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Severe Solar Activity/Space Weather and the
      Global Threat to Electric Grids




                     John G. Kappenman
                     Storm Analysis Consultants
Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Space Weather

•The US Electric Power Grid is a Critical Infrastructure &
Increasingly Vulnerable to Space Weather
   •Electricity is largest energy segment of US ~40% of all energy consumed
   (petroleum only 22% of current US energy consumption)

•EMP Commission, FEMA Exec Order 13407, National Academy of
Sciences Investigation Results Indicate
   •Space Weather Risks have potential to create Large Scale Blackouts,
   •Permanent Damage to Transformer Assets and Lengthy Restoration

•Loss of Electric Supply will Impact all other Interdependent
Infrastructures
   •Potable Water distribution, waste treatment impacted within several hours,
   •Loss of perishable foods and medications in about 12-24 hours,
   •Immediate or eventual loss of heating/AC, sewage, phones, transportation, fuel
   resupply, etc.
A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
           Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
    Geomagnetic Storms are disturbances in the Earth’s normally
    quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense Solar activity
Geomagnetic Storms have Continent-
   Wide & Planetary Footprints –
 Threaten Developed Economies on
          Planetary Scale




                 Intense Solar Activity – Carrington Class Solar
                 Events are not Rare – Playing Russian Roulette
                                 with the Sun
A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
          Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce
Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC a quasi-DC current) to
    flow in the continental interconnected Electric Power Grids




                                                       Storm causes
                                                     Geomagnetic Field
                                                     Disturbances from
                                                     Electrojet Current
                                                       that couple to
                                                       Power Systems
GIC Risk Factor – Growth of Transmission Network
                                               The larger the Grid – the Larger the Antenna to cause GIC

                                                     Growth of US Transmission Grid & Electric Energy Usage
                                      4000                                                                                             180
                                                                                                                   Cycle 22
                                                                                                                                       160
                                      3500             Annual Electric Energy Usage
                                                       High Voltage Transmission Line Miles
                                                                                                                                       140
Electric Energy Usage (Billion kWh)




                                      3000




                                                                                                                                             High Voltage Lines (Miles x 1000)
                                                                                                                                       120
                  Lacking a Design Code for this Threat Environment
                                      2500

            We have been stacking Risk Multipliers On Top of Risk Multipliers
                                                                        100
             2000
                        Unknowingly Escalating Risk to Society          80

                                      1500
                                                             Cycle 19                                                                  60
                                                                                              1969 – First 765 kV Transmission Line
                                      1000
                                                                                                                                       40
                                                                                              1964 – First 500 kV Transmission Line
                                       500                                                                                             20
                                                                                             1953 – First 345 kV Transmission Line
                                         0                                                                                             0
                                             1950   1955    1960     1965    1970     1975       1980    1985    1990    1995   2000
                                                                                       Year
US High-Voltage Transmission Network




              500 kV & 765 kV serve ~60% of US geographic
                  territory and ~86% of US population




765kV               European and Asian Continental Grids are
500kV                        of similar proportions
345kV
A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
                                                                                              Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
                                                                                        GIC flow in transformers can cause Power Grid Blackouts &
2   0   0   2   /   0   9   /   2   7   0   0   :   0   4   :   0   0   .   0   0   0
                                                                                                          Permanent Grid Damage




                                                                                              Areas of Probable                       Blackouts of
                                                                                               Power System                          Unprecedented
                                                                                                  Collapse                               Scale
A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
             Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
   GIC flow can also has potential to cause wide-spread catastrophic
               damage to key Power Grid Transformers
                     Causing Restoration Problems
                       These Key Assets may take a
                         Year or More to Replace

                                                            Internal
                                                         Damage due
                                                         to one storm




Salem Nuclear Plant
 GSU Transformer
 Failure, March ‘89
Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario
       At-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers
                                  Many Regions with High
                                  Damage Loss Estimated




 Estimated that many large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC
exposure to be At-Risk of Permanent Damage & Loss – Replacement could
        extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates
Great Geomagnetic Storms
    US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness
• Threat
        • New Awareness that Geomagnetic Storm Severity is 4 to 10
          Times larger than previously understood – Past NOAA Metrics
          did not measure risks correctly for power industry
• Vulnerability
        • Power Grid infrastructures have experienced a “Design Creep”
          over past few decades that have unknowingly escalated
          vulnerability to these threats – No Design Code Yet Exists
• Consequences
        • Power Supply is an essential scaffolding of modern society
        • All other Critical infrastructures will also collapse with long-term
          loss of Electricity

