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Attorn Ey, Esq. — Ex # *****
L & A Law Associates, PLC
1234 Final Street
Anyplace, USA 22222-1000
Attorney for Defendant Jolie Artisanal
Vegan Chocolates, Inc.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHEASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
SCHWANGAU FAMILY CHEESE CO. )
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV-15-223AD
)
v. )
)
JOLIE ARTISANAL VEGAN )
CHOCOLATES, INC. )
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Defendant, Jolie Artisanal Vegan Chocolates, Inc. (“Jolie”), opposes
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction against its 2011 federally registered
trademark. A preliminary injunction for trademark infringement may be granted
only if the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits that its
mark is both (1) protected and (2) likely to cause confusion with the challenged
mark. Plaintiff, Schwangau Family Cheese, Co. (“SFC”), has not shown a
likelihood of either. Congress intended the Lanham (Trademark) Act to “afford
nation-wide protection to federally registered marks.” Burger King of Fla., Inc. v.
Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 1968). For this reason, such an injunction is

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“never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.” Barbecue Marx,
Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Jolie
requests the Court deny SFC’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 1, 2011, the owner of Jolie registered its mark, which included the
slogan “All that matters in the end is chocolate,” with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. Jolie Dep. Ex. 2. Thirteen days later, May 14, 2011, Jolie began
selling artisanal vegan chocolates in Chicago at farmers’ markets. Hussain Dep. 1.
Jolie went on to sell through an online shop, Etsy, and discontinued selling through
farmers’ markets in 2012. Id. In 2013, Jolie moved online sales from Etsy to its
own website, and in 2014, opened a little brick-and-mortar shop in Chicago. Id. at
2. Until contacted by SFC’s lawyers, the owner of Jolie, Ms. Hussain, had never
heard of SFC or met its owner. Hussain Dep. 12.
The slogan on Jolie’s mark, “All that matters in the end is chocolate,” is
based on a line from Tolstoy, a vegetarian. Hussain Dep. 5. The mark is an oval
shape in portrait orientation, a light green color with black Edwardian script in
cursive and a silhouette on the bottom. Id. at 6. The silhouette is of the Chicago
skyline reflected in Lake Michigan; Chicago is where Jolie is based. Id. The
Tolstoy slogan rests above the skyline with a French translation beneath. Id. The
mark is printed on labels and attached to all of its products. Id. The title of the

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company, “Jolie Artisanal Vegan Chocolates,” takes up the upper half of the mark
in large font. Jolie Dep. Ex. 1. Ms. Hussain chose the French name, Jolie, because
France is important to her; it is where she “studied cooking and became a chef.”
Hussain Dep. 5.
Jolie’s products range from a two piece $8 set to a thirty-two piece $120 set.
Id. at 3. The vegan chocolates which it sells are considered a “much more
expensive . . . luxury item” compared with a similar vegan chocolate bar market.
Id. at 3-4. Jolie’s chocolates are vegan in that they do not contain milk or “whey—
the byproduct from making cheese—or other animal products.” Id. at 4. Ms.
Hussain estimates that most of Jolie’s sales, 80%, are through its website and 90%
of those are sold seasonally as gifts. Id. at 10. Jolie’s customers are located “all
over the country . . . [in] [e]very metropolitan area.” Id. at 7. Ms. Hussain estimates
that 18% of its sales come from Chicago while only 6% come from southeastern
Wisconsin. Id.
Ms. Hussain has said that she has “no plans to expand Jolie.” Id. at 10. The
only way to buy online is through Jolie’s website, and the only way to buy in-store
is through its shop in Logan Square. Id. at 11. Ms. Hussain promotes Jolie through
her vegan cooking blog, column in Chicago’s “The Reader,” Twitter account,
published vegan cookbooks, and “a regular cooking show on YouTube.” Id. at 7-8.
Ms. Hussain has said that she has no interest in ever selling vegan cheese and that

