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The Political Economy Of Interregional Relations Asean Eu
 

The Political Economy Of Interregional Relations Asean Eu

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  • Contradictions with EC Policy of the aim of integrating developing countries into de world economy, on the one hand, and those of poverty reduction and strengthening civil society participation.
  • ASEAN a factor of stability and balance that contributes to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia (e.g. Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia)EC recognition of ASEAN as a developing region into practical actions required some negotiations, because of this the EC responses were cautious, simply due to the significant share of the cost and the burden resettlement. ASEAN adopted a export-oriented industrial polices and was needed trade preferences. ASEAN’s desire for tariff reduction “trade preferences” ran up against the constraints inherent in the EC development policy, which continued to be dominated by those favored preferential treatment for former European colonies in Africa ‘Regionalist’. In the first few years of the GSP on ASEAN trade with EC countries’ agricultural exports actually qualified for more preferences than manufactured products. The impact of GSP on ASEAN trade with the EC seems to have been limited. In the short run, the constraints on the EC’ development policy and the Common Agricultural Policy prevented substantial modifications of the GSP to meet ASEAN trade demands. Given this restrictions Financial Cooperation appeared to be ‘the most necessary instrument of an overall cooperation policy’‘Globalist’ justified extending the EC’ development policy as a way of ensuring EC presence in the major developing regions resulting in the launching of a program call: Financial and Technical Aid, US$20 million , it is doubtful whether consideration if ASEAN’s concern alone was decisive in the decision to launch this program. More likely it was the outcome of combined pressures form Asia and Latin America, the latter being equally, if not more, frustrated, over the EC’s inability or unwillingness to enter into a sustained dialogue with it. The fact that ASEAN countries received only a modest amount of development assistance from individual EC member states, and none at all from the EC as an organization, was an additional argument for launching an aid program.
  • Colonial relationship still influences heavily the pattern of aid distribution. The primary recipient of DUTCH grants was Indonesia, which accounted for 94% of total DUTCH grants, Malaysia received nearly 34% iof UK Grants. France , which had no former colony among the ASEAN member nations, gave no grants at all to any country. For the other Three EC member countries with no colonial links (GERMANY, BELGIUM, AND ITALY) Indonesia was the primary recipient, a choice which can be explained by the size of that country’s population and its abundance of natural resources of strategic interest to the European countries. Only Denmark deviated with this pattern having Thailand as the first recipient of its modest effort. ASEANS acceptance of the offer of developmental assistance, which it had not pursued aggressively, should be interpreted in the context of the structural limitations of regionalism in Southeast Asia. First year of ASEAN existence, no economic cooperation project had initiated a process of regionalization in Southeast Asia.
  • One advantage of the recipient countries was the fact that assistance consisted entirely of grants. In the case of a heavily indebted country such as the Philippines, although EC assistance accounts for only 14% of all European aid to the Philippines, it is 99% in grant form, in contrast to total European assistance , which is only 56% in the form of grants. Within the recipient countries, European policy was focused on RURAL DEVELOPMENT. At 1980 AEMM food production, storage, and distribution, land and rural development, and water utilization were identified as priorities. Most of the major projects funded by the EC, whether autonomously or in collaboration with others institutions, has been in support of AGRICULTURE or otherwise located in the COUNTRYSIDE. Irrigation, rural production, and services or integrated rural development represented over half (55.67%) of total ASEAN member states between 1976 and 1995. Scarcely any INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS, unlike in Latin America, nor major INDRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS. This could be seen as EC responsiveness to the MAJOR NEEDS of the MAJOR POPULATION. EC and ASEAN do not interfere in Domestic affairs of individual member countries, but during dictatorship in the Philippines, EC commitments increased dramatically, as a form of support for the democratization process in Philippines.
  • However Indonesia the Philippines and Thailand and ASEAN received 17% of commitments between 1976 and 1991 which represented more than half of the total share (29%) of the entire Latin American Group, composed of nearly 20 countries.
