ASEAN economic integration.

1. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS:
ASEAN AND THE EC
Isis Quinones
2009535001
4th Semester International Business

2. CHAPTER 3
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Political Economy of Interregional Relations

3. PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
 EC playing important role in the assisting Development
of ASEAN.
 Access to European Markets and European
development assistance are significant contributions.
 Building Social Relationships between the European
Community and Civil Society in Southeast Asia.
 Contradictions: EC Policies of integrating developing
countries into de world economy, on the one hand,
and those of poverty reduction and strengthening civil
society participation.

4. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS AN INTERSTATE
COMPROMISE
• ASEAN a factor of stability and balance that contributes to the maintenance of peace in
Southeast Asia (e.g. Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia)
• EC recognition of ASEAN as a developing region into practical actions required some
negotiations.
• ASEAN adopted a export-oriented industrial polices and was needed trade preferences.
• In the first few years of the GSP on ASEAN trade with EC countries’ agricultural exports
actually qualified for more preferences than manufactured products.
• The impact of GSP on ASEAN trade with the EC seems to have been limited.
• In the short run, the constraints on the EC’ development policy and the Common
Agricultural Policy prevented substantial modifications of the GSP to meet ASEAN trade
demands.
• ‘Globalist’ justified extending the EC’ development policy.

5. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS AN INTERSTATE
COMPROMISE
1973 AID FROM EC
70 62.42
60
50
40
30
20
8.55 8.1
10 4.29 3.35
0
INDONESIA THAILAND MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE
Southeast Asian Countries
Table 1: 1973 Aid from the EC to Southeast Asian Countries.

6. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS AN INTERSTATE
COMPROMISE
Table 2: EC Financial Commitments in Asia and Latin America
1976-1998

7. MAIN CONSTRAINTS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
 The main constraints were inherent in the European
Policy:
1. The preferential treatment accorded to the Africa
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries: The funds
amounted to approximately US$26 millions while for the
Asia and Latin America treatment was disproportionate
of US$ 20 millions to their demographic weight.
2. Occasional lack of Coherence between EC
policies, particularly between the Common Agricultural
Policy and Development Cooperation.
3. Lack of Coherence between development policy and
other EC policies notably in the Common Agricultural
Policy.

8. EC PROJECTS CYCLE
Evaluation Identification
Implementation Preparation
Appraisal

9. WAS INTERREGIONAL RELATIONSHIP A DECISIVE FACTOR IN
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCED BY MOST
ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES IN THE 1970S AND 1980S?
 From the outsiders observer, It is difficult to form an
accurate impression of the impact of EC development
projects, due to lack of access to monitoring and
evaluations documents.
 What can be highlighted is that development
cooperation, which has so far been described as a
relationship between the EC on the one hand, and the
ASEAN as an organization in the other hand, also creates
an important Social Relations between the EC and Civil
Society (farmers, churches, organizations, groups among
the community) .

10. PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
LIST OF PROJECTS
 Indonesia Soya Pilot Project Sumatra 1976-83
 Indonesia Pilot Project on Soya and Galawija Development 1976-1979
 Thailand Pig Breeding Pilot Project 1977
 Indonesia Baturraden Dairy Project Study 1978
 Indonesia Bank of Indonesia Small Credit Programme
 Thailand Seed Centre Study 1978
 Thailand Crop Diversification Study 1978
 Preliminary Crop Development 1979
 Thailand Winged Bean Development 1979
 Indonesia Talungagung Drainage Project 1979-83
 Philippines Porgramme of Riverside Development along the Rio Bicol 1979-86
 Indonesia Irrigation Studies 1979-83
 Philippines Crop Protection Programme 1980-86
 Thailand Huai Mong Irrigation and Drainage Project (1980-85)
 Thailand Seed Production Centre 1981-85
 Thailand Agricultural and Rural Credit 1983-85

11. WHY WILL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION CONTINUE
GROWING IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION?
 First, economic growth has not yet eliminated
poverty in sectors and subnational regions of two
of the most populous countries in this
region, Indonesia and the Philippines.
 Second, ASEAN enlargement since 1995 has
added four new members-
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma- where
poverty is more widespread than in the original
member countries.
 In another sense, EC development cooperation is
once more compensating for the structural
limitations of Southeast Asian regionalism
referred to in the previous presentations, notably
the- unwillingness to ensure regional funding to
regional projects.

