innovación

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Dutrénit, G. and Puchet, M. (2015), “Tensions of STI policy in Mexico: analytical models, institutional
evolution, national capabilities and governance”, in S. Kuhlmann and G. Ordóñez-Matamoros (eds),
International Research Handbook on Science, Technology and Innovation Policy in Developing Countries:
Rationales and Relevance”, Edward Elgar (forthcoming).
Tensions of Science, Technology and Innovation policy in Mexico:
analytical models, institutional evolution, national capabilities and
governance
Gabriela Dutrénit (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana), gabrieladutrenit@gmail.com
Martín Puchet (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), anyul@unam.mx
Abstract
The analytical framework used for Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) public policy
design worldwide is largely based on a systemic/evolutionary approach and, empirically, it is
based on countries with specific initial conditions - the central economies and some successful
Asian economies. These countries have specific trajectories of institutional building, political
culture and STI capabilities, which shape their National Innovation Systems (NIS). A central
issue in understanding the trajectories and the chances of success or failure of policies
emanating from these models, and variants that aim to adapt to developing economies, is to
analytically conceive the role of the institutional framework, the rules of the game in operation
in the system, the governance at national, sectoral and regional levels, and some aspects of the
political economy in the recipients countries. These affect the STI practice and policy,
contribute to feeding tensions that militate against the building of a sustainable NIS, and are
country specific. The aim of this document is to discuss the experience of STI policymaking in
Mexico, considering the international model and the interaction between the trajectory of
institutional building, the process of construction of both the government and governance of the
NSI, and the political economy. This paper argues that a set of rules and actions are formed and
built from the STI practice; they allow or block actions in governance processes. The data that
will be used to inform our arguments is based on the STI laws and regulations, transcripts of
board meetings and interviews with key agents of the NSI.
1 Introduction
From a systemic/evolutionary approach, it is argued that science, technology and
innovation (STI) policy has to focus on the national system of innovation (NSI), the

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generation and absorption of knowledge as nonlinear dynamic models, and systemic
failures. For this approach, knowledge, accumulated capabilities and time are important,
institutions mediate between agents and there is a growing concern for the regional level
and governance of the NSI (Metcalfe, 1995; Teubal, 2002; Edler et al., 2003; Woolthuis
et al., 2005; Smits et al., 2010a).
In some ways, the models of STI policy associated with international
organizations (mainstream models) have drawn on this perspective, or adopted a
particular interpretation of it. These models have been successfully applied to so-called
newly industrialized countries (e.g. Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), which have displayed
good behavior in their economic indicators as well as in those related to their domestic
national STI capabilities. They have also been extended towards the BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) with varying degrees of success
(Cassiolato and Vitorino, 2009).
The main features of this model are: a policy focus that stresses STI
infrastructure, human capital formation, joint development between academia and
businesses, start-ups based on knowledge, small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)
and innovative clusters, a policy mix centered on demand-side measures as well as
building capabilities and fostering linkages, and a policy governance based on
multilevel coordination and participation. Business innovation is at the center of these
policies (OECD, 2010a).
These models have been offered as recipes for the developing world, and for
some of the emerging economies within it. While many developing countries have
improved the performance of various STI indicators (the contribution of businesses to
research and development expenditure, the number of researchers per economically
active population and to a lesser extent other indicators such as patents), success has

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been limited when compared to the indicators observed in OECD countries, and even
more so considering that structural problems of these economies persist (levels of
inequality, poverty and social exclusion).
The OECD (2010a) argues that the objective of the innovation strategy this
organization promotes is to support a process of policy development, recognizing that
‘one size does not fit all’. However, recommendations are strongly tied to successful
experiences. Several authors claim that these models do not adapt to the prevailing
conditions in developing countries (Arocena and Sutz, 2002; Intarakumnerd and
Chaminade, 2007; Dutrénit and Ramos, 2012; Dutrénit, 2012). In other words, the
analytical framework used for STI policy design was conceived based on countries with
different initial conditions – the central economies. In addition, these countries have a
different trajectory of institutional building. All these contribute to feeding tensions that
militate against the building of a sustainable NSI.
A central issue in understanding the trajectories and the chances of success or
failure of policies emanating from both the mainstream models and variants that aim to
adapt to developing economies is to analytically conceive the role of the institutional
framework and governance at national, sectoral and regional levels.
Following Kuhlmann et al. (2010), if we distinguish between innovation practice
(I), innovation policy (P) and innovation theory (T), it is possible to envisage the image
of a ‘dance floor’ between three partners along an interactive learning space. This paper
argues that this dance floor is conformed by a set of rules and actions. A part of the
institutional framework integrates and encodes rules of the game concerning the
relations between entrepreneurs, technologists, scientific personnel and decision
makers. In turn, these rules of the game allow or block actions in governance processes.
Rules and actions are formed and built from the innovation practice. Additionally, laws,

