Effects of centralization and decentralization of electoral administration by adebayo a.s 2010

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EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION AND
DECENTRALIZATION OF ELECTORAL
ADMINISTRATION ON THE CONDUCT OF CREDIBLE
GENERAL ELECTIONS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN AND
US ELECTORAL PROCESSES.
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BY
ADEBAYO, ADEBUKOLA SHEHU
MATRIC. NO. 960903002
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS
AKOKA.
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF

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MASTER OF SCIENCE (M Sc) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
MARCH, 2010.

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CERTIFICATION
Certified that this research project titled: Effects of Centralization and
Decentralization of Electoral Administration on the Conduct of
Credible general Elections: A Comparative analysis of the Nigerian and
US Electoral Processes, was written by Adebayo, Adebukola Shehu with
Matric. No. 960903002 under my supervision.
I hereby recommend the work to the Board of Examiners for evaluation.
…………………………………………………………………………………………
Dr. Samuel C. Ugoh Date
Project Supervisor
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

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…………………………………………………………………………………………
Prof. S. Akinboye Date
Head of Department.

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DEDICATION
I strongly dedicate this project to Almighty Allah (SWT) for making my
hopes of an MSc degree a successful reality.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I express my deep appreciation of the intellectual and moral
contributions of my amiable supervisor, Dr. S. C. Ugoh. Sir, your
thoroughness, wisdom and cooperation made this work a huge
success.
I am most appreciative of the contributions of Mr. abdulHakeem
Babatunde Abolade, a friend, brother and senior colleague (now
based in the UK), Dr. Adediji, The Chief Librarian, University of
Lagos, my older brothers, Engineer J.O. Adebayo and Barrister K.O.
Adebayo, my sister, Mrs. Rita Boyo and all members of the extended
Adebayo family; especially my Mother, Alhaja Munirat Adebayo and
my Father, late Alahaji Said Aremu Adebayo, not forgetting Mr.
Opeoluwa Akinola, a friend, brother and senior colleague. I thank you
all for your financial, material and moral contributions which made my
MSc programme a reality.
I strongly acknowledge the support of friends and well wishers
especially the entire management and staff of Christia (C&T)
Consultancy Services Limited, Ojodu, Lagos under the able
leadership of Mr. C. O. Tiamiyu. I thank Alhaji Lukman AbdulAlwal,
AbdulGaniyu Abdulalwal, AbdulFatah AbdulAlwal and the entire
AbdulAlwal family, Edward Adesina, AbdulLateef Abas, Funmilayo
Ogunsipe, Martins Akerele, Peter Opuboh, Tunrayo Falabake, Tope
Olaiwola, Vera Madubuogor AbdulGaniyu Olaniyi and Dr. M. J.
Isonguyoh, for their support.

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I deeply appreciate the support of my friends and colleagues:
Habeeb belo, Hassan Olapade, Hon. Kamardeen Basua and Hon.
Garba.
I sincerely appreciate the management and staff of Political and
Administrative Resource Center (PARC), Ogba, Lagos as well as Mr.
AbdulFatah Raji for allowing me make extensive use of their libraries
for the conduct of this research. I thank the academic and non-
academic members of staff of the Department of Political Science,
University of Lagos for their love cooperation and understanding
during my MSC programme.
I thank my darling wife, Mrs. Mulikat Oluwabunmi Adebayo and my
three children: Hafsoh, AbdulMalik and Hassan for their
understanding and encouragement.
Finally, I appreciate the fatherly guidance and motivation of the
following intellectual icons: Prof. Jinadu, Prof. Ogunsanwo, Prof.
Oyebode, Prof. Anifowose, Prof. Babawale, Dr. Oluwajuyitan, Dr.
Akinyemi and Late Dr. Akinbobola.

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ABSTRACT
There are increasing debates over the centralization and
decentralization of the administration of general elections especially
in large countries mostly known as federations. General elections are
conducted to elect national leaders like the president and members
of a national parliament. It is often argued that since this category of
election leads to the establishment of national government, its
administration should be centralized and left to the control of the
national government. On the other hand, some argue that since the
core activities (voting) in every election are carried out at the local
level, its administration should be decentralized and transferred to
regional and local governments.
Accordingly, the concern of this research has been to
investigate the fundamental effects of centralizing and decentralizing
the administration of general elections; drawing a comparative
analysis of the Nigerian and US experiences respectively. To achieve
this task, the study relied substantially on facts drawn from relevant
literatures.
This study reveals that where and when there is total
centralization or decentralization in the administration of general
elections, such problems as: poor logistics management, overbearing
political and financial control, poor supervision, process disuniformity
as well as inadequate concerns for local inputs and needs will
prevail; thus reducing the credibility of such elections. While
recommending that countries especially federations should avoid the
extremes of centralization or decentralization in their administration
of general elections, the study concludes that the need to develop a
more liberal, hybrid and workable model of national electoral
administration for federal systems has become imperative.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page
Certification. . . . . . . . i

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Dedication . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . iii-iv
Abstract . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . vi
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Statement of Problem . . . . . 1-9
1.2 Statement of Research Questions . . . 9
1.3 Purpose of the Research . . . . . 9-10
1.4 Significance of the Study. . . . . 10-11
1.5 Scope of the Research . . . . . 11
1.6 Research Methodology . . . . . 12
1.7 Research Chapterization . . . . . 12-13
1.8 Major Terms and Concepts . . . . 13-14
1.9 References . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Review of Literature on Election . . . 16-39
2.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . 39-48
2.3 References . . . . . . . 49-52
CHAPTER THREE
DESCRIPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS OF THE NIGERIAN AND US ELECTORAL PROCESS
3.1 The Nigerian Electoral Process . . . . 53-56
3.2 The US Electoral Process. . . . . 57-63
3.3 Elements of Comparison . . . . . 63-67
3.4 References . . . . . . . 67-68
CHAPTER FOUR

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EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION AND EECENTRALIZATION OF
ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ON PROCESS AND OUTCOME
CREDIBILITY IN NIGERIA AND THE US
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . 69-70
4.2 The Effects of Centralized Electoral Administration
in Nigeria . . . . . . . 70-79
4.3 Effects of a Decentralized Electoral Administration
in the US . . . . . . . 79-93
4.4 References . . . . . . . 94-97
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary of Findings . . . . . 98-99
5.2 Recommendations . . . . . . 99-101
53 Findings . . . . . . . 101-102
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . 102-103
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . 104-111

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Since 1999 and 2000, matters arising from the conduct of elections in
Nigeria and the US have generated serious intellectual debates and political
conflicts among scholars and politicians respectively. In the case of
Nigeria, we observed that the return to democratic governance in 1999 was
kick-started by and electoral process similar in character to those of
previous democratic dispensations. (Adebayo, 2000) Cases of electoral
malpractices like rigging and falsification of election results, violence and
other acts of corruption like bribing of voters and electoral officials freely
occurred and this resulted in popular dissatisfaction with election outcomes,
rejection of election outcomes by defeated parties and numerous protracted
post-election litigations which have had various forms of destabilizing
effects on government. In addition, the centralized structure and process of
the administration of election through one institution; the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) also seem to have reasonable
influences on electoral credibility and crises in Nigeria. The
recommendation for the unbundling of INEC by the Justice Ways Electoral
Reforms Committee (ERIC), in its report submitted to the Maraud
administration emphasizes the problems arising from the issues of
centralization and concentration of electoral administrative powers in INEC.
(www.answers.com)
In the case of US, until the 2000 presidential elections, the country had a
fairly stable and crises-free electoral history. Just before the 2008
presidential elections, Mayer, (2007) acknowledged that "The last 7 years

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demonstrate that from the standpoint of international standards, or even
common sense, election administration here appears to fall short of basic
procedural fairness." Mayer observes that "The three main features (which
are considered here as the fundamental problems) of US election
administration are a radical degree of decentralization, the partisanship of
election officials and its largely privatized nature.
Mayer explains that because of the complexity and decentralization, the
machinery of elections – the voting systems and equipment used to
complete and tabulate ballots – is driven by private contractors, who
exercise considerable influence over the types of equipment available."
According to Ernest Partridge, Co-Editor of The Crisis Papers, while
commenting on the crisis of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential elections,
"The grounds for suspicion about the integrity of our elections are simple,
straightforward, and undisputed. In federal elections, thirty percent of the
votes are cast, and eighty percent of the votes are regionally compiled, in
machines: (a) utilizing secret software, (b) producing no independent record
of the votes (e.g. Paper trails‖), and (c) manufactured by active members
and supporters of the Republican Party. In sum, the system in place is
effectively designed, either deliberately or accidentally, to facilitate fraud."
www.crisispapers.org
One prominent element identified in the electoral defects in Nigeria and the
US as stated above is the notion of centralization and decentralization of the
administration and process of electioneering which this research intends to
highlight as a fundamental and influential factor in the determination of the
credibility of election outcomes. The centralization and decentralization of
the electoral process possess both political and administrative dimensions.

