Third year thesis for BA (hons) in Photography at the University of Essex. This text explores the effectiveness of photographic aerial reconnaissance as an intelligence medium during the second world war, and the ways in which it was applied to British military operations.

1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to acknowledge my supervisors Andy Rees and Graham Everitt for their continual guidance
and support during the writing and research of this dissertation.
A thank you is also due to my partner Sebastian Perez and the Parsons and Black family for their
patience and encouragement.
This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, Sidney Gordon Black and the late Ruth Violet
Black who kindled my interest in World War Two.
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2. LIST OF CONTENTS PAGE
ABSTRACT 1
INTRODUCTION 2
CHAPTER 1: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE 6
CHAPTER 2: FINDING AND EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 12
CASE STUDY: OPERATION BITING 17
CHAPTER 3: MOSAICS AND TOPOGRAPHIC RELIEF MODELS 22
CASE STUDY: OPERATION CHASTISE 24
CHAPTER 4: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 28
CONCLUSION 32
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3. ABSTRACT
This dissertation will explore the idea that photographic aerial reconnaissance was the main
contributor of intelligence during World War Two and how this was made possible. It will also
suggest ways in which aerial reconnaissance may have shortened the war. To do this the dissertation
will explore the legitimacy of photography as evidence, the organisation and hardware of the
reconnaissance unit, interpretation methods and the ways in which reconnaissance was applied. Key
operations will be explored on an individual level to further clarify how these methods were used
and the ways in which they were adapted to fit the specific needs of operations, as well as act as
examples where reconnaissance supported, and was supported by other sources of intelligence. This
dissertation aims to conclude with an overview of how the areas of aerial reconnaissance came
together, and whether the claim that it was the main contributor is justifiable.
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4. INTRODUCTION
“We cannot conceive of a more impartial and truthful witness than the sun, as its light stamps and
seals the similitude of the wound on the photograph put before the jury; it would be more accurate
than the memory of witnesses, and as the object of all evidence is to show truth, why should not this
dumb witness show it?” (Franklin v. State of Georgia, 1882 cited in Meskin and Cohen, n.d. P.1)
The above quote discusses the validity of photography when presented in the form of evidence. The
camera records data which can be determined only by the distribution of light which the film
absorbs. It is more reliable than a human who may struggle to correctly recall information therefore
is highly regarded as a tool which can be used to confirm evidence by the court of law. As a result
of its reliability, photography was and still is used by military intelligence.
During World War Two (WWII), intelligence was collected from a number of sources. Intelligence
agents and those working for the Resistance produced reports of suspicious activity, information
was collected during the interrogation and eaves dropping of German prisoners of war and scientists
worked to develop new technology whilst devising ways of jamming German radar signals.
Intelligence personnel based at Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire used Enigma and Bombe
machines to decipher coded German military and government correspondences. This form of
intelligence was collectively known as Ultra and it was claimed that cracking the Enigma code in
January 1940 may have shortened the war by two to four years (Hinsley, 1993). Cracking the
coding was a crucial moment in WWII and much is owed to those who worked rigorously to obtain
invaluable information. However the claim that it shortened WWII is debatable as there were many
other factors involved; “With respect to winning the battle, no one would argue that ULTRA did it
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5. single-handedly; a whole string of naval and scientific achievements did their share.” (Deutsch,
1978. p.13). In the area of intelligence there were many areas Ultra could not cover, and also due to
the fear of the Germans learning that the code had been deciphered, further sources of intelligence
were required. This led the Germans to believe that the information was obtained solely by the
supporting source of intelligence rather than Ultra, and was also a way of clarifying information.
This often fell on to photographic aerial surveillance, which was also known as aerial
reconnaissance.
This dissertation does not aim to disprove the value of Ultra, however it will argue that with the
reliability of photography, aerial reconnaissance was of equal, if not greater importance to the war
effort. It was claimed that in 1944 aerial reconnaissance was predicted to be accountable for 90% of
sources obtained (Abrams, 2007. p.7), therefore it is apparent that aerial reconnaissance played a
significant part in WWII. This dissertation will investigate this by observing the key ways in which
aerial reconnaissance was adapted and moulded to serve varying operations, whilst also working in
collaboration with other sources of intelligence. It will also explore how aerial reconnaissance
photographs were used for propaganda purposes.
The first chapter will look into the brief origin and evolution of aerial reconnaissance up to the
beginning of WWII. It will then look at the way in which the aircraft were adapted to carry out
reconnaissance effectively and the formats of the cameras used to produce analysable photographs.
This chapter will also look at the unit which carried out the interpretation of the photographs and
how it was structured to effectively accommodate the variations of operations. Each chapter will
then look at key ways in which reconnaissance was applied to operations, whilst creating an
overview of how reconnaissance was use alongside other forms of intelligence.
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6. The second chapter will look at how reconnaissance supported other means of intelligence and was
applied to operations. It will argue the practicality of photographic reconnaissance in relation to the
technological status during the time frame of WWII. This chapter will discuss the flexibility of
aerial reconnaissance by outlining a variety of ways in which Interpreters used the available clues
within photographs to find support operations and intelligence. This chapter will then look at
Operation Biting as a case study and example of how aerial reconnaissance supported a lead from
Ultra to find an installation, how that evidence supported scientific intelligence and the ways in
which the interpretation lead to finding the evidence.
The third chapter will acknowledge the role of aerial reconnaissance as a navigational aid and how
it was used to directly support operations in ways in which other sources of intelligence could not -
in the visual form of mosaics and topographic relief models. This chapter will briefly look at the
application of aerial reconnaissance photographs to the process of creating mosaics and models.
This chapter will then look at Operation Chastise as a case study. There will be a comparative
analysis between a vertical aerial photograph and a relief model to determine the benefits of
supplying air crews with models.
The final chapter will explore how aerial reconnaissance was used to assess damage and calculate
the level of disruption and how that also played a vital role in operations. It will look at how
damage assessment provided evidence which led to the improvement of bombing accuracy, and
how an aerial reconnaissance photograph was used by the media to raise the morale of the British
public.
Each chapter will contain a conclusion, however the final conclusion will outline the key points and
discuss how all areas worked together, before establishing whether aerial reconnaissance was the
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7. main contributor to WWII.
