The political economy of north south trade liberalisation an intra-regional perspective from CEMAC+ and eu

Cover Sheet for Research Proposal and Final Dissertation
Student Name: AMOUGOU ARISTIDE AGBOR
Student Number: B710544
Programme Title: MSc Diplomacy, Business and Trade
Dissertation Title: The Political Economy of North-South Trade Liberalisation: An
intra-regional perspective from Central Africa’s negotiation
towards an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European
Union (2002 – 2017)
Word Count 10,909
Academic Supervisor: Pr. Brian Hocking
Dissertation type Desk-based
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The Political Economy of North-South Trade Liberalisation: An intra-regional
perspective from Central Africa’s negotiation towards an Economic Partnership
Agreement with the European Union (2002 – 2017)
By
Amougou Aristide Agbor
Master Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of
Master of Science in Diplomacy, Business and Trade
Loughborough University

1
Abstract
For almost two decades, the Central African negotiating bloc, comprising of eight
countries, has been negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement for the establishment of
a Free Trade Area with the European Union. Despite the reiteration of the imperative to
arrive at an interregional deal, these Central African states have not been able to adopt a
common trade policy in these negotiations as manifested by Cameroon’s unilateral decision
to sign an interim agreement with the EU. This dissertation elucidates this deficiency (or
absence) of collusion which compromises the uniformity of the region’s trade politics.
Following qualitative research, this study confirms that that weak intra-regionalism and the
pursuit of national interest within the broader dependency linkages of the region’s countries
to the EU and the global economy supersede any political quest for regionalism amongst
these countries. Although expressed in political economy agenda as an end, (intra)-
regionalism in praxis appears to be more of a means to economic development and one which
is superseded by national interest.
Key words: Economic partnership Agreement, trade regimes, Central Africa, European
Union, trade liberalisation, economic development, Cotonou Agreement, aid, regional
integration, intra-regionalism, reciprocity, preferential trade agreements

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Acknowledgements
First, I wish to express my gratitude to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office for
granting me the Chevening scholarship. Without their generous financial support, this project
might not have seen the day. Most importantly, I wish to profoundly thank my supervisor, Pr.
Brian Hocking for accepting to supervise my dissertation and for his invaluable academic and
moral support throughout the process. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to the Director of the
Institute of Diplomacy and International Governance at Loughborough University London,
Pr. Helen Drake, for facilitating the choice of getting Pr. Hocking on board this research. I
equally thank my personal tutor, Dr. Nicola Chelotti for vital academic mentorship during my
entire studies.
This project has been improved conceptually by some insightful recommendations. In
that regard, I most especially thank Maryna Shevetsova for the organisation of the summer
school on linking theory and empirical research at the Berlin Graduate School of Social
Sciences where this research’s framework was presented and critiqued. The consultation with
Pr. Felix Berenskoetter (School of Oriental and African Studies, SOAS, University of
London) as well as the comments by my discussant, Lucie Lu (University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign) have been helpful indeed. In addition, I thank my course mates; Emilia
Chukwunedum Enwezor and Valdemar Martins-Da-Silva for proofreading this dissertation.
Finally, I wish to thank my family for their support. They are the reason why I keep
giving my best in each endeavour. In this light, I also thank my team “The Minervans”. The
UK has been home for me because they made it enjoyable.
This dissertation is dedicated to all diplomats, especially my colleagues at the
Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon. It is my hope that our efforts towards building
bridges of cooperation will surpass the inclinations to walls of conflict and continue to
improve living conditions for all people.

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Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................... 7
Chapter 2: Literature review ................................................................................. 10
Chapter 3: Research Methodology ....................................................................... 14
Chapter 4: Findings ................................................................................................. 16
A. Historical Evolution of EU (North) – Central Africa (South) political Economy of
Trade….................................................................................................................. 16
B. Institutions of Regional Integration and the Negotiating Configuration in Central
Africa……………………………………………………………………………………..20
C. Central Africa’s institutional framework for negotiating the EPA ....................... 22
D. Contentious issues on the EPA: Opposing perspectives on trade
liberalisation.......................................................................................................... 23
E. The EU’s EBA and GSP as Pressure differentiating factors in the Central
African negotiating architecture ............................................................................ 25
Chapter 5: Discussion.............................................................................................. 28
A. Why did Cameroon sign the iEPA with the EU?.......................................... 28
National interest.................................................................................................... 28
B. Trade Deflection – Reinforced rules of origin and hardened borders in the
CEMAC................................................................................................................. 29
Differentiated trade regimes – divergent interests ................................................ 31
C. Diluting intraregional alliance: From Geography to Status of Development 31
D. External Dependency and Deficiency of Collusion Within Central Africa in its EPA
negotiations with the EU.......................................................................................... 32
E. The Challenges of multiple institutional regionalisms and multilateralism on
EPA negotiations .................................................................................................. 33
F. The Essence of Timing in Trade Negotiations............................................. 34
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations .................................................... 35
A. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 35
B. Policy Recommendations............................................................................ 36
C. Limits of the study and avenues for future research.................................... 37
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 38
Appendices........................................................................................................... 42

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List of Figures and Tables
Figures:
Figure 1: The Triple Hierarchy of Regional Collusion………………………………………15
Figure 2: REC overlap and the EPA Negotiating Configuration in Central Africa …………21
Figure 3: EPA Negotiating Architecture……………………………………………………..23
Figure 4: Proportion of CEMAC trade within itself, with Africa, and the Rest of the World.33
Tables:
Table 1: Alternative EU Trade Regimes available to CEMAC+ countries in the pre- and
post-WTO waiver deadline………………………………………………………...27
Table 2: Summary of Cameroon market access schedule……………………………………31
Table 3: Simulations on imports and income variation in the CEMAC resulting from an
interregional FTA with the EU…………………………………………………..…32

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List of Terms and Abbreviations
ACP: African Caribbean and Pacific States
AU: African Union
CAP: Common Agricultural Policy
CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMINA: Committee on the Negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreement
CSO: Civil Society Organisation
CU: Customs Union
DFQF: Duty Free Quota Free
EBA: Everything But Arms
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
EEC: European Economic Community
EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement
EU: European Union
FTA: Free Trade Area
iEPA: Interim Economic Partnership Agreement
LDCs: Least Developed Countries
MFN: Most Favoured Nation clause
NSA: Non-State Actors
OAU: organisation of African Unity
PTA: Preferential Trade Agreement
ROO: Rules of Origin
ROW: Rest of the World
RPTF: Regional Preparatory Task Force
STABEX: Stabilisation Fund for Export Income

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SYNDUSTRICAM: Syndicate of Cameroonian Industries
SYSMIN: Financing Facility for Mining Products
UAM: African and Malagasy Union
UEAC: Economic Union of Central Africa
USD: United States Dollars
WTO: World Trade Organisation

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Chapter 1: Introduction
Whether North-South trade liberalisation is an effective development strategy for
developing countries is a question which continues to divide political economists as well as
developed and developing countries’ governments (Panagariya, 2002, p. 1416). Since 2002,
the European Union (EU) and seven different regions of the African Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) group of states have embarked on negotiations for the establishment of Free Trade
Areas (FTA) via Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). These talks which were set to be
concluded in 2007, have so far met their objective only in one of the six regions, the
Caribbean (European Commission, 2018). In Central Africa, which is the focus of this
research, one out of the eight negotiating countries, Cameroon, signed the agreement
(European Commission, 2018). The other seven declined it. This dissertation aims to
elucidate why within the Central African region, where there exists a customs union to which
Cameroon belongs, there have been different outcomes to the EPA negotiations and external
trade regimes with the EU.
In effect, it should be underlined that one of the main goals of the EPA negotiations is
to recalibrate the EU-ACP trade regime to the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
in relation to which they have been in non-conformity (Meyn, 2008). Historically, the 1975
Lomé Convention Agreement signed between the European Community and the African
Caribbean Pacific Group of countries (ACP) were marked by the principle of non-reciprocity,
offering the latter unilateral duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to the former’s market. The
argument was that this arrangement will guarantee improved EU market access to the
developing ACP countries and thus contribute to boosting their exports and development.
However, this trade regime was discriminatory since it was limited only to ACP countries
which were former European colonies and not extended to other developing countries. As
depicted with the WTO’s ruling on the Banana III case (Hodu, 2009, p. 236), it was thus
deemed contradictory to GATT/WTO principle of non-discrimination (Murray, 1977, p.
9)and requested to be amended.
The Central African negotiating bloc comprises of Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Chad,
Central Africa Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sao Tome
and Principe. The first six are all member states of the Economic and Monetary Community
of Central African States (CEMAC) customs union. The other two are not part of this
customs union. For this reason, the Central Africa negotiation bloc has become commonly
known under the appellation CEMAC+ (South Centre, 2007).