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While the former relates with implications arising from the issues
surrounding the evolution of the nation state on one hand, as well as the
nature and objectives of political relationship between electorates, election
candidates and the government on the other hand, the latter relates with the
legitimacy and efficacy of institutions and processes established for the
administration or conduct of elections. Accordingly, in discussing the
nature, scope and effects of centralization and decentralization of election
administration and processes in both countries, these two dimensions which
logically represents the two sides of the same coin will be duly considered.
From the Nigerian and US experiences, it is observed that the notion of
centralization and decentralization evolves, first, from the realm of politics.
Both countries operate two varieties of federalism with each reflecting
contrasting degree of tolerance for centralization and decentralization. For
instance, while Nigeria operates a federal system with high tolerance for
political and economic power centralization, the US operates an exact
opposite of this.
According to Assisi Asobie, "Centralizing trends in Nigerian federalism
have manifested themselves in the following ways since the Nigerian
federal system was established in 1954. First, the federal government has,
beginning from 1963, but especially since 1976, demonstrated an increased
capacity to alter unilaterally and in its own favor, the existing distribution of
power between it and the regional governments and, indeed, among the
various levels of government. Second, there has been an increasing
accretion to the federal governments of functions previously allocated to the
regional (or state) governments. Third, the resources - coercive,
bureaucratic, ideological and financial - directly available to the component
units (regions or states) for carrying out their constitutional functions have

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steadily diminished in range and quantum while those at the disposal of the
federal government have increased." (Tunde Babawale et al, 1998)
These trends were borne out of the centralist legacies laid down during the
period of colonialism when political and administrative power centralization
was established since 1914 (when the northern and southern regions of
Nigerian were amalgamated) for the purpose of sustaining convenience for
the colonial government. The division of the country into three regions
(east, north and west) in 1939 was to pave the way for the adoption of the
federal system in the 1954 Littleton Constitution. This development
introduced some element of: first, power deconcentration before 1954 and
second, power decentralization after 1954 when the three regions were
granted autonomy.
However, the reversal to mere political and administrative power
deconcentration as against an autonomy-based power decentralization was
consequential, first, to the intervention of the military in 1966 and the
conversion of the three (and later four) regions into 12 states in 1967 for the
purpose of withdrawing the hitherto granted regional autonomy and
preventing secession by Biafra. The major implication of this was the
conversion of the federating units in Nigeria to mere administrative
appendage of the federal government as almost all government functions
and responsibilities were initiated from the central government. States were
simply empowered to implement the directives of the federal government.
The second rationale for the centralization of political and administrative
powers in Nigeria's federal system stems from the need to also centralize the
gathering and redistribution of the nation's economic resources. Arguments
in this direction suggest the need to protect minority interest in the process

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of resource redistribution especially as the nation moved towards a single-
commodity-based (petroleum) economy.
Accordingly, all state structures and institutions were centrally located and
managed. All hitherto decentralized functions in the areas of resource
management, health, infrastructure, education etc were centralized. The
various attempts at democratization and the corresponding institutions
established to administer its processes including the electoral process were
all centrally initiated and managed.
Unfortunately, as can be observed in the almost fifty year history of Nigeria,
the centralization of political and economic powers made governance at the
centre the major focus in the nation's political process. (Anifowose and
Babawale, 2006) The enormous powers and resources at the centre made
federal political offices too attractive that the military and politicians
employed several unethical strategies to secure, occupy and retain them.
These helped to fuel, expand and sustain chronic corruption in the
administration of these political institutions thereby rendering them
dysfunctional and ineffective in the discharge of their constitutional roles.
The crises bedeviling the administration of the electoral process in Nigeria
can not be divorced from this trend of institutional dysfunctional and
ineffectiveness due to over-centralization. The management of the electoral
process suffers from overbearing political power influence and pressures as
well as administrative structural defects due to the over-centralization and
over-concentration of political powers and administrative functions in one
single central body.
Samuel Ugoh (in the UNILAG Journal of Politics, 2004) and several other
scholars regularly point out both the political and administrative lapses of an

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over-centralized electoral body. Ugoh's identification of such electoral
problems as "limited autonomy of various electoral bodies, particularly their
lack of financial empowerment" implies the extent of political power
centralization as manifested in the Nigerian executive arm of government
which is in turn used in the manipulation of the nation's EMB. Similarly,
Ugoh identifies "weak human resources as well as unreliable voters'
registers nationwide" (and other poor administrative logistics) as the bane of
credible, free and fair elections in Nigeria. the inefficient management of
electoral administrative logistics since 1999 manifest mostly in the late
production and delivery of election/voting materials to polling units on
election days. This gives room for easy manipulations by politicians in
collaboration with corrupt election officials. The primary source of this
administrative problem is traceable to the over-centralization of the process
which causes inability of states and/or local governments to develop and
operate electoral administrative machineries.
The US federal system is built strictly on the principle of subsidiarity which
holds that "Tasks should never be allocated to a body higher up in a political
hierarchy if they can be effectively carried out by a body lower down."
(www.politicsprofessor.com). Accordingly, the tenth amendment to the US
constitution (and other subsequent amendments and federal legislations)
specifies the areas that fall under the legislative jurisdiction of both the
central and state governments. (www.wikipedia.org)
The US federation started on a rather loose form with autonomous states
coming together to establish a confederation. However, the threat of a civil
war exposed the young nation to the harsh realities of a weak central
government thus prompting the need for a federal system with a much
stronger central government.

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Specifically, the US federal constitution specifies the areas of legislative
jurisdiction of the federal government to cover those areas which apply
commonly to the entire country such as: foreign policy, defense, customs,
commerce (especially those which span interstate boundaries) and national
currency. It is assumed that areas not specified by the constitution fall
within the legislative jurisdiction of the states.
However, a careful examination of historical developments in the US
federal system indicate a sustained trend of gradual expansion of federal
legislative jurisdiction into areas which hitherto fall within the powers of the
states. Proponents of this trend have variously argued against what they
termed unregulated, radical and dysfunctional decentralization which,
according to them, facilitates too much of disuniformity and disparities in
the socio-political and economic processes of the nation consequence of
which is likely to lead to disunity, disintegration and disproportional
development among the states particularly among those termed as rich and
poor states.
As can be observed, the electoral process falls under the exclusive list of the
states. (www.wikipedia.org) As we shall see in chapter three, even elections
into federal political offices are all conducted by the states. The states
equally have the constitutional powers to operate, organize or manage the
electoral process in ways preferred by them so-long as such preferences fall
within the confines of constitutional prescriptions on the conduct of federal
(or general) elections. the tolerance for this degree of decentralization has
made the conduct of general elections in the US so disuniformly and
unregulatedly organized that since the 2000 general elections fundamental
problems associated with this degree of electoral decentralization began to

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show-up. Samuel Ugoh (in the UNILAG Journal of Politics, 2004)
acknowledges in particular, the controversy which surrounded the "Florida
state" conduct of the 2000 presidential elections. Ugoh observes that such
negative electoral trends as "inflation of the election results and bribing of
the polling agents" (as well as massive disenfranchisement of voters through
failing voting machines and other electoral technologies) had occurred in
the past; citing the "Watergate scandal in 1974." We demonstrate in chapter
four that the persistence in the occurrence of some of these trends in the
2000 and subsequent general elections is substantially consequential to the
radical decentralization of the US electoral process.
Essentially, this research shall critically consider the rationale for and nature
of centralization and decentralization of the Nigerian and US electoral
processes with a view to determining their degree of tolerance for electoral
malpractices, and by extension, the credibility of election outcomes. The
research shall situate its subject matter within the analytical framework of
the theories of federalism for the purpose of providing logical explanations
for the political dimensions of electoral process centralization and/or
decentralization. However, pure administrative theories of centralization
and decentralization shall be used with a view to providing explanations for
their degree of efficacy or otherwise. Meanwhile, some historical
perspectives of electioneering in both countries will be presented in order to
lay a proper foundation for the understanding of the subject matter.
This research dwells on some arguments that centralization and/or
decentralization of the electoral process as demonstrated in Nigeria and the
US poses substantial influence on the degree of credibility of both the
electoral process itself and its outcome. the experiences of both countries in

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this regard manifest not only the two extremes of electioneering, but also, its
peculiarities in both countries.
However, this research recognize the need to attempt a reconciliation of
divergent aspects of both centralization and decentralization, or the
harnessing of their merits in order to reduce electoral malpractices and
increasing its credibility.
1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How does the practice of federalism influence the centralization or
decentralization of the electoral process?
2. What are the merits and demerits of a centralized and decentralized
electoral process?
3. How does centralization and decentralization influence the credibility
of conduct and outcomes of elections?
4. what points of convergence between centralization and
decentralization are required for the conduct of credible elections in a
federal state?
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
This research intends to serve the following purposes:
1. To compare and contrast the process of electoral administration in
Nigeria and the US with a view to identifying areas of divergence and
convergence.
2. To critically examine the nature, scope and implications of
centralization and decentralization on the administration of credible
elections in Nigeria and the US.

