Boko Haram insurgents abducted 276 girls from a school in Nigeria 10 years ago, sparking global outrage and the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. Today, 89 girls remain missing, and 30 children were recently kidnapped in Katsina State. These events highlight ongoing challenges in securing the release of abducted children and the persistent threat of violent groups in the region. The CRTG Working Group, monitors terrorist targeting of children in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, understanding the strategic purposes behind such abductions. Download the report here https://t.ly/iJdyf

1. BOKO HARAM
PILOT
2021
Krystel von Kumberg
Raphaelle Beaussart
Cecilia Polizzi
November 2021
crtgroup.org
PREVENT

2. ABOUT CRTG WORKING GROUP
The CRTG Working Group is the world's
fi
rst organization dedicated to addressing the involvement of children with
terrorism and violent extremism. We help understand the nature of child involvement with terrorist and violent
extremist actors, support prevention and mitigation efforts.
The CRTG Working Group recognizes that child exploitation in terrorism is an evolutionary outcome of terrorist
tactics and strategy and one of the core elements enabling the long-term survival of terrorist organizations,
spreading violent ideology, and fueling con
fl
ict. We acknowledge that addressing the complex and evolving nature of
the terrorist threat, requires our own adaptation and therefore, we are intentionally forward-looking in our
understanding of children ́s role - as a factor that can exacerbate existing challenges, but also one that can, when
effective intervention measures are implemented and sustained, provide new solutions to current threats that we
confront and help prevent new ones from materializing.
Through a multi-tiered approach, the CRTG Working Group provides unique insights and cross-cutting analysis into
this area, helps shape policies that accommodate both child protection and security concerns through direct,
personal advocacy, and works to address context-speci
fi
c needs, facilitating meaningful and sustainable solutions.
LICENSING AND DISTRIBUTION
CRTG Working Group publications are distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non
Commercial No Derivatives License, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
© 2021 CRTG Working Group
Working Group on Children Recruited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups
Web: crtgroup.org
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT
NOVEMBER 2021
This report was written by Krystel von Kumberg, Raphaelle Beaussart and Cecilia Polizzi
Edited by Connor Bryant and Cecilia Polizzi

3. 2 2024
Tableof
Contents
RecruitmentMethods
PREVENT Overview
ResearchDesign
ExecutiveSummary
OrganizationalStructure
Doctrine
HistoryofChildRecruitmentandUse
ChildDemographics
1
1
4
4
5
5
7
8
Indoctrination
MilitaryTraining
RolesDisaggregatedbyGender
SexualandGender-BasedViolence
17
17
19
22
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT

4. PREVENT Overview
In its effort to promote a strategic, long-term approach to prevent and counter terrorism and the violent extremist
ideologies that underpin it, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) has launched an initiative on juvenile justice
in a counterterrorism context to address the emerging questions regarding children involved in terrorism, and the
different phases of a criminal justice response, which include prevention, investigation, prosecution, sentencing,
and reintegration. GCTF’s Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence (Life Cycle Initiative) and
1
its Memoranda (Neuchâtel Memorandum) recognized the need to prevent violent extremism through a
2
comprehensive strategy grounded in international law and human rights. Critical to such strategy, the need to
understanding the conditions conducive to and effectively addressing the recruitment of children, and their
potential radicalization to violence.3
With an aim to help close existing knowledge gaps and inform responses as underlined by the GCTF ́s Life Cycle
Initiative and the Neuchâtel Memorandum as well as by several experts, states, and agencies, the CRTG Working
4 5
Group is developing a research portfolio that identi
fi
es systemic issues and factors driving children into terrorist
and violent extremist groups. Through PREVENT, the CRTG Working Group introduces new methods of creating a
thorough understanding of the challenge of terrorism and violent extremism involving children, which will further
help to ensure awareness of the threat and violence against children (VAC) at the hands of terrorist and violent
extremist actors, allowing for better discussion, approaches to prevention and resource allocation.
Research Design
The CRTG Working Group developed an articulate analytical framework that allows for a holistic understanding of
the multifaceted drivers leading children and youth into the fold of terrorist and violent extremist groups, the
context in which this issue emerges and its methods, thereby providing the necessary foundation for the
formulation of informed policies, strategies, and intervention measures.
GCTF’s Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence (Life Cycle Initiative).
1
Global Counterterrorism Forum, Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence, Neuchat̂ el Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a
2
Counterterrorism Context, https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-framework-documents, 2015.
Global Counterterrorism Forum, Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence, Neuchat̂ el Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a
3
Counterterrorism Context, https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-framework-documents, 2015.
Neuchat̂ el Memorandum, Good Practice 3: Address children’s vulnerability to recruitment and/or radicalization to violence through preventive measures.
4
An increasingly diverse community of policymakers, practitioners, and academics is striving to better understand what causes and drives VE and to develop effective ways
5
of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), bringing their unique organizational mandates and perspectives to bear.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 1

5. The CRTG Working Group recognizes that terrorist and violent extremist organizations do not adhere to a
standardized strategy to recruit, use, and radicalize children, that children ́s adoption of violent behavior is non-
exclusively ideological but multidimensional, and that the dynamics of violent extremism in con
fl
ict-affected
6
settings and fragile environments are especially
fl
uid and complex. For these reasons, this research adopts a
macro-level analytical approach that identi
fi
es the conditions conducive to violent extremism involving children
and the broader exogenous factors that enable violent extremist insurgencies, including con
fl
ict, political and
social dynamics considerations.7
In addition to illuminating causes and motivations, the CRTG Working Group points to the importance of
understanding the processes of recruitment, types of violent extremist activity and their potential reach as these
form part of the calculus in designing effective interventions. In this respect, this research initiative dissects
8
terrorist and violent extremist organizations ́ strategy punctuating child recruitment, use and radicalization, and
produces a set of tailored analyses for each group including trajectory and evolution, ideological stance, methods
of child targeting, military training and child exploitation disaggregated by gender, and sexual and gender based
violence.
This analysis of child recruitment and radicalization by Boko Haram is developed as a pilot for the CRTG Working
Group´s PREVENT initiative. It draws from the analytical tool designed by the CRTG Working Group and aims at
testing the feasibility, validity and effectiveness of this line of research by the CRTG Working Group and set the
foundation for the subsequent stages of the PREVENT initiative.
Together with other assessments of the Islamic State, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, it forms part of an open-source
repository of data providing a nuanced and context-speci
fi
c understanding of child involvement with terrorism and
violent extremism. This pilot employs a multi-layered approach including both quantitative and qualitative methods,
and it relies on desk research to allow for a systematic exploration, analysis, and synthesis of existing knowledge
derived from an extensive array of primary and secondary sources.
Notably, ideology—or radical beliefs—is a feature of these models but not necessarily a precursor of violent behavior. Some theorists posit that ideological commitment can
6
occur after an individual has joined a group or committed a violent act. Other research, especially in non-Western contexts, reveals that ideology can be a secondary
consideration.; John Horgan, “From Pro
fi
les to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 80–94.; Peter Bauman, Regional Risk Assessment of Violent Extremism in West Africa (Washington, DC: US Agency for
International Development [USAID], 2015).; Georgia Holmer, Peter Bauman, Taking Stock: Analytic Tools for Understanding and Designing P/CVE Programs, United States
Institute of Peace, 2018. See also Mercy Corps, Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice, and Violence (Mary Corps, February 2015), www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/
fi
les/MercyCorps _YouthConsequencesReport_2015.pdf.
Con
fl
ict assessment tools and considerations of con
fl
ict dynamics are incorporated.
7
Georgia Holmer et al., 2018.
8
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 2

6. PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 3
BOKO
HARAM
Ideologies Islamist, jihadist, Sala
fi
st, tak
fi
ri
Year of origin 2022
Places of operation Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad
Children recruited since origin 10,000
Children recruited annually 1385-3500
Gender Boys, Girls
Age 7-18
Recruitment methods Mass Abductions, Raids, Threats and
Intimidation Tactics, Disguise, Push & Pull
Factors
Indoctrination Almajiri Quranic Schools, Propaganda
Child exploitation Front-line Soldiers, Messengers, Spies,
Checkpoint Guards, Suicide Bombers, Forced
Marriage, Forced Pregnancy, Sexual and
Gender-Based Violence

7. 1. Executive Summary
Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad - Boko Haram - is a jihadist group based in Northeastern Nigeria and
active in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Since 2002, with an aim to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria it has waged a
violent insurgency linked to more than 36,000 fatalities and 2.7 million displaced. Boko Haram is responsible for
9
the recruitment and use of at least 10,000 children. The targeting of children occurs largely through forced means
including mass abductions, raids on schools, villages and IDP camps, manipulation and disguise, threats and
intimidation tactics and other forms of coercion. The incidence of push and pull factors towards child involvement
with Boko Haram does not approximate the numbers of child victims of its forced recruitment strategy. Recruited
children are indoctrinated to Sala
fi
-jihadi ideology through sermons and lectures and undergo military training as
infantry soldiers or suicide bombers. Children recruited by Boko Haram are held captive, experience high-levels of
trauma and psychological distress and are invariably exposed to a high risk of becoming victims of sexual violence
and sexual exploitation. The exploitation of children, both boys and girls, is central to Boko Haram sustained
insurgency and long-term survival.
2. Organizational Structure
Boko Haram is a hierarchical organization with a decentralized structure led by its Amiru’l-Amm.10
Below the Amiru’l-Amm sits the Shura Council. The Shura Council is a decision-making body formed by high-
ranking commanders and representatives of other extremist groups active in the region including Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) The Shura Council is in
11
charge of commanding the group´s regional cells.
Boko Haram´s ambition to exert control and maintain in
fl
uence over diverse geopolitical areas of the Nigerian
territory introduces further fragmentation in its command structure. Regional and local-level cells are led by Amirs
and sub-Amirs with the assistance of a commander (Kwamandoji) and a deputy (Nabin) and present different areas
of specialization including intelligence, medical, weaponry and military operations.12
Emrah Kekilli, Khayri Omar, Ibrahim Bachir Abdoulaye, "Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization: Boko Haram," SETA, January 2018, accessed March 20, 2021, https://setav.org/en/
9
assets/uploads/2018/10/44_Analysis.pdf; ACLED, "Boko Haram Crisis," accessed May 30, 2021, https://acleddata.com/crisis-pro
fi
le/boko-haram-crisis/.
Ibid.
10
Project on Violent Con
fl
ict, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy.
11
Bodansky, Yossef. "Boko Haram – A Serious Threat." ISPSW, June 2014. Accessed January 2021. https://www.
fi
les.ethz.ch/isn/180761/275_Bodansky.pdf.
12
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 4

8. Boko Haram structure is highly disguised. Historical estimates of its size have ranged from as few as 1,500
fi
ghters
to what one high-level defector said was corresponding to 40,000
fi
ghters, their entourage of family members and
13
captives, uncluding children below the age of eighteen.14
3. Doctrine
Since its inception, Boko Haram adopted a hardline conception of the doctrine of alwala’ wa-l-bara’. For Sala
fi
-
jihadis, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ means exclusive loyalty (al-wala’) to those considered ´true´ Muslims, and complete
repudiation (albara’) of all others.15
Similarly to other Nigerian Sala
fi
s, Boko Haram denounces Su
fi
sm. Su
fi
orders, hierarchical organizations that
initiate Muslims into techniques and traditions of mysticism, remain the dominant type of Muslim association in
Northern Nigeria. Sala
fi
s often view Su
fi
s as blameworthy within Islam.
With Amiru’l-Amm Shekau, Boko Haram turned to the practice of tak
fi
r, or declaring other Muslims unbelievers. As
“the excuse of ignorance is not taken into consideration (…)” the right to kill other Muslims supporting democracy,
constitutionalism, technological innovation and Western-style education was claimed by Boko Haram.16
4. History of Child Recruitment and Use
The United Nations veri
fi
ed that Boko Haram and ISWAP recruited and used at least 8,000 children since
2009. Instances of child recruitment and use are possibly underreported. On average, Boko Haram´s rate of child
17 18
recruitment and use oscillates between 1385-3500 on a yearly basis.19
The historical roots of Boko Haram backtrack to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah
h
ij
ra, a Muslim Youth Organization, in Borno State. While confrontations between ´militant youth´ and government
20
Counter Extremism Project. "Boko Haram." Accessed n.d. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/
fi
les/threat_pdf/Boko%20Haram-12172020.pdf.
13
Ruth Maclean and Ismail Alfa, “Thousands of Boko Haram Members Surrendered. They moved in Next Door.” The New York Times, Sept. 23, 2021.
14
Alex Thurston "´The disease is unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious and political worldview", Middle East Policy at Brookings, Analysis Paper, No. 22, January 2016.
15
Montclos, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de. "Boko Haram and Politics: From Insurgency to Terrorism." n.d. https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/
16
divers15-04/010064363.pdf?article=1204&context=annlsurvey.
UNODC holds consultation in Abuja on the treatment of children affected by Terrorist Group.
17
Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed con
fl
ict in Nigeria (S/2017/304), paras. 29-30, Security Council, April 10, 2017, accessed January 5, 2023, https://
18
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/096/82/PDF/N1709682.pdf?OpenElement.
S/2017/304.
19
Ezeani, Elimma C. "Responding to Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of Boko Haram." Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 22, no. 1 (Year): Article 5. Accessed
20
April 2021. https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1204&context=annlsurvey.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 5