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With almost 2 decades of negotiations gone, the states do not seem to agree on a
unified position in relation to the EU’s proposed EPA. Cameroon unilaterally signed an
interim EPA (iEPA) with the EU in 2007 despite its commitment to a common external tariff
(CET) with 3rd
parties as ascribed by its CEMAC membership. Such divergences are a
manifestation of a deficiency of collusion within the CEMAC+ party which this dissertation
aims to analyse.
Research Interest and Justification of the study
Academic interest
Although the question of the role of the policies towards trade in developing countries
themselves has been extensively investigated (Page, 1994, p. 1), regionalism is still a very
fertile area for research, with new results and interpretations emerging every day that deserve
scholarly attention (Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 11). By focusing on the dynamics of trade
political economy among CEMAC+ countries, this study aims to explain how developing
countries frame their interests and adopt policies thereof. This study is indeed specific in that
it analyses the dynamics of south-south cooperation against a backdrop of north-south
political economy of trade. Scholarship on trade and development have focused more on
developed countries’ policies and the dynamics of their relations with developing countries
without paying as much attention to how these aspects are affected by and affect cooperation
among developing countries. Authoritative sources on regionalisms such as (Shaw, et al.,
2011) do not pay attention to the central African region which is perhaps the main victim of
this academic gap which this research aims to bridge.
Policy Implications
Considering that the objective of the negotiation is to establish an inter-regional FTA
between the EU and the entire Central African negotiating configuration, collusion in the
Central African bloc is indispensable. Also, if regional integration, inscribed as a goal in
national and regional development policies in the Central African region is to be achieved, an
analysis of the diversions that result from trade policy is crucial. To this effect, understanding
the dynamics of intra-regional trade cooperation within the framework of EU-CEMAC+
negotiations is essential to adopting the appropriate strategies that ensure that interests are
safeguarded, and development policies are better implemented.
On this note, the relevance of this study is further stressed by the fact that 40% of
CEMAC+ countries’ trade is conducted with their European counterparts. This is therefore an
important relationship for them. On the EU side, although this relation amounts to a mere 3%

9
of its total trade, the stakes are also important in terms of growth prospects and the rising
presence of other major trading nations like China in Africa (Men & Barton, 2011, p. 269).
Principal research question:
Why has the Central African negotiation bloc been unable to adopt a collusive
approach in its negotiations towards an EPA with the EU?
A collusive trade policy is understood as one that is “used specifically with a view to
promoting regional integration” (Collier & Gunning, 1995, p. 387)
Secondary questions:
What factors best explain the positions (acceptance or refusal) adopted by the
different states in the Central African negotiation bloc in relation to the EPA negotiations
with the European Union?
Why did Cameroon unilaterally sign and ratify an interim EPA with the EU while
other countries in its negotiation bloc declined it and what are the implications for the
negotiations and regional integration?
Dissertation Structure
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 is dedicated to an analysis of the prevalent
literature on the questions which this research addresses. In chapter 3, a presentation is made
on the methodology by which this study was carried out. Chapter 5 discusses the findings that
are laid out in chapter 4. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are made in chapter 6.

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Chapter 2: Literature review
While an abundance of literature has been produced on the EPA, more attention has
been paid to other blocs such as East Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, the Caribbean and
the Pacific. Enriching analysis on the subject such as (Heron, 2013) have no section dedicated
to Central Africa, a gap which this research bridges.
Collusion Among African countries in trade negotiation with Europe
According to (Collier & Gunning, 1995) developing countries in Africa do not need to
collude together in order to negotiate a PTA with Europe. They posit that any inter-regional
approach in negotiating FTAs between Africa and Europe is bound to be ineffective if
collusion is indispensably pursued among the African countries because this increases
coordination and compensation costs. According to them, it is in states’ best interest to keep
their decisions on trade policies at the national level, and eventually, by adopting
liberalisation at national level, regional integration amongst neighbouring African states will
ensue as a by-product. Their argument is closely supported by (Fratzscher, 1996) who asserts
that more dissimilar countries have higher potential benefits from integration. However,
pragmatically, such an assertion appears limited given that states are already constituted in
regional blocs with legal bases for trade policy coordination and therefore cannot act in total
inconsideration of this.
On collusion and its impact on trade negotiations
As stated by (Andriamananjara, 2011, p. 115), if CU members negotiate effectively as
a bloc, they can pool their negotiating power and enhance it against the rest of the world, thus
affecting the outcome of negotiations. Given the mercantilist nature of trade negotiations,
increased negotiating power is likely to lead to a more protectionist outcome (in exchange for
better market access). It could also be argued that non-members will act in a more
conciliatory way when negotiating with a (single, large) customs union than with separate
members, and the result will be smaller requests for concessions.
This argument is coherent with that of (Manger & Shadlen, 2015, p. 485) who posit
that trade negotiation outcome is affected by political dependency and asymmetry of
economic aggregate size of the parties. Plainly, the bigger economic entity has greater
leverage in negotiations and can walk out without losing much while the reverse is not true,
unless several small economic units collude to amplify their negotiating leverage. Clearly, the
question of how many countries are involved and how much power they possess collectively
is an important issue in trade negotiations for these reasons (Odell, 2007, p. 18).

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On the Appropriateness of EPAs for African countries
(Draper, 2007) argues that the EPAs can only be appropriate for African countries on
the condition that supply-side challenges are overcome, and market access constraints are
addressed. These, he states, will need substantial “aid for trade” that addresses infrastructural
investment and market buttering supportive regulatory framework.
(Borrmann & Busse, 2007) emphasize that institutional reform, in terms of
eradicating excessive regulation is an indispensable precondition for most ACP countries to
benefit from the EPAs and undergo economic development in general. According to the
authors, in the CEMAC+, only Gabon passes the institutional test. The other countries have
excessive regulation and must reform. Without this, implementing the EPAs would rather be
counterproductive for them.
According to (Hoekman, 2011), North-South PTAs must shift focus from market
access to behind the border regulatory reforms that are supported through development
assistance instruments and aimed at boosting the private sector. Given that developing
countries still perform poorly in trade exports despite the DFQF access conferred to them via
some trade regimes, this is evidence that the real problem is certainly on issues such as
bolstering trade capacity, improving the domestic investment climate and maintaining a
competitive exchange rate.
(Karingi Stephen, 2005) arrives at bleaker conclusions from statistical simulations
that demonstrate that EPAs mostly lead to net trade diversion from the rest of the world
(ROW) and from other African countries to the EU’s benefit alone. (Perez, 2006) shares this
opinion and posits that the Generalised System of Preferences plus regime (GSP+) which
offers unilateral DFQF to the EU market is best suited for the development prospects of ACP
countries.
According to (Storey, 2006), the EPAs are more of a commercial tool than a
development instrument as the EU paints it. The move towards FTAs is a means by which the
EU intends to ensure that its businesses better access ACP markets.
As (Siles-Brügge, 2014) argues, the opposition to the EPA can be explained by the
excessive neo-liberal global Europe discourse of the EU Commission which has led to
resistances from developing countries and other non-trade actors who advocate regulatory
liberalisation.
The impact of different trade-development regimes on EPA outcomes
According to (Faber & Orbie, 2009), given the internal pressure from states such as
the Scandinavians, the EU’s external relations with the developing world has evolved from

