2. LONDON BOMBINGS –
07 JULY 2005
– AIM
• To provide an overview of the London bombings and the
conclusions / lessons to be drawn from them
– SCOPE
• What happened
• Who were the perpetrators
• Intended victims
• Objectives and motivations
• Significance
• Results
• Changes effected
3. WHAT HAPPENED
• 4 x SUICIDE ATTACKS
– 3 x Trains
– 1 x Bus
• CASUALTIES
– 56 Dead (52 victims and 4 x bombers)
– 700 injured
• WIDESPREAD DISRUPTION / DESTRUCTION
4. LOCATIONS
• Russell Square
– Explosion in first carriage
causing 27 deaths
– Bomber was Jermaine Lindsay
• Aldgate
– Explosion in second carriage
causing 8 deaths
– Bomber was Shehzad
Tanweer
5. LOCATIONS - CONTINUED
• Edgware Road
– Explosion in second carriage
causing 7 deaths
– Bomber was Mohammad
Sidique Khan
• Tavistock Square
– Explosion on double decker
bus caused 14 deaths
– Bomber was Hasib Hussain
7. HOW
• Bombers rented a flat
from where they could
manufacture the
explosive devices
– Each device contained
between 2-5 kg of home
made explosive
• Operation self-financed
– Estimate of $8000
pounds to finance entire
operation
8. HOW - CONTINUED
• Planning and
Coordination
– Identified with
associating with other
extremists in the United
Kingdom
– Reconnaissance and
“practice run”
9. INTENDED VICTIMS
• British citizens
• Attack on
transportation system
designed to achieve:
– mass casualty
– mass disruption
– mass destruction
10. MOTIVATIONS & OBJECTIVES
• Pakistan
– Extremist madrassas fuel
Muslim discontent
• Al Qaeda
– Inspiration and possible
training
– Need to remain relevant
11. SIGNIFICANCE
• First ever suicide attack
on British mainland
• Al Qaeda still relevant
• Attack came after
United Kingdom had
only recently decreased
threat level
12. RESULTS
• Casualties
– 52 killed
– 4 suicides
– Over 700 casualties
• Possibility of further
suicide attacks in the UK
• Consolidation of Al
Qaeda brand name
13. CHANGES EFFECTED
• Review of the British
security services
procedures
• Increased funding for
security services
• Prevent strategy
implemented
• Coroners Report
– Preparation for future
incidents
15. BIBLIOGRAPHY
• All images courtesy of the BBC, accessed 28 June 2011 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions/default.stm
• Author unknown, The Economist, 14 July 2005, accessed on 14 July 2011 at http://www.economist.com/node/4172107
• Author unknown, The Guardian reprinted in Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 2005, accessed 04 July 2011 at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/bombers-linked-to-religious-schools/2005/07/15/1121429359122.html
• Aylwin, C.J., König, T.C, Brennan, N.W., Shirley, P.J, Davies, G., Walsh, M.S., Brohi, K., “Reduction in critical mortality in urban mass
casualty incidents: analysis of triage, surge, and resource use after the London bombings on July 7, 2005” inThe Lancet, Vol 368,, No
9554, 23/30 December 2006, pp. 2219-2225.
• Bergin, A., “When terror is home grown” in The Australian, accessed 16 July 2011 at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-
affairs/when-terror-is-home-grown/story-fn59niix-1226073926294
• Coroners Inquests into the London Bombings of 07 July 2005, Report under Rule 43 of the Coroner’s Rules 1984, published 06 May
2011, accessed 28 June 2011 at http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf
• History of London: London Bombings accessed 10 July 2011 at http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/history-of-london/london-
bombings.html
• Hoffman, B., Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 07 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot, inStudies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 32. No 12. pp. 1100-1116.
• Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 07 July 2005: Presented to Parliament by thePrime
Minister by Command of Her Majesty, Cmd 6785, May 2006 accessed 12 July 2011, at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/isc_7july_report.pdf
• Jenkins, B.M., The Lessons of London, San Diego Tribune accessed 07 July 2011 at
http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/07/17/DUT.html
• London Attacks accessed on 28 June 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions/default.stm
• Raman, B. Jihad in London & Thailand: The Link, in South Asia Analysis Group. Paper 1461, July 2005, accessed on 04 July 2011 at
http:www.southasianalysis.org/%5Cpapers15%5Cpaper1461.html
• Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 07th July 2005, return to an Address of the Honourable House of Commons
dated 11th May 2006, accessed 28 June 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf
Editor's Notes
07 July 2005, four suicide bombers mounted a terrorist attack in central London with the attacks focussed on the London Transportation System. This was mainland Britain's first ever experience of suicide bombing and the biggest attack, in terms of casualties, on the British mainland since the Second World War.
This aim presentation will provide an overview of the London Bombings and the conclusions to be drawn from them
The scope of the presentation will therefore cover the following:
What happened
Who were the perpetrators
Intended victims
Objectives and motivations
Significance
Results
Changes effected
07 July 2005, four suicide bombers mounted a terrorist attack in central London with the attacks focussed on the London Transportation System. At 0850h three bombs detonated on underground trains on the Piccadilly and Circle lines (Russell Square, Aldgate and Edgware Road) and a fourth bomb detonated approximately one hour later on a double decker bus at Tavistock Square. (1)
The attacks caused widespread destruction and loss of life resulting in 56 dead (52 victims and 4 x bombers) and over 700 casualties. (2)
The entire underground transport system along with the Zone 1 bus networks were shut down for a period of time until the authorities could ascertain the extent of the damage, disrupting thousands of commuters, whilst hospitals were inundated with the high number of casualties that had to be treated. (3)
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 07th July 2005, return to an Address of the Honourable House of Commons dated 11th May 2006, p.2. accessed 28 Jun 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf
Ibid.
History of London: London Bombings accessed 10 July 2011 at http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/history-of-london/london-bombings.html
At 0850h 07 July 2005 several explosions ripped though the London underground. The first explosion occurred on a train on the Piccadilly line that was travelling South between Kings' Cross station and Russell Square. The explosion occurred in the crowded first carriage and was detonated by Jermaine Lindsay. This resulted in the deaths of 27 people including Lindsay, with another 340 injured. (5)
The second explosion occurred on the Circle line with a train that was travelling East between Liverpool Street station and Aldgate. The explosion was detonated by Shehzad Tanweer and ripped through the second carriage. It resulted in the deaths of eight people including Tanweer and injured 171. (6)
(5) Official Report p 5.
(6) 07 July Bombings: What Happened – Aldgate, accessed 05 July 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/aldgate.stm
A third explosion occurred on another train on the Circle line that was travelling west from Edgware Road to Paddington. The explosion occurred in the second carriage and was detonated by Mohammad Siddique Khan. This resulted in the deaths of seven people including Khan, with another 163 injured. (7)
The fourth explosion occurred at approximately 0947h on a double decker bus that had been diverted off its normal route due the underground closure. Consequently, the bus was crowded with passengers who could not access the tube due to the closure of the underground. The bomb was detonated by Hasib Hussain on the upper rear deck as the bus passed Tavistock Square and resulted in the death of 14 people including Hussain, with another 110 injured. (8)
It is unknown why Hussain attacked the bus almost an hour after the attacks on the underground but CCTV footage analysed afterwards appears to show him buying a 9 volt battery from a store on the King Cross station concourse. Hussain was seen fiddling with his backpack initially on the lower deck of the bus and although there is no conclusive evidence it appears possible that his bomb may have failed to detonate with the original battery. He then was required to obtain a new one and adjusted his plan as a result. (9)
(7) Official Report p. 5.
(8) 07 July Bombings: What Happened – Tavistock Square accessed 05 July 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/tavistock.stm
(9) Official Report pp. 5-6.
