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© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Security Architecture Loft
Architecting For Resiliency
Andrew Kiggins Security Solution Architect
Aren Sandersen, CTO, FoxPass
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Goals
• Learn how to control access
• Learn how AWS services can help implement fault tolerance
• Learn how AWS services can reduce security incident blast radius
• Understand the security services and features associated with network
configuration
• Understand how to secure servers and control user access
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Conditions affecting service availability
• Large Scale Events (LSEs)
• Disaster recovery
• DDoS Attacks
• Deployment failures
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
VPCs
• Public + Private
subnets
• IGW
• NAT GW
virtual private cloud
VPC NAT
gateway
Availability ZoneAvailability ZoneAvailability Zone
VPC subnetVPC subnetVPC subnet
VPC subnetVPC subnetVPC subnet
Internet
gateway
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
VPCs
• Security Groups
– Stateful
– Ingress/Egress
– Instance specific
– Default deny
• Network ACLs
– Stateless
– Inbound/
Outbound
– Subnet specific
– Default allow virtual private cloud
Availability Zone
VPC subnetVPC subnet
Internet
gateway
instanceinstance
instanceinstance
instance
security group
security groupsecurity group
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
VPC
security group
HTTP GET
TCP(6) Port(80)
NTP Buffer Overrun
UDP(17) Port(123)
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Network ACL
security group
HTTP GET
TCP(6) Port(80)
HTTP GET
TCP(6) Port(80)
srcIP=216.246.16.228
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Obfuscate
VPC
Amazon
Route 53
CloudFront
users
security group (BuildABeer-SG-1)
Public subnet
servers
Private subnet
ELB
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Layers Of Access Control
users
Application
servers
Private subnet
security
group
Public subnet
ELB IPS/IDS
Private subnet
ELB
security group
WAF
Private subnet
ELB
security group security group
ELB
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Availability Zones
• 2 zones good, 3 zones better
• Remove AZ dependencies
– AZs can and should stand alone
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Regions (14+)
• Regional Isolation
– Keys don’t port
• Insulate from regional dependency
– Reduce centralized resources
• Reduce Blast Radius
– Don’t interconnect regions
– No VPNs
– Use protected API endpoint for communication between regions
• Disaster recovery
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Elastic Load Balancer + Application Load Balancers
• Cross AZ
– Fault tolerance
• Auto Scaling
– Load/attack resilient
• Service isolation
Elastic Load Balancing
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Separation of services
Amazon
Route 53
CloudFront
security group
Public subnet
servers
Private subnet
ELB
www.foo.commail.foo.com
security group
Public subnet
Mail servers
Private subnet
ELB
security group
Public subnet
Web servers
Private subnet
ELB
mail.foo.com
www.foo.com
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
EC2 Auto-scaling
• Create Auto Scaling Groups to span subnets & AZs
• Scale up quickly (in jumps)
• Scale down slowly (in steps)
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Introduction
• About me
• Now: Founder, Foxpass, DevOps security company
• Then: Led operations, IT, and security teams for startups over a decade
• DevOps/Security consulting
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Goals
• Understand where AWS leaves off and your own security practices must begin,
particularly for Linux servers
• Learn common threats and how to decrease exposure
• Get practical advice on how to configure production access and set IT policies
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Amazon is easy!
• Amazon’s AWS portal makes it extremely simple to bring up servers and get
started
• Creating firewalls is easy, too
– Security groups
– Network ACLs in VPCs
– WAFs
• IAM is extremely granular for portal/api access
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
But more is needed, especially at the machine level
• AWS defaults to public-private SSH key on non-root user (ubuntu, ec2-user)
which encourages sharing of the private key
• Sharing a private key is not a best practice
– If an employee leaves, now you have to rotate that key on every server
– This is annoying
– This is dangerous and can lead to lockouts
• AWS defaults to a single user on each Linux machine
– Sharing user accounts is (usually) not a best practice
• AWS does not give you a bastion host or a VPN
– It’s up to you
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
How do I improve this?
• Bare minimum:
– Update the authorized_keys file for your common user (ubuntu, ec2-user) with the
public ssh key(s) of each employee who can log in
– Every device should have a separate keypair:
ubuntu@staging:~$ cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
ssh-rsa AAAAB3... 7EFqEu aren@aren-macbook
ssh-rsa AAAAB1... 8EcZXy aren@aren-ipad
ssh-rsa AAAAB8... HG2AZ6 dave@laptop
. . .
. . .
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
How do I improve this further?
• Get rid of shared user accounts
– See who exactly is on a machine
– See what they are doing
– Assign different permissions to different users
• Who can log in
• What can they see/do when they log in
– Auditable
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Ok, how?