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historical articulation advocated by regionalist states such as France to a principles-driven
approach advocated by globalists. It is this evolution that led the EU to adopt the Everything
But Arms (EBA) initiative which offers DFQF access to all Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) and not only ACP countries. This approach has differentiated LDCs from non-LDCs
and could weaken intra-ACP alliances.
(Hawthorne, 2013) argues that this differentiation of developing countries, which
attributes more special treatment for LDCs as compared to the other developing countries, is
a salient aspect of global North-South trade politics which relived the LDCs from any
pressure to conclude EPA negotiations as opposed to non-LDCs.
EPAs and Regional Integration
According to (Bartels, 2007), the composition of states within the ACP negotiating
configurations could undermine regional integration within the existing RECs because on the
one hand, they associate non-members of a given REC to negotiations while on the other
hand splitting other RECs.
The complexities of conforming to a CET in regional groupings
According to (Andriamananjara, 2011) setting and conforming to a CET is a daunting
task which requires strong institutions and concessions amongst the different parties to the
negotiations. Because of the difficulties in agreeing to CET, trade negotiations within CUs or
negotiating configurations can take several years. The author gives scenarios of situations
where negotiations on CET took several years. For instance, the EU, arguably the world’s
most successful integration project so far took 11 years (1957 to 1968) to completely
negotiate its CET. The South American Common Market (Mercosur) took 4 years to
negotiate its non-agricultural CET.
Also, even when agreements are reached, there are usually exceptions that are
designed to accommodate the specific interests of the parties involved. As stated by
(Andriamananjara, 2011) “in the current wave of regionalism, in which flexibility and speed
are valued, membership in a CU, if played by the rules, could constitute a straitjacket for
some countries.” Such flexibilities usually concern tariff schedules and sector specific
considerations. Examples include Mercosur wherein not all sectors are covered by the CET
and includes special regimes for sensitive sectors such as automobiles and sugar. Another
example provided by the author is the EAC CU wherein countries like Kenya and Tanzania
can unilaterally reduce tariffs on imports of grains for reasons linked to food security.
It therefore appears from the literature that fully functional CUs are a rare
phenomenon in the global trading regime. (Baldwin & Freund, 2011) agree with

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(Andriamananjara, 2011, p. 129) on the crucial responsibility of supranational decision-
making institutions to “keep all external tariff in line in the face of changed in antidumping
duties; special unilateral preferences to third nations such as the Generalised System of
Preferences,; and tariff changes in multilateral trade talks.” According to these authors,
only two types of such institutions exist in the world today, the EU, and nations involved in
superhegemon relations i.e., France and Monaco; Switzerland and Liechtenstein; and the
South African Customs Union).
In a nutshell, although the flexibilities accommodated in trade negotiation blocs
facilitate a compromise for the conclusion of a deal, they not only “reduce the transparency
and effectiveness of the CU, but they also can complicate trade negotiations and increase
transaction costs. Furthermore, they reintroduce the potential for trade deflection—the very
phenomenon that the CU is designed to prevent” (Andriamananjara, 2011, p. 115). (Cf. p 29
of this dissertation for a definition of trade deflection)
The challenges of multiple overlapping membership in RECs on Trade Collusion
(Andriamananjara, 2011) highlights that when states belong to several RECs,
difficulties may arise because the different groups to which they belong might have dissimilar
or even conflicting operational or liberalization modalities, which could render member
countries’ commitments incompatible. As a result, CUs could be less effective as they
confuse traders (and even customs officers) as to which commitments or tariff schedules
apply to a particular shipment. Transaction costs could be heightened as traders seek to find
their way around a number of trade regimes with different tariff schedules, Rules of Origin
(ROO), and procedures.
Nevertheless, the author notes that despite these counterproductive consequences,
states have not been dissuaded from a predilection to multiple REC membership. Indeed, he
provides examples of cases in which a CU member alone negotiates an FTA with a third
party such as the FTAs between the EU and South Africa (a member of Southern Africa
Customs Union) and between the United States and Bahrain (a member of the Gulf
Commission Council); Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland belong to COMESA while also
belonging to SACU, and Tanzania is a member of both the SADC and the EAC etc.
What this situation proves is that the deficiency of collusion is not unique to Central
Africa. However, on its part, this dissertation aims to offer less breadth and more depth by
delivering a complementary micro analysis of the dynamics of North-South political
economy via the EU-CEMAC+ case.

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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
According to (Klotz & Prakash, 2008, p. 12), the method a study uses cannot be
dissociated from its research questions. Based on this consideration, this research shall be
conducted primarily by qualitative methods. More precisely, the content analysis
methodology shall be employed (Pashakhanlou, 2017). The choice of this methodological
approach is justified on the basis that it gives room to constructive interpretation of discourse
in the conduct of trade negotiations and practices between the EU and CEMAC+ countries.
Indeed, trade relations are not just about monetary values which could warrant quantitative
approach. Trade carries with it distribution of resources, linkages and dependencies with
power implications which can be well understood qualitatively.
Data collection
This dissertation relies principally on secondary data which is made public by the EU
Commission and the respective Central African Governments involved in these negotiations
via the CEMAC Secretariat. The final communiques of the negotiation meetings are
generally available on the websites of these entities and on those of some of the ministries of
foreign affairs, economy and trade and the Permanent representations of the said countries to
the EU. On this note, another vital source of data is the Ministerial Committee on the
negotiations of the EPA, known by its French acronym, COMINA, which is the ad-hoc
grouping of the Ministers of Trade and Economy of the CEMAC+ negotiation countries that
gather at least twice a year to review the progress made on these negotiations.
Important data is also gotten from official documents of specialised organisations
such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the International
Trade Centre (ITC), the WTO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). Although interviews were not conducted by the researcher, some very important
interviews granted by key actors of the negotiations and made public in magazines and
gazettes have been explored. All these data supplement the main scientific literature; books
and articles, employed in this research.
Theoretical Framework
This study adopts the framework of (Collier & Gunning, 1995, p. 388) in assessing
the effectiveness of collusion and regional integration in trade policy formulation in the
Central Africa negotiating configuration. The authors state that for regional integration to be
the appropriate objective for trade policy, the following conditions must all be met:
• Collusive trade policy must be superior to unilateral trade policy
• Reciprocal discrimination must be superior to reciprocal non-discrimination

15
• Regional reciprocal discrimination must be superior to south-north reciprocal
discrimination
The data collected for this research is analysed along the lines of this framework by
seeking discourses that are more aligned to any of the six trends identified in these three
conditions. For instance, emphasis is laid on arguments given by a high-level negotiator in an
interview granted (from a secondary source) to explain why his country solely adopted a
unique policy while the rest of the negotiating configuration chose an alternative path. In
such a situation, the dynamics of unilateral trade policy as against collusive trade policy is
investigated discursively and via a process tracing approach.
Figure 1: The Triple Hierarchy of Regional Collusion
Source: Designed by researcher from the framework of (Collier & Gunning, 1995).
Collusive
trade policy
Unilateral
trade policy
Reciprocal
discrimination
reciprocal
non-
discrimination
Regional
reciprocal
discrimination
south-north
reciprocal
discrimination

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Chapter 4: Findings
A. Historical Evolution of EU (North) – Central Africa (South) political
Economy of Trade
EU-CEMAC+ negotiations are grounded in colonial policies and post-colonial
regimes which evolved along the lines of structural relations in the international system.
(Brown, 2002, p. 19) in his reading of (Barraclough, 1967) coins:
“The political economy of North-South relations, as an inter-state phenomenon,
are a creation of the post-war era, the roots of which lie in the process of decolonization. This
was an historic process for the modern international system. At no other time has so great a
number of sovereign states been created in so short a space of time: between 1945 and 1960
more than 40 new states came into being, representing a geographical spread of the
state system of enormous importance (Barraclough 1967)”
The colonial trade regime: Exogeneous control of the territories
This colonial trade regime was essentially extractive and the French and British shaped
the economies of the colonies to their respective needs (Jones, 2013, p. 60). Colonial trade as
Adam Smith had contended was always detrimental to the colonies, all other nations and
even to the “mother nation” in the end, like all other mean and malignant expedients of the
mercantile system (Raffer, 1987, p. 13) (Smith, 1976, pp. 610-).
After two devastating wars, France, via the Schumann declaration, took the initiative to
establish strong European institutions aimed at sustaining peace among European countries
and Africa was an essential aspect of it as revealed by this extract (Schuman, 1950):
“With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its
essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent. In this way, there will be
realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment
of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper
community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.”
With this goal in mind, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was instituted
and seven years after Schuman’s declaration, the European Economic Community (EEC) was
born via the Treaty of Rome of March 1957. At this point, decolonisation was not envisaged,
and member states of the EEC clearly intended to treat their colonies as if they were
participants in the evolving Customs Union. As stated in Article 133.1 of (The Treaty of
Rome, 1957):
“Customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods originating in the
countries and territories shall be completely abolished in conformity with the
progressive abolition of customs duties between Member States in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty.”