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3. To examine the influences of federalism as a political system on the
determination of the degree of centralization and decentralization of
the electoral process in Nigeria and the US.
4. To determine the relationship between the efficacy of electoral
administration and the credibility of the electoral process in Nigeria
and the US.
5. To harness the merits of centralization and decentralization in the
conduct and administration of elections with a view to developing an
ideal and credible electoral process.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study provides an uncommon basis for comparison between the
electoral processes of two distinctly different countries; (Nigeria and US)
considering the notions of centralization and decentralization of both the
process and administration of their electoral systems as well as their
political foundations.
This study does not only identifies the fundamental influences of
centralization and decentralization on the conduct of credible elections, it
also provides thoughts on the rationale for their adoption, the limitations
posed particularly for the attainment of credibility of the electoral process as
well as the modalities for adjusting either of a centralized or decentralized
electoral process with a view to producing credible outcomes.
This research is a timely reaction to one of the most prominently significant
contemporary developments in Nigeria and the US. As noted in the
introductory section of this chapter, the electoral process in both countries
have generated serious intellectual and political controversies, the root

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cause of which is traced to the centralization and decentralization of its
process and administration.
The findings and recommendations of this research will serve a dual
purpose of contributing to intellectual knowledge and providing policy
guides not only to EMBs, but also to law and policy makers tinkering or
attempting to reform their electoral process as it is currently the case in
Nigeria.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
The focus of this research is limited to issues related to election
administration such as the legal frameworks of election administration,
design and structure of Election Management Bodies (EMBs), process of
administration, human resources, logistics and the political environment.
The research will be assessing the efficacy of these elements of election
administration within the prevailing political environment and their
corresponding implication.
However the scope of comparison will deal with the political and legal
rationale for centralization and decentralization of the electoral process in
Nigeria and the US, describe their administrative processes and then present
their credibility implications.
The study period covers only all general elections held in Nigeria and the
US between 1999 and 2008. The limitation of this study within the period is
because of time and financial positions. This research does not encounter
any serious limitations in terms of data availability and gathering.

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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research is designed as a case study content analysis research. It
adopts the comparative approach in the analysis of its two case studies:
Nigeria and the US.
The research does not require any survey questionnaires. However,
unstructured interviews were administered on selected but relevant
personalities comprising of intellectuals and professionals.
The research relies mainly on secondary data gathered from relevant
literature. Statistical data required especially for the testing of the three
hypotheses were also sourced through such literature.
1.7 RESEARCH CHAPTERIZATION
Chapter one focuses on statement of problems, research objectives,
significance of the study and the research methodology.
The second chapter of this research constitutes the intellectual domain of the
study which is situated in the analysis of the theories of centralization,
decentralization, and federalism as well as their application to the
administration and organization of credible elections. chapter two is the
review of literatures which extensively discuss the operational relationships
between core concepts like federalism and election administration.
The third chapter deals with legal and political frameworks guiding the
establishment, structure and operation of election Management Bodies
(EMBs) as well as the conduct of general elections in Nigeria and the US.

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The fourth chapter presents a comparative analysis of issues arising from the
centralization and decentralization of the electoral processes in Nigeria and
the US.
The fifth chapter presents the findings made on some fundamental causes of
problems associated with the structure of election administration in Nigeria
and the US. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations provided as
remedy to identified problems.
1.8 MAJOR TERMS AND CONCEPTS
(A) Election: An election is a decision-making process by which a
population chooses an individual to hold formal office. This is the usual
mechanism by which modern democracy fills offices in the legislature,
sometimes in the executive and judiciary, and for regional and local
government. This process is also used in many other private and business
organizations, from clubs to voluntary associations and corporations.
(www.wikipedia.org)
(B) Election Administration: Election Administration is the term used
to denote the steps which are undertaken when organizing an election.
These steps include: legal framework development; election management;
constituency and polling district demarcation; voter education; voter
registration; access to, and design of, the ballot; nomination and registration
of parties and candidates; campaign regulation; polling; counting and
tabulating the vote; resolving election-related disputes and complaints;
verification and certification of final results; election result implementation;
post-election procedures. (www.wikipedia.org)

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(C) Election Management Bodies: Election Management Bodies
(EMBs) are organizations/institutions which are tasked with the
administration of all aspects of the election process. (www.wikipedia.org)
(D) Centralization: In the institutional sense centralization implies the
constitutional concentration of powers in the hands of a few people or
institutions at the national level of government and the marginalization of
some other levels of government such as the state and/or local governments
and/or other such governmental institutions as the courts, parliaments and
sub-national governments. They define economic centralization as the
situation whereby the government spends a relative, large proportion, of a
country's gross national product compared to the private sector. With respect
to financial centralization, it is taken to exist under situations where the
government raises or appropriates the balk of state revenues.
(E) Decentralization: This refers to the transfer of some power and
resources from the central, to local level governments and organizations.
(Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999) There are different forms of
decentralization: deconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatization
(Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999) respectively. However, for the purpose of
this research, devolution, as a form of decentralization will be adopted.
(F) Federalism: This concept is used in defining the political structure
or organization of a country wherein there is a constitutionally authorized
sharing of political power and control of economic resources between the
government at the centre and those of sub national units commonly referred
to as region, province, state etc. Federalism also applies to the structure and
organization of both governmental and nongovernmental institutions whose
operations cover a considerably large area.

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1.9 REFERENCES
Adebayo, A. S., (2000); The Electoral Process and the Development of the
Nigerian Politics; 1979-1999. Unpublished Thesis, Department of Political
Science, University of Lagos.
Anifowose R and Enemuo F., (eds) (1999); Elements of Politics.
Anifowose R. and Babawale T., (eds) (2006); An agenda for a New Nigeria;
The Imperative of Transformation. Concept Publications Limited, Lagos.
Babawale T. et al., (1998); Re-Inventing Federalism in Nigeria; Issues and
Perspectives. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria.
Mayer, K. R., (2007); Comparative Election Administration: Can We Learn
Anything From the Australian Electoral Commission? Department of
Political Science University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Partridge, E., (April 26, 2005), What Can We the People Do About Election
Fraud? The Crisis Papers, www.crisispapers.org
The Theory of Subsidiarity. www.politicsprofessor.com
Ugoh, S. C. (2004); "Electoral Malpractice and Violence in the 2003
General elections in Nigeria" in the UNILAG Journal of Politics Vol. 1 No.
1, December, 2004.
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, (2009); Election. (www.wikipedia.org)
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, (2009); Federalism in the US.
(www.wikipedia.org)

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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ELECTION
Elections are institutionalized procedures for the choice of office holders by
the members of an organization or society. Elections broadly conceived,
refer to the process of elite election by the mass population in a given
political system. Elections are among the most ubiquitous of contemporary
political issues, while voting forms the single act of political participation
undertaken By a majority of adults in a majority of the world's states. . For a
wide variety of Political systems competitive and non competitive,
developed and developing Afro-Asian, communist and western, there seems
to be a genial recognition that elections are means by which popular
commitment to the regime may be mobilized.
According to the Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2009), ―Elections first took a
central place in politics in the Greek city state of the Eastern Mediterranean
in the fifth and sixth centuries BC.‖ There has been no systematic study of
elections in societies independent of this western tradition. Certainly, traces
are to be found else where but it does not seem that elections have played a
central part in other society. On the contrary, let us attempt a historical but
practical survey of electoral procedures in terms of the diffusion of a social
political pattern from single source and its modification in a great variety of
situations.
Meanwhile, it is assumed that these procedures correspond functionally to
certain general social needs which are particularly marked in literate
technological and mobile societies hence they periodically reappeared after
set backs in new forms in new corners of western society. However it is

26
assumed that where these procedures meet no social needs they may be
retained as forms but are filled with a new content.
W. J. M. Mackenzie in an article functions of election (encyclopedia of
social science volume 5 pp.1-6). Presents a brief but precise historical
development of the concept of electoral process at various developmental
stages of man's society beginning from the heroic age up to the
revolutionary years of the seventeenth, eighteenth and to nineteenth century.
In the heroic age he explain that the poem of homer reflects a state of
society in which rule was by large whose position was conspicuously unlike
that of the "oriental despots" of the river valley civilization with which they
came in contact". The evidence of the mythological and epic narratives is
difficult to use but it suggests situation roughly parallel to cases found in
mobile African Societies where the king although drawn from a royal
lineage emerges as leader by a process which may include competition,
concilise election and acclamation by the people.
The next development stage identified by Mackenzie is the period of the
Greek democracies. During this period, the epic period of tribal mobility
was succeeded by one of peasant agriculture tempered by growing
commercial activities and emigration to colonies overseas.
"From this situation emerged the strife between the well born and the people
which affected Greek ideas and practice about political institutions almost
everywhere" where this strife was intense Greek elections assumed new
forms either through complete popular victory or through attempts at
compromise we are primarily concerned not with voting on measures in
popular assembles but with the choice of authority.

