Unmasking Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan_Understanding the Landscape, Defining Strategies

0 Unmasking Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan: Understanding the Landscape, Defining Strategies
UNMASKING DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION IN
SOUTH SUDAN: UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE, DEFINING
STRATEGIES
CONDUCTED BY:
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL POLICY AND RESEARCH (ISPR)
FOR:
DEFYHATENOW SOUTH SUDAN
December 2023

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISPR) would like to thank the Defyhatenow (DHN) South
Sudan, especially the project management team, for their professional conduct and for entrusting us
with this assignment. We thank Emmanuel Bida Thomas, the Coordinator of 211 Check, Defyhatenow
(DHN) South Sudan, for his technical support during the assessment design, data collection, and report
writing phases.
We thank the Defyhatenow donor International Fact-checking Network for supporting this report
through the BUILD Grant.
This report is a product of the views and perspectives of various stakeholders interviewed on
Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan. We also thank the respondents for providing
valuable responses, which made this assessment possible. Finally, we thank the Defyhatenow staff, who
provided input on data collection methodologies and ongoing monitoring efforts. The results and
conclusions presented in this report represent the consultants’ analysis of respondents’ views and
perceptions and are not necessarily those of Defyhatenow.
ISPR is the leading public policy research center in South Sudan that offers national and regional
expertise to civil society groups, the private sector, and the government in seeking appropriate
approaches to address policy issues. Our approach isdesigned to provide technical support and guidance
to policymakers through research work and embedding short-medium- and long-term consultants to
support them in specific areas of intervention. ISPR engages in periodic social, economic, and
governance research to bring evidence on programs and policy gaps to stakeholders’ attention to re-
direct interventions to impact communities.
By Boboya James Edimond
Lead Consultant and ISPR Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
The Institute of Social Policy and Research
Phone: +211-929999112
Email: Boboyaj40@gmail.com

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................................................................................1
LIST OF ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................................................................3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................................................4
Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................4
Methodology............................................................................................................................................................................4
Study Findings.........................................................................................................................................................................4
Conclusion and recommendations.....................................................................................................................................6
Recommendations..................................................................................................................................................................6
INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE.............................................................................................9
Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................9
Background ...........................................................................................................................................................................10
Overview of disinformation and misinformation.........................................................................................................10
Purpose and Objectives of the report...............................................................................................................................11
Specific Objectives ...............................................................................................................................................................11
METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................................................................12
Data collection techniques.................................................................................................................................................12
Data cleaning, analysis, and report writing.....................................................................................................................13
Scope and Limitations.........................................................................................................................................................13
Scope of the report...............................................................................................................................................................14
International Perspectives on Disinformation and Misinformation........................................................................15
Defining Misinformation and Disinformation.............................................................................................................15
Understanding International Perspectives......................................................................................................................15
Lessons learned from successful counter-disinformation efforts. .............................................................................17
Demographic Data of Respondents................................................................................................................................19
Respondents’ participation and their regions................................................................................................................19
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................37
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................37
Recommendations.................................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
REFERENCE ...........................................................................................................................................................................41

LIST OF ACRONYMS
BRYCA Building Resistance in Youth in Central Asia
CSOs Civil Society Organization
DHN Defyhatenow
GPAA Greater Pibor Administrative Area
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IML Information and Media Literacy
ISPR Institute of Social Policy and Research
KIIs Key Informant Interview
NCA National Communication Authority
R-ARCSS Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan
RTGoNU Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SPLM Sudan’s Peoples’ Liberation Movement
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SSBC South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation
SSP South Sudanese Pound
SSTBN South Sudan Twins Broadcasting News
TV Television
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
Over the past five years, researchers and policymakers worldwide have devoted more attention to
misinformation and disinformation. In South Sudan, disinformation and misinformation are rife. The
country is very fragile, with a weak and fractured media sector and little capacity to engage strongly to
counter disinformation and misinformation at various levels.
This study contributes to a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities of disinformation
and misinformation and provides recommendations for effective strategies to address them. The report
offers a detailed analysis of the current situation, identifies vital actors and sources of disinformation,
assesses the impact of disinformation on South Sudanese society, and proposes strategies to counter
disinformation effectively.
211 Check’s robust monitoring and evaluation system enabled effective and efficient field data
collection, processing, storage, and information retrieval. ISPR analyzed the data collected by 211
Check throughout the year 2023, including media monitoring reports, social media trends, and other
relevant sources.
Methodology
The study employed a cross-sectional study design to conduct 160 online surveys (randomly picked
sample) and conducted 25 key informant interviews, of whom 10 were female respondents. Secondary
document reviews were conducted, and analysis mainly focused on the overview of disinformation and
misinformation, international perspectives on disinformation and misinformation, and lessons learned
from successful counter-disinformation efforts. The analyzed data focused on data collected by 211
Check throughout 2023, including media monitoring reports, social media trends, and other relevant
sources to identify key patterns, trends, and areas of concern related to disinformation and
misinformation in South Sudan.
Study Findings
The study findings focused on the community's level of awareness of disinformation and
misinformation, the role of communities in the dissemination of false or misleading information,
stakeholders that spread disinformation and misinformation, news and information sources, the level of
trust in communities, why people continue to spread disinformation and misinformation, efforts of
addressing disinformation and misinformation, the impact of disinformation and misinformation in
communities, and recommendations to reduced or prevent spread of disinformation and
misinformation.

The study findings on disseminating false or misleading information indicated that (58.8%) of the total
respondents had either shared or forwarded misleading or false information. Greater Upper Nile had
the highest proportion of respondents (69.4%) that had ever shared or forwarded false or misleading
information followed by Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal at 63.3% and Greater Equatoria at 53.2%. In addition,
74% of the respondents thought the youth were most likely to spread disinformation and
misinformation, followed by women at (15%), and the elderly at (10%) respectively.
According to the study, Radio is considered the most trusted and credible source of news about South
Sudan with (55.6%) of the respondents trusting radio for news and information while social media was
the least trusted with only (4.4%) of the respondents finding it a trusted source of information.
Furthermore, social media (Facebook, Messenger, and Instagram) were rated highest in spreading
disinformation and misinformation by (77.6%) of the respondents followed by political rallies at
(59.4%).
Politicians, uneducated youth, and armed group officials (government and opposition) were the most
likely to spread disinformation and misinformation while church leaders, journalists, and South
Sudanese back home were the least likely to spread misinformation. (83%) of the respondents thought
the main motivation for spreading disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan was to seek
political positions by the politicians. This was followed by (76.6%) of the respondents who believed that
misinformation and disinformation were spread to divert public attention from real issues affecting
South Sudan.
Regarding the impact of disinformation and misinformation, the study revealed that (98.1%) of the
respondents believed that disinformation and misinformation fuel violence among communities in
South Sudan. In addition, (94.4%) of the respondents thought that disinformation and misinformation
affected the social and political landscape in South Sudan, and (98.1%) of the respondents believed that
disinformation and misinformation affected trust in institutions and public figures in South Sudan.
According to the study, 82.5% of the respondents believed that the government has not done enough to
combat misinformation and disinformation. On the other hand, (88.1%) of the respondents were aware
of organizations or initiatives in South Sudan that are doing well in combating disinformation and
misinformation.
Findings on the prevalence of disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan indicated that
(81.9%) of respondents believe there is a high prevalence of disinformation and misinformation in South
Sudan.
To ascertain whether disinformation and misinformation influence trust in institutions and public
officials, the findings imply (98.1%) strongly suggest disinformation and misinformation influence trust
in institutions and public officials.

