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    Corporate crime and enron Corporate crime and enron Document Transcript

    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow JCJR ™ The Journal of Criminal Justice Research RESEARCH ARTICLE CORPORATE CRIME NEWS AS IDEOLOGY NEWS MAGAZINE COVERAGE OF THE ENRON CASE David E. Barlow1 & Melissa Hickman Barlow Fayetteville State University ABSTRACTThe presentation of street crime in the media has been well documented in theliterature. Some research on the presentation of corporate or white-collar crime in themedia also exists but it is much more limited. Much of the critique of the media bycritical theorists has suggested that the social harms of the rich and powerful arepresented as much less threatening than the social harms of the poor. This study usesthe news story of the Enron scandal as a case study to observe how this white collarcrime is presented in both Time magazine and U.S. News and World Report for a littleover one year.Keywords: Crime, Media, Corporate, Enron, Ideology, NewsAuthors’ BiographiesDr. David E. Barlow is a Professor and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences atFayetteville State University in North Carolina, USA. Dr. Barlow‟s research interestsinclude multicultural issues in policing, white-collar crime, and the history, ideology, andpolitical economy of crime control in the United States. He has worked in the criminaljustice field as a correctional officer, deputy sheriff and university police officer in SouthCarolina and Florida. Barlow is the author of numerous articles in professional journals,co-editor of two books, Classics in Policing (Anderson 1996) and Police in America:1 Correspondence should be forwarded to David E. Barlow, Dean. College of Arts andSciences, Fayetteville State University, 1200 Murchison Road, Fayetteville, NorthCarolina 28301. E-mail: dbarlow@uncfsu.edu Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 1
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowClassical and Contemporary Readings (Wadsworth 2004), and co-author of the book,Police in a Multicultural Society: An American Story (Waveland 2000).Dr. Melissa Hickman Barlow is Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice andDirector of the Center for Community Justice and Service Learning at Fayetteville StateUniversity in North Carolina. She is co-author of Police in a Multicultural Society: AnAmerican Story (Waveland, 2000) and has published articles on the history and politicaleconomy of crime control policy, crime and justice in the news media, and race andclass issues in criminal justice. Her article, "La natura ideologica delle notizie sulcrimine" appears in Gabrio Forti and Marta Bertolinis (2005) La televisione del crimine.Professor Barlow is interested in the race and class politics of criminal justice policy,critical resistance to mass incarceration, and grassroots efforts to reduce incarcerationthrough community justice initiatives. INTRODUCTIONNews reports on corporate scandals combined to become a major news event in 2002and provided researchers with a relatively rare opportunity to explore concentratedmedia coverage of corporate crime. Chief among the corporate crime stories of 2002was the Enron story. The financial collapse of Enron, and related allegations ofwrongdoing by corporate executives and Enron‟s auditor, Arthur Andersen, first becamea major national news story around December of 2001. The collapse of Enron was amajor news story for a number of reasons. Enron began as a small pipeline company inHouston in 1985 and grew to become the seventh largest firm in the United States in2001 by taking advantage of newly deregulated energy markets and by being a leaderin asset-light finance capitalism. A key to Enron‟s success was maintaining a steadyinflux of cash by preserving artificially high stock prices through promoting theappearance of a very successful and wealthy company. In collaboration with auditorArthur Andersen, Enron executives were able to keep the company‟s credit ratingextremely high by hiding huge amounts of debt. Part of the Enron story includes thecooperation, or at least the inaction of a large number of people, banks, and regulatoryagencies. The Enron bankruptcy in December of 2001 was the largest in U.S. history tothat date. The collapse shocked the government, the business community and generalpublic. Thousands of employees lost their jobs. Thousands of stockholders lost hugeamounts of money. 401K plans were in shambles. The stock market went into atailspin. And a number of other large companies began to collapse under the weight ofthe declining economy and the loss of faith in U.S. corporate executives andgovernment regulatory agencies.An essential element of the Enron story is that corporate executives were investigated,and a few were eventually indicted for illegal business practices, including insidertrading, money laundering, wire fraud, accounting fraud, conspiracy, marketmanipulation, and obstruction of justice. A number of other parties, including Enron‟sBoard of Directors, stock analysts, investment bankers, lawyers, accountants, andgovernment regulators were criticized for illegal behavior, unethical business practices, Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 2
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowor operating with direct conflicts of interests. The collapse of Enron, along withallegations of fraud and the impact on the stock market, posed a serious threat to thenormal functioning of business and to business confidence in the U.S. economy. Theorder and predictability necessary for confident business exchanges were destabilized.In the year that followed, Enron came to epitomize corporate executive greed andmalfeasance, contributing to a declining economy and a collapse in the value of anumber of corporate stocks.Unlike most corporate crimes, the actions of Enron executives received a great deal ofattention from the news media, business leaders, and politicians. As Friedrichs (2004:127) notes, media coverage of Enron and the related corporate scandals of 2002 wasarguably “the most substantial, pervasive, and sustained coverage of white collar crime(in some form) in American history.” The analysis presented here compares mediarepresentation of corporate crime in the Enron case to what we know about mediarepresentation of street crime. Guided by previous research on the portrayal of crimeand criminals the in news media, we explore how two weekly news magazinesconstructed the crimes and criminals of Enron. CRIME IN THE MEDIAA substantial amount of research has been conducted on news about crime. Aconsistent conclusion from the research is that news reports on crime are not neutralreflections of an objective reality of crime, but, rather, are subjective social constructions(Marsh and Melville, 2009; Barlow, 1998; Wright, Cullen and Blankenship, 1995).According to Lofquist (1997), research suggests that the news media distort images ofstreet crime, or the crimes typically committed by those with the least amount of powerand wealth in our society, in a number of different ways. The news media tend toconcentrate attention on extreme, dramatic, or sensational cases (Marsh and Melville,2009; Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Kappeler, Blumberg and Potter, 2000; Surette, 1998;Barlow, Barlow and Chiricos, 1995a; Chermak, 1994; Benedict, 1992), misrepresent theextent and types of crimes that occur in society (Barlow et al., 1995a; Reiman, 2004;Garafalo, 1981; Sherizen, 1978), and exaggerate the incidents of stranger perpetratedcrimes (Kappeler et al., 2000; Chermak, 1994; Tunnel, 1992). In addition to thesedistortions, the news media typically decontextualize crime, taking it out of its social,political, and economic context and ignoring the complex array of social forces thatshape the nature and extent of crime (Barlow et al., 1995a, 1995b; Barlow, Barlow andStojkovic, 1994; Garofalo, 1981; Humphries, 1981; Sherizen, 1978).A number of researchers have found that racial minorities are overrepresented in thenews media as offenders (Barlow et al., 1994a; Smith, 1984; Sheley and Ashkins, 1981;Graber, 1980). Others have observed that news stories identify the “newsworthy”offender as the one who is in direct contrast to the stereotype of the young urban Blackmale offender (Marsh and Melville, 2009; Roshier, 1981; Graber, 1980). Whether thenews is about the problem of crime or about a particularly newsworthy criminal offender,the media tend to distort the reality of crime by supporting racial stereotypes implying Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 3
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowthat Blacks are more likely than Whites to be involved in criminal activity. Crime newsresearchers have also observed that the victim that appears most worthy of sympathy innews accounts is one who is white, affluent, and female (Beckett and Sasson, 2000;Benedict, 1992; Graber, 1980; Fishman, 1978). Concentrating stories on casesinvolving socially favored victims is an important way in which the news media distortthe threat of crime.A common criticism of the news media is that they are inclined to distort social imagesof crime by substantially over reporting incidents of violent street crime, whileunderreporting acts of white collar crime, including corporate crime (Marsh and Melville,2009; Friedrichs, 2002; Burns and Orrick, 2002; Cavendar and Mulcahy, 1998;Coleman, 1998; Lofquist, 1997). Cavendar and Mulcahy (1998: 699) argue that storiesabout corporate wrongdoings are usually not considered newsworthy because they areoften “morally ambiguous in terms of crime, criminal and victim; they unfold slowly; andthey do not culminate in a clear resolution.”News Coverage of Corporate CrimeThe existing research on white collar crime, and more specifically on corporate crime inthe media suggests that the news media tend to distort images of corporate crime inways that minimize corporate liability by: (1) concentrating on individual defendants(Marsh and Melville, 2009; Wright, Cullen and Blankenship, 1995; Morash and Hale,1987), (2) attaching blame to secondary or spurious causes such as the failure of theappropriate regulatory agency or the criminal justice system (McMullen and McClung,2006; Wright et al., 1995; Beckett and Sasson, 2000), (3) minimizing attention to thecauses of corporate criminality in favor of the consequences of the activity (Burns andOrrick, 2002; Lofquist, 1997; Wright et al., 1995), and (4) ignoring or underestimatingthe costs of corporate crime (Kappeler et al., 2000; Reiman, 2004). Research oncorporate crime in the news also suggests that journalists are reluctant to refer to themisbehavior as “crime” (McMullen and McClung, 2006; Wright et al., 1995; Bohm, 1993;Lynch, Nalla and Miller, 1989). Wright et al. (1995) observed that the news media arenot proactive, but rather are reactive in defining corporate offending as criminal, oftenwaiting until local prosecutors officially identify behavior as criminal. Indictments,adjudication, and sanctions come about just as media attention to an incident isdeclining, thus reducing a potential educative or deterrent effect (Wright et al., 1995).Friedrichs (1996) argues that news media treatment of business persons who areindicted for criminal violations demonstrates ambivalence reflective of the generalpublic‟s ambivalence regarding the wealthy. Wealthy business persons are bothadmired and reviled. They are often portrayed in the same article both as highlyrespected citizens of the community to be admired and as ruthlessly greedy people tobe despised for living a life of luxury through their misdeeds (Friedrichs, 1996). Inaddition, journalists appear not to grasp the complexity of crime by corporations(Randall, Lee-Sammons and Hagner, 1988; Randall, 1987). Finally, with very fewexceptions, most media analyses involving corporate crime focus on social harms ratherthan on financial misconduct (Williams, 2008). Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 4