9. forces were reported as early as 1999, Boko Haram appears to have progressed as a nonviolent movement until
21
2002, when Mohammed Yusuf rose to leadership.
In Maiduguri, Yusuf´s preaching on the excesses of government o
ffi
cials as well as claims of the forbidden nature
(haram) of secular education, attracted an increasing number of youth groups from Yobe, Borno State and the Lake
Chad. In 2004, Boko Haram received an additional in
fl
ux of youth recruits when students enrolled in tertiary
22
institutions in Borno and Yobe, withdrew from school and joined the group.
Boko Haram´s violent attacks continued on an intermitting basis characterized by periodic hit-and-run against
security posts until the antigovernment uprising of July 2009. The wave of unrest that swept through Nigeria – and
most particularly Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina and Yobe - and which led to the death of over eight hundred Boko
23
Haram members and hundreds of arrests, ended with the capture and extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in
Maiduguri.24
Governmental repression crucially escalated violence within the country. Following the appointment of Abubakar
Shekau to Boko Haram´s leadership, increasingly violent tactics, including bombings, targeted assassinations,
ambushes, drive-by shootings and other forms of violent attacks were put into effect to advance Boko Haram´s
agenda. During the same period, Boko Haram also expanded the target categories of its violence to Christians,
diplomats, public servants, traders, Islamic scholars, teachers, school children and ultimately to anyone refusing to
join its ranks or comply with its rulings. In August 2011, with the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Abuja, Boko
Haram surged to the top of the international community agenda. In January 2012, a state of emergency was
25
declared.26
The dynamics of Boko Haram´s child recruitment scheme began to shift. As the
fi
ghting against Nigerian military
forces and allied powers intensi
fi
ed, the group dramatically escalated the recruitment of children in an attempt to
27
strengthen its military and operational capacity and showcase an apparent numerical advantage by providing the
illusion of a mass force ready for mobilization. At the peak of Boko Haram-related violence, 276 schoolgirls were
kidnapped from Chibok in Nigeria´s northeastern Borno State, eight girls ranging from 8-15 years of age were
28
Child Soldiers International, Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - Nigeria, 2001.
21
Muhammed K. Isa, “Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria,” in Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, eds., Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Security and
22
State Crises in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 333.
UN Security Council Report, "Children and armed con
fl
ict in Nigeria," S/2020/652 (July 6, 2020).
23
Walker, Andrew “Join us or Die: The Birth of Boko Haram“, The Guardian, February 4, 2016; Walker, Andrew. "What Is Boko Haram?" Special Report 308. United States Institute
24
of Peace, June 2012.
BBC. "Abuja attack: Car bomb hits Nigeria UN building." August 27, 2011. Accessed March 27, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957.
25
Felix Onuah & Tim Cocks, "Nigeria's Jonathan declares state of emergency" Reuters, December 31, 2011.
26
Agbiboa, Daniel E. "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria." In Religious Rights, edited by Lorenzo Zucca, Abingdon, United Kingdom
27
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Routledge, 2017.
BBC News. "Viewpoint: Global media’s Nigeria abductions coverage ‘wrong’." Accessed n.d. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55572897.
28
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 6

10. kidnapped from a village in a nearby area, hirty-three women and six children were taken from the village of
29
Nguelewa, Diffa Region. The UN reports that girls abducted during that period were “used to perpetrate suicide
30
bombings attacks and intensi
fi
ed the use of improvised explosive devices-as-landmines.” In addition, in a two
31
years period (2014-2016), Boko Haram abducted 10,000 boys for combat and military operations. In areas
32
previously held by Boko Haram, the Nigerian security forces and regional forces arrested a signi
fi
cant number of
suspected members, including children, for their alleged association with the group.
From mid-2015 Boko Haram experienced a period of relative decline. The loss of territory incurred in previous years,
further accelerated by the destruction of its stronghold in the Sambisa Forest, dispersed its leadership into Gombe,
Yobe and Bauchi states and left the group with a fragmented command structure. The recruitment and use of
33
children remained however steady. In 2018, Nigeria counted for the second-highest number of children recruited
into armed con
fl
ict globally and the third-highest number of abductions.34
5. Demographics
5.1 Child Demographics by Age
Boko Haram´s military is formed predominantly by youth and children below the age of 18. The median age of the
group, including senior
fi
ghters and commanders, is estimated thirty years. The main age target for child
35
recruitment corresponds to 7-18 years of age. The group is also veri
fi
ed recruiting children aged 5 - 8. Most
36
children in this age group, most particularly girls, are deployed in suicide bombing operations. Accounts received
by the UN report the association of children as young as 4 years old with Boko Haram.37
BBC News. "Eight more Nigerian girls abducted." May 6, 2014. Accessed March 13, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27294630.
29
Elizabeth Pearson and Jacob Zenn “Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the Surge in Female Abductions in Southeastern Niger” ICCT The Hague, February 2021.
30
S/2017/304, April 2017.
31
PBS NewsHour, "What happened to 10,000 boys kidnapped by Boko Haram?" PBS NewsHour, accessed January 15, 2021, https://www.pbssocal.org/shows/newshour/clip/
32
what-happened-to-10-000-boys-kidnapped-by-boko-haram-1478306340.
The Institute for Security Studies. "Why Effective Handling of Boko Haram Deserters Matters." March 2021. Accessed March 27, 2021. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-
33
effective-handling-of-boko-haram-deserters-matters.
A/73/907–S/2019/509 (2019).
34
Salami, B.N. "Suicide Bombing and National Security: Implications for the Armed Forces of Nigeria." Presented at the National Defense College, Abuja, Nigeria, July 2013.
35
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). "Nigeria welcomes release of over 180 children suspected of Boko Haram ties from administrative custody." July 9, 2018.
36
Irwan Kajjo and Hassan Maina Kaina. "Experts: Boko Haram Recruiting Children as Soldiers, Suicide Bombers." VoA News, 2020.
37
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 7

11. 5.2 Child Demographics by Gender
Boko Haram prejudices the participation of women and girls from high-ranking positions and its architecture
continues to present, similarly to other extremist organizations, a predominance of male members and
combatants. However, the gender ratio regarding child recruitment appears more balanced. This deriving primarily
from roles attributed to children. In fact, while boys are groomed to ful
fi
l military and military supporting roles, girls
are extensively exploited in suicide bombing operations as well as for the purposes of sexual and gender-based
violence.38
6. Recruitment Methods
6.1 Forced Recruitment
Coercion is central to Boko Haram´s child recruitment strategy. The highest majority of children were recruited by
force. Boko Haram use of forced recruitment methods, mass abductions, raids threats and intimidation and
39
manipulative techniques systematically increased since 2013. The correlation between battle
fi
eld dynamics and
increasingly aggressive child recruitment methods by Boko Haram is attributed to the need for human capital to be
deployed in combat, to the need of strengthening its military and operational capacity and to portray an apparent
numerical advantage to its opponents.
6.2 Mass Abductions
Boko Haram mass abduction campaign has been de
fi
ned „epidemic“. Its magnitude can be understood in light of
40
the 97,000 public and private primary schools, 32,800 public and private secondary schools and the thousands
Islamic schools, colleges and vocational institutes in Nigeria, making it the biggest school system in Africa.41
Boko Haram hostility towards secular education has led schoolchildren to become the primary targets for
recruitment and exploitation. In April 2014, the infamous abduction of 276 girls from a public secondary school in
Campbell, John. "Women, Boko Haram and Suicide Bombing." Council on Foreign Relations. March 25, 2020.
38
Human Rights Watch, "They Didn't Know if I Was Alive or Dead: Military Detention of Children for Suspected Boko Haram A
ffi
liation," September 10, 2019, HRW.
39
Parkinson, Joe, and Gbenga Akingbule. "Gunmen in Nigeria Kidnap More Than 100 Schoolchildren Amid Abduction Epidemic." The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2021. Accessed
40
March 25, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/gunmen-in-nigeria-kidnap-more-than-100-schoolchildren-amid-epidemic-of-abductions-11622475369.; Verjee, Aly, and Chris M.
A. Kwaja. "An Epidemic of Kidnapping: Interpreting School Abductions and Insecurity in Nigeria." African Studies Quarterly 20, no. 3 (October 2021).
Abiodun, Rita. 2021. “International Day of Education 2021 - Students express fear and hope for what the future holds.” UNICEF. 25 January.
41
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 8