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regulations and norms for STI activities are established, as well as governance
processes, which are designed in the political system and implemented by various
groups of policymakers. Thus, these legal systems also structure rules and actions but
now from the innovation policy. Questions of ‘how’, ‘how much’ and ‘how
harmoniously’ can rules and actions generated by innovation practice dance together
with those stemming from the innovation policy are challenges for innovation theory
relating to developing economies.
Drawing on a systemic/evolutionary approach and being aware of the difficulties
to interpret recommendations bearing in mind that ‘one size does not fit all’, the aim of
this document is to discuss the experience of STI policymaking in Mexico, considering
the interaction between the trajectory of institution building and the process of
construction of both the government and governance of the NSI.
After this introduction, second section describes the trajectory of institution
building in the arena of the STI policy in Mexico. Then, third section summarizes the
main arguments coming from the mainstream of the innovation policy framework. The
fourth section discusses the main features of the institutional framework and governance
in Mexico, including the evolution of the legislation in STI and the expression of the
stakeholders. The fifth section discusses the rules of the game of the innovation
processes and their impact on system governance, and the six section analyses tensions
that hamper the functioning of the system in a self-regulated manner, and the final
section concludes.
2 The evolution of STI policy in Mexico: a trajectory of institution building
The process of institution building of the STI has its roots in the early twentieth century,
and combines periods where strong efforts were made to create and strengthen the basic

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actors (1970s and 2000s), with others where the sector was severely affected by
macroeconomic instability (1980s) (Corona et al., 2014). Box 1 lists the main facts of
this process.
Box 1. Main facts of the institutional milestones
1930 Academia Nacional de Ciencias [National Academy of Sciences]
1935 Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior y de la Investigación Científica
(CONESIC) [National council of higher education and scientific research]
1942 Comisión Impulsora y Coordinadora de la Investigación Científica (CICIC)
[Commission to foster and coordinate scientific research], which substitutes
CONESIC
1950 Instituto Nacional de la Investigación Científica (INIC) [National institute for
scientific research], which substitutes CICIC
1958 Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior
(ANUIES) [National assocciation of Universities and higher education
institucions]
1959 Academia de la Investigación Científica (AMC) [Academy of scientific
research]
1970 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) [Science and
Technology National Council], which substitutes INIC
1977 CONACyT develops the National Program of Science and Technology
(PRONACyT)
1985 Law to Coordinate and Promote Scientific and Technological Development
1999 Law for the Promotion of Scientific and Technological Research

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2002 Law of S&T, and a new Organic Law of CONACyT; CONACyT elaborates
the Science and Technology Special Program, 2002–2006 (PECyT) [Programa
Especial de Ciencia y Tecnología]; creation of the Scientific and
Technological Advisory Forum (FCCyT) [Foro Consultivo Científico y
Tecnológico]
2004 Modifications of the S&T law: addition of Article 9bis, which states that
Gross Expenditure on R&D as % of Gross Domestic Product must reach 1%
2008 CONACyT elaborates the Science, Technology and Innovation Special
Program, 2008–2012 (PECiTI) [Programa Especial de Ciencia, Tecnología e
Innovación]
2011 Modifications to the S&T law: addition of a long-term approach, the PECiTI
should be designed to 25 years, the approach to S&T is modified by a focus on
STI
2013 Coordination of STI in the Office of the President; Changes to the S&T law:
promoting and encouraging the same rights and opportunities for women and
men in the NSI
This evolution reflects a process of building up STI institutions, framework
conditions and policies. Three facts deserve more attention: the creation of CONACyT,
the approval of the Science and Technology (S&T) law of 2002 and the long-term
vision of the STI program.
The creation of CONACyT in 1970 was a key fact in the evolution of the STI
sector. The National Research Council was established as a new institution to fund
research, promote human capital formation and be in charge of the design of S&T
policies. The council was created under the predominant paradigm of linearity from

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supply to demand of knowledge, which governed Latin America’s S&T arena at that
time (Crespi and Dutrénit, 2014). Even though in its origin there was weak vertical and
horizontal coordination and little public-private interaction, the creation of CONACyT
laid the foundations for an institutional connection between scientific and technological
development.
The S&T law of 2002 provides a new legal framework for the sector; it
contributes to its restructuring under the guidance of CONACyT, but by a transversal
approach to S&T, a systemic view of S&T, a focus on regionalization through
institutions to articulate federal and local policies, a wide participation of stakeholders
and the leadership of the president. This law draws on the previous law for the
Promotion of Scientific and Technological Research of 1999, but it deepens and
broadens to include new dimensions that were not considered previously, such as
clearer mechanisms for coordination and participation of the wider agents and a
complete architecture for the government of STI activities. Even though the S&T law of
2002 only refers to S&T, in 2011 it explicitly incorporates the concept of innovation,
recognizing the relationship between S&T and innovation, and the need to build a
national system of STI. In the fifth section the S&T law of 2002 is analyzed in more
detail.
The modifications of 2011 also include a long-term vision for the Special
Program for STI (PECiTI for its Spanish acronym). The previous national programs of
STI (i.e. PECyT 2002-2006 and PECiTI 2008–12) were largely thought of as programs
for the administration itself, with some references to the long term. However, the law
made it clear that next PECiTI will have to include a long-term focus. This has brought
to the discussion a more strategic view of STI, which has stimulated the connection of
STI with long-term objectives of economic and social development. With this approach,

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the planning should include the period of the actual administration as part of a long-
term strategy. In this context, a new PECiTI 2014–18 was designed, which has, in some
way, a long-term view until 2037.
The financial effort to support the STI programs has not followed the
institutional trajectory. Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) increased from $780.9
million in 1990 to achieve a maximum of $5729 million in 2013, while federal
expenditure on S&T (FEST) increased from $717 million in 1990 to $5737 million in
the same period. These increases were certainly motivated by specific policies aimed to
foster S&T in the country. However, the economy has grown over the last three decades
to become the fourteenth largest market in the world, and the financial effort on STI has
just kept pace. Its evolution as a percentage of GDP shows no changes since 1980; both
GERD and FEST have stayed below 0.5 per cent of GDP. The figures for 2013 are 0.44
per cent for both indicators.
The new administration has expressed its commitment to increasing
FEST in order to increase the public share of the GDP and be able to reach 1 per cent of
the GDP by 2018. The first step was again an institutional movement, the creation of
the Coordination of STI at the Presidential Office in January 2013, as mentioned in Box
1. Evidence of this commitment is the increase of 19.5 per cent in the CONACyT
budget for 2014. However, this increase will not significantly change the percentage
that GERD represents on the GDP, which will probably reach a figure close to 0.5 per
cent, but at least there will be an inflection towards growth.
3 The messages emerging from the mainstream model
Today, ‘mainstream model’ refers to innovation policy which synthetizes STI arenas.
The analytical framework behind this recognizes the connection between innovation