Information will be mainly obtained from books and academic papers written by those with a direct
involvement in reconnaissance, as well as historians, practicing intelligence personnel and
specialists. Information has also been collected from a range of television documentaries,
educational and government websites, and museum visits to ensure the utmost accuracy of
resources.
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8. CHAPTER 1: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
Reconnaissance is the act of surveying and monitoring enemy territory and areas of key interest to
the military; this level of surveillance provides military intelligence with a large overview of
activity on occupied and enemy targets, and to also survey neutral areas for suspicious activity.
Photographic reconnaissance, as a form of intelligence can take place from the sea and on land,
however this text will explicitly look at reconnaissance taken from an aerial perspective.
In 1783 French aviator Jean-François Pilâtre de Rozier was the first person to take to the air in a
tethered balloon. This was a pioneering move in aviation and sparked the first notion of observation
from the air, this was first used as a form of military surveillance by the French in 1789.
Photography and air travel were first combined in 1858 by French photographer Gaspard-Félix
Tournachon when the first aerial photograph was taken from a hot air balloon over France. In 1903
Dr Julius Gustav Neubronner established aerial pigeon photography by mounting a small camera
with an automatic shutter onto the bird, however there was no guarantee of adequate coverage of
specified areas (Nesbit, 1996). With the development of heavier-than-air flight by the Wright
Brothers, also in 1903, and the developments in aviation which then followed, between 1914 and
1918 reconnaissance was a routine operation during World War One. This was carried out by
externally mounting 7”x7” format F8 cameras to aircraft. Subsequently over the course of the first
world war, millions of photographs had been taken.
By WWII, aerial photographic reconnaissance was highly regarded and it was even predicted by
German General Werner Thomas Ludwig Freiherr von Fritsch that the military with the best
reconnaissance would ultimately win the war (Harwood, 2014. p.66). Aerial reconnaissance had
already been carried out during the months leading up to the declaration of WWII in 1939. Sidney
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9. Cotton, an ex Royal Naval Air Service pilot flew sorties over German military installations in a
civilian Lockheed 12A. The aircraft was painted duck-egg green, as this variation of colour was
commonly seen on private civilian aircraft of the time thus did not draw suspicion, yet was almost
invisible from the ground when flown at high altitudes. This allowed the British to observe the
activity of German military bases and gauge the status of their advances without attracting
suspicion.
The manoeuvrability of the aircraft was a critical factor in the success of aerial reconnaissance.
During the early days of the war Cotton re-engineered aircraft, predominantly Spitfires, to be able
to tackle reconnaissance sorties more efficiently, this process became known as “Cottonizing”. By
removing components which were irrelevant to reconnaissance, he lessened drag which improved
the aircrafts speed and manoeuvrability. Speed was a vital necessity as removing guns allowed the
aircraft to carry multiple cameras, however this meant the aircraft were then defenceless against
enemy interception and would need to have the upper hand in terms of speed to avoid dogfights. Air
from the engines was also redirected over the lenses to prevent condensation, allowing the aircraft
to photograph more effectively from high altitudes (Watson, 2003. p.113). This was especially
useful for avoiding the range of anti-aircraft guns, as well as being less noticeable to the Germans.
Throughout WWII there were two ways in which cameras were used; vertical and oblique. Vertical
cameras were mounted to the undercarriage of the aircraft, producing a birds-eye view of the land,
whereas oblique cameras were mounted to the side of aircraft, producing a slanted view of the land.
This allowed for a more side-on and detailed view of objects in question. Oblique sorties were more
hazardous as they often required the pilots to perform low-level manoeuvres in order to obtain the
specified photographs, this incurred a great risk of anti-aircraft fire and interception from German
fighters. This meant that low level oblique sorties were often only carried out when it was deemed
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10. absolutely necessary. The two cameras predominantly used were the F24 and F52 cameras; the
5”x5” F24 camera was established in 1925 and could take up to 250 exposures. The 8.5”x7” F52
camera was later established in 1942 allowing for much larger photographs. The larger photographs
of the F52 cameras were however at the expense of downgrading to 125 exposures (Downing,
2011).
In order for reconnaissance to be carried out successfully, specially trained personnel were required
to analyse the photographs for activity; these were known as Photographic Interpreters. Over the
course of WWII interpretation generally took place inside an unassuming country house in
Buckinghamshire, this was named RAF Medmenham where in 1939 the Royal Air Force
established the Photographic Interpretation Unit (PIU).
The PIU developed a system of sections and phases to distribute work efficiently. The sections were
named alphabetically and the Interpreters working in those sections specialised in specific areas,
this could be anything from night photography to installation identification. The first phase allowed
for the photographs of high importance to be studied immediately after processing, where the
Interpreter would assess the photographs for significant danger; this would take place on the airfield
and could potentially result in immediate action. The second phase took place at Medmenham and
consisted of a detailed and regular analysis of coverage photographs. If a photograph was flagged
for suspicious activity it would be passed to the third phase for analysts by a specialist in the area of
activity featured in the photographs.
Creating such a system made it possible for reconnaissance to support a variation of operations, and
made it easier to prioritise certain photographs without completely dismissing non-urgent exposures
which may contribute information at a later date. For example sudden changes to a landscape in the
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11. time between two successive photographs may suggest a progression of enemy activity, therefore all
photographs were stored in the library at Medmenham for future reference. The filtering system
proved to be an efficient process, simplifying the way in which coverage was distributed and
ensuring that each photograph was examined by the best Interpreter for the job (Halsall, 2012. p.
19). “Accuracy alone was not enough. Speed in copying the photographs and supplying them to
Headquaters with correct interpretations was also essential for the successful conduct of operations”
(Katz, 1966. p.14) .
Interpreters were often highly intelligent and eccentric individuals as the ability to think logically
yet outside of the box were key attributes for the role. They also received thorough training prior to
commencing their roles at Medmenham. Reconnaissance was of a high demand and the figure of
personnel working at Medmenham was just shy of 1,700 at the end of WWII (Watson, 2003. p.231).