South Sudan has established laws about freedom of expression and access to information. However,
despite legal frameworks, the study noted that the government has been using them to suppress the
media.
The study established thatmedia literacy isundoubtedly a crucial toolin thefightagainstdisinformation
and misinformation. It was suggested that to ensure that the information the media in South Sudan
processes and publishes can continue to be seen, heard, read, and believed by as many South Sudanese
as possible, the media must now educate people about its role. South Sudan should also invest in tools
and mechanisms that support independent fact-checking with the participation of journalists and civil
society.
According to the study, (73.8%) of the respondents felt confident about their ability to distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate information. Greater Equatoria and Upper Nile had the highest
proportions of respondents feeling very confident about their ability to distinguish between accurate
and inaccurate information at (75.5%) and (75.0%) respectively while for Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal, only
(66.7%) of the respondents felt very confident about their ability to identify disinformation and
misinformation.
Conclusion and recommendations
South Sudan's media landscape is characterized by liveliness and dynamism, but it also faces significant
challenges of disinformation and misinformation. As established by the study, disinformation is very
powerful, destructive, and divisive, and it is a standard espionage tool. The study proposed that
approaches that seek simple solutions to this complex problem in South Sudan are needed, as without
such, disinformation and misinformation will continue to strive. South Sudanese are encouraged to
promote and protect free and independent media, including content creators, maximize transparency
and access to information, and build trust in public institutions. Investing in digital and media literacy
programs will enable more durable and meaningful online participation by South Sudanese.
Recommendations
Policy recommendations for the government
1. Politicalpartiesand political activistsshould beencouraged to build ethicalstandardsin political
action, emphasizing influencing campaigns and distorting public opinion through
manipulating social media platforms.
2. The government should work with media stakeholders to have clear policies on how rumors can
be encountered and reported timely to avoid disinformation and misinformation in the
country.

3. The national and state governments should invest in administrative capacity-building projects
by offering trainings for civil servants, especially in the field of media and information literacy,
so that they contribute to reducing disinformation and misinformation.
4. Support building coalitions and alliances among public institutions, media, internet companies,
civil society, and others to develop multi-sectoral strategies to address disinformation and
misinformation.
5. Provide South Sudanese citizens with critical thinking and creative problem-solving skills and
make them become informed consumers and information producers.
6. Educate South Sudanese citizens on the importance of identifying/selecting and using the right
information at the right time to find solutions to issues affecting their daily lives.
7. It is recommended that the government needs to invest in digital presence in platforms such as
websiteside,Facebook, X etc. Thegovernmentalso should make sure thatsuchmedia platforms
are accessible and open to the public with up-to-date information.
8. It is also recommended that the government should dedicate communications officers or media
team in each government institutions to facilitate access to public information.
Strategies for journalists, media, and media support organizations
1. Support and increase the capacity of local media education institutions to provide adequate
quality education for journalists both in Juba and outside Juba so that they effectively engage in
combating disinformation and misinformation.
2. Train journalists and media activists to understand the nature of online communication and
work skills on social media.
3. Building and strengthening the fact-checking capabilities of media outlets and journalists is
strongly desired.
4. Exclusive awareness of misinformation and disinformation should be through radio talk shows
in different media houses in Juba and the states.
5. Journalists should be prepared to report on issues like the conflict involving South Sudan's
northern neighbor, Sudan, and its humanitarian implications, which pose a latent threat to
South Sudan’s precarious situation.
Suggestions for civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations
1. Since this type of disinformation and misinformation serves to pre-empt or predict political
intentions and actions, it is essential to invest in further research of crisis-related disinformation
and misinformation to support conflict-sensitive reporting initiatives, networking, and
cooperation as tools for conflict prevention in South Sudan.
2. Civil society organizations and policy experts should be encouraged to take part in the crafting
of practical human rights-based responses to disinformation and misinformation.

3. Non-governmental organizations and donors should work with civil society and the media to
organize forums for constant and continuous exchange of information counter-disinformation
and disinformation.
4. Non-governmental organizations should support professional fact-checker technically and
financially so that they can contribute to addressing disinformation and misinformation in
South Sudan.
5. Capacity building support will be needed from non-governmental organizations to equip
content creators with knowledge and skills to advance fact checking and determine information
and content accuracy.
6. Non-governmental organizations support research and media monitoring initiatives that
identify instances of disinformation and misinformation being spread on social media. The
monitoring should also understand the impact on different communities and what actions
should be taken.
7. It is recommended that there is need to create spaces which will provide a platform for co-
operation, where decision makers, along with representatives of civil society, academia, and the
private sector, will meet to discuss challenges, share good practices, and find effective solutions
relating to disinformation and misinformation.
Actions for individuals to combat disinformation and misinformation.
1. It is recommended that individuals engage in sensitization and awareness creation on what is
considered disinformation and misinformation and how to spot it.
2. Social media groups should continue to engage with local organizations and individuals to
develop their fact-checking capacities and benefit from a wide range of capacity building.

INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
This section introduces Defyhatenow, and its interventions aimed at addressing misinformation and
disinformation, provides background on South Sudan and its media and information landscape, and
the purpose of the study.
Introduction
This report Unmasking Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan: Understanding the
Landscape, Defining Strategies is elaborated within the context that the spread of misinformation and
disinformation is an increasingly pressing issue across the world, with growing concern about its impact
on democracy, peace, and human rights. Whereas the rise of social media has made it easier than ever for
false information to spread like wildfire, deeper issues have contributed to the rise of disinformation in
South Sudan society. Widening polarization and the wearing down of trust in communities,
institutions, and media have turned the public away from traditional sources of information. As noted
in South Sudan, as well as in the region and internationally, state, and non-state actors exploit
technologies and social media systems to disseminate disinformation and misinformation to further
their agendas. Whether it is political actors seeking to influence their stay in power or special interest
groups trying to sway public opinion, disinformation, misinformation, and other harmful content have
become widespread tools.
Defyhatenow is a non-profit organization registered in South Sudan since 2019. It is one of the leading
entities that promotes digital rights and citizenry by providing data-driven solutions to the problem of
hate speech, fake news, and misinformation in the country and working at the nexus of technology,
peacebuilding, and human rights. It creates frameworks for enhancing trust among stakeholders
through mobilizing civic action against all forms of hate speech, misinformation, human rights
violations, and incitement to violence. Defyhatenow utilizes a partnership-centered approach to
program implementation; this model emphasizes the need to enhance collaboration and strengthen the
capacity of local and international actors. The mission of Defyhatenow is to promote digital rights and
create a framework for increasing trust among stakeholders and communities in Africa through
mobilizing civic action against all forms of hate speech, misinformation, human rights violations, and
incitement to violence.
Defyhatenow seeks to support the voices acting against the online-induced conflict to go ‘viral’ within
and outside affected regions by bringing youth, community leaders, grassroots organizations, and civil
society stakeholders into a peace-oriented media and information literacy framework. Bridging gaps in

knowledge and awareness of social media mechanisms between those with access to technology and
those without, Defyhatenow is a growing network of online and offline peacebuilders.
Background
The young nation of South Sudan declared its independence in 20111
following a prolonged struggle
for self-determination. In 2018, the nation signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)2
to address the ongoing conflict and civil war that
had plagued the country since 2013, including inter-communal conflict, ethnic divisions, a worsening
humanitarian situation, and governance issues. The R-ARCSS's pace of implementation has led to an
extension of the transitional period through the roadmap, postponing the national general election
scheduled for 2023 to December 2024.
South Sudan's media and information landscape is characterized by liveliness and dynamism but also
faces significant challenges. It strives to establish free and fair journalistic practices within a turbulent
political and social environment. While the country had the opportunity to enact internationally
recognized media legislation, enforcing these laws remains inconsistent. Despite these formidable
challenges, South Sudanese content creators exhibit remarkable resilience. Operating in a nation
grappling with a growing humanitarian crisis, persistent conflict, and internal political struggles.
South Sudan hosts diverse media and information platforms, including community, commercial,
national, and public platforms such as radio, newspapers, and online news and information outlets.
With most of the population residing in rural areas (79%), content predominantly reaches the sub-urban
and urban populations (21%)3
in and around major towns, creating regional information imbalances.
The nation's rich ethnic and linguistic diversity underscores the importance of providing content in
local languages, mainly through local community media outlets, where radio stations play a crucial role.
Overview of disinformation and misinformation
In 2011, two years after gaining independence, South Sudan plunged into a disastrous civil war that was
marked by ethnic massacres,sexualviolencethatincluded children asitsvictims,therecruitmentof child
soldiers, and other atrocities that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions leading
to one of the biggest refugee crises in recent history. Hate speech, rumors, misinformation, and
1
South Sudan becomes an independent nation - BBC News
2
South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf (pca-cpa.org)
3
Rural population (% of total population) - South Sudan | Data (worldbank.org)