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policies and NSI, hence the importance of fostering links between actors. Innovation
policy objectives can be arranged into three groups: (1) support investment in research
and innovation, (2) enhance the innovation competences of firms and (3) strengthen
linkages within innovation systems.
This framework recognizes the transversality of STI policy (Kuhlmann, 2001;
Cooke, 2011) and the need for coordination among a wider range of actors from
different arenas (academia, business) and spaces (local, national, global), the
combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, the participation of stakeholders,
and the issue of multilevel governance in a context of many interacting authority
structures working at the domestic and international levels of authority (Smits et al.,
2010a).
The policy mix has evolved from a stress on supply-side measures (mostly R&D
tax incentives and grants), to a greater emphasis on demand-side measures (with a
strong emphasis on procurement policies), seeking a balance between both sides
(Flanagan et al., 2011; Edler, 2011).
However, country differences arise from the implementation of the policy mix.
Izsák et al. (2013) argue that differences in innovation systems and micro- and
macroeconomic conditions matter in explaining innovation performance. It is
particularly recognized that the framework conditions influence the performance of the
system. As argued by the OECD (2010b), finding an optimal policy mix is not a one-off
exercise but a continuous process that adjusts to the dynamics of innovation systems.
Moreover, Izsák et al. (2013) recognize the implications of applying the
mainstream model of innovation policies even in Europe, and they argue that the policy
mix in European countries has consisted of solutions simply transferred from elsewhere
rather than being an appropriate response to domestic challenges.

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It should be mentioned that innovation is at the center of the mainstream model,
and the focus is placed on innovation policy neglecting S&T. This gives the message
that while S&T are associated with innovation, they are less relevant. In countries with
small and even immature scientific systems, this emphasis on innovation may be
limited. Moreover, in countries where a significant portion of the population is
excluded, the single emphasis on business innovation may be limited, because it leaves
out other dimensions such as social or inclusive innovation, which also requires S&T
(Dutrénit and Sutz, 2014; Bortagaray and Gras, 2014).
This analytical framework was built keeping in mind the initial conditions of the
developed countries and some successful emerging countries. Unlike most of the
developing countries, the former are characterized by having quite a solid scientific
base, a broad base of companies performing R&D and in many cases what Guston
(2000) called a social S&T contract with society.
Latin American countries have designed their STI policies over time, under the
influence of the analytical framework existing at the international level, even more so in
the past decade. Mexico is no exception from this trajectory; in fact the changes in the
S&T laws in Mexico pick up the directive principles of this analytical framework. But
these changes do not necessarily adjust themselves to the institutional dynamics, social
norms and practices rooted in the country. This partially explains the difficulties of
constructing the governance for this system.
If anything distinguishes countries, it is the history of institutions through which
agents are conditioned and the rules of the game are generated, both within the
organizations as well as in establishing norms for the relationships between them
(Caballero, 2011).

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It is this that finally makes it possible for the trajectories that drive the states of
NSI to be efficient and effective for development. The central point is that STI policies
based on mainstream models do not recognize the variety in the institutional landscape
within these countries (Ostrom, 2005), and as a consequence, economic governance that
stems from the structure and functioning of both legal and social institutions is made
difficult (Dixit, 2009).
In terms of STI policy, Rodrik’s (2007) arguments in relation to development
appear to apply here: success usually requires following policies that are tailored to
local economic and political realities rather than obeying the dictates of the international
globalization establishment.
4 Institutional framework and governance
This section describes the main features of the institutional framework and governance
of the NSI in Mexico, including the evolution of the legislation in STI, the
regionalization processes and the expression of the stakeholders.
4.1 The evolution of the legislation
The S&T law of 2002 and its subsequent amendments, together with other related
reforms (e.g. the integrated budget for STI and a greater autonomy and self-financing of
the public research centers), introduced favorable institutional changes for the
structuring of the NSI. The main features of the law are the following:
• Systemic focus. Define the NSIi
and recognize the need for articulation between
actors.
• Organizational restructuring of the S&T sector. STI is no longer just associated with

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CONACyT. Rather, a transversal focus on STI has been adopted, appropriate to its
new demands. The ministries became part of the governing board of CONACyT and
the new inter-ministerial committee for the STI budget, which also incorporates
programming activities.
• Presidential leadership. The president leads a coordinating body integrating STI
activities: the General Council for Scientific Investigation, Technological
Development, and Innovation. Nine cabinet ministers participate in this group,
representing sectors of federal public administration, with the general director of
CONACyT as the executive secretary.
• Concern for linking supply and demand of knowledge. The law sets out the
integration and linkage of inter-sectoral committees in which both representatives of
the ministries as well as from the science, technology and productive sectors
participate. These actors also belong to the General Council, the governing board of
CONACyT and other committees.
• Active participation of stakeholders. A formal space was created for stakeholders,
which reflects the priority of transiting from a governmental to a public policy. The
FCCyT provides such a space and participates in all STI government bodies.ii
• Regionalization/decentralization. The National Conference of S&T was created as a
space where representatives from all state governments can participate and discuss
topics of regional interest. A representative from the National Conference of S&T is
a member of the General Council; furthermore a representative of the National
Network of State Councils (REDNACECyT) is invited to meet with various
government bodies.
• Sectorial and mixed funds for management of resources. In order to identify the
demands of other actors and articulate these to the ministries and states with