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowCrime News as IdeologyAn argument made by a number of researchers who have studied crime in the newsmedia is that the ways in which crime, criminals, victims, and the justice system arerepresented in the news reflect ideologies that support dominant institutions (Cavenderand Mulcahy,1998; Barlow, 1998; Lofquist, 1997; Ewick and Silbey, 1995; Barlow et al.,1995a & 1995b; Barlow et al., 1994; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes and Sasson, 1992;Tunnell, 1992; Bohm, 1986; Hickman, 1982; Humphries, 1981; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson,Clarke, and Roberts, 1978). Lofquist (1997: 244) describes this tendency as one ofjournalists relying upon a “hegemonic narrative… composed of system-legitimizingassumptions and assertions.” One aspect of the hegemonic narrative is that itdecontextualizes crime and criminals, separating them from the social, political andeconomic conditions of their formation. Crime is presented as simply a matter ofpathological individual action (Lofquist, 1997; Barlow et al., 1995a). When crimeappears simply as individual pathology, dominant institutions and the powerful peoplewho run them are not held accountable for the role they play in producing the conditionsthat generate crime in society.Every day, decisions are made in news organizations about what events arenewsworthy and what events are not. As Lofquist (1997) points out, decisions aboutnewsworthiness are influenced by dominant ideological perspectives. Within thiscontext, decision-making on newsworthiness has led to gross under-reporting ofcorporate crime as compared to the reporting on street crime in the news media. Adistorted public discourse of dangerousness results in which fear of crime and anamalgam of punitive attitudes are directed toward those perceived to be most involvedin street crime (i.e. young, black males), rather than toward corporate offenders, who infact are responsible for a greater degree of harm to society (Barlow et al., 1995a;Barlow, 1995). When corporate wrongdoing does make the news, Cavender andMulcahy (1998) argue, existing news frames still result in a tendency for the harm fromcorporate crime to be minimized. “News frames favor simple explanations fororganizational and structural-level problems; they also facilitate, through denials,scapegoats, and resignations, efforts to wipe the slate clean so that the organizationcan continue with its good name intact” (Cavender and Mulcahy, 1998: 715).Decisions about which corporate crimes are newsworthy and should receive mediaattention also appear to be shaped by powerful interests. According to Calavita andPontell (1994), the corporate crimes deemed worthy of media and enforcementattention are those that pose a serious threat to the normal functioning of business or tobusiness confidence in the economy. Thus, the newsworthiness of corporate crime isnot based on the seriousness of the offense, the amount of money stolen, the numberof deaths, or the number of victims. It is based on whether the criminal action is likely toharm the business community. The primary concerns appear to be the preservation ofa positive business climate and maintaining faith in the established political andeconomic institutions. Williams‟ (2008: 492) findings provide support for this perspectivewhen he describes the “hegemonic modes of discourse” found in newspaper articlesabout the financial crises of 2001 and 2002. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 5
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowCrime news, including news about corporate crime, is ideological, then, if it distorts thereality of crime in ways that support dominant social, political, and economic institutions.Marx argued that, in capitalist society, ideology is a particular form of communicationthat misrepresents social contradictions in the interest of the dominant economic class(Larrain, 1973). It is an inversion of the social reality of crime in capitalist society whenthe classes and racial groups most victimized within the capitalist social structure areportrayed as predators on society. It is also an inversion of the social reality of crimewhen the class that reaps the largest share of society‟s benefits and produces thegreatest social harm through corporate crime are portrayed as victims. Crime news isideological when it reinforces a class or racially biased image of crime, misrepresentingthe most serious criminal threats and drawing attention away from the structural sourcesfor crime. When the Enron story broke, journalists were given an enormous opportunityto debunk the myth that crime in U.S. society is primarily the work of those who arepoor, young and black. A window of opportunity presented itself in which the newsmedia could have helped to educate the public on the degree to which the social harmfrom the crimes of the powerful exceeds the harm from ordinary street crime. Thepurpose of the study reported on here was to investigate whether it is reasonable toconclude that news media coverage of the Enron case challenged the hegemonicnarrative. METHODWe conducted a qualitative case study of news magazine articles on the story about theEnron Corporation appearing in Time (see Appendix A) and U.S. News & World Report(see Appendix B) magazines from December 2001 through January 2003. Time wasselected because, as the oldest and most widely circulated weekly news magazine inthe United States, it is one of the best available representatives of mainstream media asa repository of popular discourse on contemporary social issues. We examined U.S.News and World Report, a somewhat more conservative and business-oriented newsmagazine, in order to increase confidence in our findings. We used magazines ratherthan newspaper articles, because they often offer much more in-depth coverage andanalysis.Because Arthur Andersen was intimately linked with the fraudulent practices that helpedEnron executives carry out their apparent criminal activity, every article that madereference either to Enron or Arthur Andersen was included in our data collectionprocess. The articles were identified through an electronic search using “Enron” and“Arthur Andersen.” This method was then double-checked with a page-to-page searchof the magazines by hand. A total of 46 Time magazine articles and 41 U.S. News andWorld Report articles were collected. We included only major news articles, excludingthe very short news briefs often found in the front of the magazines. Each articleincluded in the study is at least a page long or is a sidebar article within a larger articleon the subject of the Enron case. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 6
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowThe collection process was stopped in January of 2003 because the storyline haddeveloped a sense of closure at that point and articles on the subject in the two nationalmagazines no longer continued to appear. Both magazines had specialJanuary/December issues that largely summed up the Enron story and a couple of otherrelated news items from 2002. Time‟s “Persons of the Year” were the Enron“Whistleblowers,” including Sherron Watkins, the Vice President of CorporateDevelopment at Enron who helped make public “accounting irregularities” within thecompany. U.S. News and World Report‟s article on “The Worst CEOs” also providedclosure to the Enron scandal and a few related news articles from 2002. To someextent the apparently negligible role that the Enron scandal played in the Novemberelections, and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which substantially increasedthe oversight and regulation of corporate governance and auditing, signaled the end ofEnron as a political issue. The stories had begun to slow down to the point that theNovember indictment of one of the primary targets of the prosecutors, former chieffinancial officer Andrew Fastow, warranted only one small paragraph in the very front ofeach of the magazines where minor stories of the week are briefly summarized. Afterthe December/January issues, articles on the Enron story were nearly non-existent.Did coverage of the Enron story in Time and U.S. News and World Report distort thereality of this particular form of crime in ways that can be said to support dominantsocial, political, and economic institutions? Did the coverage of Enron portray criminaloffenders in ways that diminished their culpability, or even depicted them as victimsthemselves? Or, did journalists take the opportunity presented by the Enron case todebunk prevailing stereotypes about crime and criminals? Did they use the case toillustrate the degree to which the social harm from the crimes of the powerful exceedsthe harm from ordinary street crime? We examined the articles on Enron in Time andU.S. News and World Report to explore these questions. FINDINGSWho Speaks?One of the key observations to be made in the study of crime news concerns whospeaks. Answering the question of whose voices and concerns are represented instories about crime and justice tells us a great deal about whether particularperspectives are privileged in relation to others.The StateThe category of voices that dominates the articles we examined is that of the State.Reporters relied heavily on official governmental sources to describe and interpretevents related to the Enron case. They relied most heavily on representatives of theBush administration and its regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Regulatory EnergyCommission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the most part, Statesources spoke with one voice as they expressed their primary concern, which was to Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 7
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowmaintain business confidence, a strong economy, and a positive image of U.S.businesses. In a radical departure from the “get tough” posture assumed bygovernment officials in news stories about street crime, the government sources whoappeared in news stories on Enron did not call for increased regulation or enforcement,or for the toughening of penalties. In fact, they appeared to be much more concernedabout preserving a climate of deregulation or the reduction of government of oversightover business activities, than about punishing guilty parties. Not hurting businessappeared to be a higher priority than apprehending and convicting offenders.Notable exceptions were federal prosecutors and representatives of the U.S. Attorney‟soffice. These agencies are more independent from the presidential administration thanare regulatory agencies and they spoke directly about the investigation and possibleprosecution of suspected violators of the law. It is important to note, as evidenced bythe articles examined for this project, that many of the members of the Bushadministration and individuals within this administration‟s regulatory agencies had veryclose ties to Enron and to Arthur Andersen. Prosecutors interviewed for the articlesarticulated the strategies and difficulties of investigating and prosecuting corporatecrimes.Another group of State sources includes former government officials who had oncebeen involved in government regulation and lawyers who represented or prosecutedbusiness executives. For the most part, such experts discussed procedures involved ininvestigating, prosecuting and, in a couple of articles, punishing corporate offenders.One article went so far as to discuss the major differences in investigating andprosecuting corporate criminals compared with street criminals, along withdiscrepancies in their treatment by authorities and the punishment they receive. Thisarticle was notable as an exception to the more typical treatment of the Enron case asqualitatively different from ordinary crime.A final group of official sources heard from in the articles includes members ofCongress. Members of Congress primarily engaged in political maneuvering as theyapproached mid-term elections in November of 2002. The question most often posedby reporters to a member of Congress was “Who will control the House and Senate?”The other most common question was “What are you going to do?” Similar torepresentatives of the White House, members of Congress struggled to secure thepublic‟s confidence in business. At the same time, though, they did not want to be seenas being opposed to corporate reform. Although several ideas were offered, by thesummer of 2002, comments by members of Congress centered almost exclusively oncampaign finance reform. Eventually, however, the U.S. Congress did pass one majorpiece of corporate reform legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.Academic ExpertsAcademic experts were used as sources throughout the articles on a regular basis.These experts included university professors of corporate law, economics, business,and accounting. The most telling omission among the academics in the Enron articles Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 8