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no customer or potential customer has ever asked whether Jolie also sells cheese.
Id. at 11.
SFC sells artisanal cheese. Schwangau Dep. 3. When a web designer asked
to see SFC’s trademark certificate for the Tolstoy slogan it was using in 2014, it
did not have one. Id. at 9. SFC’s registration from 1946 does not list the slogan
“All that matters in the end is cheese.” Id. at 8. Once SFC realized it did not have a
certificate for the slogan, it tried to get one and found out about Jolie’s already
registered slogan “All that matters in the end is chocolate.” Id. at 9. SFC’s owner
claims that in 1946, the slogan by Tolstoy was used by his grandfather and put on a
sign behind a counter in a shop in Wisconsin. Id. at 1-2. The owner says that he
does not know why his grandfather never registered the slogan. Id. at 8.
SFC’s registered “mark is ‘Schwangau Family Cheese’ in old English type
colored red on a white background.” Schwangau Dep. Ex. 2. “Four Year Old
Cheddar Cheese” is below the title. Id. Below that is the address of the source,
“made at and distributed from . . . Wisconsin.” Id. At the bottom in Times New
Roman is the Tolstoy slogan. Id.
SFC’s owner is not sure whether the slogan was used continuously between
1946 and 1975. Schwangau Dep. 3. SFC has owned a website since 2000 which
“doesn’t let people buy cheese through it.” Id. at 5. The website has a photo of a
wooden sign with the Tolstoy slogan engraved on it which the owner says “hangs

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in the shop.” Id. at 9. SFC’s owner claims that the mark was printed and attached
to its products, and guesses that he saw the labels as early as 1975. Id. at 1-2. There
are no photos on the website of products with the label attached. Id. at 10. SFC also
lost all records, except “accounting type records,” prior to 2011 in a storage facility
fire. Id. at 9.
All of SFC’s sales are made in-store. According to the owner, 15% are
through its shop in Permilia, Wisconsin; 50% through a grocery store chain,
Sentry, also in Wisconsin; and 35% through a grocery store chain, Lunds, in
Minnesota. Id. at 4-5. SFC does not sell in the Chicago area or online. Id. at 5. SFC
promotes its product through a website, a catalog emailed to past customers and
people who request it, and once or twice a year may give an interview to a
magazine reporter or food blogger. Id at 10. There are no seasonal variations or
“significant upticks around any holidays.” Id. at 6. Schwangau cheeses are also on
the higher end in terms of “the cheese market.” Id. at 5. “One pound of cheddar
starts at $10 [and] . . . goes up with aging.” Id. at 6. SFC’s owner also says that no
one has ever asked about vegan chocolate or Jolie Artisanal Vegan Chocolates and
that he had never heard of Jolie before this litigation began. Id. at 7.
II. ARGUMENT
The Court should deny the Motion for Preliminary Injunction for trademark
infringement against Jolie because SFC has no right to the mark and Jolie’s mark is

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not likely to cause confusion among consumers. In order to prevail on a trademark
infringement claim under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must show both (1) that its
mark is protected under Lanham Act and (2) that the challenged mark is “likely to
cause confusion among consumers.” CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d
660, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2001).
The party seeking preliminary injunction bears the burden of demonstrating:
(1) no other adequate remedy; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted;
(3) that such harm is greater than the harm of defendant if granted; (4) a likelihood
of success on the merits; and (5) that public interest will not be harmed as a result.
Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084 (7th
Cir. 1988). For this Motion, only the fourth element, the likelihood of success on
the merits, is at issue. For trademark infringement, a “preliminary injunction is a
very serious remedy, ‘never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding
it.’” Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000).
Here, Jolie has a federally registered mark. This case is about Congress’
intent to “afford nation-wide protection to federally registered marks.” Burger
King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 1968). SFC has not shown
the prior use on goods or services required to establish a protectable right. Even if
a right is found, however, SFC’s use is restricted to the locations where prior use

