The document describes how Care Groups were utilized to combat the Ebola outbreak in Liberia. It provides background on the Liberian Agricultural Upgrading Nutrition and Child Health (LAUNCH) program and how Care Groups were the primary platform used to achieve reduced chronic malnutrition objectives. Initially, Care Groups conducted basic Ebola awareness focusing on preparing dead bodies, avoiding bush meat, no touching, and hand washing. As the outbreak grew, Care Groups continued meeting normally and discussing Ebola prevention messages. LAUNCH became involved in the national Ebola task force, providing support to health worker training.
2024: The FAR, Federal Acquisition Regulations - Part 28
Combatting Ebola with SBC Strategies
1. The SBC Working Group
Welcomes You to a Learning Session
on
Combatting Ebola and Similar Outbreaks with
Social and Behavior Change Strategies
Global Health Practitioner Conference, Spring 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
April 16, 2015
2. Combatting Ebola and Similar Outbreaks with
Social and Behavior Change Strategies
Presenters
• Mathias Pollock, Mercy Corps
• Suzanne Van Hulle, Catholic Relief Services
• Maya Bahoshy, International Medical Corps
• Janine Schooley, Project Concern International
Moderator
• Paul Robinson, International Medical Corps
4. Group process – 15 minutes
1. Jot down one idea of what you think is effective
as SBC initiative for addressing Ebola and similar
outbreaks in the future
a) One idea only, please!
b) Use one page from note pad on your table and
c) Write legibly please
2. Discuss your one idea with your table mates
3. Refine/change your idea if you think necessary
4. Turn in your idea sheet to a volunteer nearby
5. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
Obstacles to Case Reporting
A barrier analysis study of timely reporting of symptomatic family
members by heads of households in Montserrado County, Liberia
Global Health Practitioners Conference
April 16th, 2015
Mathias Pollock, Technical Advisor
6. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
E-CAP PROGRAM OVERVIEW
Obstacles to Case Reporting
7. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
BARRIER ANALYSIS SUMMARY
- Rapid evaluation,
mixed-method
tool
- Identifies key
determinants of
behavior
- Perception-based
Obstacles to Case Reporting
Barrier Analysis: What is a determinant? (Food for the Hungry)
8. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
STUDY PARAMETERS
Obstacles to Case Reporting
• Behavior: Timely case reporting
• 99 individual interviews
(44 Doers and 55 Non-doers)
• 5 Montserrado communities
(New Kru Town, West Point,
Gardenerville, Mount Barclay,
Brewerville)
• Data collection conducted Feb 16th – 18th
Rapid Research Team collecting data in
Brewerville (photo: Mercy Corps)
9. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
SELF-EFFICACY
Obstacles to Case Reporting
WHAT MAKES/WOULD MAKE IT EASY TO REPORT?
41
5
43
7 7
70
7
2520 25
53
11 11
89
7
13
0
20
40
60
80
100
Percentresponse
Doers %
NonDoer %
10. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES
Obstacles to Case Reporting
What are the good things that happen when you report?
52
34
43
20
47
31
27
5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Patient will get
early Tx
Higher chance of
survival
Protect
others/community
Reduce spread of
Ebola
% Doers
% Non-Doers
11. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
SOCIAL NORMS
Obstacles to Case Reporting
WHO DISAPPROVES OF YOU REPORTING?
59
5
16
47
27
18
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Nobody Friends & Neighbors Family members
% Doers
% Non-Doers
12. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
11
25
64
20
33
47
0
20
40
60
80
100
Very
difficult
Somewhat
difficult
Not difficult
Access
% Doers % Non-Doers
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DETERMINANTS
Obstacles to Case Reporting
5
11
82
13
25
60
0
20
40
60
80
100
Very difficult Somewhat
difficult
Not difficult
Cues to Action
13. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
RESULTS SUMMARY
Obstacles to Case Reporting
• Community leaders (CL) play a critical role
but some people have problems accessing
them
• Doers perceive “protecting others” and
“avoiding the spread” as key motivators for
reporting (preventive community altruism)
• Non Doers perceive “friends and neighbors”
as disapproving of reporting to #4455 or CL
• Non Doers perceive difficulty in accessibility
(lack phone/network)
• While messaging is working, some people
are still forgetting to report
ECAP poster targeting holistic community action
(photo: Mercy Corps )
14. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
PROCESS LEARNING
Obstacles to Case Reporting
Appropriate community entry
Power of stigma
Working w/ local leaders
We have as much to learn
from the communities where
we work as we do to teach
them!
