1. Counterinsurgency in the Modern Era:
Evaluating Counterinsurgency doctrine through the United
States’ conduct in Iraq, 2003 - 2008
Patrick Conor Powell
‘Being a Project presented in part requirement for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in International Relations of the University of the
West of England
2008/9

2. i
Abstract
Throughout history there is a precedent of insurgencies frustrating and defeating military
superpowers. From the jungles of Vietnam to the streets of Gaza, insurgent movements
have effectively resisted military forces with capabilities far superior to their own. This
project aims to examine the means by which insurgent movements can be effectively
combated and ultimately overcome. To do this it will assess the experience of the United
States of America, the most recent Superpower to encounter the insurgency phenomenon.
Focusing on the occupation of Iraq in the period 2003-2008, this project will demonstrate
how the United States utilized two conflicting counterinsurgency doctrines with dramatically
differing results. It will conclude that control of the population from which the insurgent
operates is the key to their defeat. It will demonstrate that an indirect approach to
counterinsurgency, which focuses on winning the active support of that population, is far
more effective than a direct military approach focused on hunting down and eliminating
insurgents.

3. ii
Contents Page
Abstract i.
Contents Page ii.
Key Individuals, Acronyms & Abbreviations iii.
Map of Iraq iv.
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Defining Counterinsurgency Theory 4
i. An Introduction to Insurgency 4
ii. Codifying Direct Counterinsurgency 6
iii. Defining Indirect Counterinsurgency 12
Chapter 3 Iraq 2003-2008:A Case Study 22
i. The Relevance of Iraq 22
ii. Conventional Warfare as Counterinsurgency (2003-2004) 24
iii. Towards an Indirect Approach (2004-2006) 34
iv. The Indirect Approach: Producing Results? (2007-8) 38
Chapter 4 Conclusion 47
Appendix A Mao Tse Tung’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks 49
Appendix B 101st Airborne Division’s First 30 Days in Ninawa Province 50
Appendix C General Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency Guidance 51
Bibliography 54

4. iii
Key Individuals in Iraq Case Study
Paul Bremer Headof CoalitionProvisional Authority(May2003 - Jun2004)
George W. Bush Presidentof the UnitedStatesof America(Jan2001 - Jan2009)
Gen.George CommanderMNF-I2004-2007
Casey
DouglasFeith Under Secretaryof Defence forPolicy(2001 - 2005)
Gen.Tommy Franks CentComCommander2000-2003
Nuri Al-Maliki Prime Ministerof Iraq(May 2006 - Present)
Gen.David 2003-2004 Commander of 101st Airborne Division - Ninawa Province
Petraeus 2004-2007 Responsiblefor trainingof ISF
2007-2008 Commander MNF-I
2009 - Present CentCom Commander
DonaldRumsfeld US Secretaryof Defence (Jan2001 - Dec 2006)
Muqtada al-Sadr Shiite Clericandleaderof the JAMmilitia
Grand Ayatollah Pre-eminentShiite clericinIraq
Ali al-Sistani
Acronyms/Abbreviations
AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq
CentCom United States Central Command (responsiblefor the US Army’s MiddleEast operations)
COIN Counterinsurgency
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
Gen. General
GoI Government of Iraq
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
JAM Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Shiitemilitia of Muqtada al-Sadr)
MNF-I Multi National Forces in Iraq
SoI Sons of Iraq (Sunni awakeningmovements)
US United States

5. iv
Map of Iraq

6. 1
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Historically speaking, the existence of the insurgent has been recognised far longer
than that of the counterinsurgent. From the times of the Roman Empire and before, when
political bodies first created the organised militarily units known as armies, there have been
conversely irregular units that resisted them. From this early pedigree insurgent movements
have faced down opponents considered many times more powerful than themselves, from
Russian partisans harassing Napoleon’s Grande Armée to the Viet Cong overcoming the
United States (US) in Vietnam. However, these conflicts have all been noticeable for the lack
of academic and military specialisation applied to overcoming insurgent movements. Time
and time again the responsibility for combating insurgency fell to the regular military
machine, that would approach the problem using the same tactics and doctrine it used
against conventional foes. Only in the 20th century would the concept of a separate military
discipline of ‘counterinsurgency’ come to the fore.
In response to the increasing frequency of insurgencies in the 20th century
(specifically Maoist style communist takeovers) a number of military intellectuals addressed
the problem of formulating a successful theory of counterinsurgency. These ex-soldiers and
military advisors formulated an approach based on denying insurgents their greatest asset -
control of the affected population. Counterinsurgency theorists argued that if the
population could be persuaded to actively support the counterinsurgent state and its forces,
insurgencies would be robbed of their supporters, suppliers and place to hide. This theory
rejected the long tried conventional military approach, that focused on trying to kill off the
insurgent movement, in much the same way it would attempt to destroy an opposing army.
The new body of scholars argued that it would be far more efficient to ‘indirectly’ target the

7. 2
insurgents by destroying their support base. This has been since termed the ‘indirect
approach’ to counterinsurgency (Nagl, 2002, pp.2-29).
With insurgent movements currently fighting in regions as diverse as Chechnya, Sri
Lanka, Colombia, Turkey, Pakistan, Sudan and, most notably, Afghanistan and Iraq, the
modern relevance of counterinsurgency discourse can not be in doubt. This is only
highlighted by the fact that the world’s only contemporary superpower has launched two
wars in the last decade, only to see short term victories become long term
counterinsurgencies that it neither expected nor was prepared for. The failure by the US to
impose its will on both Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a resurgence of debate around the
field of counterinsurgency theory (Kilcullen, 2006, p.111) to which this project aims to
contribute.
This project seeks to evaluate the relative merits of a conventional war fighting
approach to counterinsurgency, which I term the ‘direct approach’, as opposed to the
indirect approach briefly presented above. To do this I will study the actions of the US
occupation forces in Iraq, and draw conclusions from the results they achieved. I will argue
that this experience demonstrates the validity of the indirect approach to
counterinsurgency. I will highlight how its population centric tactics produced security gains
by robbing the Iraqi insurgency of it support and man power, whilst also showing how the
US’ use of the direct approach in the earlier years of the occupation was largely
counterproductive.
The following chapter of the project, Defining Counterinsurgency Theory, will first
attempt to codify the direct approach to counterinsurgency. I will argue that it has its roots
in a conventional understanding of warfare and regards killing the enemy as the primary

8. 3
tool in any conflict. The indirect theory of counterinsurgency will then be introduced and
defined.
Chapter 3, Iraq 2003-2008: A Case Study, will begin applying the two different
theories of counterinsurgency to the Iraq example. I will argue that in the period 2003-2004
the US relied on its conventional military doctrines to defeat an emerging insurgency and
failed to achieve that aim - indeed that its tactics made the situation worse. I will also argue
the occupation governance conducted by the US contributed to the development of the
insurgency in way that could have been avoided, had it utilized the indirect approach.
Moving on to the period 2004-2006 I will show that moves by the US military towards
indirect methods began to produce better security results, but that these where
overshadowed by a US desire to disengage its forces from the population, a tactic that
indirect theory warns against. Finally I will argue that 2006-2008 wittiness a wholesale
engagement with indirect methods by the US military machine, and that this development
precipitated a dramatic improvement in security for the Iraqi people. It is this development
of improved security that validates the prescience of indirect counterinsurgency theory. I
will highlight this point in my conclusion, as well as discussing what implications an
understanding of indirect COIN may hold for the future of Iraq.

9. 4
Chapter 2 - Defining Counterinsurgency Theory
i. An Introduction to Insurgency
Before starting my study of differing counterinsurgency (COIN) methods it is worth
gathering an understanding of what we mean by an insurgency.
In his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula describes
insurgency as ‘a protracted struggle conducted methodically in order to attain intermediary
goals with an eventual aim of overthrowing the existing power structure’ (Galula, 1964, p.2).
He makes a distinction between revolutionary warfare and insurgency warfare. An
insurgency is necessarily a protracted struggle as opposed to revolution, which entails a
swift overthrow of the state.
Another key element of an insurgency is the inherent asymmetry of the combatants.
Insurgencies, by their very nature, fail to match the power of the political body they oppose,
normally a state. This obliges the insurgents to fight a form of warfare that avoids the
enemy’s main strengths and works to sap their ability to resist over time. Mao Tse Tung,
who codified many of the tenants of insurgency warfare, described how this leads to a
strategy of ‘pitting one against ten’ and tactic of ‘pitting ten against one’ (Mao, 1969, p.281).
Insurgents concentrate their limited strengths where they can be assured victories and
‘make the (gradual) wiping out of the enemy’s effective strength their main objective’ (Mao,
1969, p.291).
It is also important to note the distinctly political nature of insurgency warfare, in
terms of its origins, conduct and objectives. First, as insurgencies seek to change the
‘existing power structure’ they must, by their very nature have a political agenda. This

10. 5
immediately turns any COIN into an ideological as well as military struggle, with both sides
often making efforts to convince the general population that they are ‘right’. This has a
direct impact on the second point, conduct.
Most insurgencies conduct ‘guerrilla’ campaigns that use factors such as terrain to
their advantage. Crucially, many use the population itself as such a factor. By mobilizing the
people behind them politically, insurgents can be sustained and hidden by them - making
their fighters very difficult to target without collateral damage. Mao phrased this concept
well: ‘The popular masses are like water, and the army is like a fish’ (Mao, 1969, p.287). An
insurgent army will find it very difficult to survive without the support of the people.
Finally an insurgency naturally has political objectives, for example forming a new
state. It is however also important to note that its military objectives will be affected by
political considerations. This means that the simple destruction of the enemy may not be
the ultimate aim of the insurgents. A practical example of this is the Tet Offensive of the
Vietnam War. This offensive was a military disaster for the Viet Cong, but succeeded in its
political objective of influencing American domestic opinion, arguably leading to the ending
of a U.S. commitment to the War.
These then are the main tenants of an insurgency warfare campaign. Having defined
what those fighting insurgents can expect, I will move on to discuss what I see as the two
doctrines of COIN, the direct and indirect approaches. However before doing this it is
worthwhile discussing on what basis I will assess their performance. I will argue that,
although each of the COIN doctrines prescribes very different outlooks and methods to deal
with insurgency, both have the same ultimate objective and can be assessed on the same
terms.

