Cecile Gernez MSc dissertation

MSc Environment and Development Dissertation
London School of Economics and Political Science
Cecile Gernez
Word Count: 9991
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Community-based Adaptation and Elite Capture: A call for continued learning
Post graduate dissertation: MSc Environment and Development

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Contents
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 3
2 Literature review ........................................................................................................................................ 5
2.1 Adaptation and Development ............................................................................................................. 5
2.2 Collective Action and CBA ................................................................................................................... 6
2.3 Scaling-up CBA .................................................................................................................................... 7
3 Methodology and data ............................................................................................................................... 9
4 Elite Capture: a typology .......................................................................................................................... 11
4.1 Community characteristics ......................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Institutional characteristics ......................................................................................................... 16
4.3 Project characteristics ................................................................................................................. 20
5 Case study: Samoa ................................................................................................................................... 24
5.1 Community Characteristics ......................................................................................................... 25
5.2 Institutional Characteristics ........................................................................................................ 28
5.3 Project Characteristics ................................................................................................................ 31
6 Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 34
5.4 Limitations................................................................................................................................... 37
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 38
References .................................................................................................................................................. 40
Annex-1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 45
Annex-2 ....................................................................................................................................................... 47

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Abstract:
1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the biggest issues currently facing humanity. It is interrelated with equally important issues, namely poverty and inequality. As the richest continue to burn fossil fuels and contribute to climate change, the poorest are most vulnerable to its effects. Thus, there has been increased focus on helping the poor adapt to climate change. This is shown in Al Gore’s famous quote;
“I used to think adaptation subtracted from our efforts on prevention. But I've changed my mind… Poor countries are vulnerable and need our help” - Al Gore cited in (The Economist 2008).
Community-based adaptation (CBA) has arisen as an approach to reach the most vulnerable people within poor countries. CBA is set in the community scale, builds off of local knowledge, and increases the adaptive capacity of the most vulnerable communities (Forsyth and Ayers 2009, 24). It builds off decades of experience in community-based approaches to development (CBD) and natural resource management (CBNRM), among others. However, according to Dodman and
Community based adaptation (CBA) is gaining momentum as an approach to enhance the adaptive capacity of those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. It builds off of decades of experience in community based approaches to development and natural resource management. Still, the lessons from these past approaches, particularly regarding elite capture, seem to be forgotten in the practice of CBA. If CBA projects suffer from elite capture, they will not succeed in reaching the most vulnerable people within communities. This paper seeks to integrate elite capture into the discussion on community based adaptation by testing whether CBA practitioners are omitting past lessons learnt from decades of experience with elite capture into the design of projects.

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Mitlin (2013), CBA in theory and practice omits many lessons learned from experience with CBD and CBNRM. There is therefore fear by some (Reid 2014) that CBA is simply a re-branding of past community-based approaches. Further, the current focus on scaling-up the implementation of CBA is worrisome if projects are repeating the same mistakes as past community-based approaches. Some of the most valuable lessons CBD and CBNRM can offer CBA regard elite capture. This paper will therefore test whether elite capture (EC) was considered in the design of a specific CBA project in Fasitootai, Samoa, in order to discover whether CBA practitioners are omitting the lessons learnt from past community-based approaches.
If CBA projects suffer from EC, they will not succeed in reaching the most vulnerable people within communities. “Elite capture of a particular program occurs when a powerful minority succeeds at altering the nature of the program for their own benefit, usually (but not necessarily) at the expense of other groups, particularly the poor” (Arujo, et al. 2008, 1023). The poor are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change as they lack the disposable income to cope with climatic shocks. In developing countries, the poor are often subsistence farmers who depend on climate stability for their livelihoods. The poor are also often those with the least social standing, having fewer social networks to draw on in times of shock. Thus, if EC is present in CBA projects, those most vulnerable to climate change will suffer the consequences.
This paper seeks to integrate EC into the discussion on community-based adaptation by asking: ‘have CBA practitioners incorporated the lessons learned from decades of experience with EC into the design of a specific CBA project in Fasitootai, Samoa?’ After a review of the relevant CBA literature (chapter 2), the methodology and data used for the analysis will be presented (chapter 3). A typology of considerations which demonstrate the incorporation of lessons learnt from EC will then be derived (chapter 4). This will provide a theoretical framework for the analysis

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by outlining the considerations which practitioners would incorporate into project designs if they had acknowledged past lessons regarding EC. The typology will then be tested on a case study, to show whether practitioners of a specific CBA project in Fasitootai, Samoa have learned from decades of experience with EC (chapter 5). After a discussion of the results from the analysis (chapter 6), which shows that most considerations have been omitted from the project design, the paper will conclude (chapter 7) by suggesting a stronger focus on integrating the lessons learned from previous community-based approaches into the practice of CBA.
2 Literature review
For the purpose of this dissertation, three categories of CBA literature were reviewed. First, many authors theorize about the relationship between CBA and international development. Second, many have explored the relation between collective action and adaptive capacity at the community scale. Third, there is growing interest in scaling-up CBA. Despite this wide literature, no authors have explicitly tested whether CBA practitioners are learning from past community- based approaches, specifically concerning EC.
2.1 Adaptation and Development
Whether the lessons from CBD are relevant to CBA depends on how similar these two approaches are. Some authors (Forsyth & Ayers, 2009; Ayers & Dodman, 2010; Ayers, et al. 2014; Dodman & Miltin, 2013), argue that CBA is a recognition that development itself is a form of adaptation. This claim is empirically supported by Brooks, Adger and Kelly (2005) who use national level data on mortality rates from disasters to show that adaptive capacity is associated predominantly with governance, civil and political rights and literacy (Brooks, Adger and Kelly 2005). Therefore, social development enhances adaptive capacity (Ziervogelet, al. 2006; A.

