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Michael “Nykolai” Blichar Jr.
Social Movements and Revolutions
Dr. Portada
November 18th 2014
Case Study: Moro National Liberation Front
It the contemporary world, there are many diverse groups fighting for the basic right of
self-determination. This was an idea that was laid out by the United Nations in resolution 1514
on granting independence and recognition to colonial countries and peoples in 1960, right at the
end of the colonial era (United Nations). Even after these colonies achieved independence,
groups that were neglected and their voices unheard rose up to stake their claim in the game of
self-determination as well. Among those groups of people include the Bangsamoro who inhabit
the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines. The idea that puts the Bangsamoro into the
ranks with other current social movements are the efforts that the Moro National Liberation
Front has put forward to address the concerns of their people.
The MNLF is a group that has been able to adapt to changing conditions that occur in the
Philippines when forming strategies to address the Bangsamoro concerns that correlate with
shifts in regime types, international influences, and ideological changes. The strategy of
adaptation for the MNLF has allowed them to survive in the changing conditions within the
Philippines, and authors like Tilly, Tarrow, and also Goldstone can help to answer whether or not
their continued strategies will facilitate overall success or failure. To gather a concise analysis by
using theories that particular authors offer, it would be important to first capture the historical

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context of the Moro National Liberation Front and the Bangsamoro people overall, as well as the
dynamics of the MNLF as an organized group. After considering both of these key aspects of the
movement it will become much easier to then construct an analysis of the movement itself by
using authors to explain the strategies, ability for success, and how it compares to past social
movements.
The historical context in which a conflict is facilitated has always been important in
helping explain why a current social movement developed and the Moro National Liberation
Front is no exception. It would be crucial to analyze the history and people who are at the focal
point of this conflict prior to the development of the Moro National Liberation Front to
understand the MNLF was created. The group that is at the focal point are the Bangsamoro, a
tribal people who inhabit the southern Philippines on the island of Mindanao in particular. The
Bangsamoro tribes were Islamized after the arrival of Islam to Mindanao in the 13th century,
something that has become the major source of identity for this group. (Santos, 1). The
Bangsamoro often referred to simply as the “Moro” get their name from the Spanish who named
the Muslim tribal group after the Moors, a people who ruled over Spain for eight centuries
(Santos, 2). Speaking of the Spanish, this is where most Moro Muslim’s would trace the current
conflict back to.
The Spanish who arrived in the 16th century came around the same time that Islam was
begging to spread throughout Mindanao and Sulu. When the Spanish discovered the Moro tribes
their first effort was to convert these people to Christianity. Quickly tribes that already had
adopted Islam resisted this effort which was motivated by their determination to maintain their
independence, life-style, and of course religion (Noble, 406). For the most part the Moro tribes
were successful in maintaining their freedom from direct Spanish rule during the colonization of

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the Philippines; however that did not halt the push for assimilation and conformity by Christian
Spaniards and Filipinos. The effort by Christians towards integration and assimilation was seen
by the Moro tribes as a loss of their identity and intrusion on their way of life as a result the
Moro continued to resist any efforts of assimilation being pushed forward by the Christian
groups. Ultimately, the larger conflict that was established was Moro visions that not only were
the Spanish imperialists but the Christian groups as well. The independence and autonomy of the
Moro tribes would continue during Spanish rule as well as the continued struggle to resist
Christianization even as colonial rule switched hands to the United States, after the signing of the
Treaty of Paris in 1989 and the end of the Spanish American War (Santos, 2).
Under the administration of the United States, the Moros continued to enjoy autonomy
with the establishment of a Moro province in 1903 which created a period in which there was
some sense of unity between the Muslims and the Christians. However, there were other motives
for the establishment of the Moro province. The United States hoped that by allowing autonomy
of the Moro Muslim groups it would eventually ease their concerns about losing their identities
and eventual would compel them to integrate as a larger part of the Philippine state. Although the
Moro peoples retained autonomy over their land, the threat of Christian influence still loomed.
Over time many Christians began to migrate to the same areas inhabited by the Muslim Moro
majority in Mindanao and with that came the development of small Muslim organizations that
sought to keep the territory in their control (Noble, 407). WWII gave the Moro the ability to
consolidate that power when rebel groups took advantage of the chaos and absence of a definite
colonial power ruling over the area. During that time the Moro managed to obtain large amounts
of wealth gained through landholding, timber concessions, legal and illegal trade, and political
brokerage (Noble, 407).

