Case study of L G polymers and gas leak

1. ACCREDITED BY NATIONAL ASSESSMENT & ACCREDITATION
COUNCIL (NAAC) WITH ‘A’ GRADE (AN AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTE
AFFILIATED TO VTU,BELAGAVI)
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING

3. Facts
• A Chemical plant located at Visakhapatnam, Andhra
Pradesh, India, had a gas leak incident on early morning of 7th
May 2020
• The resulting vapor cloud spread over a radius of around 3km
(1.86 mi), affecting the nearby areas and villages.
• Uncontrolled Styrene Vapor Release from M6 Tank (2450 KL)

4. Consequences
• As per the reports,
• Five villages got affected
• The death toll was 13 (thirteen)
• 25 people are critical
• More than 1,000 people became sick after being exposed to the
gas.
• 585 citizens got hospitalized
• Issues face by villages are breathing difficulties and sensations
of burning eyes due to gas leak

5. Police, Legal and other key
agencies response..
• National Green Tribunal bench ordered Company to deposit an amount
of INR 50 crore (US$7.0 million) as an initial amount with the District
magistrate of Vishakapatnam to mitigate the damages caused due to
the incident.
• FIR was filed against Company by the local police on
• IPC 278 (making the atmosphere noxious to health),
• IPC 284 (negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance),
• IPC 285 (negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter),
• IPC 337 (causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others),
• IPC 338 (causing grievous hurt by act endangering life),
• IPC 304 (causing death by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to
culpable homicide
• National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) gave notice to the
Andhra Pradesh Government and the central government that it
considered the incident a gross violation of India's constitutional right to
life.

6. Lessons and Leanings
Factor How might have been avoided and Subsequent
Lessons
Insufficient Maintenance. Tank Cleaning was
done 5 years back. Possible corrosion.
Maintenance shall not be perceived as cost
centre. Risk Based Maintenance is the key.
Improper Storage like
•Inside lining was not there.
•Constriction of Material is not Carbon Steel.
OISD 108 (Recommended Practices on Oil
Storage and Handling) and AICHE compliance
are critical.
Operation Errors, Temperature data taken from
bottom where cold material is expected.
Training on Process Safety Management
(PSM)
This plant was originally established in 1961 as
Hindustan Polymers, Then merged with
McDowell Holdings on 1978, then acquired by
the South Korean company in 1997 which
operate the plant until now.
Merges and Acquisition tends to ignore the
Critical Safety aspects.
Old facilities risk is underrated due to “no
accident history”
Time of the incident was pandemic and
lockdown.
Onsite Emergency Plan shall be realistic.
Unplanned shutdown shall be a scenario
which every premises shall be planned.

7. Factor How might have been avoided and
Subsequent Lessons
Company believes that they don’t need
MoEFCC approval for expansion but MoEFCC
insists other wise
Clients tends to under estimate the risk and
compliance.
State Government doesn't insisted for central
approval all along, till the year 2018
There are some gray areas, where it is not
clear on legal compliance requirement for
particular plant or scenario. But for any mess-
up client will be at the receiving end.
Between 2006 to 2018 no central
environmental clearance available with
company, first time applied in 2018 for
expansion
Companies shall go beyond legal requirement
and look ahead for safety and environment
compliance voluntarily
Entire issue was because material has
Polymerization property
Adequate care needed continuously for
Unstable chemicals, rapid reacting chemicals
and incompatibility of chemicals.
Valve malfunction, as in odd time (3.45 pm)
Refrigeration Unit was OFF
Firm knowledge and assessment on Layers of
Protection Analysis (LOPA) required.

8. Factor How might have been avoided and
Subsequent Lessons
Gas detector setting kept for 20% of LEL (lower
explosive limit) i.e 2200 ppm
STEL (Short Term Exposure Limit) of Styrene is
100 ppm,
IDHL (Immediate Danger to Health and Life) is
700 ppm
It might have been for STEL value as the
chemical is not only flammable but also toxic
Toxic chemicals are more dangerous than
flammables.
As per company's version, CCTV, DCS and IST
time was not matching. The delay of 12
minutes between the CCTV & DCS and delay of
4 minute between the DCS and IST
Calibration and integrity among different
instruments are very critical.
Instrumentation team shall be sensitize on
Safety aspects of gaps, failure, malfunction,
showing of incorrect data.
Change in design of cooling system which lead
to huge difference in material temperature in
top and bottom of tank.
Previously flow type, now it is bottom
discharge
Brainstorming Sessions with third party safety
consultant, design team, operation staffs
needed for this type of change. In short
HAZOP might have done for change of design.

9. Factor How might have been avoided and
Subsequent Lessons
Temperature sensor at bottom but refrigerated
material also discharge at bottom.
Only one temperature sensor.
Temperature from different levels of tank
might have taken for correct assessment of
tank temperature, effectiveness of cooling
system or to ensure no polymerization is taking
place.
From vent, no condensing unit for the escape
gas or flare arrangement or collecting
arrangement
No chemical shall escape to environment
without neutralizing specially from Storage
Tanks.
High Temperature Alarm was not available Alarms and Trips are essential part of Process
Safety.
Plant expanded its capacity five times between
2006 and 2018.
If production capacity is expanded then safety,
integration, utilities, man power, layout etc will
get impacted. Study like Hazard Identification
Study (HAZID) might have address safety
loopholes if any on every stage of
development
Company head office is South Korea Most of the time HO or other similar plant’s
replica followed without considering the local
factors. Like in this case, temperature in south
Korea is much cooler than Vizag.

10. REFERENCES
• Bhashkar, Utpal (9 May 2020). "LG Polymers admits leaking
vapor from gas storage tank caused Vizag tragedy". The
Livemint. Retrieved 10 May 2020.
• Aryan, Ashish; Mukul, Pranav (8 May 2020). "Vizag gas leak:
Don't have green nod, company told state last May". The
Indian Express. Retrieved 15 May 2020.

11. THANK YOU