  • From the outsiders observer, It is difficult to form an accurate impression of the impact of EC development projects, due to lack of access to monitoring and evaluations documents. What can be highlighted is that development cooperation, which has so far been described as a relationship between the EC on the one hand, and the ASEAN as an organization in the other hand, also creates an important Social Relations between the EC and Civil Society (farmers, churches, organizations, groups among the community) . This relationship between the EC and Civil society was a crucial factor for the long term sustainability of development projects. Civil Society Participation from project identification, planning, and preparation up to implementation is significance. Some projects evaluations concluded that they were not successful. Among its recommendations was the need to involve beneficiaries from the very beginning of project planning. Planning and implementation were participatory. As a result, project sustainability was assured at both the farm and institutional levels. This were the main lessons learn from the EC development projects assistance.
  • First, economic growth has not yet eliminated poverty in sectors and subnational regions of two of the most populous countries in this region, Indonesia and the Philippines. Second, ASEAN enlargement since 1995 has added four new members-Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma- where poverty is more widespread than in the original member countries. In another sense, EC development cooperation is once more compensating for the structural limitations of Southeast Asian regionalism referred to in the previous presentations, notably the- unwillingness to ensure regional funding to regional projects.
  • After this the Question was: The range of objectives assigned to development assistance was so vast and the objectives themselves so ambitious that one is prompted to ask whether the small volumes of funds available can suffice for projects to meet these goals.
  • Relationship between Development Cooperation (DC) and other EC Policies (problem of COHERENCE) including harmonization of development policy and other external policies (i.e. trade policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy)Efficiency of DC assistance. Tensions created with the Civil Society involvement in the DC projects. Efforts to reduce poverty could be undermine by other EC Policies. (e.g. Common Agricultural Policies).The concept of Regionalism (in order to facilitate developing countries integration to participate in World’s Economy might contradict the goal of Poverty Reduction.
  • ASEAN IMPORTED from the EC transport equipment and machinery, contributing to EC surplus in TRADE with ASEAN. 1970s ASEAN adopted EXPORT-ORIENTES industrialization programs as early as the 1970s.The ASEAN member countries will become even more export-oriented in the 19880s all … will.. Need to find markets for their exports of resource-based as well as other manufactured goods… In the near future ASEAN trade expansion is likely to be extra-ASEAN rather then intra-ASEAN . The EC will therefore continue to be one of the most important markets for ASEAN. (AKRASANEE 1982)Only 13.7% of ASEAN countries imports originated from Europe. For the EC perspective ASEAN accounted for only 1.8 percent of EC imports, Thus it would be also the EC to increase the INTEREFIONAL TRADE. At the present three-fourths of EC primary textiles, garments and consumer electronic products came from ASEAN exports. See Table 3
  • Key Topic in regionalism: Discrimination between member and non-member countries in access to European Markets. The GSP’s aim was to promote Third World industrialization by providing market access to developing countries’ exports. Preferential treatment would be non-reciprocal, that is the Developing countries were not expected to grant similar preferences to developed countries.The EC/GSP, covering both agricultural and manufactured products was adopted in 1971 for a 10 years period and subsequently revised in 1981, 1991, and 1995, with minor improvements being introduced every year. Lobbying for GSP concessions opened up a new area of relations between the EC and ASEAN, which hoped to obtain additional concessions on behalf of its members. The relationship was and continue Asymmetrical. In the other hand, other European Policies set strict limits to the scope of the GSO, as is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which severely circumscribed the scope of preferences that could be granted to food and agricultural products. For the EC, industrialization in developing countries simultaneously offered opportunities and constraints. It would sustain demand for imports of technology-intensive manufactured products from the EC, thus supporting employment in the industrial sectors concerned. On the other hand, abundant labor supply in developing countries, particularly Asia, reduced the cost of production of simple consumer goods, which would compete with European Goods and in the medium and long term, aggravate unemployment in Europe
  • EC/GSP its professed objective was to stimulate industrialization of developing countries but it sought to protect the competitiveness of European producers through all sorts of restrictions (De Lotto,1993)In reality, even if the more advanced developed countries’ share in exports enjoying preferences was reduced, the low level of industrial development in the least developing countries prevented them from increasing their share of exports in the short term. European firms could then make up the difference. The rapid increase of exports to Europe from several ASEAN ensured that they would be severely affected by restrictions on products. The 1980 GSP reform fixed, for 64 very sensitive products, maximum amounts of duty-free exports in absolute terms (indiv. Country tariff quotas). The restrictions adversely affected all ASEAN countries except Thailand in plywood, Malaysia in Shoes, and Singapore in Radios, TV sets and Diodes. By 1981, 44 products exported by ASEAN member states were affected by butoirs, tariff quotas, tariff ceiling and special surveillance.