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However, the peaceful era of autonomy would come to an end with the establishment of
independence for the Philippines on July 4, 1976 (Judd). The colonial era offer the back story of
the Moro struggle, however fast forward to the 1950s and the 1960s, is where the present day
conflict between the Moro people and the Philippines government begins. In the years after
independence the Philippine government accelerated its promotion of migration into the south
particularly, Mindanao. This was an effort by the government to consolidate and utilize the
resource-rich areas located in the southern islands. As more and more Filipinos began populating
the area, Moro demands became apparent because their territory was now being threatened by
outside groups, a territory that the Moro regarded as theirs by rights and claimed through their
own legal system (Noble, 407). Regardless, because the Christians, who had been in conflict
with the Moro for centuries, controlled most of the governmental agencies all of the legal
documents made by the Moro were ignored and instead the Christian government continued to
enforce their own decisions on land ownership and use. By this time the small Muslim
organizations that did exist began to hold talks in order to address the issues. These talks were
not the main contributors as two major events would occur that would facilitate these groups to
establish the Moro National Liberation Front.
The first incident occurred in March of 1968 known as the Corregidor Incident which
occurred as a result of the Philippine government claim to Sabah, a region that at the time was a
part of Malaysia (Noble, 407). The Muslim Moro groups initially believed the claim would be
pushed on behalf of their cause, under the pretext that Sabah was purchased through a transaction
between the Muslim Sultan of Sulu and an Austrian businessman in 1878 (Noble, 408).
However, instead the claim was made based on an issue of national right by the Philippine
government rather than because of ties to the Muslim Moro and the Sabahans. When Marcos

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became president then in 1966, he moved to create better relations with Malaysia and
participated in the formation of ASEAN (Noble, 409). This move originally would have
appealed to the Muslim Moro, since they really did not identify with the claims made by the
Philippine government in 1962 but because Marcos signed an anti-smuggling agreement with
Malaysia it ended up affecting the Muslims inhabiting Mindanao in a negative way. Smuggling
between Muslims in Mindanao and Sabah was one of the main sources of obtaining goods and
wealth since WWII and after the establishment of this agreement, Muslim groups only became
angrier as it affected their livelihoods and the ability for them to obtain quality goods that they
needed.
Ironically, at the same time Marcos was negotiating with Malaysia, he had been secretly
recruiting Moro Muslims into the Philippines Armed Forces that aimed at taking Sabah. Muslims
who were in the recruitment were trained with other Filipinos on the Corregidor Island but
because of previous actions taken by the Marcos regime it has been said that the Muslim soldiers
committed mutiny after not receiving their paychecks and were murdered by the other recruits
after not obeying orders, at least that is what the Philippine government reported (Santos, 3). The
Moro people however, who through soldiers who witnessed the accounts would argue that these
Muslim soldiers committed munity because they against an invasion of Sabah because the
Philippine government’s motivation behind claiming it was pushed in a way that didn’t reflect
the Muslim association to the territory. Angered by this these accounts, Muslim organizations
banded together to form the Muslim Independence Movement in 1968 which called for the
creation of an independent Moro nation (Noble, 408). From 1968 to 1972, the MIM began
training new recruits for the cause and carried out attacks against the Marcos administration in

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areas of Mindanao. In response Marcos declared martial law against the Muslim rebels in
October 1972 which led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front.
The Moro National Liberation Front was created in 1969 formally organized on Pulau
Pangkor in Malaysia, where the Malaysian government provided transportation, weapons, and
ammunition (Noble, 409). At this time the MNLF was operating under a regime that was
oppressive with Marcos as the dictator of the government in power. Since the regime had control
over coercive forces the MNLF relied on foreign aid like that of Malaysia to keep its rebellion
moving. Only in 1976 with the signing of the Tripoli Agreement which called for the creation of
an autonomous Moro region did the major conflict end as well as the Marcos administration
(Santos, 5). However, the Tripoli Agreement never went into effect as a result of governmental
changes with a new administration taking over and it wouldn’t be until 1987 when actual
implementation of the Philippine Constitution created a framework for an Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (Santos, 8). Most of the conflict between the Philippine government and
the MNLF died down after the end of the Marcos regime because new ways for negotiation
opened up including the ability for the MNLF to influence governmental policy through
democratic reforms.
However, it is important to also analyze the Moro National Liberation Front to
understand how they were able to be so successful and able to adapt to the varying governmental
changes over time. Overall the Moro National Liberation Front has been a loosely knit
organization; in formal terms the MNLF has both political and military structures. Its political
structure consists of about twenty committees including a military front known as the Bangsa
Moro Army which is not administrated by a central committee (Noble 412). Furthermore this
loose administration allowed for more radical individuals within the organization to break off in