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Agarwal 2010; Ayers, et al 2014). However, to others (Berger & Ensor, 2014; Conway & Mustelin, 2014; Reid, et al., 2009) community-based adaptation differs from community-based development by incorporating projections of future climate change impacts into vulnerability reduction. Furthermore in order to receive funding, CBA practitioners must differentiate their activities from development (Huq and Ayers 2009, 3). CBA can therefore be seen as the combination of adaptation and development. Without a focus on vulnerability and adaptive capacity, development may worsen the conditions of those it seeks to benefit. Meanwhile development is needed to reduce vulnerability and enhance adaptive capacity (Ayers, et al. 2014, 39). Thus, adaptation and development are integrated. CBA practitioners must incorporate past lessons from CBD, specifically concerning EC.
The lack of differentiation between development and adaptation raises concern over whether CBA is ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Reid 2014, 43). The UNFCCC is expected to increase the amount of funding for adaptation, which may cause development practitioners to re-brand their activities as adaptation in order to tap into this funding (Reid 2014). Rebranding refers to disguising “older, but well proven project activities as ‘new’ in order to gain advantages in bargaining for international support, a strategy well known in development cooperation” (Weisser, et al. 2013, 4). It is dangerous as it minimizes learning, causing past mistakes to be repeated. While some authors (Berger and Ensor 2014; Reid 2014; Reid and Schipper 2014) hint at this possibility, none have explicitly tested it.
2.2 Collective Action and CBA
The current theoretical debate surrounding collective action related to CBA resembles the institutional analysis of CBD and CBNRM around the 1990s (Dodman and Mitlin 2013, 643). A community’s ability to act collectively will determine its ability to adapt to climate change (Adger

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2003). As collective action arrangements are determined by institutions, Gupta, et al. (2010) and Agarwal (2010) call for an institutional analysis of adaptive capacity. However, both of these studies seek to find replicable design features of institutions which enhance adaptive capacity through collective action. This is similar to the early work on local level collective action (Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990; Boland and Platteau 1996) which has been criticized since the late 1990s for omitting the politics within communities (Agarwal and Gibson 1999; Cleaver and Hamada 2010; Hall, et al. 2014), thus omitting EC. However, these criticisms are scarce in the CBA literature.
Dodman and Mitlin (2014) have recently addressed this gap. They claim that CBA theory and practice has not incorporated the knowledge learned from past participatory approaches. They criticize CBA on a variety of fronts, including a lack of understanding of community processes and dynamics. The article states that CBA practitioners assume communities are homogeneous, and that all community members have equal say in local governance (Dodman and Mitlin 2013, 647). By omitting the power relations within communities, practitioners are unable to identify the elite of a community, and cannot consider the possibility of EC. Thus, Dodman and Mitlin (2013) argue that the CBA discourse needs to incorporate the lessons of past participatory approaches (Dodman and Mitlin 2013). This paper will build off this article by providing a framework to empirically test whether CBA practitioners are omitting the lessons of past participatory approaches, specifically regarding EC.
2.3 Scaling-up CBA
Within the CBA literature, there is an increasing interest on how to scale it up. One aspect of scaling-up refers to integrating the local scale of CBA with larger scales of governance. Climate change is an urgent and widespread issue, and communities will not be able to adapt to all of its effects. Adaptations therefore need to occur on a variety of scales, from local to global. The

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different scales of governance need to work together to avoid contradicting forces (Forsyth and Ayers 2009, 30). To Huq and Ayers (2009), this means larger scales of governance must support local adaptations (Huq and Ayers 2009). However, Regmi (2012) suggests that local adaptations should promote national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs) (Regmi 2012, 4). Dodman and Mitlin (2013) propose a third option, revolving around representative governance. They argue that scaling-up requires local empowerment, combined with representation of community interests at national and global scales. Through participatory arrangements, each governance scale can represent the interests of local people, allowing for local ownership and higher capacities to deal with the effects of climate change (Dodman and Mitlin 2013, 647). However, this requires ensuring that the interests of all community members are represented, and avoiding EC
Scaling-up also involves replication. Global level agencies, such as the GEF and the Adaptation Fund are responsible for funding CBA. These agencies need centralized frameworks for designing and monitoring projects. Therefore, practitioners must demonstrate replicability of projects if they are to receive funds (Huq and Ayers 2009, 3). In fact, replication has become so important for scaling-up that CBA learning documents, such as the case studies provided on the Adaptation Learning Mechanism website, contribute an entire section to replication (ALM 2009). However, no project documents or learning documents provide information regarding how projects aim to avoid EC. As Reid and Schipper (2014) state, CBA must not try to ‘run before it can walk’ (Reid and Schipper 2014, 4). Promoting replication of projects which do not benefit vulnerable people will not enhance their adaptive capacity to climate change. While it has been acknowledged that CBA projects must avoid EC before being scaled-up successfully, no articles, to the author’s knowledge, have tested whether CBA practitioners have sufficiently learned from past experiences with EC.

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This dissertation will address the gap in the CBA literature by addressing the question: to what extent have CBA practitioners learned from past lessons of EC? CBA cannot be up-scaled successfully if EC is a problem. As it is interrelated with development, it must build off of the same lessons, particularly regarding EC. Further, CBA projects need to incorporate the politics within communities in order to successfully enhance the adaptive capacity of those most vulnerable to climate change. Therefore, this paper will create a framework to determine which projects are ready to be scaled-up, whether rebranding is occurring, and whether intra-community power relations are being omitted in CBA.
3 Methodology and data
In order to analyse how far CBA practitioners have learned from past experiences with EC, this paper will derive a typology of lessons learned from experiences with EC in CBD and CBNRM and test this typology on a case study of a specific CBA project. Due to a lack of information regarding which community members were included in the project, and the distribution of benefits from the project across the community, this paper cannot show whether EC has taken place. In order to do this, further research can use field work to determine the presence of EC in CBA projects. Rather this paper aims to test whether CBA practitioners of a specific project in Fasitootai, Samoa are integrating past lessons regarding how to avoid EC.
A typology of considerations for EC provides this theoretical framework for the analysis. It will be derived from academic journals or book chapters which show insight about certain factors which are related to EC. The typology does not seek to create a literature review of EC, nor does it seek to outline best practice. Rather the objective of this typology is to set out categories of considerations which would be taken into account if projects are incorporating past lessons of EC.