  • In the period 1990-92, exports from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia that received GSP benefits grw by at least 70% and exports from Thailand rose by 37%.1995 4 ASEAN countries were among the top seven beneficiaries of the GSP. 1991 Annual tariff preference on Thai exports under the GSP was worth more than 200 million ECU, a figure that exceeded EC development assistance. At 1992 AEMM the EC proposed to gradually apply GATT principle of reciprocity in relations between the two groups. The ASEAN would have had to grant to the EC the same treatment that the EC granted to it, otherwise the EC could withdraw preferential treatment from ASEAN. The ASEAN-EC discussions on the GSP reform are a graphic illustration of the inequality in the relationship and the limits of ASEAN’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the EC in trade, in the face of determined EC Action
  • After conditions have been established, the importing country may impose antidumping duties (tariffs) whose effect is to eliminate the price DIFFERENCE.
  • Table 4 and 5 page 80 and 81
  • AEMM:AseanEuropean Union Ministerial Meeting

The Political Economy Of Interregional Relations Asean Eu The Political Economy Of Interregional Relations Asean Eu Presentation Transcript

  • THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFINTERREGIONAL RELATIONS:ASEAN AND THE ECIsis Quinones20095350014th Semester International Business
  • CHAPTER 3PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT INSOUTHEAST ASIAThe Political Economy of Interregional Relations
  • PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA EC playing important role in the assisting Development of ASEAN. Access to European Markets and European development assistance are significant contributions. Building Social Relationships between the European Community and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Contradictions: EC Policies of integrating developing countries into de world economy, on the one hand, and those of poverty reduction and strengthening civil society participation.
  • DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS AN INTERSTATE COMPROMISE• ASEAN a factor of stability and balance that contributes to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia (e.g. Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia)• EC recognition of ASEAN as a developing region into practical actions required some negotiations.• ASEAN adopted a export-oriented industrial polices and was needed trade preferences.• In the first few years of the GSP on ASEAN trade with EC countries’ agricultural exports actually qualified for more preferences than manufactured products.• The impact of GSP on ASEAN trade with the EC seems to have been limited.• In the short run, the constraints on the EC’ development policy and the Common Agricultural Policy prevented substantial modifications of the GSP to meet ASEAN trade demands.• ‘Globalist’ justified extending the EC’ development policy.
  • DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS AN INTERSTATE COMPROMISE 1973 AID FROM EC70 62.426050403020 8.55 8.110 4.29 3.35 0 INDONESIA THAILAND MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE Southeast Asian CountriesTable 1: 1973 Aid from the EC to Southeast Asian Countries.
  • DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS AN INTERSTATE COMPROMISETable 2: EC Financial Commitments in Asia and Latin America1976-1998
  • MAIN CONSTRAINTS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE The main constraints were inherent in the European Policy: 1. The preferential treatment accorded to the Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries: The funds amounted to approximately US$26 millions while for the Asia and Latin America treatment was disproportionate of US$ 20 millions to their demographic weight. 2. Occasional lack of Coherence between EC policies, particularly between the Common Agricultural Policy and Development Cooperation. 3. Lack of Coherence between development policy and other EC policies notably in the Common Agricultural Policy.