17
The colonies were a key part of Europe’s international economic policy because they
provided some of the raw materials which Europe needed for its industries. From the
colonies’ perspective, being under the control of foreign administration meant that they did
not have institutional autonomy and the bureaucratic architecture to develop and implement
trade policies with Europe and the rest of the world.
Independence of the colonies and the perpetuation of dependency reflected in
the Yaoundé I and Yaoundé II Conventions
Following the accession to independence of several African states in the early 1960s
as well as the expiry of the Trade provisions in Part IV of the Rome Treaty, 18 African
Francophone countries1
embarked on negotiations with the EEC for a new trade regime.
Contrarily to the UK which accorded unilateral trade preferences to its colonies, France
successfully advocated for EEC member states to adopt reciprocity in trade liberalisation with
the territories. Indeed, the trade system after the First World War was based on the principle
of reciprocity (Mennes & Kol, 2005, p. 11). This EU policy towards Africa was highly
criticised by leaders of African independent movements at the time such as Ghana’s
President, Kwame Nkrumah, who considered the EEC as a system of collective colonisation
(Jones, 2013, p. 62). There was some perception of this regime being divisive, neo-liberal and
exploitative of Africa (Campling, 2015, p. 63). Under France’s influence, the EEC agreed to
the establishment of a European Development Fund (EDF) whose goal was to fund
development projects in the colonies.
These francophone African states in these negotiations had little room for manoeuvre
as most of their trade was done with Europe (France) and they depended significantly on
European firms for the production of their main export products. For them, the cost of giving
up preferential access into the European market and losing aid and other forms of assistance
was too high.
At the time of negotiating the Yaoundé II convention with the EEC, these newly
independent African states still lacked the institutional capacity to secure more concessions
from the EEC. An effective strategy which they undertook was to form a united front via the
creation of the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM)2
. Despite the heterogeneity of its
members, they were able to maintain a common position in the negotiations articulated
1 These included all the countries of the Central African negotiating configuration except for Equatorial
Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe which are of course not Francophone but rather Hispanophone
and Lusophone respectively.
2 This could be translated in English as the African and Malagasy Union

18
around 3 main demands: negotiating on a basis of parity and equality of representation,
maintaining advantages equivalent at least to the Rome Treaty and extracting an EEC-
financed commodity price stabilisation scheme (Jones, 2013).
Since these countries had weak bargaining power, they appealed to the honour and
integrity of the EEC to see through their development needs. Contrary to their requests, aid
allocations that were agreed upon were significantly lower, the EEC rejected their request for
the joint management of aid and the creation of the commodity price stabilisation fund. As
power asymmetries weighed against them, these francophone African states agreed to this
deal.
The immediate trade environment in the former British colonies
It is important to understand how the trade regimes linking Britain’s former colonies
and the EEC were structured as this had an impact on the wider ACP group later. Indeed,
former British colonies were seeking a new form of trade relations with the EEC. Most
notable of these was Nigeria, Africa’s second largest economy. Nigeria’s negotiations with
the EEC started in 1963 and culminated in the Lagos Treaty in 1966. The Nigerian
government was strongly opposed to any idea of reciprocity in trade regimes with developed
EEC countries. Also, as a matter of pragmatism, Nigeria was also strongly opposed to any
form of preference that could be granted to francophone African countries which as it
perceived, made its own productions uncompetitive on the EEC market (Jones, 2013, p. 67).
In its negotiations, Nigeria rejected every aspect of aid in the deal and focused on
market access to the EEC on the same terms as the Yaoundé Agreement, while offering a
margin of 2-5% to the EEC on some product lines that were carefully chosen in such a
manner that they were not of interest to its other major partners: the UK and the USA.
Despite long protests by the French Government, the deal was signed (Jones, 2013, p. 68).
In comparison to the francophone countries, Nigeria had a significant leverage in
these negotiations and was able to negotiate for reciprocity because it did not depend as much
on trade with the EEC (its main trading partners were the US and the UK), did not associate
any form of aid with trade and so could easily walk away from the negotiations without
losing out too much. Beyond this however was also the skill and awareness of Nigeria’s
negotiators in building on these structural factors in securing themselves a better deal.
Moreover, most EEC member states (Germany, The Netherlands etc.) were interested in
finding a trade agreement with former British colonies in order to dampen their criticism of
trade arrangements with francophone Africa.

19
In a similar fashion, the East African nations led by Tanganyika, i.e. Tanzania,
embarked on trade talks with the EEC by emphasizing the principle of non-reciprocity which
was gaining significant traction in international arena such as GATT and UNCTAD. In the
end there was some form of symbolic reciprocity but not as profound as in the Yaoundé
Agreement.
The Lomé Agreement and non-reciprocity in favour of ACP Countries
Broader trade negotiations took place between the EEC and the 46 countries of the
ACP which comprised of signatories to the Yaoundé II Agreement, Commonwealth States in
Africa and the Pacific and some other countries that had not been in any previous trade
agreement with the EEC. These negotiations were prompted by Britain’s accession to the
EEC in 01st
January 1973 (CVCE, 2015). As the important question at that time was
articulated on what will become of the Britain’s preferences to its former colonies, the EEC
invited them for talks on grounds that they would adhere to the Yaoundé convention terms.
This was not the case as these anglophone countries firmly rejected any form of reciprocity
(Jones, 2013).
Nigeria’s proactive diplomacy bolstered ACP countries to speak with one voice and
gain substantially in the new trade regime that was agreed upon. Indeed, the Lomé
Agreement guaranteed unilateral DFQF access for ACP countries into the EEC’s market with
no obligation on their part to reciprocate. The agreement also created an operational
compensation scheme (STABEX) for agricultural products. When world prices fell, the ACP
states received interest-free repayable compensation from the EEC. Also, unlike in the
previous agreements, ACP countries were not obliged to provide preferences to European
companies or guarantee the free flow of capital.
The second Lomé Agreement which was signed on 31 October 1979 instituted the
system of stabilisation of earnings from mining products, SYSMIN, which allowed the EEC
to provide urgent financial assistance to ACP states experiencing serious upheaval in the
mining industry if it represented a major proportion of their total export volume, and the EDF
was doubled (CVCE, 2015). These characteristics of the Lomé framework based on
partnership, dialogue, contractuality and predictability –gained EU–ACP relations the label of
a ‘unique model of North–South cooperation (Scappucci, 1998, p. 109). They were crucial to
developing countries considering that the volatility of most commodity prices on world
markets, as well as deteriorating terms of trade relative to manufactures, had been a major
problem for development planning and finance (Yeats, 1979, p. 5).

20
The Cotonou Agreement: Agenda setting for WTO conformity in EU-ACP
trade regime
By the mid-1990s it became obvious that the EU wanted to put an end to the unilateral
preferences offered to ACP countries. Indeed, this trade regime had been contested severally
by GATT/WTO members for its non-conformity with the organisation’s principle of non-
discrimination. The EU advocated for the establishment of FTAs with ACP countries. In its
approach to the negotiations, the EU put an end to 2 fundamental aspects by splitting off the
ACP Group: non-reciprocity and non-differentiation. The former had been a critical element
of the ethical discourse of the development advocacy of developing countries in global trade
governance while the latter had been a key factor in conferring negotiation advantage to the
ACP countries.
The Cotonou Agreement which was finally signed in 2000 provided for a maximum
of 8 years for the negotiation of regional EPAs with ACP countries that were now divided
into 7 groups (European Commission, 2018):
➢ Central Africa
➢ Eastern and Southern Africa
➢ East African Community
➢ Southern African Development Community
➢ West Africa
➢ Caribbean
➢ Pacific
B. Institutions of Regional Integration and the Negotiating Configuration in
Central Africa
Regional integration in Central Africa has been structured around two main
institutions. The first major one is the CEMAC while the second, which has been relatively
less active on the integrationist agenda is the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS). In addition to the 6 CEMAC states, ECCAS is composed of the other 2 CEMAC+
states; DRC and Sao Tome and Principe as well as Angola and Burundi.
CEMAC
An understanding of regional integration in Central Africa warrants a broader
perspective from the entire continent. Indeed, as African states began to gain independence in
the 1960s, they met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and founded the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) on 25 May 1963 where the Heads of state decided to implement regional integration
via political, judicial and economic cooperation as a means to achieve collective