The four bombers were all British citizens. Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were all second generation British citizens of Pakistani descent whilst Jermaine Lindsay was born in Jamaica but moved to Britain with his mother shortly after his birth. (10)
All four bombers were from West Yorkshire where Khan, Tanweer and Hussain grew up on the outskirts of Leeds in the districts of Beeston and Holbeck, whilst Lindsay grew up a short distance away in Huddersfield. (11)
All four appeared to lead unremarkable lives and were involved in the Muslim community through attendance at mosques and youth clubs in the Beeston area where Khan was a leading figure. He had been employed as a learning mentor at a primary school where he worked with children who had language or behavioural difficulties. In his work Khan demonstrated a real ability to connect with difficult children and was highly regarded by both his peers and parents for this. Khan also contributed heavily to youth groups in the local area and this is where his association with Tanweer and Hussain developed. (12)
It is not clear how or when Khan met Lindsay but he moved in Islamic circles in the Huddersfield and Dewsbury where Lindsay lived and by the latter half of 2004 they were close associates. (13)
The four bombers were positively identified at each of the bomb sites through a thorough examination of CCTV and forensic evidence which included DNA matching. (14)
(10)Official Report pp. 13-17
(11) Ibid
(12) Ibid
(13)Ibid p. 18.
(14) Coroners Inquests into the London Bombings of 07 July 2005, Report under Rule 43 of the Coroner’s Rules 1984, published 06 May 2011, accessed 28 June 2011 at http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf, p.3.
The bombs were constructed in a rented flat that had been sub-let from an Egyptian student. The flat itself was in a student area near Leeds University and the Leeds Mosque. The population in the local areas contains many students who are transitory in nature and the bomb--makers were able to blend into the community without drawing any suspicion. The knowledge required to make the bombs could be obtained from open sources but is believed that the group had assistance as the materials required careful handling during the construction phase in order to ensure that they did not detonate. A significant amount of bomb-making was recovered from the rented flat when it was discovered during the subsequent investigation as pictured above. (15)
Each of the devices used by the bombers contained between 2-5kg of peroxide based explosives. A number of prepared but unused devices were also found in a rented car used by one of the group. The car was left near Luton station which was the station the bombers departed from to make their way to London. (16)
The total cost of the operation was estimated to be approximately $8000 pounds. Several of the group had visited Pakistan in late 2003/2004 and this cost includes overseas travel, materials for bomb construction, the rented flat, car hire and domestic travel. The group used their own resources including personal loans and credit cards to finance all aspects of the operation. (17)
(15) Official Report pp. 22-23.
(16) Ibid pp.3-4.
(17) Ibid p.23.
Both Khan and Tanweer had been identified on the margins of other extremist activity in 2004 during Operation Crevice; where the British Security Services were endeavouring to prevent an “imminent attack” on mainland Britain by Muslim extremists. Both Khan and Tanweer had been identified as having had met Omar Khyam, one of the most prominent individuals under surveillance during that operation. During this period Khyam had received a visit from an individual known as Khawaja – an electronics bomb expert, to receive training. The volume of individuals identified and the finite resources of the British Security Services meant that both Khan and Tanweer were not considered as a high priority as there was no intelligence to suggest they were involved in that particular operation and they were not arrested nor placed under surveillance. What this does highlight is that Khan and Tanweer were associating with other extremists over this period who had training and were in all likelihood sharing information and skills with them. (18)
The group had travelled to London on 28 June 2005 (pictured above) to conduct a practice run of the operation. CCTV footage identifies three of the group being Khan, Lindsay and Tanweer meeting at Luton station at 0810 and arriving at London at 0855. They then make their way to the underground network were they are unaccounted for three hours, before returning to King Cross at 1250h. A route reconnaissance and operational rehearsal indicates that the group had received at least some elementary instruction as to how they should operate and conduct their mission. (19)
Coroner’s Report pp. 7-15 and Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 07 July 2005: Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, Cmd 6785, May 2006 accessed 12 July 2011, p. 16. at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/isc_7july_report.pdf
07 July Bombings: The Investigation - Planning, accessed 05 July 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/investigation/html/dummy_run.stm
British citizens particularly citizens of London (chosen as a symbolic target) were the intended victims of the group. Both Khan and Tanweer, in martyrdom videos released on Al Jazeera, held British citizens accountable for democratically electing their government and they held that the British government was deemed responsible for committing atrocities against Muslims throughout the world. Consequently, in the groups eyes, British citizens were to be punished for the actions of their government. (20)
The transportation systems was chosen as it is an ideal target that provides a group with the ability to detonate explosives in confined spaces, in order to achieve mass casualty, mass disruption and possibly mass destruction. Its problematic to consider whether this attack achieved mass destruction particularly when compared to an attack such as Sep 11. The train line was able to be repaired and their were sufficient trains to replace the ones damaged, but what is clear is that the group achieved the first two goals of any terrorist organisation. (21)
(20) B. Hoffman, Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 07 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot, in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 32. No 12. pp. 1102-1104.