11. 6
Arguably one of the most influential military theoreticians of the modern era is Carl
von Clausewitz. Born in Prussia 1780, his career as a solider throughout the Napoleonic era
enabled him to offer some revolutionary insights in his work On War. Perhaps the most
succinct observation in the book is the simple truth that war is an instrument or act of
policy. It is an ‘act of force to compel our enemy to do out will’ (1976, pp.605-610). No state
(or even insurgency) launches a war for the sake of fighting - all have a grand political
objective in mind. This being demonstrably the case, I argue that any COIN campaign can be
assessed by whether it can be seen to achieve the political aims set to it, by either its
leadership or more general political constituency. To put this a little clearer: every military
campaign has a distinct political objective that should inform its overall strategic approach.
This informs a strategic goal that should then help militaries and governments decide on the
battlefield tactics they will adopt, or how they will practically achieve their aims. This does
mean that it is vital to get an idea of what those political aims are before coming to a
judgement on the success of a tactical doctrine, something I will do in the case of the Iraq
Occupation.
ii. Codifying Direct Counterinsurgency
The first doctrine of COIN I have chosen to address is what Nagl terms ‘The Direct
Approach’. Its main tenet is perhaps best described by Col. Harry Summers, author of On
Strategy - an analysis of the American military during the Vietnam War. His phrase ‘A war is
a war is a war’ (cited by Nagl, 2002, p.27) arguably sums up the direct approach. It essentially
maintains that wars against insurgents or irregular forces can be successfully pursued using
‘conventional’ warfare tactics.

12. 7
Any attempt to define the direct approach will encounter a number of difficulties.
The scholars and generals who espouse the conventional doctrine on which it is based,
often make no effort real to address the issue of COIN warfare. For example Antonie-Henri
Jomini (whose theories on strategy and warfare are often confused for Clausewitz’s own,
and has had a significant impact on modern military thinking (Paret, 1986, p.144)) wrote little
on what he termed ‘irregular warfare’. When he did he left an impression that the whole
affair was best left avoided and offered little in the way of tactical theory (Paret, 1986, p.171).
In order to present the direct approach it will be necessary to analyse conventional warfare
doctrine and determine what it recommends for COIN. Like many theorists of warfare I will
attempt to demonstrate strategy and tactics that are separate from any historical example,
as it is necessary to show that it is a theory that offers prescriptive techniques for military
planning.
I will argue that the direct approach can be summarised as the following rules:
1. Application of superior and overwhelming forces to the enemy’s strategic
points is the surest path to victory.
2. Offensive military action is preferable to being on the defensive.
3. The enemy’s will to fight is best destroyed by military defeats.
In my attempt to demonstrate the points above it is necessary to return to the
original great military thinkers of the modern era. Many cite Clausewitz as a one of the main
sources of modern military thought, and it is difficult to underestimate the effect that his
work (specifically On War) had its development. Strachen and Herber-Rothe argue that ‘On

13. 8
War is the prism through which we have come to look at war’ (Strachen, 2007, p.1). They
present an interesting example, the discovery of an annotated copy of On War in an al-
Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan in 2001.
Clausewitz has arguably remained so influential because he was the first to take
what he saw happening in the wars of his lifetime, remove the historical context and offer a
succinct theory of strategy; strategy that could then be used to develop tactics in any future
situation. He argued that ‘war, though conditioned by the particular characteristics of the
state and their armed forces, must contain some more general - indeed a universal element
with which every theorist ought above all to be concerned’ (Clausewitz, 1976, pp.593-4). This
led him to his key assertion that war is an instrument of policy or politics (Clausewitz, 1976,
pp.605-10).
It is however Clausewitz’s conclusions on how wars should be fought that make the
greatest contribution to the direct approach. One of his key concepts was that of the
enemies ‘centre of gravity’, which is the source of the enemy’s strength. Clausewitz
discusses such centres of gravity in On War, listing some examples in order of importance:
the enemy’s army, their capital, their principle allies, the enemy’s leader and enemy public
opinion. He argued that military leaders should make all efforts to engage the most
significant of these centres of gravity in decisive battle with the hope of inflicting an
annihilating defeat (‘vernichtende Niederlage’) (Clausewitz, 1976, pp.595-6). It is clear that for
Clausewitz the centre of gravity will most often take the form of the enemy army. For
example, in On War he states that ‘the aim of war and battle…was to ‘disarm’ the adversary
(and) to ‘annihilate his armed forces’’ (Clausewitz cited by Hesuser, 2007, p.149. Emphasis
added). Such a defeat inflicted upon the enemy would then allow the victorious army to

14. 9
achieve or enforce its political aims (if the defeat of the enemy’s war capabilities was not
the aim in itself).
Arguably Clausewitz focused much of his writing on such large, single military
confrontations that would decide whole wars. This did indeed capture some of the
revolution in tactical thinking of the Napoleonic era, but has also had a far longer lasting
effect in military thinking. Heuser argues that Clausewitz’s work ‘led to the obsession in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries with decisive battles and battles of annihilation’ as well
as a ‘cult of the decisive battle’ (2007, pp.143 & 149). I will argue that these ‘obsessions’ are
also alive and well within the direct approach to COIN.
However Clausewitz does not provide the complete picture of the direct approach.
One of his lesser known contemporaries was the Swiss solider and tactician, Antonie-Henri
Jomini. Interestingly work is often misquoted as Clausewitz’s, to the extent that scholars
such as Peter Paret have argued that ‘Jomini, more than Clausewitz, deserves the dubious
title of the founder of modern strategy’ (1986, p.144). Certainly it is his ideas that are most
directly reflected in the direct approach.
Jomini, who criticised Clausewitz’s On War for being too ‘long…tedious, obscure,
(and) pessimistic’, devoted his life to producing a simpler, ‘scientific’ theory that would
explain Napoleon’s great successes. His key overriding theory of warfare was first laid out in
his work Treatise on Grand Military Operations in 1803 in which he argued:
1. That strategy is the key to warfare;
2. That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles and

15. 10
3. That these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against
weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to
victory.
(cited by Paret, 1986, p.163)
It is clear that Jomini’s principles share some similarity to those of Clausewitz. The
use of mass force and the belief in universal scientific principles true to all warfare are
distinctly Clausewitzian. Jomini’s definition of a decisive point is similar to that of
Clausewitz’s centre of gravity, but not exactly the same. Examples of a decisive point include
such things as ‘a road junction, a river crossing…or an open flank of the enemy army itself’
(cited by Paret, 1986, p.154). This leads to Jomini offering a slightly different approach to
Clausewitz’s tactic of applying force specifically to the enemy’s strongest point (i.e. seeing
the bulk of the enemy’s army as prime target). In fact Jomini specifically states that it may
be better to seek out weaker enemy forces at a decisive point. Either way, it permits a
certain flexibility in identifying strategic points other than just the enemy’s strength. Indeed
Jomini makes it clear that identifying a suitable point to strike is half the battle.
Once this point has been identified, Jomini calls for a commander to commit totally
to attacking it and not to hesitate in using maximum force. He is clear that aggressive action
against the enemy’s strategic points robs the enemy of initiative and is the surest way to
assure victory (Paret, 1986, p.168). Crucially he also maintains that should this attack fail then
a commander should not look to any other strategy to find victory. He must simply regroup
and try again, using Jomini’s scientific method. This, Jomini says, ‘is the science of war in a
few words’ (cited by Paret, 1986, p.152). I will show that this tactic is still enshrined in many

16. 11
military doctrines today, and thus it forms basis for the 1st rule in my definition of the direct
approach.
One more final contribution must be made to the understanding of the direct
approach, to establish the argument that the ‘enemy’s will to fight is best destroyed by
military defeats’. It is clear that both Jomini and Clausewitz believe this to be the case; both
their sets of strategy/tactics call for the destruction or decimation of the enemy’s military in
order to effect their capitulation. Clausewitz in particular stated that crude force and big
spectacular victories were the best recipes for defeating the enemy’s will to fight. Helmuth
von Moltke, the military mind behind Prussia’s ascendancy in the mid 1800’s summed up
these concepts well:
‘Victory in combat is the most important moment in war. It alone breaks
the will of the enemy and forces him to submit to ours. It is not in general
the conquest of a piece of land or of a strongpoint, but the destruction of
the enemy’s forces alone which will be decisive’.
(cited by Heuser, 2007, p.147)
Both Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s theories are both designed to be a guide to conventional
warfare situations, and it is clear that their lessons have been taken to heart by many of the
worlds most formidable militaries. In his article, ‘Toward an American Way of Way’, US
Army Colonel Echevarria discusses how western militaries have heavily drawn from
Jominian concepts (via Moltke and others), leading to a preference for decisive and
overwhelming force. This has been expressed contemporarily as ‘The Powell Doctrine’, after