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CONACyT, sectorial funds (by ministries) and regional funds (with governments of
federal and municipal bodies) were established. This allows resources from other
sources to be leveraged.
• Competitive funds. These were introduced as a tool for resource allocation of
funding programs for scientific research, technological development and innovation
managed by CONACyT.
From the point of view of the government, the principle bodies of the systems
are the General Council, which orients the planning of state STI activities, and the Inter-
Ministerial Budget Committee, which reviews the congruence of the programs with the
federal government budget and which is jointly coordinated by the vice minister of
expenses of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the executive secretary of the
General Council, who is the general director of CONACyT.
The General Council is a decision-making body made up of a wide group of
ministers for sectors, which have important STI activities, such as those for education,
health, energy, agriculture, the environment and the economy. It also includes
representatives from important associations in the scientific, technology, academic and
business communities, as well as members in a personal capacity invited by the
president as consultants. The Inter-Ministerial Budget Committee is made up of
officials at the vice minister level, each one of which coordinates and monitors the
functions of scientific investigation, technological development and innovation in the
respective sectors of federal public administration.
By virtue of their function as the executive secretary of the General Council, the
general director of CONACyT coordinates the actions of the federal public
administration in terms of STI, and this function also gives CONACyT its characteristic

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of being a coordinating body for STI policy at the national level. Together with the vice
minister of Expenses of the Finance and Public Credit ministry, they calculate the
annual STI budget, which encompasses all resources destined for STI by ministries and
CONACyT.
Article 8 of the S&T law stipulates the creation of inter-sectorial linkages
committees as support bodies for the General Council, for ‘the articulation of policies,
the proposal of priority programs and strategic areas’ and ‘the linking of investigation
with education, innovation and technological development with the productive and
service sectors’. These committees are made up of officials from the respective sectors
of federal public administration and by members of the STI communities.
Even if the legal framework is comprehensive, the process of maturity still has
not been completed. Since its creation in 2002, the General Council has scarcely met,
and has not carried out all of its assigned functions. In particular, it only formed the
inter-sectorial linkage committee with the Ministry of the Economy (Inter-sectorial
Innovation Committee). These committees are necessary in order to develop the
interaction between dependencies and government bodies, and of these with the STI
communities. They are necessary in order to carry out the programming and budgetary
design of STI. In absence of these committees, the Inter-Ministerial Budget Committee
has effectively taken on the role of decision maker and advisor for the general STI
policy, by means of the budget. In this way, an exhaustively prepared institutional
design, carried out with wide political support and with characteristics of participation,
integration and multiple counterweights, has been subjected to a failure of government
(Puchet, 2013).

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The still scarce functioning of the General Council and its support committees,
and the overloading of the general director of CONACyT limit the scope of the tasks for
planning, programming, design and application of the budget at the federal level.
4.2 Advances in the process of regionalization
The territorial dimension of STI policies is advised by the National Conference of S&T
and by the REDNACECyT, which is the network that articulates the state S&T
councils. The National Conference of S&T is the space for institutional coordination
between the federal government and the federative entities. It gives opinions and makes
recommendations on the STI policies that affect the latter. It is made up of the general
director of CONACyT and the primary members of the state S&T councils; the
executive coordinator is the president of the REDNACECyT.
The organizational structure of the conference favors a distribution of power and
commitments assumed by the various federative bodies and state S&T councils so that
it is more horizontal and balanced. These characteristics make the conference sessions a
more favorable atmosphere to deal with and agree on subjects relevant to the
regionalization and decentralization of the NSI, particularly with respect to: (1) criteria
for distribution of the federal STI budget among bodies and regions, (2) mechanisms for
state S&T councils to participate in processes of approval, follow-up and evaluation of
projects financed by federal programs, (3) establishing joint strategies between the
bodies in order to manage the budget with the federal government to finance
instruments such as mixed funds and (4) formation of joint working commissions
between the entities in order to tackle regional issues in the system.
Despite the regularity of its bi-annual sessions, the conference has still not
developed from the discursive stage towards the constitution of bodies and operative

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commissions that orchestrate a set of concrete agreements on decentralization and
regionalization of STI policies and actions.
4.3 The expression of the stakeholders
Article 36 of the S&T law describes the FCCyT as ‘an autonomous and permanent
consulting body of Executive Power, of the General Council of Scientific Investigation,
Technological Development and Innovation, and of the Governing Board of
CONACyT’. It states that ‘its primary objective is to promote the expression of the
scientific, academic, and technological community and of the private sector, for the
formulation of proposals in terms of policies and programs for scientific investigation,
technological development, and innovation’.
Its primary functions feature the following: (1) to be the permanent and
autonomous consulting and advisory body at the federal level of executive power, and,
at the request of the legislative authority, (2) to function as the body for the expression
and communication of proposals to the government by the NSI communities linked to
areas of action such as academia, business, government and social organizations and (3)
to participate in the communication and diffusion of STI activities.
According to the law, the board of directors is made up of incumbents from the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), the Instituto Politécnico
Nacional (IPN), the Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del IPN
(CINVESTAV), the Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de
Educación Superior (ANUIES), the Sistema Nacional de Centros Públicos de
CONACyT, made up of the several center directors the Academia Mexicana de
Ciencias, the Academia Nacional de Medicina, the Academia de Ingeniería, the
Academia Mexicana de Historia, the Academia Mexicana de la Lengua, the Consejo