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If practitioners recognize past experiences with EC, they should consider certain features in the project design which explicitly address EC. The typology outlines the factors which practitioners would consider if they had incorporated past lessons from EC into the design of projects. This will facilitate the analysis by breaking up the large issue of EC into various components. Thus, the typology will create a framework with which to test whether CBA practitioners are incorporating the lessons learned from past participatory approaches, specifically concerning EC.
This typology will then be tested on a case study of a CBA project in Fasitootai, Samoa called ‘Reduce Impacts of Climate Change Driven erosion through protection and conservation of Mangroves, eco-systems, and Coral Reefs’. This paper will analyse only one project in-depth in order to show the extent to which practitioners in this project have incorporated each consideration derived in the typology. However, this limits the analysis as I cannot show the extent to which all practitioners are incorporating these lessons. Still, the case study will allow the typology to be tested as a framework through which to analyse whether CBA practitioners have incorporated past lessons of EC into the design of projects.
The case study has been written using secondary data. The project proposal (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d.), which is the most comprehensive project document available, was used to test whether the conditions outlined in the typology were taken into account during the design of the project. If the project proposal does not make implicit or explicit reference to a specific consideration, it can be inferred that practitioners have not incorporated it into the project design. Background information on the project was sourced from the Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM 2012B; UNDP-ALM n.d.), the UNDP/GEF (UNDP/ GEF 2012), and academic articles which have also used the project as a case study (Nyandiga and Tessa 2013; Gero, Meheux and Dominey-Howes 2011). Further cultural studies on the indigenous governance structure

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present in Samoa more generally (Huffer and So'o 2003, 2005; Faa 2009; Tuimaleali'ifano 2011) will provide cultural and institutional information to supplement the analysis. While primary data based on field work would yield more concrete results, secondary data has proved sufficient to show whether practitioners of this specific project have explicitly incorporated past lessons on EC into the project proposal.
4 Elite Capture: a typology
In this section, I will highlight some factors which CBA practitioners would likely consider if they have incorporated past lessons learnt from decades of experience with EC. These broadly refer to community characteristics, institutional characteristics, and project characteristics which are associated with EC. Due to the lack of literature regarding the extent to which practitioners of one community-based approach have learnt from others, a novel framework is necessitated, illustrated in figure 1. It demonstrates that factors within each category are related to EC. The categorization is based on the aspect of local governance within which these factors are found. Other authors have characterized factors which are associated with EC in similar ways. For example, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) describe four categories; the project design, pre-existing community contexts, the community’s capacity for collective action, and the broader socio- political context (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 245). I have adapted this categorization by including the ability to act collectively as a community characteristic, and incorporated factors relating to the broader socio-political context into institutional and community characteristics. I have also expanded by incorporating more specific factors within each category. Further, I have used these factors to derive considerations which practitioners who have incorporated past lessons from EC would take into account. For simplicity, I have assumed that the factors within each of these

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categories are not interrelated. Thus, each consideration derived from each factor will be considered separately, allowing me to assess which considerations practitioners have incorporated into the design of projects.
Figure 1- Theoretical framework. Word count-8
4.1 Community characteristics
Some local circumstances within the community are associated with EC. These include information asymmetry, income inequality, the characteristics of the elite, and collective action arrangements. CBA practitioners which incorporate the lessons learnt from EC would promote transparency regarding project information. They would consider the distribution of wealth and power within communities, as well as how this power is derived. Further, CBA practitioners would consider the trade-off between small population sizes, social capital and EC.
Elite capture
Community Characteristics
Institutional Characteristics
project Characteristics

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4.1.1 Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry may facilitate EC. While democratic governance systems in which representatives must become re-elected enhances accountability, this effect is greatly facilitated by the spread of information, which allows the public to be aware of officials’ actions (Besley and Burgess 2002). Low average levels of political awareness, and unequal relative levels of voter awareness will lead to less representative decision-making (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 137). In such situations, the elite must only represent those members of society which are aware of political decisions and their implications. In order to be politically aware, people must be well educated. Thus, literacy inequality is related with EC at the local level (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 137). CBA practitioners which have incorporated this lesson would acknowledge educational inequality.
Enabling the spread of information to all project participants can help avoid EC. Fritzen (2007) finds that greater effort inform all community members of project rules enhanced accountability of the representatives, and the probability that the project benefits the poor (Fritzen 2007, 1382). CBA practitioners would therefore ensure all community members are aware of the project details if they had incorporated this information.
4.1.2 Income Inequality
Income inequality has also been associated with EC through its association with power concentrations and less representative decision making arrangements. In fact, socio-economic inequality may contribute to the possibility of EC, even when projects emphasize good governance1 (Fritzen 2007, 1363). Communities with more concentrated wealth are also likely to
1 In Fritzen’s (2007) terms, ‘good governance’ means that projects promote transparency of information, representative leadership and participatory decision-making (Fritzen 2007, 1363).

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have more concentrated power, leading Arujo, et al. (2008) to use income inequality as a proxy for the concentration of power. They show that communities with higher levels of inequality are less likely to receive projects which benefit the poor (Arujo, et al. 2008). Highly concentrated power suggests that institutions within communities favour the already powerful. Thus, highly unequal societies are more prone to EC. CBA projects would therefore consider income inequality to determine power concentrations if they had considered this lesson.
Analysing which income classes are represented in powerful community groups will also help practitioners avoid EC. La Ferrara (2002) show that income inequality is associated with less democratic decision making arrangements. Income inequality reduces participation in open access groups, which tend to favour the poor as anyone can join, and increases participation in restricted access groups, in which people can be excluded simply based on who they are (La Ferrara 2002, 237). Because these groups are restricted, they enable less democratic decision-making, and allow for EC. Practitioners which have incorporated this information would therefore analyse which income classes are participants in powerful groups and whether these groups are restricted access.
4.1.3 Elite characteristics
The way in which elite status is derived determines the accountability of the elite, and therefore their likelihood to capture the project. For example, many authors suggest that the elite of lineage based communities are more likely to capture projects because status is derived from the elite’s structural position at birth. They are less likely to lose their positions as elite, and are hence less accountable for their actions (Platteau and Abraham 2002; Platteau 2004A; Adhikari and Goldey 2010). If they were incorporating this lesson, CBA practitioners would consider how elite status is derived.

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Further, several different groups of elite may exist within a community. Fritzen (2007), and Platteau (2004A) differentiate between the old elite and the new elite. The old elites are often indigenous elite, and their status comes from social standing. “New elite are young professionals, whose status comes from their occupation and socio-economic position” (Fritzen 2007, 1374). The rise of new elite may change power relations, making community governance more or less equitable. However, this is not always the case. Old elite or may integrate new elite into the traditional social structure by offering them neo-traditional titles within associations (Platteau 2004A, 252; Platteau 2004B, 112; Platteau and Abraham 2002, 122). Thus CBA practitioners which have learned from past experiences with EC would not only map out indigenous power structures, but accommodate the possibility of several contradicting groups of elites.
4.1.4 Collective action and Social Capital
While the ability of a community to act collectively is seen as a form of adaptive capacity (Adger, et al. 2009), it does not limit EC (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). Indeed, small size and high amounts of social capital are two main ingredients for collective action at the local level (Ostrom 1990), which facilitate EC by enhancing the cohesiveness of elite interest groups (Arujo, et al. 2008; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000). Small group sizes minimize negotiation costs for agreements, allow for information sharing, and create continuous interactions which develop trust, enhancing social capital and facilitating collective action (Platteau and Abraham 2002, 109). This type of collective action is rigid and based on sanctions from continuous interactions within a community (Ostrom 1990). It avoids rule breaking but also reinforces power relations, and perpetuates EC (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). Social capital among the elite will enhance their cohesiveness and allow them to cooperate for their own self-interest (Platteau 2004A, 244-245).