17. 12
ex-US Chief of Staff Colin Powell (Echevarria, 2004, pp.3&6). Echevarria describes how
militaries prefer to fight using methods consistent with those espoused by my definition of
the direct approach (detailed in the 3 rules above). Arguably it is this understanding of
conventional warfare, as applied to COIN operations, that forms the direct approach. This
adherence has been highlighted in US operations from Vietnam to Somalia (Ricks, 2006,
pp.129-33). The challenge for any commander using the direct approach is in ‘brining the
irregular foe to battle for destruction’ (Grey, 1999, p.14) - the tactics used in individual COIN
campaigns vary, but for the direct approach, the destruction of the enemy’s military
capacity (and thus his will to fight) is always the main aim.
ii. Defining Indirect Counterinsurgency
Indirect COIN has received a large amount of academic attention. The indirect
theory argues that COIN warfare is a distinct and unique area of the military experience,
which requires serious consideration and thought. It argues that militaries equipped solely
with conventional equipment and methods will struggle to defeat a committed insurgency.
Conversely, a military that is aware of the aims and objectives of insurgents and is willing to
adapt its own practices, will have a far better chance of success.
Current indirect theory largely derives from what has been called ‘Classic COIN’. This
term refers to a body of work written in response to the rise of Maoist style communist
insurgencies after World War II. Robert Thompson, for example, was one of the architects of
strategy during the Malayan Emergency and was one of President Nixon’s chief advisors on
Vietnam. In his work, Thompson advances 5 Principles that explicitly describe what
governments must consider when forming their strategy for COIN campaigns:

18. 13
Robert Thompson’s 5 Principles:
1. The government must have a clear political aim
2. The government must function within the law
3. The government must have an overall plan
4. The government must give priority to defeating political subversion,
not the guerrillas
5. In the guerrilla stage of an insurgency, the government must secure its
base areas first
(1972, pp.50-60)
Unlike the direct theory, which focuses on destroying the enemy, indirect COIN
focuses on ‘softer, more malleable, complex, sub-strategic objectives’ (Smith, 2006, p.214).
Most importantly, Thompson recognises that insurgencies rely on the support of civilians
around them (as asserted by Mao). As I will discuss, Thompson’s points are designed to help
COIN forces gain the support of the population, thus denying it to the enemy.
Thompson’s arguments can be combined with those of David Galula, a French Officer
who fought in both Indo-China and Algeria and is the author of Counterinsurgency Warfare:
Theory and Practice. His ‘8 Steps’ provide a tactical framework for COIN forces to operate
within.
David Galula’s 8 Steps:
1. Concentrate enough force to expel or eliminate armed insurgents

19. 14
2. Leave a force among the population in order to stop insurgents
returning (and securing base area)
3. Interact with the population & isolate it from insurgents
4. Destroy the insurgent political movement
5. Establish new local governance
6. Enable these governments by organizing self defence/security forces
7. Involve and educate leaders & population in a national political
movement
8. Win over or suppress the remnants of insurgency.
(1964, p.56)
Both Thompson’s and Galula’s points highlight their belief that COIN warfare is largely a
matter of politics. Galula begins his work with a break down of the stages of an insurgency.
He argues that insurgents follow a series of steps, beginning with the gaining support for
their cause and culminating in a complete overthrow of the government or state. From this
analysis of how insurgencies operate Galula reasoned that:
‘the first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making
trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved
…and active supporters … have to be recruited by persuasion’ (1964, p.18)
Other classic COIN theorists agree that being able to gain and maintain popular support is
perhaps the most important prerequisite of a successful insurgency – Roger Tringuier for

20. 15
example makes it clear that controlling public support is, to borrow Jomini’s concept, the
decisive point in such conflict (1964, p.48). This requires counterinsurgents to adopt a
population centric approach.
The reasoning behind this claim relates back to the nature of insurgencies. As Mao
said, ‘the popular masses are like water, and the army is like a fish’ (1969, p.287) –
insurgencies rely on their domestic population for manpower, recourses, information,
protection and places to conceal themselves. Without this support, it is argued, they quickly
become isolated and unable to continue an effective resistance. Equally, the more support
any COIN effort has, the more cooperation and information it will receive from the
population. The insurgents themselves are aware of this fact. To again use Mao as an
example, he enforced specific rules for the Chinese Red Army to follow when dealing with
civilians that encouraged politeness and care, in order to foster support (see appendix A.). It
is therefore unsurprising that Galula argues that counterinsurgents must ‘interact with the
population and isolate it from insurgents’ (1964, p.56).
Appropriately, given the argument that COIN is a largely political affair, both
Thompson and Galula focus many of their points on one issue: good governance. An
effective government that can provide for its population will diminish the attractiveness of
any alternative offered by insurgents. Having a clear political aim and direction from the
outset is, for Thompson, the key to achieving this. He warns that ‘unless this long-term aim
is constantly borne in mind, there will be tendency to adopt short-term ad hoc measures
merely as reactions to insurgent initiative’ (1972, p.52). A government with a clear political
aim has several advantages over one without. First it is able to communicate this aim to the
public, setting up a direct contrast to the aims of insurgents (forming a ‘national movement’

21. 16
- Galula: Stage 7). This should help counterinsurgents to mobilise the population behind
their efforts. Secondly it is conducive to more coherent government. If separate
departments/agencies are aware of the overall direction of government then it is easier for
them to cooperate together. One prerequisite of this is some form of stable power
structure. If this is lacking then indirect theory stresses the extreme importance of the state
getting its own house in order, before seriously attempting to destroy the insurgency (this
can be seen as part of Thompson’s 5th Principle - securing your base area). These principles
also carry down to local government; something that Galula argues must be established to
help quell insurgency (1964, pp.82-92).
Another key part of establishing good governance is establishing a strong sense of
legitimacy and trust. This again is aimed at winning over the population and reducing the
political capital of insurgents, who should be portrayed as usurping a legitimate
government. The most common method of establishing said legitimacy is arguably some
form of representative government. This could, dependant on questions of practicability
and what the population concerned will accept, be directly elected or some form of
provisional authority (Galula, 1964, p.90). Either way, any government that can demonstrably
show that it represents the people and is addressing their needs and grievances has a better
chance of winning the political battle with insurgents.
Trust in a government is gained when it is able to make good on its promises to the
people and, crucially, when it operates within the law - both domestic and international.
Thompson saw that there could be a real temptation for states to abuse the law in order to
more ‘effectively’ combat insurgents. He warns:

22. 17
‘Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more
practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which
does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a
government and cannot expect its people to obey the law’ (1972, p.52)
Some COIN theorists such as Shinn discuss the importance of Coercive Force. He
raises the example of US action in the Philippines in the 1890’s. After identifying an
insurgency being sustained by the populations of the more remote islands, the US embarked
on a campaign of destroying villages, relocating populations and enforcing blockades to
‘give local inhabitants an object lesson in American power’ (Shinn, 2007, p.68). Both Nagl and
Thompson recognise that there may well be a need to actively suppress elements of an
insurgency’s civilian support, especially diehard elements. The key is to perform these
actions in a legal manner and to avoid any situation where suppression would cause more
support for the insurgents than it originally eliminated. To return to the Philippine example -
the US’s coercive force did indeed ensure a swift end to what otherwise may have been a
protracted insurgency. Crucially however: ‘goodwill generated by initial (US) benevolence
policies probably created a greater tolerance for the later chastisement policies and
suffering that went with it’ (Shinn, 2007, p70).
Of course, all indirect theorists are clear that effective governance alone cannot
defeat an insurgency. The theory acknowledges the vital role of the military in any COIN
effort, indeed as we have seen; many of its most prominent voices come with military
experience. In indirect theory the ultimate role of the military is ‘to establish the conditions
under which the counter-insurgent state can fulfil its political objectives’ and therefore

23. 18
‘political considerations provide the context for the strategy…military considerations and
actions must always work within and contribute to the political purpose’ (Smith, 2006, p.214).
This is dramatically different to the direct approach which, while acknowledging the
militaries role as an instrument of government, normally reserves the right to formulate
actual tactical decisions (Cornish, 2009, p.72). Under the indirect approach militaries are
expected to make political judgments when operating at any level, in close conjunction with
civil authorities. These judgements may require actions that are not the best option in pure
military terms, but that serve the political greater good.
The most obvious example of this is the issue of collateral damage and
proportionality. Given its focus on keeping the population ‘on side’, the indirect approach
discourages any military action that engenders a negative public reaction. This means that
military planners must weigh up potential military gains against political cost. For example, a
missile strike on a village’s Mosque might kill the leadership of a local insurgent group.
However, the political fallout from the attack would turn the inhabitants of the village
against the counterinsurgents and might spur more people to support the insurgents, or
even fight for their cause. This also has implications for the way military operations might be
conducted. Again an example: the safety of counterinsurgent troops might be better
guaranteed if they patrolled a city inside of heavily armoured vehicles. However, politically
this may send a negative signal to the population. If a lighter footprint, i.e. foot patrols,
would make the population feel more comfortable then indirect theory would indicate it
would be worth the military risk.
This population centric approach also effects how military forces might be deployed.
The indirect approach warns against seeking the large scale confrontations recommended