disinformation circulating both online and offline are the complex drivers of conflict in South Sudan,
with the ripple effect of also raising tensions and mistrust among South Sudanese citizens.
The current situation under the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU)
presents fertile ground for rumors, misinformation, and disinformation to thrive, as most of the
information regarding the terms in the revitalized peace agreement remains high. Millions of South
Sudanese citizens have been consuming verified and unverified information from third parties, hearsay,
rumors, and what some suspect is propaganda. The situation is worse for IDPs, returnees, and refugees.
These categories of people are faced with tough decisions about whether they should return home or
remain in relatively safe camps. Hate speech, misinformation, and fake news are poisoning the media
environment in South Sudan and contributing to the spread of ethnic violence.
Today, digital communication makes it possible to disseminate information at high speed across borders
to more people than ever before, thus generating an enormous reach. In South Sudan, there is also
constant content production established by professional and non-professional content producers,
including journalists and bloggers responsible for misinformation and disinformation circulating.
Misinformation and disinformation, incitement to violence, and other challenges relating to emerging
media in South Sudan. While internet penetration remains around (8%) in South Sudan, according to
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2018 indicators, mobile phone subscribers have grown
exponentially in recent years. This increase in mobile internet use, especially in towns and densely
populated protection of civilian sites, has resulted in an explosion of user-generated content, including
misinformation and disinformation.
Purpose and objectives of the report
The findings of this report will contribute to a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities
related to misinformation and misinformation and provide recommendations for effective strategies to
address them.
The report provides a detailed analysis of the current situation, identifies key actors and sources of
disinformation, assesses the impact of disinformation on South Sudanese society, and proposes
strategies to counter disinformation effectively.
Specific Objectives
1. To understand the level of awareness of South Sudanese on disinformation and misinformation
and who is likely to spread disinformation and misinformation.

2. To evaluate the platforms, people trust as credible sources of news and information and those
channels used for spreading disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan.
3. To map out the likely stakeholders responsible for the spread of disinformation and
misinformation and the motivation of people to spread disinformation and misinformation.
4. To determine how widespread disinformation and misinformation and its impacts on the social
and political landscape of South Sudan.
5. To assess the role of government in addressing the issue of disinformation and misinformation
and what they should do to address disinformation and misinformation.
6. To identify organizations or initiatives in South Sudan that are engaging in combating
disinformation and misinformation and what they should do better.
7. To suggest ways of reducing or stopping disinformation and misinformation in South Sudanese
communities.
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the approach and process employed in conducting the Unmasking
Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan: Understanding the Landscape, Defining
Strategies. It also includes analysis design, scope, sampling procedures, data collection, data analysis,
limitations, and ethical considerations.
Data collection techniques
The institute of Social Policy and Research (ISPR) employed a participatory assessment style and
utilized a combination of suitable methodologies as appropriate. The consultant developed the final
detailed methodology best suited to this assignment in close consultation with Defyhatenow during the
inception phase of the assignment. The ISPR team conducted the assessment based on a comprehensive
assessment protocol detailing the assessment design, the sampling design, and data collection methods
used during the assessment as agreed with the Defyhatenow.
ISPR analysis entailed qualitative and quantitative methods to gather primary and secondary data from
the beneficiaries who participated in Defyhatenow capacity-building activities and those who have
engaged in content creation and dissemination in South Sudan and beyond. All qualitative and
quantitative data collected through the assessment were disaggregated by tribe and geographic location
from Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal, Greater Equatoria, and Greater Upper Nile States. The team adopted
beneficiary-friendly approaches and tools per the disability policy provisions. Triangulation of
information gathered during the quantitative and qualitative assessment was crucial.
The ISPR employed a cross-sectional study design to conduct 160 online surveys (randomly picked
sample) and conducted 25 key informant interviews, of whom 10 were female respondents. ISPR also

conducted a secondary document review and analysis, mainly focusing on the overview of
disinformation and misinformation, international perspectives on disinformation and misinformation,
and lessons learned from successful counter-disinformation efforts. Information collected from the
respondents focused on public perceptions, attitudes, and awareness regarding disinformation and
misinformation from media: professionals and relevant stakeholders.
Data cleaning, analysis, and report writing.
A robust data management strategy was employed to ensure effective and efficient field data collection,
processing, storage, and retrieval of information. ISPR analyzed the data collected by 211 Check
throughout the year 2023, including media monitoring reports, social media trends, and other relevant
sources. Identify key patterns, trends, and areas of concern related to disinformation and
Quantitative data was processed and analyzed using SPSS to generate appropriate descriptive statistics
for data population and disaggregation. The findings are illustrated in different forms, including tables,
graphs, and narratives to enable the report audience to pick relevant insights quickly. The entire process
entailed data coding, cleaning, and generating percentages, frequency tables, charts, and cross-
tabulations used to develop the descriptive statistics on the different study themes.
The report is comprehensive and prepared to highlight key findings, trends, challenges, and
opportunities related to the disinformation and misinformation landscape in South Sudan. The report
is structured clearly and concisely, incorporating relevant data, analysis, and case studies. The report
includes an executive summary, introduction, methodology, data analysis, key findings,
recommendations, and a conclusion.
Limitations
• The legal definition of disinformation and misinformation remains a challenge for both
governments and policy experts in South Sudan.
• Monitoring and evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of the counter-disinformation and
misinformation efforts remain a challenge in South Sudan.
• There is no adequate space for a more innovative and specialized approach to measuring the
effectiveness of countering disinformation and misinformation efforts be it medium or long-
term. Critical thinking and media literacy could be very useful instruments for measuring the
effectiveness of counter-disinformation and misinformation efforts at both national, state, and
local level in South Sudan.
• There is lack of research and evidence on how disinformation impacts crisis and peace building
efforts in South Sudanese communities.

Scope of the report
This report is based on information generated from the data analysis, information obtained from the
document review, key informant interviews, and online interviews used to develop an understanding of
the current situation, identify key actors and sources of disinformation, assess the impact of
disinformation on South Sudanese society, and propose strategies to counter disinformation effectively.
A draft report was presented to Defyhatenow for review and validation, and feedback from the team
was incorporated culminating in the final Unmasking Disinformation and Misinformation in South
Sudan: Understanding the Landscape, Defining Strategies Report.

LITERATURE RVIEW ON DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION
This section aims to review existing literature concerning disinformation and misinformation. The
literature review focused on the International Perspectives on Disinformation and Misinformation,
the definition of Misinformation and disinformation by scholars, Understanding International
Perspectives and Lessons learned from successful counter-disinformation efforts.
International Perspectives on Disinformation and Misinformation
Defining Misinformation and disinformation
According to the Nation al Library of Australia, 4
disinformation is deliberately misleading or biased
information; manipulated narrative or facts; propaganda.” Misinformation and disinformation refer to
types of wrong or false information, though only disinformation is wrong on purpose.
Equally, Fetzer, James H. (2004-05-01) and UNESCO (2023) define Misinformation as incorrect or
misleading information. Specifically, UNESCO defined misinformation as information that is false and
deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization, or country. UNESCO also defines
disinformation as information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group,
organization, orcountry.From reviewed literature,it wasclearlyunderstood thatmisinformation differs
from disinformation, which is deliberately deceptive and propagated information. Early definitions of
misinformation focused on statements that were patently false, incorrect, or not factual.
Understanding International Perspectives
The international perspective on misinformation and disinformation revealed that, not long ago, the
rise of social media inspired great optimism about its potential for flattening access to economic and
political opportunity, enabling collective action, and facilitating new forms of expression. Additionally,
it has been established that traditional media consists of mostly professional people deciding what does
and does not get printed and broadcasted. Nonetheless, in this new era of the internet and the variety of
social media, the creation and consumption of news and information in contemporary society are
changing (Nagi,Kuldeep,2018). Therapid transformation of traditional printmedia into online portals
has becomes a new trend. Online social media has democratized the means of news production and
dissemination. Yet, it has become a breeding base for false misinformation and disinformation with the
increasing use of mobile devices and easy access to the internet through Wi-Fi and 3G/4G networks
(Ayesiza, Jackline, 2019). Furthermore, the rise in misinformation and disinformation has been
additionally exacerbated by social media networks, including, among others, Facebook, Instagram,
YouTube, and X. This has developed in the careless spread of fake news that damages the reputation of
4 What is fake news, misinformation, and disinformation? https://www.nla.gov.au/faq/what-is-fake-news-misinformation-and-
disinformation