12. the small town of Chibok, Borno State sparked international outrage and the “Bring Back Our Girls” social media
42 43
campaign calling for their release. However, the Chibok abduction was not the
fi
rst instance of child abduction and
violence against children by Boko Haram. In 2013, forty-one students and one teacher were shot or burned alive at
the Mamudo Government Secondary School in Yobe State and forty-four students and teachers were killed in a
separate incident at the College of Agriculture in Gujba. In February 2014, another attack against and educational
44
institution resulted in the death of
fi
fty-nine students. In 2018, 110 girls were abducted from a school in Dapchi.
45 46
Boko Haram relentless mass abduction campaign further escalated in 2020-2021. In a nine months period, twelve
instances of mass abductions and four attempted abductions were veri
fi
ed in Nigeria. On 11 December 2020, 300
47
boys were abducted from the Kankara Government Science Secondary School. By August 2021, at least 771 more
48
children were abducted in Nigeria.49
Boko Haram repeatedly relied on Sala
fi
sm as a justi
fi
cation for mass abductions. In 2014, former leader Abubakar
Shekau, while claiming responsibility for the Chibok kidnapping a
ffi
rmed: “Allah instructed me to sell them...I will
carry out his instructions (…) slavery is allowed in my religion, and I shall capture people and make them slaves“.50
In 2020, he further assumed that the Kankara mass kidnapping was carried out to “promote Islam and discourage
un-Islamic practices as Western education is not the type of education permitted by Allah and his holy Prophet.”51
Children recruited by Boko Haram become victims of grave forms of violence including sexual violence, sexual
exploitation, enslavement, forced pregnancy and forced marriage and for the purposes of exploitation in military
operations and suicide bombing whereas the groups incurred severe battle
fi
eld losses and a weakened military
capacity. Children recruited by Boko Haram are also used as a bargaining tool during negotiations with government
authorities or to
fi
nance its operations. Kidnap-for-ransom has been increasingly used by Boko Haram and other
52
factions operating in the region. In recent years, $18.34 million was paid cumulatively by family members of
abducted children and the Nigerian authorities. Intelligence shows that the pro
fi
tability of kidnap-for-ransom has
53
"2014 Chibok Schoolgirls Kidnapping." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, February 28, 2021. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Chibok_schoolgirls_kidnapping.
42
Bring Back Our Girls https://bringbackourgirls.ng; Joe Parkinson, Drew Hinshaw, “How the ´Bring Back our Girls´ Tweets Changed a War in Nigeria” WSJ.
43
AFP. 2021. “Gunmen kidnap 39 students in Nigeria in raid on college.” 12 March. 2021; “Attempt to kidnap hundreds of schoolchildren in Nigeria foiled.” 14 March.
44
Agbiboa, Daniel E. 2021. “The Precariousness of Protection: Civilian Defense Groups Countering Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria.” African Studies Review 64.1: 192-216.
45
"Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective," African Con
fl
ict and Peacebuilding Review 3, no. 1 (Year): 144–57.
46
Aly Verjee and Chris M. A. Kwaja 2021.
47
Al-Jazeera. "Gunmen raid school in Nigeria’s Kaduna, seize three teachers." March 2020. Accessed March 15, 2021.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/gunmen-kidnap-
48
primary-school-pupils-in-nigerias-northwest-kaduna.
Al Jazeera. "Hundreds of Nigerian Schoolboys Released, Local Governor Says." December 17, 2020. Accessed January 27, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/
49
hundreds-of-nigerian-schoolboys-released-local-governor-says.
"Boko Haram 'to sell' Nigeria Girls Abducted from Chibok," BBC News, April 30, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27283383.
50
Boko Haram, "Boko Haram kidnaps 330 boys: 'No child should have to choose between their education and their life'," USA Today News, December 16, 2020, https://
51
eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/12/16/boko-haram-kidnaps-330-boys-nigeria-outcry-uses-bringbackourboys/3919404001/.
Adam Nossiter, Nigerian Girls Seen in Video From Militants.“ The New York Times, 13 May 2014.
52
Parkinson, Joe, and Gbenga Akingbule. "Kidnapped Nigerian Schoolboys Say Ransom Was Paid, Tell of Beatings." December 2020. Accessed on: January 27, 2021. https://
53
www.wsj.com/articles/kidnappednigerianschoolboys-say-ransom-was-paid-tell-of-beatings-11608747119?mod=article_inline.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 9

13. not only increased its probability, likelihood and posed enhanced security risks to children and communities but
has also created substantive in
fl
uxes of monetary gains to terrorist organizations and other militias. Since 2014,
mass abductions more than doubled in Nigeria and more than 800 abductee children were only released after
payment.54
6.3 Manipulation and Disguise
Boko Haram members conceal their identity to abduct children. These predatory and manipulative strategy exploits
children´s need for protection and targets primarily girls. A group of female students who escaped one of such
attack in Dapchi in 2018, report Boko Haram
fi
ghters shooting and screaming “Stop, stop! We are not Boko Haram!
We are soldiers, get into our vehicles. We will save you.” With false narratives Boko Haram persuade children to
55
voluntarily following the group. The number of children affected is at present unknown.
7. Push and Pull Factors
The Global Terrorism Index designated Boko Haram the “deadliest terrorist group in the world.” Such label is also
56
indicative of its child recruitment strategy. At the dawn of its violent uprising, Boko Haram was largely able to
attract in
fl
ux of recruits by bene
fi
tting from youth deprivation and disenfranchisement. However, the group has
never proceeded to the development or enactment of a systematic and structural strategy for child recruitment.
The exploitation of push and pull factors appears, while present, disproportionately low, not only respect to other
neo-jihadist movements but also respect to the brutality of means that Boko Haram employs.
7.1 Personal Motives
A number of individual, personal and psychological motives drive youth to join Boko Haram. Reportedly, 40,3% of
youth join to satisfy a need to belong, a desire to be respected and feared or in view of a perceived prestige and
acquisition of higher social status. No data is available on children below the age of eighteen.
57
WSJ, 2021.
54
Abraak, Issac, and Ruth Maclean. "'We are soldiers! We will save you': how Boko Haram tricked Dapchi schoolgirls." The Guardian, March 8, 2018. https://
55
www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/08/nigeria-we-are-soldiers-we-will-save-you-how-boko-haram-tricked-dapchi-schoolgirls.
Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index, 2019 https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/GTI-2019web.pdf.
56
Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria – Reality and Perceptions.“ The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, February 2017.
57
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 10