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Therefore, CBA projects that have incorporated this lesson would not rush to implement projects in small communities with high social capital.
However, a second form of collective action, “based on diversity, dispersed power and dynamic social and political processes… can refine power relations and may allow for structural change” (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 245). In this case, many groups of elite coexist and must each gain support from community members. Because individuals can shift their allegiances to different groups of elites, each group must be fair and equitable, minimizing the opportunities for EC (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 241). Practitioners who are aware of this would consider the possible trade-off between rigid collective action and EC, and realize the potential of dynamic collective action.
4.2 Institutional characteristics
While community-based projects are often controlled by elite, they may not be captured by the elite. Certain institutional characteristics allow for benevolent rather than malevolent EC. Benevolent capture happens when the elite capture decision making processes, but still benefit the poor and marginalized within a society (Mansuri and Rao 2004; Arnall, Twyman and Liverman 2013; Rao and Ibanez 2007). CBA practitioners having incorporated past lessons from EC regarding institutional characteristics would ensure accountability; consider the informal, or cultural institutions that regulate decision-making; promote representative and accountable governance arrangements; and take measures to enhance the agency of the non-elite.

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4.2.1 Accountability
The key to making EC benevolent is to hold the elite accountable to the local people. Arnall, Twyman and Liverman (2013) describe three types of accountability, summarized in table 1.

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Table 1 (Arnall, Twyman and Liverman 2013, 309)
Top down accountability can easily apply pressure through hierarchical organization. This leads Platteau and Abraham (2002) to suggest that top down accountability, specifically by a strong centralized government is necessary to ensure benevolent elite control during decentralization. However, in order for top down accountability to benefit the poor, higher order institutions must represent the poor’s’ interests. Conversely, bottom up accountability is promoted by the non-elite, which do not gain from corruption. It is therefore less likely to become a corruption network. Thus, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) suggest that bottom up accountability is most effective in benefiting the poor within communities (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 224). Meanwhile Veron, et al. (2005) find that the strength of top down accountability is at least as influential as the strength of bottom up accountability. However, horizontal accountability mechanisms can easily deteriorate into corruption networks among elites (Veron, et al. 2005, 1924). Because both those being held accountable and those holding accountable have the same power, deals are often made, to reduce monitoring in exchange for the gains of corruption. Therefore, practitioners aware of this lesson would promote either bottom up or top down accountability mechanisms, while avoiding horizontal accountability mechanisms.
4.2.2 Informal Institutions
Informal Institutions can determine whether elite within a community will capture the benefits of a project, or control the project in a way that benefits the entire community. Platteau and Abraham (2002) notice that in communities with consensus decision-making, informal
Top Down Accountability
Through higher order institutions such as state or regional government
Horizontal accountability
Through other community level elites
Bottom up Accountability
Through non-elite community members

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institutions facilitate EC. Achieving consensus implies that no community member disagrees with a decision. However, in public deliberations, marginalized community members are unlikely to voice their interests, giving more power to elite interests (Edmonds and Wollenberg 2001). As the decision is still deemed to be consensual, community members are unable to show dissent. Therefore, consensus decision making can serve to silence disagreement, and ensure compliance with decisions (Platteau and Abraham 2002, 117). This facilitates EC as the elite have more influence over decisions, and non-elite are unable to show disagreement. Thus, CBA projects which are aware of this information would consider the indigenous institutions which regulate decision-making within a community.
4.2.3 Democratic governance arrangements
Democratically elected, representative leaders are logically more accountable to their people than appointed and non-representative leaders. In fact, democracy is found to be a significant contributor to government accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002). However, two studies of the same project in Indonesia found contradicting effects of democratic leadership. Fritzen (2007) shows that democratically elected elite are more likely to benefit the poor in their communities (Fritzen 2007, 22). Meanwhile, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) find that some communities which did not elect their leaders democratically nor had widespread participation still benefited the poor because the leaders were accountable to the community (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 244). Furthermore, Arnall, Twyman and Liverman (2013) argue that socially embedded, informal institutions are actually more effective forms of accountability than externally imposed institutions when the cultural responsibility of the elite require them to share benefits (Arnall, Twyman and Liverman 2013). Therefore, accountability, whether derived from democracy or not, is key to making EC benevolent. CBA practitioners that have incorporated this lesson would

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promote representative and accountable governance arrangements without assuming that democratic rule is the only way to ensure accountability.
4.2.4 Agency of Non Elite
In order for elites to be held accountable, non-elites must be agents. People need to be empowered, know their rights, and understand the duties and responsibilities of their leaders in order to demand representative and fair decision-making. Therefore, “a vigilant civil society must exist” (Platteau and Abraham 2002, 130). The non-elite are by definition less powerful than the elite. If fair and equal decision making is to take place, both the elite and the non- elite must have equal influence. Therefore, Edmonds and Wollenberg (2001) suggest that practitioners must actively seek to enhance the bargaining capacity of the non-elite (Edmonds and Wollenberg 2001). CBA practitioners would promote enhanced agency among the non-elite if they have incorporated this lesson.
4.3 Project characteristics
Project characteristics can also increase or decrease the likelihood of EC. Practitioners incorporating past lessons from EC would take a demand driven approach while considering which community members have demanded the project. They would take the time to build institutional capacity, and avoid channelling large amounts of funding through communities in a small amount of time. They would also promote the interactive participation of all community members, with a special focus on the least powerful.
4.3.1 Demand for the project
Projects demanded directly by community members are more likely to be relevant to communal needs. Sara and Katz (1997) study 125 community water systems and find that when