prominent people and media organizations (Harvard University, 2020). The literature established that
online misinformation was linked to lower trust in mainstream media across ideological lines. It was
further stressed that scholars, journalists, and politicians expressed alarm that spreading disinformation
and misinformation could destabilize political institutions and delegitimize media organizations.
Further analysis of regional and international perspectives showed that disinformation and
misinformation have emerged as significant challenges in the digital age, with profound implications for
individual and societal well-being. This article aims to extensively analyze recent international legal
mechanisms developed since 2015 to address the escalating threat posed by fake news and
disinformation to international peace and security. Employing a descriptive-analytic approach, this
study explores the reasons behind the proliferation of disinformation and misinformation and their
multifaceted impacts and draws upon several legal articles addressing this issue.
The literature also pointed out that the operating environment for media and content creators has
expanded, and players in the sector, including the Government, have promoted misinformation and
disinformation. Notably and within professional expectations, depending on events of the hour and
date, media apportioned different volumes of space and airtime, itemization, timing, and tonality to the
various political players, which some argue amounted to misinformation and disinformation and
preferences while others hold that was the normal practice (Wilding, D., Fray, P., Molitorisz, S. &
McKewon, E. 2018).
Some authors also emphasized that the role of media includes a watchdog role, disseminating
information, entertaining, educating, and sensitizing the public to take action, including participating
in elections. The flow of information is important for citizen participation in community affairs.
Without a wide array of information, people’s opinions, ideas, and views would be limited, and their
impressions, understanding, and conclusions of the world around them would be stunted (The
Economic Times, (2020).
International literature indicates that efforts to counter the spread of disinformation and
misinformation have gained traction among international organizations, regional and global
institutions, national governments, and various stakeholders at different levels. International literature
disinformation and misinformation also pointed out that there is a need to have initiatives aimed to
uphold democratic structures, protect the rights of marginalized groups, and maintain security and
stability in society. It was indicated that one key institution that emphasizes issues of disinformation and
misinformation is the United Nations (UN), which recognizes the impact of disinformation on peace
and security, emphasizing the importance of promoting information literacy, critical thinking, and
responsible journalism to combat this issue (UN, 2020). Moreover, the UN Security Council
acknowledged the potential role of disinformation and misinformation in exacerbating conflicts and
destabilizing regions. The UN also stressed that countering disinformation requires lasting investment
in building societal resilience and media and information literacy. Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is also an instrument that covers Freedom of expression, which promotes critical speech,

including speech that questions societal norms, expressions that take the form of irony, satire, parody or
humor and erroneous interpretation of facts or events. Such speech must not be unduly restricted under
the guise of combating disinformation (United Nations, 2023).
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinion without interference
and seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.
The review of literature also suggested that efforts to combat disinformation and misinformation have
had its limitations as many actors have offered criticism, particularly concerning the potential
infringement upon freedom of expression. On the other hand, critics argue that measures taken to
combat disinformation and misinformation may inadvertently curtail the rights and freedoms of
individuals and groups. Balancing the need to address the harmful effects of disinformation and
misinformationwhilesafeguarding freedom of expression remainsa complexchallengeforpolicymakers
and legal experts alike presently. Furthermore, legal institution such as Yale Law School, (2021)
highlight the necessity of finding the right balance between countering disinformation and protecting
free speech, advocating for nuanced approaches that do not undermine democratic values.
Unmasking Disinformation and Misinformation revealed that at international level there are patterns
of exposure and consumption, and what is known about mechanisms behind its spread through
networks. A body of literature from research conducted in multi-ethnic countries reveals that
Disinformation and Misinformation can exacerbate ethnic tensions, leading to a new form of threat and
discrimination against ethnic groups. False information can perpetuate existing conflicts and foster
animosity between different communities. Information in the digital also emphasis that as of current
decade there is a rapid technical transformation that have completely upended the ways people interact,
communicate and access information about the world. People now possess the entirety of human
knowledge in their hand, and news and information can ricochet worldwide in seconds, and this also
brings in vast new opportunities to educate, inform and organize society (United Nations, 2023).
Lessons learned from successful counter-disinformation efforts.
Media and civil society have responded with solutions to fight against misinformation. Central Asia’s
BRYCA promotes critical thinking and strengthens young people’s online resilience against
disinformation and hate speech. To provide impartial analysis during the military hostilities in 2020,
News conducted a fact-checking initiative through which Azeri and Armenian journalists monitored
and verified Armenian/Azeri government statements, media, and social media. In Georgia, a group of
eight civil society organizations joined forces to establish the Information Integrity Coalition to
“identify, monitor and research sources of disinformation.” These initiatives, however, should begreatly
strengthened through even better cooperation, including building trust (Guess et al., 2019).
The study review of the literature showed that to address the challenges posed by disinformation and
misinformation effectively; international legal mechanisms should be cautiously designed to target the

dissemination of false information while maintaining the fundamental rights and freedoms of
individuals and groups. Collaborative efforts between international organizations, governments, civil
society, and media institutions are crucial in developing and executing strategies that address
disinformation and misinformation.
It can also be specified that other international efforts on disinformation and misinformation relate to
the Council of Europe, for instance, which has adopted a comprehensive approach, emphasizing media
pluralism, transparency, and supporting fact-checking initiatives (Council of Europe, 2017). Another
international body is the European Union, which, through its Code of Practice on Disinformation,
seeks to promote transparency, integrity, and accountability in online platforms (European
Commission, 2018).
Drawing upon the experiences and recommendations of legal scholars and researchers, several key
strategies can be identified to comprehensively address the issue of disinformation and misinformation.
Notably, fostering media literacy and critical thinking skills is essential in enabling individuals to discern
reliable information from falsehoods. Reviewed literature from Kaplan (2019) articulates educational
programs, awareness campaigns, and media literacy initiatives that should be promoted to enhance the
public's ability to critically evaluate news sources and content (Kaplan, 2019). It was also emphasized
that the importance of media literacy is also recognized by organizations such as UNESCO, which
highlights the need for comprehensive media and information literacy programs to counter
disinformation and misinformation (UNESCO, 2018).
Lessons learned from successful counter-disinformation efforts suggested that promoting responsible
journalism practices is vital to combating the spread of disinformation and misinformation. Media
organizations should uphold journalistic ethics, fact-checking protocols, and professional standards to
ensure the disinformation and misinformation of accurate and reliable information. It was
recommended that collaborative efforts between media institutions, fact-checking institutions, and
technology platforms contribute to verifying and debunking false information (Wardle & Derakhshan,
2017). The expanded literature showed that the role of media self-regulation in maintaining journalistic
integrity and countering disinformation and misinformation is highlighted in the research by Nielsen
and Graves (2017), which emphasizes the importance of industry-wide initiatives to address this issue.
Another lesson learned relates to the need to have regulation of social media platforms and technology
companies. That regulation is crucial in curbing the spread of disinformation and misinformation.
Transparent procedures, improved content moderation, and cooperation with fact-checkers can help
mitigate the dissemination of false information. Some emphases were also made pointing to the fact that
striking a balance between regulation and avoiding censorship is a challenge that requires careful
consideration of thepotential impact on freedom of expression (Citron & Norton, 2011). Legal scholars
such as Gillespie (2018) argue for a comprehensive regulatory framework that ensures accountability,
transparency, and user empowerment in the digital ecosystem.