24. 19
by Clausewitz. Not only do indirect theorists argue that COIN efforts must be protracted
affairs, they also maintain that militaries must seek to win a series of small victories. To
return to Galula’s 8 steps, he argues that the military should then disperse its forces into
areas of resistance, amongst the population, following the 8 steps to root out militant
insurgents and create an atmosphere of security and rule of law. This allows the
counterinsurgent state to begin to provide the necessary good governance to convince the
people to give it support. Once security has been achieved in an area, the military can then
move on to repeat the process elsewhere (1964, pp.75-93). Thompson stresses the need to
be proactive and to take the initiative from the insurgency as soon as possible (1972, p.50).
Militaries must also ensure that sufficient troops and support remain in already pacified
regions, in order to keep the population satisfied and to guard against a return by
insurgents. When only the hardcore of the insurgency and its support remains, they must be
either won over or suppressed. This process has been described as ‘Clear and Hold’ (Rotzien,
2007, p.5). The indirect approach clearly holds that the gradual spreading of governance and
security is the surest path to successful COIN, as opposed to any conventional effort to find
the enemy and annihilate their forces.
One final recommendation that exponents of the indirect approach make to the
military is the importance of being adaptable and flexible. COIN warfare is, by its very
nature, far from straightforward and will present unique situations. Nagl points out that
‘Military organizations often demonstrate remarkable resistance to doctrinal change as a
result of their organizational structure’ (2003, p.8). He argues that militaries often have long
‘institutional memories’ reinforced by their centralised decision making structures. This
instils a certain concept of what that military is designed to do; what its ‘mission’ is.

25. 20
Crucially, adherence to this concept by senior figures can stifle any new input from within
and without the organization. Nagl argues that the US army, for example, saw itself as
designed to fight conventional massed warfare and so struggled to meet the challenges of
the Vietnam War which required a totally different approach. This was despite junior
officers and civilians on the ground suggesting a change in doctrine. The words of senior
officer at the time demonstrate this resistance to learning: ‘I will be dammed if I will permit
the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrines and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this
lousy war’ (cited by Cassidy, 2008, p.21). Nagl, and other exponents of the indirect approach
point out how the US Military’s failure to adapt to the insurgency in Vietnam led to its
eventual defeat. He proposes that militaries should adopt the following rules to become a
more effective, ‘learning institution’:
1. Promote suggestions from the field
2. Encourage subordinates to question superiors and policies
3. Regularly question basic assumptions
4. Have high ranking officers be routinely in close contact with those on
the ground and be open to their suggestions
5. Have locally generated SOPs (standard operating procedures), as
opposed to ones imposed from the centre
(Nagl, 2003, p.10)
These measures, Nagl argues, will make militaries far more able to adapt to the unique
challenges of COIN warfare.

26. 21
It is clear then that the indirect approach offers a detailed and in-depth analysis of
the nature of insurgency based warfare. In response it prescribes a coordinated effort from
both the military and civil wings of the counterinsurgent state or states. It stresses the
importance of taking a population centric approach, cultivating support for the COIN and
thus denying the insurgents their most important asset. To achieve this it stresses the
importance of effective and clear governance that works to convince the population that
the government is worth supporting. In addition it calls for a politically considered military
response, that may challenge some of the base assumptions of what militaries are for and
how they should fight. This integrated and protracted response, according the direct
approach, is the best way to defeat an insurgency.

27. 22
Chapter 3 - Iraq 2003 - 2008: A CaseStudy
i. The Relevance of Iraq
The Iraq war and occupation poses a unique set of opportunities and challenges for
anyone attempting to discern the merits of COIN theory. The occupation running from 2003
to the present day is undoubtedly a classic example of an asymmetric and protracted
insurgency, pitting the military might of the US against a determined but irregular enemy.
The reason that the Iraq conflict recommends itself for study is that over the course
of the occupation different COIN methods have been put into practice with varying degrees
of success. A lack of planning and leadership before the invasion led to strategic reviews in
2004 and 2006 that have resulted to both the direct and indirect approaches being applied
to the same conflict. This situation offers us as close to a direct comparison of the
effectiveness of differing COIN doctrines as we are ever likely to get.
However, in political discourse things are rarely that straightforward. My work
focuses on the actions of the US government and military and how their use of COIN
theories either increased or decreased the effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency. It is difficult
however to draw a direct link between action and reaction in these scenarios. There is no
concrete way of proving that abuse A. caused person B. to become an insurgent for
example.
What can discern however, are trends. Sepp argues that historical precedents
indicate that for every active insurgent, there are around 10 active assistants (auxiliaries)
and 100 active sympathisers, drawn from the general population (2007, p.207). Therefore as
insurgent numbers increase, we can extrapolate that their support from the community

28. 23
increases. By 2006 there were an estimated 20-30,000 insurgents engaged in an active and
deadly insurgency, indicating nearly 3,000,000 active sympathisers in the population (Sepp
2007, p.207). Yet by 2008 the estimated number of insurgents and recorded numbers of
attacks had dropped significantly (The Brookings Institution Iraq Index 2009). We can therefore
infer that events/actions must had taken place to A. reduce the number/efficiency of
insurgents and B. reduce their support base. I will argue that the trend towards an increase
in violence corresponded with the US’s use of direct COIN tactics, and fell as they became
aware of, and fully implemented, indirect COIN tactics.
A second problem with analysis of the Iraq occupation is the nature of its insurgency.
Unlike other historical insurgencies (for example communists in China and Vietnam), the
Iraqi insurgency is far from coherent. The insurgency during the period was predominantly
manned by Iraqi Sunni Arabs from the centre of the country. These Sunni’s, who formed the
basis of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party power base, along with a minority of foreign Islamic
jihaddist (holy war) fighters, were responsible for the majority of attacks on US troops and
Iraqi civilians - mostly targeting the larger Shiite community. These Sunni groups (as well as
Us forces) were resisted by Shiite militias such as the Jaysh al-Mahdi, leading to a significant
sectarian divide that by 2004 was itself a cause of conflict; culminating in what many have
described as full civil war throughout 2006 (Dodge,2007, pp.89-93). However, the politics and
effects of these various factions could warrant a project in itself so, for the purposes of my
study, I will largely focus my attention on the effects the US’s use of direct and indirect COIN
had on the growth resistance overall. This is until my discussion of 2006-2008, where the
US’s active inclusion of militia groups helped precipitate a change in the security situation.

29. 24
It is also worth making clear on by what grounds I am assessing the two COIN
doctrines - what is they are expected to achieve in Iraq. At the time of invasion the Bush
regime announced its desire to create an ‘Iraq that is whole, free, and at peace with itself
and its neighbours’ (Wolfowitz,2003). As discussed in my last chapter, all military action takes
place to fulfil a political gaol. As COIN discourse is focused primarily on creating a secure
state, I intend to put aside the earlier aspirations of the Bush regime for a western style
democracy in Iraq and focus on their eventual aim: a sustainable security. President Bush
has defined this as an Iraq where internal violence is down to such a level that normal civil
life can largely resume, and where Iraqi’s have some measure of confidence in the Iraqi
state, and their own futures (Bush,2007).
Finally, my case study intends to cover the period 2003 to 2008. I chose September
2008 mainly due to fact that why my research began before that year had ended, and I felt
any more up to date analysis would be impossible due to time constraints. I initially
intended to use the Iraqi local elections scheduled for October 2008 as an ‘end point’. In the
event these were postponed until 2009, so I have attempted to include data as close to the
end of 2008 as was possible.
ii. Conventional Warfare as Counterinsurgency (2003-2004)
In assessing the period of the US occupation of Iraq running March 2003- June 2004 I will be
highlighting several issues. First I will examine the actions of the US military throughout the
period and demonstrate how, lacking any decisive leadership, the majority of units relied on
using the direct approach to COIN - focused on finding and killing insurgents. I will

30. 25
demonstrate how this was counterproductive and turned the Iraqi people against the
American occupation, leading to a corresponding increase in insurgent violence. Secondly I
show how, as a result poor planning and an ignorance of indirect COIN theory, US attempts
to create an effective and functioning Iraqi state floundered - a failure that contributed to
the swell of public opinion away from the occupation and towards the various insurgent
groups, and highlights the prescience of indirect theory.
In the spring of 2003 ‘the U.S. military fought the battle it wanted to fight,
mistakenly believing it would be the only battle it faced’ (Ricks, 2006, p.115). Beginning with a
bombing campaign on the 20th March, the coalition clinically and systematically destroyed
Saddam Hussein’s military might and occupied Iraq. It was the very essence of a
conventional campaign, focused on destroying the enemy’s capabilities by engaging and
destroying Iraqi forces and resulted in the toppling of his government in less than a month
(Ricks, 2006, pp.125-7).
The military planning of the post-war peace was crucially hampered by bad
leadership. General Franks (commander of American Central Command (CentCom), with
responsibly for Middle East Strategy) was close to Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defence
2004 – 2006) and subscribed to his views that victory in Iraq could be achieved swiftly and
with little military man power. Similarly to Rumsfeld he was unreceptive of any other views
from elsewhere in the more ‘cautious’ army and purposely concealed his Iraq plans from the
rest of the military (Ricks, 2006, pp.33/4 & 40). Under him CentCom exemplified military
resistance to learning, as described by Nagl. Franks himself conceived a war plan that was
similar to the one he had helped engineer for Afghanistan. Crucially ‘Franks failed to grasp
that in waging the Afghan war the taking of the enemy’s capital wasn’t the same as winning

