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OSSEC
Know More, Protect Better
Wim Remes
  (maltego me)
22-23 September (training)
24-25 September (conference)
http://www.brucon.org
Excaliburcon
http://www.newcamelotcouncil.com
  2010 CFP to be announced soon
http://www.eurotrashsecurity.eu
http://www.twitter.com/eurotrashsec
   feedback@eurotrashsecurity.eu
OSSEC
•   Daniel Cid

•   2005

•   Third Brigade

•   Trend Micro

•   GPL v3
Agenda
   Log Management

   OSSEC Features

  OSSEC Architecture

Log Analysis with OSSEC

      Conclusion
Log Management
   so easy the kid can do it ...
Sources ?

         Users




App    App       App   App



        Systems
Reasons
Because we have to :-(         Because we want to :-D



                         2%


           PCI-DSS
                                ISO 27K


            HIPAA             SOX

                         98%
Standards ?
•   Syslog

    •   2001, RFC 3164

    •   The non-standard standard


•   WELF, CBE, CEF

    •   Proprietary

    •   We know what happens then ...


•   IDMF

    •   Academic

    •   Complex
What do we need ?

•   Taxonomy

•   Syntax

•   Transport

•   Recommendations
Common Event Expression
  http://cee.mitre.org
OSSEC features
OSSEC features



   Log Analysis


 Integrity Control


 Rootkit Detection
OSSEC architecture
OSSEC Architecture

(root)                      logcollector
           chroot                 Agent
                                           zlib compressed
                                           blowfish encrypted
                                           UDP 1514

           chroot                 Server
chroot                   ossec-analysisd
  chroot            ossec-maild        ossec-execd   chroot
OSSEC Architecture

Firewall
                                         IDS
Switch               SRV
Router                                     Database

                                               App1

                                               App2




  Client   Client   Client   Client   Client


                Virtualization
I can haz rules ?
Log Analysis with OSSEC
Log Analysis with OSSEC

       predecoding


        decoding


         analysis
Predecoding


•   Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing appdaemon:user john
    logged in from 10.10.10.10

•   <decoder name="appdaemon">
    <program_name>appdaemon</program_name>
    </decoder>


    time/date	

 : Feb 24 10:12:23
    Hostname	

: beijing
    Program_name :appdaemon
    Log : user john logged in from 10.10.10.10
Predecoding


•   Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing switch:appdaemon quit
    unexpectedly

•   <decoder name="pam">
    <program_name></program_name>
    <prematch>^appdaemon$</prematch>
    </decoder>


    time/date	

 : Feb 24 10:12:23
    Hostname	

: beijing
    Program_name : switch
    Log : appdaemon quit unexpectedly
Decoding

•   Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing appdaemon:user john logged in from
    10.10.10.10

•   <decoder name="appdaemon-login">
      <parent>appdaemon</parent>
      <prematch>^user$</prematch>
      <after_prematch>(S+)logged in from (S+)</after_prematch>
      <order>user,srcip</order>
    </decoder>


    time/date	

 : Feb 24 10:12:23
    Hostname	

: beijing
    Program_name :appdaemon
    user : John
    srcip : 10.10.10.10
    Log : user john logged in from 10.10.10.10
Analysis

•   Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing appdaemon:user john logged in from
    10.10.10.10

•   <rule id="10001" level=”3”>
      <decoded_as>appdaemon</decoded_as>
      <match>logged in</match>
      <description>Successful login</after_prematch>
    </rule>

•   <rule id=”10002” level=”7”>
      <if_sid>10001</if_sid>
      <user>!John</user>
      <description>Ok, this was not John !!</description>
    </rule>

•   <rule id=”10003” level=”7”>
      <if_sid>10001</if_sid>
      <srcip>!10.10.10.0/24</srcip>
      <description>login from unauthorized network!!</description>
    </rule>
Analysis : The Rule Tree

                           10001




                10002                   10005




 10003                  10004           10006



                                10007           10008
                  N
              T IO
         AC
Advanced rule building
os_regex library (fast, not full regex)
    w   ->   A-Z, a-z, 0-9 characters
    d   ->   0-9 characters
    s   ->   For spaces " "
    t   ->   For tabs.
    p   ->   ()*+,-.:;<=>?[] (punctuation characters)
    W   ->   For anything not w
    D   ->   For anything not d
    S   ->   For anything not s
    .   ->   For anything

     +   ->   To match one or more times (eg w+ or d+)
     *   ->   To match zero or more times (eg w* or p*)


     ^ -> To specify the beginning of the text.
     $ -> To specify the end of the text.
     | -> To create an "OR" between multiple patterns.