21
development. (Sommo Pende, 2010). To achieve this goal, these leaders divided the continent
into 5 regional economic units (Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western and Central Africa)
within which institutional mechanisms had to be developed to this effect. In this regard,
Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Gabon and Congo signed the treaty creating the Customs Union of
Central African States (UDEAC) on 08 December 1964. Equatorial Guinea was the 6th
member to join on 01January 1985.
However, after 30 years of cooperation within the UDEAC, intra-regional trade and
movement of people was not effective, and it was obvious that there was a need for a new
boost in regionalism within central Africa (Sommo Pende, 2010). The governments of
UDEAC decided to revamp the institution by creating the CEMAC which was born out of the
treaty of Ndjamena on 16 March 1994. This goal within the framework of this sub-regional
institution was to harmonise regional policies and institute a judicial and economic
environment that would boost investment and establish a common market in Central Africa.
ECCAS
On its part, the ECCAS was born out of the initiative of then Gabonese President,
Omar Bongo. The declared objective of the organisation at its creation in 1983 was to
consolidate regional integration in central Africa and ultimately ease the creation of the
African common market and the African Economic Community.
In terms of trade, the following targets were set in the founding texts of the
organisation: free movement of people, easing customs procedures, instituting compensatory
mechanisms, adopting a CET with CEMAC, eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
and adopting agricultural and industrial policies (ECCAS, 2014).
Figure 2: REC overlap and the EPA Negotiating Configuration in Central Africa
Source: Translated by researcher based on map from (South Center, 2007, p. 2)

22
C. Central Africa’s institutional framework for negotiating the EPA
The Central African negotiating configuration carries out joint negotiations on its
position within the framework of the Committee for the Negotiation on the EPA, which is
composed of member states’ ministers of Trade and Experts.
The Council of Ministers of the CEMAC mandated the Executive Secretariat of the
CEMAC to take joint efforts with the General Secretariat of the ECCAS in view of
negotiating and concluding EPAs with the EU. In this regard, the Council created a Regional
Committee for Negotiations with the goal of meeting the following 5 objectives:
• Create a FTA between the EU and CEMAC countries + Sao Tome and Principe3
which conforms to the rules of the WTO
• Prioritise development (in Central Africa)
• Deeping regional integration in Central Africa
• Boost trade cooperation
• Improve competitivity (building capacity)
According to the road map of the negotiations, the organigram is structured thus (Biyoghe
Mba & Hubner, 2004):
The Council of the Ministers of the (Economic Union of Central Africa) UEAC4,
composed of three ministers from each member state. It issues the directives by which the
negotiations shall be undertaken.
The Trade Ministerial Committee, composed of the trade ministers of the central
African countries. Its role is to supervise the ACP negotiations at a political level. It controls
the work of the negotiating structures and particularly approves the conclusions of the
Regional Negotiating Committee. It is presided by the minister of trade of the country
occupying the presidency of the negotiations and meets before and after each negotiation
round. Its decisions ae validated by the Council of Ministers of the UEAC for CEMAC and
the Council of Ministers for the ECCAS.
The Regional Committee for Negotiations which oversees the negotiations at a
technical level is presided by the Executive Secretary of the CEMAC, assisted by the Deputy
Secretary General of the ECCAS. Its competence is codified in the regulations of CEMAC
n°02/02/UEAC-085-CM-08 of 03 August 2002.
3 DRC joined the negotiations later, so was not part of the initial bloc)
4 UEAC is an organ of the CEMAC in charge of economic cooperation

23
The Technical Working Groups prepare the works of the RCN and are presided by the
Director of Trade of the CEMAC, assisted by the Director for Trade of the ECCAS.
In addition, the joint Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) was created to facilitate
links and coherence between the trade negotiations and related financial assistance (ECDPM,
2006, p. 3)
Figure 3: EPA Negotiating Architecture (South Centre, 2007, p. 4)
D. Contentious issues on the EPA: Opposing perspectives on trade
liberalisation
Loss of tariff revenue
From the point of view of the African states, the major challenge with the EPA is the
decrease of government revenue resulting from the elimination of tariffs on EU products
(South Centre, 2007, p. 11). On the flip side, the EU believes that states’ dependence on
tariffs as a major source of revenue is not sustainable and has agreed ‘in principle’ to support
programmes that enhance the competitiveness of the business sector, help governments
transition out of dependence of tariffs revenue, and implement fiscal reforms (South Centre,
2007, p. 10).
The Infant Industry Argument
Developing countries’ governments contend that liberalisation of their economic
environments to European products will expose their industries to unrivalled competition
from more efficient European manufacturers and certainly lead to their demise given their
relative less capacity.
EU Common Agricultural Policy CAP (non-) Reform
The scepticism towards the EPA is heightened by resistances within the EU to put an
end to its agricultural subsidies as requested by most developing states within the framework
of the Doha negotiations for a reform of the multilateral trading system (Conceição-Heldt,
2011, p. 162). Indeed, these subsidies have been condemned for causing unfair competition,

24
encouraging dumping and outcompeting local producers with cheap imports (South Centre,
2007, p. 16).
Farmers in developing countries who sign the EPA and whose governments do not
provide them with similar means, will face direct disloyal competition against EU farmers
who are subsidised. In these countries, agriculture is an important sector and a major
employer. Chad, one of the CEMAC+ states, has been the most vocal in calling for an end to
EU subsidies which, as it argues, negatively affects its own domestic cotton sector and
amplifies poverty rates within its population (South Centre, 2007, pp. 16-17). For 2001-2002
alone, the EU granted 1 billion USD worth of subsidies to cotton producers alone (Baffes,
2005, p. 264). This issue is a very sensitive one which causes friction between developed and
developing economies (Das, 1990, p. 125).
Mercantilism reflected in Aid for Development Commitments requested
from the EU
The issue of aid for development support appears to have been the most contentious
issue throughout the negotiations. Writing in 2007, the South Centre noted that “negotiations
of phase 2 had, in fact, been blocked since July 2006, owing to strong divergences among
African and European negotiators concerning the format, definition and contents of the EPA
accompanying measures aimed at levelling up the productive capacity of Central Africa”
(South Centre, 2007).
Central Africa asked for the inclusion of the matter in the formal EPA negotiating
process. While the EU recognised their importance, it maintained that the negotiations should
focus on trade aspects only and insisted that the developmental dimension should be covered
by external instruments such as the WTO Aid for trade and the programming of the European
Development Fund (EDF). Indeed, the establishment of the RPTF along the lines of the EPA
negotiations were meant to facilitate dialogue on these questions on capacity building (Cf. p
23 above).
The EU decided to push the agenda process into the final stage of negotiation while
promising to address this conflicting issue at a later stage. 5
This approach was inefficient as
portrayed by its rejection by the majority of the CEMAC+ countries. In the EU-Cameroon
iEPA, no concrete engagement on this matter was taken. Rather, just a document recognising
the needs of the region in terms of overcoming supply side constraints via capacity building
was annexed to the main agreement (EU - Cameroon, 2009, pp. 39-44).
5 « Communiqué Final du Comité Ministériel Commercial Conjoint élargi » (6 February 2007). Available
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/february/tradoc_133268.pdf.

25
This has continued to be contentious issue in these negotiations as they protract 18
years after their commencement. In their most recent extraordinary summit, the Heads of
state of the CEMAC, in their final declaration stressed that the
“adoption of a compensatory mechanism which allocates for fiscal loss
resulting from the liberalisation of Central African markets must be considered
a priority in these negotiations (…) These negotiations must deliver a regional
Agreement which is complete, just and equitable on a commercial and
financial basis and capable of guaranteeing the development of the region.
(CEMAC, 2016)”
E. The EU’s EBA and GSP as Pressure differentiating factors in the
Central African negotiating architecture
A crucial question is “in a case of a “no deal” on the EPA negotiations, were these
countries all under the same threat of trading with the EU under the Most Favoured Nation
clause (MFN) which would have stripped them of SDT and DFQF access on the EU market?
It appears that the EU’s multiple development-trade regimes articulated on the EBA and GSP
had a differentiating effect on these states choices.
The EU’s existing EBA regime provided the opportunity for five of the eight
negotiating CEMAC+ countries to maintain DFQF access on the EU market without any
obligation to reciprocate. Indeed, this regime which was coined under the premise of the
WTO’s enabling clause, offered all LDCs (not only those from the ACP as with the contested
Lomé agreement) the possibility to be exempted from the MFN clause and receive SDT
which other developing countries are not eligible to. These LDCs include Chad, CAR,
Equatorial Guinea, DRC and Sao Tome and Principe. In plain terms, European external trade
policy bifurcated the states of the Central African negotiating configuration into 5 LDCs
which could continue to benefit from Lomé equivalent market access provisions under the
EBA and 3 non-LDCs without these privileges (Cf. table 1, p.27 below).
However, the history of the EBA precedes the EPA negotiations and was established
out of a global pressure in the WTO for extension of SDT to all LDCs and not only former
colonies of European countries. The EU was obliged to grant Lomé style preferences to non-
ACP LDCs and this was an unprecedented move in its relations with the developing South
(Faber & Orbie, 2009, pp. 778-779). This was manifested by the adoption in 1997 of the EBA
initiative which allowed all goods from LDCs except arms to access the EU market DFQF
with no obligation to reciprocate. This move drew a clearer line between LDCs and non-
LDCs and blurred the position of the ACP, and its negotiating configurations, as a distinct
‘holistic’ category in Europe’s trade ambit (Faber & Orbie, 2009, p. 778).

26
At the time, this seemed inconsequential. But even without directly addressing the
status of the ACP group, it set a precedent for the differentiation between ACP LDCs and
ACP non-LDCs (Faber & Orbie, 2009, p. 779). It was clear at this stage that reciprocal trade
relations would be pursued. But what appeared problematic was the difficulties that arise
when non-reciprocal treatment is given to LDCs participating a FTA, a difficulty which the
Commission had foreseen. If ACP LDCs agreed to EPA, they will face less favourable
treatment than their LDC counterparts outside of the ACP. In this light the Cotonou
agreement was coined with some conditionality of interest stating that only countries that
found themselves as being in a position to do so could negotiate the EPAs. The ACP LDCs
had a very strong incentive to side with non-ACP LDCs and discard the EU-ACP trade
framework, a move which non-LDC ACP countries could not afford (Faber & Orbie, 2009).
Writing in 2002 as regional EPAs started to be negotiated (McQueen, 2002, p. 109)
noted that:
“The EU special preferences for the LDCs create a potential obstacle for the
negotiation of EPAs since practically all of the ACP sub-groups which could negotiate
EPAs include LDCs. The LDCs have now been given the same duty and quota free
access to the EU market as they could obtain under an EPA, while if they participate
in an EPA they will have to offer the EU free access to their domestic markets.”
Of the three countries in the negotiating configuration that were not eligible for the
EBA, the Republic of Congo was eligible to the GSP which although not as generous as the
EBA scheme equally offers DFQF on most products exported from beneficiary countries into
the EU (Cernat, et al., 2004, p. 220) (Liapis, 2007). There was therefore little incentive for
Congo to sacrifice its customs revenue within the framework of the EPA whereas it could
continue to benefit from substantial access on the EU market via the GSP scheme.
In a nutshell it can be argued that the 5 countries that were eligible for the EBA
scheme as well as the sole country, Congo that was eligible for the GSP scheme had not and
currently still do not face the same pressure that the other two countries; Cameroon and
Gabon faced in the advent of a “no deal”.

27
Country Cameroon Gabon Congo Chad C.A.R Eq.
Guinea
DR
Congo
Sao Tome
&Principe
Status Developing Middle
income
developing
Developing LDC LDC LDC LDC LDC
Alternative
Regime to
maintaining
DFQF access
in EU market
post waiver on
Lomé
provisions
None None GSP EBA EBA EBA EBA EBA
Trading
Regime post-
WTO waiver
EPA MFN GSP EBA EBA EBA EBA EBA
Table 1: Alternative EU Trade Regimes available to CEMAC+ countries in the pre- and
post-WTO waiver deadline

28
Chapter 5: Discussion
A. Why did Cameroon sign the iEPA with the EU?
National interest
According to Cameroon’s minister of economy, the main motivation for signing the
EPA was the country’s quest to avoid any distortions on its exports as of the 31st
of
December 2007 [expiry date of the WTO waiver in Lomé discriminatory preferences]
(Motaze, 2016). He further adds that by signing the agreement Cameroon “benefited as of the
01st
of January 2008, from DFQF access on the EU market for its exports such as banana,
aluminium, cocoa products, wood as well as other fresh and processed agricultural products”
(Motaze, 2016).
Cameroon’s decision to sign this agreement as well as the other countries’ refusal to
do so is therefore an expression of primacy of national interest over regional solidarity
considerations in the conduct of trade diplomacy. (Pigman, 2016, p. 15) contends that trade
diplomacy frames trade negotiations as the essential and original form of human negotiation,
in that it resolves political disputes over who-gets what questions. For as the Cameroonian
government perceived it, at least six of the other seven negotiating countries of the
configuration had alternative legal and WTO recognised regimes through which their
products could continue to benefit from DFQF access on the EU market. Had Cameroon not
signed the agreement, its exports would have been outclassed competitively by other DFQF
access countries including the very ones with whom it was a member within the Central
African negotiating configuration. As coined by the Cameroonian minister of economy, “by
concluding this bilateral agreement with the EU, Cameroon sought to preserve its trade
interests” (Motaze, 2016).
However, the Cameroonian government adopted a liberalisation schedule which
pushes the burden of fiscal impact to a later date (2023) and made liberalisation exemptions
amounting to about 20% of trade in sensitive sectors such as agriculture.
Nevertheless, the argument of ‘national interest’ is one that must be approached with
caution in political economy analysis because as (Hocking & McGuire, 1999, p. 3) contend:
“the very nature of trade policy, with its focus on balancing the economic
interests of a range of domestic constituencies, undermines the notion of the state as
a unitary actor, pursuing a clear and identifiable ‘national interest’. Indeed, in many
senses, trade politics, concerned as it is with the distribution of resources within and
between political communities, is amongst the clearest manifestations of the
processes determining who gets what, why and how. And as the trade agenda
becomes more complex, explaining how trade policy is formulated and articulated

29
demands that the role and interactions of a range of governmental and non-
governmental actors be taken into account.”
Based on this, and following profound research conducted by (Jones, 2013, pp. 272-
273), it was found that the lobbying action from non-state actors (NSA) such as the Group of
Businessmen in Cameroon (GICAM), the Syndicate of Cameroonian Industries
(SYNDUSTRICAM) and other civil society organisations (CSO) that opposed the iEPA, was
not sufficient to stop the Cameroonian government from signing the agreement. This is
symptomatic of the high degree of governmental centralisation in this region where non-state
actors are not as influential as in other regions (Jones, 2013, p. 273). However, the other
countries of the CEMAC+ whose interest laid in refuting the EPA incorporated some of the
arguments of these NSAs (Jones, 2013, p. 273).
Consequently, national interest as alluded to in this research refers to the official
government position and in no case assumes uniformity of preferences within the different
CEMAC+ states.
B. Trade Deflection – Reinforced rules of origin and hardened borders
in the CEMAC
Article 4 of the CEMAC treaty established a common external tariff (CET) applied to
all third country imports and the gradual removal of tariffs on intra-regional trade.
Furthermore, there are efforts to harmonize the common external tariffs between CEMAC
and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and introduce the free
circulation of goods (South Centre, 2013, p. 12).
Also, according to Article 21 of the EU-Cameroon EPA, new tariffs cannot be
introduced by both Parties and the current level of tariffs must be maintained and cannot be
increased. Therefore, Cameroon cannot impose higher tariffs on goods from the EU market
again, and even if were decided through renegotiations for the CET among CEMAC and/or
ECCAS Member States. The policy space currently available for Central African States to
(re-)agree on the Common External Tariff is limited by this consideration (South Centre,
2013).
Cameroon’s sole implementation of the EPA implies that the CET of the CEMAC
vis-à-vis the EU is compromised and the issue with this situation is that it could lead to trade
diflection - a situation in which goods from outside the FTA are shipped to a low-tariff
country and then transhipped tariff-free to the high-tariff country (Andriamananjara, 2011, p.
113). Such roundabout shipping patterns, which have the sole purpose of exploiting the
existing tariff differential, are inherently inefficient and can create friction among members.