27
However, elections under the Greek democracies posses two notable
features; first in voting on proportions in the assembly of the citizens. The
role was apparently made of written votes in the procedure of ostracism and
of ballot in the form of pebbles.
Meanwhile, holders of certain legally recognized offices in particular
archons Generals were elected by non legal constituencies known as tribes
which were held to have been instituted deliberately so as to cut across local
divisions of interest within Africa.
Secondly, the principle of election was accepted grudgingly in Athenian
democracy theory. It infringe the principles of equality among citizen and it
was dangerous because it opened way to power for ambitions attractive and
well trained young men of the old families and equally for ambitious men of
the people who were prepared to perpetuate their electoral victory by force
(the common pattern of Greek "tyranny") The orthodox principle was that
citizens should hold offices of authority in rotation while the order would be
determined by lot. (Those features are described in detail by Aristotle
politela Athenian -63-66). However it is notable that in general the Athenian
used voting for election to offices requiring special skills such as military
leadership whereas in western countries voting is now used to fill offices of
a representative character for which the Athenians used. The lots, offices
requiring special skills are now generally filled by appointment from a field
determined by specified professional qualifications.
The third stage identified by Mackenzie is the period of Roman Republic
even of the republic the Romans never accepted the principles of one man
one vote. Decision in legislation end in the choice of the principal officials

28
which was by a plurality of Counties by a plurality of tribes within each of
these constituencies, one man one vote prevailed but the units varied in size.
However during the medieval church period Mackenzie maintained that the
tradition of ancient elections was preserved in the church rather than in the
state. It continued unbroken in the Roman catholic churches but many
national and non conformist church also developed the use of elections as
the basis of a legitimate claim to hold office (it is an interesting coincidence
that election has in protestant theology has different meaning: that of the
granting of spiritual grace to God's elect)". The most ancient and continuous
tradition has been that of the election of superiors (Popes, Bishops, Deans,
Priors and so on) by a relatively small electorate consisting of this next in
rank up to a point the procedure is deliberative tending toward a conclusion
by "sense of the meeting" But there are also ancient and complex roles
about voting procedures these rights of election were defended strongly but
not always with success against hierarchical and secular attempts to
substitute appointment. Like the Athenian political system elections in the
church medieval period also posses features such as the use of majority vote
and rotational method.
During the feudal stages of political system Mackenzie believes "elections"
become permanent socio-political phenomena such that it defines the pattern
of interactions among key political actors. According to him "the position of
the feudal emperor king or over lord was deemed to be limited by law and
custom and to some extent by the consent of his vassals. The relation
between king and lord and between lord and man was in principal one of
consent leading to binding initial obligation. The vassal chose to do homage,
the lord choose whether or not to accept. It was not a long step from this to
an elected emperor and (in a few instance) an elected king. The social

29
situation greatly limited the application of the principles of consent and
election in practice but the idea of binding legal right of succession to office
emerged slowly along with the growth of other nations of private and
heritable property".
Consequently there arose the need for consultation, first with a feudal
council then with assemblies representing" others beside immediate vassals.
These assemblies were the basis of the parliamentary tradition national
government but without any national enactment about electoral procedures.
In the revolutionary years of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries a radical change had occurred in western political systems and as
such the idea and practice of electoral processes inevitably assumed
different dimension.
According to Mackenzie "In most of Europe the assemblies of estates were
displaced by autocratic, modernizing monarchies for the diffusion of
elections the only important survival was in England (the parliament of
Scotland and Sweden survived but had little or no influence outside their
own countries and in colonial assemblies based on the English model.
During the struggle for survival certain basis principle of consent franchise
and representation were hammered out although these practice were never
fully applied in practice they were recognized as the ideological basis of a
system of democratic election. The classic statement are those of English
popular leaders in the 1640s and 1650s their language recalls both that of
non conformist congregation and that of Athenian democracy. The principle
in brief is that all government aids their just powers to the consent of the
governed and that in numerous societies this consent may be expressed by
representative freely elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage".

30
This provided the basis upon which further modification of the electoral
process was established especially from the nineteenth century to this
contemporary period. In the 19th century global political system had not
only been polarized into the communist and capitalist democracies
respectively, there were also new states which were being nurtured into
existence through colonialism. Based on these three distinct geopolitical
settings we shall draw the concept of electoral process. It is however worthy
of mentioning that one common features which characterized the idea and
practice of election (especially communist and capitalist states) was the
emergence of political parties (party system of various forms (one party,
two party and multi party system) which serves as intermediaries between
elected and electorates but we shall not go into in depth analysis of this
aspect as our focus in this study is to explain the institutional and
organizational aspects of the electoral process which simply emphasis on
political parties and party systems (as another interactive structure) within
the political system.
Nonetheless, we must admit that the most important of this new
phenomenon are political parties as intermediaries between voter and
assembly. Clear recognition of this situation comes first in American
presidential elections but it spread rapidly with the extension of the
franchise in large states in the nineteenth century. By the last quarters of that
century parties and elections had become interdependent and electoral
parties were no longer limited to national politics, but had extended to trade
unions and large cooperative societies. But national elections are hence forth
intelligible only in terms of parties the traditional principles demand the
scrutiny of procedures within parties since they control the first stage of
national elections. Stein Ronkein in his article ' Electoral systems'

31
(international Encyclopedia of social Sciences, 1972-vol. 4 and 5) provides
further analysis on parties in electoral process.
It is pertinent at this point to present some electoral models constructed by
Prof. Remi Anifowose (Unpublished Thesis, 1970) which were in
contemporary use in communist capitalist as well as under developed
political systems. According to Anifowose, elections as "a game" guided by
specific rules and regulations. From this assertion, Anifowose established
two characteristics which electoral roles possess. The first is the constitutive
character while the second is the regulative character. The constitutive rules
determine what is the form or structure of the game and the regulative rules
specify what are to count as legitimate moves in the game. Anifowose
therefore regard any electoral institution as consisting of constitutive and
regulative roles for its successful operations. And for the stability of any
electoral system, there must be congruence between form and process that is
between the constitutive and regulative roles of the game. In addition, the
major competing groups must be in fundamental agreement on these roles
and the latter must be regarded as worthy of conformity. Added to these, is
the need to preserve the domestic norms necessary for the successful
operation of either the ratification or competitive electoral models. To
attempt to impose the norms and regulative rules of the former on the latter
and vice versa is to create the conditions for stress, violence and instability
on the political system. This has been the case in most old and emerging
democracies where and when electoral crises occur.
Discussing further on Anifowose electoral models, we briefly explain the
methods used in the adoption of this models. As earlier remarked, elections
serve different purposes and function for different political systems thus in
essence elections have different meaning for both western and communist

32
countries. This provides the framework for Anifowose's analysis. in his
view: the result of electing the soviet union are largely a forgone conclusion
it is therefore legitimate to ask why the authorities should consider it
worthwhile to incur such tremendous expense in money and man power to
achieve it. Totalitarian regimes exert tremendous pressure to drive their
people to the polls to satisfy foreordained choices. Are not elections
therefore a superfluous and dispensable luxury in totalitarian system?
Again Anifowose Opines "Elections in Ratificatory model as exemplified
by the soviet electoral system must be viewed as serving some essential
functions other than the selection of representative which in a parliamentary
system of government is regarded as its actual main function". First it is a
public demonstration of the legitimacy of the regime. It provides a setting
for the continued demonstration of popular support.
For the regime ratificatory electoral system serves to demonstrate to the
outside world that the people are solidly aligned with the regime. Elections
based on this model serve as a form of national mobilization by manipulated
unanimity; totalitarian regimes strive to create an impression of mono ethic
support aid unshakeable strength. Anifowose quotes Howard sweater (1961)
that "In the Soviet Union the formal act of voting is comparable in purpose
to such civil rituals as singing the national anthem or selecting a country's
flag. It is a public display of personal re-affirmation of the soviet way of life
and the party leadership. The function of soviet elections is not only to
legitimize the leadership in the mind of the mass and to help identify the
people with its politics but also to reassure the leader itself of its popularity
and infallibility quoting Richard M. Scammer, Anifowose observed that
soviet elections reflect "the need felt by every regime for popular
endorsement and consent to its program no matter how unreal the conditions

33
under which that endorsement be produced'. Citing Mole (1965-77), in his
study an election in Leningrad, Anifowose suggests that the very idea of an
election as a choice between alternatives is not comprehended by the
average soviet citizen who thinks of voting as both a patriotic and social
activity invested with the diverse pleasures which most people derive from
performing a commendable regime"
Soviet elections provide the citizens with a sense of participation. The
millions who administer the elections and the millions of votes have a
feeling of political participation. Allison (1968-814) What this means is
that even though the millions of voters do not make valid decision on the
operations of their government, yet they are allowed to feel that they are
consulted and to feel that they have at least participated.
Thus, an election in soviet condition is an invaluable educational and
propaganda exercise. It provides a good opportunity to stress the wisdom
and achievements of the party in the past and to disseminate its promise for
the future. Finally soviet elections provide proof that the system of control is
compared. This emphasizes the percentage of voting turn out rather than
competition. Consequently Anifowose concludes, "This incredibly high
percentage of soviet voters are used by soviet leaders to validate the claim
that there is a greater degree of democracy in the Soviet Union than in the
Anglo-American system where percentage of voting turnouts is
comparatively low".
That soviet election is essentially participatory, legitimizing, demonstrative,
educational and patriotic acts, elections here are expressions of the
pervading beauty of soviet society.