In conclusion, information production and consumption have drastically changed since the early 2000s.
The rise of disinformation and misinformation poses a grave global, regional, national, and local threat
to peace, security, and coexistence. Countermeasures against this phenomenon have encountered both
support and opposition, with the need to balance preserving freedom of expression and mitigating
harmful effects of disinformation and misinformation.
Efforts to combat disinformation and misinformation should incorporate a multi-faceted approach that
includes media literacy, responsible journalism practices, regulation of technology platforms, and
government-citizen cooperation. By implementing comprehensive legal mechanisms and fostering
collaboration among stakeholders, societies can effectively confront the challenges posed by
disinformation and misinformation while upholding the principles of freedom of expression and
preserving the peace and security of communities.
THE STUDY FINDINGS
The study findings focused on the community's level of awareness of disinformation and
misinformation, the role of communities in the dissemination of false or misleading information,
stakeholders that spread disinformation and misinformation, news and information sources, the level of
trust in communities, why people continue to spread disinformation and misinformation, efforts of
addressing disinformation and misinformation, the impact of disinformation and misinformation in
communities, and recommendations to reduced or stopped spread of disinformation and
misinformation.
Demographic Data of Respondents
Respondents’ participation and their regions
One hundred sixty (160) respondents from Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal, Greater Equatoria, and Greater
Upper Nile States participated in the study. From the study findings (58.75%) of the respondents were
from Greater Equatoria, (18.75%) from Greater Bahr El Ghazal and (22.50%) from Greater Upper Nile.
Figure 1 Respondents’ participation and their regions
Source: (ISPR data analysis 2023)
18.75%
58.75%
22.50%
Respondents by Region
Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal
Greater Equatoria
Greater Upper Nile

Respondents’ tribes
The respondents were from a total of 30 tribes, with more than half of the respondents (51.3%) being
Dinka, (25%) being Kakwa,(12.5 %) being Kuku, and (10%) Nuer.
Figure 2 Respondents’ tribe
Disinformation and Misinformation Awareness
From online survey data analysis, (93.1%) of the respondents were aware of disinformation and
misinformation in their communities. In comparison (6.9 %) of respondents indicated they are unaware
of disinformation and misinformation in their communities.
Figure 3 Disinformation and Misinformation Awareness
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Lokoya
Lotuko
(Otuho)
Jur
Mananger
Shilluk
Atuot
Balanda
Bviri
Lugbara
Gollo
Luwo
(also
known
as…
Avukaya
Mangayat
Jur
Beli
Mundari
Didinga
Murle
Anuak
Lango
Nyangwara
Moru
Morokodo
Toposa
Zande
(Azande)
Acholi
Bari
Pojulu
Nuer
Madi
Kuku
Kakwa
Dinka
Number
of
Respondents
Tribe
Number of Respondents by Tribe
6.9%
93.1%
Disinformation and Misinformation Awareness
No
Yes

Disinformation and Misinformation Awareness by Region
The analyzed data from the household survey showed that in Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal, all the
respondents (100%) were aware of disinformation and misinformation in their communities, while in
Greater Upper Nile (94.4%) of the respondents were aware. In Greater Equatoria,(90.4%) of
respondents had knowledge of disinformation and misinformation in their communities.
Figure 4 Disinformation and Misinformation Awareness by Region
Dissemination of false or misleading information
According to the study, (58.8%) of the total respondents had either shared or forwarded misleading or
false information. (41.3%) Respondents said that they had not shared or forwarded false or misleading
information.
Figure 5 Dissemination of false or misleading information
9.6% 5.6%
100.0%
90.4% 94.4%
Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal Greater Equatoria Greater Upper Nile
Region
Disinformation and Misinformation Awareness by Region
Yes
No
41.3%
58.8%
Respondents that have ever shared or forwarded false or misleading
information

Respondents that have ever shared or forwarded false or misleading information by region.
From the analysis, Greater Upper Nile had the highest proportion of respondents (69.4%) that had ever
shared or forwarded false or misleading information followed by Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal at 63.3% and
Greater Equatoria at 53.2%.
Figure 6 Respondents that have ever shared or forwarded false or misleading information by region.
Outline of top examples of disinformation or misinformation in South Sudan
Results from online survey and key informants’ interviews revealed that some of the disseminated false
or misleading information relates to inaccurate political statements aimed at slandering political
opponents, fake promises to sway the electorate, unverified conflict-related messages, tribalistic
statements, misleading product and service adverts and branding, scam/spam messages and unverifiable
religious information.
The lack of effective laws to regulate information sharing in South Sudan was mentioned as a major
enabling factor for disinformation and misinformation. The data protection bill is still being developed,
and as such, there is no law to curb data-related crimes.
From Defyhatenow fact-checking, several top examples of disinformation or misinformation in South
Sudan were recorded. Some examples are listed below:-There is a rumor that David Yau Yau left Juba
secretly to an unknown location.5
This information was fact-checked and was found to be Violence-
inciting content.
Breaking News| President Kiir warns NilePet board of Directors over failure to submit a report on the
progress of NilePet building, stagnant growth of the oil & gas industry and alleged massive corruption
involving the Managing Director of NilePet Bernard Amuor and Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin after
5 https://www.facebook.com/groups/1001472987052634/permalink/1439612043238724/
36.7%
46.8%
30.6%
63.3%
53.2%
69.4%
Region
Respondents that have ever shared or forwarded false or
misleading information by Region
No
Yes

15,000,000USDdisappeared one week afterBernard Amuorassumed office. Thisinformation wasfact-
checked and found to be misinformation and disinformation.
Ugandans killed in South Sudan 30th January 2023; Ugandans were shot dead in Juba for burning
charcoal. The incident comes in a period when thousands of Ugandans have been killed without both
governments taking concern.6
Who shall save Ugandans in South Sudan? Cry Ug. This information
was fact-checked and found to be misinformation and disinformation.
Attention! Banks in South Sudan approve loans of up to $20,000, even for people with DEBT! You
have been selected. Apply now.7
Fact-checking this post revealed that it was misinformation and
disinformation.
Breaking News! President Kiir shades tears on arrival from Bahr-El-Ghazal after he was shown the
current rate of Dollar against SSP and handed a short list of five hungry and incapacitated politicians
who had submitted their interests for the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Docket under
the drowning leadership of Dier Tong Ngor and Governor of Central Bank.8
Fact-checking this post
revealed that it contained misinformation and disinformation.
Most likely to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
Data analysis of the most likely to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan revealed
that (74%) of the respondents thought the youth were most likely to spread disinformation and
misinformation, followed by Women at (15%), and the elderly at (10%) respectively.
Figure 7 Most likely to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
6 https://twitter.com/enoth_musinguzi/status/1624109283083276289?s=19
7]https://www.facebook.com/100090119599789/posts/111576698522983/?flite=scwspnss&mibextid=yFpoxOHKzfQV
12xx
8https://www.facebook.com/100081571560163/posts/pfbid0CpJkH5PD5TKzLVZZvKtfZkGodNiv7FB2SHVmSupap
wFLDJNPK6MtmSfcsmYEYeE8l/?app=fbl
10.0%
15.6%
74.4%
Elderly Men
Women
Youth
Most likely to spread disinformation and
misinformation

Reasons for Most likely to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
The study documented the following reasons for most likely to spread disinformation and
Youth: Their active social media presence/ exposure; desire for social validation; easy access and use of
the internet, and less desire to verify or fact-check information on social media and the internet; ease to
get influenced and manipulated by politicians due to their high levels of poverty and unemployment
make them prone to spreading disinformation and misinformation.
Women: There was a general perception that women naturally love gossiping, and because most of
them do not work, they are highly likely to spread disinformation and misinformation through their
social interactions.
Elderly: Most of the respondents thought that elderly men take advantage of the trust society has in
them to pass on disinformation and misinformation.
Trust and credible source of news and information in South Sudan
When measuring trust and credible sources of news and information in South Sudan, the findings
revealed that radio is the most trusted source of news. Respondents rated radio at 55.6%, social media at
(4.4%), Television at (15.6%) websites at (14.4%) and newspapers at (10%) respectively. Data obtained
from key informants’ interviews pointed to Radio, Television (TV), newspapers, social media, and the
internet as the most relied-on sources for news and information about South Sudan.
While radios and TVs are prevalent across most of the nation, newspapers are primarily available in
Juba's capital. Currently, there are 3 functional TVs, namely SSBC, and Juba Echo TV. These media
appear to provide somewhat credible sources of information to consumers. South Sudan has several
functional radios across the country, of which some are community radios, and others are commercial
broadcaster stations.