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has been shown. Such a right, however, is not at issue here since Jolie’s federally
registered mark is unlikely to cause confusion among consumers.
A. THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BECAUSE SFC LIKELY HAS NO RIGHT TO THE
MARK AND AT BEST A LIMITED ONE.
SFC has not shown the continuous prior use in commerce required to
establish a common law right against Jolie’s 2011 federally registered mark. If a
right was found, however, protection of SFC’s mark would be limited to those
market areas in Wisconsin and Minnesota where prior use was shown.
In a case of trademark infringement, the registered mark grants a right
nationwide against all except a person who can show a common law right through
previous use of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)(1) (2012). Prior use must have been
continuous and in commerce, such as being placed on goods with tags or labels. 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Prior use is determined by considering “the totality of
circumstances,” and established through “evidence including affidavits, testimony,
and photographs.” Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 188
F.3d 427, 433-37 (7th Cir. 1999).
If a common law right to a mark is established, it is limited to areas where
prior continuous use has been shown against a federally registered mark. Burger
King, 403 F.2d at 907. “Congress expanded the common law . . . by granting an
exclusive right in commerce to federal registrants in areas where there has been no

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offsetting use of the mark . . . and that once the certificate has issued, no person
can acquire any additional rights superior to those obtained by the federal
registrant.” Burger King, 403 F.2d at 908. A more recent case stated that if the
court determines that “more than one person is entitled to use [the mark] . . . the
Commissioner [of Patents] should be the one to determine the places of use of the
mark.” Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Quality Foods, Inc., 433 F.2d 99, 103 (7th
Cir. 1970).
The prior users in Burger King had their rights restricted to “sufficiently
distinct and geographically separate markets” where prior use had been shown
within Illinois. Burger King, 403 F.2d at 909. The defendants had used the mark,
Burger King, in Illinois and registered it under state law prior to plaintiffs’ federal
registration. The court found, however, that the defendants “did not acquire [the]
exclusive right that they would have acquired had they used [the] mark throughout
Illinois prior to plaintiffs’ federal registration.” Id. at 907. The court, therefore,
restricted defendant’s use to areas within Illinois. Id. at 909.
Here, SFC has not shown the prior use required to establish a right to the
mark. Besides the owner’s deposition, SFC offers no photographs, affidavits, or
other testimony to support its claim. In his deposition, the owner claims sales
through its shop and Sentry stores in Wisconsin as well as through Lunds stores in
Minnesota. SFC’s owner also guesses to have seen the mark printed on labels as

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far back as 1975. Although it is possible that SFC made prior sales in these areas,
the deposition, by itself, is not enough to transform this possibility into a likelihood
on the merits. Also, while SFC has had a picture on its website since 2000 of a
“wooden sign with the slogan engraved on it,” it does not show prior use in
commerce for a trademark on goods; the website does not sell SFC’s products, or
show pictures of the products with the label attached. The self-interested testimony
and website, therefore, do not demonstrate the likelihood of continuous prior use in
commerce required to establish a common law right and injunction against Jolie’s
2011 federally registered mark.
Alternatively, like the senior user in Burger King, if prior use were found,
SFC’s use would be restricted to the market areas where prior use has been shown.
In his deposition, the owner of SFC claims prior use in stores throughout
Wisconsin and Minnesota; however, a fire in 2011 has burned all records prior to
2011. For prior use in Wisconsin, SFC offers testimony of a picture of the mark on
its website. The website does not sell goods or show any of SFC’s products with
the mark attached. Given the serious nature of a preliminary injunction, the Court,
at most, should only restrict Jolie’s use of the mark within the parts of Wisconsin
and Minnesota where it or the Commissioner finds, on the merits, that SFC has
shown a likelihood of prior use. Expansion beyond these locations would go
against Congress’s intent to afford nation-wide protection to the federal registrant.

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At most, SFC has limited rights.
SFC, therefore, has no right to the mark because it has not shown prior use.
If the Court determines that prior use has been shown, SFC is limited to Wisconsin
and possibly Minnesota depending on how the Court or Commissioner weighs the
deposition offered by the owner of SFC. Given the serious nature of this Motion,
SFC has failed to meet its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits
and that this case “clearly demands it.”
B. THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE CHALLENGED MARK IS NOT
LIKELY TO CAUSE CONFUSION AMONG CONSUMERS.
SFC cannot show that the challenged mark is likely to cause confusion
among consumers because the mark, its use, the product, and the heightened
degree of consumer care all serve to distinguish Jolie’s mark from SFC’s. In order
to prevail on a claim for trademark infringement, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to
prove that the challenged mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers.
Burger King, 403 F.2d at 908.
Under the Lanham Act, “seven factors comprise a likelihood of confusion
analysis,” four of which are relevant and disputed in this case: “(1) the similarity
between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products;
(3) the area and manner of concurrent use; [and the] (4) degree of care likely to be
exercised by consumers.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir.