34
Ratificatory elections can then be seen as what Jerzy wiatr calls consent
elections, Which he defines as those in which the voter do not make any
choice between parties competing for power but he can influence the
selection of the member of representative bodies in both a negative and a
positive way by voting against some and or for some other candidates.
However, in the competitive model as Anifowose opines, "The chief
characteristics which distinguish it from the satisfactory model a party
competition" the concept of competitive elections and the criteria for such
elections are stated in the study by Janowitz and Marwick (1966-5 to 6)
"At each stage in the electoral process the electorate is involved and each
plays its own role in the resolution of political conflicts within a divided
society indeed it is safe to say that a competitive party system is the essence
of western democracy and that parties are the brokers that convert the
elections process into a coherent system.‖
The party nominates, comparing and divides the electorate on Election Day.
Indeed in the norm of the democratic system, the whole election process is
geared toward the construction of voters‘ coalition based on crude behavior.
These group of voters form sub-system of the electorate to which a party
must appeal and the electoral process normally substantially influenced by
the necessity to appeal to these group of voters.
In Anifowose's view, Elections based on the competitive model are seen as a
ritual of choice. A British general election or a Presidential election in the
United States of America, for example, serves to choose a governing party
and thus a government unlike the soviet system where no alternative choice
is presented to the electorate Anifowose argues that:

35
"The touch-stone of competitive elections and Western democracy is 'free'
election. The actual clause being whether the opposition has had an
adequate chance to organize, chooses its candidates and presents its case.
Where it is assumed that the government to provide themselves with funds,
win over supporters, hustle their opponents and make it worth every one's
while to vote for them".
However it is believed that full freedom does not exist. Mackenzie (1958-
14) believes that election under the competitive model can be free and fair if
four conditions are met:
"Firstly, an independent judiciary to interpret electoral law, secondly, an
honest competent, non-Partisan administration to run elections, thirdly, a
developed system of Political parties well enough organized to put their
policies, tradition and teams of candidates before the elections as
alternatives between which to choose, fourthly, a general acceptance
through the political community of certain rather vague rules of the "game"
which limits the struggle for power because of unspoken sentiment that if
the rules are not observed more or less faithfully the "game" itself will
disappear amidst the wreckage of the whole system". These conditions are
no doubt ideal and therefore nowhere do these exist undisturbed and
unmodified.
But Mackenzie argued further that "free election depends more on the
attitude of candidate, voters and government then on the drafting of
electoral laws. Similarly Anifowose quotes Aron (1966-420 to 422) "What
is necessary for competition between parties is that the different parties
should accept the roles of the "game" that they should have the feeling that
the unity of the nation is good itself."

36
By implication, we can submit that the competitive model such as the West
Minister with its peaceful exchange of government control, works because
the competition is carried on under rules which all the contestants recognize
more or less explicitly. Western democracy has proved difficult to practice
in developing countries unless same code of this sort is generally accepted.
It requires certain forbearance, a toleration of opposition and a willingness
to play by the rules of the game.
Describing elections in underdeveloped new states, Anifowose argues that
―elections in general deviated from those generally recognized functions and
features of the ratificatory and competitive model which operated in the
communist (Eastern) and capitalist (Western) nations‖ as described above.
Anifowose identified Two major reasons for this deviation.
First the concept of political institutionalization which according to
Huntington (1965-386 to 411) can be defined as.
"The process through which organization and procedures acquire values and
stability where there is the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and
adherence of its organizations and procedures" is absent in the political
systems in many new States. This according to Anifowose is unlikely that
this model will work effectively in a polity with this level of political
institutionalization such as we have in most of the new states. Samuel
Huntington remarked that ―institutional decay has become a common
phenomenon of the modernizing countries; coup-de‘tat and military
intervention in politics is one index of low levels of institutionalization.‖
They occur where political institutions lack autonomy and coherence.

37
Given this definition by Huntington, we are not likely to have a high level of
political institutionalization where there is lack of agreement among the
political elite on what constitutes the rules underlying the system. And
coherence and autonomy of institutions largely depend on the prior
acceptance of these politicians; ethnic consciousness and corruption are
prevalent norms in the new states. Such institutional decay only breeds
instability in the form of coup de'tat and military intervention in politics,
protracted civil wars, autocratic and unpopular leaders etc; as the events of
the post-independent decade in Africa had demonstrated.
Secondly, the concept of the civic culture as defined by Almond and verba
is an allegiant participant culture in which the political culture and political
structure are congruent. It is a balanced political culture in which political
activity; involvement and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity in
traditional commitment to parochial values. Again, Anifowose argues that
―it is the non-existence of the notion of a high and developed political
culture) that renders the ratificatory and competitive electoral models highly
unworkable in under developed new states.‖ He states that
"What we witnessed in the elections (of most African States) is that the
ratificatory model's rules and norms were applied to an electoral system
modeled on the competitive model. Their was no gentlemanly confrontation
between the parties. Party politics was a zero sum affair in which the
"winner takes all" This attempt to graft the regulative rules of the
ratificatory, model on to the constitutive roles of a competitive model with
which they are incompatible inevitable led the people to reject through
outcome of the election and the rejection was infested in terms of the wave
of violence that followed virtually every election".

38
Consequently, the evidences of this abnormal fusion of electoral models and
methodology in African states as reported by Anifowose indicates that since
independence very few African states have legitimately as well as
democratically changed their government.
This shows that instances where ruling government have seen changes by
means of the ballot box in a competitive situation are indeed very rear.
Furthermore, political experience of new states within the past decades has
tended to further the proposition that, a model can be unreservedly exported
to the new states and that it is unwise to suppose that we can graft on to any
colony a political institution which could retain, its familiar shape in
complete unresponsiveness to entirely different social realities. These
electoral models are exported to new states only for the exporter to discover
that they do not function exactly the way they had expected. Still within the
context of our central argument we can as well say of the new state that
politics and election in particular are viewed as fulfilling purposes and
function differently from those that may be predicated of the models
discussed above. What is observed in the new states, is the situation where
the leaders show preference for either the ratificatory or Competitive model.
In most cases states which base their electoral system on the competitive
model with its emphasis on free elections and competition for choice of
leader and governments have invariably made such elections a farce. While
they conduct elections within a legal and social structure which permit
possible goal of election (that is change of government) the ruling party
makes sure that it employs governmental and administrative machinery to
rig elections in order to hold tenaciously to power to the disadvantage of the
opposition parties. In General, elections in these states places emphasis on

39
the commitment and integrative functions of election rather than on the
possibility of change of government already in power.
The general understanding that can be drawn from this is that the forms and
functions of Western or communist type elections change considerably
when transferred to the new states.
But the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s triggered-off new
electoral trends. The global spread of capitalism and liberal democracy into
hitherto communist states, the transition by most third world states from
military to democratic government, the emergence of several international
electoral assistance organizations and the shift of intellectual attention to
studies and researches on election administration and management
contributed significantly to the modification of old election ideas and
practices as well as the development of new ones.
In view of the shift in intellectual attention from the theories and models of
voting or election systems, voter behavior and functions of elections, vast
scholastic works are beginning to emerge on issues concerning the
administration and management of elections. The trend of issues are
shifting away from normative issues and turning towards scientific
structuralism which emphasizes institutional efficiency in the administration
and management of elections. Studies now focus on the nature and structure
of election management bodies (EMBs) and the attendant effects of this on
the conduct of free and fair elections. Essentially, the central concept here
is election administration and management.
According to Jinadu, (1997) "electoral administration is the organization
and conduct of elections to elective public (political) office by an electoral
body." Jinadu used his definition to subsume both "structure and process."

40
By structure, he meant the bureaucracy that is set up or established to
organize and conduct elections. This is usually an electoral body, like the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of Nigeria. But apart
from this specific bureaucracy, whose primary function is the administration
of elections, Jinadu acknowledged that "there are agencies or institutions of
the state, like the civil service, the police and security agencies and civil
society groups whose support and cooperation through the provision of
logistical support is vital to the operation of the electoral body." Also
important for their oversight functions, according to Jinadu, are "the
legislature and the judiciary". However, Jinadu points out that in much of
Africa, this oversight function has for obvious historical reasons been
impaired, vitiated or in limbo.
By process, Jinadu refers to the rules, procedures and activities relating to,
among others, the establishment of electoral bodies, the appointment of their
members, the registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, balloting,
counting of the ballots, the declaration of results, the selection and training
of electoral officials, constituency delimitation, voter education and, in
some cases, registration of political parties and supervision of party
nomination congresses.
Theorists and model builders on election administration and management
have attempted to harmonize the structure and process of electoral
administration in to uniquely identical systems which serve or operate in
different political systems. These theories and models of electoral
administration establish ethics, principles, methods and structures of
electoral administration as well as their legal and political frameworks.
Basically, they discuss the modes of appointment and removal of EMB
members; the tenures of both EMB members and the EMB itself; the level

41
of financial, political and other forms of independence granted to the EMB;
and, the scope and running of the administrative institutions and structures
of the EMB.
According to Jinadu (1997), Charles Lasham (2005) and the official website
of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (www.aceproject.org), three
broad models have been developed for the description of the constitution,
composition, control and operation of EMBs. They are the independent
EMB, the governmental EMB and the mixed (independent and
governmental) EMB models respectively. EMB theories and models also
describe their tenures (whether they are permanent or temporary EMBs) and
their organizational structures (the centralized and the decentralized EMB)
models.
The Independent Model of electoral management exists in those countries
where elections are organized and managed by an EMB which is
institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch of
government, and which has and manages its own budget. Under the
Independent Model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or
department. It may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the
head of state. EMBs under the Independent Model may enjoy varying
degrees of financial autonomy and accountability, as well as varying levels
of performance accountability. They are composed of members who are
outside the executive while in EMB office. Many new and emerging
democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral management.
In some countries, two bodies are established for the management of
elections, both of which are independent of the executive and can be
considered as independent EMBs. One of these bodies is likely to have
responsibility for policy decisions relating to the electoral process, and the