30
To counter trade deflection in FTAs or ineffective CUs, states resort to a ROO system
which can take various forms, but generally requires that goods (or value added) qualifying
for tariff-free trade be produced within the PTA and that imports from outside pay the tariff
of the destination country, even if they pass through another member country
(Andriamananjara, 2011, p. 113).
The ineffectiveness of the CET in the CEMAC could lead to hardened borders
between the Central African countries as the non-EPA countries reinforce their assessment of
the origin of goods crossing intraregional borders. Also, ROO in EPA negotiating countries
such as those of the CEMAC impose costs greater than 3% of the value of export because of
information constraints and institutional difficulties (Francois, 2006, p. 61). Theoretically,
had a CET been fully in force, such internal controls would not be necessary.
(Andriamananjara, 2011, p. 113) states that
“In practice, rules of origin are particularly complex, and their implementation costs
can be high. They necessitate significant internal border controls to ensure compliance and to
collect the relevant customs duties.”
Therefore, the EU’s special provisions for LCDs increases ROO tendencies and
decrease possibility for regional integration within African regional blocs, including the
CEMAC+ (McQueen, 2002). While the COMINA has taken decisions recently to increase
surveillance and capacity building for ROO (COMINA, 2017, p. 4), this measure could be a
bottleneck for free trade if CEMAC states (and CEMAC+) adopt conflicting trade policies.
However, it must be noted that the possibility of trade deflection [and jumping
investment] may incite non-signatories of the CEMAC to lower their tariffs to prevent
imports from going through Cameroon. Eventually, this may lead to a converge of interests
on an inter-regional EPA with the EU and thus a collusion of trade policy. For this to be
achieved, more policy coordination and flexibility towards the specific interests of CEMAC+
countries are required.

31
Table 2: Summary of Cameroon market access schedule
Source: (Bilal & Stevens, 2009, p. 115)
Differentiated trade regimes – divergent interests
C. Diluting intraregional alliance: From Geography to Status of
Development
The most important allies in the norm entrepreneurship endeavour to maintain
unilateral SDT for the ACP LDC countries in the Central African negotiating bloc is the
group comprising of the other non-ACP LDCs. This weakens group cohesion within the
Central Africa negotiating bloc, coupled with Cameroon’s decision to sign the EPA. This
weakens cooperation despite declarations made by the governments of CEMAC that
measures will be taken to prevent Cameroon from paying a penalty for violation of the
community’s regulation and signing this deal all alone.
As explained by (Andriamananjara, 2011), trade deals are not simply all about trade.
Indeed, “there are many possible rationales for choosing a CU over an FTA, including
political and economic ones. Some regional groupings consider the establishment of a CU a
prerequisite for the future establishment of a political union, or at least some deeper form of
economic integration, such as a common market. The Abuja Treaty of 1991 envisaged
gradual implementation in the following stages: creation of regional blocs, by 1999;
strengthening of intrabloc integration and interbloc harmonization, by 2007; establishment of
an FTA and then a CU in each regional bloc, by 2017; establishment of a continentwide
customs union, by 2019; realization of a continentwide African Common Market (ACM), by
2023; and (f) creation of a continentwide economic and monetary union (and thus also a
currency union) and a parliament, by 2028.

32
Therefore, the current divisions amongst Central African countries along the different
trade-development regimes of the EU and the distortions to the CET thereof, goes beyond the
sole issue of trade to question the region’s wider economic and political objectives.
D. External Dependency and Deficiency of Collusion Within Central
Africa in its EPA negotiations with the EU
Trade diversion among Central African countries
The primary effect of PTA is that they discriminate against non-members. In the case
of the EU-Cameroon EPA which establishes a FTA between both entities, trade could be
diverted from other African countries in favour of the EU (Karingi, et al., 2004)
. Also, even in the eventuality of an intra-regional trade between the Central African
negotiating bloc and the EU, considerable trade will be diverted from some of those countries
in favour of the EU. Simulations conducted by UNECA using partial and general equilibrium
forecast substantial revenue loss among CEMAC countries in the eventuality of an
interregional EPA (Cf. Table below).
Country Imports
variation from
the EU
Income deficit in
billions of US
dollars
Variation of lost
income
Cameroon 28.58% -149,256,117 -69.60
Congo 29.11% -75,104,052 -55.20
Gabon 29.96% -74,302,297 -51.90
Equatorial
Guinea
29.36% -33,914,150 -60.30
Central African
Republic
27.64% -5,844,950 -55.60
Chad 24.01% -26,677,028 -58.60
Table 3: Simulations on imports and income variation in the CEMAC resulting from an
interregional FTA with the EU
Source: UNECA simulations in partial and general equilibrium (Karingi, et al., 2004, p. 51)
Whether the other CEMAC+ countries choose to join the existing EU-Cameroon FTA
as the EU had once suggested or a new free trade agreement is negotiated, the impact in terms

33
of reduction of intra-regional trade among central African countries could offset regional
integration in this region. This is an important factor considering that intraregional trade
among CEMAC countries is only 2% of their total trade, making it one of the least integrated
regions in the world (Prusa, 2011, p. 184).
Figure 4: Proportion of CEMAC trade within itself (orange), with Africa (purple) and the
Rest of the World (pink)
Source: UNCTAD Statistics consolidated in (Karingi, et al., 2004, p. 21)
E. The Challenges of multiple institutional regionalisms and
multilateralism on EPA negotiations
While the CEMAC states have had a more advanced level of cooperation resulting
from their common monetary policy6
, finding a common ground with DRC and Sao Tome,
and Principe, the other two non-CEMAC members, has proven challenging.
First, for Sao Tome and Principe, since it is not a member of the CEMAC, this
implied that it was not constrained by the obligations to a CET of the CU. Therefore, in order
to effectively coordinate interests in the EPA negotiations, an agreement on trade and
customs needed to be concluded between CEMAC and this country. The negotiations
towards this are still being undertaken.
As for DRC, it started negotiations within the Eastern and Southern Africa regional
negotiating configuration from 2002 – 2005 and only joined the Central African negotiating
configuration thereafter. This situation which is explained by its membership to several sub
regional institutions as explained above raises questions on its commitment to a CET in
6 They all share the FCFA currency,

34
Central Africa. In addition, this adherence was relatively late (2 years to the expiry of the
WTO’s Cotonou waiver). Its inclusion in Central Africa’s regional configuration has
considerably complicated the configuration of the region (…) as it is also a member of SADC
and COMESA which negotiate separate EPAs (South Centre, 2007, p. 2). The question
therefore arises to what extent the DRC can be committed to the dismantling of tariffs within
the CEMAC+ configuration considering its membership in the COMESA and given that the
Eastern African negotiating configuration is not inclined to signing the EPA now?
The complexities of multiple membership of African countries in several regional
blocs as well as the existence of multiple organisations within given zones has been
recognised to the extent that in Central Africa, negotiations have been ongoing between
CEMAC and ECCAS for a merging of both institutions (Josling, 2011, p. 155).
F. The Essence of Timing in Trade Negotiations
For Cameroon, timing was essential because having no other available alternative in
the case of no deal before 01 January 2008, meant that it would have traded with the EU, its
most important partner, under the MFN regime which would have stripped its exports of their
competitiveness in the European market. Like in most multilateral settings, these negotiations
were extremely slow. Time was not on the side of those countries that decided that trade
liberalisation was the appropriate policy to be adopted. As coined by Cameroon’s minister of
economy, “negotiations between the EC and the Central African party have been slow, we are
looking forward to making progress on them” (Motaze, 2016).
In his conceptualisation of the slow pace of multilateral negotiations,
(Andriamananjara, 2011, p. 115) states that “the current wave of regionalism is characterised
by smaller cross-regional deals, flexibility, selectivity and most important speed. The notion
of speed is particularly important. As trade deals drag on, states could find themselves in a
losing position when the other states in their negotiating alliance or their interlocutors drag
on.” In this type of scenario, states could detach themselves from the alliance and adopt a
solitary approach in the defence of their interests as was the case with Cameroon on this
issue.
It is the obstacles to speed in negotiation that incite Collier and Gunning to criticise
any collusive approach to trade negotiation within regional frameworks. According to them,
in their three strata approach to trade policy formulation and adoption for developing
countries, keeping the locus of authority within the national framework tends to be timelier
and thus efficient than engaging in time wasting collusive discriminatory mechanisms.

