remains corrupt and predatory, instability and illicit behavior will continue. Instead of focusing
on counternarcotics, ISAF should treat the illicit economy as a symptom of bad governance and
focus more effort on combatting corruption.
82
Windle, 306.

42
There is sufficient evidence to support the assertion that the predatory and corrupt actions
of powerbrokers like Ahmed Wali Karzai are as destabilizing as the illicit narcotics trade, but the
international community has done little to curtail his corrupt activities. He maintains control of
the flow of Afghan contracting and rewards those who support him. Removing his influence by
controlling fund and contract distribution may be a more effective way of reducing support to
corrupt governance.
Objective of Counternarcotics
Theorists such as Kilcullen and Chouvy highlight the counterproductive nature of anti-
narcotics efforts when understood in the COIN context, and question why ISAF is involved such
operations at all. All evidence, as noted, points to the fact that counternarcotics efforts by non-
indigenous forces are inherently counterproductive, yet many decision makers still push for
continued ISAF involvement in such operations.83
Kaminga and Hussain assert that non-military
forces would be better suited to conduct counternarcotics operations and should do so non-
kinetically through crop substitution and incentives while operating under an ISAF security
“bubble”. Crop substitution has been the most effective counternarcotic tool to date, or at the
least, the least counterproductive.
Military counternarcotic operations are counterproductive, and according to some
scholars such as Linneweber, may be illegal according to international law and the Geneva
Convention. Targeting of civilians by military forces is a violation of the Geneva Convention,
“but civilians can forfeit their protections by direct participation in hostilities.”84
Linneweber
refutes that narcotics traffickers meet the definition of direct participation, since narcotics do not
83
Chouvy, 220.
84
Linneweber, 161.

43
pose a direct threat to US personnel (as opposed to weapons or explosives), but rather, an
indirect threat. The Taliban could use narcotics profits to purchase weapons, but could also
purchase medicines, food, or other non-violent necessities.85
The US and ISAF have no legal
right to target traffickers, therefore, counternarcotic operations remain a domestic issue best
combatted through domestic judicial channels. This avoids the xenophobic responses highlighted
by Kilcullen in The Accidental Guerilla.
There is scant support thus far to support any military role in counternarcotics operations.
It goes against the military’s own doctrine in FM 3-24 by increasing instability, and creates many
unintended second-and third–order effects as detailed by Chouvy. Windle adds, “removal of the
opium economy would strengthen the insurgency and alienate the rural population…support is
understandably low for a policy which could remove the income of a third of the population,
destabilize the economy, and ignite anti-government feelings.”86
All evidence highlights the
negative implications of military involvement in counternarcotics with no lasting positive
benefits.
Understanding the impact of the illicit opium trade in Afghanistan is difficult without
understanding the other variables it effects, to include patronage systems, Afghanistan’s illicit
but stabilizing opium economy, and unintended effects of counternarcotics operations. It clearly
corrupts and corrodes Afghanistan power networks, but it is impossible to determine the extent
of its corruption, without accounting for other variables which would include political
corruption, warlordism, specific account transactions, or internal Taliban communications.
85
Ibid, 168.
86
Windle, 305.

44
Conclusion
After reviewing current literature, it remains apparent that the illicit opium
economy is and will remain a destabilizing factor for the Karzai government in Afghanistan.
Current growth trends indicate this economy will continue to grow as ISAF draws down and
Afghan authorities lose military forces necessary to bring stability and government presence to
rural areas of Afghanistan. Currently the country is, in fact, reliant on the illicit economy as the
main revenue for rural farmers and landowners. The drug trade has invaded all aspects of the
Afghan power dynamic, including tribal, regional, and lawful government. Corrupt government
officials add to the instability, causing the low-level Afghans to choose between a corrupt
government in Kabul and local power brokers who control their livelihood.
A surprising finding in this study is the destabilizing nature of contracting and ISAF
funds misused by the Karzais to increase their own personal power networks over competing
power brokers. In Kandahar, for example, the Karzais have used ISAF contracts as a resource to
award loyal members of their own network above competing power brokers creating great
animosity and instability. What some may see as insurgent violence is actually anti-Karzai
violence, as opposed to anti Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)-
violence, an important distinction. Furthermore, lacking access to equal funding from ISAF,
many powerbrokers turn to the illicit economy to fund their fight against the Karzais, not
necessarily GIRoA, as well. As a result, there is no clearly identified cause and effect of illicit
narcotics and instability. One must identify a control mechanism to account for the variables of
corruption and non-profit-motivated involvement in the illicit economy.
Peters’ arguments that the Taliban has become a narco-terror organization seem
premature. There is no convincing evidence to indicate that the Taliban has abandoned its

45
political goals in favor of building a narcotics empire. If this were the case, the Taliban would
concentrate its forces on Helmand province, as it is the top producer of opium. Nor would it seek
to supply a shadow government to include judicial and social reforms.
The Taliban instead, promotes an alternative to the highly corrupt Karzai government. It
began as and remains a decentralized grass-roots insurgency based on political Islam. However,
the Taliban itself must contend with the narco-funded warlords that are currently empowered
throughout Afghanistan. Thus far, the Taliban have not competed with nor attempted to curtail
narcotics growers and traffickers. Should the Taliban attempt to seize power in Afghanistan as it
did after the Russian war, it will likely find itself in conflict with armed warlords. This is very
similar to the Taliban’s original war for control in Afghanistan.
The illicit economy has also corrupted local power networks. Wealthy “warlords” who
control vast militias and resources are supplanting tribal and local power brokers. There is no
strong evidence that the illicit economy is the primary factor in supplanting local networks. More
erosive are the contracts awarded by ISAF to individual contractors and controlled by the Karzai
government, who ultimately determines eligibility of competing companies. Powerful private
armies gain profits from “protecting” ISAF forces and providing security for government aligned
poppy-producers. The privately contracted militias pay more than the Afghan government, which
pulls more talented personnel from the military and police to work in a private army that profits
from increased instability. Increased instability creates a demand for more security personnel in a
profit-from-violence industry, creating a recurring cycle of violence.

46
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