* A soft landing is the least likely outcome for the US economy. Inflation, stagflation and recession have higher probabilities. * Yield compression (amplified by years of financial repression) has left valuations extremely vulnerable to sharp increases in risk-free rates. * Disorder in markets may produce dislocation and price distortions that could lead to generational investment opportunities. * GCC stock markets reflect twentieth-century economies based on traditional industries and outdated business models . * There is little evidence that the regional economy is weaning itself quickly enough away from oil. * Each GCC country is on its own distinctive journey towards reform and diversification, and success will vary. * There is a war on fossil fuels and the stakes could not be higher.

1. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Tarek Fadlallah, CFA
Chief Executive Officer
Nomura Asset Management
Middle East
P.O. Box 506882
Dubai, UAE
Tel: +971 4 428 4587
www.nomura-asset.co.uk
April 20th, 2022
The Arabian Markets
Highlights:
 A soft landing is the least likely
outcome for the US economy.
Inflation, stagflation and recession
have higher probabilities.
 Disorder in markets may produce
dislocation and price distortions
that eventually lead to generational
investment opportunities.
 GCC stock markets reflect
twentieth-century economies based
on traditional industries and
outdated business models.
 Oil revenues have unexpectedly
swelled government coffers and
secured a long spending runway.
 There is little evidence that the
economy is weaning itself quickly
enough away from oil.
 Each GCC country is on its own
distinctive journey towards reform
and diversification, and success will
vary. Some plans are too sluggish.
 There is a war on fossil fuels and
the stakes could not be higher.
Content:
Pop Music 2
GCC Markets 3
The Gemini Economy 4
The Puzzle of Profits 5
Banking on Banks 6
After Oil 7
Bottom Line 9
Market Commentary — a product of Sales and Marketing and not Investment Research or Advice
Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority
Game Stopped

2. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 2
Pop Music
A deadly plague, meme stock bubbles, speculation in invisible coins, soaring food prices, an energy crisis
and a war in Europe was not predicted for the decade billed as the “roaring twenties”.
Even if US inflation moderates it is a matter of historical fact that the Fed got its transitory forecast wrong.
It ignored economic theory, neglected the data, relied on clairvoyance and left itself exposed — it lost
control of the narrative and damaged its credibility. The ECB, BoJ and BoE are equally culpable.
Unfortunately a soft landing is now the least likely outcome for the US economy — inflation, stagflation
and recession have higher probabilities with ominous consequences for the global economy.
Some of the irrational exuberance in the stock
markets has been flushed out. Ark Innovation
ETF — symbol of the Robinhood-fuelled retail
mania — has given back all its relative gains.
Questionable growth stocks and indices have
suffered equally steep reversals.
It is far from certain that the corrections are
over but volatility is leading to remarkable
disparity in valuations that should ultimately
offer attractive investment opportunities.
With interest rates rising and far from settled, there are serious implications for asset prices across the
risk spectrum. Yield compression — amplified by years of financial repression — has left valuations hugely
vulnerable to sharp increases in risk-free rates. For example, the price of an asset yielding 4% should
(must!) change as federal funds rates move from 0.50% towards its terminal rate around 3%.
The Yield Gap — a measure of spreads
between the US 10-year treasury yield and
the equity earnings and dividend yields —
has widened markedly in recent weeks.
The 10-year treasury yield is about 1.41%
higher than the S&P500 dividend yield.
And though the earnings yield is still 1.59%
above the treasury yield the spread has
narrowed considerably from the 5.75%
level reached in March 2020.
Moreover, the macroeconomic and geopolitical backdrop has worsened amid growing protectionism and
concerns over supply chains, energy independence, food security and the Dollar’s reserve currency status.
These are individually critical issues and collectively constitute a profound challenge that threatens to roll
back further the gains of globalisation by raising costs, reducing profits and increasing risk premiums.
Disorder in the financial markets may produce dislocations and price distortions that eventually lead to
generational investment opportunities.
-1.84
1.41
-1.59
0.06
-2.71
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
03/18 09/18 03/19 09/19 03/20 09/20 03/21 09/21 03/22
Bond-Equity Yields
US10Y-SPX Dividend Yield US10Y-SPX Earnings Yield
Average
Average
Source: Bloomberg, @tarekfad
EQUITIES
BONDS
BONDS
EQUITIES
-26%
47%
64%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
10/2018 06/2019 02/2020 10/2020 06/2021 02/2022
China Internet Basket ARK Innovation S&P500
Source: Bloomberg, @tarekfad
Pop!

3. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 3
GCC Markets
The IMF has downgraded global growth forecasts but expects Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest economy,
to grow by 7.6% this year — optimism that reflects a shorter term dynamic around oil but also a longer
one related to transformative change. Many private sector analysts expect Saudi GDP to exceed 8%.
Recent data showing improvements in the labour market, elevated PMI numbers and a welcomed uptick in
foreign direct investment underpin the prevailing positive sentiment.
Compared to other emerging markets the GCC economies are well insulated from the ripple effects of
higher interest rates due to ample financial reserves, modest borrowings and expansionary fiscal policies.
Sovereign bonds yield spreads are stable and measures of risk, such as the five-year credit default swaps,
are well-anchored in contrast to many emerging economies.
The Saudi Arabian TASI is up 21% this year and though Abu Dhabi’s ADX index is slightly lagging on 17% it
has actually tripled from its March 2020 pandemic lows.
The MSCI benchmarks reveal just how well the GCC and Saudi indices have performed this year with the
latter’s five-year returns comparing extremely favourably to Asia, Europe and the Emerging Markets.
The gains have come from recovering profits but also from multiple expansion that has lifted the Saudi
price to earning ratios from the teens to mid-twenties despite the moderating effect of a weighty Aramco.
Given elevated valuations and abundant
liquidity it’s not surprising to see a flurry
of corporate activity and a lengthy queue
of proposed initial public offerings.
Dubai Electricity and Water’s $6.1 billion
IPO was the largest offering this year
across the Middle East, Africa and Europe
but there have also been a number of
notable transactions from Saudi Arabia
and Abu Dhabi that underscore buoyancy
across the exchanges.
It’s difficult to think of many other economies that are undergoing such momentous transformation or to
imagine more dynamic capital markets at this time.
Source: Bloomberg
6.1
1.4
1.1
0.8
0.5
0.3
-$0.5 $0.5 $1.5 $2.5 $3.5 $4.5 $5.5 $6.5
DEWA
Nahdi Medical
Abu Dhabi Ports
Elm
Al-Dawaa Medical
Al Masane Mining
Selected GCC IPO Listings 2022 YTD
(USD Billions)
Source: Bloomberg
PE RATIO PB RATIO EV/EBITDA DIV YIELD YTD % 5 YEAR %
MSCI USA 23.9 4.5 15.6 1.4 -7.1 90.1
MSCI WORLD 19.8 3.0 12.8 1.9 -7.6 61.6
MSCI WORLD (EX-USA) 14.2 1.7 9.0 3.0 -8.9 20.4
MSCI EMERGING MARKETS 12.7 1.7 8.9 2.7 -11.0 14.4
MSCI AC ASIA PACIFIC 13.2 1.5 8.7 2.7 -11.5 17.1
MSCI EUROPE 15.5 1.9 9.9 2.9 -5.7 19.4
MSCI SAUDI ARABIA 23.0 2.7 11.4 2.2 20.9 103.1
MSCI GCC (ex-KSA) 19.4 2.3 NA 2.7 17.6 47.2

4. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 4
GCC Gemini Economy
A chart of the aggregated profits for the nearly 700 listed GCC companies (excluding Aramco) by sector
reveals that while earnings have trended up since the global financial crisis this has been driven largely by
the banking sector which grew its contribution from 32% of total profits in 2007 to 59% in 2019.
After non-bank profits reached $37.3 billion in 2007 it took another 7 years to regain that level in nominal
dollars and unadjusted for new listings. Profits fell to $24.4 billion in 2019 and $18.4 billion in pandemic-
affected 2020 but recovered to over $36 billion last year. Each peak has coincided with higher oil prices.
GCC stock markets reflect twentieth-century economies based on traditional industries and outdated
business models that relied on subsidies, patronage and regulatory protection with minimal value-added.
Companies spend virtually nothing on R&D and only a little more on any kind of proprietary innovation.
Even with the wave of IPOs the market characteristics is largely unchanged with few companies engaged in
what might be construed as growth sectors — it’s typically family groups divesting mature businesses.
At the country level, data hints at the
diminishing dominance of Saudi Arabia
relative to the UAE although the
latter’s resilience may be reflective in
part to market concentration in a few
stocks and modest exposure to the
volatile petrochemical sector.
The chart also shows the decreasing
importance of the Kuwait stock market
in a regional context after it accounted
for just 5% of overall profits in 2020
compared to 23% in 2007.
35.5%
5.0%
19.8%
3.4%
2.1%
34.2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Share of GCC Corporate Profits
KSA Kuwait Qatar Oman Bahrain UAE
Source: Marmore, @tarekfad
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
-$10,000
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20
GCC Corporate Profits By Sector
Banks Commodities Conglomerates Construction Related Financial Services
Others Real Estate Telecommunications Utilities Percentage
Source: Marmore, @tarekfad
Non-Bank
$37.34 billion
$24.40 billion
$37.77 billion

5. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 5
The Puzzle of Profitless Growth
An explanation for the profitless growth in the GCC can be found in the author’s article for the Middle
East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/puzzle-profitless-growth-gcc-firms published last year.
One issue is that profits have been cyclical, highly correlated to oil prices and reliant on public spending.
While this is good news at current prices, breaking away from boom to bust cyclicality is the hallmark of a
diversified economy and a common objective among regional policymakers.
Companies are gradually coming to terms with the new policy environment and trying to find sustainable
operating models but face strong headwinds caused by the withdrawal of subsidies, rising labour costs,
regulatory reforms, higher taxes and an increasingly competitive business landscape.
Almarai is among the best managed Saudi
blue chips but has toiled to maintain hefty
profit margins due to subsidy withdrawals
and rising operating costs.
Profits have stagnated and its stock price
has been flat for several years.
Comparisons with global peers suggest
scope for further margin erosion — 20%
to match French dairy-firm Danone and
40% to equal Swiss dairy-maker Emmi.
Almarai’s biggest shareholder is Savola whose own troubles are highlighted by the fact that its market cap
is largely accounted for by investments in the Saudi dairy company and the fast-food chain Herfy.
Savola has suffered managerial missteps in addition to the prevailing
headwinds and (notwithstanding transactions costs, loans and taxes) has
a value that is barely greater than its combined investment holdings —
its food and retail businesses are theoretically “free”.
Saudi Telecom Company (STC) is highly regarded and since 2013 its Enterprise Value (market cap+debt)
has increased 137% and revenues by 39% but income is down 10% — valuations are basically running ahead
of its ability to generate dividend growth.
Almarai, Savola and STC are among the very best companies in Saudi Arabia, and indeed the GCC, and
their trials and tribulations speak volumes to the difficulties faced in maintaining historically extraordinary
margins facilitated by monopoly, patronage, subsidy and other unsustainable cost advantages.
As these benefits are phased out or competed away the true characteristics of these businesses is being
exposed and it doesn’t always make for pleasant viewing.
Saudi Telecom (SAR) FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY13 - FY21
Enterprise Value 97,681 122,371 124,622 133,686 125,425 165,706 206,497 207,949 231,573 137%
Revenue 45,605 45,826 50,651 52,674 50,661 51,963 54,368 58,953 63,417 39%
Net Income 11,783 10,957 9,547 8,958 10,251 11,007 10,694 10,530 10,657 -10%
Source: Bloomberg, @tarekfad
Source: Bloomberg
7.9
15.7
9.9
5.5
1.5
-
4
8
12
16
20
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Dairy Profit Margins (%)
Danone AlMarai Emmi Savencia
Source: Bloomberg @tarekfad
COMPANY MARKET CAP
19,944,178,548
STAKE VALUE
ALMARAI 34.52% 17,536,160,000
HERFY 49.00% 1,793,835,120
(At 1
9/4/2022) TOTAL 19,329,995,120
SAVOLA

6. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 6
Banking on Banks
The Saudi market is liquidity driven and overvalued, particularly within the long tail of stocks outside the
three sectors that account for 72% of the index.
The macro-story may be appealing but drilling into
specific stocks and identifying attractively priced ones
is really challenging.
The unweighted average price to earnings ratio for the
bottom 18 sectors representing most of listed stocks
is 55x with a return on equity of 7.8% compared to
11.7% for the overall index.
Furthermore, the average unweighted return among
these 18 sectors at 13% over the past year has been
less than half the overall market returns.
A breakdown of the gains in the TASI
reveals that most stocks did not actually
add much to the index performance.
The overwhelming majority of the gains in
TASI over the past year were accounted
for by a few banks with the balance
coming mostly from the Petrochemical
and Energy (Aramco) sectors.
The other listed stocks have been largely
irrelevant to the index.
Media reports have suggested that the Saudi National Bank (SNB) may seek international acquisitions and
reported Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Standard Chartered and Julius Baer among the possible targets.
The market capitalization of SNB at
$87 billion is much greater than the
those four banks combined.
The financial behemoth that is Alrajhi
bank ranks as the world’s 13th largest
bank with a market cap bigger than
Citigroup or Japan’s largest megabank.
The high bank market caps is a regional
phenomenon and a function of similar
cost advantages they shares.
There is no immediate danger to bank earnings but this simple sense check suggests poor long-term values.
$25
$20 $20
$11
$59
$66
$87
$117
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
DEUTSCHE
BANK
STANDARD
CHARTER
CREDIT
SUISSE
JULIUS BAER QNB FIRST ABU
DHABI
SNB AL RAJHI
Market Cap (US)
($ billions)
Source: Bloomberg, @tarekfad
Total $76 billion
As of 17/4/2022
Source: Bloomberg
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Contribution to TASI's Rally in Past Year
Source: Bloomberg, @tarekfad
The Long Ineffective Tail
Saudi Sectors PER PBR ROE Weight % 1 Year %
Banks 24.3 2.7 11.5 44.9 66.9
Materials 14.6 2.2 15.6 18.5 25.6
Energy 10.5 3.2 30.6 8.6 18.0
Telecoms 20.1 2.3 11.6 5.0 0.6
Real Estate 77.6 1.8 2.8 4.0 12.2
Food & Beverage 62.6 2.8 4.5 3.2 -8.9
Utilities 23.7 0.7 3.0 2.5 34.0
Retailing 38.0 9.7 25.7 2.4 -0.4
Healthcare 42.4 5.3 12.2 2.3 35.7
Insurance NA 2.6 -2.2 1.8 -1.8
Media 43.6 9.9 23.4 1.1 147.3
Consumer Svcs NA 2.1 -2.4 1.0 11.6
REITs 92.7 1.2 1.3 0.8 1.2
Transportation NA 2.5 0.8 0.7 -3.6
Food & Staples 6.9 1.5 25.1 0.7 -10.8
Diversified Financials 21.2 3.0 13.9 0.7 25.1
Capital Goods 41.9 2.6 6.2 0.7 -4.9
Commercial Svcs 103.6 6.4 6.3 0.4 10.1
Software Svcs NA NA NA 0.4 NA
Consumer Durables NA 2.3 -0.8 0.2 -18.9
Pharma 140.1 2.3 1.4 0.2 -9.4
TASI 25.3 2.9 11.7 100.0 33.5
TASI-18 (Unweighted Ave) 55.0 3.5 7.8 28.0 12.9

7. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 7
After Oil
Despite the pandemic, there has been no let-up in the regional reform and diversification programs that
continue to boost sentiment, especially in Saudi Arabia, where the business community is riding a euphoric
wave of PIF-led investment initiatives.
Saudi GDP and PMIs have been strong
but the lubricant is oil and it is not clear
whether this is another cyclical recovery
or a more sustainable structural upturn
enabled by diversification strategies.
Oil revenues have swelled government
reserves and secured a long spending
runway so we wont know for a while.
However there is little evidence of a
significant shift away from oil dependence.
It is now six years since the Vision 2030 plan was announced and sixteen months until the half way point
to its symbolic delivery date in December 2030.
The number of programs launched is many and the list of achievements impressive, from increased home
ownership to improved health services, reform of the capital markets, advanced e-government, female
empowerment, Saudization and the creation of new industries such as tourism and entertainment.
The removal of wasteful subsidies and higher taxation has also established a strong and sustainable fiscal
basis from which to grow the economy.
For all the positives it is not obvious
what might eventually complement oil
in securing export dollars.
Petroleum products represented a
higher percentage of exports in 2019
than in 2016 when Vision 2030 was
launched and will do so again in 2022.
The Saudi industrial strategy has merit
but is not yet compelling enough to
overcome continued caution among
international and domestic investors.
There is a big emphasis on several strategic sectors, including tourism, but the jury is out on whether they
can generate sufficient revenues to compensate for potential shortfalls in petroleum exports.
Building out the vision necessarily takes time but actual project delivery has been modest so far and the
FDI pipeline has secured few blockbuster deals or marquee projects despite the occasional rumour.
There is absolutely no debate on the path or direction only question marks over the speed and execution.
Building cities in the desert is one thing, populating them productively is another.
72.6% 72.8%
71.5%
74.1%
75.1%
65.2%
62%
66%
70%
74%
78%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Petroleum Products
% of Saudi Arabian Exports
Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/sau, @tarekfad
[Defined: Crude, Refined and Petroleum Gas]
Covid Effect
40
45
50
55
60
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
11/2018 05/2019 11/2019 05/2020 11/2020 05/2021 11/2021 05/2022
Brent Oil Saudi PMI (RH scale)
Source: Bloomberg, @tarekfad

8. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 8
The War on Fossils Fuels
It’s easy to get carried away by the excitement around triple-digit oil prices but the longer term outlook
for demand is distinctly unfavourable.
In the ten years prior to the pandemic
demand grew at just 1.7% per annum
and should grow less or even decline
over the next decade.
The global war on hydrocarbons that
was evident at COP26 has reached a
crescendo amid soaring prices and a
desire to accelerate the transition away
from fossil fuels and reduce reliance on
OPEC+ and Russia in particular.
Road transportation is (by far) the most important usage for oil and data shows that it is almost certain
that 2017 was the year in which sales of passenger cars with an internal combustion engine (ICE) peaked.
The demand for petrol is on a predictable
downtrend with electric vehicle (EV) sales
set to soar and irreversibly usurp demand
for ICE cars.
Meanwhile, industrial and petrochemical
users of oil are coming under pressure for
environmental reasons and are unlikely to
pick up the slack.
Additionally, the debate over the energy
transition has refocused attention on the
switch to price-competitive renewables.
Until recently there was a persuasive case that plentiful oil supply would overwhelm demand and force the
equilibrium price down to $60 a barrel or perhaps less.
The post-pandemic recovery however has highlighted supply bottlenecks induced by a reluctance to invest
in the precarious industry outlook and reduced access to funding — ING bank for example announcing
that it will no longer finance new oil and gas projects.
With reduced investment and funding by the private sector the national oil companies, specifically in the
GCC where the cost of production is low, should increase their market share in spite of shrinking demand.
High oil prices will fill GCC government coffers and buy time for economies to pivot away from fossil fuels
but the battle to combat climate change, rising geopolitical considerations and rapid advancements in the
electrification of the land transportation sector impose a definitive timeline on the process.
This period of elevated oil prices may represent a final hurrah for producers to invest proceeds wisely.
1.7%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Slow Growth & Disruption
Oil Demand (mbpd) Annual Growth (RH scale)
Source: Statista, @tarekfad
1.8%
3.0%
3.6%
4.4%
9.8%
12.6%
16.2%
48.6%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Rail & Waterways
Electricity generation
Marine Bunkers
Aviation
Residential/Commerical
Other Industry
Petrochemicals
Road Transportation
Oil Demand by Usage
Source: Statista, @tarekfad
28.8%

9. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Limited Dubai branch April 20th, 2022
Page 9
The Bottom Line
It’s anybody’s guess how the global economy will perform but volatility in currencies and interest rates on
this scale is rare and may be a harbinger of trouble so it is best to keep an open mind and remain vigilant.
Sentiment is solidly bearish and may tempt contrarians but the risks are asymmetric. No time for bravery.
In Countdown to Midnight (November 14th, 2016) we warned about the impact of electric vehicles on oil
demand and were wrong only because our forecast is materializing even faster than expected!
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 was launched to address these risks and though achieving its lofty objectives in
the designated time-frame may seem unrealistic there was no alternative to setting such high aspirations.
In the event, legacy hurdles in regulations, stifling bureaucracy and the massive amount of change required
to facilitate the “new economy” have understandably hurt the speed of progress.
Each GCC country is on its own distinctive journey towards reform and diversification, and success will
vary. There is room for optimism in some programs but others are worryingly sluggish.
While achievements to date must be respected, resting on laurels is unhelpful especially when the past has
taught us not to underestimate the unpredictable future.
Oil prices were negative just two years ago and there is an intense international campaign to completely
eliminate use of the region’s principal source of income. The stakes could not be higher.
Eid Mubarak
Tarek Fadlallah, CFA
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