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Mexicano de Ciencias Sociales, the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales, the Cámara
Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación, the Confederación Patronal de la
República Mexicana, the Consejo Nacional Agropecuario, Asociación Mexicana de
Directivos de la Investigación Aplicada y Desarrollo Tecnológico, the president of
REDNACECyT and three representatives elected by the members of the National
Researchers System.
In the advisory plan, the FCCyT has played an outstanding role in its specific
tasks with respect to the integration of opinions to formulate special programs for STI
from 2002–06, 2008–12 and 2014–37 and for other programs with a smaller scope. It
has also proposed, in concordance with the programs, the orientations for the federal
S&T budget. Furthermore, it has responded to a great number of specific requests from
the bodies it advises, and at the same time, has collected the initiatives,
recommendations and measures relative to various public policies covering the broad
spectrum of STI communities and brought them to the relevant decision makers (Casas
et al., 2013).
In terms of the legal systems relative to STI, it has maintained constant attention
towards the changes in the S&T law and the introduction of regulations within
institutions, and it is a consultant to whom STI commissions in both houses of congress
regularly refer. In budgetary terms, the FCCyT carries out its analysis and assessment
role in this respect, and coordinates the technical aspects relative to the demands made
annually by various members of its board of directors before the House of Deputies
during the time when the federal expense budget is received, discussed and approved.
An assessment of FCCyT activities from 2002–09 shows that the NSI still has
shortcomings in many mechanisms of intermediate participation where policies are
decided both at local and state levels, such as in certain sectors of the federal

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administration (Puchet, 2010). In particular, the shortcoming is greater where the
FCCyT has had less capacity for representation of communities. It is worth mentioning
the example of the entire broad subsector of technological education and research,
which is coordinated by different bodies of the Ministry of Public Education. In the
wide space of community representation, the processes of incorporating its members are
mediated by pre-established associations which do not always pay special attention to
STI issues, and which are not generally designed to process demands that can be
transformed into policy initiatives in this specific area.
As a broad body for the articulation of state and society on STI policies, the
FCCyT has the permanent challenge of producing public policy proposals that articulate
community demands and transform them into widely-supported legal, economical and
policy measures (Casas et al., 2013).
Designing the mechanisms for the effective design of public STI policy that
includes and integrates the entire process, from consulting the communities to the
responses provided by state decision-making bodies, is an important challenge with
requirements that are difficult to satisfy. The process of proposal formulation must
satisfy the terms of an equal and transparent dialogue between the participants, and
there must be effective accountability before the communities represented.
Very often, dialogues about the core issues of STI policies that need solutions
based on STI activities start and develop informally, with members of the community
who form an opinion, or with groups in power who act upon them. The fact that the
bodies representing the communities do not have formal structures, or depend on
associations or organizations which have much more general purposes than those
relative to STI, distorts the quality of the dialogue and presents difficulties in
accountability to the communities who are interested and involved in STI issues.

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In meeting its objective of promoting the expression of STI communities, the
FCCyT has a daily struggle with the fact that its consultant and advisory role for the
executive and legislative powers of the state and some of its constituencies cannot be
untied from this legal mandate. This means that the dialogue with the communities is an
exchange, which should lead to a consensuated position to be proposed to the
authorities.
Add to this the fact that the associations and individuals, which make up the
board of directors, generally have different objectives and agendas than those relative to
STI policies and do not always agree on plans emanating from its members, who are
part of the communities immersed in STI. Examples of such overlaps, which do not
always facilitate the process of consensus generation, are university associations or the
systems of research centers that struggle with budgetary demands different to those
relative to the budget for the S&T branch, or chambers of industry in which innovative
businesses are not the only ones, or even the majority of those, represented.
As this process implies a set of highly specialized tasks, many participative
mechanisms still need to be designed and put into practice, which not only show good
attributes in procedures, but are also representative, efficient and of technical quality.
The basis for perfecting the FCCyT’s central activities of expressing, representing and
communicating proposals from the communities lies in international practices of
participative negotiation of public budgets, conflict mediation in terms of environmental
issues and management of common resources that have developed criteria and manuals
to varying degrees (Shah, 2007; Barret, 2012; Rey-Valette et al., 2011).
One of the main challenges of FCCyT is to be identified as the independent
advisory body to the Mexican state in the field of STI public policies. For this, it has to
harmoniously organize the two roles, advisor to the authorities and that concerning the

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expression and representation of the scientific, technological, academic and productive
sectors.
5 The rules of the game and governance
The set of modifications to the legal institutions that was made in 1999 and extended in
2002 was, to a great extent, inspired by the mainstream models of STI policies. The
evidence shows that these institutions that were completed and broadened in the last 15
years have had serious difficulties in their structure and in functioning effectively,
which has contributed to causing increasing failures for the economic governance of the
NSI. It is appropriate to specify some details about the origin of these failures.
The rules of the game, which form and make possible the processes of
innovation in different geographical or sectorial areas, establish institutional
frameworks and make possible the structure and functioning of the institutions that
constitute governance of each one. An institutional framework is required to anchor the
agreements on which the governance is based, but the behavior of the agents largely
overtakes this.
Institutional frameworks comprise countless informal rules that serve to allow
various groups of agents to carry out their daily interactions and receive their payments
and penalties; that is, the games are established with their respective payment structures.
Formal rules are added to the informal ones by different bodies of authority –
organizations of the agents themselves, firms, research centers, universities, various
levels of government agencies and constitutional powers. The institutional framework
configured over a certain sphere where innovations are produced always has tensions
arising from the compatibility and harmonious function of the rules. In particular,
changes in the formal rules coming from law – administrative regulations, laws,

