Qatar crisis

1. Qatar’s Dilemma
By DR HAMID HUSSAIN
Following piece was written after few conversations about Qatar crisis. The little known facts
about internal power struggle in Saudi Royal family as well as tribal and family dynamics need a
separate discussion (I’ll expand on that theme soon).
“This question that keeps you up at night
its answer won’t be found
on any of the official channels
Why, why do these regimes
import everything from the West

2. everything but the rule of law, that is,
and everything but freedom?”
Qatari poet Muhammad al-Ajami
It was this poem written during Tunisian popular uprising in 2011 for which al-Ajami was
arrested by Qatari authorities and sentenced to life in prison.
Regards,
Hamid
Qatar’s Dilemma
“Everyone is critical of the flaws of others, but blind to their own.” Arab
Proverb
On June 05, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates
(UAE) severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and also placed land and air
embargo. This move came as a surprise to many as this immediately followed
U.S. President Donald Trump’s high profile visit to Saudi Arabia where most
heads of Muslim countries gathered. The simmering differences between
Qatar and its Arab neighbors reached the boiling point resulting in the June
shock therapy.
Qatar is a small country but in the last two decades it has gradually shown its
presence on the international diplomatic scene. Qatar began its foreign
policy as a broker of negotiations and mediator of conflicts. This combined
with softer image of involvement in humanitarian and cultural interactions
increased its profile and earned genuine respect. However, in the last few
years, it got directly involved in armed conflicts resulting in negative fallout.
Qatar’s policies clashed with interests of Saudi Arabia and Egypt; two heavy
weights of the Middle East politics. Older generation of Saudi royal family
worked on the Bedouin traditions and avoided public clashes with fellow
Arabs. The new generation is removed from the traditions of their fathers,
more ambitious and at times reckless. There are three main players in the
current showdown and include 37 years old Emir of Qatar Shaikh Tamim bin
Hammad al Thani, 31 years old son of King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi
Arabia, Deputy Crown Prince and Defence Minister Muhammad Bin Salman
(known in western circles as Mr. Everything) and 56 years old Crown Prince
of UAE Shaikh Muhammad Bin Zayed al Nahiyan. The stage on which this
cast is performing is a complex set of ideology, opportunism, ambition,
tribal, clan and family dynamics.
The question is how Qatar embarked on an ambitious foreign policy agenda
that ran afoul with many powerful neighboring countries? Any given foreign
policy is seen through the twin pillar of impact on external security and
internal dissent. A policy maker is usually cautious if a certain move will

3. anger a larger neighbor and threaten country’s external security or general
public not happy with the government will disagree resulting in effect on
internal cohesion of society. Qatari rulers felt over confident on both fronts.
1868 treaty with Britain ensured Qatar’s territorial integrity especially
against expanding power of al Saud next door big brother. British security
guarantee came with the control of the foreign relations of Qatar by Britain.
In 1971, Britain departed and Qatar’s territorial integrity was guaranteed by
United States with the additional benefit that Qatar now controlled its own
foreign relations. The anxiety caused by vulnerability of small states in the
aftermath of Kuwait’s occupation by Iraq in 1990 was relieved by Qatar
hosting a U.S. Air Force base (al-Udeidbase near Doha). Internally, Qatari
population is more cohesive with majority Sunni population of same school
of thought (Qatar is the only other country apart from Saudi Arabia that
adheres toWahhabi school albeit a softer version) and ruled by a Sunni Arab
tribal family al-Thani considered first among the equals (this is in contrast to
neighboring Bahrain where a Sunni family rules a
disenfranchised Shia majority). Native Qatari population of only little over
300’000 of a total population of about 2.2 million and with a sovereign
wealth of over $240 billion made the job of rulers very easy. They provide
cradle to grave benefits to native Qataris. Native population is content with
free education, overseas education scholarships, first rate healthcare, secure
lucrative jobs and a worry free future. This ensures legitimacy of al-
Thani ruling family and no threat from a disgruntled population. It is in this
background that Qatar felt overconfident and embarked on policies that ran
contrary to the policies of some big Arab countries specifically Saudi Arabia
and Egypt.
Qatar hosts Arab satellite channel al-Jazeera that gives coverage to
dissidents of many Arab countries. This has been a bone of contention
between Qatar and several Arab countries for long period of time. However,
major conflict is Qatar’s support for Islamist groups of Arab world especially
Muslim Brotherhood branch of Egypt. Initially, Qatar tried to mediate
between Islamist opposition groups and ruling Arab regimes. Arab spring of
2011 changed Qatar’s calculus. Qatar saw it as an emerging trend and tried to
ride this wave. It openly supported President Muhammad Morsi of Egypt
and provided $12 billion to prop up his government amidst economic crisis.
A year later, Morsi was overthrown by military strongman Field Marshal
Abdul Fattah al-Sissi and Saudi Arabia and EAE rushed to his aid providing
financial support worth of several billion dollars. Sissi cracked down on
Muslim Brotherhood and several leaders found refuge in Qatar. In this fight
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE are in one corner and Qatar in the other.
In 2011, Libya also erupted and Qatar supported Libyan Islamists with arms
and money. Qatar’s two main armed proxies in Libya were Ali al-Sallabi and