14. 7.2 Climate Change
In the past several years, the collective understanding of the relation between climate change and security
increased extensively and resulted in the classi
fi
cation by a number of States of climate change as a threat to
global and/or national security. While the casual links between climate change, con
fl
ict and instability remain
58
non-linear, climate change acts as a threat multiplier, interacting and converging on other pre-existing risks at the
local and regional level.
In Nigeria and the Lake Chad, climate change represents a prominent factor leading to resource´ scarcity,
displacement, forced migration and which severely enhances child risks and exposure to recruitment and
exploitation by Boko Haram and other factions. Following UN estimates, 5.8 million people are severely affected
59
by food insecurity across the Lake Chad. Over the past seventy years, the size of the region decreased by 95% as a
result of extended drought and climate change, affecting both the ecosystems and the economy. With
60
approximately 40 million people depending on Lake Chad for crop and livestock farming,
fi
shing and trade
opportunities for Boko Haram to exploit famine and crucial needs for livelihoods to attract children into its ranks
are disproportionately high. In addition, the scarcity of resources increases competition between communities and
builds social tensions among youth, which were already reported prior to the outbreak of the insurgency 2012.
7.3 Peer Pressure, Social Relations and Kinship
Children´s immediate social circles, including families, peers and communities may be incidental to recruitment in
Boko Haram. A young boy reported: “when I was in Bama town, I did not have any intention of joining this
61
sect....There are few children that have decided to join, but for me...my cousin...invited me for a serious lecture one
day, then from there I developed the interest of being a member of the group.”62
Family members – more speci
fi
cally parents or caretakers – were veri
fi
ed offering their children to Boko Haram for
martyrdom in exchange of
fi
nancial gains, security guarantees or to demonstrate their loyalty to the group. Young
63
Flavelle, Cristopher, Julian E. Barnes, Eileen Sullivan, and Jennifer Steinhauer. "Climate Change Poses a Widening Threat to National Security." New York Times, October
58
2021.
Atta Barkindo, CRTG Working Group Expert Brie
fi
ng, 2020.
59
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Regional O
ffi
ce for Africa. "Food Insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin." 2016. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://
60
www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/en/c/420990/.
Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. "Reality Versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria." Studies in Con
fl
ict and Terrorism 42, no. 5 (November 2017): 1-27.
61
Ibid.
62
Berman, Eli. Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. MIT Press, 2009.
63
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 11

15. girls were also reportedly offered to Boko Haram to ease
fi
nancial constraints or as a deterrent against the risk of
abduction of unmarried girls by both Boko Haram and other extremist groups.64
7.4 Lack of Access to Education
The lack of access to education is a critical factor driving the recruitment of children by Boko Haram. In Nigeria,
the education system is overburdened by strong demographic growth. In 2015, 44% of the population was under
65
fi
fteen years of age and according to UNESCO, 8.73 million children had no access to education at all in previous
years. Illiteracy affects 72.8% of the youth population and was reported as one of the primary factors driving
66
youth involvement with Boko Haram in Kano, Gombe and Borno states.67
Boko Haram – which literally translates to “Western Education is Forbidden” – has enacted one of the most violent
campaign against education in human history. Boko Haram´s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, argued that Islam forbade
Western education as “These foreign, global, colonialist schools (..) have embraced matters that violate Islamic law,
and it is forbidden to operate them, support them, study and teach in them.“ Boko Haram´s opposition to
68
education, unique among other jihadist movements, did however not emerge in a vacuum. Yusuf capitalized on
pre-existing grievances resting on the perception of Western education as a by-product of the colonial era,
incompatible with traditional beliefs and responsible for high illiteracy levels, unemployment, poor educational
outcomes as well as a symbol of corruption within the country, presided by Western-educated elites. Unmet
expectations regarding secular education, led students to “tear up their certi
fi
cates”, fueled resentment and
strengthened support for Boko Haram in the northeast.69
Since 2009, Boko Haram´s systematic destruction targeting education claimed the lives of 2,295 teachers and
displaced 19,000 more across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. An estimated 1,400 schools have been destroyed,
damaged or looted and more than 600,000 children lost access to education.70
In addition to secular education, Boko Haram extensively targets female students. The infamous abduction of 276
schoolgirls in Chibok in April 2014 which spurred international outrage and the “Bring Back our Girls” social media
campaign, led international notoriety to Boko Haram violence. However, this was not an isolated incident. In 2018,
the group abducted 110 girls from a school in Dapchi and it is estimated that more than 600 women and girls have
Children and armed con
fl
ict in Nigeria, S/2020/652, UN Security Council Report, July 6 2020.
64
Staff, Wes. "Education in Nigeria." WENR, Word Education News + Reviews, 2017.
65
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) http://data.uis.unesco.org.
66
Mefor, Law. "Nyanya Tragedy and Surviving Asymmetry Terrorist War." Punch, April 16, 2013.
67
Thurston, Alexander. Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
68
Afzal, Madiha. "From 'Western Education is Forbidden to the World's Deadliest Terrorist Group." Brookings, 2020.
69
Adedigba, Azeezat. "Nigeria: Boko Haram Kills 2,295 Teachers in North-East – Minister." Premium Times / All Africa, May 3, 2018.; O'Neil, Siobhan, and Kato Van Broeckhoven.
70
Cradled by Con
fl
ict: Child Involvement with Armed Groups in Contemporary Con
fl
ict. New York: United Nations University, 2018.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 12

16. been abducted from schools by Boko Haram militants. Abducted women and girls are held in captivity, obliged to
71
convert to Islam and become victims of domestic servitude, forced marriage, rape and other grave forms of sexual
and gender-based violence, required to provide combat support including conducting suicide bombing operations.
Hundreds of schools have been closed for fear of Boko Haram´s violence. At present, Nigeria has 20 million out-of-
school children, 13.2 million of which because of direct activities by Boko Haram.72
7.5 Ideology
The lack of in-depth knowledge of religious teachings is indicated as one of the most incidental drivers of
child and youth involvement with Boko Haram. Historically, the proliferation of sects, both Christian and
Islamic, conjunctly with the proliferation of a number of independent preachers, religious ideologues as
well as over-reliance on their views, appear to have contributed to vulnerability to extremist ideologies.
The 82-93.2 % of respondents in Borno, Kano and Sokoto expressed the view that „ignorance of religion is
a prominent factor in
fl
uencing the adoption of extreme views by young people in the community.
“ Similarly, the governor of Borno state, Kashim Shettima, lamented that “distorted translation of the Holy
73
Book by the insurgents landed us in this mess. If we have had good understanding of Islam, we would have
been in a better place. There is no room for extremism in Islam. We need to go back to Islam as practiced
by Prophet Muhammad, when Islam encouraged Muslims, Jews, and Christians to live in peace with one
another.”74
The abuse of the almajiri has a number of implications for state and society in Nigeria and in neighboring
countries. The term Almajiranci refers to the traditional practice of sending boys - between 3 to 12 years
of age - to big cities or urban areas to learn the Qur’an under the care of a teacher (malam). Over time,
75
neglect has led this system to become progressively dysfunctional and most members of the caste
(almajirai) have turned into urchins and street beggars, highly vulnerable to recruitment by Boko Haram
and other terrorist organizations. Common perceptions regard the almajirai as “the antithesis of modernity
Ibid.
71
Owolabi, Temitope J. "Boko Haram Terrorism and Out-of-School Children in Northeast Nigeria." In Africa's Radicalism and Conservatism, vol. 14. Brill, January 6, 2021.
72
Freedom Onuoha. "Why do Youth Join Boko Haram?" United States Institute of Peace, June 2014.
73
Kingsley Omonobi and Ndahi Marama, “15 Civilians Killed in Borno ‘Suicide Attack,’” Vanguard, April 1, 2014.
74
Akali Omeni „Forced, Stigmatized and Misunderstood: Almajirai and Boko Haram beyond the Victim-Perpetrator Binary“ The Republic, 2020.
75
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 13