42
other to be responsible for conducting and implementing the electoral
process. Provisions may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from
interference by the policy EMB in staffing and operational matters.
The Governmental Model of electoral management exists in those countries
where elections are organized and managed by the executive branch through
a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local
authorities. Where EMBs under the Governmental Model exist at national
level, they are led by a minister or civil servant and are answerable to a
Cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they have no ‗members‘. Their
budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities.
Mixed Model EMBs have dual structures, with a policy, monitoring or
supervisory component that is independent of the executive branch of
government (as for the Independent Model) and an implementation
component located within a department of state and/or local government (as
for the Governmental Model). Under this model elections are organized by
the governmental implementation component of the EMB, with some level
of oversight provided by the independent component of the EMB.
The powers, functions and strength of the independent component in
relation to the governmental component vary in different examples of this
model, and the classification of a particular EMB as a mixed model is
sometimes not very clear. In some cases, the independent component is little
more than a formalized observation operation, although this version is dying
out. In other cases, the independent component has a role to supervise and
verify the implementation of electoral events by the governmental
component, and sometimes also to tabulate and transmit results. In some
other cases, a Constitutional Council is established to engage in the
processes of tabulation and declaration of results and can be considered as

43
an independent component of the EMB. In few countries, (especially where
an independent EMB exists) the Independent National Election Commission
and the Constitutional Council undertake their own tabulation of results: the
EMB may therefore be said to have three components, one which is
governmental and two which are independent.
The relationship between the components of a mixed model EMB is not
always clearly defined in legislation or interpreted by stakeholders, and
friction can result. Its effectiveness is therefore usually heavily disputed.
In determining whether a permanent or temporary EMB is appropriate,
electoral workloads throughout the electoral cycle need to be considered and
compared to the expense of maintaining a permanent institution versus the
expenses and time required to establish a new body for each election. In
situations where electoral events are regularly occurring – such as regular
partial or by-elections and continuous voter registration – or there are needs
for continuing electoral development work, such as on-going voter
education, or advocacy of electoral law reforms, a permanent electoral
institution is justifiable.
Some countries have EMBs which exist during the election period only.
Such EMBs may follow the Independent, Governmental, or Mixed Models.
In some cases, the Governmental Model EMB needs to be temporary,
because the public servants who run elections have other full-time duties
and are redeployed to the EMB during election periods only. However,
some countries with a Governmental Model EMB, maintain a small skeleton
staff to take care of electoral issues between elections, including updating
the electoral register. In some Mixed Model EMBs, the governmental

44
component is permanent to preserve institutional memory, while the
Independent Model component is temporary during election periods.
Some countries whose EMBs follow the Independent Model have
permanent central EMBs which coexist with temporary subordinate EMBs
at the district or local levels; depending on their responsibilities and on the
logistics required, the latter structures are appointed anywhere from two to
six months before elections.
There are many phases to the electoral process: in an election, for example,
these include the design and drafting of legislation, the recruitment and
training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the
registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the
electoral campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the
declaration of results, the resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing
and archiving. After the end of one electoral process, it is desirable for work
on the next to begin: the whole process can be described as the electoral
cycle.
The nature of the EMB, in terms of power concentration or devolution,
depends very much on the system of government in the country and will
usually be defined in the electoral law. The legal framework may
distinguish between powers and functions given to a central or national
EMB and those given to regional or lower-level EMBs. Such vertical
divisions of powers and functions may be between different branch levels of
the one national EMB, between a national EMB and separate provincial
EMBs, or between national and local EMBs.

45
It is common in a unitary system to have one central EMB that is
responsible for all elections but with subordinate offices at both provincial
and local levels. Countries whose laws define separate, hierarchically
accountable EMBs at national, regional, administrative district, and even
village level often assign devolved or different powers and responsibilities
to each level. Electoral legal frameworks that are modeled on central EMBs
devolving responsibilities for implementing some electoral functions are in
place in many countries.
Countries with Governmental or Mixed Model EMBs may rely on local
authorities to conduct all or part of electoral activities. Devolving electoral
powers and responsibilities to local authorities without appropriate oversight
may make it more difficult to maintain electoral consistency, service,
quality, and ultimately the freedom and fairness of elections.
Decentralized EMB structures can ensure continuity in the EMBs work,
especially where the EMB has responsibility for recurring tasks such as
continuous voter registration. Decentralized EMBs, even if only temporary
at lower levels, can enhance inclusiveness and transparency in electoral
management.
The sustainability and relative costs of permanent over temporary EMBs at
regional and/or lower levels needs to be considered, as well as the
advantages.
In federal countries, separate EMBs may exist at the national level and in
each state/province, often operating under different legal frameworks and
possibly implementing different electoral systems. Both the national-level
and provincial-level EMBs may each have separate devolved structures. The
nature of the relationship between such EMBs and the powers and

46
responsibilities of each EMB depend on the provisions of the law. The
prevalence of diverse forms of federalism is responsible for the variety of
approaches to the relationship between national and local EMBs in federal
states.
In Australia and Canada, the national EMB is responsible for national
(federal) elections, while provincial EMBs are responsible for provincial
and local elections. In Brazil, the state EMBs are generally responsible for
running all elections, with the national EMB involved in the tabulation and
declaration of the results for national offices. In India, the national EMB
exercises overall superintendence, control and direction over state elections.
The conduct of these elections is the direct responsibility of the state chief
electoral officer, a senior civil servant appointed by the national EMB. In
Nigeria, the national EMB assumes responsibility for federal and state
elections while the provincial EMBs are only responsible for local elections.
In the Russian Federation a central EMB at the national level is responsible
for all federal elections; regional EMBs are responsible for elections in the
89 regions that make up the federation; and lower-level EMBs are
responsible to the central EMB for federal elections and to the regional
EMB for republic, regional and local elections. In Switzerland a national
EMB is responsible for policy coordination, while local authorities manage
elections. In the US, states have constitutional jurisdiction and responsibility
over the conduct of all (local, state and federal) elections. However,
recently, legislations have resulted in the emergence of federal election
bodies but whose functions are strictly limited to policy formulation only on
federal (or general) elections).
While there are often rivalries between EMBs at national and provincial
levels in federal systems, there are examples of cooperation. For example, in

47
Australia, state electoral laws specifically provide that the electoral registers
for provincial and local elections are to be jointly maintained with the
national EMB, rather than the provinces also maintaining their own
registers. Such coordination in electoral laws has significant cost-savings
benefits.
Finally, scholars are unanimous on the fact that no single model of election
administration and/or EMB can be applied in all countries. They agree that
the prevailing political social, cultural, economic and legal environment
determines to a large extent the model to be adopted by each country.
Nonetheless, they set common standards which a workable electoral
administration and/or EMB must meet. The ACE Electoral Knowledge
Network (www.aceproject.org) refers to this as "The Guiding Principles of
Electoral Management." Fundamentals of these principles are:
independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, and service
orientation. These principles form the basis of electoral administration and
are essential to ensure both the appearance and the actual integrity of the
electoral process. The principles are not developed in a vacuum; instead
they have emerged in the context of international electoral standards and
norms and are guided by national legal frameworks and good practices
based on country-specific and global innovations. The guiding principles
should be considered the ethical framework for conducting elections and for
the operations of EMBs. These principles are a guide for meeting the needs
of the management of elections.
In sum, the wealth of literature reviewed so far: from W. J. M. Mackenzie,
Remi Anifowose, Adele Jinadu, Charles Lasham, to the ACE Electoral
Knowledge Network, provides, at a glance, dynamic facts on the evolution
of the concept of election as well as the operation and administration of the

48
electoral process across civilizations (from ancient to contemporary times)
and nationalities. While we admit that each author has been constrained by
the targeted period and place of their studies, we argue that this research
provide an uncommon platform for the synthesization of these vast
literatures; with each succeeding literature complementing and/or extending
on the scope of the previous; thereby providing a more comprehensive
knowledge on the subject.
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To determine the rationale for as well as the efficacy and credibility of
centralized and decentralized election systems conducted in federal states,
it is important to establish the relationship between the idea of federalism
and the structure and organization of governmental institutions. Our point
of departure is hinged on the assumption that the adoption of federalism is
premised on the need to structure and organize political power in the society
using such social institutions as government. The structuring of power
could be differentiated according to certain existing or established
geographical levels of social group, while the organization of same is done
through the creation and sustenance of relevant governmental institutions
whose responsibility is to use power to guarantee the preservation and
continuity of society.
For the purpose of clarity, the attention of this study is directed towards the
processes of creating and sustaining the institutions of government through
the electoral process. We only seek to examine certain political and
administrative factors (the federal process of centralization and
decentralization) which impose considerable influence on the electoral
process. Accordingly, in view of the significance of the concept of