    <regex> </regex> (in rules)
    <regex> </regex> (in decoders)
    <prematch> </prematch> (in decoders)
    <if_matched_regex> </if_matched_regex> (in rules)
Advanced rule building
os_match library (more limited, faster)
   ^ -> To specify the beginning of the text.
   $ -> To specify the end of the text.
   | -> To create an "OR" between multiple patterns.



  (rules only !)
    <match> </match>
    <user> </user>
    <url> </url>
    <id> </id>
    <status> </status>
    <hostname> </hostname>
    <program_name> </program_name>
    <srcport> </srcport>
    <dstport> </dstport>



                 use this whenever possible !
                   it beats the <regex> tag
Integrity Checking
ossec.conf
<syscheck>
  <!-- Frequency that syscheck is executed - default to every 22 hours -->
  <frequency>79200</frequency>

  <!-- Directories to check (perform all possible verifications) -->
  <directories realtime=”yes” check_all="yes">/etc,/usr/bin,/usr/sbin</directories>
  <directories check_all="yes">/bin,/sbin</directories>

  <!-- Files/directories to ignore -->
  <ignore>/etc/mtab</ignore>
  <ignore>/etc/mnttab</ignore>
<syscheck>
ossec_rules.xml
<rule id="550" level="7">
  <category>ossec</category>
  <decoded_as>syscheck_integrity_changed</decoded_as>
  <description>Integrity checksum changed.</description>
  <group>syscheck,</group>
 </rule>

  <rule id="551" level="7">
   <category>ossec</category>
   <decoded_as>syscheck_integrity_changed_2nd</decoded_as>
   <description>Integrity checksum changed again (2nd time).</description>
   <group>syscheck,</group>
  </rule>

  <rule id="552" level="7">
   <category>ossec</category>
   <decoded_as>syscheck_integrity_changed_3rd</decoded_as>
   <description>Integrity checksum changed again (3rd time).</description>
   <group>syscheck,</group>
  </rule>

...
syscheck commands



/var/ossec/bin/syscheck_update -a
/var/ossec/bin/syscheck_control -l
/var/ossec/bin/syscheck_control -i [agentid]
/var/ossec/bin/syscheck_control -i [agentid] -f [filename]
Management
commands
/var/ossec/manage_agents
   >server
   >agent

/var/ossec/agent_control -lc
/var/ossec/agent_control -i [agentid]
/var/ossec/agent_control -r -a
/var/ossec/agent_control -R [agentid]
/var/ossec/agent_control -r -u [agentid]
Conclusion
Conclusion
nobody knows your system/
application as well as you

OSSEC is a mature starting
point for your log management
needs

Tuning rules never stops !

Questions ?


              http://www.ossec.net
Thank you!
         wremes@gmail.com
 (all pictures = creative commons)