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowis criminologists. At no point were criminologists, sociologists, or psychologistsengaged by reporters to explain the behavior of these corporate criminals. One articlein July 2002 used the phrase, “corporate criminal” and asked questions about why theexecutives did what they did. But the questions were posed to an accounting professorrather than to a criminologist or sociologist. In an article in November 2002, a lawprofessor was consulted as an expert on legal issues, but there was still no effort toexplain behavior. The types of experts included implied that, not only was the behaviornot crime, it needed no explanation as it was rational and logical. Such a depictionserved to establish the fundamental humanity of these criminals, suggesting that theirbehavior was understandable and simply opportunistic.The PublicAlthough the perspectives of the general public did not receive much attention in thearticles, advocacy groups who attempted to speak on behalf of the public were cited ona few occasions. In the 87 articles, a few spokespersons for advocacy groups wereasked to comment on events and asked what should be done to correct the problem,but only a few lines were devoted to their points of view. Although one governmentwatch group, Common Cause, was given a voice in one article, most of the advocacygroups represented stockholders, investors, and taxpayers. Therefore, the groupsincluded mainly gave voice to a very specific segment of the population, those in theupper-middle class and above. The concerns expressed by these groups focusedprimarily on corporate reform, with a specific focus on removing conflicts of interestswithin corporate boards of directors, the auditing of corporations, and the analysis ofstock by investment bankers.The only direct effort to learn the perspectives of those in the general public was a polltaken by Time magazine. Even here, though, the questions focused on the public aspotential investors, as it asked questions about the public‟s confidence in business.Also meaningful was a question asking respondents whether they thought that Enronexecutives did anything illegal. The reluctance of journalists to label the behavior ofEnron corporate executives as “crime” was evident at every turn. The only other area ofpublic interest addressed in the poll was how these events would affect voting in themidterm elections. Attention to the general public within reporting on Enron wasprimarily focused on the political impact of the case.The final group that could be placed under the category of the public includes those whowere specifically and directly harmed by the crimes, i.e. the victims. However, victimswere largely absent from the Enron story as told in the news magazines. The onlytimes that victims appeared were in the very first articles about the Enron collapse andthe final stories summarizing observations on the previous year. Of note concerning thefirst articles on the Enron case is the degree to which they blamed the victims forcontributing to their own victimization, claiming that they should have known better thanto place so much of their money through their 401Ks into the company for which theyworked. It was not until the final summary articles at the end of the year that we heardfrom those most directly harmed by the crimes – Enron employees and investors. The Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 9
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowconcerns that they expressed were about losing their jobs, their life savings, and theirretirement funds. They also expressed anger about the injustice of seeing the Enronexecutives who victimized them continuing to enjoy the “good life” while they werestruggling to find employment and rebuild their retirement accounts.Corporate AmericaAlthough it is common for news about street crime to include the perspectives of officialgovernment sources (the police), academic experts (criminologists), and even, at times,the general public (the community), previous research suggests that the businesscommunity is typically absent from the picture (Barlow, Barlow and Stojkovic, 1994).Rarely do news accounts of crime suggest that leaders of business and industry makedecisions that produce the conditions that generate crime in our society, or that theycould do anything that might reduce crime. In the Enron story, corporate America wasdirectly implicated and, therefore, could not distance itself from the case. A largenumber of businesspersons were consulted for the stories, including the defendants‟peers, industrial analysts, investment experts, and representatives of various businessorganizations. The concerns expressed by representatives of the business communitywere remarkably similar to those expressed by the Bush administration and itsrepresentatives in the executive branch. They expressed grave concern aboutmaintaining business confidence among consumers and investors in order to ensure agrowing economy. They were concerned about maintaining a positive image ofcorporate America. Also like the Bush administration, they were particularly concernedabout preserving the deregulation movement and resisting increased governmentregulation. They advocated for the business community solving its problems throughself-regulation.Not only is it extremely uncommon for reporters to connect the issues surroundingstreet crime to business decisions and strategies, it is also uncommon for crime newsstories to give voice to a suspect‟s peers to provide insight into his or her world view. Inthe reporting on Enron, presenting honorable businesspersons as sources ofinformation supported an image of defendants as fundamentally human andundermined any potential for stereotyping white businessmen as corrupt or evil.The Suspects and Their SupportersWhile news about crime typically includes an occasional quote from a suspect or theirlawyers, reporting on the Enron case gave extensive coverage to the suspects and theirwide variety of supporters. These suspects, unlike those in ordinary crime stories, wereallowed to tell their side of the story, and they did not do it alone. The defendants, theirlawyers, and professional “spinners” or spokespersons were allowed to plead theirinnocence and, in many cases, their ignorance. They were allowed to suggest that theactivities of the company had moved beyond their control. Perhaps most importantly,they were allowed to argue that their actions were not illegal. Giving this kind of depthto the point of view of the defendants in the Enron case cast doubt upon their guilt,especially on their criminal culpability. As a result, their behavior appeared less Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 10
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowthreatening and more understandable. Family members were given the opportunity toask for sympathy as they explained how much the accusations were hurting thempersonally. In addition, friends, acquaintances, and former colleagues were granted thechance to voice their strong opinions about the integrity of the defendants. Pastors,rabbis, and other benefactors told us that those charged with crimes were basicallyreligious, kind, and generous human beings.Describing the CrimesIn the articles we examined, reporters went to great lengths to avoid the use of the word“crime” or any of its derivatives. The list of euphemisms used by reporters and theirsources is exhaustive, though as the year progressed the terms did become somewhatmore negative or accusatory. In the early articles, the terms used to describe thesuspects included “brash,” “innovative,” “creative,” and “rogue operator.” The case wasreferred to as a “drama,” an “accounting debacle,” a “series of innovations,” a “hugemistake,” “inappropriateness,” and an “epidemic of misstated corporate earning reports.”It was also described as the creation of “complicated private partnerships,” “syntheticleases,” and “murky off-the-books enterprises.” Some of the terms used to describe thesuspects‟ criminal activities included “dubious accounting,” “hyper aggressive rogueaccounting,” “unusually aggressive accounting practices,” “taking liberties with thenumbers,” “cooked its books,” “management hubris,” “company manipulations,”“innovative energy trading,” “financial gaming,” “shuffling assets,” “questionablebusiness practices,” “conflicts of interest,” and “gross mismanagement.” Rather thansaying that the executives committed a crime or that the Boards of Directors aided andabetted in the commission of crimes, it was said that there was a “systematic failure”with “directors suspending their ethical guidelines,” “accountants and lawyers studiouslylooking the other way,” and “Wall Street analysts failing in their principal duty.” In otherwords, the Board of Directors at Enron did not aid and financially benefit in thecommission of a crime; they simply “waived the company‟s ethics code.”By April of 2002, there was some suggestion that criminal behavior may have occurred,but the reporters continued to go to great lengths to avoid labeling the behavior“criminal” themselves. For example, one article suggested that the employees of Enron“may have been victims of a crime” and asked the question, “How much of what Enrondid was illegal?” The answer suggested within the article was that the behavior was notillegal, even suggesting that the individuals involved simply did what anyone else would“naturally” do in their situation; they took advantage of an opportunity to make a lot ofmoney. In May, when substantial evidence emerged that Enron was involved in illegalactivity in relation to California‟s energy crisis, reporters continued to write about“market manipulation,” “megawatt laundering,” “California scheming,” “gaming themarket,” and an “alleged scheme to game California‟s deregulated energy market.”Particularly telling is the following quote in a May article: “Experts are divided onwhether Enron‟s behavior amounted to criminal wrongdoing. Most agree, however, thatthe company appeared to run afoul of the California grid operator‟s board, weaklyenforced prohibition against market manipulation but not necessarily criminal.” Thereporters went on to say that the deregulation of California‟s market assumed that the Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 11
