14 July 2016, ION Hangzhou (China) - RPKI Deployment at CNNIC

1. RPKI at CNNIC
Zhiwei Yan

2. Why do we need RPKI？
Feb, 2014
Hacker Redirects
Traffic From 19
Internet Providers
to Steal Bitcoins
Feb 2008
Pakistan
Telecom brought
down YouTube
worldwide
Jan , 2015
An ISP in USA
hijack an IP prefix
of IIJ from Japan
Nov, 2015, An ISP
in India as Bharti
Airtel hijack a lot
of IP prefix
Prefix hijacking is one of the large-scale BGP specific routing anomalies that are able to paralyze the Internet.
RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) is designed to prevent route hijacking and other attacks on BGP.

3. Prefix hijacking: Attackers can use bogus BGP UPDATE (NLRI and Path Attributes) messages to disrupt
routing without breaking the peer-peer connection.
BGP UPDATE Message Format :
NLRI：Network Layer Reachability Information
Why do we need RPKI？

4. Bogus BGP UPDATE Message
According to “prefer the path with the shortest AS_PATH” rule, AS4 prefers message from AS5 to message
from AS1.
AS3
AS2 AS4
AS1 AS5
218.241.0.0/16
AS_PATH: 2 1
NLRI: 218.241.0.0/16
AS_PATH: 3 2 1
AS1 was authorized to originate prefix 218.241.0.0/16
NLRI: 218.241.0.0/16
AS_PATH: 1
AS3
AS2 AS4
AS1 AS5
218.241.0.0/16
AS_PATH: 2 1
NLRI: 218.241.0.0/16
AS_PATH: 3 2 1
NLRI: 218.241.0.0/20
AS_PATH: 5
NLRI: 218.241.0.0/16
AS_PATH: 1
AS5 forges BGP UPDATE Message
Why do we need RPKI?

5. Actually, BGP protocol accepts any routes they learn from their neighbors.
Obviously, this may result in Route Hijacking on the Internet.
Authorization
Ownership
Unable to verify
who is the
legitimate holder
of the INRs
(Internet Number
Resources).
Unable to verify who
has the authorization
to originate specific
IP prefixes
Why do we need RPKI?

6. BGP is vulnerable to a variety of routing attacks because of the lack of a verification mechanism to ensure the
legitimacy of BGP messages (especially the origin information).
RPKI is proposed in IETF to offers a verification mechanism to protect the ownership and authorization of
the INRs (Internet Number Resources).
Why do we need RPKI?

7. Certificate Authority, CA
Any resource holder who is authorized to sub-allocate these resources must be able to issue resource certificates
to correspond to these sub-allocations. Thus, for example, CA certificates will be associated with IANA and each
of the RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs. Also, a CA certificate is required to enable a resource holder to issue ROAs,
because it must issue the corresponding end-entity certificate used to validate each ROA.
End-entity, EE
The private key corresponding to a public key contained in an EE certificate is not used to sign other certificates
in a PKI. The primary function of end-entity certificates in this PKI is the verification of signed objects that relate
to the usage of the resources described in the certificate, e.g., ROAs and manifests.
Trust Anchor, TA
A trust anchor in the RPKI is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority
(CA) certificate, a format commonly used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software
The Architecture of RPKI

8. The Architecture of RPKI-the relation of roles and data
Resource Holders
CA
LIR/ISP
Subscribers
IANA
RIR
NIR
CRL
CA
certificate
EE
certificate
ROA
manifest
Repository
INR
（Internet Number Resources)
Entity PKI
Resources
Signed Objects

9. ROA Profile –RFC6482

10. Challenges NOW:
BGPSEC
RPKI-Safegurad
RFC 6480
An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing
RFC 6487
A Profile for X.509 PKIX
Resource Certificates
RFC 6481
Resource Certificate Repository
Structure
RFC 6489 Key Rollover
RFC 6490 RPKI Trust Anchor Locator
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI
RFC 6485
The Profile for Algorithms and
Key Sizes for Use in RPKI
RFC 6482 A Profile for ROAs
RFC 6486 Manifests for the RPKI
RFC 6488 Signed Object Template for RPKI
RFC 6483
Validation of Route Origination
Using RPKI and ROAs
The standardization process of RPKI

11. Industrial products of RPKI
Cisco BGP routers
Supporting BGP Command (match RPKI)
Juniper routers
Configuring Origin Validation for BGP
Alcatel-Lucent Service Router(Release 12.0 R4)
Trying to support RPKI

12. Deployment situation
5 RIRs have finished the deployment of RPKI.
A number of countries have also started to deploy RPKI interiorly, Ecuador, Japan, Bangladesh, China, etc.