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times when negotiations, especially those that took place after Marcos’s administration ended, to
be carried out. After the Philippine government became more democratized, the MNLF became
more secularists and less radical, transforming into the diplomatic voice for the Moro people. As
a result, radical Muslim Moro individuals who believed that the fight should still be continued
created the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1977 (Santos, 4).
This split was a result of differences in political strategy and objectives but also because
of beliefs in the role of Islam in their struggle. Members of MILF tended to be concentrated on
the Islamic aspect of the Moro struggle rallying behind it as a common cause to fight for (Noble
417). What this does is attracts certain followers and excludes others from both the MNLF and
MILF. Leaders of both groups have agreed that combing the two goals would most likely lessen
the potential for new recruits which lead to the creation of separate groups. What this split
indicated was the weakness among Moro groups and leaders even on the rebel side (Santos, 5).
Overall, the main demand of both Moro liberation fronts’ has alternated between independence
and autonomy.
The MNLF as the main diplomatic voice between the Moro people and the Philippine
government tends to be the advocate more diplomatic agreements to establish autonomy, while
MILF continues its track for independence and full rights to land, using past history as a rallying
call. In the way of tactics however, both groups have used guerilla warfare to demonstrate their
control over the Muslim areas of Mindanao (Noble, 418). The MNLF’s leadership in particular
has focused on connections with other Muslim states to keep the government on the defensive
especially during the years Marcos was in power. These connections include arms that were
being supplied to MNLF by Malaysia and even Libya during 1970, when Kaddafi charged the
Philippine government of Marcos with genocide. Reports given in the Arab Report and Record

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published in 1971 reported that Libya had been sending supplies to MNLF prior to even
denouncing actions by the Marcos regime.
Overall the Moro fronts have shifted their goals and demands based on the change in the
regimes that dominant the Philippines. During the Marcos regime contentious guerilla tactics
were used by the MNLF, but with the establishment of democratic openings for the Moro people
to voice their concerns, the MNLF had become more of a political voice rather than the military
voice which facilitated the creation of groups like MILF by radicals who wanted to continue an
armed struggle. In order to understand why certain actions were taken and why, authors like
Sidney Tarrow who wrote Power in Movement, can help to explain why certain strategies have
been used depending on the type of regime that the MNLF was facing. Tarrow’s “political
structure theory” outlines four different regime types that can facilitate the types of strategies that
a group may develop. Taking the Moro National Liberation Front into account, during the time
of formation the MNLF was operating under an oppressive dictatorship headed by Marcos. This
type of administration could be defined as a low capacity authoritarian regime (Tarrow, 86).
These tend to be a government which is oppressive but the military is not nearly as strong
allowing contenders better opportunities to mobilize (Tarrow,86). Here tactics used by
contenders tend to be guerilla tactics against the government and groups will mobilize in such a
way because they understand that the military isn’t as strong; this is certainly the case for the
MNLF who realized that the security forces under the Marcos regime were not as strong
especially since they were sent into territory unknown to them but certainly known to the MNLF.
However, as regime types changed in the Philippines, the strategies that the MNLF
developed changed as well. After Marcos’s administration the government became much more
open to negotiation and concessions for Moro demands. Although their demands were not

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granted entirely the change in regime type allowed the MNLF to become more diplomatic as the
voice of the Moro people. The Philippine government after Marcos could be defined as a low
capacity democracy where the ability to have voices heard are much more prevalent (Tarrow,
85). For the Moro National Liberation Front this came in the form of party seats being opened in
regional government of Mindanao. By winning seats in the regional assembly the MNLF was
able to have their voices heard and use their elected seats to push demands. However, it’s
important too, to include external factors that would help facilitate a group’s efforts. Tarrow also
outlines external opportunities that facilitate a group’s success. One of these includes the factor
of influential allies (Tarrow 88). For the MNLF these allies came in the form of Malaysia and
Libya when well providing arms, transportation, weapons, and a forum to have their voices and
cause seen and heard around the world. The MNLF although organized and controlled some
resources needed allies like Malaysia and Libya who could also bring their concern into forums
like the United Nations and other international organizations all while supplying the struggle so
that it can stay on its feet. This is something that has also occurred in history, for example the
United States who continually supplies Taiwan with weapons and defense systems allows to
Taiwan’s struggle to maintain legitimacy and seriousness.
Frantz Fanon too may be useful to look and analyze why guerilla warfare may have been
used in the case of the Moro cause. Frantz Fanon who wrote “The Wretched of the Earth” argued
that violence must be used in order to break from the oppression of colonial powers but also the
group’s oppressors. Frantz wrote during the same time that the movement in Mindanao was
occurring but wrote specifically on the Algerian Revolution which took place in 1954 to 1962.
What Fanon’s ultimate argument is that colonial powers brought violence with them to conquer
the territory so in turn violence is justified to break away from the colonial power or the group