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2008). The parties have stipulated to the remaining three: “(5) strength of
plaintiff’s mark; (6) any actual confusion; and (7) the intent of the defendant to
‘palm off’ his product as that of another.” Id. Of the relevant factors, the similarity
between the marks is the most important. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891,
898 (7th Cir. 2001).
1. The challenged mark is not likely to cause confusion among consumers
because the marks are dissimilar in appearance and suggestion.
The commercial impressions of the two marks, viewed in their entirety and
in light of their salient portions, are unlikely to cause consumer confusion.
The similarity in appearance and suggestion is derived from considering the
mark “as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail.”
AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 929-30. A mark causes confusion if “the viewer of the
challenged mark would be likely to associate the product with which it is
connected with the source of the challenged mark.” AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 930.
Also, if “one word or feature of a composite trademark is the salient portion of the
mark, it may be given greater weight than the surrounding elements.” Ty, Inc. 237
F.3d at 898.
The court in AutoZone, compared the marks by looking at their overall
impression in the marketplace. AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 931. The court looked at
both the similarities and dissimilarities in comparing the OilZone mark with the
AutoZone mark. Id. at 930. Besides using “Zone” as the second word for their

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marks, both had the same font, directional slant, bar design suggesting movement,
and the “first letter of both words [was] larger than the others letters.” Id. The
marks were dissimilar in that “they [were] usually portrayed in different colors . . .
the bar designs [ran] in different directions, and the first words [were] different.”
Id. The court looked at the fonts, their slant, size, and relationship to the rest of the
mark, as well as color and all of the shared and non-shared elements of the mark in
the context of what occurs in the marketplace and determined that “a consumer
cruising down the street” would believe that OilZone represented AutoZone’s
entry into other markets. Id. The court ruled, therefore, that consumers could be
likely to confuse the marks. Id. at 935.
It is “inappropriate to focus on minor stylistic differences . . . if the public
does not encounter the two marks together.” Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 898. Instead, the
more salient portion of the mark gets “greater weight than the surrounding
elements. Id. When determining confusion, “the comparison should be made ‘in
light of what happens in the marketplace,’ [and] not merely by looking at the two
marks side-by-side.” Id. The court in Ty, Inc. reasoned that even though placing
Beanie Racers and Beanie Babies side-by-side may reveal minor dissimilarities,
consumers were unlikely to do so. Id. at 899. Because the “word ‘Beanie’ was a
well-known and famous part of the Ty mark,” the court rendered it “the more
salient portion of the mark” and found a likelihood of confusion. Id.

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Unlike the marks in AutoZone, the marks in this case create an overall
different impression in the marketplace. While the marks in AutoZone shared
company titles, the marks in this case share only part of a slogan borrowed from
Tolstoy, “All that matters in the end,” which sits underneath their company titles:
“Jolie Artisanal Vegan Chocolates” and “Schwangau Family Cheese.” Both
slogans end respectively with cheese or chocolate. Also, unlike the marks’
similarities in AutoZone, the marks in this case are dissimilar in font size, slant,
color, and relation to the rest of the mark. SFC’s mark has no portrait, the title is in
“old English type colored red on a white background,” not slanted. Following
below the title is the phrase “four year old cheddar cheese” and “made at and
distributed from . . . Wisconsin” below that. The slogan is on the bottom in Times
New Roman font, not bolded or slanted. Alternatively, Jolie’s mark has a green
oval portrait with black font slanted in bold Edwardian cursive. Below Jolie’s title
is the slogan with a French translation and a mirror image of the Chicago skyline
beneath. The marks create an overall different impression in the marketplace.
Unlike the marks in Ty, Inc., the salient portions of the mark are not similar
and the stylistic differences are not minor. The companies’ distinct titles, in larger
font at the top of the mark, are the salient portions because they are more
noticeable and important than the “All that matters in the end” slogan in smaller
font at the bottom. Although customers are not likely to hold the products up side-