Figure 8 Trust and credible source of news and information in South Sudan
Rating of channels in spreading Disinformation and Misinformation
The study established that there are social media pages and groups that either fuel disinformation or
misinformation. These pages or groups include South Sudan Eye- Facebook Page, sixty-four tribes of
South Sudan -Facebook Group, GPAA TV- Facebook Page, 64 Tribes- Facebook Page, Ten States Press
- Facebook Page, Terekeka Press - Facebook Page, Phow Radio FM -Facebook Profile. Others are First
Class Bales- Facebook Page, South Sudan Twins Broadcasting News SSTBN, and Heart of South
Sudan. Other sources include blogs/websites, WhatsApp, and X.
The study analysis of South Sudan SafetyCom also showed that the categories of these social media
platforms are personal blogs, private groups, legal, media/news companies, radio stations online, and
public groups.
It was also established that the location and management of these social media platforms are in South
Sudan, Kenya, Morocco, Ethiopia, or the United States of America.
The engagement of the study on the rating of channels in spreading disinformation and misinformation
indicated radio, TV Newspapers, and religious gatherings were rated average, Facebook, messenger, and
Instagram, TikTok, community events such as meetings, funerals, and parties, and political rallies very
high meanwhile websites are rated high.
10.0%
55.6%
4.4%
15.6%
14.4%
Most trusted source of news and information about South Sudan
Newspapers
Radio
Social Media
TV
Websites

Figure 9 Rating of channels in spreading Disinformation and Misinformation
Likely to Spread Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan
Regarding the likeliness to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan, the study
showed (83.2%) of the respondents believed that politicians are the most likely people to disinformation
and misinformation in South Sudan, followed by uneducated youth at (68.3%) and armed group
officials such as government and opposition. The study findings also revealed that South Sudanese in
the diaspora and other content creators are likely to spread disinformation and misinformation in South
Sudan.
Figure 10 Likely to Spread Disinformation and Misinformation in South Sudan
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
Channels ratings in spreading Disinformation and Misinformation
Average High Low Very High Very Low
19.8%
25.1%
25.7%
28.1%
42.5%
46.1%
50.9%
63.5%
64.7%
68.3%
83.2%
Church Leaders
South Sudanese back home
Educated Youths
Other content creators
Armed groups officials (government and opposition)
Politicians
Likely to spread Disinformation and Misinformation

Motivation to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
One of the focuses of the study was also to understand the motivation to spread disinformation and
misinformation in South Sudan. Based on the findings (83.8 %) of the respondents reported that one of
the main motivations for spreading disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan was for
politicians to seek political positions, and (76.6%) of the respondents also believed that it was to divert
public attention from real issues affecting South Sudan, (62.3%) are of the thinking that the motivation
was to mobilize citizens into army or rebellion, (58.7%) to seek public sympathy, (53.9%) believed the
motivation was for financial or economic gain. The rest are to forge communal cohesion, meant as a
deterrent to silence critics and to help others by sharing important information.
Information gathered through KIIs showed that, Since the escalation of violence across the country,
hatespeech and messageshave become a strategy by community leadersand politiciansto gathersupport
from their followers. It was also reported that one of the motivations of disinformation and
misinformation is to cause harm to communities. For example, the 2016 conflict in South Sudan was
initially caused by political disagreement among the leaders of the Sudan’s Peoples’ Liberation
Movement(SPLM).However,atthecommunity level,theconflictwasdeeply rooted ininter-and intra-
communal hatred because of social injustice, communal fighting, and repression of minorities.
Figure 11 Motivation to spread disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
The impact of disinformation and misinformation in increasing violence in the community in
South Sudan
Information has real-life consequences. It can be a literal lifesaver—when it is true. Unfortunately, the
opposite is also true. Untrue information can cause great harm. Looking at the impact of disinformation
24.0%
37.7%
43.7%
53.9%
58.7%
62.3%
76.6%
83.8%
To help others as in sharing important information
As deterrent to silence critics
To forge communal cohesion
For financial or economic gain
To seek public sympathy
To mobilize citizens into army or rebellion
To divert public attention from real issues
To seek political position
Motivation to spread disinformation and misinformation

and misinformation in increasing violence in a community in South Sudan, the study showed that
(98.1%) of respondents pointed out that disinformation and misinformation increase violence in a
community in South Sudan. In comparison (1.9%) believed that disinformation and misinformation do
not increase violence in the community in South Sudan.
Figure 12 The impact of disinformation and misinformation in increasing violence in the community in South Sudan
Disinformation and misinformation have increased violence in the Region of South Sudan.
The study analysis of disinformation and misinformation have increased violence by region indicates
that (96.7 %) of respondents in Greater Bahr El Ghazal said yes, (98.9%) in Greater Equatoria Region
said yes, and (97.2%) in Greater Upper Nile also responded yes.
Figure 13 Disinformation and misinformation have increased violence in the Region of South Sudan.
The effort of the government to combat misinformation and disinformation in South Sudan
1.9%
98.1%
Disinformation and misinformation have increased violence in your
community or in South Sudan
No
Yes
3.3% 1.1% 2.8%
96.7% 98.9% 97.2%
Region
Disinformation and misinformation have increased
violence in your community or in South Sudan by Region
No
Yes

Evaluating the effort of the government to combat misinformation and disinformation in South Sudan
showed that (82.5%) of household respondents suggested the government has not made any effort to
combat misinformation and disinformation, with only (17.5%) believing that the government has made
some efforts towards combating disinformation and misinformation.
Several interviews revealed that the Governments andpublic institutions have not taken adequate action
to combat disinformation and misinformation. The government has not supported fact-checking
platforms to strengthen their work in South Sudan. What the government is good at is its engagement
in restricting freedom of speech and criticism of government policies.
Figure 14 The effort of the government to combat misinformation and disinformation in South Sudan
Specific organizations or initiatives combating disinformation and misinformation in South
Sudan
The assessment respondents’ level of awareness of Specific organizations or initiatives combating
disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan showed a high level of awareness. According to
analyzeddata,(88.1%) of respondentsareawareof organizationsorinitiativescombating disinformation
and misinformation in South Sudan, and only (11.9%) are not aware.
The civil sector and independent media are the most active players in the fight against disinformation
and misinformation in South Sudan. Independent media associations have long been building media
capacity by training journalists, developing ethical standards in reporting, and improving the legislative
framework related to freedom of speech, the independence of the media, and freedom of information.
An organization such as Defyhatenow was also referenced alongside other media outlets in developing
their responses, monitoring, and fact-checking platforms. They also contribute to efforts by
implementing reporting ethics and creating self-regulatory policies. Other responses from civil society,
media outlets, and international organizations to information include education on general
disinformation and misinformation, i.e., information consumers, through media and information
literacy (MIL) educational programs and projects.
82.5%
17.5%
Government in South Sudan is doing enough to combat
misinformation and disinformation
No
Yes

Defyhatenow provides high-quality online safety and data security training to journalists and civil
society actors. Efforts have also been made to train the public on computer literacy; the NCA and
SafetyComm South Sudan have conducted cybersecurity and online safety awareness campaigns.
Additionally, media aspects are included in the education curriculum of primary and secondary schools.
Defyhatenow leverages the power of media monitoring and data collection to gain deep insights into
the ever-evolving landscape of dis/misinformation trends in South Sudan. Defyhatenow employs a
multi-pronged approach that harnesses the invaluable expertise of human media monitors who
meticulously examine various media sources to achieve this. These vigilant individuals act as frontline
defenders against disseminating false narratives, hate speech, and harmful rumours. Their tireless efforts
enable Defyhatenow to stay informed about the latest developments and emerging trends in the digital
information space. In addition to the invaluable contributions of human monitors, Defyhatenow
recognizes the immense potential of cutting-edge digital tools. They rely on a carefully curated selection
of open-source resources, such as Google Alerts, Google Trends, Google Forms, CrowdTangle,
BuzzSumo, and Talkwalker. These innovative technologies empower Defyhatenow to tap into the vast
expanse of digital news gathering and analysis.
However, despite these training initiatives, respondents agree that the overall low level of digital literacy
remains a significant challenge in raising awareness about the importance of digital security.
Furthermore, there is a general lack of information regarding how social media platforms like Facebook
utilize personal information and engagement to influence the content that appears on users' news feeds.
The study pointed out that even though organizations are contributing to combating disinformation
and misinformation, there is no well-developed system of independent responses to disinformation and
misinformation in South Sudan. However, South Sudan has an active and extensive network of
international donors that have significantly supported media and civil society and content creation.
Despite adversity, economic limitations, and a challenging context, South Sudanese journalists are
crafting a narrative that combines hope for a developing nation with its stark challenges.