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Fosdem10

  • 2. Wim Remes (maltego me)
  • 3. 22-23 September (training) 24-25 September (conference) http://www.brucon.org
  • 6. OSSEC • Daniel Cid • 2005 • Third Brigade • Trend Micro • GPL v3
  • 7. Agenda Log Management OSSEC Features OSSEC Architecture Log Analysis with OSSEC Conclusion
  • 8. Log Management so easy the kid can do it ...
  • 9. Sources ? Users App App App App Systems
  • 10. Reasons Because we have to :-( Because we want to :-D 2% PCI-DSS ISO 27K HIPAA SOX 98%
  • 11. Standards ? • Syslog • 2001, RFC 3164 • The non-standard standard • WELF, CBE, CEF • Proprietary • We know what happens then ... • IDMF • Academic • Complex
  • 12. What do we need ? • Taxonomy • Syntax • Transport • Recommendations
  • 13. Common Event Expression http://cee.mitre.org
  • 15. OSSEC features Log Analysis Integrity Control Rootkit Detection
  • 17. OSSEC Architecture (root) logcollector chroot Agent zlib compressed blowfish encrypted UDP 1514 chroot Server chroot ossec-analysisd chroot ossec-maild ossec-execd chroot
  • 18. OSSEC Architecture Firewall IDS Switch SRV Router Database App1 App2 Client Client Client Client Client Virtualization
  • 19. I can haz rules ?
  • 21. Log Analysis with OSSEC predecoding decoding analysis
  • 22. Predecoding • Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing appdaemon:user john logged in from 10.10.10.10 • <decoder name="appdaemon"> <program_name>appdaemon</program_name> </decoder> time/date : Feb 24 10:12:23 Hostname : beijing Program_name :appdaemon Log : user john logged in from 10.10.10.10
  • 23. Predecoding • Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing switch:appdaemon quit unexpectedly • <decoder name="pam"> <program_name></program_name> <prematch>^appdaemon$</prematch> </decoder> time/date : Feb 24 10:12:23 Hostname : beijing Program_name : switch Log : appdaemon quit unexpectedly
  • 24. Decoding • Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing appdaemon:user john logged in from 10.10.10.10 • <decoder name="appdaemon-login"> <parent>appdaemon</parent> <prematch>^user$</prematch> <after_prematch>(S+)logged in from (S+)</after_prematch> <order>user,srcip</order> </decoder> time/date : Feb 24 10:12:23 Hostname : beijing Program_name :appdaemon user : John srcip : 10.10.10.10 Log : user john logged in from 10.10.10.10
  • 25. Analysis • Feb 24 10:12:23 beijing appdaemon:user john logged in from 10.10.10.10 • <rule id="10001" level=”3”> <decoded_as>appdaemon</decoded_as> <match>logged in</match> <description>Successful login</after_prematch> </rule> • <rule id=”10002” level=”7”> <if_sid>10001</if_sid> <user>!John</user> <description>Ok, this was not John !!</description> </rule> • <rule id=”10003” level=”7”> <if_sid>10001</if_sid> <srcip>!10.10.10.0/24</srcip> <description>login from unauthorized network!!</description> </rule>
  • 26. Analysis : The Rule Tree 10001 10002 10005 10003 10004 10006 10007 10008 N T IO AC
  • 27. Advanced rule building os_regex library (fast, not full regex) w -> A-Z, a-z, 0-9 characters d -> 0-9 characters s -> For spaces " " t -> For tabs. p -> ()*+,-.:;<=>?[] (punctuation characters) W -> For anything not w D -> For anything not d S -> For anything not s . -> For anything + -> To match one or more times (eg w+ or d+) * -> To match zero or more times (eg w* or p*) ^ -> To specify the beginning of the text. $ -> To specify the end of the text. | -> To create an "OR" between multiple patterns. <regex> </regex> (in rules) <regex> </regex> (in decoders) <prematch> </prematch> (in decoders) <if_matched_regex> </if_matched_regex> (in rules)
  • 28. Advanced rule building os_match library (more limited, faster) ^ -> To specify the beginning of the text. $ -> To specify the end of the text. | -> To create an "OR" between multiple patterns. (rules only !) <match> </match> <user> </user> <url> </url> <id> </id> <status> </status> <hostname> </hostname> <program_name> </program_name> <srcport> </srcport> <dstport> </dstport> use this whenever possible ! it beats the <regex> tag
  • 30. ossec.conf <syscheck> <!-- Frequency that syscheck is executed - default to every 22 hours --> <frequency>79200</frequency> <!-- Directories to check (perform all possible verifications) --> <directories realtime=”yes” check_all="yes">/etc,/usr/bin,/usr/sbin</directories> <directories check_all="yes">/bin,/sbin</directories> <!-- Files/directories to ignore --> <ignore>/etc/mtab</ignore> <ignore>/etc/mnttab</ignore> <syscheck>
  • 31. ossec_rules.xml <rule id="550" level="7"> <category>ossec</category> <decoded_as>syscheck_integrity_changed</decoded_as> <description>Integrity checksum changed.</description> <group>syscheck,</group> </rule> <rule id="551" level="7"> <category>ossec</category> <decoded_as>syscheck_integrity_changed_2nd</decoded_as> <description>Integrity checksum changed again (2nd time).</description> <group>syscheck,</group> </rule> <rule id="552" level="7"> <category>ossec</category> <decoded_as>syscheck_integrity_changed_3rd</decoded_as> <description>Integrity checksum changed again (3rd time).</description> <group>syscheck,</group> </rule> ...
  • 32. syscheck commands /var/ossec/bin/syscheck_update -a /var/ossec/bin/syscheck_control -l /var/ossec/bin/syscheck_control -i [agentid] /var/ossec/bin/syscheck_control -i [agentid] -f [filename]
  • 34. commands /var/ossec/manage_agents >server >agent /var/ossec/agent_control -lc /var/ossec/agent_control -i [agentid] /var/ossec/agent_control -r -a /var/ossec/agent_control -R [agentid] /var/ossec/agent_control -r -u [agentid]
  • 36. Conclusion nobody knows your system/ application as well as you OSSEC is a mature starting point for your log management needs Tuning rules never stops ! Questions ? http://www.ossec.net
  • 37. Thank you! wremes@gmail.com (all pictures = creative commons)