  • EC PROJECTS CYCLE Evaluation IdentificationImplementation Preparation Appraisal
  • WAS INTERREGIONAL RELATIONSHIP A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCED BY MOST ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES IN THE 1970S AND 1980S? From the outsiders observer, It is difficult to form an accurate impression of the impact of EC development projects, due to lack of access to monitoring and evaluations documents. What can be highlighted is that development cooperation, which has so far been described as a relationship between the EC on the one hand, and the ASEAN as an organization in the other hand, also creates an important Social Relations between the EC and Civil Society (farmers, churches, organizations, groups among the community) .
  • PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA LIST OF PROJECTS Indonesia Soya Pilot Project Sumatra 1976-83 Indonesia Pilot Project on Soya and Galawija Development 1976-1979 Thailand Pig Breeding Pilot Project 1977 Indonesia Baturraden Dairy Project Study 1978 Indonesia Bank of Indonesia Small Credit Programme Thailand Seed Centre Study 1978 Thailand Crop Diversification Study 1978 Preliminary Crop Development 1979 Thailand Winged Bean Development 1979 Indonesia Talungagung Drainage Project 1979-83 Philippines Porgramme of Riverside Development along the Rio Bicol 1979-86 Indonesia Irrigation Studies 1979-83 Philippines Crop Protection Programme 1980-86 Thailand Huai Mong Irrigation and Drainage Project (1980-85) Thailand Seed Production Centre 1981-85 Thailand Agricultural and Rural Credit 1983-85
  • WHY WILL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION CONTINUE GROWING IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION? First, economic growth has not yet eliminated poverty in sectors and subnational regions of two of the most populous countries in this region, Indonesia and the Philippines. Second, ASEAN enlargement since 1995 has added four new members- Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma- where poverty is more widespread than in the original member countries. In another sense, EC development cooperation is once more compensating for the structural limitations of Southeast Asian regionalism referred to in the previous presentations, notably the- unwillingness to ensure regional funding to regional projects.
  • MAASTRICHT TREATY AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION In this central treaty were the European Union was formed, it were declared sustainable economic development and social development, integration of developing countries into the world economy and campaign against poverty as objectives of development cooperation for the following years. The goals were specified as: Protection of the environment and Natural Resources, the Combat against Drugs, The Promotion of Women’s participation in development, The Protection of Children and Ethnic Minorities, Demographic Questions, The Spread of Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights, Strengthening of the capacity of national institutions, and the improvement of the economic, legal and social environment for the private sector.
  • KEY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS TOPIC OF EC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION Relationship between Development Cooperation (DC) and other EC Policies (problem of COHERENCE). Efficiency of DC assistance. Tensions created with the Civil Society involvement in the DC projects. Efforts to reduce poverty could be undermine by other EC Policies. (e.g. Common Agricultural Policies). The concept of Regionalism (in order to facilitate developing countries integration to participate in World’s Economy might contradict the goal of Poverty Reduction.
  • CHAPTER 4CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONALFREMEWORKS FOR FIRMS: TRADEThe Political Economy of Interregional Relations
  • IMPORTANT FIGURES TO EVALUATETRADE BETWEEN EC AND ASEANCOUNTRIES.The Political Economy of Interregional Relations
  • BIG PICTURE OF INTERREGIONAL RELATION BETWEEN EC-ASEAN 2010
  • CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FIRMS: TRADE Trade not remain just to the relationship between States and Regional Organizations, but also FIRMS. Interregional Relationship can be forge by FIRMS to the extent that their strategies and actions treat the member countries of the two organizations as constituting a Region. In this chapter we are going to analyze the subsequent actions of the ASEAN and the EC on behalf of firms and the way in which conditions and contradictions deriving from global and regional levels have influenced both the actions of firms and the two organizations.
  • CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FIRMS: TRADE In 1980s : Food and Beverages, Crude Materials, and other Primary Commodities accounted for nearly half of ASEAN’s export to the EC. Table 3: ASEAN Export to the EC by Sector
  • ASEAN / GSP: FROM (LESS) PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO GRADUATION Key Topic in regionalism: Discrimination between member and non-member countries in access to European Markets. The GSP’s aim was to promote Third World industrialization by providing market access to developing countries’ exports. Preferential treatment would be non- reciprocal, that is the Developing countries were not expected to grant similar preferences to developed countries. The EC/GSP, covering both agricultural and manufactured products was adopted in 1971 for a 10 years period and subsequently revised in 1981, 1991, and 1995, with minor improvements being introduced every year. Lobbying for GSP concessions opened up a new area of relations between the EC and ASEAN, which hoped to obtain additional concessions on behalf of its members. The relationship was and continue Asymmetrical.