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by-side, the stylistic differences are enough to distinguish the source of products in
the context of the marketplace: a white and red label with a Wisconsin address in
Old English Font attached to a block of cheese is noticeably different than a green
and black label, oval shaped, in English and French Edwardian cursive with the
Chicago Skyline attached to a box of chocolates. Even if, like the marks in Ty, Inc.,
the slogan was the more memorable salient portion, it is unlikely that a consumer
would associate famous quotes styled, positioned, colored, and translated
differently as these are as coming from the same source, especially considering the
source references for Chicago and Wisconsin on each mark. Consumers will not be
confused.
The dissimilarities in the salient portions of the marks, along with the sum of
the marks’ elements, distinguishes their source in a way that consumers would be
unlikely to associate the products with which they are connected as being from the
same source.
2. The challenged mark is not likely to cause confusion among consumers
because the products with which the marks are associated are dissimilar.
It is unlikely that the marks will cause confusion among consumers because
vegan chocolate is not closely related to cheese, and consumers are unlikely to
expect product expansion by either source.
The similarity of the products is determined by “whether the public is likely
to attribute the products . . . to a single source.” CAE, 267 F.3d at 679. Courts

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consider (1) the relatedness of current products and (2) consumers’ expectations
regarding product expansion. CAE, 267 F.3d at 679-81. This factor weighs heavily
in favor of injunctive relief if “it appears extremely likely . . . that the trademark
owner will soon enter the defendant’s field.” Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker
Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1992).
The CAE court found products were closely-related when there were general
and specific similarities, as well as a reasonable consumer expectation that a source
would expand. CAE, 267 F.3d at 680. General and specific similarities between the
parties included marketing “systems for monitoring air quality and emissions” and
developing software for stack emissions. Id. Consumers may have also expected
the senior user to expand “its business to offer the same products” because both
parties were in the same air pollution business and marketed to companies subject
to environmental regulations. Id. at 681. Both product relation and expectations of
expansion showed a likelihood of confusion given the products’ similarities. Id. at
687.
Unlike the products’ similarities in CAE, the vegan chocolates produced by
Jolie and the cheese produced by SFC are dissimilar. While chocolate and cheese
are both artisanal foods, it is the only general product similarity. There are no
specific similarities such as the use of milk or animal products. Unlike the
expectation of expansion in CAE, it is unlikely that SFC will actually expand or be

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expected by consumers to expand since it has not done so in nearly 100 years of
making cheese. The owner of Jolie has also said that there are “no plans to expand
Jolie.”
It is, therefore, unlikely that consumers would confuse the sources because
cheese is not closely related to vegan chocolate and consumers have no reason to
expect product expansion from either source. This factor also weighs lightly since
there is no likelihood of expansion given SFC’s history and the testimony of Jolie’s
owner.
3. The challenged mark is not likely to cause confusion among consumers
because the marks are dissimilar in their areas and manners of use.
It is unlikely that Jolie’s mark will cause confusion because the seasonal use
of products, mediums of promotion, and sale and distribution methods between the
parties are sufficiently unrelated.
The area and manner of concurrent use is determined by “whether there is a
relationship in the use, promotion, distribution, or sales between the goods of the
parties.” Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 (7th Cir. 1990).
The parties in Forum did not “advertise in the same publications or attend the same
trade shows,” however, they did “share a number of clients and marketing
methods,” including sending mail directly to the same clients. Id.at 441-42. Since
there was only “one way in which the parties’ marketing differed,” the court found
that the overlap in markets was likely to cause confusion. Id.