“Listen, Learn, Act”
Learning to wash hands in Ebola-time (photo: Mercy Corps)
15. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
LIMITATIONS
Obstacles to Case Reporting
• Limited geographic area
• Relaxed behavior statement
• Survey fatigue
• Time constraints
A survivor educating people about the harmful
effects of discrimination. (photo: Mercy Corps)
16. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS
Obstacles to Case Reporting
• Establishing community selected volunteer committee to
increase reporting to CL
• Host palava hut conversations with survivor testimonials to
dissipate stigma among community members
• Create community maps to identify homes with functioning
cell phones in case of emergency
17. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Obstacles to Case Reporting
• Focus on community
mobilization from
onset of emergencies
• Present messaging
through holistic
community lens
Community educators for the Center for Liberian Assistance mobilize
for a community outreach activities. (photo: Mercy Corps)
18. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
NEXT STEPS
E-CAP II
Follow up barrier
analyses (stigma)
Photo voice
survivor stories
Obstacles to Case Reporting
The Liberia Crusaders for Peace. (photo: Mercy Corps)
19. Saving and improving lives in the world’s toughest places.
Obstacles to Case Reporting
CONTACT
Technical Advisor
mpollock@dc.mercycorps.org
Mathias Pollock, MPH
Thank you for your attention
Questions?
Rapid Research Team: Marion, Prince, Eunice, Chris, Hermenia, and Marcus
25. Comparing SBC activities and
Prochaska’s Stages of Change
Early
Response
Phase
SBC activities Prochaska’s Stage
of Change
1: Learning Public education using
mass media
(IEC materials – Posters,
Pamphlets, Banners, Radio
Discussions, Radio Jingles,
etc)
Pre- contemplation
26. Early
Response
Phase
SBC activities Prochaska’s Stages
of Change
2: Alarm 1. Community led activities of
positive reinforcement and
social support (district level
authorities working together
with traditional leaders).
2. Public education using mass
media (IEC materials – Posters,
Pamphlets, Banners, Radio
Discussions, Radio Jingles, etc)
1. Preparation/
Action for
initially affected
areas
2. Pre-
contemplation for
newly affected
areas
27. ER Phase SBC activities Prochaska’s Stages of
Change
3: Acceleration Focus of social mobilization is on
DIALOGUE, targeting influential
change agents .
Activities:
Stakeholder dialogue sessions
with community level change
agents
Training for religious leaders,
traditional leaders, societal
heads etc.
Community dialogue sessions
with representation for a variety
of community members.
Preparation/Action
28. Case study: Koinadugu District
CRS SBC activities to promote proactivemeasures to prevent
the EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone
31. • Last district in Sierra Leone to record EVD cases
(mid-October 2014)
• To date, is the district with the 2nd lowest number of cases
in the outbreak (108 cases in total).
36. No forum for people to challenge beliefs and ideology
(27.7% of Koinadugu respondents believed that bathing in
salt and hot water can prevent Ebola, & 9.2% believed
that spiritual healers could successfully treat Ebola.)