The PIU required personnel with a vast range of skills as interpretation covered the whole range of
scenarios operations of WWII would face. The work often involved highly complex mathematical
calculations such as trigonometry, geometry and photogrammetry. It also involved a great deal of
geology to identify terrains, and specialist identification of military hardware and installations.
Plotting, mapping and model-making were also a required skill.
Devices were also used at Medmenham to help Interpreters to accurately measure and identify
objects. Squadron Leader Claude Wavell invented a piece of equipment named the “Altazimeter”.
The device was used to measure the height of installations through measuring the length of the
shadow in relation to the positioning of the Sun and the altitude of which the photograph was taken
from. The formula and way in which the Altazimeter worked was that “height equals shadows-
length times the tangent of the sun’s [sic] altitude; so the only data you need are latitude, the scale
of the photographs, the orientation, and the date. The Altazimeter does the rest.” (Babington-Smith,
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12. 1961. p. 157). Before the creation of the Altazimeter, Interpreters had to apply extensive time-
consuming mathematical workings to establish the heights. During WWII, time was of an essence
and through inventing a piece of equipment which simplified the process significantly, the
Interpreters were able to work more efficiently and apply their time to analysing a larger quantity of
photographs.
Another time-saving piece of equipment was imported from Switzerland, the Wild A5 Autograph
machine. The machine required two consecutively exposed photographs, where it was vital that
these photographs were taken in quick succession so the exposures will overlap when placed
together. When both photographs were placed under the viewfinder, the machine would produce a
3D image. This method allowed Interpreters to examine the contours of the landscape; “Interpreters
could view targets as large as airfields or railroad marshaling [sic] yards as stereo pairs. These
images produced greater detail than a standard vertical photo, providing a three-dimensional effect
that permitted Interpreters to measure object height and better detect camouflage” (Dengler, 1998.
p.15) The machine was especially useful when producing topographic relief models which will be
explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.
The immediacy of the process was made possible by the efficiency of the equipment, the speed
capabilities of the aircraft and the organisation of the PIU. Together these factors allowed the
British to be one step ahead of the enemy. “Photographic reconnaissance had been singled out in
May by the Joint Intelligence Committee as the best means Britain had of avoiding a surprise
attack” (Richelson, 1995, p.159).
The importance of adapting hardware and creating a unit with efficient organisation was echoed
from the enemy side. As the Germans had a technological advantage over the Allies, the British
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13. relied on intelligence and strategics to counteract the Germans as evident in the following chapters.
This pushed the British to focus more on the development of their intelligence sources. Meanwhile
the Germans had focussed mainly on the production of weaponry therefore had not adapted their
aircraft to carry multiple cameras, nor did they put as much thought into establishing an
reconnaissance interpretation unit. This meant that the Germans did not have the eyes which the
Allies had and lacked the reconnaissance skills to match the British on the intelligence front, which
may ultimately have been their downfall.
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14. CHAPTER 2: FINDING AND EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE
In the field of WWII aerial surveillance, having progressed from the method of using balloons for
reconnaissance and before the future invention of satellites and unmanned drones, a camera
attached to an aircraft fuselage was the most efficient and surefire way of obtaining visual data of
specified areas. It would have been virtually impossible to carry out an accurate interpretation
process directly from the air as this would have been costly and the high altitude and speed of the
aircraft would make it impossible to examine the ground in great detail. It would also be highly
dangerous for the aircraft to circle an area longer than it has to due to the risk of anti-aircraft fire
and interception. Acquiring hard copies in the form of photographs allowed for Interpreters to
examine the data for as long as necessary; it could also be passed to a specialist Interpreter and
examined by others if required. It also had the ability to be re-examined at a later date.
Accuracy of interpretation was vital and the camera itself was regarded the accurate tool for the job.
“A camera could not make mistakes and cannot like a human being under conditions of extreme
strain be misled by appearances. Conclusions drawn from photographs should be completely
reliable” (Webster and Frankland, 2006 cited in Downing, 2011). However there was still the
possibility of human error during the process of interpretation. To prevent this as much as possible,
no action would be taken unless Interpreters were certain of what they had identified, or there was
correlating evidence from another intelligence source. In many cases extra low-level oblique sorties
would be sent to clarify information prior to raids, and extra data would be collected from
intelligence sources.
Interpreters relied on factual clues found in the photographs to gain an accurate overview of the
activities of the land below. This approach was very methodical and required the utmost precision,
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15. measurements and calculations. Flight Officer Constance Babington Smith of the aircraft
identification section stated that “as new interpreters [sic] are taught, a vertical air photograph is not
a picture but a precise mathematical document” (Babington Smith, 1961. p.98). Interpreters had to
make the most of all of the information they could find within the photograph, even the simplest of
clues could provide important data. For example Interpreters specialising in naval activity were able
to measure the speed of water vessels by measuring the distance between each of the waves left in
the ships wake. The speed, when calculated with the distance to their suspected destination (which
could be obtained through other intelligence sources), would allow Interpreters to establish a time
frame in which a convoy may arrive at the destination. This would then provide the military with an
advanced warning, allowing time for preparation.
Features which may seem insignificant can also point to suspicious activity when viewed in the
right context. “A trained photo interpreter [sic] knew how to spot the most important signatures.
Their presence told him what was going on even when he could not see the activity in
detail” (Nesbit, 1996, p.13). Colour film was available during the 1940’s, however Interpreters
found that black and white film was more effective in detecting variations in textures and shapes.
Different textures could be analysed to identify types of terrain, for example vegetation will be rich
in texture whereas a large body of water would appear almost solid and may glisten in the sunlight.
Deep water with little reflection from the Sun would appear dark in tone, whereas shallow water
would appear lighter. A sandy terrain will appear light in tone whereas a muddy terrain will be much
darker in tone. Identifying the natural face of the land could then lead to further clues of enemy
activity. Power stations require large amounts of water to aid cooling, or to produce hydroelectricity,
therefore will often be situated near large bodies of water such as rivers and reservoirs. The
presence of a sizeable power station could indicate an industrial complex nearby, which could be
producing military hardware and may warrant further investigation.
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16.