31. 26
the war’ (Ricks, 2006, p.70), a mistake he would repeat in Iraq. This explicitly Jominian
understanding of warfare would be indicative of the US approach throughout the early
stages of the occupation. Once on the ground Franks provided the US military with very
little clear leadership or strategic direction (Ricks, 2006, pp.179-182). Ricks argues that this
lack of direction led to the various different military sectors1 adopting whatever approach
their particular commander favoured and that, crucially, ‘most conventional commanders
did what they knew how to do: send out large numbers of troops and vehicles on
conventional combat missions’ (Ricks, 2006, p.195). The lack of coordination as a result of
Frank’s failure led to confusion and counterproductive actions on the ground in Iraq and
would highlight that Thompson’s stress on coherence and planning by counterinsurgent
governments is crucial to for COIN military forces as well.
One of the key features of the direct approach is that it focuses on using
‘conventional combat missions’ to destroy a definable ‘enemy’. This doctrine meant that
many US troops did not act to halt the widespread looting that took place in Iraqi cities
immediately after the invasion, because the looters were not enemy combatants and
therefore not their concern (Dodge, 2007, p.88 & Ricks, 2006, pp.150-2) . With law and order
‘falling apart in front of the eyes of the US military’ (Ricks, 2006, p.150), almost no military
units attempted to intervene. For example, one US officer in Baghdad, after deciding local
looters were not a threat, made no effort to restore order - ‘it was not our mission at the
time’ (cited by Ricks, 2006, p.150). The US’s inability to act when there was no clear adversary
highlights not only their adherence to the direct approach, but also one of its failings. On the
whole, conventional commanders simply did not grasp the necessity to create a state of
1 The US commitment in Iraq was divided into 5 military sectors,each the responsibility of a different Division

32. 27
stability for the population. Dodge argues that initial chaos experienced in Iraqi cities cannot
be underestimated as a cause of Iraqi resentment towards the coalition, it convinced many
that the Americans either could not, or were unconcerned with, guaranteeing their safety
(Dodge, 2007, pp.88/9).
For Iraqis this impression was compounded by the direct methods employed by the
US Army when they recognized that there was an active and violent insurgency, as it grew
throughout 2003-4. Focusing on offensive action to find the enemy and kill/detain them,
‘army leaders tended to see the Iraqi people as the playing field on which a contest was
played against insurgents’ . The Americans were fully aware that insurgents relied upon the
population to operate. However, instead of attempting to separate insurgents from their
support base (as per indirect theory), the US forces began to ‘treat all civilians…as enemies,
potential threats or objects to be denied to the enemy’ (Herring, 2006, p.178). The Army also
demonstrated its Jominian conception of COIN by attempting to identify, (quoting here from
my own definition of direct COIN) ‘the enemy’s strategic points’ and then apply ‘superior
and overwhelming forces’ to destroy them. Large scale attacks were launched throughout
the period, for example on Fallujah in April 2004, when it was identified a ‘safe haven’ for
insurgents (Ricks, 2006, p.398). These attacks focused on killing insurgents at the expense of
relations with the public.
Throughout 2003-04, US Army and government officials maintained that these direct
tactics were killing large numbers of insurgents and thus winning the conflict. For example,
the US claimed to have ‘broken the back of the insurgency’ (Herring, 2006, p.181) in Fallujah
after announcing it had killed 1200 insurgents and captured 1000 more (Sample, 2004).
However what commanders failed to realise was that these direct tactics, though militarily

33. 28
successful, were politically counterproductive. The large scale military operations did indeed
kill many insurgents, but they also served to drive thousands of Iraqi’s out of their homes,
loose their jobs and have their property destroyed. The operations also resulted in a
significant number of civilian casualties, with US air strikes being the highest cause of civilian
death between 2003-4 (Roberts et all., 2005, p.1862). Without any effective state to provide
for them, most of the displaced Iraqi’s felt nothing but resentment towards the US forces.
Malkasian discusses the Fallujah example - claming the assault created ‘widespread outrage’
from Iraqi communities who viewed them ‘as attacks on their society’ (2008, p.245). He
draws a direct links between the public reaction to the offensives and nationwide increases
in insurgent activity that followed (2008, p.246). It was the conventional, direct, conduct of
the majority of the US forces that fuelled Iraqi dissatisfaction with the occupation and,
worse still, increased passive and active support for the various insurgent groups that
worked against them. As a result, by April 2004 the US had ‘lost all semblance of authority in
several cities, notably Najaf and Kut’ (Ricks, 2006, pp.335/6) as well as parts of Baghdad itself.
Ultimately the US army’s reliance on the direct approach did not help them to
achieve their COIN aims. In addition to this, their lack of understanding of certain elements
of indirect COIN theory served to worsen an already deteriorating situation. Galula’s
Counterinsurgency Warfare stresses the need for COIN forces to ‘interact with the
population and isolate it from insurgents’ (1964, p.80). To win over the population and
convince them to support you, you must necessarily go out and interact with them. This is
especially true for a counterinsurgent military faced with a suspicious population. It is vital
to convince that population that they should not fear COIN forces - indeed they should trust
them enough to hopefully supply them with assistance and intelligence etc. The US military

34. 29
and government in 2003-4 made largely no such effort to integrate with the Iraqi people,
and relations suffered for it. When not on operations, American military forces were largely
confined to bases far away from the population - many soldiers would ‘never interact with
an Iraqi, and some (would) never see one’ (Ricks, 2006i). This separation had a two fold
effect. Not only did it mean that no relationship was built between Iraqis and the US forces
but also, with the bases situated outside major population centres, insurgents often had
free reign in cities and towns whilst the Americans were not patrolling. This led to numerous
occasions where American forces would ‘clear’ an area of insurgents, only to fail to ‘hold’ it -
allowing them to return2. Galula argues that populations often support the side that ‘gives
the best protection (or), which threatens the most’ (1964, p.8). The passing and impersonal
nature of much American activity, compared to the fairly constant insurgency, convinced
many Iraqis that the US forces could not be relied upon to provide for their security
(Robinson, 2008, p.13).
In fact one of the few situations where US troops met Iraqis was when they were
detained, and here again the US ignorance of indirect COIN theory led to counterproductive
measures. In his work Thompson makes clear the necessity of COIN forces acting within the
law (1972, p.52). Herring describes how the US occupation forces, as de facto government in
Iraq during the period, failed to even live up to their own, coalition imposed, standards.
There are numerous examples of raids on households that involved treatment such as
‘pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles, punching and kicking and striking
with rifles’ (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Report, 2004, p.7) as well as arrests
where the US ‘routinely’ did not explain who they where, why they were arresting people or
2 Referring here to IndirectCOIN’s ‘Clear & Hold’ tactic,as described in Chapter 1

35. 30
where they were taking them (Herring, 2006, p.188). Once detained, Iraqis discovered a
shambolic judicial system where there was general mistreatment of detainees suspected of
criminal offences and ‘systematic’ abuse of those suspected of security offences (ICRC, 2004,
pp.11-16). Combined with well publicised cases of extreme abuses inflicted on Iraqi prisoners
at internment camps such as Abu Ghraib, Iraqi’s became extremely distrustful of the system
as a whole. As a result 54% of Iraqis polled in 2005 believed that all US soldiers acted in a
similar manner to those at Abu Ghraib (cited by Herring, 2006, p.203) - an impression not
discouraged by other examples of abuse (Ricks cites military convoy drivers as often being
‘trigger happy’ (2006, p.257) - shooting Iraqi civilians dead on numerous occasions when they
were perceived as getting too to their path). These abuses again demonstrated to the Iraqi
people that the US military was not in Iraqi to provide for their security - Abu Ghraib in
particular was a cause célèbre for insurgent recruiters, and caused many to join their ranks
(Ricks, 2009, p.212). Had the US troops received sufficient training in indirect COIN theory
then the vital nature of preventing such abuses would have been stressed, instead of being
encouraged by US intelligence officers.
The failures of US governance in 2003-04 also highlights the validity of the claims of
indirect COIN. In the crucial period after the invasion, had the US provided security and
good governance then it is possible that general Iraqi approval of the fall of Saddam might
have transferred into gratitude towards the coalition. However, what did follow was a
period of uncertainty and indecision that galvanised opposition to the American forces.
Indirect theorists such as Thompson point out that a government must enter the
post war period with a clear political aim and detailed plan to achieve it (1972, pp.50-60).
Events in Iraq after the 2003 invasion clearly demonstrate that ‘The US invaded Iraq without