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projects were demanded, water use was more sustainable. Further the demand-responsive approach was most effective when demand was expressed directly by household members, not through traditional leaders or community representatives (Sara and Katz 1997, 49). This shows that leaders which demand projects may not adequately represent the needs of the entire community, leading to the possibility of EC. However, the ability to demand a project requires administrative and technical skills which are unlikely to be found among the non-elite (White 2002, 606). Indeed, the elite usually possess the skills to communicate with aid agencies (Platteau and Gaspart 2003, 1709). Platteau (2004A) adds that elites often create community-based organizations solely to secure funds from the international community (Platteau 2004A, 253). While not all community- based organizations which demand projects are ‘empty shells’ which embezzle funds, this possibility should be considered when channelling funds through community-based organizations. Therefore, while CBA projects should take a demand driven approach, practitioners which have incorporated this lesson would also consider who is demanding the project, and whether these people represent the interests of the entire community.
4.3.2 Time Pressures
EC happens more often when funds are channelled to quickly communities with low institutional capacity (Tai 2007, 1189). Time pressures on donor agencies cause them to rush projects, thus not spend the required time to empower the poor and increase their bargaining capacity (Platteau 2004A, 259). Aid agencies that necessitate quick measurable results tend to rush through institutional capacity building, as this is not a measurable result. By channelling large sums of money quickly through community leaders, aid agencies are in fact legitimizing local elites from the outside with monetary gains. Therefore, the elite no longer need to be legitimized by community members (Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Arnall, Twyman and Liverman 2013). This

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facilitates elite capture by reinforcing power relations. CBA practitioners which have incorporated this lesson would not rush implementation, but rather take the time to ensure institutional capacity is built.
4.3.3 Participation
While participatory approaches, such as CBA and CBD are said to empower local people, by being more democratic than top down approaches, they can also reinforce and impose unfair power relations (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Lane and Corbett 2005). “Participation is a form of power”, which can be captured (Kesby 2005, 2038). For example, Lane and Corbett (2005) show how a community-based environmental management project in Australia failed to represent indigenous people’s interests and reinforced local power relations. In order to avoid this Edmonds and Wollenberg (2001) and Wiliams (2004) suggest taking local power relations into account, and deliberately empowering the non-elite. This will allow for the interactive participation of more marginal community members. Interactive participation goes further than simply participating in discussions and activities. It requires all community members to have equal voice and influence over decisions (Agarwal 2001, 1624). When projects emphasize non-elite participation, EC is likely to be avoided as non-elites have more control over decision making (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 245). CBA practitioners with awareness of past EC lessons would seek to enable interactive participation among the most marginal community members.
There are many considerations which CBA practitioners would take into account if they are incorporating past lessons learnt from EC into the design of projects. Table 2 summarizes the considerations associated with each factor in the typology.

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Table 2-Word count-188
Typology of considerations to demonstrate learning from elite capture
Community Characteristics
•Information Asymmetry
•Acknowledge educational inequality
•Promote transparency regarding project details
•Income Inequality
•Consider income inequality to determine power concentrations
•Analyse which income classes are participants in powerful groups and whether these groups are restricted access
•Elite Characteristics
•Consider how elite status is derived
•Map out indigenous power structures, and accommodate the possibility of several contradicting groups of elites
•Collective Action and Social Capital
•Don't rush to implement projects in small communities with high social capital
•Appreciate tradeoff between rigid collective action and elite capture
Institutional Characteristics
•Accountability
•Promote either bottom up or top down accountability mechanisms, while avoiding horizontal accountability mechanisms
•Informal Institutions
•Consider the informal institutions regulating decision- making
•Democratic Governance Arrangements
•Promote representative and accountable governance arrangements which are suitable to the local context
•Agency of the non-elite
•Enhance the agency of the non- elite
Project Characteristics
•Demand for the Project
•Take a demand driven approach while considering who is demanding the project and which interests they represent
•Time Pressures
•Take time to build institutional capacity before channeling funds
•Participation
•Promote interactive participation of marginalized community members

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5 Case study: Samoa
The typology above (table 2) will now be tested on a project entitled: ‘Reduce Impacts of Climate Change Driven erosion through protection and conservation of Mangroves, eco-systems, and Coral Reefs’. A more in-depth background to the project can be found in annex 1. However, relevant information is provided here. The project was chosen as it incorporates elements of both CBD and CBNRM, two previous community-based approaches which have suffered from issues of EC. It incorporates components of CBNRM by aiming to preserve mangroves and restore ecosystems. Because Fasitootai is located on the coast of a Samoan island, the climate change threats involve coastal erosion, increased storm surges, and coal bleaching. The project aims to replant and protect corals and mangroves in order to address these threats (Nyandiga and Tessa 2013, 9). It incorporates components of CBD through a focus on protecting livelihoods from climatic shocks. Because many villagers are subsistence fishers, coral bleaching is a serious threat to livelihoods. Thus by restoring coral reefs, the project will protect livelihoods (ALM 2012B). Further, the village of Fasitootai is governed through the customary Samoan Matai system, where chiefs, or Matais are appointed from each extended family to the village council of chiefs in order to govern the entire community (Huffer and So'o 2005, 284). Within this customary organization, the elite are easily identifiable, making for an interesting analysis. The evaluation of this project will follow the same structure as the typology above, to test whether practitioners have incorporated past lessons of EC into the project design. The project will be tested based on an whether the project proposal makes reference to each of the considerations outlined above. If no reference is made, practitioners are likely to have omitted the consideration.

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5.1 Community Characteristics
5.1.1 Information Asymmetry
CBA practitioners which have incorporated lessons on EC would acknowledge educational inequality. In Samoa more generally, people differ in their access to education (Huffer and So'o 2003, 297). 82 % of boys and girls reach the 8th year of their education (AusAID 2012A, 6). It is therefore possible that the residents of Fasitootai differ in their educational attainment. Further, it is culturally accepted that Matais are the wisest members of society (Huffer and So'o 2005, 315), implying that Matais, and people considered suitable for the Matai position may have greater access to education and information than the rest of the community. The project documents do not state anything about the distribution of education (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d.). Thus, it can be inferred that the practitioners did not take educational inequality into account during the design of the project.
CBA practitioners would ensure all community members are aware of the details of the project in order to enhance accountability and minimize the chances of EC. The project does take measures to ensure all community members are aware of the project details. The customary Matai system of governance was not used. Instead a steering committee was appointed by the village to oversee project activities. The steering committee is to hold consolations with the rest of the community to explain the details of project activities, and the community is to be involved in various management plans (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 14, 17). Further, the council of chiefs are to maintain transparency at all times concerning resource appropriation and use (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 16). Therefore, practitioners of this project have taken this consideration into account by promoting transparency regarding project details.