4. Abdul Hakim Belhaj. After Gaddafi’s removal and death, country fractured
into militia fiefdoms. Two main rival umbrella groups are now involved in
civil war of Libya. Islamist controlled General National Congress (GNC) and
secular Libyan House of Representatives (LHR). Different armed groups and
militias have joined these two rival groups for the control of the country.
Qatar is supporting armed groups of GNC and rival armed groups of LHR are
supported by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Field Marshal Khalifa Belqasim Haftar
is the head of Libyan National Army; the name given to LHR armed groups.
Qatar replicated the Libyan template when protests started in Syria against
President Bashar al Assad in 2011. Shaikh Hammad (Tamim’s father) was a
personal friend of Bashar and their wives were also close friends. Hammad
dumped his friend and provided arms and money to opposition groups
mainly Islamists. Muslim Brotherhood played a major role in Syrian National
Congress (SNC); an umbrella group of different opposition groups. Qatar had
significant influence over SNC in view of general support of Brotherhood.
However, when Iran and Hezbollah openly sided with Bashar and early
military gains of opposition groups were reversed, Qatar also hedged its bet.
It now embarked on a dangerous journey and in search for looking for a
more effective armed proxy found itself in bed with Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-
Qaeda affiliate). This was followed by support for Ahrar al Sham al
Islamiyyah; a salafist militant group that became most effective in military
campaign against Assad. In the byzantine world of Middle East conflicts,
Saudi Arabia was initially supporting salafist militant groups but later Qatar
and Turkey became main supporters of Ahrar al-Sham. Saudi Arabia is now
supporting Ahmad al Jarba whose fighters are trained by U.S. Special Forces.
In Palestine and occupied territories, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are also
supporting opposing groups. Qatar has been supporting Hamas in Gaza strip
while Saudi Arabia and Egypt support Palestinian Authority (PA) in West
Bank. Qatar’s financial support to Hamas and residence of some Hamas
leaders in Qatar is resented by PA. They are of the view that Hamas rule in
Gaza would have collapsed long time ago without Qatar’s help.
Qatar and Iran have shared economic interests and Qatar kept economic,
diplomatic and security channels opened with Tehran despite hostility of
Saudi Arabia and UAE towards Iran. Qatar tried to walk a fine line to avoid
open hostility of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. If one policy ran afoul, Qatar
tried to compensate with other gestures. For example in Syria, Qatar was
openly supporting armed groups fighting Iranian and Hezbollah fighters but
softening the friction by directly signing security and economic treaties with
Tehran. Qatar also supported U.S.-Iran nuclear deal that all other Arab
countries opposed. It cooperated with Saudi Arabia in many areas to allay
their anxieties.

5. The biggest unknown is unpredictability of new US president Donald Trump.
The most serious concern will be if President Trump throws his lot with
Saudi Arabia. In that case a simple threat of moving the U.S. troops from al-
Udeid base in Qatar to neighboring UAE will take the life insurance policy of
Qatar. This will force Qatar to make concessions that it would not be willing
to make. This move may also embolden Saudis and may end up in some more
reckless decisions. Qatar on its own part will try to appease new American
administration by trying another American weapons purchase binge.
Kuwait is the preferred mediator understanding local dynamics. In current
tug of war between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, later has to pull back. There are
several concessions that Qatar will likely offer especially in areas not directly
affecting Qatar’s vital interests. The list will include asking Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood members as well as Hamas leaders to find a new home most
likely in Turkey and pulling some support from its proxies in Syria and Libya.
It will also ask Al Jazeerah to tone down criticism of neighboring countries.
Qatar’s relations with Iran will be kept at current frequency with no new
agreements in the short term. If these concessions satisfy Saudi Arabia and
Egypt then de-escalation process can start. However, it must be remembered
that Shaikh Tamim is also an Arab and he will need some face saving to
maintain his dignity and not be seen as capitulating.
A side show of the side show of current crisis will be impact on occupied
territories in Palestine. PA is taking advantage of the precarious situation of
main backer of Hamas. It has decreased payment to Israel for electricity
supply to Gaza and increased tariffs on diesel fuel that may result in forty
percent cut down of electricity supply to Gaza. PA has already stopped
medicine and medical equipment supply to Gaza. This is complemented by
complete blockade of Gaza by Egypt. The hope is that this squeeze of Gaza
population will force them to re-think about their support of Hamas. New
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was summoned to Egypt and read the riot act.
He was bluntly asked to start thinking about rolling back Hamas rule in Gaza
and allow some space for Muhammad Dahlan; an old PA hand in Gaza and
potential successor of Mahmud Abbas. Dahlan is based in Dubai and close
friend of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed and Egyptian President al-
Sissi. Hamas is already feeling the heat from several directions and
considering concessions on many grounds. The clear and present danger is
that this multi-faceted conflict between Palestinians and worsening
humanitarian crisis in Gaza will provide the perfect breeding ground
for Daesh to get a foothold in the fertile terrain of hopelessness, misery,
anger and resentment. Thanks to Palestinian infighting and changed ground
realities, if ever a deal is reached it will not be a two state but a three state
solution.

6. The price of brinkmanship of leaders is usually paid by their subjects and
ripple effect goes beyond the borders of their countries. Leaders surrounded
by court jesters and with modus operandi of making decisions on whims and
in a fit of anger without serious thought and without informed counsel
usually end up in blind alleys. Everyone makes mistake but a wise man
grasps his folly early and acts quickly to minimize damage from an error.
“Arrogance diminishes wisdom.” Arab Proverb
Hamid Hussain
coeusconsultant@optonline.net
June 19, 2017
Defence Journal, July 2017