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Unlike the parties in Forum, there is more than one way in which the
marketing of SFC and Jolie differ. In this case, the use, promotion, distribution,
and sales between the goods of the parties are different. For use, Jolie’s chocolates
are used primarily as seasonal gifts while SFC’s are used regularly throughout the
year. For distribution and sales in Wisconsin and Minnesota, the only way to buy
SFC’s cheese is in store and the only way to buy Jolie’s vegan chocolate is online.
100% of SFC’s sales are made in-store in Wisconsin and Minnesota, while 80% of
Jolie’s are made online with the remaining 20% sold through Jolie’s store in
Chicago. Even though Jolie’s customers are located “in every metropolitan area,”
only 6% of sales are from southeastern Wisconsin. For promotion, SFC takes a
more traditional approach; the owner may be interviewed twice a year by a
magazine reporter or food blogger and sends catalogs only to previous customers
and those who ask for it. Jolie, however, takes a more tech-savvy approach by
marketing through Ms. Hussain’s blog, cookbooks, journal publishing, and twitter
and YouTube accounts. These different marketing areas and uses distinguish the
marks from one another.
The dissimilarities in the seasonal use, in-store distribution, regional sales,
and online promotion between Jolie and SFC make it unlikely that the marks will
be confused by consumers.

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4. The challenged mark is not likely to cause confusion among consumers
because customers of both marks’ products are likely to exercise a
heightened degree of care.
Consumers are likely to use a heightened degree of care and unlikely to be
confused by the marks because the products are expensive and access is limited.
For the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers, “the more widely
accessible and inexpensive the products, the more likely consumers will exercise a
lesser degree of care.” CAE, 267 F.3d at 683.
The court in CAE found that consumers were unlikely to exercise a
heightened degree of care where parties sold inexpensive and widely accessible
products to overlapping clientele. Id. at 684. The products ranged “from $1.75 to
$11,150” and were targeted to the same “pharmaceutical and surface coating”
industries. Id. at 671. Both parties also used “appearances at trade shows and
conferences” for marketing. Id. at 682. Products were available online and through
catalogs. Id. at 669. The court found that the widespread access to inexpensive
products for overlapping clientele made it so that “consumer sophistication did not
diminish the likelihood of confusion.” Id. at 684.
Unlike the consumers in CAE, consumers in this case are likely to use a
heightened degree of care because the products are expensive and access is limited.
Jolie and SFC sell high-end, luxury products. Jolie sells vegan chocolates ranging
from a two piece $8 set to a thirty-two piece $120 set, whereas SFC produces non-

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vegan cheese ranging from $10 per pound and more with aging. Even consumers
with disposable incomes are unlikely to confuse the items since the products are
considered expensive in their relative markets. Unlike the overlapping of clientele
and targeting of the same specific audiences in CAE, Jolie primarily targets an
online vegan audience with seasonal gifts while SFC targets an in-store audience
for regular purchase. There is no indication that the parties have overlapping
clientele; neither party has heard of or been asked about the others product. Access
to SFC’s product is also limited in that all of its sales are in-store, and none are
made in Chicago. Jolie’s product is limited in that, unless you buy it from its shop
in Chicago, all of its sales are made online.
Consumers, therefore, will exercise greater care and discrimination in their
purchases between the different products because the products are expensive,
access is limited, and different audiences are targeted.
Weighing the above factors, the Court should deny the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction because there is no likelihood of confusion about the source
of marks’ products in the minds of consumers.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Jolie respectfully requests that this Court deny the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

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Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April, 2015.
JOLIE ARTISANAL VEGAN CHOCOLATES, INC.
By its attorney
Attorn Ey - *****____________
Attorn Ey, Esq. — Exam # *****
L & A Law Associates, PLC
1234 Final Street
Anyplace, USA 22222-1000
520-999-4444
I certify that I served 2 copies of this Memorandum
in Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction on the parties listed below this 20th day
of April, 2015.
Attorn Ey *****__________
Original plus one copy by hand-delivery:
Jon W. Sanfilippo
Clerk of Court
District Court of Southeastern Wisconsin
333 Fourth Avenue
Big Town, Milwaukee 99999
AND one copy by first-class mail:
Andrea Keys
222 Fourth Street
Big Town, Milwaukee 99999