12. MAASTRICHT TREATY AND DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION
 In this central treaty were the European Union was
formed, it were declared sustainable economic
development and social development, integration of
developing countries into the world economy and
campaign against poverty as objectives of
development cooperation for the following years.
 The goals were specified as: Protection of the
environment and Natural Resources, the Combat
against Drugs, The Promotion of Women’s
participation in development, The Protection of
Children and Ethnic Minorities, Demographic
Questions, The Spread of Democracy, Good
Governance and Human Rights, Strengthening of
the capacity of national institutions, and the
improvement of the economic, legal and social
environment for the private sector.

13. KEY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS TOPIC OF EC
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
 Relationship between Development Cooperation (DC) and
other EC Policies (problem of COHERENCE).
 Efficiency of DC assistance.
 Tensions created with the Civil Society involvement in the
DC projects.
 Efforts to reduce poverty could be undermine by other EC
Policies. (e.g. Common Agricultural Policies).
 The concept of Regionalism (in order to facilitate
developing countries integration to participate in World’s
Economy might contradict the goal of Poverty Reduction.

14. CHAPTER 4
CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONAL
FREMEWORKS FOR FIRMS: TRADE
The Political Economy of Interregional Relations

15. IMPORTANT FIGURES TO EVALUATE
TRADE BETWEEN EC AND ASEAN
COUNTRIES.
The Political Economy of Interregional Relations

18. BIG PICTURE OF INTERREGIONAL RELATION BETWEEN
EC-ASEAN 2010

19. CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
FIRMS: TRADE
 Trade not remain just to the relationship between States and Regional
Organizations, but also FIRMS.
 Interregional Relationship can be forge by FIRMS to the extent that their
strategies and actions treat the member countries of the two organizations as
constituting a Region.
 In this chapter we are going to analyze the subsequent actions of the ASEAN and
the EC on behalf of firms and the way in which conditions and contradictions
deriving from global and regional levels have influenced both the actions of firms
and the two organizations.

20. CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
FIRMS: TRADE
 In 1980s : Food and Beverages, Crude Materials, and other Primary Commodities
accounted for nearly half of ASEAN’s export to the EC.
Table 3: ASEAN Export to the EC by Sector

21. ASEAN / GSP: FROM (LESS) PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT TO GRADUATION
 Key Topic in regionalism: Discrimination between member and non-member
countries in access to European Markets.
 The GSP’s aim was to promote Third World industrialization by providing market
access to developing countries’ exports. Preferential treatment would be non-
reciprocal, that is the Developing countries were not expected to grant similar
preferences to developed countries.
 The EC/GSP, covering both agricultural and manufactured products was adopted
in 1971 for a 10 years period and subsequently revised in 1981, 1991, and
1995, with minor improvements being introduced every year.
 Lobbying for GSP concessions opened up a new area of relations between the
EC and ASEAN, which hoped to obtain additional concessions on behalf of its
members. The relationship was and continue Asymmetrical.

22. RESTRICTIONS OF THE EC GSP SCHEMES
 Minimum Import Price: goods entering the EC at prices (including insurance and freight)
below the minimum may be charged a duty or level equal to the difference between the
two.
 Tariff Quota: fixes the amount of goods for which a special, reduced tariff is charged. All
imports in excess of this amount must pay the normal common external tariff.
 Tariff Ceiling: was similar to the tariff quota, with the difference that the normal tariff is
not automatically reemployed once the ceiling is exceeded but is subject to negotiations
between EC member states.
 Member State Share: fixes amount of the tariff quota that a single member state may use.
When imports to the member state exceed this share, it must impose the normal duty on
further imports, though imports to other member states may continue at the reduced GSP
rate.
 Butoir: fixes the amount of tariff quota or ceiling that any single country exporting to the
EC may use. All exports in excess of this amount must pay the full duty.
 Quantitative Restriction: fixes amount of a product that can be imported irrespective of
the tariff charged. Imports in excess of this amount are not allowed.
 Rules of Origin: to ensure that imports enjoying preferential treatment originate from a
developing country.