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow“providers would play nice.” In June, the euphemisms continued with reports of Enronexecutives “exploiting complex rules,” “bending rules,” “ignoring the rules,” andengaging in “creative tax avoidance” and “creative financing structures.” One articleattempted to distinguish between the different levels of corporate wrongdoing byanalogy, discussing differences among actions that were “a little fishy” and those thathad a “strong stench” or were “thoroughly rotten.” Still there was no reference to“criminal” behavior.The harshest criticism of the corporate executives at Enron occurred in the month ofJuly, just as articles about Enron began a rapid decline. A couple of editors began torefer to the executives in noticeably more negative terms such as “sleazy, deceitful, andout-and-out criminal.” One article used the term “corporate criminals,” though it madeno reference to any specific person or activity in the case. The criminal intent of thedefendants in the Enron case continued to be downplayed in most of the articles,though, as they were referred to as “bad boys” and “corporate sleaze,” and their criminalbehavior was called “corporate excess” and “shenanigans.” About as strong as theaccusations got occurred in July when one article described Enron executives whoparticipated in “corporate malfeasance” as “corporate muckety-mucks acting as thoughthe rules don‟t apply to them.” Still, this editor used the term “rules” not “laws.”Journalists did not use terms like “wire fraud,” “money laundering,” “conspiracy,” “insidertrading,” or “crime,” except when directly quoting the few government sources who usedthese terms to specifically describe the indictments or pleas of the Enron executives.Journalists for Time and U.S. News and World Report were completely dependent onthe government to define the situation and to inform them as to whether or not a crimehad been committed. Rather than engaging in proactive investigative reporting thatmight have challenged the government to prosecute these suspects, journalists werenotably cautious, waiting for the government to hand down indictments before theydared to imply criminality. As one reporter put it, “The courts will decide if those peoplebroke the law. But for now, the only crime that has been committed is that of hubris.”A notable exception was a March article in U.S. News that compared the “possiblecrimes” of Enron to street crime. However, the focus of this was on how much morecomplicated it is to investigate and prosecute people for this type of “wrongdoing,” thanit is for street crime. The article was very informative and explicitly mentioned some“possible” crimes with which the Enron executives could be charged, including “mail andwire fraud,” “securities fraud,” “insider trading,” “obstruction of justice,” “tax fraud,”“money laundering,” and “racketeering.” On the other hand, the article did not identifyspecific people and acts as criminal and it emphasized that these were “possible”crimes. Nonetheless, the article exposed many of the complexities involved in the caseand identified a number of circumstances that make prosecution difficult: complicated,confusing, and lenient laws, the obfuscation of evidence by burying them into piles ofdocuments, and the ability of defendants to buy the best possible defense. As criticalas this article was of the law and the system of prosecution surrounding corporatecrime, it did not suggest that any changes in the law or its enforcement were needed orlikely to improve the situation. The final January 2003 article in U.S. News and World Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 12
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowReport echoed this same message, pointing out the difficulties in proving intent anddefeating the corporate lawyer dream teams. This article even referred to the difficultiesof working with “corporate-friendly law written by Congress.” Among the very fewarticles that mentioned the difficulties of prosecution, none identified reforms that couldmake investigation, apprehension, prosecution, or punishment of corporate offendersany less complicated. The statements about difficulty of prosecution seemed primarilygeared toward explaining to the public why arrests and prosecutions had not yet beenmade.Other articles emphasized not only how complicated the prosecution of corporate crimeis, but also the complicated nature of the corporate criminal act. At times, reporterscame across as overwhelmed by the complexities of trying to understand how theoperations took place. One journalist, as late as September, wrote that the “mind-numbing complex financial morass at Enron has been slower going” to explain whyfewer indictments were being handed down for Enron executives than for many of theother corporate offenders exposed in 2002. Perhaps one of the reasons reporters wereso reluctant to declare an act to be criminal was precisely because it was so hard tounderstand exactly what took place. Some of the articles were very difficult to read,suggesting that reporters had a difficult time telling readers what had taken place. Themessage was that these corporate “wrongdoings” were complicated. In July, PresidentBush added to the confusion as he commented on some of his own company‟s actionsbefore he took office: “In the corporate world . . . sometimes things aren‟t exactly blackand white when it comes to accounting procedures.”Explaining the CrimesCommentator John Leo of U.S. News and World Report wrote a column in which heargued that the “intellectual liberal elite” were to blame for the Enron scandal. For Leo,the root causes of the Enron debacle, as for most of society‟s ills, are to be found in the“radical relativism” promoted by the liberal elite. Most of the articles in Time and U.S.News suggested more plausible culprits and causes.The VictimsIronically, the first to be blamed in news accounts for losses suffered by the victims ofthis corporate crime were the victims themselves. One of the very first articles on thecollapse of Enron stated that the “victims must accept some responsibility for theirtroubles.” Enron employees and stockholders who lost their retirement and life savingswere criticized for not properly diversifying their 401Ks. Calls for “individualresponsibility” were made with respect to the victims more frequently than to theperpetrators of the crimes. Major financial incentives had been offered by Enronexecutives to encourage stockholders and employees to put more and more of theirmoney into the company‟s stock. Yet the earliest articles on the Enron case suggestedthat investors should have taken personal responsibility to resist such suggestions andmanage their funds more carefully. An article in April 2002 continued the victimblaming trend by criticizing legislation designed to force employees to diversify their Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 13
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow401Ks, stating that the legislation was proposed to “save us from our greedy selves.”The journalist who wrote this article also referred to those most victimized as “Enrondiehards” who had relied heavily on Enron stock to support their 401Ks.The RegulatorsIn another irony, the second group deemed potentially blameworthy within the articleswas comprised of those responsible for regulating the activities of the EnronCorporation, including those government officials who were responsible for regulatingthe industries involved. However, lax regulation did not last long as a theme,presumably because the political climate at the time was one in which deregulation wasa highly favored approach in general. Fairly early on, attention was directed to ArthurAndersen, the company responsible for auditing Enron. Initially, personnel at ArthurAndersen were criticized not for illegal activity, but for having a legal conflict of interestin that they acted as both regulators and promoters of Enron. Later, Arthur Andersenwas exposed as a willing partner in the illegal activities of the Enron Corporation and thetwo stories became intertwined.The group of regulators that received the most attention was Enron‟s Board of Directors.Yet, even though some board members were apparently more than just negligent, inthat they received substantial benefits from the criminal activity, the descriptions of theirbehavior in the articles generally downplayed their culpability. When it was reportedthat board members knew something was wrong but did not ask the questions that theirpositions as regulators demanded that they ask, they were described as having a“failure of character” and as having “lost their moral compass.” When it was discoveredthat members of the Board of Directors were in illegal partnerships with clear conflicts ofinterests, they were said to have been caught “napping.” When it was discovered thatthe Board‟s executive committee provided a million dollars in loan guarantees toChewco, a phantom company established to facilitate fraud, journalists reported that theBoard “waived the company‟s ethics code.” Board members were described as being“too cozy with management” and for being too willing to approve proposals withoutscrutiny. In July, one of the articles included a quote from the Senate‟s PermanentSubcommittee on Investigations, stating that member‟s of Enron‟s Board “knowinglyallowed Enron to engage in high-risk accounting” and “were aware of everything fromextensive off-the-books deals to conflicts of interests and executive compensation. ---and did little or nothing.” That same month, President Bush was reported to havemade a speech calling on corporations to “do a better job of regulating themselves.”Nothing was said about holding those who engaged in illegal activity accountable forconspiring in these operations or about punishing those who committed crimes.Wall Street AnalystsThe third group suggested as partly to blame was Wall Street stock analysts exposedas having a major conflict of interest with the Enron Corporation. Many of these stockanalysts were inflating the value of Enron stock while simultaneously gaining hugeprofits from Enron through consulting, investment banking, and owning Enron stock. A Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 14