17. and as specters of crime-bound youth.” Quranic pupils of schools set up by self-proclaimed religious
76
teachers imparting Boko Haram´s ideology and precepts in exchange of food and shelter. Some accounts
77
also suggest that Mohammad Yusuf himself was an almajiri. Almajiri training appears to provide one of
78
the easiest avenues for indoctrination of children. Reportedly, the almajirai are made to chant songs of
protest that criticize schools providing secular education (makarantan boko) and praise Quranic schools
(makarantan addini/makarantan allo).
In 2010, the 19-year-old Usman Musa, was arrested for the attempted assassination of the emir of Kano,
one of the most prominent Muslim leaders in Nigeria, during a service at the Kano Central
Mosque. During interrogation, the almajiri confessed that he was simply executing the orders of his
79
mallam, who also gave him the weapon and some charms. Confessions of children arrested in
80
connection with Boko Haram-related violence provide insights into vulnerability and indoctrination
processes. In May 2013, a group of 35 almajirai children released by the Nigerian authorities, reported that
they were paid $30 by some rebel groups to spy on troops, vandalize property, and maim and kill non-
Muslims: “We were given a keg of petrol by our bosses to set some schools ablaze, which we did within
Maiduguri and we were paid N5000”. Another almajiri said: “We were taken to Damaturu. We watched out
for the soldiers at their units and reported back to them [Boko Haram] and were paid for doing that.” In
81
2006, there were 1.2 million almajiri in Kano State alone.
The signi
fi
cance of religion as a motivating factor for child recruitment appears prevalent in Nigeria.
Reportedly, a high number of children are manipulated into believing that by joining Boko Haram they may
be able to adhere to true and pure Islam as prescribed by the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet.82
Hannah Hoechner, “Traditional Qur’anic students (almajirai) in Nigeria: Fair game for unfair accusations?”in Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria,
76
African Studies Center Leiden, Leiden University, 2014.
Madiha Afzal, "From “Western Education is Forbidden to the World's Deadliest Terrorist Group: Education and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Brookings, 2020.
77
Ibid.
78
Nairaland Forum. "Emir of Kano Escapes Assassination Attempt – Politics." July 12, 2010. Accessed March 2021. https://www.nairaland.com/477458/emir-kano-escapes-
79
assassination-attempt.
Aghedo, Iro, and Surulola James Eke. "From Alms to Arms: The Almajiri Phenomenon and Internal Security in Northern Nigeria." The Korean Journal of Policy Studies 28, no.
80
3 (2013).
Alli, Y. (2013). "We were paid N5000 to burn schools—freed Boko Haram kids." Nigeria Nation Newspaper.
81
Salifu, Uyo, and Martin Ewi. "Boko Haram and Violent Extremism: Perspectives from Peacebuilders." Institute for Security Studies, 2017.
82
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 14

18. 7.6 Lack of Economic Opportunity
Pervasive poverty, collapsing livelihoods, desperation and challenges in accessing sectors of both formal and
informal economy drive the involvement of children and youth with Boko Haram.83
Approximately 87 million people in Nigeria live below the poverty line, 70% of which residing in the north. In recent
years, Nigeria´s economy initiated a slow recovery process from the severe
fi
nancial crisis that hit the country in
2014-2016. However, the unemployment rate has ever since risen annually, reaching a provisional high of 33.3 % in
the fourth quarter of 2020.84
Boko Haram “draws its members mainly from disaffected youth, unemployed high school and university graduates
and destitute children.” Since 2009, it helped securing meals, livelihoods and offered both material incentives and
85
fi
nancial rewards to its members. Reportedly, Boko Haram recruits, without regard of their age, afford a $600-2000
salary or may obtain capital to establish and operate petty businesses in sectors such as transportation, retailing,
sales and agriculture. In previous years, hundreds were employed seasonally to cultivate parcels of land
86
belonging to Mohammed Yusuf with the produce used to feed indigent members of the group including men,
women and children.87
Financial incentives or employment opportunities are therefore a major appeal for children and young people to
join Boko Haram. In Borno, Kaduna and Kano survey respondents identi
fi
ed the prevailing incidence of
unemployment and poverty as the second most important factor increasing vulnerability to recruitment.
7.7 Weak Governance
In Nigeria, weak governance exacerbated violent extremism.
O
ffi
ce of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). "Violent Radicalisation in Northern Nigeria: Economy & Society." Policy Brief, 2015.
83
Trading Economics. "Nigeria Unemployment Rate." Accessed January 2021. https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate.
84
Onuoha 2014.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 15

19. The coercive nature of military juntas which governed the country for decades opened channels for abuse,
including the abuse of o
ffi
ce, corruption, human right violations, and gross disregard for the rule of law. In 1999, the
return to democratic governance emboldened chains of corruption within the country. Reportedly, more than 400
88
billion US dollars in State funds were misappropriated.89
At present, corruption continues to remain pervasive and is practiced on a systematic scale at every level of
society including: embezzlement of state funds, clientelism, nep
o­
tism, fraud, bribery and large-scale money
laundering. Corruption widens social gaps and increases societal fragmentation and grievances which facilitate
child recruitment by Boko Haram. Following one account “(..) Whether it is in the Niger Delta or in Maiduguri or in
Jos there is always, always an initial cry for justice which is ignored and it is the ignominy that you give to that
leads to frustrations, that lead to violence.“
Issues of social injustice and wrongdoings by public o
ffi
cials frame anti-secular and extremist narratives by Boko
Haram and other militant groups. The ideological refrain that “the system represented by the yan boko is unjust (…)
has no divide origin and therefore un-Islamic and accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness” increases the
90
group´s appeal to impoverished and alienated children and youth. Boko Haram claims to eradicate social injustice
and positions itself as the only alternative to the Nigerian government.
The strategic approach of citing social injustice to recruit new members was reported as effective by 70% of
respondents in Sokoto and 67% in Kano.91
7.8 Human Rights and Rule of Law Violations
Nigerian security and military forces have been criticized by the local population, commentators, media opinion
leaders, civil society and international organizations for the harsh and indiscriminate responses to Boko Haram
92
and other factions including: unlawful killings, unnecessary force, arbitrary arrests, extortion and intimidation.93
Predatory, humiliating and violent tactics undermined the standing between communities and military forces and
Karim, Mohd Aminul. "Cycle of Bad Governance and Corruption: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria." SAGE Open, January 2015.
88
Kreck, Vladimir. "Nigeria's Hopeless Fight Against Corruption." Konrad Adenauer Stiftung International Reports (2019).
89
Isa, Muhammad K. 2010. “Militant Islamist Groups in Northern. Nigeria.” In Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa, Institute for
90
Security Studies, 2010.
Freedom C. Onuoha , USIP 2014.
91
S/RES/14382, 2020.
92
Ibid.
93
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 16