  • RESTRICTIONS OF THE EC GSP SCHEMES Minimum Import Price: goods entering the EC at prices (including insurance and freight) below the minimum may be charged a duty or level equal to the difference between the two. Tariff Quota: fixes the amount of goods for which a special, reduced tariff is charged. All imports in excess of this amount must pay the normal common external tariff. Tariff Ceiling: was similar to the tariff quota, with the difference that the normal tariff is not automatically reemployed once the ceiling is exceeded but is subject to negotiations between EC member states. Member State Share: fixes amount of the tariff quota that a single member state may use. When imports to the member state exceed this share, it must impose the normal duty on further imports, though imports to other member states may continue at the reduced GSP rate. Butoir: fixes the amount of tariff quota or ceiling that any single country exporting to the EC may use. All exports in excess of this amount must pay the full duty. Quantitative Restriction: fixes amount of a product that can be imported irrespective of the tariff charged. Imports in excess of this amount are not allowed. Rules of Origin: to ensure that imports enjoying preferential treatment originate from a developing country.
  • RESTRICTIONS OF THE EC GSP SCHEMES EC/GSP its professed objective was to stimulate industrialization of developing countries but it sought to protect the competitiveness of European producers through all sorts of restrictions (De Lotto,1993) The rapid increase of exports to Europe from several ASEAN ensured that they would be severely affected by restrictions on products. The restrictions adversely affected all ASEAN countries except Thailand in plywood, Malaysia in Shoes, and Singapore in Radios, TV sets and Diodes. By 1981, 44 products exported by ASEAN member states were affected by butoirs, tariff quotas, tariff ceiling and special surveillance.
  • BENEFITS FROM EC GSP TO ASEAN COUNTRIES Southeast Asia firms successful in exporting to Europe. Asian Countries are the major GSP beneficiaries. During the first decade on the 9 countries that accounted for the three-fourths of imports under the GSP-The Philippines and Thailand, were ASEAN members. 1971-89 Singapore was one of the 4 counties for whom the terms of trade benefits under the GSP were the largest. ASEAN firms success using GSP preferences system could be reflected in the doubled of exports goods covered between 1978-1985
  • COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ITS RESTRICTIONS FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES EXPORTS CAP was the structural obstacle to expansion of coverage in agricultural productions, Although ASEAN occasionally obtained piece meal concessions from the EC. 1973 GSP list of Agricultural Products just included: -Tobacco (Indonesia) -Preserved Pineapple, Palm Oil (Indonesia and Malaysia) -Coconut Oil (Malaysia and Philippines) -Shrimps and Prawns (Indonesia) -Underground Pepper (Indonesia -Orchids (Indonesia and Thailand)
  • BENEFITS FROM EC GSP TO ASEAN COUNTRIES In the period 1990-92, exports from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia that received GSP benefits grew by at least 70% and exports from Thailand rose by 37%. 1995 4 ASEAN countries were among the top seven beneficiaries of the GSP. 1991 Annual tariff preference on Thai exports under the GSP was worth more than 200 million ECU, a figure that exceeded EC development assistance. The ASEAN-EC discussions on the GSP reform are a graphic illustration of the inequality in the relationship and the limits of ASEAN’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the EC in trade, in the face of determined EC Action.