21. 21
constitutions – play a part in relation to the codes and norms of conduct, contracts,
practices and routines through which the agents interact. These rules may be both
formal and informal, and come from distinct bodies of authority such as associations,
corporations, firms and government. It is therefore important to understand how various
types of rules exist within an institutional framework, in order to assess the possibilities
and limitations of the governance and its changes.
Given the strength that legal and regulatory changes have had, in the case of the
institutionality of Mexican STI it is important to ask, what role does the law play? Are
the rules of the game that generate innovation changing? Is the way the agents behave
changing? Does this directly intervene in governance?
This is a polemical issue. Becker (1968) argued that the law acts on, and alters,
the rules of the game. Conversely, according to Basu (2011), the law does not act on the
rules of the game, rather, it acts on the expectations of the agents, and as such, on their
behavior. This position makes a distinction between the rules of the game that govern
activities – in our case, those that interact to produce innovation – and others that also
govern institutions, such as legal ones, but do not alter the basic structure that sustains
institutional frameworks. As a consequence, an institutional framework can have
problems with coherence, such as the aforementioned Mexico STI that probably had
and continues to have such problems. However, attacking this lack of coherence does
not remove the obstacles to a certain game.
According to Basu (2011), if the law, with its recompenses and penalties, does
not coincide with the equilibrium/comfortable situation resulting from the game, there is
not sufficient incentive to comply with the law, because the balance exists and this is
the case regardless of the law. In turn, if the policies are designed in accordance with

22. 22
contexts in which the law does affect the rules of the game, the recommendations will
not be appropriate for a context where they do not change.
In the case of Mexico, it seems appropriate to conceive the changes in legal
institutions and many failures in the governance of NSI based on the following results:
(1) the equilibrium observed in the processes of innovation, in particular, low
investment and lack of effective links between agents, is outside of legal reforms to
boost increases in funds and horizontal forms of coordination that favor them, and (2)
among other functions, Mexican policymakers have been ascribed to the routine of
providing rules that should be incorporated into the legal institutions, according to their
version of the mainstream models.
In hindsight, it is possible to question the representation of the main rules of the
game of those that designed the S&T rules in 1999 and 2002. It was surely a vision that
favored those rules, which came from government organizations. It is from there that
the changes were conceived. Box 2 outlines the changes to the rules of the game.
Box 2. Proposal to change the rules of the game
Rules of the game valid in the 1990s Rules of the game proposed by the laws
Discretionary assignment of resources Competitive funds
Different policies for each agent Exchange and coordination between all agents
involved (inter-sectorial and inter-ministerial
committees, National Conference of S&T,
networks of research groups and centres)
Government STI policy Public STI policy
The evidence suggests that the intention was to fundamentally change the rules
of the game with changes to legislation. Said changes were reinforced with new

23. 23
government programs, with which the set of incentives associated with the STI policy
was modified, but the types of behavior emanating from the rules of the game were not.
Different government incentives were introduced. The STI policymakers
designed and put into practice programs, which contrasted with specific incentives that
were rooted in the communities. For example, discretionary assignment of funds
assumed specific agreements between investigators and officials, or between businesses
and officials, which contributed to the reputations of those individuals who obtained
and conceived them in their respective communities. Many leaders came from or were
reinforced by means of approving conditions to obtain funds. As the assignment came
from negotiation, the funds conceived had objectives that not only covered individual
activities, but also the resources for infrastructure or the organization of actions that
incorporated various agents.
The transformation of the mechanisms for assigning funds to projects through
competition produced a distortion in the structure of incentives, inasmuch as it was
primarily concentrated in the financing of individual activities, and it has taken a long
time to restore the mechanisms for granting funds for the creation of long-term
capability building. Knowledge of the game is partial, to the extent that it tends to
identify with certain policies, and put the focus on the behavior of some agents, but not
the entire game. It is commonly observed that when considering processes of
innovation, directors of R&D activities and their departments or entrepreneurial
businesses are taken into account, but it is overlooked that firms, in organizing various
agents and their interests, play a game where profitability does not necessarily depend
on innovation, or at least on R&D.
Both Dixit’s definition (2009) as well as another more operative one on which the
institutional quality ranking of countries is based (World Bank, 2012) integrate both

24. 24
legal and social institutions. As such, the structure and the function of the government
of STI also help or hinder governance. As we have seen, the evolution of Mexican STI
institutions has been characterized by the extension and deepening of the legal
components. At the same time, many of these components that determine the
coordination between levels of government and sectors of federal public administration,
programming, budget preparation, and decision making in relation to STI activities have
functioned partially or even defectively. This fact places an additional limitation on
governance; even more so when considering that structures of economic governance
function in states, markets and communities (Bowles, 2004), and that quite rightly,
deficiencies in meeting and orchestrating legal orders on the part of the government
reduces the very capacity for governance.
6 Tensions that hamper the functioning of the system in a self-regulated manner
Over the past 15 years, the NSI began to be delivered in a more decisive manner
(Corona et al., 2014). Advances have been noted in the following aspects:
1. Decision-making processes related to the consensus between participants in STI
activities, management of STI in organizations in the academic, productive and
governmental sectors, and linkage between organizations or agents to innovate
and establish relationships for the exchange of knowledge.
2. Mechanisms for inclusive participation of individuals and organizations that
carry out STI activities within bodies, and consultation for formulating STI
policy.
3. Long-term consulting and planning procedures according to the types of
articulation of actions between federal government, other levels of government