Weaknesses in early
social mobilization strategies
37. Shift in CRS’SBC strategy in theAcceleration phase
Sharing knowledge with communities
Engaging in dialogue
Understanding how various community groups communicate & share information
Understand barriers and motivating factors for certain key behaviors
38. CRS’revised SBC strategy:
Stream1:
CommunityLevelSocialMobilizationthroughInfluential
Community ChangeAgents
Identification
and training
of community
level change
agents to be
lead trainers
in their
respective
chiefdoms
/districts
Each lead
trainer to
cascade
training to a
further 30
community
level change
agents
Community
level change
agents to
integrate
behavior
change
messaging
in
community
level
mobilization
sessions
Conduct
open
dialogue
sessions at
community
level to
share
experiences
39. CRS’revised SBC strategy:
Stream2:
SocialMobilizationRapidResponseTeams(RRTs)to carry outSBCactivitiesat
community level
CRS social
mobilizers
trained on
community
engagement,
social
mobilization
tool kit,
deployment
activities, etc
Standard
Deployment
10 day
blocks in the
field
Emergency
Deployment
3-7 days
deployment
based on
size of
affected
community
RRT conduct
H2H
sensitization
and
community
structure
engagement
using
CRS
Soc. Mob
tool kit
RRTs to
conduct
regular
community
follow ups
to check on
progress in
behavior
change
practices
41. CRS Social Mobilization Toolkit
Features
Low literacy friendly
Images set in the local context and local languages
Prompts discussion with audience
Focuses on and reiterates (6) key messages through
out discussion
42. CRS Social Mobilization Toolkit
Rapid Response Team Field Protocol Guide
Video - “Ebola – A poem for the living”
Pictorial flipbook - “Ebola – A poem for the living”
Discussion guide for video and flipbook
Hotline cards – with district alert numbers
Poster
56. In 2010, PCI and ACDI-VOCA
(prime), received $40 million
from USAID for a 5 year, Title
II DFAP for Liberia.
The Liberian Agricultural
Upgrading Nutrition and Child
Health (LAUNCH) program is
designed to increase access
to food, reduce chronic
malnutrition, & increase
access to improved livelihood
& educational opportunities
in Bong & Nimba counties.
BACKGROUND
57. PCI is responsible for 2 of 3
Strategic Objectives (SO):
SO2—Reduced Chronic
Malnutrition of Vulnerable
Women & Children
SO3—Increased Access to
Education Opportunities
Care Groups are the primary
platform through which PCI
works to achieve SO2.
There are a total of 158
Care Groups & about 1400
CGVs (i.e. Lead Mothers)
reaching a total of 402
communities.
CARE GROUPS IN LAUNCH
58. Initial outbreak of Ebola in Liberia with cases coming
from Lofa, a county bordering Sierra Leone & Guinea.
PCI began basic Ebola awareness with Care Groups, using
no additional materials, focused on:
1. Preparing dead bodies, a major risk for transmission
Traditionally Liberians bathe and plait the hair once someone
dies & then bury the dead in the yard with family.
2. Avoiding bush meat
3. No touching!
4. Hand washing
20-40 cases in Bong; 0 in Nimba.
TIMELINE OF EBOLA — MARCH 2014
59. PCI H&N staff served as “Promoters”, along
with general Community Health Volunteers
(gCHVs). At the time of the outbreak, staff
received training from PCI’s Country
Director.
Care Groups continued to meet normally,
with CGVs conducting regular meetings and
household visits, including basic messages
about Ebola prevention as part of their
regular meetings.
During this first wave LAUNCH became a
member of the National Ebola Task Force &
the Case Management sub-committee
providing logistical and technical support
to the initial training of health workers
throughout the country.
CARE GROUPS — MARCH - MAY 2014
60. The second wave of the epidemic precipitated a consolidated
response at the community, district, county & national levels
which took precedence over all project health-related
initiatives.
Monrovia was hit hard; Six counties exploded with cases
including Bong & Nimba.
Nurses, Doctors & Health Care Workers began dying. People
started to panic. Health clinics began closing.
In June, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW)
suspended all non-Ebola related training & travel so that core
MoHSW staff could focus solely on the Ebola response.
Care Group activities continued in the communities sharing the
same basic Ebola information along with regular lesson plans.
TIMELINE OF EBOLA — JUNE/JULY 2014
61. The President declared a national State of Emergency in
August, prohibiting public meetings, closed central markets &
sealed international borders impacting food security &
instituted a national curfew.
LAUNCH program—all non-Ebola activities were put on hold;
food distributions ceased, no large gatherings were allowed.
PCI staff remained & by mid August activities were 100%
focused on the Ebola response.
TIMELINE OF EBOLA — AUG/SEPT 2014
62. PCI contributed to the
development of an Ebola
training guide for staff, based
on WHO & MoHSW training
guidelines.
Training materials were
produced by UNICEF & the
MoHSW for the gCHVs.
PCI printed and bound 4,000
copies as it was a perfect tool for
CGVs.