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5.1.2 Income Inequality
CBA projects would consider income inequality as a proxy for power concentrations if they had incorporated past lessons from EC. The Samoan Gini coefficient was .47 in 2008 (the year prior to project implementation), indicating a moderate amount of inequality compared to global averages (AUSAID 2012B, 22). It can be inferred that the income distribution in Fasitootai is also moderately unequal. The project proposal does mention that within the village, most people have subsistence or semi-subsistence livelihoods, and that some are earning income through small businesses and remittances (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 6-7). However, no project documents make specific reference to income inequality. Therefore, project practitioners have not incorporated this lesson into the design of their project.
Projects which incorporate past lessons would analyse which income classes are participants in powerful groups and whether these groups are restricted access. The Matai, is a semi- restricted access group. Matai are culturally expected to be elderly men (Faa 2009, 243). However, they are appointed by each family and extended family (Huffer and So'o 2005). Thus, while Matai are men, any man who has a family can become a Matai. The project proposal did not make any reference to the income category of high ranking Matais, or the lack of access for women to the Matai title (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d.). In fact, there are no indications that the project practitioners have mapped the differentiated poverty and vulnerability levels of villagers. Therefore, project practitioners have not taken this consideration into account in the design of the project.
5.1.3 Elite Characteristics
CBA practitioners with awareness of past EC lessons would not only map out indigenous power structures, but accommodate the possibility of several contradicting groups of elites. The

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project proposal includes figures mapping out the power structure in the village, shown in annex 2. The possibility of ‘new elite’ as described by Platteau (2004A), and Fritzen (2007) is relevant to Fasitootai. The proposal states that while many villagers live from subsistence and semi- subsistence activities, few are gaining incomes through small businesses and remittances (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d. 6-7). It is possible that this income group becomes empowered by their socio-economic standing, and compete with the old elite for political power. However, the customary village governance structure in Samoa has withstood colonization and globalization (Huffer and So'o 2003), so it can be inferred that these new elite will be incorporated into the Matai System. While the Project proposal did map power structures and mentioned the differentiated livelihoods of community members, it did not consider whether this may lead to several competing groups of elites. Practitioners have therefore not incorporated this lesson in the project design
CBA practitioners which have incorporated lessons learnt on EC would consider how elite status is derived. Matais are appointed by each family through consensus decision-making. Along with their title, they receive the responsibility of adequately representing the entire family’s interests. If they do not, it is seen as a lack of love, and the Matai will lose his title (Huffer and So'o 2005, 319). The high-ranking Matai on the Village Council therefore indirectly represent all members of the village. The project proposal does not mention how elites gain their status, nor the interests which they represent most (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d.). Practitioners of this project have therefore not shown that they have incorporated this lesson.
5.1.4 Collective Action and Social Capital
CBA practitioners which have incorporated past lessons on EC would not rush to implement projects in small communities with high social capital. Samoan villages can be said to

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have high amounts of social capital, as family and community life is very important. However, this means that time spent in private is limited, which hinders the ability of people to show dissent for seemingly unanimous decisions (Huffer and So'o 2003, 300). The village of Fasitootai has a population of approximately 2,000 people (Nyandiga and Tessa 2013, 8). It can therefore be considered as a small community with high social capital. It is unclear whether CBA practitioners favoured this community based on its size and social cohesion. However, project documents do not seem to incorporate the possibility of social capital being mobilized against the poor. Therefore, practitioners have not incorporated this lesson into the project design.
Practitioners who are aware of EC would consider the trade-off between rigid collective action and EC. The Matai governance system, based in consensus decision making, is a rigid form of collective action. Sometimes participants of lower ranks may disagree with a decision, and not be able to voice their disagreement. They are “coerced into a decision because of unequal title status, age group and so forth” without being able to show discontent due to continuous interaction (Huffer and So'o 2003, Pg. 286). This rigid form of collective action may contribute to the possibility of EC (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). The project proposal has not considered this, nor has the decision-making process been explained in any of the project documents. The project practitioners have therefore not considered the trade-off between rigid collective action and EC.
5.2 Institutional Characteristics
5.2.1 Accountability
Practitioners which have learned from past EC experiences would promote both bottom up and top down, rather than horizontal accountability mechanisms. The project steering committee is held upwardly accountable by government ministries and implementing agencies through fund

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disbursement (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 34). However, as stated in the GEF webpage for the project, it was terminated before completion due to misuse of funds. The GEF reports “accounts of mismanagement of funds, the community also did not follow the activities as planned and built a sea wall which was against the recommendations made by the Ministry of Environment” (GEFSGP 2012). This implies that the top down accountability mechanisms were not strong enough to ensure compliance. The committee is most likely also downwardly accountable as it was appointed using the traditional decision making system. Representatives on the steering committee were most likely held accountable by the same norms which ensure the accountability of Matias, where those receiving titles have the cultural responsibility to adequately represent their group’s interests (Huffer and So'o 2003, 319). If practitioners had aimed to use cultural accountability mechaisms, they would have been described in the project proposal. However, the project proposal did not mention any bottom up accountability mechanisms (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d.). Still, practitioners have incorporated this lesson by avoiding horizontal accountability mechanisms and promoting top down accountability.
5.2.2 Informal Institutions
CBA projects which are aware of past experiences with EC would consider the indigenous institutions which regulate decision-making within a community. The consensus decision making arrangement in the Matai system serves to silence any dissent within the community, as members of lower ranks are unable to show dissent for a seemingly unanimous decision (Huffer and So'o 2003, 286). There is a sense of ranking in Samoan society where the eldest members of society have more decision-making power, (Faa 2009, 243) and strong gender norms mean women are less able to voice their interests (AUSAID 2012B, 16). The project proposal fails to make reference

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to the decision-making mechanisms within the community (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d.). Project practitioners have therefore not incorporated this lesson into the project design.
5.2.3 Democratic Governance Arrangements
CBA practitioners which have incorporated past experiences with EC would promote representative and accountable governance arrangements without assuming that democratic rule is the only way to ensure accountability. In ensuring that a member from every sector of village life2 was on the project steering committee, the project has ensured representative governance. The project proposal states that the steering committee is to act on behalf of the entire community, making the community members the ultimate managers of the project (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 22). By allowing cultural accountability mechanisms to take place, the project also created an accountable governance arrangement for the project. However, it is uncertain whether this was a purposeful attempt by project practitioners. Still the project has created an accountable, representative governing structure which is appropriate for the village of Fasitootai.
5.2.4 Agency of the Non-Elite
CBA practitioners with awareness of EC would promote enhanced agency among the non- elite. While the project proposal states that the steering committee will gain consensus from all sectors of the community (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 14), no additional measures were taken to ensure their voices were heard. As we have seen in section 5.2.2, consensus decision- making in Samoa can be used to coerce less powerful individuals into complying with decisions (Huffer and So'o 2003, 286). Therefore, if untitled men and women are to have equal influence in decision making, project practitioners must take measures to empower them, and enhance their
2 As shown in figure 2 in annex 2, Samoan village structures contain many sectors. These include the title-holding men, women, untitled men and young women (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 22)