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowmajor conflict of interest was exposed as the same banks and people who weresupposed to objectively evaluate Enron stock were making a great deal of money aslong as they gave Enron the rating that the executives wanted. News accounts raisedquestions about this conflict of interests. By the end of the year of reporting on theEnron case, the same banks that had been identified as participants in the conflicts ofinterests were identified as victims of the Enron scandal as well.Enron ExecutivesAlthough it would be reasonable to assume that responsibility for criminal activity wouldnaturally fall on the individuals who committed the crimes, Enron executives receivedonly sporadic attention for their part in the malfeasance. When it came to searching forcauses of the crimes, news accounts included almost no effort to explain the behavior ofEnron executives. One article questioned, “Did they really think they would not becaught?” but still offered no attempt to determine the causes of the illegal behavior. Nocriminologists, sociologists, or psychologists were quoted giving their opinions aboutwhy those involved engaged in criminal activity.The articles included some discussion of the lack of integrity and greed of Enronexecutives, but did not present their actions as deviant or even particularly harmful. Infact, the behavior of Enron executives was identified as normal and rational humanbehavior. One article stated, “Wherever and whenever there is a chance to make adishonest buck, someone will take it.” The use of this particularly humanizing versionof rational choice theory as an explanation for the illegal behavior of Enron executiveswas perpetuated both by the whistle-blower, Sherron Watkins, and by President Bushwho explained the behavior as “human nature.” President Bush was quoted as saying,“human nature is the culprit,” sending the message that these offenders are really nodifferent than the rest of us.One article‟s effort to place the Enron case into historical context did so in a way thatimplied that perhaps we were all overreacting. The article explained that corporatecriminal scandals have been going on for a long time and that we have survived theseevents with little damage. Worse scandals have occurred and we survived them. Inone of the very few instances in which the behavior was even indirectly labeled ascriminal, the article went as far as to say that “[w]hite collar crime is as American asapple pie, as old as the original European settlements on these shores.”Company CultureThe closest that any of the articles came to offering an explanation for the behavior ofEnron executives or anyone else involved in the scandal was a couple of articlesfocusing on the culture of the Enron Corporation. The article cited many examplessuggesting that the culture of the company encouraged risky and illegal behavior. Asfar back as 1986, Enron employees were found to have been involved in manipulatingcompany earnings, doctoring bank statements, and opening accounts with forgeddocuments. Rather than punishing or firing these employees, CEO Kenneth Lay stated Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 15
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowto them, “Please keep making us millions.” Intense competition within the companycreated incentives to make bigger and bigger deals at any cost, to inflate profits, and tohide debt. Enron was described as a “pressure cooker” that had severe disincentivesfor those who operated carefully or questioned the activities of their bosses. Everyyear, those employees who were rated at the bottom 20 percent by their immediatesupervisors were fired.The culture of Enron reflected the personal characteristics of its personnel: ego, pride,competition, excitement, and masculinity. One article stated, “Enron is about a band ofpretty smart people who thought they had found a way to defy the laws of businessphysics.” Focusing on the fact that Sherron Watkins is a woman, one article observedthat “females seem overrepresented [among whistleblowers] relative to their numbers inthe business world . . . the ranks of corporate rogues notably lack the feminine touch . ..[women] lack the corporate clout needed for big-time bamboozling . . . they feel likeoutsiders.” Watkins‟ lack of involvement in illegal behavior was attributed not to herintegrity, but to her gender, and to the fact that she was not welcomed into the “boys‟club.” There was some suggestion that the problems are endemic to capitalism, or atleast capitalism gone bad, with reporters frequently referring to “crony capitalism.” Onejournalist wrote, “By now people know that capitalism is a spectacle of hope and gutsand guile, all racing toward the bottom line. That is its genius, but without guardrails,the whole contraption can take us over a cliff.” The suggestion was that there is a needfor minor reforms or regulations, but no one was calling for a radical overhaul of thesystem, or even for punishment of the offenders. Enron was depicted as simply acompany that went a little too far and the executives went along for the ride.Characteristics of OffendersBoys will be BoysOne news article summed up the Enron scandal in the following statement: “A band ofcocky inexperienced young MBAs was left alone to do whatever it took to structure adeal, regardless of the circumstances.” Statements such as this one tend to give animage of the offenders as bad boys rather than real criminals. Another article describedthe Enron company itself as a “swaggering, rule-breaking, deal making cult thatultimately mislaid its analytical skills and perhaps its moral compass.” Sherron Watkinswas quoted as saying that CEO Kenneth Lay was “duped by underlings,” even thoughhe sold off his stock, $100 million in 2001 and $20 million after Watkins sent him amemo exposing the accounting irregularities at Enron.A common theme in the articles is that Enron executives were working on the edge of anew economic system and that the borders of what is legal and what is illegal aresomewhat vague. Just as unclear was whether we should revile Enron executives oradmire them. For example, the suspects were referred to both as “arrogant jerks” andas “bad guys,” as “corporate honchos,” and as “corporate rogues who did not play nice.”They were described as “confident” and as “visionaries.” Journalists took pains toemphasize that at least some aspects of the suspects‟ behavior may not have been Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 16
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowillegal and may actually have been positive for the economy. One article stated that theideas of speculation and deregulation were “New Economy chic, and to some extentretain currency.”Human BeingsJournalists went to great lengths to present the offenders as human beings. Whendescribing the corporate executives, the reporters identified their ages, college degrees,hobbies, religious activities, and charitable contributions. Identifiers such as“trombone-playing MBA,” “son of a Missouri minister,” and a “high-voltage intellect” werecommon. Extensive personal histories were provided on the suspects, includingdiscussions of their schools, awards, charities, recognitions, and contributions to thecommunity. One article stated that Fastow had recently “helped coach his son‟s tadpolebaseball team and taught Hebrew at the local synagogue.” The articles often expressedsympathy for the Enron offenders. An article in July 2002 explicitly expressed concernsthat the public might dehumanize the suspects: “many people may soon be looking forsomeone to blame. And the targets for public wrath are easy to demonize: corporatefat cats.” Several articles described all the trouble that the investigations andaccusations were causing the suspects personally. The final articles of the yeardescribed at length how the exposure and investigation process had affected thesuspects.The amount of space devoted to putting a human face on the offenders is remarkable incontrast to the very limited attention give to the victims in the Enron case. A number ofvictims were identified: employees, stockholders, the stock market, the energybusiness, several large banks, and the city of Houston. However, with the exception ofthe employees and stockholders, the suffering of victims was said to be the result of theexposure and investigation of the crimes, rather than the crimes themselves. Inaddition, as previously noted, employees and stockholders were not presented as trulyinnocent victims because it was said that they should have taken precautions to protectthemselves from this crime. Ironically, the “human” victim who received the mostattention from the media was President Bush‟s mother-in-law, Jenna Welch, who “gotsoaked” by the “Enron collapse.” She lost $8,000.NewsworthinessHow reporters shaped the story of Enron and the context in which they placed it tell us alot about what they perceived to be most important about the case. One factorcontributing to the newsworthiness of the case is that it involved big losses. Enron wasthe seventh largest firm in the United States and its bankruptcy was the largest in U.S.history to that date. The collapse shocked the government, the business communityand the general public as thousands of employees lost their jobs and/or their lifesavings. The impact on the economy was dramatic. However, the hook that kept thearticles coming until the Fall of 2002 was the political story. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 17
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowAlthough the economic impacts of the Enron crimes were substantial, it was the politicalconsequences that were given the largest amount of attention in the news magazines.Initially, the primary political story was about the political connections and the influencethat members of the Enron Corporation had with the Bush administration, with lawenforcement agencies, and with the U.S. Congress. For example, 212 of the 248government officials involved in the Enron hearings had taken money from Enron orfrom Arthur Andersen. The interconnectedness of the Bush administration and Enronwas extraordinary; however, the story that came to dominate the articles was thepotential impact of the Enron scandal on the midterm elections of November 2002. InJuly, reporters wrote that the Republican Party was afraid of the “irritable voter” whomight have lost their retirement fund. One article stated: “For Democrats, the politicalbeauty of the corporate scandals is that they „play into what people already believe‟about Republicans -- „that these guys are in the tank with corporate special interests.”The Democrats sought to use this edge to push through legislation that had been stalledby the Republican controlled Congress. They also hoped to use the relationshipbetween the Bush administration and Enron to defeat the Republicans in the mid-termelections. Another July article stated that: “All this is good political news for theDemocrats....Democrats believe now they have a lethal weapon to use againstRepublicans this fall -- linking the White House to corporate excesses and portrayingthe president as insensitive to the „little guy‟....Corporate excess could hurt the GOP inthe midterm elections.” The Republicans used the articles to suggest that the Enronscandal was a business problem and not a political problem. Apparently, theRepublican message was strong because they triumphed in November. Only twopieces of legislation were passed through Congress on the energy generated by theEnron Corporation. One was on campaign finance reform and the other was theSarbanes-Oxley Act, which substantially increased the oversight and regulation ofcorporate governance and auditing. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTCOMESThe articles about the Enron case contained implicit and explicit policy implicationsconcerning what should be done about the illegal actions of the executives of Enron andArthur Andersen specifically, and about white collar crime more generally.Harm ReductionIn contrast to the tough on crime stance characterizing discourse on street crime sincethe late 1970s in the United States, the articles on Enron contain policy suggestionsmuch more in line with harm reduction or restorative justice than with punishment,retribution, or deterrence. Policy discussions in the articles reflect the intense debatethat occurred on the potential effects of possible official responses to the criminalbehavior. The position taken most often was that there is a need to “rein in” thebehavior of a few bad apples, but to do so in a way that will not hurt the company or theindustry too much. Considerable attention was given to the need to restore the“public‟s confidence” in business, corporations, and the economy. The debate was not Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 18