Figure 15 Specific organizations or initiatives combating disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
Prevalent of disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
Freedom of speech and expression are fundamental human rights protected by the South Sudanese
constitution. Journalists, CSOs, and citizens utilize these rights to voice their concerns on contentious
issues, including disinformation and misinformation.
Findings on the prevalence of disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan indicated a high
prevalence. (81.9%) of the respondents answered yes, there is high prevalence, (15%) indicated medium,
and only (3.1%) answered low. During interviews with respondents, it was revealed that emergencies
and natural disasters show us the weaknesses of social resilience against disinformation and
misinformation. One key example cited was COVID-19-related disinformation. This has been and
remains pervasive throughout South Sudan. The anti-vaccination narratives that question the very
existence of the virus have significantly affected vaccination rates in South Sudan.
Figure 16 Prevalent of disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
11.9%
88.1%
Aware of organizations or initiatives in South Sudan that are doing
well in combating disinformation and misinformation
No
Yes
81.9%
3.1%
15.0%
Prevalence of disinformation and misinformation in South Sudan
High
Low
Medium

Disinformation and misinformation impact the social and political landscape of South Sudan.
Information producers and distribution channels enable and encourage information sharing across
ideological lines. As noted by the study, the impact of disinformation and misinformation concerning
the social and political landscape in South Sudan is noticeable. The findings in this area revealed that
disinformation and misinformation impact the social and political landscape of South Sudan. (94.4%)
of the interviewed respondents indicated yes, and (5.6%) responded no. The findings from KIIs
indicated that online disinformation expands significantly during political, economic, and social
grievances. In that way, it contributes to further polarizing the public debate, eroding public trust, and
inciting violence and hatred against marginalized groups and women.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) in South Sudan play a vital role in using quality information to
improve theircommunities.One impactof disinformation ison civilsociety leadersand journalists,who
are increasingly threatened and subjected to disinformation campaigns because of their journalistic
work, opinions, and reporting.
Figure 17 Disinformation and misinformation impact the social and political landscape of South Sudan.
Disinformation and misinformation affect trust in institutions and public officials.
To ascertain whether disinformation and misinformation influence trust in institutions and public
officials, the findings strongly suggest so. As noted, (98.1%) believed that disinformation and
misinformation influence trust in institutions and public officials, with only (1.9%) saying they do not
believe it influences trust in institutions and public officials. As pointed out during KIIs, one primary
concern about misinformation is that it could damage the public trust in democratic institutions. In
recent years, mainstream news organizations have experienced a considerable decline in public
confidence. The consequences of this lack of trust are especially apparent in times of crisis and
uncertainty when citizens most need credible sources providing current and reliable information. To
5.6%
94.4%
No Yes
Disinformation and misinformation impacts the social and political
landscape of South Sudan

the extent that disinformation and misinformation can undermine the public’s confidence in
mainstream media, it may leave its consumers misinformed and make them more vulnerable when
disaster strikes. Years of press censorship and self-censorship, media house closures, and the rise of
partisan websites have also adversely affected public trust, allowing rumors to proliferate.
Figure 18 Disinformation and misinformation effect trust in institutions and public officials.
Efforts to intentionally spread disinformation or misinformation in South Sudan
While the country's ongoing conflict and political tensions have led to significant polarization among
different groups, the study noted some effort to intentionally spread disinformation or misinformation
in South Sudan, revealing an equal response from respondents, with 50% saying yes and 50% saying no.
Figure 19 Efforts to intentionally spread disinformation or misinformation in South Sudan
1.9%
98.1%
Disinformation and misinformation affect trust in institutions and
public figures in South Sudan
No
Yes
50.0%
50.0%
Encountered efforts to spread disinformation or misinformation in
South Sudan intentionally
No
Yes

Measures to Counter Disinformation and Misinformation
Government initiatives and policies
South Sudan has established laws about freedom of expression and access to information. However,
despite legal frameworks, the respondents noted that the government has been using them to suppress
the media.
The Media Authority Act, the Code of Conduct for Journalists, and the Cybersecurity and Computer
Misuse Provisional Order serve as guiding documents for media activities. However, according to the
respondents, the government exploits these laws to justify actions such as deploying National Security
Officers at printing presses to censor publications and interfering in the planning of radio content. This
has resulted in the spread of disinformation and misinformation.
The laws of South Sudan, including the Right of Access to Information Act of 2013, provide good
guidelines and safeguards for accessing and disclosing information in the public interest. Its purpose is
to give effect to the constitutional right of access to information, promote maximum disclosure of
information in the public interest, establish effective mechanisms to secure that right, and provide for
incidental matters.
Media, education, and media literacy
With the growth of Information and Communication Technologies, the impact of traditional media
(radio, television, and newspaper) has been expanded and transformed, and information and news have
thus become more widely available. In this information age, journalists and information professionals
can play a pivotal role in providing access to credible information beyond their audience and facilitating
citizen participation in governance toward democratic societies, peace, and sustainable development.
The study established thatmedia literacy isundoubtedly a crucial toolin thefightagainstdisinformation
and misinformation. In South Sudan, there is evidence that some people are critically and digitally
literate. As such, they can assess online information, identify trustworthy sources, make well-informed
decisions as citizens and information consumers, and more.
In South Sudan, wheresocial networksand media area majorsource of information and disinformation,
knowing how to distinguish a fact from a lie is a major concern. The study called for the media and
content creators to play their role fully in educating the citizens. It was pointed out that it is desirable to
empower South Sudanese citizens in harnessing the benefit of the effective use of media through better
understanding and appreciation of the media for a better citizenry.
It was suggested that to ensure that the information the media in South Sudan processes and publishes
can continue to be seen, heard, read, and believed by as many South Sudanese as possible, the media is
now required to educate people about its role. In this manner, media and information literacy are

indicated to focus on interrelated and intersecting competencies to transform people’s interaction with
information and content, digital platforms, media, algorithms, and learning environments online and
offline.
One aspect called for by the study relates to engaging in media literacy, which is necessary for improving
people's capacity to receive and disseminate information in a relevant, ethical, and critical manner.
As recognized by international human rights instruments such as Article 19, meant to affect the right to
information better, the media has a role in helping citizens of all ages and all categories to extricate
themselves from the mire of violent propaganda on the web has become a major global challenge.
As noted by the study, given the disinformation that floods social networks and a tendency to put
opinions and facts on the same level, those whose profession is to present reality as it is must now, to be
credible, explain how the media work in South Sudan.
Encountered efforts to spread disinformation or misinformation in South Sudan intentionally
by region.
South Sudan's main challenge is the limited quality of information, as seen from the three greater
regions; the spread of disinformation or misinformation in South Sudan intentionally suggested that in
the Greater Bahr El Ghazal Region (56.7%), in Greater Equatoria Region (44.7%) and in Upper Nile
Region (58.3%) have encountered efforts to spread disinformation or misinformation. Those who
believed they did not encounter efforts to spread disinformation or misinformation in the Greater Bahr
El Ghazal Region account for (43.3%), the Greater Equatoria Region (55.3%), and the Upper Nile
Region (41.7%).
Figure 20 Encountered efforts to spread disinformation or misinformation in South Sudan intentionally by region.
43.3%
55.3%
41.7%
56.7%
44.7%
58.3%
Axis Title
Encountered efforts to spread disinformation or misinformation in
South Sudan intentionally by Region
No
Yes