23. RESTRICTIONS OF THE EC GSP SCHEMES
 EC/GSP its professed objective was to stimulate
industrialization of developing countries but it sought
to protect the competitiveness of European producers
through all sorts of restrictions (De Lotto,1993)
 The rapid increase of exports to Europe from several
ASEAN ensured that they would be severely affected by
restrictions on products.
 The restrictions adversely affected all ASEAN countries
except Thailand in plywood, Malaysia in Shoes, and
Singapore in Radios, TV sets and Diodes.
 By 1981, 44 products exported by ASEAN member
states were affected by butoirs, tariff quotas, tariff
ceiling and special surveillance.

24. BENEFITS FROM EC GSP TO ASEAN COUNTRIES
 Southeast Asia firms successful in exporting to Europe.
 Asian Countries are the major GSP beneficiaries.
 During the first decade on the 9 countries that accounted for the three-fourths
of imports under the GSP-The Philippines and Thailand, were ASEAN members.
 1971-89 Singapore was one of the 4 counties for whom the terms of trade
benefits under the GSP were the largest.
 ASEAN firms success using GSP preferences system could be reflected in the
doubled of exports goods covered between 1978-1985

25. COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ITS
RESTRICTIONS FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES EXPORTS
 CAP was the structural obstacle to expansion of coverage in agricultural
productions, Although ASEAN occasionally obtained piece meal concessions from
the EC.
 1973 GSP list of Agricultural Products just included:
-Tobacco (Indonesia)
-Preserved Pineapple, Palm Oil (Indonesia and Malaysia)
-Coconut Oil (Malaysia and Philippines)
-Shrimps and Prawns (Indonesia)
-Underground Pepper (Indonesia
-Orchids (Indonesia and Thailand)

26. BENEFITS FROM EC GSP TO ASEAN COUNTRIES
 In the period 1990-92, exports from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia
that received GSP benefits grew by at least 70% and exports from Thailand
rose by 37%.
 1995 4 ASEAN countries were among the top seven beneficiaries of the
GSP.
 1991 Annual tariff preference on Thai exports under the GSP was worth
more than 200 million ECU, a figure that exceeded EC development
assistance.
 The ASEAN-EC discussions on the GSP reform are a graphic illustration of
the inequality in the relationship and the limits of ASEAN’s bargaining
power vis-à-vis the EC in trade, in the face of determined EC Action.

27. ASEAN’S BARGAINING POWER
 Was too limited as a result we have :
 The New GSP benefits for all products.
 Agricultural Products European Council
Regulation.
 Very Sensitive Products (Canned
Pineapple, Textiles, Garments, etc) 15% tariff
reduction.
 Sensitive Products (Timber, Timber
Products, Palm, Vegetable
Oil, Electrical, Electronics Products) 30% tariff
reduction.
 Countries and territories whose per capita income
was higher than that of an EC member states

28. ANTIDUMPING: TOWARDS AN INTERREGIONAL
PROBLEMATIC
 Dumping: Export Price is less than a comparable price
for the like product, in the ordinary course of trade.
 Purpose of Dumping: To unload overstock or to
eliminate competition in the foreign market, or to
realize maximum economies of scales.
 Conditions if Dumping Exercise is to be Proven:
 1. The existence of a Dumping Margin.
 2. Injury to a branch of National Industry
 3.A Cause-and-Effect relationship between the
alleged dumping and the injury.
 Objective : Eliminate price Difference.

