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From Traditional Malware
to Targeted Attacks
Raimund Genes
Chief Technology Officer
Trend Micro
Internet
PC
PC
PC
Internet
Gateway
Exchange
Server
150 infected Mails
CRIMEWARE
DamagecausedbyCybercrime
2001 2003 2004 2005 2007 2010
Vulnerabilities
W orm
Outbreaks
Spam
Mass Mailers
Spyware
Intelligent
Botnets
Web
Threats
Evolution to Cybercrime
2011+
Targeted
Attacks
Mobile
Attacks
Trustwave 2013 Global Security Report:
Average time from initial breach to
detection was 210 days, more than 35
days longer than in 2011.
Malware / Bot / APT Behavior Comparison Table
APT Bot Malware
Distribution With organized planning Mass distribution over regions Mass distribution over regions
Services interruption No No Yes
Attack Pattern Targeted (only a few
groups/organizations)
Not targeted (large area spread-
out)
Not targeted (large area spread-
out)
Target Audience Particular Organization/Company Individual credentials including
online banking account
information
Random
Frequency of attacks Many times Once Once
Weapon -Zero-day exploit
-Drop embedded RAT
-Dropper or Backdoor
Multiple-Exploits,All in one By Malware design
Detection Rate Lower than 10% within one month Around 86% within one month Around 99% within one month
Some Documented Advanced Persistent Threat Campaigns
(Real-world Examples)
• LURID – threat actors launched around 300 campaigns
targeting different industries in different countries
• Luckycat – threat actors used diverse infrastructure
(from throwaway free hosting to dedicated VPSs)
• Taidoor – threat actors primarily targeted government
organizations located in Taiwan
• IXESHE – threat actors used compromised computers
inside the network to evade network detection
Advanced Persistent Threat
Targeted Attacks
The attacker knows
what he’s looking for!
South Korea – Hacktivism, Cyber Sabotage, or Cyberterrorism?
Sometimes an “unusual” targets
Typical Industrial Control System (ICS)
• In a small city in US with 8000 citizens
• It has to look like a real system
• And by “accident” the system has a link to the
Internet
Let’s simulate a Water Pressure Control station
Building a SCADA Honeypot…
Attacks from
US, 9
LAOS, 6
UK, 4
CHINA, 17
NETHERLANDS, 1
JAPAN, 1
BRAZIL, 2
POLAND, 1
VIETNAM, 1
RUSSIA, 3
PALESTINE, 1 CHILE, 1 CROATIA, 1 NORTH
KOREA, 1
What to expect next?
Your phone as your wallet
Android Malware
120,000 350,000
Vehicle past and now
TOYOTA'S
Vehicle(1955)
TOYOTA'S
Hybrid Vehicle(2011)
None of
computers included
over 70 of
computers included
Tire Pressure
Monitoring System
UNAUTHORIZED
APPS, Multimedia File
Smartphone,
USB
Immobilizer
Cutter
DOOR LOCKS
Smart Key
CHAdeMO :
Quick charging method for battery
powered electric vehicles
KEY
FOB
TELEMATICS
SYSTEM
OBDII , CAN, ECU
Vehicle Area Network
iVehicle
Embedded OS selected by car industry
SELECTED
IVI Standard
Organization
Security Assessment
Kernel > 2.6.35.3
Gain Privilege > 18
• All the ECU turned into
Fail-Safe-Mode.
• Engine fan and
headlamp kept working.
• Meter(e.g. speed)
needle keeps wobbling
Overflow attack to CAN bus
If someone wants to
get in, he get’s in!
So do we do a lot of
stuff just to satisfy the
auditors?
LATIN AMERICA
EUROPE
APAC
NORTH AMERICA
GLOBAL
Thank You

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Raimund genes from traditional malware to targeted attacks

  • 1. From Traditional Malware to Targeted Attacks Raimund Genes Chief Technology Officer Trend Micro
  • 2.
  • 4. CRIMEWARE DamagecausedbyCybercrime 2001 2003 2004 2005 2007 2010 Vulnerabilities W orm Outbreaks Spam Mass Mailers Spyware Intelligent Botnets Web Threats Evolution to Cybercrime 2011+ Targeted Attacks Mobile Attacks
  • 5. Trustwave 2013 Global Security Report: Average time from initial breach to detection was 210 days, more than 35 days longer than in 2011.
  • 6. Malware / Bot / APT Behavior Comparison Table APT Bot Malware Distribution With organized planning Mass distribution over regions Mass distribution over regions Services interruption No No Yes Attack Pattern Targeted (only a few groups/organizations) Not targeted (large area spread- out) Not targeted (large area spread- out) Target Audience Particular Organization/Company Individual credentials including online banking account information Random Frequency of attacks Many times Once Once Weapon -Zero-day exploit -Drop embedded RAT -Dropper or Backdoor Multiple-Exploits,All in one By Malware design Detection Rate Lower than 10% within one month Around 86% within one month Around 99% within one month
  • 7. Some Documented Advanced Persistent Threat Campaigns (Real-world Examples) • LURID – threat actors launched around 300 campaigns targeting different industries in different countries • Luckycat – threat actors used diverse infrastructure (from throwaway free hosting to dedicated VPSs) • Taidoor – threat actors primarily targeted government organizations located in Taiwan • IXESHE – threat actors used compromised computers inside the network to evade network detection
  • 9. The attacker knows what he’s looking for!
  • 10. South Korea – Hacktivism, Cyber Sabotage, or Cyberterrorism?
  • 13. • In a small city in US with 8000 citizens • It has to look like a real system • And by “accident” the system has a link to the Internet Let’s simulate a Water Pressure Control station
  • 14. Building a SCADA Honeypot…
  • 15.
  • 16. Attacks from US, 9 LAOS, 6 UK, 4 CHINA, 17 NETHERLANDS, 1 JAPAN, 1 BRAZIL, 2 POLAND, 1 VIETNAM, 1 RUSSIA, 3 PALESTINE, 1 CHILE, 1 CROATIA, 1 NORTH KOREA, 1
  • 17.
  • 18. What to expect next?
  • 19.
  • 20. Your phone as your wallet
  • 22. Vehicle past and now TOYOTA'S Vehicle(1955) TOYOTA'S Hybrid Vehicle(2011) None of computers included over 70 of computers included
  • 23. Tire Pressure Monitoring System UNAUTHORIZED APPS, Multimedia File Smartphone, USB Immobilizer Cutter DOOR LOCKS Smart Key CHAdeMO : Quick charging method for battery powered electric vehicles KEY FOB TELEMATICS SYSTEM OBDII , CAN, ECU Vehicle Area Network
  • 24.
  • 26. Embedded OS selected by car industry SELECTED IVI Standard Organization
  • 27. Security Assessment Kernel > 2.6.35.3 Gain Privilege > 18
  • 28. • All the ECU turned into Fail-Safe-Mode. • Engine fan and headlamp kept working. • Meter(e.g. speed) needle keeps wobbling Overflow attack to CAN bus
  • 29.
  • 30. If someone wants to get in, he get’s in!
  • 31.
  • 32. So do we do a lot of stuff just to satisfy the auditors?
  • 33.
  • 34.