36. 31
a coherent, viable plan to win the peace’ (Diamond, 2005, p.27). Douglas Feith (Under
Secretary of Defence for Policy, 2001-2005 and policy chief for post war planning) has stated
that, ‘you will not find a single piece of paper...that says, 'Mr. Secretary or Mr. President, let
us tell you what post-war Iraq is going to look like, and here is what we need plans for’’
(cited by Fallows, 2004). In addition the Department of Defence under Rumsfeld, whose
responsibility post war reconstruction was, was even less of a learning institution that the
army, ignoring advice from both regional experts and military minds, leading them to reject
many studies that warned of exactly the problems they would face (like the Future of Iraq
project) (Ricks, 2006, pp.70,73 & 102).
What little planning did take place focused on a quick transfer of power from
American forces to an Iraqi interim government and rested on two key assumptions; that
the MNF-I (multi-national forces in Iraq) would be warmly received by the Iraqi population
and that the Iraqi state machinery would be left largely intact (Bensahel, 2007, p.131). Feith
admits that ‘we predicted that everything was going to be swell, and we didn't plan for
things not being swell’ (cited by Fallows, 2004).
In the event, the Iraqi state largely dissolved in the face of the occupation. Herring
points out that there was a ‘low degree of loyalty to the institutions of the (Iraqi) state’,
demonstrated in the way in which the state’s central bureaucracy and police simply stopped
functioning (2006, p.50). Initial attempts to ‘hand over’ sovereignty to local Iraqi leaders
floundered simply because there was an ‘obvious absence of any mechanism for making it
so’ (Diamond, 2005, p.34). Either way, Iraqi community in the early stages simply wanted the
security that the Army was failing to provide (Diamond,2005, p.34). The first few weeks of the
occupation serve to highlight that claims of indirect theory that effective governance can

37. 32
only occur after comprehensive planning, a cohesive effort and in a stable security
environment are indeed accurate.
Paul Bremer was appointed head of the CPA3 in April 2003 with a mandate to regain the
initiative, and instead proceeded to compound the problems that already existed. His first
move was to announce that plans for an interim government were postponed indefinitely,
and that the CPA itself would be assuming the sovereign duties and administration of the
Iraqi state. This move engendered an immediate series of protests, from both the Iraqi
public and its leaders. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the pre-eminent Shi’a religious leader
and extremely influential figure for the Iraqi Shiite majority, publicly warned Bremer that
such a state of affairs would be unacceptable for Iraqis. He stressed the importance of a
government seen as legitimate and ‘freely arrived at’ (Diamond, 2005, p.44). This response by
Iraqis ably demonstrates the assertion of indirect COIN doctrine that providing a sense of
legitimate government is vital to securing the support of the population. In the event,
Bremer ignored Sistani’s advice and began reversing any grassroots moves for local
governance (leading in turn to Sistani issuing a fatwa (religious ruling) against the move and
galvanising resistance). Diamond argues that ‘Bremer’s early failure to grasp the wide
popular support for Sistani’s demand for elections would cost the occupation dearly’
(Diamond, 2005, p44), contributing to the growth of Shiite insurgent movements.
After engendering Shiite anger, Bremer made further moves that denied members of
the Baath party any employment in the public sector and disbanded the Iraqi security
forces, forcing more than half a million into redundancy, destroying the already crippled civil
3 The Coalition Provisional Authority was created in early 2003,and was the de facto supreme sovereign
authority in Iraq during2003-2004

38. 33
services and alienating the Sunni Arab communities who held most of these jobs (many of
whom joined the party only to advance their careers) (Ricks, 2006, p.159). An expert on the
Baath party at one US think-tank commented: ‘abruptly terminating the livelihoods of these
men created a vast pool of humiliated, antagonized, and politicised men’ (cited Ricks, 2006,
p.162). Indirect COIN theorists would criticise these moves as they actively alienated sections
of society from the COIN government/forces, an assertion borne out by several sources.
Dodge argues that the early actions of the US pushed Iraqis away from the state and forced
them to look to ‘whatever grouping, militia or identity offers them the best chance of
survival in times of profound uncertainty’ (Dodge, 2007, p.88). One US official commented on
de-Baathification and the disbandment of the military; ‘that was the week we made 450,000
enemies on the ground in Iraq’ (cited by Diamond, 2005, p.39). An understanding of indirect
COIN might have made the US reconsider these moves - instead of ostracising what
manpower that the Iraqi state had left, Bremer might have been better served by using it to
help engage the rest of the population and restore order.
By the end of 2004 a Lancet study demonstrated the deteriorating security situation in
Iraq by reporting that the risk of death from violence in the period after the invasion was 58
times higher than in the period before the war, as a result of both US collateral damage (and
abuses) and an effective and growing insurgency (Roberts et all., 2005, p.1862). The direct
COIN tactics used throughout the period were clearly not producing improving security;
indeed they made the situation worse by turning the civilian population against the COIN
forces. These developments were compounded by US failures to provide a legitimate or
effective government (stemming from a lack of planning), that arguably would have been
avoided had the US adopted a more indirect approach to the whole Iraq conflict.

39. 34
iii. Towards an Indirect Approach (2004-2006)
The appointment of General Casey, in June 2004 as Commander MNF-I signalled the
beginning of a change in US policy in Iraq. Casey ‘took immediate steps to give the coalition
strategy a purpose hitherto lacking’ (Malkasian, 2008, p.248) and pioneered the introduction
of elements of indirect COIN theory to the US military. I argue that it was these
developments that enabled the series of Iraqi elections in 2005 to take place relatively
peacefully; elections that in turn helped to establish the beginnings of a legitimate Iraqi
state. This period did not however lead to a stabilizing of the situation in Iraq because of a
number of factors. The biggest factor was that the Sunni insurgent groups that had been
able to develop over 2004-2005 launched assaults on Shiite militias, triggering widespread
conflict. From the US COIN perspective however there were additional errors. First,
adoption of indirect COIN by the military at this period was ‘uneven’ (Sepp, 2007, p.213).
Secondly the US lacked the manpower to capitalise and hold its gains. Third, a continuing
failure to provide effective governance in Iraq hampered the COIN effort. Importantly
however, it is clear what little progress that did occur was due to a new openness towards
the lessons of indirect COIN, and lay down ground work for further improvements in
2007/2008.
In formulating his new tactics, Casey referred heavily to a strategy group drawing upon
the lessons of indirect COIN. He instigated the creation of a ‘COIN academy’ where US
commanders were given intensive courses that focused on imparting indirect tactics such as
living amongst the population, addressing their concerns and the importance of clear and
hold tactics (Ricks, 2006, pp.392 & 418).

40. 35
The benefits of these new strategies can demonstrated in the way offensives were
conducted against the now heavily embedded insurgents. For example, in August 2004,
Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shiite Jaysh al-Mahdi militias (JAM) staged an uprising in the city of Najaf.
Whilst launching a military operation to combat the insurgents, the US military also entered
political negotiations with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who could intercede to end the
fighting. Crucially ‘negotiations took precedence over the military offensives, which were
repeatedly stopped to placate Sistani’ (Malkasian, 2008, p.248), which in turn led to him
convince the militias to lay down their arms within three weeks. In response Casey poured
investment into the city that ‘would remain quiet for the next three years’ (Malkasian, 2008,
p.249). Similar examples could be found in the cities of Samarra, Tal Afar and in Fallujah
which, by the summer of 2004, was again an insurgent stronghold (further confirming the
failure of earlier direct COIN tactics to clear it). The second battle of Fallujah was a preceded
by protracted attempts to negotiate with the Fallujah insurgents and followed a concerted
information campaign by US that convinced the vast majority of civilians to leave the city.
This was followed by a conventional military campaign that did demonstrate the uneven
nature of indirect COIN learning (Ricks, 2006, pp.399-406). However, less than 5000 civilians
(out of a population of 250,000) remained in the city, which helped keep collateral damage
to a minimum. After successfully routing the insurgents, a phenomenal amount of
investment was put into reconstruction and a large deployment of US Marines dispersed
within the city’s population safeguard against the return of large numbers of insurgents
(Malkasian, 2008, p.247-9). This motivated ‘the people of Fallujah to participate in the political
process’ (Malkasian, 2008, p.247-9) of 2005, and the city has since remained relatively
peaceful.