29. WHY ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATIONS?
 They merely serve to protect Domestic Industries, particularly since tariff
barriers have been largely dismantled and non tariff barriers are
increasingly subject to regulation.
 Antidumping in the view contradicts the ideology of trade liberalization
advocated by the EC. In ASEA-EC relations, this contradiction is generated
by the increase in ASEAN trade with the EC and the declining importance of
tariff barriers.
 According to an independent study commissioned by the European
Parliament in 1993:
 4/5 of imports to antidumping duties come From Japan.
 7.4% from ASEAN NICs.
 Cases in Antidumping rose from 10% (1981-1985) to 30% from (1986-
1991)

30. ANTIDUMPING CASES DETAILS

31. CHAPTER 5
CONSTRUCTING INTERREGIONAL
FREMEWORKS FOR FIRMS: INVESTMENT
The Political Economy of Interregional Relations

33. REGIONALIZATION IN EUROPE AS AN OBSTACLE TO EC
FDI IN ASEAN
 1980 Investment is identify as a Priority by ASEAN-EC: Strengthening economic
links between the two regions by promoting trade and transfer technology.
 Investment is the weakest area of Interregional Relations between ASEAN-EC.
 Not attractive region for EC
 Not great importance to the region.
 1980s-1990s Southeast Asia Region was the most attractive region for investment
among Emerging Economies.
 Regionalization of ASEAN, constitution of a regional market required to
compensated the risks associated with European FDI.

34. THE PROBLEMATIC OF EC’S FDI
 Quantitative terms formulated (insufficient in Volume)
 During the Colonial Period FDI was dominant, after the Independence had fallen
to 14.2%.
 1980-1993 European FD more than quadrupled in volume, from $4.183 billion to
$23.312 billion.
 EC’s FDI account for 20% of total FDI in ASEAN 5.
 Japan’s FDI account for 25% of total FDI in ASEAN 5.
 USA’s FDI account for 14.5% of total FDI in ASEAN 5.
 1982/1992 EC total FDI amounted just 1% for ASEAN.
 Since 1970s ASEAN has been less attractive than other developing regions for
European Firms.
 ASEAN interested in EC is not to depended merely from JAPAN.
 ASEAN sees EC’s FDI as “accelerating and diversifying their industrial capacities”
mainly in labor intensive industry to adopt an export-oriented strategy and
abandoned imports.

35. TABLE 4: EC FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT.

36. EC FDI IN ASEAN
 Chee (1980) “ASEAN wished to attract skill-intensive and
knowledge-based industries to move from Europe to
Southeast Asia”
 Post War Period: European FDI in the region was
concentrated in
Post War Period: Raw Materials
(Petroleum/Rubber)
Colonial Pattern: Local Market
(Food, Simple
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals)

37. MALAYSIA EC FDI INDUSTRIES
 Rubber Industry: British Subsidiary had succeeded in acquiring the capacity to
design and develop rubber processing machinery locally and export the
machinery.
 Telecommunication Industry: 50/50 Joint Venture, set up in 1969 with the Dutch
from Phillips for the assembly of television sets, purchase local materials or parts.
Starting local manufacturing of VHF, radios-telecommunications
equipment, followed by printed wiring boards.
! Technology Transfer was successful in this industry, after
three years foreign experts were not needed on permanent
basis!

38. MALAYSIA EC FDI INDUSTRIES
 Chemical Industry: Very little transfer of Technology to Malaysia from EC firms.
Chemicals firms producing hairdressing cream and talcum powder were limited
mostly to mixing of mineral oil, perfume and wax.
 Motor-Vehicle Industry: Merely assembled vehicles from Completed Knocked
Out kits containing 90% imported components.
The little Research and Development that was done in Malaysia focused on
product quality maintenance or minor modifications of products and processes
for the Local Market
! The lack of components from local suppliers was a difficulty for European Firms
and the behavior reflected the fact that investment was undertaken primarily
to supply the LOCAL MARKET, circumventing protectionist policies associated
with Import Substitution!

39. THAILAND DETAILS OF EC FDI
- 99 EC Firms benefiting from Government Incentives
- 23 Firms in Agriculture.
- 17 Minerals, Metals and Ceramics.
- 10 Chemicals.
- 10 Mechanical and Electrical Equipment.
- 10 Plastics, Medical Supplies, Component Parts, Natural or Synthetic Fiber
Products.
!Most of the Investment were oriented toward production for the LOCAL
MARKET!
Relative low of investment were oriented to labor-intensive sectors such as
textiles, garments, electric and electronic goods and plastic goods.