Barbed wire fences situated around installations was made obvious to Interpreters as wind would
cause leaves and litter to gather around the base, and eventually vegetation would thicken and grow
up the fence producing a distinct outline around the installation when viewed vertically. The
presence of a fence would lead the Interpreters to believe that the activity inside of the fence was of
high military importance. This could confirm reports from other intelligence sources or justify an
investigation. The ability to keep such a close watch over enemy territory allowed Interpreters to
collect information which may not have yet reached other sources of intelligence.
Shadows were also a useful tool for Interpreters, therefore sorties would ideally take place either in
the morning or afternoons when the Sun was at its lowest in relation to the horizon. This allowed
for long shadows which were ideal for identification of both the shapes and heights of buildings,
installations and land formations. This was especially useful for finding camouflaged installations
which could have been otherwise missed. Weather was an ongoing issue for reconnaissance, not just
with visually disabling conditions such as fog or heavy rain, but overcast conditions would scatter
the light causing little to no shadows. As Figure 1 shows, the field appears empty and
inconspicuous:
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17. Figure 1: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of Camouflaged Antiaircraft Guns (1944)
However in ideal conditions, camouflage will not prevent giveaway shadows. The ideal condition
for reconnaissance to be carried out was while the weather was clear to ensure sharp shadows, and
with just a day’s difference the shadows reveal two circular objects as seen in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of Camouflaged Antiaircraft Guns (1944)
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18. The fact that the installations were camouflaged would create suspicion alone that the objects in
question were of some significance to the German military; “the most effective camouflage is no
camouflage at all” (Babington Smith, 1961. p.174). Other clues in the photograph, or reports
obtained from other intelligence sources could then pinpoint the type of installation which is being
camouflaged.
The ability to seek data from all available information provided the military with an overview of
activity, and also had the ability to provide further information on specific targets. It is evident that
it was almost impossible to hide from the eyes of reconnaissance. “The intelligence value of good
air photography is immense. The old adage that one picture is worth a thousand words can be
multiplied by a hundredfold or more. No part of the terrestrial world is now immune from this vital
form of intelligence gathering”. (Nesbit, 1996. p.10).
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19. CASE STUDY: OPERATION BITING (27 -28 Feb 1942).
Operation Biting is a key example of how the multiple sources of intelligence collaborated and is
also an example of how a clue as minor as a shadow led to the successful identification of key
equipment. In 1940, the Germans developed the Kammhuber Line, an early warning radar and
searchlight-laced band stretching the North Sea coast of Belgium and towards Hamburg to aid the
interception of British night bombers. The front of the line was equipped with Freya, a German
defence radar which would detect the presence of bombers on approach to the coast; upon detection
German night fighters and searchlights would ambush the aircraft.
The use of Freya radar had already been uncovered by Ultra which recognised that it was being
used in conjunction with another piece of radar equipment named the Würzburg. Intelligence
scientist Reginald Victor Jones established that in order to learn how to jam the radar and prevent
further casualties, the equipment needed to be examined up close in order to gain a clear
understanding of how their radar functioned (Jones, 2009). First and foremost he needed to know
what the equipment looked like. It was common for agents to sketch installations, however the swift
and accurate way of achieving this was to provide concrete photographic evidence. Reconnaissance
sorties were sent to acquire photographs of the equipment, and to furthermore provide evidence
which would correlate with existing claims that such equipment existed. This further justified the
urgency to seize and examine the equipment.
Data was gathered from all areas of intelligence and made readily available for those the
information concerned. This information was valuable to the findings of Wavell, who had invented
the Altazimeter and was also the head of G (Wireless) Section. Two stereo photographs taken during
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20. a reconnaissance sortie near Auderville on the North Coast of France on the 22nd February 1941
revealed two circular installations which were similar to that of previously identified beam stations.
Unlike beam stations they were small and were situated along the edge of a field, it was flagged as
suspicious by G Section and brought to the attention of scientific intelligence.
Figure 3 shows an aerial reconnaissance photograph from the oblique sortie over Auderville:
Figure 3: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of a German Freya Radar Station, (1941)
Figure 4 is from the same sortie and was taken just moments later:
Figure 4: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of a German Freya Radar Station, (1941)
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21.
Interpreters of the Signals section were able to quickly identify this installation as the Freya station
due to their intensive knowledge of radar equipment. The positioning of the Sun was ideal and
produced long shadows, allowing Interpreters to see the opaque shape of the radar projected onto
the ground. With the aid of the Altazimeter, the Interpreters were able to measure the exact height of
the radar. The spacing between the equipment was also required by scientific intelligence so that the
scientists could estimate the strength of the radar frequencies being used by the Germans (Williams,
2011. p.77).
In this case the long shadows provided an extra clue; the photographs were taken just moments
apart yet it was identified that a shadow protruding from one of the circular structures had changed
width - just a tenth of a millimetre - between both photographs within the time frame (Downing,
2013. p.121). The measurement was so minuscule yet this discovery lead to the belief that the
object in question was rotating, this provided scientific intelligence with further information on how
the equipment functioned.
Attention then turned to finding the Würzburg radar, however British Intelligence did not know
what the equipment looked like. They had however established that the equipment was likely to be
smaller than that of Freya equipment, therefore would prove harder to find. Months later, after a
reconnaissance sortie of the area Interpreters uncovered an additional Freya station close to
Bruneval, Northern France. It was suspected from the findings of scientific intelligence that a
Würzburg radar may typically be close by. The Interpreters identified the faint markings of a worn
path in the grass produced by foot traffic leading along a nearby cliff edge, stopping before a tiny
black speck. Though unidentifiable in this photograph, the enquiring mind of the trained
intelligence personnel lead them to believe that this may be the Würzburg.
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22.
A second reconnaissance sortie was ordered and from the low-level oblique photograph of the
equipment, it was confirmed to be a Würzburg radar. The discovery of the Würzburg warranted the
Bruneval Raid of Operation Biting, where the radar was ceased, dismantled and brought back to the
United Kingdom before being obtained by scientific intelligence. From studying the equipment, the
scientists were able to devise ways in which to jam the enemy frequencies thus contributing
significantly to the undermining of enemy radar and preventing many further interceptions of
British bombers.