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agency. The lack of measures to enhance the agency of the non-elite within the project may allow the elite to silence opposition through cultural and customary methods. Project practitioners did not incorporate this lesson into the project design.
5.3 Project Characteristics
5.3.1 Demand for the Project
CBA projects which have incorporated past lessons on EC would take a demand driven approach, while considering who is demanding the project and whether the non-elite of a community are represented in this demand. The project was originally the village pastor’s idea. He gained support from the Matai and the community through his high social ranking, and his role in many community activities (Gero, Meheux and Dominey-Howes 2011). The church has a special interest in this project, stated in the project proposal. One of the first missionaries to arrive in Samoa settled in Fasitootai. His first home, and sunken ship is a historical and cultural sight. It is now threatened with erosion due to sea level rise and increased storm activities. One of the outcomes of this project are to protect this religious site (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 22). While this implies that the project was not demanded directly by community members, the project proposal also states that endorsement from all sectors of the community was necessary for the project to proceed. The proposal further reassures us that all people are represented by the church through their contributions and involvement in religious activities (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 15, 6). However, a critical analysis would call for caution as not all community members may have equal voice in religious organizations, and it is possible that not all community members are Cristian. Still the project has taken a demand-driven approach, while

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considering who demanded the project, and whether they had the interests of all community members in mind.
5.3.2 Time Pressures
CBA practitioners which have learned from past EC experiences would take the time to build institutional capacity before channelling funds through community organizations. The project duration was intended for two years, and would cost a total of 50,000 US Dollars. The funds were disbursed in four times, as follows.

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Table 3 (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 32)
Amount
Date
Conditions
$15,000
August/September 2009
project agreement signed and relevant staff hired
$15,000
October 2009
submission of additional documents, such as the progress report, engineering assessment and awareness raising program plan
$15,000
January 2010
submission of the second progress report
$5000
January 2011
Submission of the third progress report
The community received most funds within the first 6 months of the project, indicating the possibility of rushed implementation and minimal capacity building. Signing the agreement and hiring relevant staff could be considered as institutional capacity building. However, it is a very minimal attempt to build institutional capacity. Still, it is possible that the institutional capacity building phase had already been completed when the final project proposal was submitted, as a steering committee had already been selected. Therefore, the project may or may not have rushed implementation at the cost of building institutional capacity.
5.3.3 Participation
CBA project practitioners that have learned from decades of experience with EC would enable the interactive participation of the most marginal community members. While village endorsement of the project and its activities were emphasized throughout the project proposal, the type of participation in this project is not interactive. Endorsement would allow individuals to agree or disagree with a decision, rather than contributing their opinions to the decision itself. Further, consensus decision-making does not allow for people of lower social standing to show disagreement (Huffer and So’o 2003). Community members participated in activities and implementation, but did not have influence over decision making. Further, no project document

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maps marginalization. Without identifying which villagers are marginalized, project practitioners could not have enabled their interactive participation. Therefore, practitioners in this project did not promote the interactive participation of marginalized community members.
6 Discussion
Table 4-Word count-219

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Table 4 shows, to the extent possible, the considerations which were included in the project proposal. The project ensured all community members had access to project information; implemented top down, and not horizontal accountability mechanisms; promoted a representative and accountable governance structure which was appropriate for the community; and took a demand driven approach while considering which community members demanded the project. The project also may have built institutional quality before the final project proposal was written, in which case it would not have rushed implementation. However, project practitioners did not incorporate the other lessons learnt from past experiences with EC into the design of the project, demonstrating a need for continued learning.
The project took four of the eleven lessons regarding EC into the design of the project. It insured information disclosure, an important step in avoiding EC as community members are able to hold their leaders accountable for their actions. While practitioners failed to take educational inequality into account, their promotion of transparency may be sufficient in insuring equal political awareness among project participants. The project also promoted top down accountability, and avoided horizontal accountability mechanisms. However, the accountability mechanism promoted by the project was not sufficient to ensure compliance with government ministries. Still, practitioners incorporated this consideration into the project. The steering committee was also representative and accountable, while building off the customary institutions in Fasitootai. This would help avoid EC as each sector of the village is represented, and each representative was held accountable through cultural mechanisms. The project was also demanded by the community, which will ensure it is relevant to their needs. The project proposal considers which individuals demanded the project and whether they represent the interests of the entire

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community. Therefore, practitioners have incorporated few lessons on EC into the design of the project.
However, aside from promoting transparency, the project did not appeal to the three remaining considerations regarding community characteristics. The project did not consider income inequality within the village, nor the interworking’s of the Matai system. Thus, the project could not identify which community members had more or less power, and could not have ensured marginalized people would benefit. This is consistent with Dodman and Mitlin’s (2013) criticism that CBA practitioners fail to consider the power relations within communities. The project also failed to appreciate the relationship between rigid collective action and EC. This is consistent with the literature on collective action in CBA which sees rigid forms of collective action and social cohesion as components in adaptive capacity. However, as this paper has shown, social capital may enhance the cohesiveness of the elite, facilitating EC. Therefore, with regard to community characteristics, practitioners of this specific project have not taken the necessary steps to show that they have completely learned from decades of experiences with EC.
Further, apart from the governance structure and accountability mechanisms, the project did not take the remaining considerations regarding institutional characteristics into account. The project failed to take the traditional decision-making mechanisms within the village into account. Nor did the project take any steps in enhance the agency of the non-elite. Given the consensus decision-making structures, this would facilitate EC. If the non-elite are unable to question the decisions of the elite, EC is more likely. Practitioners in this project have not sufficiently considered the institutional characteristics of the community to demonstrate an integration of past lessons on EC.