40. WHY PRODUCTION FOR THE LOCAL MARKET?
 Logical Response to import Substitution
Strategies.
 The problem from the ASEAN perspective was
that well after import substitution had been
abandoned by most of their member in favor
of EXPORT-ORIENTED strategies, EC
investment continued to be concentrated in
raw materials and in production for the Local
Market. Surveys showed that EC firms consider
ASEAN region as primarily a FINAL GOOD
market and not as a location for production for
the European or World Markets.

41. EC PERCEPTION OF ASEAN FOR FDI
 High Transportation Cost.
 Japan’s competitiveness could be attributed to production and marketing cost
advantages rather than to lower transport costs (Langhmmer,1987)
 European has pointed out, Capitalist Economies, states and regional
organizations lack the power to coerce firms and can only provide incentives to
them. This difference in perception, is illustrate in the issue that initiatives to
create an interregional framework for firms were proposed by ASEAN.
 EC did not seen the Interregional Framework as a mechanism for encouraging
European firms to invest in Southeast Asia.
 Unfavorable Investment Climate in the Region.
 State Regulation were Excessive and Inadequate.: Intellectual Property and
Investment Protection.
 100% of Ownership: Requiring setting up of Joint Ventures.
 Restrictions of FDI in certain Industries and Regions, Restrictions on Capital
Repatriation.
 Investment Conditions not Harmonized.

42. EC SEEKING FDI CONDITIONS AS:
 Fiscal incentives and Investment Guarantees.
 Tax exemptions.
 Accelerated depreciation allowances.
 Exemption from Import Duties on Equipments and Raw Materials.
 Tariff Protection for the Domestic Market.
 Incentives to Export.
 Guarantees regarding expropriation.
Europeans firms argued that Southeast Asia regionalization was going in an
very slow pace: Often cited the existence of 5 separate markets, instead
of a SINGLE MARKET, this is one of the most important disincentive to
invest in the Southeast Region.

43. WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE EC DURING ASEAN
INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS.
 Treaty of Maastricht: Accomplishment of a new
momentum for the Single Market including a
Single Currency and strengthening the three
pillars of EC: The European Parliament, The
Council of Ministers, The European Commission.
 German Economist Hiemenz and his colleagues
believed that Regional Development Policy was
probably more than sufficient to attract
investment that would otherwise have gone to
Developing Countries.
 Development Policy, also influenced the
orientation of FDI towards certain developing
countries and regions.

44. SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (SEM)
 Fears among Developing Countries that
investment would be diverted away from
them in favor of the EC members, whether
developed or less developed.
 Little doubt that the SEM stimulated intra-
EC investment. Between 1984 and
1988, the latter more than quintupled.
Europeans firms increased their intra-EC
FDI, primarily in the form of Merges and
Acquisitions, the goal of which was to
consolidate their competitive position in
preparation for the SEM.

45. 1987 REGIONAL INVESTMENT ADVISERS
 Warned that investments in Southeast Asia
were being reoriented towards production
for exportation to the World Market, thus
potentially threatening European firms’
export markets. The warning was followed
by another 1989 that added Taiwanese and
South Korean firms to the Japanese firms
investing in Southeast Asia and pointed to
the danger that products from Southeast
Asia would compete with European
products in Europe itself.
(Bassetti, 1898,p.3)

46. REGIONALIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS AN INCENTIVE
TO EC FDI
 In the 1990s Southeast Asia as a region became one
of the primary destinations of European FDI in the
developing world. In 1992 European investment in
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines already
exceeded those made in the African Countries
belonging to the ACP, reaching a peak in Southeast
Asia in 1994, after that year, Latin America became
more attractive as an investment site (See table 5)