  • ASEAN’S BARGAINING POWER Was too limited as a result we have :  The New GSP benefits for all products.  Agricultural Products European Council Regulation. Very Sensitive Products (Canned Pineapple, Textiles, Garments, etc) 15% tariff reduction. Sensitive Products (Timber, Timber Products, Palm, Vegetable Oil, Electrical, Electronics Products) 30% tariff reduction. Countries and territories whose per capita income was higher than that of an EC member states
  • ANTIDUMPING: TOWARDS AN INTERREGIONAL PROBLEMATIC Dumping: Export Price is less than a comparable price for the like product, in the ordinary course of trade. Purpose of Dumping: To unload overstock or to eliminate competition in the foreign market, or to realize maximum economies of scales. Conditions if Dumping Exercise is to be Proven:  1. The existence of a Dumping Margin.  2. Injury to a branch of National Industry  3.A Cause-and-Effect relationship between the alleged dumping and the injury. Objective : Eliminate price Difference.
  • WHY ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATIONS? They merely serve to protect Domestic Industries, particularly since tariff barriers have been largely dismantled and non tariff barriers are increasingly subject to regulation. Antidumping in the view contradicts the ideology of trade liberalization advocated by the EC. In ASEA-EC relations, this contradiction is generated by the increase in ASEAN trade with the EC and the declining importance of tariff barriers. According to an independent study commissioned by the European Parliament in 1993:  4/5 of imports to antidumping duties come From Japan.  7.4% from ASEAN NICs.  Cases in Antidumping rose from 10% (1981-1985) to 30% from (1986- 1991)
  • ANTIDUMPING CASES DETAILS
  • CHAPTER 5CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONALFREMEWORKS FOR FIRMS: INVESTMENTThe Political Economy of Interregional Relations
  • REGIONALIZATION IN EUROPE AS AN OBSTACLE TO EC FDI IN ASEAN 1980 Investment is identify as a Priority by ASEAN-EC: Strengthening economic links between the two regions by promoting trade and transfer technology. Investment is the weakest area of Interregional Relations between ASEAN-EC.  Not attractive region for EC  Not great importance to the region. 1980s-1990s Southeast Asia Region was the most attractive region for investment among Emerging Economies. Regionalization of ASEAN, constitution of a regional market required to compensated the risks associated with European FDI.
  • THE PROBLEMATIC OF EC’S FDI Quantitative terms formulated (insufficient in Volume) During the Colonial Period FDI was dominant, after the Independence had fallen to 14.2%. 1980-1993 European FD more than quadrupled in volume, from $4.183 billion to $23.312 billion. EC’s FDI account for 20% of total FDI in ASEAN 5. Japan’s FDI account for 25% of total FDI in ASEAN 5. USA’s FDI account for 14.5% of total FDI in ASEAN 5. 1982/1992 EC total FDI amounted just 1% for ASEAN. Since 1970s ASEAN has been less attractive than other developing regions for European Firms. ASEAN interested in EC is not to depended merely from JAPAN. ASEAN sees EC’s FDI as “accelerating and diversifying their industrial capacities” mainly in labor intensive industry to adopt an export-oriented strategy and abandoned imports.
  • TABLE 4: EC FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT.
  • EC FDI IN ASEAN Chee (1980) “ASEAN wished to attract skill-intensive and knowledge-based industries to move from Europe to Southeast Asia” Post War Period: European FDI in the region was concentrated in Post War Period: Raw Materials (Petroleum/Rubber) Colonial Pattern: Local Market (Food, Simple Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals)
  • MALAYSIA EC FDI INDUSTRIES Rubber Industry: British Subsidiary had succeeded in acquiring the capacity to design and develop rubber processing machinery locally and export the machinery. Telecommunication Industry: 50/50 Joint Venture, set up in 1969 with the Dutch from Phillips for the assembly of television sets, purchase local materials or parts. Starting local manufacturing of VHF, radios-telecommunications equipment, followed by printed wiring boards. ! Technology Transfer was successful in this industry, after three years foreign experts were not needed on permanent basis!
  • MALAYSIA EC FDI INDUSTRIES Chemical Industry: Very little transfer of Technology to Malaysia from EC firms. Chemicals firms producing hairdressing cream and talcum powder were limited mostly to mixing of mineral oil, perfume and wax. Motor-Vehicle Industry: Merely assembled vehicles from Completed Knocked Out kits containing 90% imported components. The little Research and Development that was done in Malaysia focused on product quality maintenance or minor modifications of products and processes for the Local Market! The lack of components from local suppliers was a difficulty for European Firms and the behavior reflected the fact that investment was undertaken primarily to supply the LOCAL MARKET, circumventing protectionist policies associated with Import Substitution!