In conclusion Operation Biting is a classic example of just how rigorously aerial reconnaissance
photographs were examined. “The smallest detail had to be accounted for in terms of military
importance. Nothing was too slight to escape the attention of those whose difficult task it was to
provide rational explanations of the photographs” (Katz, 196. p.14). In this case the discovery of the
slightest increase in a shadows width escalated to the identification of a crucial piece of radar
equipment. Passing the coverage to the relevant section at Medmenham expedited the process as
personnel in the corresponding section had the expertise required to identify the equipment quickly
and accurately. Analysis of reconnaissance photographs and the final raid to pilfer the equipment
led to further research. This in the longer term saved many aircraft, ships and lives from German
interception. Furthermore capturing the equipment led to research which later assisted the further
development of radar equipment produced by the British, all factors of which would make a
contribution to the shortening of the war.
Operation Biting is also an example of how various forms of intelligence had worked together:
“The intelligence obtained from these highly dangerous air operations (which required a special
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23. kind of courage from those who crewed the aircraft) was coupled with the outstanding achievement
of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park in decrypting the German ‘Enigma’
signals. Thus British Intelligence had the edge on its enemy throughout much of the war” (Nesbit,
1996. p.9)
In the case of Operation Biting, Ultra had provided reconnaissance with a lead which allowed the
sorties to locate the equipment. Photography then provided the on-going coverage, providing the
concrete evidence which supported all areas of intelligence involved. Reconnaissance will have in
the meantime also provided support to those carrying out the raid, which will be examined in the
following chapter.
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24. CHAPTER 3: MOSAICS AND TOPOGRAPHIC RELIEF MODELS
Reconnaissance was flexible and leant itself to not only seeking targets, but also to aiding those
directing front-line raids in the form of aerial mosaics. To create a mosaic a sortie would be sent
over the target area to produce a number of photographs. The photographed areas would purposely
overlap to avoid gaps, and when arranged accordingly they would produce a single, large
photograph of the area. As aircraft naturally ascend and descend in flight it was common for the
exposures to be produced at slightly varying altitudes. To overcome this all photographs were sized
to an equal scale; this also meant that a scale could be specified during the printing stage. The
mosaics would then be photographed to produce a map which could be reproduced multiple times.
“Due to the limited preparation time, map shortages forced greater reliance of photos and mosaics
with annotations to identify defensive positions.” (Dengler, 1998. p127). Mosaics were fast to
produce, unlike illustrated maps, and were a realistic reflection of the land formation, buildings and
installations. Features also attain the correct scale in relation to each other. Tonal ranges and shapes
were also represented on a mosaic.
Although mosaics were a vital tool on the fighting front itself, the vertical photographs alone were
not an accurate reflection of how a target may appear to those fighting on the frontline. It was
common practice for air crews and frontline troops to be briefed using topographic relief models
prior to raids. V (Model) Section at Medmenham was established to build models which aided with
the planning of the raids and to also acquaint the crew with the geographical features of the
landscape and terrain types. “To the Commander or staff planning an attack, a relief model of the
terrain that will be encountered will prove to be an immeasurable aid in the plan of
strategy” (Abrams, 2007. p.186). As an example frontline personnel would need to know in advance
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25. the terrain properties and manmade features of their attack area to preempt whether they could get
certain types of hardware across the landscape, or whether sea defences would prevent landing craft
from reaching beaches. As those without interpretation training may find vertical aerial photographs
difficult to comprehend, topographic relief models provided a realistic alternative.
To create a model the model makers would first contour the base by layering pieces of hardboard to
fit the precise measurements taken from available maps and reconnaissance photographs. The
contours were then covered with a hardening mixture to form the general land formation determined
with the aid of the Wild A5 Autograph Machine and exact calculations. An accordingly-scaled
mosaic was then laid over the top of the model to form the basis of the landscape. The mosaics then
became a guide of where to accurately place the natural and manmade features of the landscape.
Those features were then built upwards from their positioning on the mosaic and sculpted in
accordance with their vertical measurement from a range of suitable materials (Reed, 1946).
Operation Chastise, the operation behind the infamous Dam Busters raid is a prime example of how
models were important in the planning of raids.
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26. CASE STUDY: OPERATION CHASTISE (16-17 May 1943).
It was recognised that to produce a single ton of steel, one to two hundred tons of water was
required (Bombercommandmuseum.ca, 2016). The Germans relied heavily on a number of dams
including Edersee, Möhne and Sorpe to serve a key industrial complex in the Rhur Valley of West
Germany which contributed significantly to the production of iron and steel. Combined, the dams
supplied 400 million tons of water to the area and the metals produced were used to manufacture
military hardware. Not only did these dams provide water, they also provided hydroelectric power
to the Ruhr Valley. A common strategy used by the British was to undercut the industrial activities
of the Germans, as slowing down production bought time for the Allies. To bomb the dams would
cause a considerable amount of damage and disruption to the steel industry and would have a direct
impact on hardware production. Scientist Dr Barnes Wallis designed the 4 tonne “Bouncing Bomb”
that when released from a bomber flying at 60 feet, would bounce over the surface of the reservoir,
over the submerged torpedo nets and upon contact with the wall of the dam, will sink in a rotational
motion, detonating at 30 feet underwater (Sweetman, 1990).
Aerial reconnaissance supported Wallis during his research. From the analysis of aerial
photographs, it was determined that to be most effective, the dams would need to be targeted in
early May while the water levels of the reservoirs were estimated to be at their highest to cause as
much damage as possible. By the time the operation was given the go-ahead by Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, the Royal Air Force had just 2 months to manufacture the bombs, train and brief
the squadron. The PIU had to work fast and a total of nine sorties were ordered to obtain coverage
of the dams and the surrounding area during February 1943 (Downing, 2011. p.191).