41. 36
In both the case of Najaf and Fallujah, the US military applied lessons of indirect COIN
and achieved better results than they had in the past. The US army had demonstrated
capacity for institutional learning and had begun to apply political considerations before
military ones. This led to a more population centric approach - working out how to eliminate
insurgents in a manner than also safeguarded the people. In Fallujah especially, the Army
displayed an understanding of the need to maintain its presence within the city in order to
separate the population from insurgents, and were rewarded with a city that did not again
fall to the insurgents, as it did after the previous US intervention. In other areas,
commanders who made the effort to regularly meet the community and resolve their
concerns were rewarded with better security situations (Ricks, 2006, pp.420-23). The
experience of the US units who adopted indirect tactics in the summer of 2005 and 2006
highlight its effectiveness as compared to the direct approach.
These developments enabled the newly constituted Iraqi interim government to
proceed with a plan to hold a series of elections over 2005 (Parliamentary elections in
January, a constitutional referendum in October and national assembly elections in
December). Although Sunni parties largely boycotted the January elections, US pressure
helped convince Shiite parties to make concessions in the drafting of the Iraqi constitution,
avoiding the enforcement of either group’s religious laws and promising fresh elections in
December. Largely on the strength of those commitments, Robinson argues ‘the
constitution was narrowly ratified and Sunnis came out to vote in December’ (2008, p.10).
However the situation on the ground did not readily reflect this progress. Although the
elections themselves were a relative success, the negotiation process between the largely
sectarian parties to decide who should fill the key ministries and Prime Ministerial position

42. 37
of the Government of Iraq (GoI) dragged on for five months. As a result the GoI did not
begin to provide basic services to their people; Herring discusses how intergovernmental
confusion, corruption and US inaction heavily stunted efforts to provide electricity, water
and employment to the Iraqi people (2006, pp.56-72). Indeed some of the sectarian ministers
(mostly Shiites) who were eventually given portfolios actively denied services to the
opposing ethnic group (Baker, 2006, p.20). Areas of the country that remained stable, such as
Fallujah & Ramadi, relied on services that where provided directly by the US army (Kaplan,
2007, pp.16-19). However, Thompson reminds us of the importance of effective national
government: ‘without a reasonably efficient (central) government machine, no programmes
or projects, in the context of counter-insurgency, will produce the desired results’ (1972,
p.51) - military efforts that cover the shortfall do not lead to long term security. The
government that was eventually formed under the Nuri Al-Maliki4 was far from efficient and
this contributed to the instability and sectarian division during 2005-6.
In addition to this continued governance failure, some of the gains that Casey’s use of
indirect COIN did make were lost because he lacked the manpower to sustain them. One of
the pillars of his strategy was to turn over control of the secured areas to the newly forming
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as quickly as possible, in order that US forces could extricate
themselves (Robinson, 2008, p.20 & Ricks, 2006, pp.398, 417). However, the ISF (that due to the
disbandment of the Army and Police in 2003 had be reorganised and trained from scratch)
were not yet ready ‘for independent operations of any level’ (US Marine Report cited by Ricks,
2006, p.406). When they were relied upon to enforce security after American operations
clearing areas of Baghdad in 2005, for example, only one-quarter of the Iraqi troops even
4 Leader of the Shiite Islamic Dawa Party

43. 38
turned up (Robinson, 2008, p.16). To make matters worse, sectarian insurgent forces had
infiltrated much of the ISF (sometimes at the behest of sectarian ministers), and many
would abandon their posts or even join insurgent attacks (Herring, 2006, p.197 & Ricks, 2006,
p.428). As a result the security situation in areas of Iraq under ISF control deteriorated and,
when sectarian Sunni insurgent groups that had grown strong over 2003-4 launched an
offensive against Shiite militias (beginning with the bombing of the Askariya Golden Dome
Mosque in Feb 2006), there was little security to prevent a small scale civil war erupting in
Baghdad and surrounding regions (Biddle, 2008, p.43).
What this experience demonstrates is that effective indirect COIN relies on having
enough suitably trained soldiers to sustain any gains made. In his discussion of how to
isolate and secure populations from insurgency, Galula makes it clear that only once an ‘an
area has been made safe, (can) important forces be withdrawn’ (1964, p.57) - a clear and
hold strategy takes time. Casey was too keen to hand over to substandard troops and thus
lost the gains indirect methods had achieved.
iv. The Indirect Approach: Producing Results?(2007-2008)
Reacting to the increased violence in Iraqi throughout 2006 (and especially to the
Iraqi Study Group’s pessimistic 2006 report) the Bush government once again considered a
change of plan, and formulated a policy that would become known as ‘The Surge’. Within
two years of this policy being enacted overall violence in Iraq was down 80%, with
specifically sectarian violence reduced by an astonishing 90% (Biddle, 2008, p.41). I will argue
that the surge policy gave the new MNF-I commander, General Petraeus, the resources he

44. 39
required to properly implement the military aspects of indirect COIN theory, and that it was
far more effective than anything the US had tried before.
The surge policy was clearly a product of indirect COIN theory, a point signalled by
the choice of General Petraeus to be its instigator. As commander of the 101st Airborne
Division during the invasion and throughout 2004, Petraeus had been responsible for the
Iraqi city of Mosul and the surrounding Ninawa Province, and had put indirect theory to
good effect. Under his command the division integrated with the local communities,
gathering an in-depth knowledge of the local tribes and factions. He placed an emphasis on
law and order, reconstruction and providing the services that were simply not provided by
the CPA, as demonstrated by the huge amount of tasks the division performed in its first
thirty days in the region (see Appendix A). This was in marked contrast the majority of US
units in Iraq at the time, which pursued the direct approach. Also in marked contrast to the
majority experience of the US during 2003-4, the Ninawa province regained some
semblance of normal life under the 101st‘s tenure (Wilson, 2007, pp.229-235 & Malkasian,
2008, pp.243-4) - further highlighting the differing results of the direct and indirect
approaches.
In his 2006 article Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq
and more crucially in the U.S. Army and Marine Corp Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(written by a team headed by Petraeus and issued and taught to all US troops throughout
2006-7), Petraeus brought what he learned from Ninawa into US military doctrine and
directly drew upon the indirect approach, through the works of Galula, Thompson and Nagl
(who himself advised on its content). When in command in Iraq Petraeus built upon the
work of General Casey and was able to successfully spread these concepts throughout the

45. 40
US military machine. Ricks argues that years of failure had opened the minds of the majority
in the US military, who were now prepared to try something new and that application of the
new doctrine was fairly universal (2009, p.160). Appendix B, Petraeus’ issued guidance to all
MNF-I in 2008, highlights the increased prominence of indirect COIN theory in the American
effort.
As well as enforcing a new tactical approach, the centrepiece of the Bush/Petraeus
surge policy was to dramatically increase the US troop commitment to Iraq, for a temporary
period. This would take the form of five additional brigades totalling some 30,000 extra
troops (bringing the US commitment in 2007 up to 160,000). These troops would be able to
take and hold ground in a way that the under trained and equipped Iraqi forces had been
unable to do in 2005/6. Again referring to indirect theory, this surge of troops was to create
the ‘breathing space’ for the GoI to achieve political breakthroughs and to start providing
services and good governance to its people. These developments would ensure continued
security when the surge of troops ended (Johnson, 2007, p.252). However, despite the official
confidence, many in Petraeus’ own staff remained to be convinced that the new tactics
would work (Ricks, 2009, pp.149-153).
The extra troops began to arrive from February 2007 and were gradually dispersed
into the worst affected regions, mainly in and around Baghdad - the site of 80% of the
sectarian violence (Johnson, 2007, p.252). The US spread its reinforcements (and existing
forces) into small new outposts of between 35-100 men throughout towns and cities. Forces
were instructed to provide 24 hour security to Iraqis (preferably via foot patrols) and to get
to know their local populations by holding community meetings and conducting censuses,
precisely in the manner Galula describes in Counterinsurgency Warfare (1964, pp.77-81). US

46. 41
troopers were instructed to get to know their area of operations in such depth that they
themselves would be able to recognise insurgent movements.
Initially, statistical data painted a bleak picture of the surge, with US forces suffering
on average almost 180 attacks a day in February, and with May/June 07 being the second
worst month for US casualty figures for the whole occupation (Ricks, 2009, p.166 & Simon,
2008, p.64). However, this arguably was to be expected as the US pushed into the
insurgency’s territory and strongholds, as ‘at almost every new outpost a series of fights and
terrorist actions would ensue’ (cited by Ricks, 2009, p169). It is important to note however
that the upsurge in violence was almost entirely directed at the US forces, and a
corresponding fall in sectarian violence on civilians was witnessed. The US forces were
placing themselves in-between the insurgency and the population, simultaneously
protecting them and separating them from the insurgency.
That security did improve after the surge there is no doubt (Biddle, 2008, p.41).
However, there is some debate as to whether this can be directly attributed to the indirect
methods enshrined in Petraeus’ strategy. Steven Simon has argued that the biggest
contribution to Iraq’s new found stability was the role of the Sunni awakening movements,
otherwise known as the Sons of Iraq (SoI) (2008, p.58). Throughout 2007/8, a wave of Sunni
militias, who had previously been the mainstay of the insurgency, turned to the MNF-I. They
offered to assist with security and turn their forces on the minority of foreign fighters who
had been largely directing and funding their attacks (often referred to as al-Qaeda in Iraq or
AQI), in return for support and payment5. Simon argues that the Sunni militias and tribes
5 It is estimated that as many as 100,000 Sunni militants werebeen directly paid by the US in 2008,in over 750
local ceasefires.