20. created a fertile ground for Boko Haram propaganda. It engendered resentment on child victims and enhanced
vulnerability to recruitment.94
8. Indoctrination
Children recruited by Boko Haram are subjected to ideological indoctrination. At the onset of Boko Haram´s
insurgency, Mohammed Yusuf´s preaching took place in schools, mosques and in the premises of the Ibn
Taymiyyah Center that he had established in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. His followers, the largest
95
majority of which were youth, were sometimes addressed as yan mallam or “children of the teacher.” Yusuf´s
96
sermons used religious references including the hadith or surah to legitimize violence and incited his followers to
“arm themselves, kill and take up jihad.” Its rhetoric centered on three ideas including accusations against an
oppressive government, injustice and glori
fi
cation of martyrdom.
While Boko Haram´s indoctrination strategy shifted from the use of traditional media including public statements,
lea
fl
ets and public lectures to designated “re-education” centers, the discourse on martyrdom not only assumed a
97
most prominent dimension after Yusuf´s death but also became progressively connected to child exploitation.
Children, most particularly girls, are forced to enroll in Boko Haram´s classes to be imparted its version of Islam and
told that martyrdom is a “transition to eternal bliss” and that “The chehidi [martyr] is he who practices Islam
properly. If he’s killed, Allah will save him, and he’ll be reborn into another life.” Children indoctrinated and trained
98
for suicide bombing operations are held captives and food deprived for months.99
9. Military Training
The military training of children by Boko Haram is designed to prepare for deployment in combat and combat
support operations.
Children in Boko Haram´s military camps are assigned different roles on the basis of their age and gender. Boys
between the age of nine to seventeen are trained to shoot
fi
rearms and to hold and defend ground as infantry
Atta Barkindo, CRTG Working Group Expert Brie
fi
ng, 2020.; Violent radicalisation in Northern Nigeria: Economy and Society, O
ffi
ce of the National Security Adviser, Policy
94
Brief.
Élodie Apard, “The Words of Boko Haram: Understanding Speeches by Momammed Yusaf and Abubakar Shekau”, In Afrique contemporaine Volume 255, Issue 3, 2015, pages
95
41 to 69.
Ibid.
96
Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Tra
ffi
cking in the Lake Chad Region, CTC Sentinel Vol. 7 Issue 10, 2014.
97
Ibid at 95.
98
Dionne Searcey, "Why the Chibok Girls returned by Boko Haram are still not entirely free," The Independent, May 1, 2018.; Dionne Searcey, Boko Haram Turns Female Captives
99
Into Terrorists, The New York Times, April 7, 2016.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 17

21. soldiers while younger boys are deployed to guard checkpoints or to perform other supporting roles. The tactical
100
training of children by Boko Haram lasts for a period of approximately three months during which seniors
commanders monitor their performance and select those who demonstrate prowess to become ´proteges´ and rise
in the group´s ranks.101
Three quarters of children trained for deployment in suicide bombing operations are girls between the age of
seven and early teens. Boko Haram select girls for suicide bombing operations by inquiring on their intent to
102
follow Islam. Those who accept conversion undergo ideological indoctrination and are told that “[suicide bombing]
is the path to heaven.” Girls also reported that military training to suicide bombing involves being taught how to
maximize casualties.103
Children recruited by Boko Haram are subjected to harsh living conditions, captivity, starvation, sexual violence and
sexual exploitation are not allowed to cry or to show weakness. Boko Haram is also reported to intoxicate children
with cocaine or Indian hemp to render them into submission.104
Boko Haram subjects children to extreme psychological distress. It forces children to witness physical
punishments, lashings, amputations, beheadings and executions of its opponents as a mean to instil fear by
demonstrating the consequences of disobedience. Punishments are typically public displays. A 12-year-old boy
105
from a village in Adamawa State who was abducted and held captive in Sambisa described being forced to witness
on more than
fi
fteen occasions the slaughtering of people by Boko Haram. Boko Haram also frequently forces
106
children to witness atrocities against siblings, family members and friends. Forcing the witnessing of murder and
107
other violent acts is considered an act of torture under international law.108
Children are also forced to commit atrocities, including murder, rape, and torture to demonstrate their loyalty to
Boko Haram.
Why Boko Haram Is Recruiting Child Soldiers – Military Source, Sahara Reporters, February 15 2021.
100
Amnesty International, “We Dried our Tears“ Addressing the Toll on Children in Northeast Nigeria's Con
fl
ict, 2020.
101
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. “UNICEF, Beyond Chibok, Over 1.3 Million Children Uprooted by Boko Haram Violence.” Accessed January 24, 2021.
102
https://www.unicef.org/sites/default/
fi
les/press-releases/media-Beyond_Chibok.pdf.
Dionne Searcey, „Boko Haram Turns Female Captives Into Terrorists“ The New York Times, April 7, 2016.
103
Why Boko Haram Is Recruiting Child Soldiers – Military Source, Sahara Reporters, February 15 2021.
104
AI, 2020.
105
Amnesty International interview, 7 January 2020.
106
Ibid at 92.
107
Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, 14 February 2020, UN Doc. A/HRC/43/49, para. 47; Hernan
108
Reyes, “The worst scars are in the mind: psychological torture,” International Review of the Red Cross, September 2007: vol. 89 (867), p. 594.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 18

22. 10. Roles
10.1 Boys
Boko Haram insurgency heavily relies on the exploitation of children. Since 2014, it has escalated the recruitment of
boys below eighteen years of age. It is estimated that between 2014 and 2016, in a revamped strategy to replenish
its ranks after battle
fi
eld losses incurred during counterinsurgency operations, Boko Haram has abducted 10,000
boys for deployment in combat and military operations. Younger boys between six and
fi
fteen years of age are
109
employed as spies, weapons smugglers or to guard checkpoints in Boko Haram-held territory, while older ones are
deployed in attacks against the Nigerian military and civilian targets.110
Human Shields
Boko Haram deploys untrained boys in offensive military operations.
Children are tasked to carry out the
fi
rst wave of attacks on villages or barracks. Those who survive and gain
experience are deployed as part of the second wave designed to overwhelm the security forces after the
fi
rst wave
weakens their positions and morale. Boys may also be given a quota of how many security o
ffi
cers or “high value
111
targets” they must attack, and risk death at the hands of their commanders if they fail or show cowardice.112
Reportedly, at the peak of Boko Haram violent insurgency 300-500 boys were exploited in human wave tactics while
feeling offensive action by opposition forces.113
Njadvara Musa. "Boko Haram Recruiting Child Soldiers, Military Alert Parents." The Guardian, August 2020.
109
Amnesty International, 2020.
110
Boko Haram ‘Executes’ 2 for Smoking Cigarettes,” Agence France-Presse, August 21, 2014; “Boko Haram Kidnaps Scores of Villagers in Nigeria: Witnesses,” Agence France-
111
Presse, August 15, 2014; “Gunmen Kill 16 Villagers, Burn Several Houses, Conscript Youths,” newtelegraphonline.com, April 13, 2014.
Kingsley Omonobi, “Thousands Flee to Cameroon as Boko Haram Conscripts Youths to Fight Nigeria,” Vanguard, September 1, 2014.
112
AP. "O
ffi
cial: Boko Haram using civilians as human shields." March 25, 2015. Accessed February 9, 2021. https://www.ansa.it/amp/english/news/world/2015/03/25/boko-haram-
113
abducts-scores-of-nigerians_9529d129-f42c-4bf8-a87e-15a70508fa0f.html.
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 19