Tool included signs & symptoms,
how Ebola is spread, what to do
when a family member has Ebola,
etc.
CARE GROUPS — AUG/SEPT 2014
63. Care Groups in LAUNCH are 8-10
CGVs, a perfect size for continued
trainings during Ebola.
CGVs were key in terms of education
to community members, distribution
of hand washing buckets, etc.
CGVs protected themselves from
Ebola when making household visits.
Not touching anyone (including shaking
hands, kissing, hugging), washing their
hands with soap or disinfectant after
each household, standing at a distance
from others, avoiding contact with those
who are sick, etc.
Care Groups allowed us to be in the
communities & stay connected,
relevant & useful throughout when
many projects & program activities
couldn’t continue.
CARE GROUPS — AUG/SEPT 2014
64. PCI held community video shows on
Ebola. Special permission was
granted to show after curfew. CGVs,
along with gCHVs, led Q&A.
CGVs & gCHVs, supported families
who were quarantined & isolated.
Brought water & food
Helped with farming
By the end of Sept all LAUNCH
communities were mobilized &
educated. Everyone had hand
washing buckets & bleach &
everybody knew Ebola was real.
CARE GROUPS — AUG/SEPT 2014
CONTINUED
65. Stopped focusing fully on Ebola as staff
realized Ebola education only wasn’t
sufficient & other issues were also
important.
CGVs reviewed old modules (ENA, Maternal
Care, etc.)
CGVs focused on nutrition education
including the preparation of a local CSB
substitute.
PCI began working with the DHO to re-
open clinics in Bong.
ANC services are now up & running in
all health facilities in Bong & Nimba.
CGVs were key in reestablishing links
between health facilities &
communities.
LAUNCH commodity distribution began
again in October.
CARE GROUPS — SEPT/OCT 2014
66. The Care Group model is adaptable & flexible, able to be responsive
to changing contexts & needs of communities.
PCI successfully used the Care Group approach in reaching &
identifying the most vulnerable (both in terms of those at risk for
contracting Ebola, as well as pregnant & lactating women,
elderly/disabled, those who lost their caregivers & others who
struggled to access regular health services) during the emergency.
PCI has reached over 150,000 community members with Ebola
education & prevention messages through the use of Care Groups.
The training of staff working with Care Groups lends itself to the
successful use of Care Groups in Ebola as they are already trained in
facilitation and outreach – critical in Ebola response.
Care Groups contributes to a full cycle approach, covering Ebola from
the community awareness stage all the way to the Ebola Treatment
Unit (ETU) level & then re-entering people back into the communities.
CONCLUSIONS
67. CGVs have been key to the
Ebola response!
To date, no PCI staff & CGVs
have contracted Ebola.
They are now taking up the task
of helping communities adapt &
meet the needs of the growing
orphan population.
Helping with “re-entry”,
minimizing stigma &
discrimination of survivors.
Their messages/education &
support on Ebola reached men,
children, others in the
community.
They have been the
programming thread
throughout!
THANK YOU!
JSCHOOLEY@PCIGLOBAL.ORG
68. feedthechildren.org
Hot off the press…
• The Ebola Viral Disease Care Group Lesson Plans AND
Flipchart (draft for testing) is now available!
69. Questions & Answers – 10 minutes
• Keep your questions/comments
REAL short and sweet
• This is important since we have only
a very short time for the next activity
– Group Process
70. Group process – 15 minutes
1. Jot down one idea of what you can do in your
organization as SBC initiative to address Ebola
and similar outbreaks in the future
a) One idea only, please!
b) Use one page from note pad on your table
2. Discuss your one idea with your table mates
3. Refine/change your idea if you think necessary
4. Turn in your idea sheet to a volunteer nearby
Editor's Notes
Ebola Community Action Program (ECAP) is a large social mobilization program, funded by USAID and developed by Mercy Corps and Population Services International, which has engaged over 70 community-oriented NGOs to support the Government-led Ebola response.
Identified as a gap by ministry of health, ECAP worked with communities to disseminate key messages to help people protect themselves and their families, ultimately reaching 2million people, or about half the country’s population.
Liberia’s Minister for Information said: "No group has been able to effectively engage the nation during this crisis the way that ECAP has.”