13. RPKI at CNNIC
• Standardization work in IETF
• X. Lee, X. Liu, Z. Yan and Y. Fu, RPKI Deployment Considerations: Problem Analysis
and Alternative Solutions, draft-lee-sidr-rpki-deployment-01, Jan, 2016.
• RPKI Deployment Problems：Existing and Potential Problems , such as Technical, Economic
and Political
• Alternative Solutions
• Y. Fu, Z. Yan, X. Liu and C. Wang, Scenarios of unexpected resource assignment in
RPKI, draft-fu-sidr-unexpected-scenarios-01, March 2016.
• Problem: Unbelonged resource allocation, Duplicated allocation, Resource transfer
• Solution: Safeguard of CA function
• Z.Yan, Y.Fu, X.Liu, G.Geng, Problem Statement and Considerations for ROA
Mergence, draft-yan-sidr-roa-mergence-00, May 2016
• analyzes and presents some operational
• Problems caused by the misconfigurations of ROAs containing multiple IP prefixes.
• Suggestions and considerations

14. RPKI at CNNIC
• Standardization work in CCSA
• In charge of the standardization of RPKI in China

15. RPKI at CNNIC
• Published two white-papers to guide the test of RPKI and BGPSEC

16. RPKI at CNNIC
• Published the first RPKI-Pilot system in China

17. RPKI at CNNIC
• Published several academic papers
• Cuicui Wang, Zhiwei Yan and Anlei Hu. An Efficient Data Management Architecture
for the Large-scale Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure
• Xiaowei Liu, Zhiwei Yan, Guanggang Geng, Xiaodong Lee, Shian-ShyongTseng and
Ching-Heng Ku. RPKI Deployment: Risks and Alternative Solutions
• Xiaowei Liu, Zhiwei Yan, Guanggang Geng and XiaodongLee.
Research of ResourceAllocation Risks by CAs in RPKI and Feasible Solutions
• Zhiwei Yan, Xiaowei Liu, Guanggang Geng and SheraliZeadally. Secure and Scalable
Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

18. What is the future of RPKI?
• Will RPKI be SECURE enough?
• We should avoid additional risks caused by a security enhancement
• More than One TA
• Operational Errors
• Unilateral Resource Revocation
• Mirror World Attacks
• ……
• Data Synchronization
• Problems of Staged and Incomplete Deployment
• Combining with BGP
Production
Synchronization
Usage

19. What is the future of RPKI?
• Will RPKI be deployed widely?
• Let’s have a glimpse of DNSSEC
• 2010-12～
2013-03
Experimental
• 2013-04
Announced
• 2013-08
Partial
• 2013-11
DS in Root
• Keep
going…
Operational
Experimental：
ü Risk analysis
ü Software development
Announced：
ü Hardware & software deployment
ü Training and drills
Partial：
ü Signing & roller
ü Observations & verification
DS in Root：
ü Generation & submission
ü Observations & verification
Operational：
ü Upgrades and improvements
ü Debugging
Over
800 days
120 days

20. What is the future of RPKI?
• Will RPKI be deployed widely?
• Let’s have a glimpse of DNSSEC
DNSSEC COVERAGE RATE OF
ALEXA TOP 1 MILLION WEBSITES:
1.6%

21. What is the future of RPKI?
• Analyze the challenges for deployment:
• Up-bottom model has difficulty in the Internet world
• PKI has too high requirements for the managers
• Security is a huge investment for the enterprises

22. •I am not NEGATIVE or UNCONFIDENT to RPKI
• But I am sure it has a long way to go for:
• Protocol improvement
• Deployment enlargement

23. Thank you for your attention~
Zhiwei Yan@CNNIC