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that is creating the oppression (Fanon, 101). In the case of the Moro people the Marcos
administration and the declaration of martial law against the Moro National Liberation Front was
more than enough reason to rise up against the Philippine government. In their case violence is
justified in order to protect their way of life and the land that they legally claim.
Nevertheless the ability for a group to organize and how they organize is also very
important to understanding why ideas a group is able to rally behind can mobilize their members.
Authors like Tilly, who wrote From Mobilization to Revolution in 1978, can offer an explanation
too. Tilly offers to this movement the “collective action model” which outlines certain factors
like common interests, organization, and mobilization that facilitates a movement’s success
(Tilly, 54). In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front, religion in particular being Islam
has been used as a rallying call to motivate most of the struggle and demands of the Moro
people. This idea of being Islam and protecting their Islamic identity would fall under the
category of common interests among the subordinate group that is defined by Tilly. For the Moro
National Liberation Front and even the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, their Islamic identity is a
part of who they are since the 13th century when Islam came to Mindanao. The main struggle for
the Moro to maintain their Islamic identity even while Christianity was trying to spread
throughout the Philippines is also a part of their common cause as it creates an overall struggle.
Another author, Goldstone who can offer an explanation as to why religion was an
important aspect to the Moro. Goldstone offers a structural approach similar to that of Skocpol
who wrote about the political structure theory. What Goldstone adds is the ability for ideology to
play a role in the success or the increased unity of a group. He doesn’t argue that ideology
creates the revolution but rather that it can be used to facilitate group’s motives because it adds a
common interest to it (Goldstone, 30). The use of Islam in uniting the tribes together can be

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compared to that of possibly even socialism being used in Vietnam. Even though socialism is not
a religion, it was still used as a rallying call to unite those who Ho Chi Minh needed to mobilize
particularly the peasantry. For the Moro National Liberation Front it’s a rallying cry but also a
part of their cultural identity that they wanted to protect.
Islam however is not the only common interest that unites the Bangsamoro groups. There
is in a sense a greater struggle that exists and this struggle comes in the form of constant
domination by other groups. The Moro people have since the 16th century when Spain conquered
the territory, have been fighting a struggle to maintain their independent territory, identity, and
way of life. This can be compared to the causes that both revolutionaries like Ho Chi Minh in
Vietnam and Fidel Castro of Cuba used to rally against foreign or oppressive rule. Similar to the
fight in Mindanao, Vietnam was also seen as a territory that had been under the domination of
other groups for a very long time first China, then by France, followed by Japan and France
again. Ho Chi Minh, like the MNLF used the context of an overall historical struggle to unite the
Vietnamese people, much like that of the Moro National Liberation Front. However, it’s also
important to recognize the way in which the MNLF was able to stay organized for the most part.
The second step of the “collective action model” can also be used to explain the
organization of the Moro cause (Tilly, 54). Prior to the creation of the MNLF the Bangsamoro
people were splintered with many Muslim organizations being established and many different
tribes existing all with the same identities and goals. It was not until 1972 when these groups
were consolidated into the Moro National Liberation Front. However, with the events such as the
Corrigan Incident and when Marcos declared martial law it allowed for the facilitation of a larger
consensus among the Moro peoples and the various factions that existed. Unlike other social
movement groups, the MNLF however did not have an overall prominent leadership but rather