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27. Figure 5: Topographic Relief Model of the Eder Dam, (1943)
Figure 5 shows an oblique view of the relief model created by V Section of the Eder Dam. The
model incorporated the reservoir and the surrounding vegetation and settlements as indicated by the
photographs. From this angle, the reservoir appears thinner due to the oblique angle and the height
of the land obstructing the reservoir in various points. Figure 6 shows a vertical aerial
reconnaissance photograph taken of the same dam post raid:
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28. Figure 6: Reconnaissance Photograph of the Eder Dam, (1943)
In this damage assessment photograph of a segment of the same reservoir, in comparison to the
model there is a slight difference in shapes. In an aerial photograph, the viewer will see the
landscape in a flat and vertical view with no obstructions to the shapes. There will also be no
obvious differentiation between the contours of the landscape. An untrained eye may have difficulty
identifying the contours, and landmarks may be indistinguishable to crews when viewing targets in
a vertical format before facing the land from the angel of the aircraft.
Seeing the target area in 3D and colour, as opposed to a series of 2D black and white vertical aerial
photographs gave the crew a realistic example of what they would expect to see from the cockpit in
advance to the raid. This would help them to quickly identify key landmarks to aid navigation when
approaching the dams from an oblique angle. A model is interactive and lends itself to be moved
and viewed from various angles, as opposed to static 2D aerial photographs. The models were then
photographed in all likely angles and under various light adjustments to replicate how the area may
appear during different times of the day and from different perspectives (Reed, 1946). The
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29. flexibility of how the model could be adapted also lent itself well to the unpredictability of raids and
can be reviewed to accommodate sudden changes to the time schedule and navigation al plans.
Through being acquainted with the range of heights of the land features, this helped crews to pre-
determine manoeuvres they may need to perform in order to avoid higher landmarks. After the
briefing using the models, the Dam Busters raid took place on May 16th and during the early hours
of May 17th 1943 with a great amount of success. The models were critical time-savers and allowed
personnel to concentrate on what they do best, in this case those planning strategic raids required a
visual representation of the target area which they could quickly process.
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30. CHAPTER 4: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Post-raid reconnaissance was carried out routinely by the Royal Air Force, this was where the
accuracy and extent of the bombing was assessed. The results would determine the disruption to the
surrounding areas, or whether the target required a follow-up attack (Rauch, 2002). This work was
undertaken by K (Damage Assessment) Section at Medmenham.
After the Dam Busters raid in the early hours of May 17th, to determine the extent of the damage,
sorties were sent to the Ruhr Valley to clarify the extent of the damage made to the dams. The
photographs found that the Möhne and Eder dams were breached, and the Sorpe dam had suffered
only minor damage. (Sweetman, 1990).
Figure 7: Daily Mirror Front Page (1943)
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31. A photograph of the newly breached Möhne dam and the flooding reservoir water was featured in
various British newspapers (Figure 7); this acted as photographic evidence to the British public that
the Royal Air Force had been taking effective and successful steps towards winning the war. Due to
the classification of information, the public release of intelligence material was rare during wartime.
However, unlike Ultra, the fact that reconnaissance was being carried out was no secrecy to the
Germans and this particular photograph contained no classifiable information. Providing visual
concrete evidence of the breached dam was of more assurance to the British public than if they were
only informed of its success. It is argued that the publishing of the photograph had a greater effect
than the damage itself; “this was of course, far more visible as an effect of the attack than the
notional damage to war production.” (Hayward, 2013. p.16). The photograph improved the morale
of the relatives and spouses of those fighting in the war and improved confidence in the fighting
abilities of the British military. As a result of its publicity, it became one of the most famous
reconnaissance photographs ever produced (Downing, 2011).
Interpreters also analysed the photographs to determine the speed in which the Germans were able
to rebuild structures and installations after attacks; the Royal Air Force would bomb the targets
again, just as the restoration started to look complete. Through doing this, German resources and
money were wasted on restoration projects which were in hindsight doomed from the start.
Damage assessment also provided the British with the ability to pinpoint a key weakness which
could lead to further development of bombing tactics. Reviewing the accuracy of hitting targets was
vital for the trial and errors of bombing which would provide the incentive to improve accuracy
throughout the rest of the war. The following example goes back to the beginning of WWII, on the
night of the 19th March 1940 when the RAF carried out its very first raid against the Germans. The
target was Hörnum airbase on the island of Sylt, Germany. Interpreters believed that the base was
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32. home to seaplanes which had been laying mines in the North Sea and causing major difficulties for
the Royal Navy.
This warranted an attack and following the bombing, the crews believed that the target had been hit.
Reconnaissance sorties were carried out the following day to assess the damage, however it became
evident that the airbase and aircraft were still fully intact and no damage had been inflicted.
Due to the high visibility of approaching bombers, it was determined by Bomber Command that
raids would have to take place at night to avoid detection. On the night poor visibility at night
generated navigational problems among bombers as pilots had to rely on timing and dead-reckoning
for navigation. Bomber Command would not accept that the target may have been missed and
fabricated various reasons as to why reconnaissance had failed to produce evidence, such as issues
with the scale of the photographs and even going as far as to claiming that the Germans had cleared
the damage overnight.
Further reconnaissance of the surrounding areas revealed where the bombs had hit, which was in
fact a nearby island. This incident affected the morale of flight crews and the relationship between
the PIU and Bomber Command as the reality was difficult to face.
As a result of this discovery, a flash bomb was developed which exuded light upon ignition mid-air.
This was synchronised with the shutter of the camera and illuminated features on the ground which
would assist Interpreters in the identification of key features in the landscape. Interpreters were also
able to identify fires, searchlights and bomb blasts through examination of the photographs. These
features manifested as white streaks on the otherwise pitch black photographs. By acquiring such
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33. skills, Interpreters could plot of positioning of the aircraft in relation to where the bombs hit when
compared to daylight damage assessment photographs.
As photographic evidence was viewed as more reliable than that of human recollection, it was
eventually recognised that there was a definite issue with night navigation. A report stated that out
of the crews who claimed they had hit their target, only one in three were correct (Downing, 2011.
p.183). At the price of a temporary mistrust between reconnaissance and bombing crews, this
ultimately lead to the development of aircraft navigational systems which were able to assist the
pilots in poor visibility. The issue was brought to light early in the war and had reconnaissance not
intervened due to the risk of ruining their relationship with Bomber Command, the development of
navigational aids may have been delayed longer which could have prolonged the war.