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With regard to project characteristics, the project did take a demand driven approach, and may or may not have rushed implementation while neglecting the importance of institutional capacity. However, while the project proposal did mention community endorsement of the project, and ensured the reader that all people were represented in the steering committee, there seems to be more emphasis on gaining support than on listening to community members’ views. This would facilitate EC as those with power could implement decisions which do not fit completely with the non-elites’ interests. Further, without determining which community members were more marginalized, project practitioners could not have promoted their interactive participation. Thus, the practitioners of this project have not adequately ensured the interactive participation of marginal community members.
Therefore, the project did spread information, implement top down accountability, promote accountable and representative governance, and was demanded. However the lack of consideration for other items within the typology shows that practitioners of the CBA project in Fasitootai, Samoa may not have incorporated many lessons of EC into the design of the project. Thus, while practitioners may not be completely omitting the lessons learnt from decades of experience with EC, a severe knowledge gap is likely to exist. CBA scholars and practitioners must address this gap if CBA is to benefit the poor.
5.4 Limitations
While this paper has shown a relative lack of consideration for EC within a specific CBA project, there are certain limitations. Firstly, I have tested the typology of considerations on a single case study. I can therefore not conclude that all CBA practitioners lack awareness of EC. Rather, I can call for caution for EC within the CBA field. More research could analyse a larger number of projects using the typology I have created, to test for awareness of EC in CBA. Second, many

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of my considerations may be interconnected. While I have assumed each lesson could be considered independently, this may not be the case. For example, accountability mechanisms may be interrelated with information asymmetry, governance arrangements, and agency of the non- elite. It is possible that incorporating one of the lessons within each of these factors may demonstrate learning from all thee. If this is so, my results cannot adequately demonstrate whether practitioners have incorporated knowledge learned from past experiences with EC. An interesting project could test whether each of my factors are interrelated, thus verifying the validity of my framework. Lastly, I have relied mostly on one project document to test whether these considerations were taken into account. It is possible that practitioners have taken measures during the implementation of the project which reflect the typology, but were not included in the project documents. Further research regarding the specific project in Fasitootai could also involve field work and interviews to determine whether additional measures were taken which may fit the typology.
7 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated preliminary evidence that CBA practitioners may be omitting some important lessons learnt from decades of experience EC. It has derived a typology of considerations regarding EC, which practitioners would take into account if they had incorporated these lessons. This typology was tested on a case study of a specific CBA project in Fasitootai, Samoa. Assuming each lesson could be analysed independently, and that practitioners have not taken measures during the implementation of the project which reflect the typology, the case study has shown that practitioners incorporated few lessons regarding EC into the project design. This is a worrisome finding. If practitioners omit many lessons learned from CBD and CBNRM

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regarding EC, they are doomed to repeat the same mistakes. The non-elite, and marginalized people within communities are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts through their lack of access to adaptive measures. Therefore, not incorporating EC considerations into the design of CBA projects will harm those which CBA seeks to benefit. Addressing this gap in knowledge must be an urgent priority in the CBA field.
This dissertation has contributed to the relevant literature on CBA in three key ways. First, it has tested one portion of Dodman and Mitlin’s (2013) claim that CBA discourse and practice is omitting past lessons from other community-based approaches. The case study used in this paper cannot support or reject this claim. Practitioners of the CBA project studied have incorporated some considerations regarding EC, showing that they have not completely omitted past lessons. However, practitioners have also failed to incorporate most considerations outlined in my typology, demonstrating a significant gap in knowledge. The paper has also began to consider whether CBA is a re-branding of CBD, as Regmi (2012) suggested. The typology provided in this paper has created a framework to test whether specific lessons regarding EC are being incorporated into the practice of CBA. If practitioners are omitting one of the most serious issues with past community-based approaches, it is probable that re-branding is occurring. Further, this paper has provided a framework through which to test whether CBA projects are ready to be scaled-up, in the strict sense that they are likely to avoid EC. The case study provides an example of a project which should not be scaled-up and replicated, as it has largely failed to consider EC in its design. CBA practitioners and academics must prioritize the integration of lessons learned from other community-based approaches.

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Annex-1
For those interested, this annex will provide background information on the CBA project used in my case study. This section will situate the project within the wider trend of CBA, identify the climate risks prioritized for adaptation, and summarize how the project will enable the community to adapt to those risks.
The project ‘Protection and Conservation of Mangroves, Ecosystems, and Coral Reefs – Fasitootai’ is part of a wider CBA pilot conducted by the UNDP and the GEF. “This pilot project is designed to implement community-based projects that seek to enhance the resiliency of communities, and/or the ecosystems on which they rely, to climate change impacts. It will essentially create small-scale/policy laboratories and generate knowledge about how to achieve adaptation at the local level” (ALM 2012A). The pilot aims to enhance communities’ adaptive capacity to climate change and climate variability. This objective will be realized by enhancing adaptive capacity on the local level, promoting supportive policies and replication of best practice on the national level, and promoting information sharing between countries on the global scale. The pilot has a five year time span. It is implemented by the UNDP and funded by the GEFSGP. UN volunteers have also partnered with the GEF and UNDP in order to enhance community mobilization (UNDP/ GEF 2012). 10 countries are currently participating in this project, including Samoa. In order to monitor a large amount of projects while retaining the community-based aspect of each projects, vulnerability risk assessments (VRAs) are used. “The VRA uses a system of question-based indicators to assess changes in community-level perception of their own capacity to adapt to changing climate, and forms an index” which can then be used to measure progress (ALM 2012A).

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Climate science was used to identify the relevant climate change risks for each country. The climate risks identified in Samoa include flooding and coastal erosion (Nyandiga and Tessa 2013), due to sea level rise, high intensity of rainfall events and increased intensity of tropical cyclones (UNDP/ GEF 2012). In Fasitootai, the project will reduce these risks through restoring the mangroves and coral ecosystem which the village depends on. As many villagers rely on subsistence farming and fishing, restoring these ecosystems will enhance livelihoods. Further, mangroves act as a buffer for storm surges and reduce erosion, thus protecting the village from flooding and coastal erosion (ALM 2012B). In aiming to protect these ecosystems, the project has four main outputs.
1. “Designing and constructing shoreline protection to stabilize the coastline
2. Reclaiming 5,000 square meters that have been eroded away by the ocean through the planting of mangroves
3. Renovating the three pools which are used for drinking, bathing and recreation
4. Setting up a Special Management Area to protect mangroves and coral reefs” (UNDP/ GEF 2012, 2)
These activities combined will enhance the adaptive capacity of Fasitootai village to the relevant climate change risks.

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Annex-2
Figure 2-Taken from (Fasitootai Village Council of Chiefs n.d., 6)

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