  • THAILAND DETAILS OF EC FDI- 99 EC Firms benefiting from Government Incentives - 23 Firms in Agriculture. - 17 Minerals, Metals and Ceramics. - 10 Chemicals. - 10 Mechanical and Electrical Equipment. - 10 Plastics, Medical Supplies, Component Parts, Natural or Synthetic Fiber Products. !Most of the Investment were oriented toward production for the LOCAL MARKET! Relative low of investment were oriented to labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, garments, electric and electronic goods and plastic goods.
  • WHY PRODUCTION FOR THE LOCAL MARKET?  Logical Response to import Substitution Strategies.  The problem from the ASEAN perspective was that well after import substitution had been abandoned by most of their member in favor of EXPORT-ORIENTED strategies, EC investment continued to be concentrated in raw materials and in production for the Local Market. Surveys showed that EC firms consider ASEAN region as primarily a FINAL GOOD market and not as a location for production for the European or World Markets.
  • EC PERCEPTION OF ASEAN FOR FDI High Transportation Cost. Japan’s competitiveness could be attributed to production and marketing cost advantages rather than to lower transport costs (Langhmmer,1987) European has pointed out, Capitalist Economies, states and regional organizations lack the power to coerce firms and can only provide incentives to them. This difference in perception, is illustrate in the issue that initiatives to create an interregional framework for firms were proposed by ASEAN. EC did not seen the Interregional Framework as a mechanism for encouraging European firms to invest in Southeast Asia. Unfavorable Investment Climate in the Region. State Regulation were Excessive and Inadequate.: Intellectual Property and Investment Protection. 100% of Ownership: Requiring setting up of Joint Ventures. Restrictions of FDI in certain Industries and Regions, Restrictions on Capital Repatriation. Investment Conditions not Harmonized.
  • EC SEEKING FDI CONDITIONS AS: Fiscal incentives and Investment Guarantees. Tax exemptions. Accelerated depreciation allowances. Exemption from Import Duties on Equipments and Raw Materials. Tariff Protection for the Domestic Market. Incentives to Export. Guarantees regarding expropriation.Europeans firms argued that Southeast Asia regionalization was going in an very slow pace: Often cited the existence of 5 separate markets, instead of a SINGLE MARKET, this is one of the most important disincentive to invest in the Southeast Region.
  • WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE EC DURING ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS. Treaty of Maastricht: Accomplishment of a new momentum for the Single Market including a Single Currency and strengthening the three pillars of EC: The European Parliament, The Council of Ministers, The European Commission. German Economist Hiemenz and his colleagues believed that Regional Development Policy was probably more than sufficient to attract investment that would otherwise have gone to Developing Countries. Development Policy, also influenced the orientation of FDI towards certain developing countries and regions.
  • SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (SEM) Fears among Developing Countries that investment would be diverted away from them in favor of the EC members, whether developed or less developed. Little doubt that the SEM stimulated intra- EC investment. Between 1984 and 1988, the latter more than quintupled. Europeans firms increased their intra-EC FDI, primarily in the form of Merges and Acquisitions, the goal of which was to consolidate their competitive position in preparation for the SEM.