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34. CONCLUSION
Due to the complexity of war and the amount of variable factors involved, it would be inaccurate to
claim that an intelligence branch had solely shortened the war and it is evident throughout this
dissertation that intelligence as a whole was just part a much larger puzzle.
This dissertation has touched on just a small segment of WWII and aerial reconnaissance, however
from the information gathered it is evident that aerial reconnaissance was continuously relied upon
to support and verify other sources of intelligence. Due the reliability of photography as evidence
and the flexibility to adapt all coverage to fit such a vast range of operations, aerial reconnaissance
had the correct attributes to supply the bulk of intelligence support. The statistic that aerial
reconnaissance provided 90% of support also suggests that other forms of intelligence did not
provide anywhere near the volume of support as aerial reconnaissance provided.
Much of the success of aerial reconnaissance is owed to the organisation of the PIU as appointing
Interpreters to specialise in dedicated areas meant the information could be obtained and distributed
much faster which is vital due to the preciousness of time during the war. The varying application of
aerial reconnaissance to operations is apparent in the case studies of Operation Biting and Chastise,
which had very different objectives, therefore required the attention of very different sections of the
PIU. This laid the key foundation for the success of aerial reconnaissance as without such an
efficient unit organisation, the subjects of the following chapters would not have been carried out as
swiftly and accurately. It is evident that the PIU itself was the most important attribute of
reconnaissance.
This dissertation has looked at some of the varying methods used in interpreting photographs which
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35. made aerial reconnaissance relevant to all operations, and how even the smallest and inconspicuous
of details led to greater findings. The ability to utilise so much of the information allowed aerial
reconnaissance to pick up on activity before it may have reached other sources of intelligence. It
was here that it was established that weather was a big factor in interpretation as lack of visibility
was a big and hinderance, and the distribution of sunlight was key to producing the shadows. The
importance of shadows was highlighted through exploring Operation Biting where a minuscule clue
identified within a shadow had been a catalyst for the identification of an important piece of radar
equipment. This discovery led to a series of events that had an effect on the outcome of the war. It
was also an example of how Ultra had aided aerial reconnaissance in finding a target, and how
aerial reconnaissance had then provided support to scientific intelligence, therefore providing a
scenario where intelligence had collaborated.
Interpretation made it possible for raids to be carried out, and then other sections of the PIU would
produce mosaics and topographic models to aid those involved in the raid first-hand. In a time
where illustrated maps were difficult to acquire, aerial reconnaissance allowed for fast production of
navigational aids to those who needed it, and the models allowed troops and aircrews to become
acquainted with the terrains they would face. Speed of the unit again, allowed for the swift
production of these models and it was an example of where aerial reconnaissance had a direct
involvement with those carrying out the raids.
Aerial reconnaissance was also used to determine the accuracy of the bombing after raids, and long
after other squadrons had moved on upon completing an operation, reconnaissance remained
concerned with the area and kept a close eye on the restoration and activity. Aerial reconnaissance
provided the evidence to clarify that bombers were not hitting their targets. Although raising the
alarm damaged the relationship between the PIU and Bomber Command, it did ultimately lead to
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36. the improvement of navigational equipment which was an invaluable move towards winning the
war. The chapter also touched on the publication of an aerial photograph to raise the morale of the
British public, this was vital as providing evidence that the British military were taking the correct
steps to undermining German arms production would have provided much needed strength to the
civilian war effort.
In conclusion it is evident from these findings that the contribution made by those of aerial
reconnaissance was absolutely critical and will have played a invaluable part in the winning of
WWII. Aerial reconnaissance acted as a glue which adhered all intelligence information together,
smoothing over gaps in data and shortcomings, and providing a foundation of solid evidence to
build operations upon.
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37. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrams, T. (2007). Essentials of aerial surveying and photo interpretation. Milton Keynes: Lightning Source
UK.
Babington Smith, C. (1961). Evidence in camera. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Brickhill, P. (1965). The Dam Busters. New York: Ballantine Books.
Campbell, C. (2013). Target London. London: Abacus.
Downing, T. (2011). Spies in the sky. London: Little, Brown.
Downing, T. (2013). Night raid. London: Abacus
Halsall, C. (2012). Women of intelligence. Stroud: History Press.
Harwood, J. (2014). World War II from above. Hove: Quid Publishing.
Ivie, T. (1981). Aerial reconnaissance. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers.
Jones, R. (2009). Most secret war. London: Michael Joseph.
Nesbit, R. (1996). Eyes of the RAF. Phoenix Mill: Sutton Pub.
Richelson, J. (1995). A century of spies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, R. (1998). To fool a glass eye. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Pub.
Sweetman, J. (1990). The dambuster's raid. London: Cassell.
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38.
Watson, J. (2003). Sidney Cotton. Sydney: Hodder Headline Australia.
Williams, A. (2011). Operation crossbow. London: Preface.
Williams, A. (2011). The untold story of photographic intelligence and the search for Hitler's V weapons.
London: Preface Publishing.
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39. ONLINE RESOURCES
ONLINE BOOKS
Hayward, J. (2013). The Ecological Implications of Modern Air Warfare. 1st ed. [ebook] Alabama: Air
University Press, p.16. Available at: http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/
b_0131_hayward_airpower_environment.pdf#page=26 [Accessed 11 Feb. 2016].
JOURNALS / REPORTS
Brugioni, D. and Poirier, R. (2000). The Holocaust Revisited: A Retrospective Analysis of the Auschwitz-
Birkenau Extermination Complex. Studies in Intelligence, [online] Fall 2000, p.105. Available at: https://
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall00/
ch6_Holocaust_Revisited.pdf [Accessed 1 Feb. 2016].
Deutsch, D. (1978). The influence of Ultra on WWII. [online] Carlisle: Defence Technical Information
Centre. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA512228 [Accessed 10 Feb. 2016].
Fix, R. (1992). Reconnaissance in Force: A Key Contributor to Tempo. [online] Kansas: School of Advanced
Military Studies. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a264418.pdf [Accessed 17 Feb. 2016].
Katz, A. (1966). Some Notes on the History of Aerial Reconnaissance (Part 1). [online] California: Rand
Corporation, p.14. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2009/P3310.pdf
[Accessed 19 Feb. 2016].