25. 25
and agents participating in STI activities; specifically, planning according to
these cases is obligatory (at the federal government level), agreed upon (between
the federation and the state governments) or indicative (when it involves other
organizations or agents).
4. Formal bodies of orientation, implementation and evaluation of STI policies.
Aspects 1 and 2 are primarily based on reinforced social institutions, to some
extent by legal orders. In turn, aspects 3 and 4 are almost entirely regulated by legal
institutions and they take on the governing function as a requirement of governance.
It would appear that the S&T law and its subsequent amendments were designed
and approved bearing in mind that changes in the law would change the rules of the
game. But it is difficult for the law to change the rules of the game, such that it
constitutes a system with high levels of governance. As argued by Basu (2011), agents
tend to respond with what they know to do. This explains some of the tensions that have
arisen.
What follows is a discussion of three of the primary tensions that have been
generated in the NSI: (1) conflicts between the legal institutions adapted to the
mainstream models of STI policy and the informal rules of the game that stem from the
interaction of agents and organizations; (2) a strong intromission of politics into STI
decision making; and (3) an incipient process of constructing STI public policy due to
difficulties with the participation of communities.
Conflicts between the legal institutions adapted to the mainstream models
of STI policy and the informal rules of the game that stem from the interaction of
agents and organizations. The different visions of the agents about the role that STI

26. 26
should play in the national development greatly determine the informal rules of the
game, and they conflict with manners of coordination, incentive structures and
conditioning established in the legal institutions. Policymakers drive a vision that they
suppose is in legal institutions. Other agents, particularly in the academic and
productive sectors, act in accordance with their own visions, where neither agrees with
each other, nor with the broad visions of the policymakers. In this way, games begin for
the assignment and obtaining of funds, in the linkage between the agents, and in its
coordination, which is governed by rules that are outside of legal institutions.
The legal changes represent an ongoing activity of regulatory design, which very
often leads to the imposition of formal regulations and the reduction of coherence
between the same. The multiplicity of rules hinders the enforcement that requires
compliance. Difficulties then arise to meet the system of the formal laws as a whole.
A strong intromission of politics into STI decision making. The legal
institutions have been designed outside the rules of the game followed by the agents and
organizations involved in the processes of innovation, or with a partial and imprecise
knowledge of these rules. Very often, the legal orders have an influence in modifying
the expectations of the agents that contradicts incentives stemming from the payments
and penalties established by the game. Two examples of this are as follows. The
configuration of clusters for innovation observed in various regions of the country is
based on the cooperation and transfer of knowledge between businesses and public
research centers. However, the rules of the National Researchers System favors
individual publication above other results,iii
and the financial stimulation programs for
businesses which were valid from 2002 through 2009 did not enforce the costs of
investigation and experimental development that would be made with agreements
between business and research centers. With these contradictions in place, tensions have

27. 27
arisen between agents and organizations. Conflict resolution happens in the political
arena and is achieved through parallel games where negotiations are made according to
political powers and incentives that distort the very processes of innovation that they
wish to favor.
Also, the fact that the government for STI activities shows failures due to non-
compliance with legal orders generates a wide space for intromission of politics. For
example, the detection of non-compliance by the Auditoría Superior de la Federación
(ASF, 2010), the body for the control and supervision of the House of Deputies,
introduced to the discussion the issue of the quality of the laws and their contribution to
putting STI policies into practice.
An incipient process of construction of STI public policy due to difficulties
with the participation of communities. An important part of the legal changes
introduced from 1999 was that the governmental STI policy turned into a public one.
For this change, the mechanisms for participation of the STI communities were
extended and deepened. At the same time, as analyzed in section fourth, a state body
was created: the FCCyT, whose primary mission was to listen to the different agents
and organizations in the communities and give them a voice before the decision-making
bodies of STI policy. However, the games of many associations and academies, which
include various sections of these communities, still face difficulties in being governed
by the aims and interests required for the development of STI activities and the
promotion of public policies to favor the participation and consensus of the active
communities.
This fact has generated some rules of the game around political negotiation
between STI policymakers and leaders of associations and academies that do not always
aim for the improvement of institutions and policies for the development of STI.

28. 28
Because of this, the process of constructing public policy is subjected to difficulties that
come from the scarce participation of the communities or from limitations to the
adequate functioning of the legally established mechanisms for participation.
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to discuss the experience of STI policymaking in Mexico,
considering the interaction between the trajectory of institution building and the process
of constructing the government and governance of the system.
There is no doubt that the NSI has been strengthened and advanced. STI policies
can contribute to generating change in the behavior of agents, articulate demand for and
offer knowledge, stimulate the development of strategic sectors and promote new areas
of competitiveness. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of the system’s
functioning depends primarily on extended governance.
This governance needs to act from the bottom-up, through the constitution of
agreements between agents, their associations and the organizations they form for
specific purposes, and at the same time, it must be based on the wide participation of
these same actors in the public policy of STI. In the case of Mexico, these processes are
still in the first phases of maturity.
In governing STI, the dominant strategy of the policymakers has been to change
laws and other formal regulations derived in accordance with their vision of
international experience, that is, the S&T law and many subsequent regulations. But
these changes did not achieve the transformation of many of the rules of the game
governing the processes of innovation. This appears to be due to thinking that said
change was a legal issue, when in fact it probably was not, or even because they
foresaw that the changes would modify expectations that led to new behaviors, without