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various chairmen that oversaw each of the committees that were initiated under the MNLF
(Noble, 17). Another important aspect of the “collective action model” includes mobilization.
Overall the MNLF seemed organized and ready to mobilize the resources that were delegated to
them from Malaysia and Libya, but loyalty, another important aspect of mobilization in this
model was absent. Since the creation of MILF the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, holes have
been poked in the consensus and the ability for the Moro people to communicate their goals and
concerns effectively. What this split did was create different goals and attitudes which make it
harder for the Bangsamoro people to make a united decision.
After using certain historical contexts and authors to analyze the reasons why the Moro
National Liberation Front and even the Moro Islamic Liberation Front used strategies that they
did its important to analyze their ability for success. A conclusion that can be drawn is that the
MNLF in particular is a group that has a high success rate because it has been able to adapt with
the changes in the Philippine government and opportunities to talks and negotiations. However,
because this lends to changes in goals and objectives as the MNLF adapts, it lends to an
inconsistent plan or goal. This is why organizations like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has
created splintered groups as a way to continue the original demands that were made being
independence and using Islam as the rallying point. However, MNLF has been able to develop
strategies and depending on government changes may even resort back to military action if the
group deems it necessary. The MNLF while struggling with maintaining consistent objectives
will be able to achieve their goals easier by negotiating and adapting to the changes and making
decisions as they see fit.
Overall this movement can be seen as a part of the “The Roundtable Negotiated
Revolution” which Garton Ash outlines in his work published in 2009(Garton, 52). However, it’s

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important to note that the Moro National Liberation Front does not conform to most of the
characteristics of the “roundtable negotiated revolution” but it does conform to the negotiation
process. As Garton Ash points out in these types of revolutions, which appeared to be common
throughout 1989 all the way to the present day, happen much less violently than the revolutions
of 1789. Comparing this to the Moro National Liberation Front the negotiation process has been
for a majority of the present day movement the main tactic for creating an autonomous Muslim
region. However, there is always a price to this model which is the compromises that have to be
made to achieve a peaceful agreement. This means that sometimes groups will have to give up
bigger demands and this was certainly the case of the Moro National Liberation Front, who prior
to negotiations being opened full out supported independence but after they were able to access
political institutions seemed to have lessen their demands to simply autonomy so that peace can
be made between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine government.
What becomes important to analyze is how successful the MNLF and MILF will be after
looking and comparing various theories and examples in history. For the most part, the Moro
National Liberation Front seems to be an organization that will continue to thrive because it can
manage to adapt to any changes in government or regime type in the Philippines. What authors
like Tilly and Tarrow have shown is that the Moro National Liberation Front has been able to
rallying behind two major causes which include their Islamic identity and the long struggle to
maintain their autonomy and life style in Mindanao. Tarrow in particular helps to explain the
strategies that MNLF has developed over time, using a guerilla warfare tactic during the Marcos
regime and a diplomatic tactic in the administrations that followed. However, there are also
downsides that could possibly harm the organization as a whole. The split in the MNLF with the
creation of MILF makes it clear that the ideology and objectives of the Bangsamoro people are

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not exactly clear. This can overtime weaken the peace and negotiation processes that are taking
place between the two groups and the government. However, the Moro National Liberation Front
continues to be the main voice of the Bangsamoro people and the international community too
continues to recognize this group as the leaders of the struggle. What this social movement
teaches to other movements is the adaptation of a group dynamics and tactics that fit with
changes in regime type and governmental policies.

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Works Cited
Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press, 1961)
Gardner Noble, Lela. "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines." Pacific Affairs
49.3 (1976): 405-24.
Garton, Ash Timothy, “Velvet Revolution in Past and Future: in Facts Are Subversive (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
Judd, Mary. The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace
Dividend. Washington D.C.: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PAPERS Conflict
Prevention & Reconstruction, 2005. Ser. 24.
Majul, C.A. "The Political and Religious History of the Bangsamoro People." Moro National
Liberation Front. MNLF, n.d. 17 Nov. 2014. <http://mnlfnet.com/>.
Santos Jr., Soliman. Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions. Washington D.C.: East-
West Center Washington Working Papers, 2005. Ser. 3.
Santos Jr., Solomon. EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED CONFLICT ON THE MORO FRONT.
Rep. Washington D.C.: Human Development Network Foundation, 2005. ,
Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement., (Cambridge University Press, 1994)
Tilly, Charles, ch 3, “Interests, Organization, and Mobilization:, in From Mobilization to
Revolution (Addison-Wesley, 1978).
United Nations. “The United Nations and Decolonization.” UN News Center. UN, 14 Dec. 1960,
22 Nov. 2014. http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml