Research Question: What evidence exists that shows that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is expanding and what can the United States do to fulfill its goal of degrading and ultimately destroying it?
Methodology: I was able to answer this question through open-source intelligence (OSINT) as well as through interviews. Conducted interviews with BGen David Reist from the Potomac and a representative from the SOCOM office in the Pentagon
Islamic State owns and/or operates territory in Iraq and Syria approximately the size of the United Kingdom
They have established governorates in 8 sovereign states including Iraq/Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. (Stars are the governorates)
Beyond that, they have inspired or directed attacks in over 24 sovereign states
Evidenced by their increasing territory, vast wealth, high recruitment rates and robust training camps, it is clear that the US strategy against ISIL is not working.
Prior to 9/11 when they were at their peak, al-Qaida needed merely $30 million a year to sustain itself
ISIL has enough money to conduct 800 9/11-type attacks
ISIL has no trouble replacing killed recruits with new ones, evidence of their wealth and expansion as a caliphate
Five countries: Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and Turkey
Appeal: ISIL is offering young men and women a job and a chance to belong to something larger than themselves
While religious indoctrination plays a huge role in maintaining the state, for many religious appeal isn’t the reason they join.
ISIL is filling a gap in governance and economics that people want to be a part of. They’ve created a fully-functioning state that people are comfortable living in because of its services
Reist: ISIL doesn’t have to be good, they just have to be good enough
They also feature religious indoctrination in which recruits are taught the “true” form of Islam
The sophistication of the camps and the number of soldiers they train is testament to their growing influence
Continuing airstrikes doesn’t stop ISIL from recruiting more Sunnis and runs the risk of civilian casualties – ISIL knows this and has adapted its military tactics from a large singular army to more of an insurgency. Thus, airstrikes are not a long term solution.
However, ISIL is a Sunni organization and most Sunnis are untrusting of the ISF, regardless of joining ISIL or not.
According to a representative at SOCOM, the issue with not having US forces embedded in the indigenous forces is that they lose the incentive to fight and are not as effective if US military expertise is not there to lead by example (ex: Ramadi)
The US military can begin the process by paving the way for diplomacy
According to Gen Reist (whom I owe a lot of credit to for this idea), the US did engage Sunni tribes in al-Anbar province in 2006/2007 and used economic incentives to quell violent extremism.
Also, a similar deal was struck between the Iraqi government and Kurdish forces in 2014 (with the help of the US) that involved a trade of money/arms from Iraqi government in return for Kurdish oil to be sold by Iraqi govt
There are 20 oil facilities under ISIL control, as well as many other resources that can serve as incentive for Sunni tribes to take control of.
This is why ISIL is so wealthy; having these taken from them will deal a serious blow to the organization.
Representative from SOCOM claims that accompanying indigenous forces increases the effectiveness of the mission because US military expertise will allow for more progress and will incentivize the troops
These forces will also include forward air controller teams from the USAF to deliver more precise and deadly airstrikes as well as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) to provide more exact intelligence
Increasing intervention is the only way to see real results against ISIL as they adapt to our airstrikes
However, the point is still to have the Sunnis do most of the fighting; the US military will complement them
Getting the Sunnis on our side will drastically reduce the number of ISIL recruits and would destroy the very fabric of the organization
Relying on the ISF ignores the bigger issue that many Sunnis are sidelined and unwilling to work with the Shia-dominated government. Predominantly Sunni ISIL will continue to coerce and recruit more Sunnis if a different strategy is not pursued