29. 29
a clear interpretation of neither how the agents were playing nor the local regulations on
which their actions were based.
Returning to the dancers image, the innovation policy is facing difficulties to
dance with the innovation practice without understanding that it is not possible to
change its music (the rules of your game) only with the creation of new legal rules,
particularly when it is unclear how actors play in the innovation practice.
For the changes in the laws to be effective, they had to have started from a more
precise analysis of the different rules of the game in operation in the system and its
subsystems, as well as the particularities of each agent’s strategy. The following are
examples of modifications to formal regulations and policies based on them which, in
turn, do not take into account an adequate interpretation of the rules of the game: (1) the
promotion of R&D incentives to firms that, in the majority, do not aim for profitability
based on innovation; (2) the design and orchestration of funds for linkage between
academia and productive sectors, when the primary public incentive to researchers is
based on ‘publish or perish’ and (3) pressure on those who implement policies to design
and make the budget without adequate safeguards that instruments should have if they
also wish to promote R&D and linkage.
As well as this continuous change in the legislation, there have been difficulties
in using the new legal regulations, including those that already had time to have been
approved to be thoroughly implemented. The fact that legal institutionality in many
parts of the system has not been put into practice is probably based on difficulties with
both the government and the communities to conceive their respective roles. In terms of
the government, the majority of policymakers have not managed to modify the
hierarchical logic of public administration. The lack of adaptation to the legal
framework that explicitly requires incorporating other actors into public policy

30. 30
decisions leads to government agencies repeatedly acting through an inadequate top-
down and centralized focus, lacking openness towards the integration of opinions and
proposals from representatives of communities in the decision bodies. In order for the
communities, in turn, to contribute to transit from governmental to public policy, they
require participation in the debate and in the construction of proposals that make it
possible for their representatives to contribute technical designs for the formulation of
STI policy to the decision-making bodies, more so than the defense of the general
concepts and positions.
The governance needs the government itself to contribute through a more stable
and systematic action in terms of the participation of the communities in constructing
public policies, with greater levels of coordination at the federal level and with better
agreement between the different levels and powers. It also needs the communities and
their representatives to debate and discuss among themselves, with the explicit aim of
designing and formulating proposals with the necessary attributes to allow policymakers
to put them into practice. Both elements have conditioned and impeded the construction
of wide system governance.
International evidence suggests that the existence of a strategic level of STI
policy could contribute to greater efficiency in inducing changes to upgrading national
STI capabilities, which includes a dimension of learning about the policies themselves.
Policymakers can internalize the need to constantly adjust their actions to foment STI
capabilities while they develop. This requires a long-term policy vision (Avnimelech
and Teubal, 2008; Avnimelech et al., 2010). Difficulties in governance undermine this
focus of gradual accumulation of capabilities.
In order to advance in building the NSI in Mexico, where advances have already
been made in the legal institutional design and, to some extent, towards public policies,

31. 31
policy change is needed at the strategic level of the design in at least two aspects. The
first is that policymakers must modify their vision to include an understanding of the
local rules of the game that govern processes of innovation, and as such, they should
move away from the temptation towards constantly changing legal orders, following the
dictates of mainstream models, as the unique way to improve the NSI and its
governance. The second is that based on this understanding of how agents and
organizations in the Mexican STI arena play the game, they must design and put into
practice policies that strictly comply with the basic legal institutional framework of STI,
and advance policies taking account of the initial conditions in which they are
operating, suggesting both new and fresh focuses as well as different combinations of
instruments.
In the dance floor of innovation practice, policy and theory (IPT matrix),
Kuhlmann et al. (2010) argue that ‘researchers use experience of policy makers as
empirical input’ to build theory. In this line, the authors of this paper are somehow
using such empirical input to obtain these preliminary thoughts on how to harmonize
the rules that are implicit in the innovation practice with the legal rules proposed by the
innovation policy. We need to understand the music that follow the dancers of
innovation practice to write the music the dancers of innovation policy have to dance to.
It is not enough to imitate the score playing by mainstream policy practitioners. In this
vein, this article is based on an analysis of detailed empirical evidence on the innovation
practices of the policymakers and it is intended to provide elements for strengthening
innovation theory to enhance a joint dance floor for the three actors.
The proposal of a strategic STI policy, which considers the three actors, the rules
of the game in operation in the system, the initial conditions, particularly the national
STI capabilities and the institutional fabric of Mexico seems to be the only one that will

32. 32
give a clear message to the different actors, find agreement starting from its various
conceptions and focus long-term efforts towards economic development and social
inclusion.
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i
The S&T law defines the national STI system. In this document, we refer to it as NSI.
ii
In the fourth section the main characteristics of the FCCyT are described.
iii
This is one of the instruments of the STI policy with the longest tradition in the country; its main goals
include the promotion of the formation, development and consolidation of a critical mass of researchers at
the highest level, mostly within the public system of higher education and research. The program grants
both pecuniary (a monthly compensation) and non-pecuniary stimuli (status and recognition) to
researchers based on the productivity and quality of their research. Researchers from universities and
research centers are beneficiaries of this stimulus.