(21) B.M. Jenkins, The Lessons of London,in San Diego Tribune accessed 07 July 2011 at http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/07/17/DUT.html
The overall motivations and objectives for the attack are vague but indications from the videos of Khan and Tanweer as well as Khan’s Last Will and Testament (discovered after the bombings) indicate a desire to avenge perceived injustices and atrocities perpetrated against Muslims by Western governments. A quote from Khan”s video states “I am directly responsible for avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters”. Khan also focuses on the act of martyrdom as supreme evidence of religious commitment. (22)
There is strong evidence to suggest that all of the bombers were influenced heavily by Islamic extremists both in Britain and this became more pronounced after they had visited Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence personnel confirmed that Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan between November 2004 and February 2005 whilst Hussain is believed to have visited Karachi. Within six months of their return the three were part of a group that carried out the first suicide bombings on British home soil. (22)
Tanweer’s relatives had confirmed that Tanweer had attended a madrassas in late 2004. His family believed that he had only gone there to learn the Koran but shortly after the attack, the then Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, confirmed that many of the madrassas were breeding grounds for extremism. (23)
Al Qaeda, through Ayman Al Zawahiri (pictured above), claimed responsibility for the attacks in two separate broadcasts on 01 and 19 September 2005. There is a significant amount of evidence to support this claim and if Al Qaeda was not directly responsible it appears that they contributed to it through either the provision of training and the inspiration they provided for other extremists. During both Tanweer and Khan’s trip to Pakistan in late 2004 and early 2005 they are believed to have received training in terrorist strategies and techniques from Al Qaeda operatives in a camp in Malakand in Pakistan’s North West Frontier. The method of operation used in the London bombings was also comparable to other claimed Al Qaeda operations and both Khan and Tanweer in their martyrdom videos praised Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. (24)
In Tanweer’s video, Ayman Al Zawahiri from provided similar explanations to Tanweer as to the reasons for the attack but also cited British support for Israel and the “Jews”. Al Qaeda’s efforts to either engineer the operation or implicate itself in the operation is a direct result of the organisation’s desire to remain relevant to young muslims. (25)
(22) Official Report, p. 19.
(23) B. Raman, Jihad in London & Thailand: The Link, in South Asia Analysis Group. Paper 1461, July 2005, accessed on 04 July 2011 at http:www.southasianalysis.org/%5Cpapers15%5Cpaper1461.html
(24) Author unknown, The Guardian reprinted in Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 2005, accessed 04 July 2011 at http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/bombers-linked-to-religious-schools/2005/07/15/1121429359122.html
(25) Hoffman, B., op. cit. pp. 1102-1104.
(26) Ibid.
The attack by the group was the first ever suicide bombing on mainland Britain. Unlike previous terrorist attacks such as those carried out by the IRA, it was undertaken by British citizens who were home-grown rather than individuals who had temporarily entered Britain to undertake the attack. (27)
Initial reports concentrated on the fact that the bombers were home-grown, disaffected Muslims and that they were self-radicalised. As the investigation into the bombing has unfolded there is evidence that supports Al Qaeda’s involvement particularly in the planning and provision of training but the extent of this involvement is unclear and subject to claim and counter claim. This evidence is separate from Al Qaeda’s claiming responsibility for the attack.(28)
Al Qaeda proved that it was still a relevant and credible terrorist threat as it was able to facilitate an attack on the British mainland through the channelling / recruitment of disaffected resident British Muslims. It proved that it was a durable and resilient organisation that would search for vulnerabilities and opportunities amongst the Muslim diaspora. (29)
It is very difficult to contain small scale terrorist cells particularly when there is no evidence to narrow the search parameters of the authorities. The bombers in this case were British citizens that had not drawn any immediate attention to themselves and they were able to mount the attack with common items and which they self-financed. There was no money trail to follow or any other substantial terrorist leads. This was demonstrated just before the attack when the United Kingdom lowered its overall threat level from Severe (General) to Substantial as the authorities had considered that there was no group within the United Kingdom at that time with both the capability and intent to mount such an attack. (30)
(27) Author unknown, The Economist, 14 July 2005, accessed on 14 July 2011 at http://www.economist.com/node/4172107
(28) Hoffman pp. 1101-1102
(29) Hoffman p. 1112.