47. 42
moved away from AQI because it was attempting to establish direct control over the Sunni
insurgency, mainly by assassinating the Iraqi born militia/tribal leaders. He argues it was
AQI’s actions, not the American’s changed COIN doctrine, that galvanised the SoI to change
sides (Simon, 2008, pp.62/3).
Simon is indeed correct that the defection of the Sunni tribes had a dramatic effect
on the security situation. The SoI provided manpower and intelligence that helped to
dramatically reduce the amount of AQI’s operations in the region. Equally they denied AQI
the manpower on which they previously relied - a captured diary written by an AQI leader
lamented that ‘there were almost 200 fighters in our sector before the tribes changed
course’ and that now (Autumn 07) ‘many of our fighters quit and some joined the
deserters’. Indeed the leader only had 20 fighters left on which he could rely (Raghaven,
2008).
Simon is however incorrect in arguing that the new US’s new indirect approach had
little bearing on the decision of Sunni insurgents to reject AQI. The surge, and the new
emphasis on the indirect tactic of protection the population, made the US forces seem like a
more attractive alternative to AQI that, as Simon details, was increasingly pursing a militant
Islamist agenda many Sunni’s did not follow (2008, p.62). As Biddle et all. put it, it was the
surge tactics that ‘enabled the Sunnis to survive this realignment in the face of AQI’s
inevitable counterattacks’ (2008, p.43). The simple presence of the new US outposts made
AQI reprisals that much harder, as an American officer observed: ‘AQI could no longer
threaten individuals with violence after we left, because we never did’ (Lt. Col Crider cited by
Ricks, 2009, p.176). This was true of both Sunni militiamen and the general Iraqi public who,
once convinced they were to be kept safe by the US, started to supply the American forces

48. 43
with local information of AQI bomb factories and movements (Ricks, 2009, pp.175/6). Without
adopting a population centric approach, this reconciliation between the Sunni forces and
the US would not have been possible. Using classic indirect COIN techniques, the US had
been able to separate the insurgency’s leadership from its target population, and much of
its actual manpower. The US had demonstrated they could provide the Sunnis with better
protection and prospects than AQI and, as Galula argued it would (1964, p.83), the people
turned to them. This central tenant of indirect COIN is therefore borne out by the US
experience in 2007/8.
The incorporation of the Sunni SoI into the COIN effort helped set off a domino
effect that facilitated further improvements with the other key source of violence - Shiite
militia groups. The biggest and most prolific organization was al-Sadr’s JAM, who claimed to
be protecting Shiite communities from Sunni violence, especially throughout 2006. Biddle et
all. describe how:
‘as violence waned and resentment of JAM milita thugs (many of whom
seemed mostly concerned with extorting personal profit) grew, Shiite
support for JAM plummeted - especially since the US military build-up in
Baghdad and the ceasefires with the Sunnis gave the US enough troop
strength to the offer the Shiites security without gangsterism’ (2008, p44)
Again it was the US army’s ability to provide better security and prospects to the population,
that turned them away from insurgent influence and control.
In both the Sunni and Shiite regions, the US troops followed Galula’s theory, and
spread out from their initial outposts to provide ever larger rings of security. Ricks also cites

49. 44
interviews with US intelligence officers who discuss great successes in using the new influx of
locally sourced intelligence to break up the leadership and political backing of AQI and other
insurgent groups, though the details of these operations have not yet been declassified
(2009, pp. 192/3). Again this is a measure that Galula and indirect COIN argue is vital once
initial security has been achieved (1964, pp.87/88) and, if these intelligence officers are to be
believed, it has certainly contributed to the dramatically improved security situation
throughout 2008.
Many contemporary commentators argue that by 2008 the surge policy delivered on
its tactical promises (Biddle, 2008, p41, Pollack, 2007, p.24/5 & Ricks, 2009, p. 296). Violence
levels had decreased dramatically, with civilian, US and ISF deaths rates dropping6 and the
frequency of insurgent attacks in US controlled regions suffering a rapid decline (Biddle, 2008,
p.41, The Brookings Institute Iraq Index, 2009 & Ricks, 2009, p.237). Utilizing tactics embodied in
Galula’s 8 steps, the US established a vastly better security situation. However, as has been
demonstrated throughout this project, indirect theory points out that COIN needs to be a
two pronged effort. Arguably the US’s experience on the ground validates indirect COIN’s
claim that good governance is vital to security, as well as indicating that the failures of the
GoI leave concern for the future.
Indirect theory dictates that once an area is secure, COIN forces should ‘establish
new local governance’ and ‘enable these governments by organizing self defence/security
forces’, in order to establish a sense of legitimacy and security for the population (1964,
pp.56/98/90). The US in Iraq effectively co-opted the existing local power structure of the
Sunni regions (the tribes that, as Simon describes, had long held sway in local Iraqi politics
6 (US casualties,for example,dropped from 126 in May 2007 to just14 in December 2007)

50. 45
(Simon, 2008, pp.6/7)) to perform this role. Through the funding of these groups, and through
directly instigated reconstruction projects, the US forces have assumed the role of providing
local services and governance to the Iraqi population, especially in Sunni regions. This has led
to a resurgence of civil activity, such as shopping, social projects etc. that has contributed to
the atmosphere of security and normality (Ricks, 2009, pp.273 & 298), as indirect COIN
suggests it would.
However, indirect theory is clear that long term stability relies on having an efficient
national government (Galula, 1964, p.56) and that militaries should only be ‘nation builders of
the last resort’ (Kahl, 2007, p.171). By 2008 the majority Shiite government of Nuri Al-Maliki
had, despite some progress, yet to achieve many of the goals set to it by the US, on
questions of public provision, ethnic reconciliation and sectarianism within government
(Johnson, 2008, p.267-70). Sectarianism within the government poses a particular problem for
progress. In order to keep the Sunni SoI on the side, it will be necessary to continue to show
that they will be better off with the GoI than against it. This will probably require the GoI to
provide jobs and training for the majority of the SoI, and some integration into the vastly
improved ISF forces (Biddle, 2008, p.50).
Iraq in 2008 could be said to be at the mid point of a successful COIN, having
provided local security and governance but having not yet established an effective state
government or unifying ‘national movement’ (Galula, 1664, p.56). Indirect theory argues that
long term stability depends whether Iraq’s leaders can now construct a government that
fulfils Thompson’s (1972, pp.51/2) criteria, of providing good governance and earning
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The fact that many commentators, such as Biddle et all
(2008, pp.50-3), Ricks (2009, pp.295-98) and Simon (2008, p.58) point out this lack of

51. 46
governance is their gravest concern for the future of Iraq only highlights the prescience of
indirect theory.

52. 47
Chapter 4 - Conclusion
This aim of this project was to introduce and highlight the difference between two
opposing counterinsurgency doctrines and, using the Iraq occupation as a case study, to
come to some form of conclusion as to the effectiveness of both. I have argued that in Iraq
the indirect approach, described by Thompson, Galula & Nagl produced markedly superior
results to the more direct approach that draws upon on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini.
In order to reach this conclusion it was necessary to first introduce the two theories
of counterinsurgency. The direct approach’s focus on utilizing conventional military action
to find and destroy an enemy with overwhelming force was discussed. Following this was a
description of the indirect doctrine, highlighting its population centric approach, designed to
overcome insurgency by denying it a support base.
With the two counterinsurgency doctrines established the project moved on to the
Iraq case study. It is clear that in the early stages of the occupation (2003-4) the US Army
relied on its direct tactics to simply kill off the insurgency, whilst both the military and the
CPA gave little regard to the thoughts and well being of the Iraqi people. This approach
evidently failed to eliminate or even quell the Iraqi insurgency, indeed its growth over the
period led to my conclusion that direct tactics were counterproductive.
A change of strategy in 2004 led to a piecemeal adoption of indirect tactics that,
where applied, produced results. The re-taking of Fallujah demonstrated how, when
adequate attention was paid to the welfare of civilians, and efforts were made to separate
them from insurgents, security was achieved. It was however the appointment of General
Petraeus and the adoption of the 2007 Surge strategy that truly showcases the results of a

53. 48
comprehensively implemented indirect counterinsurgency campaign. The adoption of
population centric tactics, that dispersed counterinsurgent forces amongst the people,
resulted in vastly improved security and reconciliation with significant elements of the
insurgency. This project has demonstrated that, in the Iraqi example, the key tenets and
assertions of the indirect approach have been borne out by experience on the ground.
It has also been clear throughout the project that indirect theory is right to stress the
importance of effective central government. In the early stages of the occupation the lack of
good governance directly contributed to the birth and growth of insurgent movements. It
has been made clear that, despite the military successes achieved in 2007/8, without an
Iraqi state that can earn the loyalty of its citizens, long term stability is in doubt.
The convincing nature of the indirect approach has implications for the future. In the
Iraq case it is clear that security must be maintained by suitable counterinsurgency forces,
whilst renewed effort is put into achieving political progress. It is also likely that the US
military will now export its new counterinsurgency learning to the Afghan theatre where, if
applied in a flexible and culturally aware manner, I believe the indirect approach can
produce results.
Ultimately, it is likely that violent insurgencies will continue to be a significant factor
in the present and future. Indirect counterinsurgency theory, by recognising that control of
the population is key, offers us with an effective methodology for overcoming the
insurgency phenomenon.

54. 49
Appendix A
Mao’s 3 Rules & 8 Remarks
Rules
1. All actions are subjectto command
2. Do not steal fromthe people
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust
Remarks
1. Replace the door when you leave the house
2. Roll up the bedding on which you haveslept
3. Be courteous
4. Be honestin your transactions
5. Return what you borrow
6. Replace whatyou break
7. Do not bathe in the presenceof women
8. Do not without authority search those you arrest
(Mao, 2000, p.96)

55. 50
Appendix B
101st Airborne Division’s First 30 Days Ninawa Province
Source: (Wilson,2007, p.234)

56. 51
Appendix C
General Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency Guidance

57. 52
Appendix C

58. 53
Appendix C
Source: US Army Combined Arms Centre
Available at:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081031_art004.pdf
(Accessed 18/04/09)

59. 54
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