• Risk – Events have catastrophic potential, the ability to take the lives of
  hundreds of people in one blow, or to shorten or cripple the lives of
  thousands or millions more, impact future generations of society
March 13, 1989 – Storm 7:39UT




Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT)   20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather
Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989




Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT)   Quebec Blackout in 92 Seconds at
                                        Intensity 0f ~480 nT/min
March 13, 1989 – Storm 21:40UT




Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)
Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989




                                        Intensity over Mid-Atlantic Region
Time 16:03-17:30 EST (21:03-22:30 UT)              ~300 nT/min
Great Geomagnetic Storms
   March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons




                                               Position of
                                               Westward
                                               Electrojet


Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet
        March 13, 1989
Great Geomagnetic Storms
      March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons




Estimated Boundaries of
   Eastward Electrojet
    May 14-15, 1921
Larger & More Intense than
        March 1989
Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
              Within 25 months after the March 1989 Storm




          7                                                      11
                                                 12

                                       6          10             1.    Salem
                                                             2
                                            9        8   1
                                                                 2.    Oyster Creek
                                                                 3.    South Texas
                                                         5       4.    Shearon Harris
                                                                 5.    Surry 1
                                                 4               6.    Zion 2
                                                                 7.    WNP 2
                                                                 8.    Peach Bottom 3
                                                                 9.    D.C. Cook 1
                               3                                 10.   Susquehanna
                                                                 11.   Maine Yankee
                                                                 12.   Nine-Mile


Latent Impacts of March 1989 Storm – Delayed Failures of Large Transformers
                   at Nuclear Plants suspected across US
Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
    Nuclear Plants have some special vulnerability issues
• Severe Storms could initiate a Long Term Outage to large portions of the US
  electric grid – Including many Nuclear Power Plants all at the Same Time

• The Large Transformers in Nuclear Plants also have Higher Exposure to GIC,
  making them more Vulnerable to damage/failure

• Transformer Damage - Fire & Disruptive Failure of the Exposed Transformer -
  Collateral Damage to Vital Back-up and Cooling Systems at the Nuclear Plant

• Fukushima demonstrated that loss of outside power (Grid Blackout) & Plant
  Damage to Back-up Systems has severe consequences for both reactors and
  spent fuel pools

• Trends of Increasing EMP and RF Weapon Vulnerabilities for Nuclear Plant Control
  Systems (Fast Transient Vulnerability in addition to GIC Vulnerability)
Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
  Movie of Transformer Disruptive Failure – NOT DUE TO GIC




    Above Movie is Disruptive Failure of ~3MVA Transformer
  Nuclear Plant Transformers can be 400 Times Larger Capacity
Wrap-Up
   The Nation has experienced a Several Decade Long Failure to
Understand how Risk has Migrated into our Electric Grid Infrastructures
                   from Space Weather Threats

     What are the Issues We should Understand Going
                         Forward

• The Sun, Magnetosphere remain fully Capable of Producing
  Historically Large Geomagnetic Storms in the Future

• Grid Design Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and
  Potential Impacts
   Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize
                               this Threat

• Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is
  a Certainty – Only with Much more Serious Consequences