(30) Security Committee p.30.
As can be seen from the photo above, many of the injured from the blast suffered severe injuries that required extensive medical treatment. Just one example of the extent of injuries is that of the 194 casualties received at the Royal London Hospital on the day of the attacks there were 11 lower limb amputations and one upper limb amputation performed. This is only one portion of the injuries suffered and the operations required; it does not include statistics from any other hospitals utilised or medical services provided. (31)
Suicide attacks had been discounted as unlikely method of operation by the British Security Services prior to the attack. After 07 July, the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that it was likely that other suicide attacks could be mounted as they would be inspired by the London bombings. This is a major contingency that the security services are preparing for particularly in the lead up to the 2012 Olympics. (32)
Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks and many extremists in the Islamic world are inspired by it actions. Al Qaeda consolidated its brand name and highlighted the threat it posed by its morphing into a “network of networks”. Al Qaeda has varying degrees of relationships with its affiliate groups but its ability to inspire others to commit acts in its name is one of the most problematic areas for security and intelligence services to address. (33)
(31) Christopher J Aylwin, Thomas C König, Nora W Brennan, Peter J Shirley, Gareth Davies, Michael S Walsh, Karim Brohi, “Reduction in critical mortality in urban mass casualty incidents: analysis of triage, surge, and resource use after the London bombings on July 7, 2005” in The Lancet, Vol 368, No. 9554, 23/30 December 2006, p. 2223.
(32) ISC report pp. 27-29.
(33) Official Report p. 28.
After the attack the Intelligence and Security Committee Report focussed on what had occurred and how to respond better in future. It identified that their were inconsistencies in sharing information and that the attacks were actually undertaken by individuals who by the most part had been discounted from security service assessments because they did not fit the profiles the security services had been used to and they had been identified only on the periphery of the then current enquiries and there was insufficient resources to follow them up. It provided three main recommendations:
that the threat levels in the UK be reassessed for functionality and their practical effect – if a threat level changed what did this actually mean in both a practical and procedural sense
the threat from home-grown radicalised British citizens be included in all intelligence reviews – it was identified that not enough scrutiny was applied to the possibility of the radicalisation of resident British citizens
inter-agency cooperation between intelligence, security and police services (34)
The British security services were provided with an additional $85 million pounds in December 2005 to bolster staff numbers and increase the capability in IT and surveillance activities. (35)
The London Bombings have led to Britain implementing a counter radicalisation strategy known as Prevent. It aims to counter pro terrorist ideologies by challenging extremist views in schools, universities, the internet and anywhere else identified as a conduit for radicalisation. The revised Prevent strategy released in 2011 confirmed that the main terrorist threat to Britain still remains Al Qaeda related or inspired groups. (36)
The coroner amongst other things, recommended a review of the capability ad funding for the London Air Ambulance (LAA) and their Medical Emergency Response Incident Teams (MERIT). By chance the LAA was having a conference on 07 July at the British Medical Association building near Tavistock Square when the bus detonated. Consequently they had 27 physicians and paramedics who were available to immediately assist. This was extremely fortuitous as the coroner noted they would not normally be there. This caused this coroner to consider what would have happened if they were not available and as a consequence she expressed concern over the capability and funding of the London Air Ambulance and the city’s ability to respond to future incidents if this was not addressed. A considerable portion of the LAA’s funding came from charitable donations and its members were comprised mostly from professional volunteers who gave up their own time. The coroner made it quite clear that this was not acceptable for a city like London and in particular noted the potential threat posed to London when hosting the 2012 Olympics. (37)
(34) ISC Report pp. 41-44
(35) ISC Report pp. 34-35
(36) A. Bergin, “When terror is home grown” in The Australian, accessed 16 July 2011 at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/when-terror-is-home-grown/story-fn59niix-1226073926294
(37)Coroner’s Report, pp 58-60.