  • 1987 REGIONAL INVESTMENT ADVISERS Warned that investments in Southeast Asia were being reoriented towards production for exportation to the World Market, thus potentially threatening European firms’ export markets. The warning was followed by another 1989 that added Taiwanese and South Korean firms to the Japanese firms investing in Southeast Asia and pointed to the danger that products from Southeast Asia would compete with European products in Europe itself. (Bassetti, 1898,p.3)
  • REGIONALIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS AN INCENTIVE TO EC FDI In the 1990s Southeast Asia as a region became one of the primary destinations of European FDI in the developing world. In 1992 European investment in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines already exceeded those made in the African Countries belonging to the ACP, reaching a peak in Southeast Asia in 1994, after that year, Latin America became more attractive as an investment site (See table 5)
  • WHERE GOES THE EC INVESTMENT IN ASEAN? 1993 DATA INFO. Philippines Thailand Malaysia Singapore Electrical and Electroniccs Manufacturing Electrical Appliances, for domestic markets Petroleum Food, Beverages, Tabacco Machinery Mining Mining and Quarrying Rubber Thailand Chemicals and Petroleum Raw Materials (Petroleum and Coal) Tourism 0 0.5 1 1.5 Malaysia Electrical Singapore Mining and Philippines Thailand Petroleum Appliances, for Quarrying 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 domestic markets 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 Series2 0.082 0.084 9.90% 0.086 0.088 8.80% 0.092 0.094 0.096 0.098 0.09 0.1 0 Malaysia Materials (Petroleum and Coal) 0.5 0.1Raw 0.2 0.3 0.4 Rubber 0.6 0.7 Electrical and 0.9 0.8 Food, Beverages, Tabacco Electroniccs Series3 30.50% 6.70% 20.20% 12.10% Series1 30.50% 6.70% 20.20% Machinery12.10% Series4 Singapore 74.80% Chemicals and Petroleum 12.10% 8.20% Philippines Tourism Mining Manufacturing Series1 Series1 22.50% 9.90% 6.90% 74.60% 8.80% Series2 9.90% 8.80% Series1 74.80% 12.10% 8.20%
  • WHY FDI IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS ENHANCE BY ASEAN Enhance their capacity to export not only to Europe, but also to the rest of the World. ASEAN-EC cooperation should seek to apply technology to Industrial Activities and to Promote Innovations in Technologies that ASEAN countries acquired. Mobilize Financial Resources to support Joint projects between firms. SME’s should be given priority access to capital, appropriate technology and markets. Cheaper but high quality manufactured products in ASEAN are predicted to benefit European consumers by adding variety and choice while stimulating competition among manufacturers. European FDI in Southeast Asia would not substitute trade, but would instead intensify trade between the two regions. Potential Imitation effect in the home country, encouraging other companies to engage in Production Overseas. Increase the parent company’s international competitiveness.
  • EC-ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES 1993 : European Business Information Center (EBIC) established in Manila, Philippines, followed by others in ASEAN regions. Functions:  Provide or facilitate information to European and Southeast Asian firms on trade, infrastructure, firms, factors costs, and regulations and standards.  Organize Seminars, workshops and Conduct other trade promotion events.
  • EC-ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES European Investment Bank (EIB) financing in ASEAN:  Founding on investment projects.  Facilitate Joint private sector investment projects.  Financing to Technology-Transfer Projects, Capital Investment, and Projects implemented by Joint Ventures between EC and Asian or Latin America. Undoubtedly EIB operations have facilitated the conclusion of Joint Ventures involving European firms in several ASEAN countries. The beneficial consequences on industrial activity of energy or water supply projects are evident.
  • EC-ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES European Community Investment Partners (ECIP):  Programme to assist in creating or developing Joint Ventures, Privatization or Private Infrastructure Projects in all developing countries outside the ACP.  Complete Cycle of Investment Process Consultancy.  Creation of ASEAN-EC Partenariat which arranges business meeting and set a target of 500 strategic alliances between EC-ASEAN with a 45 million budget for a 5 year period.
  • CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS European SMEs employ more than large transnational companies are a KEY partnership in order to enlarge the Interregional Relations between EC-ASEAN. In the Short and Medium-Term , the progress of regionalization in Europe and Southeast Asia will continue to determine European firms’ tendency to invest in Southeast Asia. The enlargement of EC to the Central and East European Countries (CEEC), will expand the coverage of EC regional development policy and broaden the group of countries that can compete with developing regions for EC FDI. Risk: The strategic position of the CEEC is more favorable than that of the ASEAN and other developing regions. ASEAN efforts to create and sustain an interregional relationship in the field of investment bore fruit in the 1990s, in the form of ASEAN-EC investment promotion activities.
  • ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IS CHANGING THE WORLD 고맙습니다 THANK YOU MUCHAS GRACIAS