49
federalism to our analysis, it will be pertinent to begin with its proper
conceptualization.
Scholars are skeptical about giving the definition of federalism because it is
difficult to achieve a universally accepted definition. The word federalism
is so loose that it fits virtually all forms of government even those
considered as unitary systems. For instance, it finds a common tie in South
American federations such as Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela with those
of North America such as USA and Canada or Europe such as Germany,
Russia and former Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, former Yugoslavia, and
also in Asia such as India and Malaysia and in Africa such as Nigeria and
Tanzania. (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2009)
The nature of federalism is a form of government designed to get the best of
two worlds: the advantages of a unified state and the benefits of the
diversity which is inherent in the peoples and the regions which make up the
state. (Johnson, 1998 cited in http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-
2005/Verrelli.pdf.) Is it sufficed to say that federalism is one way to solve
the problem of enlarging government? (Riker, 2009 cited in
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Verrelli.pdf.) Or, that it is the division
of jurisdiction and authority between at least two levels of government?
(Jackson and Jackson, Where cited in http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-
2005/Verrelli.pdf.) Or, as Lazar and Watts point out, federalism is the
combination of self-rule and shared rule? (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-
2005/Verrelli.pdf.)
We need to acknowledge that federalism, as a theory, goes beyond the
simple division of legislative powers or arrangement of institutions. That is,
in our understanding of federalism, we need to take into consideration the

50
ideas of other theorists, who incorporate the socio-political element into
their conceptualization of federalism.
Denis de Regiment argues that federalism is ‗essentially an attitude, which
comprises four basic principles: diversity, interdependence, responsibility
and efficiency‘. (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Verrelli.pdf.)
Burgess and Gagnon point out that federalism is the accommodation of
human associations in which unity and diversity are balanced and
maintained. (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Verrelli.pdf.) For
Stevenson, federalism protects minorities. LaForest argues that federalism is
a form of partnership and friendship. Tully, also contributing to the
discussion, points out that federalism is an expression of democratic
practices, which encourages autonomy within regions. According to
Robinson and Simeon, ‗federalism is about the co-existence of multiple
loyalties and identities and about shared and divided authority‘. Finally,
Covell points out that federalism manage and deals with conflict. Others,
however, would argue that it produces conflict, as it enables the growth and
empowerment of regional identities. (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-
2005/Verrelli.pdf.)
Upon this quick rendition of these definitions of federalism, the question
that begs to be asked is, do these definitions capture the true essence of
federalism?
The simple answer is no. It would be obvious to any student of federalism
that these definitions are too simplistic and vague in form, to offer any
concise or concrete understanding of federalism, either as a theory, an
ideology, or a form of government. As such, a deeper look at federalism, as
a value concept, is needed.

51
In a federation, a particular theory, or theories of federalism underpin its
constitutional politics. According to Kindle Amoco (in Tuned Abatable et
al, 1998) ostensibly, one‘s conceptualization of federalism almost always
informs his/her constitutional position. Similarly, one‘s constitutional
position is a strong indication of his/her conception of federalism. That is,
the way in which one, an individual, a government, or an institution,
conceptualizes federalism and subsequently federation, has an impact on
constitutional politics in that one‘s position on federalism translates into a
constitutional position. For this reason, understanding the various
conceptualization and types of federalism and federation becomes important
in understanding constitutionalism.
Despite this seemingly simple task, federalism, what it is and how it ought
to operate vis-à-vis constitutional politics is a highly contested and
convoluted concept. For years theorists have tried in vain to come to grips
with an all-encompassing meaning of federalism. Though this Endeavour
has proven fruitless, there is a consensus amongst academics that
federalism is a political system in which there are at least two levels of
government, where responsibilities, powers and jurisdiction are outlined,
divided, and entrenched in a constitution. Furthermore, there is a ‗set of
ideas‘ and prioritization of federal principles underpinning federal
institutions; however, these sets of ideas and accentuation of principles vary
from academic to academic. Scholars differ on how power ought to be
shared, the degree of autonomy to be allocated to the regional/constituent
units, the degree of centralization and decentralization and finally, why
country chooses a federal form of governance over other forms.
We need not dwell too extensively on why countries prefer one type of
federation over others. As we know, multiplicity of factors: historical,

52
economic, political, social and geographical among several others may be
responsible. Rather, in line with the intent of this study, we shift attention to
examining issues arising from the centralization/decentralization dichotomy
in the discussion of federalism.
Many authors have noted the large and growing trend across the world
towards decentralization. Campbell (2001), Manor (1997), Piriou-Sall
(1998), Smoke (2001), World Bank (1994), and UNDP (1993), to name just
a few, document the efforts of literally scores of countries in Africa, Asia
and Latin America to devolve power and resources to lower tiers of
government and/or deconcentrate their administrations in various ways.
Enthusiasm is predicated on claims that decentralization can make
government more responsive to citizens‘ needs by ―tailoring levels of
consumption to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups‖
(Wallis and Oates 1988, 5); by ―bringing government closer to the
governed‖, decentralization should make government work better (Ostrom
et al. 1993, Putnam 1993). The existence of such a broad, international
fashion for potentially far-reaching reform begs two obvious questions: (i)
Is there empirical evidence that decentralization works? and (ii) Why is
there so much centralization in the first place?
Curiously, the answer to the first question appears to be "no". The vast
majority of scholarly studies on decentralization‘s effects have yielded
ambiguous results: in country after country, decentralization improved some
aspects of public services, worsened others, and left the remainder largely
unchanged. Rondinelli, et al. (1983) conducts an exhaustive review of three
decades worth of decentralization studies. More recently, Smoke and Piriou-
Sall provide updating surveys of the literature, with quite similar
conclusions. Theoretical claims based on inductive reasoning from

53
particular instances (i.e. cities, regions) of success are not supported across
larger samples – often from the same countries. Such evidence is not
encouraging, and does not support reformers‘ continuing efforts. Hence we
re-frame our question: Why does a reform with such strong arguments in its
favor so rarely succeed?
Firstly, Manor (1999) states that ―over 80 percent of developing and
transition countries… are experimenting with decentralization.‖
Secondly, in order for so many countries to be experimenting with
decentralization – quite apart from the wisdom of doing so – they must have
first developed relatively centralized governmental-administrative
structures. Why did this happen? Until quite recently economic theory
provided few answers to this question, and other disciplines have taken the
lead. Historical analysis has emphasized the role of nationalism and the
construction of the nation-state. In a context of overt national competition,
such as Europe since the Renaissance, there were clear advantages to
countries that could articulate a distinct identity and project military power
beyond their borders. Centralizing power and resources aided governments
in the achievement of both goals. Social, cultural and religious trends
contributed to making the state seem the natural and best form of civic
society, hence facilitating the growth of its powers, Kennedy (1988) admits.
But it was the military, economic and organizational demands of war that
really drove this process.
To this, Horsham (1987) adds social and ideological reasons natural to the
late-nineteenth century. Worried by socialist agitation and outbreaks of civil
unrest, political elites first in Germany, and then Austria, Britain and
France enacted broad programs of social reform and welfare which

54
undercut support for radical politics, but also undermined liberal notions of
limited government, private enterprise and self-help. Once these boundaries
were crossed, the state embarked on a path of steady expansion. Lastly, the
intellectual currents of the 19th and 20th centuries also played a role. For
different reasons and in different ways, real socialism, social democracy,
developmentally, import substitution, and even structural adjustment led to
increasingly powerful central states that intervened at all levels of the
economy and society.
Such theories provide historically rich explanations of how centralization
arose in particular groups of countries, especially in Western Europe. But
they are too particularistic and path-dependent to provide a general
explanation of centralization across the globe. As indicated above, highly
centralized states arose across six continents and four centuries, in countries
rich and poor, industrial and agrarian, tropical and temperate alike.
Explaining so broad a phenomenon would seem to require a simple,
incentives-based theory.
The 21 centuries that separate Plato‘s Republic from Rousseau‘s Social
Contract saw little discussion of issues of (de)centralization by political
theorists. Summarizing heroically, this is because the idea of democracy
changed little throughout Platonic, Medieval and Renaissance times, and
featuring assemblies of free men who represented themselves directly.
Democracy was fit for city-states whose populations numbered in the tens of
thousands, not millions. Larger populations and expanses of territories
required monarchical rule (Rousseau 1968 [1762]). As decentralizing
political authority was unnecessary in a city-state, and nonsensical in a
monarchy, the question of decentralization did not arise.

55
The transformation of the democratic ideal from city-state to federal
democracy, where the many are represented in a legislature by the few,
allowed new conceptions of individual rights and freedoms to flourish (Dahl
1989). Larger nations could internalize large problems that eluded city-
states, and the capacity of citizens to govern themselves was significantly
enhanced. Centralization vs. decentralization of power was now relevant.
Hence Hegel‘s (1967 [1821]) treatment of scale, arguing that bigger states
would have more impartial civil servants more concerned with the public
good, as authority became impersonal and the social ties and passions that
distort public decision-making in smaller realms were diluted.
But it was political theorists concerned with the new United States that
treated the question in greatest depth. Indeed in the Federalist Papers, the
classic statement of American political thought, Madison, Hamilton and Jay
sought to discredit the loose union between the states under the Articles of
Confederation, with its feeble executive and weak federal powers, in favor
of the new Constitution. The Federalists sought a stronger, more centralized
national government, arguing that this would decrease the risk of war, both
external and internal, and improve defenses against a hostile world; boost
commerce and the national economy; improve the ability of government to
finance itself; decrease the ―explanations and compensations‖ that powerful
foreign powers might be able to extract; and – like Hegel – improve the
quality of political leaders.
Such arguments notwithstanding, theirs was not a fundamentally
centralizing project, but rather an attempt to re-balance the distribution of
powers in the young nation towards a less extreme, but still highly
decentralized federation of states. Indeed, the Federalists dismissed the
threat of centralization in the US with something akin to scorn. This view