35
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations
A. Conclusion
This research set out to elucidate the deficiency of collusion among CEMAC+
countries in their approach towards an inter-regional EPA with the EU party. The inability of
these states to agree together on the terms of a FTA with the EU after nearly two decades of
negotiations as well as Cameroon’s unilateral approval of an iEPA triggered the interest on
this research. By means of qualitative methodology, specifically employing process tracing,
this research has provided some important insights regarding intra-regionalism within Central
Africa.
First, although reciprocal discrimination supersedes reciprocal non-discrimination in
the region, it is mainly manifested along the lines of developmental differentiation set out by
global economic institutions adopted by the EU rather than on geographical basis within the
CEMAC (or CEMAC+). Because these states have higher stakes in their trade relations with
the EU and a historic dependency (Babarinde & Wright, 2013, p. 93) than they do amongst
themselves, this has left them structurally stratified along the lines of the EU’s differentiating
developmental-trade regimes established in conformity to the WTO’s principle of non-
discrimination. In plain terms, ACP-LDCs have a greater interest in allying themselves with
other LDCs than with non-LDC ACP countries in their quest for continued DFQF access in
EU markets. The single GSP- and five EBA- eligible countries of the CEMAC+ negotiating
bloc had no interest in establishing reciprocity via an EPA (FTA) with the EU, since like
other LDC countries globally, they are guaranteed unilateral market access for which they do
not have to reciprocate via domestic liberalisation.
The other two ineligible countries chose very opposite paths. While Cameroon
unilaterally signed the EPA, Gabon rejected it and has since the expiry of the WTO waiver to
SDT in 2008, traded with the EU on MFN basis. The justification of both parties articulates
with national interest framed on different models. As stressed by Cameroon’s Minister of
Economy, the Cameroonian government’s priority was to maintain the competitiveness of its
commodities on the EU market. Gabon on its part, like the other CEMAC+ countries
requested for substantial and concrete commitments on development and financial support in
view of compensating for the loss of revenue that would result from the elimination of tariffs
on EU products.
Also, unilateral trade policy dominates collusive trade policy in this region. Although
not unique to CEMAC, compromising the CET of the CU as has been perceived in this
negotiation is evidence of the heightened intergovernmentalism of the bloc in contrast to the

36
expected neo-functionalist cooperation mechanism that should ensure that compromise is
achieved within the CEMAC+ negotiations and ultimately resulting in an inter-regional
agreement eventually reached with the EU, and expected as such by the latter. The inability
of the CEMAC secretariat to curtail any deviations in terms of variability of trade regimes
between these countries, and their third-party counterpart, the EU, attests of the fact that the
region’s states are much more in control of trade policy which they unilaterally frame based
on national interest.
Thirdly, regional reciprocal discrimination appears to dominate North-South
reciprocal discrimination. For the CEMAC+ states, discriminatory trade with the EU in the
form of a FTA must be matched by the EU’s concrete engagement to deliver on the
development needs of the region in terms of infrastructure and lifting of supply side
constraints. The EU’s hesitation to revise some of its policies such as the CAP, coupled with
the projected impacts in terms of trade diversion and deindustrialisation, have heightened
such mercantilist bargains.
One salient aspect that appears in these negotiations is the asymmetry of institutional
capacity and preparedness of the CEMAC secretariat’s inexperience compared to the EU
Commission’s experience. While the former has proven deficient in trade collusion policy,
the latter has remained cohesive in its approach. In such a situation, regional integration
within the Central African bloc could be difficult to achieve particularly in the prevailing
context where the gains of liberalisation for developing countries appears to shrink while the
cost rises (Gallagher, 2013, p. 143). (Nayyaar, 2007, p. 82) notes that “for a game is not
simply about rules. It is also about players. And, if one of the teams or one of the players does
not have adequate training and preparation it would simply be crushed by the other. In other
words, the rules must be such that newcomers or latecomers to the game, say, the developing
countries, are provided with the time and the space to learn so that they are competitive
players rather than pushover opponents”.
B. Policy Recommendations
If an interregional EPA will have to be signed between the EU and CEMAC+ in view
of institutionalising a FTA between the two regions, collusion amongst the Central African
states will be indispensable. However, the achievement of trade policy cohesion within these
countries can only be achieved in due consideration of certain parameters.
First, the trade negotiations must incorporate sufficient flexibility that would allow
CEMAC+ countries to exclude differentiated sensitive sectors that could be highly impacted

37
by liberalisation. Such exclusions can be accommodated within the limits of the generally
accepted 20% margin acknowledged to PTAs in WTO law. These sectors do not have to be
homogeneous amongst the CEMAC+ countries but rather should vary according to the
defined interest of each state. Such an approach would calm the critics of the EU’s CAP and
would maintain some level of tariff revenue for the central African States.
Secondly, for the EBA- and GSP- eligible states of the CEMAC to revert to a FTA
with the EU, the latter must make concrete financial commitments for trade support and
capacity building that can compensate for the loss of tariff revenue resulting from
liberalization. The challenge lies in guaranteeing and proving concretely to the sceptics of
trade liberalisation that gains shall result from such a policy, only then can its case be
convincingly made (Nurkse, 2009, p. 360) and hopefully gain more support. As emphasized
by (Tussie & Aggio, 2006, p. 221), “governments cannot ignore the losers of liberalisation
and the problem of specific loses has to be addressed with concrete and practical initiatives
that take of potential destabilising effect”.
C. Limits of the study and avenues for future research
This study could be further enriched by the collection of primary data via self-
designed interviews and participation in some of the meetings of the COMINA for informal
network and perhaps, a more ethnographic approach to this research. Due to time and
financial constraints these were not possible but, could be carried out within a broader
research project.

38
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Appendices
1. Timeline of Negotiations
11 December 2000: Council of Ministers of CEMAC mandates Executive Secretariat of
CEMAC to prepare EPA negotiations
12 June 2002: European Council Authorises European Commission to begin
negotiating EPAs
03 August 2002: Regional Committee on Negotiations of EPA is created
16 July 2004: Road map adopted for EU-CEMAC+ EPA Negotiations
17 December 2007: EPA initialled between Cameroon and EU
31 December 2008: Expiry date of WTO on EU-ACP Cotonou regime. Only Cameroon
initials an EPA, No inter-regional agreement reached with the EU
15 January 2009: Cameroon signs the EPA
13 June 2013: EU-Cameroon iEPA approved by European Parliament
22 July 2014: Cameroon Ratifies EPA
30 July 2016: Heads of States of the CEMAC hold Extraordinary Conference on
EPAs with the EU and still no agreement was reached
04 August 2016: Cameroon begins implementing the iEPA with tariff reduction on 1st
group of goods from the EU

43
L 57/2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.2.2009
2. INTERIM AGREEMENT
with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its
Member States, of the one part, and the Central Africa Party, of the other part
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREAMBLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TITLE I OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TITLE II PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
TITLE III TRADE REGIME FOR GOODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHAPTER 1 Customs duties and non-tariff measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHAPTER 2 Trade defence instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CHAPTER 3 Customs and trade facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 4 Technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER 5 Forestry governance and trade in timber and forest products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
TITLE IV ESTABLISHMENT, TRADE IN SERVICES AND E-COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
TITLE V TRADE-RELATED RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER 1 Current payments and capital movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER 2 Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER 3 Intellectual property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER 4 Public procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CHAPTER 5 Sustainable development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CHAPTER 6 Protection of personal data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
TITLE VI DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CHAPTER 1 Objective and scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CHAPTER 2 Consultations and mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CHAPTER 3 Procedures for the settlement of disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
CHAPTER 4 General provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
TITLE VII GENERAL EXCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
TITLE VIII GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

44
28.2.2009 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 57/3
‘CENTRAL AFRICA’ WHICH, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT, COMPRISES:
THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON,
of the one part,
THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,
THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA,
THE CZECH REPUBLIC,
THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK,
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA,
IRELAND,
THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC,
THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,
THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA,
THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,
THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY,
MALTA,
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,
THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND,
THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,
ROMANIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA,
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC,
THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND,
THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
of the other part

The political economy of north south trade liberalisation an intra-regional perspective from CEMAC+ and eu

The political economy of north south trade liberalisation an intra-regional perspective from CEMAC+ and eu

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