But while it is one thing to disseminate messages, its another for their recipients to actually adopt the new behaviors.
So based on the findings from en extensive KAP survey data of more than 10,000 households, we decided to adopt barrier analysis as a tool to investigate the gaps between knowledge and practice.
Who here is familiar with barrier analysis methodology? (Quick overview?)
Interview ~90 people, 45 Doers/45 Non-Doers of a behavior, using a standard questionnaire addressing 12 behavioral determinants, and compare answer frequency. Those with a 15% or more discrepancy are considered “significant”
Chose this behavior based on evidence from KAP surveys (as well gaps in chain-of-transmission mapping) that indicated that case reporting was a problem
Behavior statement: HoH report to #4455 or CL within 48 hours of suspecting an Ebola case in anyone living in their house
Priority Group = HoH
Our analysis identified 5 significant determinants of behavior, which I will address in the next few slides, and leave us with some interesting data to interpret
The first significant determinant was perceived self-efficacy
The most common responses involved being able to use a working phone (owning a phone, being able to borrow a phone, phone having power). In total, phone issues were mentioned by 89% of Doers and only 70% of Non-Doers- suggesting that phone access is a problem. This theory is reinforced by results of a later question specifically on the access determinant, which I will get to to in a minute.
Also 41% of Doers mentioned “getting help from CL” as an enabler. Interestingly, “having access to CL” was mentioned by 25% of non-doers as something that would have helped them report.
The second significant determinant identified in our barrier analysis was…
While answers relating to individual well being were the most common, they were relatively consistent across both Doers and Non-doers.
Answers relating to prevention (helping family, protecting community, reducing spread) as a means of social protection were more frequently mentioned by Doers.
Suggests a measure of preventive community altruism.
The third determinant that produced an interesting results….
The most frequent answer for both Doers and Non-Doers was “nobody”, and no individual responses produced a 15% difference
However, when clustered together, “friends and neighbors” (non-family community ties) were more likely to be mentioned by Non-doers, indicating a level of fear and perceived community stigmatization.
Lastly, the barrier analysis identified Access (defined as “the measure of difficulty in acquiring the things you need to report”) and Cues to Action (defined as “the difficulty in remembering to report”) as determinants of influence.
Doers mentioned “not difficult” 64% and 82% of the time respectively, while Non-Doers were more likely to consider it “somewhat or very difficult” to either get the things they needed or remember to report
So to summarize our findings…
Story from a survivor who had run away from the ETU. He voluntarily returned after speaking with his wife and a community educator who convinced him to go back for the sake of his family and friends.
Social stigma is a serious issue. We know that family is very important in Liberian culture, and while their protection may prove a motivator for reporting, those outside the family may hold a more negative influence on choice to report, especially as the country was getting closer to 0.
We visited a family who had recently had a loved one pass who was still unaware of the national hotline (the community volunteer wrote it in charcoal on the wall).
I wanted to take a moment to mention some lessons learned from conducting the barrier analysis itself:
The social mobilization model proved very helpful in identifying and interviewing members of the priority group
Even with their help, we were unprepared for the level of stigma. People were quite comfortable talking about Ebola (to the point of survey fatigue), but as soon as we mentioned someone being sick in their house, many shut down.
It was also helpful to contact the CLs and receive their blessing to enter and conduct interviews.
PSI uses a methodology called “Listen, Learn, Act” as a way to remember that the community should guide the messaging (community members know their community best)
- Restricted to Monsterrado County due to logistical concerns and the state of the epidemic at time of data collection
24 to 48 hours
Stigma and survey fatigue
Had only 1 week for data collection and it proved harder than anticipated to identify members of our priority group
Recommendations came from program team as “activities” in our DBC framework
Create a second tier of geographically and socially connected individuals to serve as a conduit to transmit information to/from the CL, like districts or wards representatives connect with the mayor’s office.
Sort of participatory discussion, like a town hall meeting as a vehicle for information. Survivor testimony would help to increase perception that Ebola is real, its bad, but people can recover.
Community mapping would not only increase social cohesion for this emergency, but build resilience for future emergency responses.