47. WHERE GOES THE EC INVESTMENT IN ASEAN?
1993 DATA INFO.
Philippines
Thailand
Malaysia
Singapore
Electrical and Electroniccs
Manufacturing
Electrical Appliances, for domestic markets
Petroleum
Food, Beverages, Tabacco
Machinery
Mining Mining and Quarrying
Rubber
Thailand
Chemicals and Petroleum
Raw Materials (Petroleum and Coal)
Tourism 0 0.5 1 1.5
Malaysia
Electrical
Singapore Mining and
Philippines Thailand Petroleum Appliances, for
Quarrying
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 domestic markets
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Series2
0.082 0.084 9.90%
0.086 0.088 8.80% 0.092 0.094 0.096 0.098
0.09 0.1
0 Malaysia Materials (Petroleum and Coal) 0.5
0.1Raw 0.2 0.3 0.4 Rubber 0.6 0.7 Electrical and 0.9
0.8
Food, Beverages, Tabacco Electroniccs
Series3 30.50% 6.70% 20.20% 12.10%
Series1 30.50% 6.70% 20.20% Machinery12.10%
Series4 Singapore 74.80% Chemicals and Petroleum
12.10% 8.20%
Philippines Tourism Mining Manufacturing
Series1
Series1 22.50% 9.90%
6.90% 74.60% 8.80%
Series2 9.90% 8.80%
Series1 74.80% 12.10% 8.20%

48. WHY FDI IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS ENHANCE BY ASEAN
 Enhance their capacity to export not only to Europe, but also to the rest of the
World.
 ASEAN-EC cooperation should seek to apply technology to Industrial Activities and
to Promote Innovations in Technologies that ASEAN countries acquired.
 Mobilize Financial Resources to support Joint projects between firms.
 SME’s should be given priority access to capital, appropriate technology and
markets.
 Cheaper but high quality manufactured products in ASEAN are predicted to benefit
European consumers by adding variety and choice while stimulating competition
among manufacturers.
 European FDI in Southeast Asia would not substitute trade, but would instead
intensify trade between the two regions.
 Potential Imitation effect in the home country, encouraging other companies to
engage in Production Overseas.
 Increase the parent company’s international competitiveness.

49. EC-ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES
 1993 : European Business Information Center (EBIC)
established in Manila, Philippines, followed by others in
ASEAN regions.
 Functions:
 Provide or facilitate information to European and Southeast
Asian firms on trade, infrastructure, firms, factors costs, and
regulations and standards.
 Organize Seminars, workshops and Conduct other trade
promotion events.

50. EC-ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES
 European Investment Bank (EIB) financing in ASEAN:
 Founding on investment projects.
 Facilitate Joint private sector investment projects.
 Financing to Technology-Transfer Projects, Capital Investment, and
Projects implemented by Joint Ventures between EC and Asian or
Latin America.
Undoubtedly EIB operations have facilitated the conclusion of Joint
Ventures involving European firms in several ASEAN countries. The
beneficial consequences on industrial activity of energy or water
supply projects are evident.

51. EC-ASEAN INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES
 European Community Investment Partners (ECIP):
 Programme to assist in creating or developing Joint
Ventures, Privatization or Private Infrastructure Projects in all
developing countries outside the ACP.
 Complete Cycle of Investment Process Consultancy.
 Creation of ASEAN-EC Partenariat which arranges business
meeting and set a target of 500 strategic alliances between
EC-ASEAN with a 45 million budget for a 5 year period.

52. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 European SMEs employ more than large transnational companies are a KEY
partnership in order to enlarge the Interregional Relations between EC-ASEAN.
 In the Short and Medium-Term , the progress of regionalization in Europe and
Southeast Asia will continue to determine European firms’ tendency to invest in
Southeast Asia.
 The enlargement of EC to the Central and East European Countries (CEEC), will
expand the coverage of EC regional development policy and broaden the group of
countries that can compete with developing regions for EC FDI.
 Risk: The strategic position of the CEEC is more favorable than that of the ASEAN
and other developing regions.
 ASEAN efforts to create and sustain an interregional relationship in the field of
investment bore fruit in the 1990s, in the form of ASEAN-EC investment promotion
activities.

53. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IS CHANGING THE
WORLD
 고맙습니다
 THANK YOU
 MUCHAS GRACIAS