23. Planting Explosives
Boys as young as ten years of age are exploited in the fabrication of explosives and forced to stuff nails and ball
bearings as shrapnel into suicide vests for other children deployed in suicide bombing operations. Reportedly,
114
children are also used to plants IEDs before battles and ambushes.115
Auxiliary Roles
Boko Haram exploits children in a variety of auxiliary and supporting roles including as cleaners, cooks, spies,
messengers, guards or to conduct night patrols and search operations. It is estimated that a percentage of
116
recruited boys are also used to support Boko Haram mass abduction campaign of children and are tasked with
ensuring that abducted children would not escape.117
10.2 Girls
Boko Haram exploits women and girls in a variety of both combat and non-combat roles ranging from direct or
indirect support to military operations to auxiliary functions such as the one of cooks and cleaners.
Military Support
Boko Haram exploits girls as spies, messengers, human shields or to lure security forces into ambushes
118 119
because they may act in disguise and attract less suspicion than their male counterparts. Following the same
rationale, and unlike other violent extremist organizations, a high number of girls are veri
fi
ed participating in
suicide bombing operations.120
Parkinson, Joe, and Drew Hinshaw. "‘Please, Save My Life.’ A Bomb Specialist Defuses Explosives Strapped to Children." The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2019.
114
UNICEF, 2017.
115
Ibid.
116
Parkinson, Joe, and Gbenga Akingbule. "Why Nigerian School Children Keep Getting Kidnapped: A Brutal Business Model That Pays." Wall Street Journal, March 23, 2021.
117
Agerholm, Harriet. "Kidnapped schoolgirls 'used as human shield' by Boko Haram." The Independent, December 28, 2016.
118
Bigio, Jamille. "How Violent Extremist Groups Pro
fi
t from the Tra
ffi
cking of Girls." The Hill, October 11, 2019.
119
Searcey, Dionne. "Boko Haram Turns Female Captives Into Terrorists." The New York Times, April 7, 2016.
120
PREVENT PROJECT PILOT 20

24. Suicide Bombers
The use of girls as suicide bombers by Boko Haram has brought to the forefront critical questions regarding the
exploitation of girls in crisis situations. It changed the nature of guerrilla warfare and gender roles and called for
121
an onerous rethinking of terrorism and its violent means.
On February 22, 2015 a seven years old girl was used to detonate an explosive in a potiskum, a Nigerian market,
killing
fi
ve persons and injuring nineteen more. In May, the same year, a twelve-year-old girl was used to detonate
122
an explosive at a bus station in Damaturu killing seven. Similar incidents were consequently reported in Cameroon
and Niger.123
The use of girls in suicide bombing operations by Boko Haram increased systematically since the abduction of 276
schoolgirls from their school in Chibok. With a ratio of four girls deployed in suicide bombing operations to every
124
one boy, Boko Haram reversed pre-existing stereotypes regarding gender and reframed its terrorist brand on this
very basis. Boko Haram became de facto the
fi
rst terrorist-designated organization exploiting a higher number of
girls than their male counterpart in such violent attacks. By August 2017, approximately 106 females, including
125
girls between 7 and 17 years of age, were veri
fi
ed as having conducted suicide bombing operations in Nigeria and
the Lake Chad Basin.126
Women and girls represent convenient targets of exploitation in suicide bombing operations. Social constructions
regarding the female gender as inherently non-violent and nurturing have been deliberately exploited by Boko
Haram and other factions. In fact, women and girls, because of pre-existing perceptions and biases, may easily act
in disguise, penetrating or evading security checks and related procedures. In addition, female suicide bombers
127
greatly strike public morale, effect severe psychological responses on both national and international audiences
and best contribute to a climate of insecurity and distrust within society which ultimately serves to expose terrorist
organizations and favors their purposes.128
Allotey-Pappoe, Serwaa, and Afua Agyeiwaa Lamptey. "Pawns, Puppets or Weapons of Choice: Examining Boko Haram's Use of Female Suicide Bombers in Nigeria." KAIPTC
121
Occasional Paper #42 (2019).Matfess, Hilary. Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, Weapons, Witnesses. African Arguments Series. London: Bloomsbury, 2017.
Ibid.
122
United Nations. Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Extremist Organizations: The Role of the Justice System. 2017.
123
UNODC, 2017.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
AOAV. “An epidemic of suicide bombings.” August 10, 2015.
127
Serwaa Allotey-Pappoe and Afua Agyeiwaa Lamptey. "Pawns, Puppets or Weapons of Choice: Examining Boko Haram's Use of Female Suicide Bombers in Nigeria." KAIPTC
128
Occasional Paper #42 (2019).
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25. Other assumptions, regard the use of women and girls in suicide bombing operations as resulting from their
perceived expendability compared to males. Males can be trained to
fi
ght and play multiple roles for the group for a
longer time than females therefore they are more inclined to use females in suicide bomb attacks. The lack of
education of women and girls also enhances their vulnerability for targeting by Boko Haram, unwilling victims,
either forced or deceived to carry out suicide attacks.129
11. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
Sexual and gender-based violence is an integral part of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency across Nigeria and the
Lake Chad. The European Asylum Support O
ffi
ce reported that in the period from 2009 to 2016, Boko Haram has
abducted approximately 2000 women and girls, subjecting them to sexual abuses including rape, forced marriage
and labor, torture and sexual slavery. By April 2015, 534 women and girls were rescued by Nigerian military forces,
130
214 of whom were pregnant.131
In 2020, the UN reported that girls continued to be extremely vulnerable to rape and other forms of sexual violence,
including sexual exploitation, sexual slavery and forced marriage. Boko Haram remained the main perpetrator. The
country task force veri
fi
ed 64 incidents of sexual violence affecting 204 children aged between 5 and 15 years, 195
of which attributed to Boko Haram. Displaced women and girls from marginalized groups or in con
fl
ict-affected
132
areas are particularly vulnerable.
11.1 Forced Pregnancy and Forced Marriage
Hundreds of women and girls abducted by Boko Haram have become victims of rape in what Nigerian authorities
described as “a deliberate strategy to dominate rural residents and create a new generation of Islamist militants in
Nigeria.” In 2015, over 200 women and girls of the 15,000 displaced seeking shelter at one IDP camp near
133
Maiduguri were found to be pregnant and many more had already given birth to children of Boko Haram militants.
Skaine, Rosemarie, 2006.
129
Ibid.
130
European Union Agency for Asylum. "Country Guidance Nigeria." Updated 2019.
131
Joshi, R. (2015). "The Con
fl
ict of A Social Movement." Bartleby.com. Accessed February 27, 2021. https://www.bartleby.com/essay/The-Con
fl
ict-Of-A-Social-Movement-
132
FK22AM3VGXZW.
Nossiter, Adam. "Boko Haram Militants Raped Hundreds of Female Captives in Nigeria." The New York Times, 2015.
133
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26. Kashim Shettima, governor of Borno State noted that “The sect leaders make a very conscious effort to impregnate
women (…) Some are made to pray before mating, offering supplications for God to make the products of what they
are doing become children that will inherit their ideology.”134
The UN veri
fi
ed instances of rape, forced marriage and systematic sexual violence involving girls as young as 10
years of age.135
Child marriage has also been forced by families with an aim to alleviate economic desperation and deter armed
groups from abducting their unmarried girls.
Lewis, Taylor. "Women Rescued From Boko Haram Say They Were Raped, Impregnated: Government O
ffi
cials Suspect that the Terrorists Want to Perpetuate their Extremist
134
Bloodline." ESSENCE, October 2020.
S/2020/652.
135
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28. crtgroup.org
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