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowabout how best to catch and punish corporate offenders, but how best to “clean up thecorporate books,” or to “fix” or “restore” the public‟s confidence in the industry.The assumption that the government must support innovation and business wasunchallenged. White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer stated: “It‟s not good to bashbusiness” and journalists and politicians alike appeared to take this sentiment to heart.One journalist noted that: “[n]o legislator wants to appear to be blocking reform now,especially in an election year.” Thus, the debate centered on what is best for theeconomy: more regulation or less regulation. Another journalist suggested thatinvestors were concerned about the ability of “lawmakers to distinguish betweenreforms that are needed and those that will cramp the recovery even more.”A prime example of this curious debate was exemplified by “Wall Street‟s Top Cop,” “theenforcer,” “the Sheriff of Wall Street,” New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. Spitzerbecame famous for his “aggressive pursuit” of Merrill Lynch and a dozen other WallStreet firms. He was referred to in the media as one of the only players who was reallygoing after corporate criminals. Corporate leaders criticized Spitzer as an aggressive,harmful, self-promoter, who was “pushing the law for social change” and “taking on WallStreet.” What did he win with his aggressive prosecution? Merrill Lynch agreed to paya fine, apologize, and reform. Spitzer himself said that he “never sought cripplingpenalties . . . I began this with the premise that we did not want to challenge thefinancial viability of Merrill or any of the others.” Reflective of a family model approachto criminal justice, offenders in the Enron case were viewed as needing discipline, notpunishment.A U.S. News and World Report article in July illustrated the contradictory path on whichthe government was proceeding as it described Bush‟s goal in resolving the scandal.Bush‟s objective, the article claimed, was to “balance seemingly contradictory goals ---to signal to his corporate backers that he will not become their enemy and to tell thewider electorate that he will not let business run amok.” The “bad apple” theoryemerged again as the article explained that Bush “wants to weed out the bad actorswithout undermining public faith in the business community and the overall economy.”The preferred, though contradictory policy direction of reining in the industry whilepreserving a climate of deregulation was repeated throughout the articles.Increase RegulationPolitical DebateAlthough both Democrats and Republicans agreed on the need to rein in the industry,they were clearly divided along party lines about the extent of the changes to law orpolicy, particularly in reference to the level of government intervention, oversight, andpenalties. The Bush administration pushed mostly for greater self-regulation andfaster, more accurate reporting practices. Democrats argued for increasing the powersof prosecutors to fight corporate fraud, adding new penalties, and more aggressive,government-centered oversight of the inter-relationships of corporations. Overall, the Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 19
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowmagazine articles appeared to suggest that the regulatory system was broken and thatthe economy needed the government to respond aggressively in order to rebuildbusiness confidence among the general public. In July, an article stated that“politicians can no longer afford to treat the accumulating scandals as anomalies in anotherwise healthy system.” However, in reference to the offenders themselves, thedominant message was that they were simply a few bad apples who were takingadvantage of a flawed system.One of the few legislative reforms that actually materialized regarding the corporatescandals of 2002 was campaign finance reform. Campaign finance reform was a highlypolitically charged issue. Legislation was deadlocked by the Republican controlledCongress. The exposure of all the political connections and campaign financing by thecorporate executives involved in the Enron scandal helped to break the logjam and theCampaign Finance Reform Act was passed into law.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 was another important piece of legislation passed inthe wake of the Enron and related scandals. It reflected a political compromise forgedby a government largely dominated by Republicans and watched carefully by a largenumber of investors and corporate executives. It was described as the most sweepingsecurities regulation in nearly 70 years; however, it fell far short of what Democraticlegislators wanted. This legislation established rules for boards of directors and auditcompanies, imposed earlier deadlines for disclosure of insider trades and materialevents, and enhanced penalties for fraudulent activities. In addition, Congress made itillegal for companies to lend money to their own executives. It also called upon theSecurities and Exchange Commission to write formal rules detailing the regulations itputs into place and placed greater pressure on SEC lawyers to be more aggressive andfaster in their enforcement of corporate fraud.Conflicts of InterestThe magazine articles identified several areas of concern about the corporate scandalstaking place in the U.S. and high on their lists were the conflicts of interest amongauditors and boards of directors. The relationship between Enron and Enron‟s auditingfirm, Arthur Andersen, exemplified the concerns. Arthur Andersen was hired by Enronboth to audit its books and to serve as a consultant to the company; thus, ArthurAndersen benefited financially by conducting insufficient oversight. In fact, thecompany was awarded more money for consulting than it earned as an auditor. Severalarticles suggested that auditing laws should be changed to prohibit accounting firmsfrom doing both activities with the same client. The former SEC Chair, Arthur Levittsupported this prohibition, while the SEC Chair at the time of the articles, Harvey Pitt,opposed the prohibition. It is interesting to note that Harvey Pitt served as a lawyer andlobbyist for the accounting industry for over 20 years and had represented both ArthurAndersen and Merrill Lynch. While serving in that capacity, he led the fight against theClinton Administration‟s SEC Chair, Arthur Levitt, in his effort to prevent accountingfirms from both auditing and consulting the same client. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 20
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowThe articles also suggested that there should be greater disclosure of the conflicts ofinterest among board members for corporations. Enron exemplified this problembecause many of the members of its Board of Directors were also receiving substantialfinancial benefits in consulting fees from Enron and through participation as partnerswith Enron executives on side investments. Similar to Arthur Andersen, the Board‟snegligence regarding mismanagement played a major role in allowing the executives atEnron to essentially steal millions of dollars from the stockholders through a series ofillegal and unethical operations.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act had provisions to address such conflicts of interest, but it reliedprimarily on self-regulation and greater exposure of the conflicts rather than prohibitingthe relationships that produced the conflicts. One article in Time magazine actuallypredicted this outcome in early February 2002 when the reporter stated that “Senatorsmay be talking about stricter regulation in televised hearings, but they‟re not proposingany bills.” In other words, the Senators were talking tough to the media to impress thepublic, but they were not willing to put that tough talk into legislation. A couple ofarticles actually criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, stating that it had too manyloopholes, too few restrictions, and did not provide enough funding for the SEC.Criminal ProsecutionCriminal prosecution as a method of reining in the industry was very rarely discussed.Only a couple of articles focused on it, and that focus was on the difficulties ofprosecuting the cases. It appeared that journalists were preparing the public forgovernment‟s failure to convict corporate offenders: “The public may want jail time, butneed to realize that long sentences are rare and convictions are very difficult.” Onearticle offered advice to the prosecutors when it said that they should not take shortcuts,ignore smaller crimes, engage in turf wars, or pile on charges. It also suggested thatthe prosecutors should offer immunity early, follow the money, build momentum, andexploit divisions. The RICO statute, used so dramatically against corporate criminals inthe past, was removed from the prosecutors‟ arsenal, under heavy lobbying by thosewho were now being prosecuted. Another article suggested civil forfeiture as a meansto seize assets purchased with the proceeds of criminal activity in order “to create adeterrent effect.” The money from these forfeitures, however, would normally go to thestockholders or the banks supporting the companies rather than to employees who losetheir livelihood.Target HardeningIn line with the victim-blaming stance taken with respect to the causes of the Enroncrimes, several articles suggested that those in the general public should take action toprotect themselves. Government representatives were cited as recommending that thepublic mix diversified stock and bond market funds, hold as little as possible in one‟sown firm, and avoid company shares in the same industry as that in which one isemployed. Eventually, legislation passed placing limits on the amount of employer‟s Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 21
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowstock one can have in their 401K and eased restrictions on when an employee can sellcompany stock.Decrease RegulationAlthough policy suggestions to increase government oversight occasionally appeared, astrong message throughout the articles was that deregulation must be preserved as astrategy for economic success. One could easily argue that the deregulationmovement was specifically to blame for Enron and other corporate scandals.Nonetheless, the “bad apple” theory appeared to insulate the deregulation movementfrom criticism. In a few instances, reporters criticized executives and politicians forplacing blame on scapegoats, such as when, despite the existence of a company memoencouraging shredding, executives at Arthur Andersen blamed David Duncan forshredding subpoenaed documents. Overall, though, reporters seemed to accept thatscandals were caused by a few bad apples rather than by systematic corruptionencouraged by deregulation. By and large, the authoritative voices presented in thearticles declared emphatically that deregulation was an important and viable economicstrategy, and any effort to address these scandals should be careful not to disrupt it.The capstone article in U.S. News & World Report ended the coverage on the scandalsof the previous year with the message that we do not want to stop the innovative ideasof Enron and that they are still valid.The most remarkable policy suggestion to emerge in the articles was that thegovernment should eliminate the laws that were violated by corporate offenders in orderto prevent corporations from violating them. Treasury Secretary Paul O‟Neil andCouncil of Economic Advisors Chairman R. Glen Hubbard championed this approachwhen they argued that the best way to stop corporations from violating U.S. tax lawswas to eliminate the corporate income tax, making tax havens and loopholesunnecessary. DISCUSSION CRIME NEWS AND EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY: THE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES OF THE ENRON STORYTo the extent that most people think of crime as street crime and criminals as youngracial minorities from urban ghettos, they are buying into divisive and extremelydamaging stereotypes that undermine democracy. The news media play a major role increating these stereotypes. Commonly held beliefs notwithstanding, it is not true thatthe greatest threats to public safety and economic well-being come from the poor. TheEnron case provided the media with an opportunity to expose commonly held mythsand stereotypes about crime and criminals. It was a perfect teachable moment andthere was much to learn about crime and the realities of class bias in civil and criminaljustice within our capitalist democracy. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 22