Meskin, A. and Cohen, J. (n.d.). Photographs as Evidence. [online] p.1. Available at: http://
aardvark.ucsd.edu/perception/agnosticism.pdf [Accessed 24 Feb. 2016].
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40. Reed, H. (1946). The Development of the Terrain Model in the War. [online] Geographical Review, 36(4)
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/211419?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 18 Jan. 2016].
PHD/RESEARCH PAPERS
Dengler, D. (1998). Seeing the Enemy: Army Air Force Aerial Reconnaissance Support to the US. Army
Operations in the Mediterranean In World War II. MA. University of Nebraska.
Elhassen, I. (1978). Metric Aspects of Reconnaissance Frame Photography. PhD. University of Glasgow.
Rauch, J. (2002). Assessing Airpower’s Effects: Capabilities And Limitations Of Real-Time Battle Damage
Assessment. School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University.
LECTURES
Hinsley, S. (1993). The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War. Available at: http://www.cdpa.co.uk/
UoP/HoC/Lectures/HoC_08e.PDF [Accessed 10 Feb. 2016].
WEBSITES
Airandspace.si.edu, (n.d.). The Wright Brothers | The First Successful Airplane. [online] Available at: https://
airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/wright-brothers/online/fly/1903/ [Accessed 21 Feb. 2016].
Airrecce.co.uk, (2016). Allied Cameras. [online] Available at: http://www.airrecce.co.uk/cameras/
raf_ww2_cameras.html [Accessed 17 Jan. 2016].
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41.
American Photo, (2013). The Massive Aerial Photography Archive That Helped Win World War II. [online]
Available at: http://www.americanphotomag.com/massive-aerial-photography-archive-helped-win-world-
war-ii [Accessed 16 Jan. 2016].
Bombercommandmuseum.ca, (2016). Were The Dambusters Successful - A Dambuster's Grand-daughter's
study. [online] Available at: http://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/s,dambustersstudy.html [Accessed 4
Feb. 2016].
Cia.gov, (2016). Aerial Reconnaissance — Central Intelligence Agency. [online] Available at: https://
www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/text-version/collection-by-subject/aerial-
reconnaissance.html [Accessed 18 Jan. 2016].
FlightGlobal.com, (2016). [online] Available at: https://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/
1958/1958%20-%200104.PDF [Accessed 17 Jan. 2016].
History Learning Site, (2016). The V Weapons - History Learning Site. [online] Available at: http://
www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/world-war-two-in-western-europe/the-v-revenge-weapons/
the-v-weapons/ [Accessed 31 Jan. 2016].
London-medals.co.uk, (2016). 1958 R.A.F. Wittering Commander's Order of the Bath, Bomber Command
Blenheim Pilot's 1940 Hornum Raid Distinguished Flying Cross and United States Legion of Merit group
awarded to Air Commodore W.P. Sutcliffe, Royal Air Force. [online] Available at: http://www.london-
medals.co.uk/index.php?route=blog/post&post_id=28 [Accessed 5 Feb. 2016].
Militaryhistoryonline.com, (2016). Military History Online. [online] Available at: http://
www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/airreconinwwi.aspx [Accessed 16 Jan. 2016].
Ncap.org.uk, (2016). NCAP - National Collection of Aerial Photography. [online] Available at: http://
ncap.org.uk [Accessed 16 Jan. 2016].
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42.
Ncap.org.uk, (2016). The Dambusters Raid | NCAP - National Collection of Aerial Photography. [online]
Available at: http://ncap.org.uk/feature/dambusters-raid [Accessed 30 Jan. 2016].
Nrcan.gc.ca, (2016). Introduction to Air Photo Interpretation | Natural Resources Canada. [online] Available
at: http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/earth-sciences/geomatics/satellite-imagery-air-photos/air-photos/about-aerial-
photography/9689 [Accessed 6 Feb. 2016].
Professionalaerialphotographers.com, (2016). History of Aerial Photography - Professional Aerial
Photographers Association Intl. [online] Available at: http://professionalaerialphotographers.com/
content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=808138&module_id=158950 [Accessed 18 Jan. 2016].
DOCUMENTARIES ACCESSED ONLINE
Map Making from Aerial Photo Interpretation - 1955 - The New Cartography. (2013). [video] Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPEM8Q7pZR0&index=10&list=WL [Accessed 18 Jan. 2016].
Old Fliers Group, (2016). Sidney Cotton - Spy and Aviatior. [video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GC5EcJoT9sA&index=1&list=WL [Accessed 18 Jan. 2016].
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43. FILMS
Operation Crossbow. (1965). [DVD] United Kingdom: MGM - British Studios.
The Dam Busters. (1955). [DVD] United Kingdom: Association British Picture Corporation, Michael
Anderson.
The Imitation Game. (2014). [DVD] United Kingdom: Morten Tyldum.
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44. MUSEUM VISITS
Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire [Visited October 2015]
Churchill War Rooms, London [Visited Feb 2016]
Combined Military Services, Essex [Visited August 2015]
Royal Air Force Museum, London [Visited Feb 2016]
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45. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of Camouflaged Antiaircraft Guns (1944). Source:
Stanley, R. (1998). To fool a glass eye. p.48. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Pub.
Figure 2: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of Camouflaged Antiaircraft Guns (1944). Source:
Stanley, R. (1998). To fool a glass eye. p.48. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Pub.
Figure 3: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of a German Freya Radar Station, (1941). Source:
Jones, R. (2009). Most secret war. p.221. London: Michael Joseph.
Figure 4: Aerial Reconnaissance Photograph of a German Freya Radar Station, (1941). Source:
Jones, R. (2009). Most secret war. p.221. London: Michael Joseph.
Figure 5: Topographic Relief Model of the Eder Dam, (1943). Source: Imperial War Museum
[online] Available at: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205022178 [Accessed 29 Feb.
2016].
Figure 6: Reconnaissance Photograph of the Eder Dam, (1943). Source: Imperial War Museum,
[online] Available at: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205132710 [Accessed 29 Feb.
2016].
Figure 7: Daily Mirror Front Page (1943). Source: British Newspaper Archive [online] Available
at: http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk [Accessed 29 Feb. 2016].
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