The level of confidence of communities in distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate
information
The study findings under the level of confidence of communities in distinguishing between accurate
and inaccurate information revealed that (73.8) of those said they were confident, (1.9%) were not
confident, and 24.4% said they were somewhat confident.
Figure 21 The level of confidence of communities in distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate information
Confidence in the ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information by
region.
Analyzing confidence in the ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information by
region disclosed some confidence levels. In the Greater Bahr El Ghazal Region (66.7%), in the Greater
Equatoria Region (75.5%), and in the Upper Nile Region (75%), they are very confident in their ability
to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information.
Figure 22 Confidence in the ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information by region.
1.9%
24.4%
73.8%
Confidence in ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
information
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Very Confident
3.3% 2.1% 0.0%
30.0%
22.3% 25.0%
66.7%
75.5% 75.0%
Confidence in ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
information by Region
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Very Confident

To reduce or prevent the spread of disinformation and misinformation.
Sensitization and awareness creation on what is considered disinformation and misinformation, how to
spot disinformation and misinformation, the dangers of spreading disinformation and misinformation,
generating evidence of disinformation and misinformation, and the most effective approach to combat
its creation and spread were the recommendations raised.
The role of government in addressing the issue of disinformation and misinformation
● Legislation and law enforcement aimed at penalizing and disincentivizing the creation and
spread of disinformation and misinformation.
● Supporting innovationsand initiativesaimed atcombating disinformation and misinformation.
● Social media regulation should be at the top of actions for the government.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents the general inferences and recommendations to policymakers, journalists, media,
media support organizations, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
individuals to combat disinformation and misinformation.
Conclusion
South Sudan's media landscape reveals a dichotomy of subtle content diversity amidst predominant
challenges, such as censorship, misinformation, and technical and financial deficiencies affecting the
production and dissemination of quality information. South Sudan's media landscape is characterized
by liveliness and dynamism, but it also faces significant challenges of disinformation and
misinformation. It strives to establish free and fair journalistic practices within a turbulent political
system and social environment. CSOs areinstrumental in ensuring civic participation and engaging with
governments by providing reliable and relevant information.
The media environment confronts daunting challenges despite the country having enacted solid laws
aligned with international standards for safeguarding freedom of expression and information access. A
gap exists between policy and its practical implementation, underscored by media suppression and
misuse of laws significantly hampering the operation and establishment of media outlets, thus limiting
information access, and stifling free expression. Information has real-life consequences. It can be a literal
lifesaver when it’s true. Unfortunately, the opposite is also true. Untrue information can cause great
harm. Like a virus, wrong information can spread; poor communications infrastructure and natural
geographical barriers hinder access to information for millions of citizens, particularly those from
remote, marginalized, and transient communities. Communities are left without reliable information
access or are at risk of consuming disinformation and misinformation from third parties. While radios

and TVs are prevalent across most of the nation, newspapers are primarily available in Juba's capital.
Currently, there are 2 functional TVs: SSBC, and Juba Echo TV making information access an issue.
Now more than ever, South Sudan is experiencing the spread of two forms of wrong information:
misinformation and disinformation. These two words, often used interchangeably, are one letter apart.
Asestablished by thestudy, disinformation isverypowerful,destructive, and divisive,and itisa standard
espionage tool.
Regarding the enforcement of existing media laws, the study found that it is inadequate, and the limited
diversity and independence of information channels raise concerns about the practical availability and
reliability of information. Additionally, mechanisms intended to facilitate the establishment of media
outlets and access to governmental information often become entangled in financial, regulatory, and
political hindrances, making the realization of theoretical guarantees and freedoms more aspirational
than actualized across the country.
South Sudan should also invest in tools and mechanisms that support independent fact-checking with
the participation of journalists and civil society.
The study indicated that disinformation and misinformation have spread in South Sudan and are
promoted by state or non-state actors. The spread of disinformation and misinformation has affected a
broad range of human rights, undermining responses to public policies or amplifying tensions in times
of emergency or armed conflict.
The study proposed that approaches that seek simple solutions to this complex problem in South Sudan
are needed as without such, there is a likeliness the government of South Sudan will, as already
established by the study, censor legitimate speech that is protected under the Transitional Constitution
of the Republic of South Sudan 2011 as amended Bill of Rights and international human rights law.
The study concluded that South Sudanese are encouraged to promote and protect free and independent
media, including content creators, maximize transparency and access to information, and build trust in
public institutions, governance, peacebuilding, and processes. In doing so, the study encourages public
participation at all levels and enables meaningful dialogues and debates on those issues that could
exacerbate disinformation and misinformation.
Investing in digital and media literacy programs will enable more durable and meaningful online
participation by South Sudanese. Such initiatives will promote critical thinking skills that empower
citizens to identify, dispel, and debunk disinformation and misinformation.

Recommendations
Policy recommendations for the government
9. Politicalpartiesand political activistsshould beencouraged to build ethicalstandardsin political
action, emphasizing influencing campaigns and distorting public opinion through
manipulating social media platforms.
10. The government should work with media stakeholders to have clear policies on how rumors can
be encountered and reported timely to avoid disinformation and misinformation in the
country.
11. The national and state governments should invest in administrative capacity-building projects
by offering trainings for civil servants, especially in the field of media and information literacy,
so that they contribute to reducing disinformation and misinformation.
12. Support building coalitions and alliances among public institutions, media, internet companies,
civil society, and others to develop multi-sectoral strategies to address disinformation and
misinformation.
13. Provide South Sudanese citizens with critical thinking and creative problem-solving skills and
make them become informed consumers and information producers.
14. Educate South Sudanese citizens on the importance of identifying/selecting and using the right
information at the right time to find solutions to issues affecting their daily lives.
15. It is recommended that the government needs to invest in digital presence in platforms such as
websiteside,Facebook, X etc. Thegovernmentalso should make sure thatsuchmedia platforms
are accessible and open to the public with up-to-date information.
16. It is also recommended that the government should dedicate communications officers or media
team in each government institution to facilitate access to public information.
Strategies for journalists, media, and media support organizations
6. Support and increase the capacity of local media education institutions to provide adequate
quality education for journalists both in Juba and outside Juba so that they effectively engage in
combating disinformation and misinformation.
7. Train journalists and media activists to understand the nature of online communication and
work skills on social media.
8. Building and strengthening the fact-checking capabilities of media outlets and journalists is
strongly desired.
9. Exclusive awareness of misinformation and disinformation should be through radio talk shows
in different media houses in Juba and the states.
10. Journalists should be prepared to report on issues like the conflict involving South Sudan's
northern neighbor, Sudan, and its humanitarian implications, which pose a latent threat to
South Sudan’s precarious situation.

Suggestions for civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations
8. Since this type of disinformation and misinformation serves to pre-empt or predict political
intentions and actions, it is essential to invest in further research of crisis-related disinformation
and misinformation to support conflict-sensitive reporting initiatives, networking, and
cooperation as tools for conflict prevention in South Sudan.
9. Civil society organizations and policy experts should be encouraged to take part in the crafting
of practical human rights-based responses to disinformation and misinformation.
10. Non-governmental organizations and donors should work with civil society and the media to
organize forums for constant and continuous exchange of information counter-disinformation
and disinformation.
11. Non-governmental organizations should support professional fact-checker technically and
financially so that they can contribute to addressing disinformation and misinformation in
South Sudan.
12. Capacity building support will be needed from non-governmental organizations to equip
content creators with knowledge and skills to advance fact checking and determine information
and content accuracy.
13. Non-governmental organizations support research and media monitoring initiatives that
identify instances of disinformation and misinformation being spread on social media. The
monitoring should also understand the impact on different communities and what actions
should be taken.
14. It is recommended that there is need to create spaces which will provide a platform for co-
operation, where decision makers, along with representatives of civil society, academia, and the
private sector, will meet to discuss challenges, share good practices, and find effective solutions
relating to disinformation and misinformation.
Actions for individuals to combat disinformation and misinformation.
3. It is recommended that individuals engage in sensitization and awareness creation on what is
considered disinformation and misinformation and how to spot it.
4. Social media groups should continue to engage with local organizations and individuals to
develop their fact-checking capacities and benefit from a wide range of capacity building.

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