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowDespite the wide open window of opportunity provided by the Enron case, the Enronstory as told in the articles examined for this study provided no critique of popular mythsabout crime and criminals. Only one article deviated from this and came close to beingthe exception that proved the rule. This particular article discussed the higher financialcosts and the lighter penalties for white collar crime, focusing on the dramaticdifferences in the difficulty of prosecuting corporate criminals compared to prosecutingstreet criminals. Even here, though, an opportunity was missed to educate the publicon the class biases that contribute to the difficulties of prosecuting the rich and powerfulcompared with the relative ease of prosecuting the poor and powerless. At no point didany of the articles in the two magazines mention class or race in their analysis of thecrimes and criminals of Enron. To do so would have gone a long way toward debunkingthe myths that make palatable a criminal justice system that directs nearly all of itscoercive power to controlling the crimes of the poor.Not only did journalists reporting on Enron miss an opportunity to debunk popular mythsand stereotypes about crime and criminals, they generally handled the corporatesuspects with kid gloves and offered explanations for their behavior that served todistinguish them from ordinary street criminals. For instance, the particular way inwhich rational choice theory was used to explain the criminal behavior of Enronexecutives tended to humanize the offenders and rationalize their behavior. Whenrational choice theory appears in news about street crime, it is typically used to dismissconsideration of mitigating factors for crime and to justify proposals to strengthenpunishments for the purpose of deterrence. In the Enron story, rational choice theorywas invoked to suggest that the offenders in this case were not so different from the restof us. The Enron offenders were also humanized by the manner in which they werepresented in the articles. Descriptions of the suspects included their personal histories,hobbies, education, social activities and other information that appeared to encouragesome degree of sympathy for the offenders by showing us all that they had lost, or howfar that they had fallen from grace. There were no discussions of criminal intent, nouse of animal analogies, and no efforts to establish that the offenders were by naturecriminal. News about street crime is typically framed in ways that separate the criminals(them) from the law-abiding (us). Journalists who went to great lengths to show us thehumanity of the Enron offenders could have gone further. They could have pointed outthat, if corporate offenders are not so very different than the rest of us, neither are thegang members, drug dealers and other ordinary street criminals whom we regard withsuch fear and loathing. The failure of reporters to identify criminal intent among theEnron executives or to search for causes of their criminal behavior was part and parcelof the overall avoidance of labeling the individuals involved as criminal. Reporters wentto great lengths to avoid the criminal label, using many very creative euphemisms. Thereticence of journalists to label the criminal behavior of corporate executives as criminalis not without consequence, as it serves to rationalize a dual system of justice in whichcriminality is a status reserved for the poor.It was not the case, however, that the journalists who told the Enron story, and thesources on whom they relied for information, conveyed that no one did anything wrong.Wrongdoing by corporate executives was, after all the foundation for the story. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 23
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowThroughout the articles, the bad apple theory was the main explanation offered for whatwent wrong at Enron. The losses suffered were said to be largely due to the actions ofa few rogue operators who went too far. There was some debate in the articles aboutderegulation and some suggestion of a need for greater oversight of the energy andaccounting industries, and corporations in general, but the dominant message was acall for self-regulation. Support for aggressive government action or the passage ofnew legislation to regulate the energy and accounting industries was very weak. Thefocus of calls for reform stayed on ways to rein in rogue operators, who were not reallycriminals, just overzealous and arrogant. The overriding message was that theseviolators needed to be brought under control while causing the least amount of harm tothe company, to the industry and to business in general.Not only was the Enron story an excellent opportunity for the media to debunk the myththat crime is the work of the poor, it was an opportunity to expose the criminogenicnature of the limited-liability corporation. When making profits for stockholders iselevated above all else, corporations encourage excess, greed, avarice and cuttingcorners by any means necessary to increase dividends. At Enron, the result was thatthose members of the corporation who were able to raise the value of the company‟sstock were lavishly rewarded without anyone being concerned about how they did it. Infact, even those convicted of criminal violations were rewarded as long as theirconvictions did not negatively impact the stock. In 1986, when several employees atEnron were convicted of manipulating earnings, doctoring bank statements, andopening accounts with forged documents, no actions were taken by the company todiscipline these employees. The limited-liability corporation is also criminogenicbecause of its multiple layers of operation, responsibility, and oversight and its inherentconflicts of interests between executives, board members, stockholders, and auditors.It is difficult to determine who is actually accountable for any action or inaction, and it isnearly impossible to obtain effective self-regulation to rein in those who are driven to cutcorners in order to make profits. The articles suggested that Enron‟s company culturehad taken the avarice a little too far, but did not question the broader system thatencourages and supports the wrongdoing.A final missed opportunity in the Enron story was the opportunity journalists had to atleast question, if not challenge the emergence of paper entrepreneurism as thedominant form of profit making in the United States. The executives of Enron, led byKenneth Lay, set out to create a no-asset corporation. Enron was a company that builtits wealth on nothing, building nothing, making nothing, producing nothing, just trading,buying and selling deals. This new form of capitalism, as exemplified by Enron, wasextremely vulnerable to any loss of public confidence in the economy. Williams‟ (2008:483) research suggests that it is on the basis of investor confidence that the “effects ofthe [Enron] scandal are gauged and the various legal and regulatory responses arerationalized and legitimized.” Deregulation is an important part of the new economy,because corporations must have extraordinary flexibility in order to keep their profitsahead of the fact that nothing of value is being produced. The concept of building acompany with no assets and making large profits without producing anything was neverseriously questioned by those who told the story of Enron in the news magazines. The Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 24
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlowarticles we examined never critiqued this fundamental shift in the U.S. economy and, infact, repeatedly suggested that the new economy is good and valid, and must bepreserved at all costs. CONCLUSIONOur research question as we began this study was whether news about the Enroncorporate crime case challenged the hegemonic narrative on crime and justice in theUnited States. Journalists could have used the Enron case to educate the Americanpublic on the degree to which the social harm from the crimes of the powerful exceedsthe harm from ordinary street crime. At the very least, journalists could have used thefacts of the Enron case to discredit the ideological notion that crime is the work of thepoor. Our examination of news magazine articles about Enron and Arthur Andersen inthe year after the Enron story broke indicates that news about Enron did not challengethe dominant narrative on crime and justice. Instead, the story of Enron as told byjournalists for Time and U.S. News and World Report between December 2001 andJanuary 2003 strengthened that narrative. The research findings reported here,combined with the findings of previous research on crime in the news media, suggestthat the news media perpetuate the notion that crime is the work of the poor, not therich, and that threats to public safety and wellbeing come from below rather than above.Coverage of the Enron case provided ideological support to dominant social, politicaland economic institutions by the many ways in which it conveyed the message that theoffending corporate executives were not really criminals and their actions were notreally crimes. REFERENCESBarlow, M.H. (1998). Race and the problem of crime in Time and Newsweek Cover Stories, 1946 to 1995. Social Justice, 25(2), 149-181.Barlow, M. H., Barlow, D.E. and Chiricos, T.G. (1995a). Mobilizing support for social control in a declining economy: Exploring ideologies of crime within crime news. Crime and Delinquency, 41(2), 191-204.Barlow, M.H., Barlow, D.E. and Chiricos, T.G. (1995b). Economic conditions and ideologies of crime in the media: A content analysis of crime news. Crime and Delinquency, 41(1), 3-19.Barlow, M.H., Barlow, D.E., and Stojkovic, S. (1994). The media, the police and the multicultural community: Observations on a city in crisis. Journal of Crime and Justice, 16(2), 133-165.Beckett, K. and Sasson, T. (2000). The politics injustice: Crime and punishment in America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.Benedict, H. (1992). Virgin or vamp: How the press covers sex crimes. New York: Oxford University Press.Bohm, R. (1986). Crime, criminal and crime control policy myths. Justice Quarterly, 3, 193-214. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 25