56
proved prescient, as Tocqueville (1967 [1835, 1840]) chronicled four
decades later, describing an American system of government that was far
more decentralized than any in Europe. Indeed, as late as the early twentieth
century the federal government‘s responsibilities were limited to managing
the currency, limited taxes, tariffs and bond emissions, and partial
regulation of interstate carriers (Carleton 1960), with other functions the
preserve of the states.
Tocqueville admired this decentralization and decried its opposite as leading
to tyranny. But even in countries such as the US, he warned, power has a
natural tendency to grow more centralized over time, as individuals seek to
enlist the efforts of public authorities to their own benefit, so gradually
extending state authority over previously private affairs. Unlike Hegel and
the Federalists, here at last was a theory of centralization based not on
appeals to the good, but rather micro-level incentives of individuals and
policy-makers.
While the concept of federalism simply provides us with the directions of
how legislative and political powers are shared between two levels of
government and their governing institutions, by implication, the federal
views of power centralization and decentralization suggests that there are
both political and administrative consequences of expressing preference for
one over the other. First, we infer that the extremes of centralization and
decentralization are incongruent with the ideals of true federalism.
Subscription to either extreme will, according to Tocqueville, lead to
tyranny or a vulnerably weak federation respectively. Second, that even a
moderately centralized or decentralized federal system may, also according
to Tocqueville, by the natural growth of power, gradually evolve into a
more centralized system. Third, that the decentralization of federal powers

57
and functions to states, according to Jean-Paul Faguetdoes, does not
absolutely guarantee satisfactory delivery of public services or good
governance. Lastly, that sustenance of moderacy in the adoption of
centralization and decentralization in federal systems may, according to
Hegel and the Federalists, promote appreciable democratic development.
The realities of these variations in power sharing and their corresponding
consequences are manifested in the Nigerian and US experiences of
federalism and this is equally transmitted to the manner in which both
countries operate their electoral management bodies.

58
2.3 REFERENCES
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Election
Management Bodies. www.aceproject.org
André B., Louis M. and Antoine Y. (2004); Establishing the Rules of the
Game: Election Laws in Democracies. University of Toronto Press.
Anifowose, R. (1970); "PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN NEW
STATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE OCTOBER 1965 ELECTIONS IN
WESTERN NIGERIA." (UNPUBLISHED THESIS) THE VICTORIA
UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER.
ARBOR, A.M., (1966); "COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND
DEMOCRATIC CONSENT: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1952
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS" (UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS
ARON, R., (24 MARCH 1966); THE PROSPECT OF DEMOCRACY.
THE LISTENER
ASTER, H., (1961); THE FUNCTION OF SOVIET LOCAL ELECTION.
MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Babawale T. et al., (1998); Re-Inventing Federalism in Nigeria; Issues and
Perspectives. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria.
Campbell, T. 2001. The Quiet Revolution: The Rise of Political
Participation and Leading Cities with Decentralization in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Dahl, R. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale.
Ellis A. and Legge A., (2004); Comparative Election Administration in the
Pacific. Port Vila, Vanuatu
Faguet JP., (2004); WHY SO MUCH CENTRALIZATION? A Model of
Primitive Centripetal Accumulation. The Suntory Centre, London School of
Economics and Political Science.
General definitions of federalism. http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-
2005/Verrelli.pdf.

59
GILISON, J., (1968); SOVIET ELECTIONS AS A MEASURE OF
DISSENT: THE MISSING ONE PER CENT. AMERICA POLITICAL
SCIENCE REVIEW VOL LXLL
Hegel, G.W.F. 1967 [1821]. Philosophy of Right. Trans. T.M. Knox. New
York: Oxford University Press.
HUNTINGTON, S. P., (April, 1965); W. E I D POLITICS VOL XLLL NO.
3.
Jinadu, L. A., (1997); Matters Arising: African Elections and the Problem of
Electoral Administration.
http//www.archive.lib.msu.edu/dmc/african%20Journals/.../ajps002001002.
pdf
Lasham, C., (2005); TRANSPARENCY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE
ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ON ELECTION DAY: THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS AND
THE ROLE OF THE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATOR. Report presented
at the UNIDEM SEMINAR on ―ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS BY
AN IMPARTIAL BODY‖, Belgrade, 24-25 June, 2005
www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-UD (2005)005-e.pdf
MACKENZIE, W. J. M. (1972); THE FUNCTION OF ELECTIONS.
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE VOL
V & VI (ED) DAVID L. SILL
MACKENZIE, W. J. N. (1958); FREE ELECTIONS. LONDON.
Madison, J., A. Hamilton and J. Jay. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New
York: New American Library.
Manor, J. 1997. Lecture given at ―Technical Consultation on
Decentralization for Rural Development.‖ Rome, 16-18 December 1997.
Manor, J. 1999. ―Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An
Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization.‖ Berkeley: Manuscript.

60
MOTE, M. E., (1965); SOVIET LOCAL AND REPUBLIC ELECTION.
HOWEVER INSTITUTE NO 10
Ostrom, E., L. Schroeder and S. Wynne. 1993. Institutional Incentives and
Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Piriou-Sall, S. 1998. ―Decentralization and Rural Development: A Review
of Evidence.‖ Washington, DC: Manuscript.
Putnam, R. D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern
Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
RANDY, A., (1973); THE GOVERNING OF MEN 4T" EDITION,
HINSDALE; THE DRYAD
PRESS
RENNEY, A., (ED) (1962); ESSAYS ON THE BEHAVIORAL STUDY
OF POLITICS: ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN POLAND.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS, URBANE.
Rondinelli, D. A., G. S. Cheema and J. Nellis. 1983. ―Decentralization in
Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience.‖ World Bank Staff
Working Paper No. 581. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Rousseau, J.J. 1968 [1762]. The Social Contract. Trans. M. Cranston. New
York: Penguin Books.
Smoke, P., 2001. ―Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: A
Review of Current Concepts and Practice.‖ Democracy, Governance and
Human Rights Programmed Paper No. 2. Geneva: UNRISD.
The League of Women Voters of California, (2000); Election Systems.
THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINES (APRIL 6 1959); WHY THE
RUSSIANS BOTHER WITH ELECTIONS.
Tocqueville, A. de. 1994 [1835, 1840]. Democracy in America. P. Bradley
(ed.). Trans. H. Reeve. London: Everyman‘s Library.

61
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 1993. Informed Sobre
Desarrollo Humano 1993. Madrid: CIDEAL.
Wallis, J. J. and W. E. Oates. 1988. ―Decentralization in the Public Sector:
An Empirical Study of State and Local Government.‖ In H.S. Rosen (ed).
Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
World Bank. 1994. World Development Report: Infrastructure for
Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (2009), Federalism. www.wikipedia.org
YOUNG, O., (1968); SYSTEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. PRENTICE
HALL"

62
CHAPTER THREE
DESCRIPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS OF THE NIGERIAN AND US
ELECTORAL PROCESSES
3.1 THE NIGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS
Nigeria operates a highly centralized electoral process with virtually all
elections (except for local elections) centrally managed by one single body;
the Independent National Electoral commission (INEC). The organization
and structures of INEC provides the sole platform for the conduct of general
elections in Nigeria. Elections which fall under this term include:
presidential election, national assembly elections, state governorship
elections and the state assemblies elections respectively. (Electoral Act,
2006) and (Constitution of Nigeria, 1999)
Within the one decade of its existence, the legal framework establishing and
guiding the operations of INEC and the electoral process in Nigeria has
witnessed frequent alterations at rather close intervals. The INEC was
established by the Independent National Electoral Commission Decree No
17 of 1998. The decree was amended by Decree No. 33 of the same year.
The INEC decree was complemented by an Electoral Act of 2002 while the
INEC Decree was replaced by an INEC Act of 2004. In 2006, the INEC
Act of 2004 and the Electoral Act of 2002 were harmonized in to the new
(and currently operational) Electoral Act of 2006. (www.INECnigeria.org)
At the moment, while the INEC is making frantic efforts to reform its
administrative and management procedures, (Morris Iowa, 2009) the
Maraud led government has submitted seven bills to the national assembly
on proposed amendments to the 1999 constitution as well as the Electoral
Act of 2006 with a view to reform the Nigerian electoral process.

63
Section 153 and the third schedule (part I) of the 1999 constitution as well
as part (I) of the 2006 Electoral Act explicitly provides for the
establishment, composition, powers and functions of INEC.
The laws vests the powers of appointment and removal of INEC members
including:
1. The chairman, who is the chief executive officer and chief electoral
officer of INEC;
2. twelve commissioners (two each from the six geopolitical zones);
and,
3. thirty-seven Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC) (one each for
the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory)
in the executive through the president but with confirmation by the
senate. However, proposals for the reversal of this provision are
being included in the electoral reform bills.
Although the 2006 Electoral Act (unlike previous electoral laws) provides
for an INEC Fund, the budget for this fund is integrated with the annual
executive budget. However, the quest to obtain financial independence for
INEC is currently being incorporated in the proposals for electoral reforms.
Administratively, both the 1999 constitution and the 2006 Electoral Act
simply provides for the existence of state INEC offices headed by the
Resident Electoral Commissioner as well as a local government office
headed by an Electoral Officer respectively. The laws specify that the
functions and powers of the state and local government offices of INEC are
to be solely determined by the commission.

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