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Kappenman Oct6 Ndu

  • 1. Severe Solar Activity/Space Weather and the Global Threat to Electric Grids John G. Kappenman Storm Analysis Consultants
  • 2. Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Space Weather •The US Electric Power Grid is a Critical Infrastructure & Increasingly Vulnerable to Space Weather •Electricity is largest energy segment of US ~40% of all energy consumed (petroleum only 22% of current US energy consumption) •EMP Commission, FEMA Exec Order 13407, National Academy of Sciences Investigation Results Indicate •Space Weather Risks have potential to create Large Scale Blackouts, •Permanent Damage to Transformer Assets and Lengthy Restoration •Loss of Electric Supply will Impact all other Interdependent Infrastructures •Potable Water distribution, waste treatment impacted within several hours, •Loss of perishable foods and medications in about 12-24 hours, •Immediate or eventual loss of heating/AC, sewage, phones, transportation, fuel resupply, etc.
  • 3. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms Geomagnetic Storms are disturbances in the Earth’s normally quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense Solar activity Geomagnetic Storms have Continent- Wide & Planetary Footprints – Threaten Developed Economies on Planetary Scale Intense Solar Activity – Carrington Class Solar Events are not Rare – Playing Russian Roulette with the Sun
  • 4. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC a quasi-DC current) to flow in the continental interconnected Electric Power Grids Storm causes Geomagnetic Field Disturbances from Electrojet Current that couple to Power Systems
  • 5. GIC Risk Factor – Growth of Transmission Network The larger the Grid – the Larger the Antenna to cause GIC Growth of US Transmission Grid & Electric Energy Usage 4000 180 Cycle 22 160 3500 Annual Electric Energy Usage High Voltage Transmission Line Miles 140 Electric Energy Usage (Billion kWh) 3000 High Voltage Lines (Miles x 1000) 120 Lacking a Design Code for this Threat Environment 2500 We have been stacking Risk Multipliers On Top of Risk Multipliers 100 2000 Unknowingly Escalating Risk to Society 80 1500 Cycle 19 60 1969 – First 765 kV Transmission Line 1000 40 1964 – First 500 kV Transmission Line 500 20 1953 – First 345 kV Transmission Line 0 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Year
  • 6. US High-Voltage Transmission Network 500 kV & 765 kV serve ~60% of US geographic territory and ~86% of US population 765kV European and Asian Continental Grids are 500kV of similar proportions 345kV
  • 7. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms GIC flow in transformers can cause Power Grid Blackouts & 2 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 . 0 0 0 Permanent Grid Damage Areas of Probable Blackouts of Power System Unprecedented Collapse Scale
  • 8. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms GIC flow can also has potential to cause wide-spread catastrophic damage to key Power Grid Transformers Causing Restoration Problems These Key Assets may take a Year or More to Replace Internal Damage due to one storm Salem Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Failure, March ‘89
  • 9. Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario At-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers Many Regions with High Damage Loss Estimated Estimated that many large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC exposure to be At-Risk of Permanent Damage & Loss – Replacement could extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates
  • 10. Great Geomagnetic Storms US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness • Threat • New Awareness that Geomagnetic Storm Severity is 4 to 10 Times larger than previously understood – Past NOAA Metrics did not measure risks correctly for power industry • Vulnerability • Power Grid infrastructures have experienced a “Design Creep” over past few decades that have unknowingly escalated vulnerability to these threats – No Design Code Yet Exists • Consequences • Power Supply is an essential scaffolding of modern society • All other Critical infrastructures will also collapse with long-term loss of Electricity • Risk – Events have catastrophic potential, the ability to take the lives of hundreds of people in one blow, or to shorten or cripple the lives of thousands or millions more, impact future generations of society
  • 11. March 13, 1989 – Storm 7:39UT Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) 20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather
  • 12. Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989 Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) Quebec Blackout in 92 Seconds at Intensity 0f ~480 nT/min
  • 13. March 13, 1989 – Storm 21:40UT Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)
  • 14. Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989 Intensity over Mid-Atlantic Region Time 16:03-17:30 EST (21:03-22:30 UT) ~300 nT/min
  • 15. Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons Position of Westward Electrojet Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet March 13, 1989
  • 16. Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons Estimated Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet May 14-15, 1921 Larger & More Intense than March 1989
  • 17. Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents Within 25 months after the March 1989 Storm 7 11 12 6 10 1. Salem 2 9 8 1 2. Oyster Creek 3. South Texas 5 4. Shearon Harris 5. Surry 1 4 6. Zion 2 7. WNP 2 8. Peach Bottom 3 9. D.C. Cook 1 3 10. Susquehanna 11. Maine Yankee 12. Nine-Mile Latent Impacts of March 1989 Storm – Delayed Failures of Large Transformers at Nuclear Plants suspected across US
  • 18. Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents Nuclear Plants have some special vulnerability issues • Severe Storms could initiate a Long Term Outage to large portions of the US electric grid – Including many Nuclear Power Plants all at the Same Time • The Large Transformers in Nuclear Plants also have Higher Exposure to GIC, making them more Vulnerable to damage/failure • Transformer Damage - Fire & Disruptive Failure of the Exposed Transformer - Collateral Damage to Vital Back-up and Cooling Systems at the Nuclear Plant • Fukushima demonstrated that loss of outside power (Grid Blackout) & Plant Damage to Back-up Systems has severe consequences for both reactors and spent fuel pools • Trends of Increasing EMP and RF Weapon Vulnerabilities for Nuclear Plant Control Systems (Fast Transient Vulnerability in addition to GIC Vulnerability)
  • 19. Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents Movie of Transformer Disruptive Failure – NOT DUE TO GIC Above Movie is Disruptive Failure of ~3MVA Transformer Nuclear Plant Transformers can be 400 Times Larger Capacity
  • 20. Wrap-Up The Nation has experienced a Several Decade Long Failure to Understand how Risk has Migrated into our Electric Grid Infrastructures from Space Weather Threats What are the Issues We should Understand Going Forward • The Sun, Magnetosphere remain fully Capable of Producing Historically Large Geomagnetic Storms in the Future • Grid Design Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat • Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a Certainty – Only with Much more Serious Consequences