According to WHO, “community engagement is the one factor that underlies the success of all other control measures. It is the linchpin for successful control”
This study suggests that its not just uniform messaging that is important, but also the target of that messaging. In the highly fearful and often fatalistic environment created by Ebola, appealing to preventive altruistic sentiments could have a greater effect than appealing to individual recovery and survival.
Plans for continued research, to learn from how we can help the people of Liberia to get to Zero and recover from this outbreak, as well as how we can build resilience to allow for a better response to future epidemics.
E-CAP II – concept note submitted
BA stigma:
Proof of Ebola-free status is very important
While there is significant and increasing empathy for survivors, as well as a desire to help with integration, employers are negatively influenced by threats to livelihoods if customers are fearful
Co-worker opinion is important influence, both supervisor and colleague
Distributed cameras to survivors in communities throughout the country and asked them to take pictures of how Ebola has effected life for them. These will be accompanied by narratives.
May – August 2014
August – October 2014
October to date
CRS employed a proactive measure to try and prevent the spread of the disease into Sierra Leone
Airing jingles about EVD, its mode and transmission and preventative methods in five local languages over the district’s community radio
Organized and held radio discussion programs
Organized chiefdom town hall meetings in the 7 border chiefdoms (with Guinea)
CRS’ field staff engaged in awareness raising and sensitization activities in their areas of operation
Engaged with Peripheral Health Units in communities bordering Guinea to conduct awareness raising activities with Health staff and community members accessing the facilities.
Communication styles and strategies to adopt during community engagement – focus on DIALOGUE and empowerment
Find ways to present important information to people of low literacy
LAUNCH HQ is in Monrovia with 13 staff
Field Office in Bong with 31 staff
Field Office in Nimba with 31 staff
No materials—just word of mouth
Nothing available on line, no govn’t materials
“you know we like to touch dead bodies too much!”
“Don’t mess with me and my meat.”
March-May very few cases…people had heard of it but lots of disbelief, lots of distrust. In May thought the crisis was past
A woman traveled in taxi from Foya to harbel but was so sick so the taxi driver took her to his house because they did not reach their destination. The next day she went to Firestone hospital, suspecting Ebola, but her mother said she shouldn’t stay. They just want money. They eventually found her dead at home. Tried to find taxi and family…pure panic
A second woman went from Monrovia to Phoebe hospital did not tell hospital she had been in Monrovia. 7-8 nurses worked on her, all died.
A note on Nimba—Nimba county started to self isolate and began refusing visitors. They were the first county to have hand washing buckets at clinics and at their boarders as well as thermometers for monitoring people’s temperature. No clinics in Nimba ever shut down but were not fully staffed.
The six counties included Monsorato, Margibi, Bomi, Bong, Nimba and Lofa. Lofa has not reported a new case since mid October. Nimba has had no new cases in 60 days. Bong has recently seen a spike in cases coming from neighboring counties and Monrovia.
Still doing Ebola messages, bush meat, handling of dead,
Note on the timing of Ebola and farming—Bong and Nimba are large agricultural producing counties. The onset of Ebola happened right after families had planted their crops. Liberians farm in very much a communal way, so with Ebola and the moratorium on groups being together, people stopped doing their communal farming, weeding, and later harvesting. This negatively impacted FS but the great impact is thought to be felt in the coming planting season after the death of so many. In addition, Sierra Leon is a large producer of food for Liberia so it remains to be seen how the Ebola outbreak there will affect FS in Liberia.
Back to about85% are open in Bong now. Hospitals are not up to 100%
Local porridge:
CHO—eddo, rice flour, bulgar wheat
PRO—dried fish powder, ground sesame seeds/peanuts
FAT—red palm oil, may add sugar, magi cube (bullion)
Shelf life 3 months and we also distribute a sealed buckets to women for storage.
One staff lost 3 extended family, one lost 2
ALL Staff are part of the behavior change strategy to halt the spread of Ebola.
Office cleaner in Monrovia came to our Country Director saying “I need a hand washing bucket. I need materials to teach my family
LAUNCH was able to stay in the communities when so many programs and organizations pulled out. PCI staff in Liberia see great strength and resilience in the communities where we have Care Groups.
“When they needed us most, we were still there”—Jolene Mullins