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowBohm, R. (1993). Social relationships that arguably should be criminal although they are not: On the political economy of crime. In K. D. Tunnell (ed.) . Political Crime in Contemporary America (pp. 3-29). New York: Garland.Burns, R.G. and Orrick, L. (2002). Assessing newspaper coverage of corporate violence: The dance hall fire in Goteborg, Sweden. Critical Criminology, 11(2), 137-150.Calavita, K. and Pontell, H.N. (1994). The state and white-collar crime: Saving the savings and loans. Law and Society Review, 28, 297-324.Cavendar, G. and Mulcahy, A. (1998). Trial by fire: Media constructions of corporate deviance. Justice Quarterly, 15(4), 697- 717.Chermak, S.M. (1994). Body count news: How crime is presented in the news media. Justice Quarterly, 11(4), 563-582.Coleman, J.W. (1998). The criminal elite: Understanding white-collar crime. (4th. Ed.). New York: St. Martin‟s Press.Ewick P. and Silbey, S.S. (1995). Subversive stories and hegemonic tales: Toward a sociology of narrative. Law and Society Review, 29, 197-226.Fishman, M. (1978). Crime waves as ideology. Social Problems, 25, 531-543.Friedrichs, D.O. (2004). Enron Et Al.: Paradigmatic white collar crime cases for the new century. Critical Criminology, 12(2), 113-132.Friedrichs, D.O. (2002). State-corporate crime in a globalized world: Myth or major challenge? In Gary W. Potter (ed.) Controversies in White-Collar Crime, pp. 53-71. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company.Friedrichs, D.O. (1996). Trusted criminals: White collar crime in contemporary society. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.Gamson, W.A., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W., and Sasson, T. (1992). Media images and the social construction of reality. American Sociological Review, 18, 373-93.Garafalo, J. (1981). Crime and the mass media: A selective review of research. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 18, 319-350.Gouldner, A. (1976). The dialectic of ideology and technology. New York: Oxford University Press.Graber, D.A. (1980). Crime news and the public. New York: Praeger.Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., and Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state, and law and order. London: MacMillan.Hickman, M. (1982). Crime in the streets – a moral panic: Understanding get tough policies of the criminal justice system. Southern Journal of Criminal Justice, 7(1), 7-22.Humphries, D. (1981). Serious crime, news coverage, and ideology: A content analysis of crime coverage in a metropolitan paper. Crime and Delinquency, 27, 71-89.Kappeler, V., Blumberg, M. and Potter, G. (2000). The mythology of crime and criminal justice. (3rd ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.Larrain, J. (1983). Marxism and ideology. London: Macmillan.Lofquist, William S. (1997). Constructing “crime”: Media coverage of individual and organizational wrongdoing. Justice Quarterly, 14(2), 243-263. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 26
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowLynch, M.J., Nalla, M.K., and Miller, K.W. (1989). Cross-cultural perceptions of deviance: The case of Bhopal. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 26, 7-35.Marsh, I. and Melville, G. (2009). Crime, justice, and the media. New York: Routledge.McMullen, J.L. and McClung, M. (2006). The media, the politics of truth, and the coverage of corporate violence: The Westray disaster and the public inquiry. Critical Criminology, 14, 67-86.Morash, M. and Hale, D. (1987). Unusual crime or crime as unusual? Images of corruption at the interstate commerce commission. In T.S. Bynum (ed.), Organized Crime in America: Concepts and Controversies, pp. 129-49. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Nichols, L.T. (1997). Social problems as landmark narratives: Bank of Boston, mass media and "money laundering." Social Problems, 44(3), 334-341.Randall, D.M. (1987). The portrayal of business malfeasance in the elite and general public media. Social Science Quarterly, 68, 281-93.Randall, D.M., Lee-Sammons, L. and Hagner, P.R. (1988). Common versus elite crime coverage in network news. Social Science Quarterly, 69, 910-29.Reiman, J. (2004). The rich get richer and the poor getpPrison: Ideology, crime, and criminal justice. Seventh Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.Roshier, B. (1981). The selection of crime news by the press. In S. Cohen and J. Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Rosoff, S.M., Pontell, H.N., and Tillman, R.H. (2004). Profit without honor: White- collar crime and the looting of America. (3rd Ed). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Sheley , J.F. and Ashkins, C.D. (1981). Crime, crime news and crime views. In R. Surette (ed.), Justice and the Media: Issues and Research. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.Sherizen, S. (1978). Social creation of crime news: All the news fitted to print. In C. Winick (ed.), Deviance and Mass Media. (pp. 203-24). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Smith, S. (1984). Crime in the news. British Journal of Criminology, 24, 289-295.Surette, R. (1998). Media, crime, and criminal justice: Images and realities. (2nd Ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.Tunnel, K. (1992). Film at eleven: Recent developments in the commodification of crime. Sociological Spectrum, 12, 293-313.Williams, J.W. (2008). The lessons of „Enron‟: Media accounts, corporate crimes, and financial markets. Theoretical Criminology, 12 (4), 471-499Wright, J.P., Cullen, F.T., and Blankenship, M.B. (1995). The Social construction of corporate violence: Media coverage of the imperial food products fire. Crime and Delinquency, 41, 20-35. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 27
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow APPENDIX A: TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLESDate Title Reporter(s) Page #s12/3/01 “Don‟t Bet it All on Your Sharon Epperson * Employer”12/10/01 “Power Failure” Daniel Kadlec *12/24/01 “An Enron Link to Energy Adam Zagorin * Policy?”12/31/01 “Power‟s On - - But the Laura A. Locke * Cost!”1/14/02 “Democrats: Don‟t Gloat Michael Weiskopf * About Enron”1/21/02 Sub-Cover Story: “Enron and Bush” “Who‟s Accountable” Daniel Kadlec 29-35 “Bush in the Glare” Karen Tumulty 361/28/02 Cover Story: “You‟re On Your Own” “What did they know . . . Michael Duffy 16-22 When Did They Know it?” “What $6 Million Can Buy” Karen Tumulty 20-21 Michael Weiskopf “Your Money: Old Safety Daniel Kadlec 26-28 Nets Are Gone. Here‟s What to Do.”2/4/02 Cover Story: “The Enron Mess: How Sticky Will it Get.” Running Title: “The Enron Spillover” Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 28
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow “Enron Spoils the Party” Michael Weiskopf 19-24 John F. Dickerson “Enron Takes a Life” Cathy Booth 20-21 Thomas “The Enron Players” Eric Roston 20-21 “Can Lawmakers Now 24 Afford to be Obstacles to Reform?” “The Incredible Shrinking Michael Elliott 26 Businessmen” “Under the Microscope” Daniel Kadlec 27-30 “Blame Enron Eric Roston 29Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 29
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowDate Title Reporter(s) Page #s2/18/02 “Ignorant & Poor?” Daniel Eisenberg 37-39 “Speak No Evil” Bill Saporito 34-39 “The Plot Thickens” Michael Orecklin 39 “The Trail Out of Texas” Adam Zagorin 41 “Houston: The Enron Roy B. White * Tour”2/25/02 “Enron: The Scandal That Daren Fonda * Keeps on Giving” Adam Zagorian3/18/09 “Will the Big Five Go Down Unmesh Kher 26 One”4/1/02 “When One Stock is Bill Saporito * Enough”5/20/09 “California Scheming” Chris Taylor 43-44 “When Enron‟s Auditors Cathy Booth 44 Sing” Thomas “A Taste of Rummy‟s Way” Michael Duffy 456/12/02 Sub-Cover: “Behaving Badly” “Dennis the Menace” Daniel Eisenberg 47-49 “8 Remedies” Daniel Kadlec 516/24/02 “Called to Account” Cathy Booth 52 Thomas7/8/02 “Is Pitt‟s SEC a Toothless Karen Tumulty 25 Watchdog?”7/15/02 “Enron‟s Board Games” Adam Zagorin 167/22/09 “Summer of Mistrust” Melissa August 16-20 James Carney Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 30
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow John F. Dickerson “The Rap on Bush and Bill Saporito 22 Cheney” “Do As I Say, Not As I Do” Mitch Frank 227/29/02 “More Reform and Less Julie Rawe 24-25 Hot Air” Eric Roston Adam Zagorian Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 31
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowDate Title Reporter(s) Page #s7/29/02 “Seven Top Executives Melissa August 31 With No Retirement Woes” Barbara Burgower- Horden Daren Fonda Jyoti Thottan Laura Koss-Feder Betsy Rubiner Mary Sutter Leslie Whitaker9/2/02 “Enron Payback” Cathy Booth 20 Thomas11/11/02 “Indicted” No Author 312/30/02 – Cover Story: “The01/06/03 Whistleblowers” Persons of the Year “The Year of the James Kelly, Editor Whistleblower” “The Party Crasher” Jodie Morse 53-56 Amanda Bower “Enron: Picking Over the Daren Fonda 26 Carcus” “The Interview” 58-60 “Wall Street‟s Top Cop” Adi Ignatius 64-7246 Articles, 3 Cover Stories, 2 Sub-Cover Stories* No page number is available. These articles were obtained from the internet. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 32
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow APPENDIX B U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT MAGAZINE ARTICLESDate Title Reporter(s) Page #s12/10/01 “The Biggest Bust” Marianne Lavelle 30-36 Matthew Benjamin12/24/01 “The 402(k) Stumbles” Paul J. Lin 30-32 Matthew Benjamin1/21/02 Sub-Cover Story: “Bush‟s Business Ties: The Enron Mess.” “Back to Business” Kenneth T. Walsh 14-20 “Farewell to All That” Christopher H. 22-25 Schmitt Julian E. Barnes Megan Bennett1/28/02 – “Man on the Hot Seat” Christopher H. 20-222/4/02 Schmitt Julian E. Barnes Megan Bennett2/11/02 “The First Wives Club” Gloria Borger 29 “A Question of Values” David E Gergen, 72 Editor at Large “One Cozy Bunch” Christopher H. * Schmitt Julian E. Barnes Megan Bennett “Washington vs. Wall Editors * Street, Again” Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 33
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow2/18/02 “Conflicts Come Back to Christopher H. * Bite” Schmitt “Confidence Lost” Noam Neusner 32-34 Paul J. Lin James M. Pethokoukis3/11/02 “Payback Time?” Marianne Lavelle 36-403/18/02 “How a Titan Came Julian E. Barnes 26-36 Undone” Megan Bennett Christopher H. Schmitt “Andersen Clients Bolt – Kit R. Roane 34 and Legal Risks Mount” “Practicing the Art of Gloria Borger 24 Secrecy”Date Title Reporter(s) Page #s3/25/02 “Accounting Chaos?” Marianne Lovelle 374/8/02 “Cardboard Board” Matthew Benjamin 28-305/13/02 “Bad CEO! Got to Your Kim Clark 39 Room”5/20/02 “Power Plays” Marianne Lavelle 38-39 “Everybody Doesn‟t Love Kim Clark 39 Harvey”5/24/02 “Time to Crack Down” Mortimer B. 68 Zuckerman, Editor- in-Chief7/1/02 “The Age of Excess” Jay Tolson 24-30 “Distrust of Business Roils Joshua Kurlantzick 30 Market” Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 34
    • Research Article – Barlow & Barlow “Chief Entertainment Randall E. Stross 31 Officer”7/22/02 Sub-Cover Story: “Will Angry Investors Blame Bush” “Professors Who See No John Leo 14 Evil” “Bush and the Bear” Kenneth T. Walsh 20-28 “Cleaning Up the Kim Clark 26 Corporate Books” David D‟Addio “Bush & Cheney‟s Not-so- Christopher H. 28 Excellent Adventures, a la Schmitt Enron.” “A Weary Watchdog” Megan Barnett 30 Julian E. Barnes Joellen Perry “Takin‟ Care of Bidness” Randal E. Strass 317/29/02 “Are Cooked Books a Terrance Samuel 20 Recipe for Democrats?”8/19/02 “The Tax Man Goeth” Leonard Wiener 30-32 “In the Cross Hairs” Marianne Lavelle 339/23/02 “The Feds Get Tough” Marianne Lavelle 44-4610/14/02 “Feisty Fastow” Marianne Lavelle 4810/21/02 “Oh, To Slay a Dragon” Megan Barnett 40-42 “Do Loans by Ay Other Pamela Sherrid 42 Name Smell as Sweet” Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 35
    • Research Article – Barlow & BarlowDate Title Reporter(s) Page #s12/30/02 Sub-Cover Story: “The Worst CEOs” “Rogues of the Year” Marianne Lavelle 32-45 Megan Barnett Matthew Benjamin Kim Clark Thomas K. Gross Richard J. Newman Joellen Perry James M. Pethokoukis Pamela Sherrid Christopher H. Schmitt Betsy Steisand “Ha! You Call This Kim Clark 40 Reform” “Women Who Blow Jodie T. Allen 48 Whistles . . .” “Scandal as Usual” Mitchell Stachell 4941 Articles, 3 Sub-Cover Stories* No page number is available. These articles were obtained from the internet. Copyright 2010 - The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) - Volume 1, Number 1 – Page 36