• Add by hand with useradd command
– Works fine for one machine, does not scale (user id numbers don’t line up)
• Use configuration management like Chef, Puppet, OpsWorks
• Use centralized directory server (LDAP)
– Run your own
– Use a SaaS provider
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
SSH access to production
• Don’t keep port 22 open to the world to every host
• Instead:
– Use a bastion host
• Users SSH to the bastion host (jump box) and from there can access another host via the private IP
(10.x.x.x)
– Use a VPN server
• Makes employee laptop a part of the production network
• OpenVPN (opensource and Access Server)
– Requires special client
• Ipsec-based can use built-in client
– Foxpass gives one of these away in the marketplace
• No matter which you choose, requiring 2-factor for access to your production
infrastructure is critical
– Google Authenticator
– Duo
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
IT security
• Easiest way to break into a company is by tricking the employees
– Two-factor authentication reduces attack surface and should be required for email
accounts
• Laptop security
– SSH keys should be created with passwords (use ssh-add so you don’t have to re-
type the password)
– Enforce laptop disk encryption from day 1
– Turn on locking screen savers
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
IT security, continued
• Network security
– If your office IP is whitelisted into production anywhere, you need to secure your
office wireless
• Consider not whitelisting it: treat your office like any coffee shop
• Whitelists to back-office apps are the worst, many app security holes
• Make p/w hard to remember and do not write it on whiteboards (for example)
• Rotate the password frequently, especially after an employee leaves
– Or set up 802.1x
• 802.1x forces the OS to ask a user for his/her name and password before granting access to
the WiFi network
• Needs a RADIUS server. Run your own or use a SaaS provider
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Have an employee departure checklist
• Servers
• VPN
• Google Apps account
• AWS account
• Domain Registrar
• DNS
© 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved
Thank you!
aren@foxpass.com

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Architecting for Resiliency

  • 1. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Security Architecture Loft Architecting For Resiliency Andrew Kiggins Security Solution Architect Aren Sandersen, CTO, FoxPass
  • 2. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Goals • Learn how to control access • Learn how AWS services can help implement fault tolerance • Learn how AWS services can reduce security incident blast radius • Understand the security services and features associated with network configuration • Understand how to secure servers and control user access
  • 3. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Conditions affecting service availability • Large Scale Events (LSEs) • Disaster recovery • DDoS Attacks • Deployment failures
  • 4. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved VPCs • Public + Private subnets • IGW • NAT GW virtual private cloud VPC NAT gateway Availability ZoneAvailability ZoneAvailability Zone VPC subnetVPC subnetVPC subnet VPC subnetVPC subnetVPC subnet Internet gateway
  • 5. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved VPCs • Security Groups – Stateful – Ingress/Egress – Instance specific – Default deny • Network ACLs – Stateless – Inbound/ Outbound – Subnet specific – Default allow virtual private cloud Availability Zone VPC subnetVPC subnet Internet gateway instanceinstance instanceinstance instance security group security groupsecurity group
  • 6. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved VPC security group HTTP GET TCP(6) Port(80) NTP Buffer Overrun UDP(17) Port(123)
  • 7. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Network ACL security group HTTP GET TCP(6) Port(80) HTTP GET TCP(6) Port(80) srcIP=216.246.16.228
  • 8. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Obfuscate VPC Amazon Route 53 CloudFront users security group (BuildABeer-SG-1) Public subnet servers Private subnet ELB
  • 9. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Layers Of Access Control users Application servers Private subnet security group Public subnet ELB IPS/IDS Private subnet ELB security group WAF Private subnet ELB security group security group ELB
  • 10. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Availability Zones • 2 zones good, 3 zones better • Remove AZ dependencies – AZs can and should stand alone
  • 11. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Regions (14+) • Regional Isolation – Keys don’t port • Insulate from regional dependency – Reduce centralized resources • Reduce Blast Radius – Don’t interconnect regions – No VPNs – Use protected API endpoint for communication between regions • Disaster recovery
  • 12. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Elastic Load Balancer + Application Load Balancers • Cross AZ – Fault tolerance • Auto Scaling – Load/attack resilient • Service isolation Elastic Load Balancing
  • 13. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Separation of services Amazon Route 53 CloudFront security group Public subnet servers Private subnet ELB www.foo.commail.foo.com security group Public subnet Mail servers Private subnet ELB security group Public subnet Web servers Private subnet ELB mail.foo.com www.foo.com
  • 14. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved EC2 Auto-scaling • Create Auto Scaling Groups to span subnets & AZs • Scale up quickly (in jumps) • Scale down slowly (in steps)
  • 15. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Introduction • About me • Now: Founder, Foxpass, DevOps security company • Then: Led operations, IT, and security teams for startups over a decade • DevOps/Security consulting
  • 16. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Goals • Understand where AWS leaves off and your own security practices must begin, particularly for Linux servers • Learn common threats and how to decrease exposure • Get practical advice on how to configure production access and set IT policies
  • 17. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Amazon is easy! • Amazon’s AWS portal makes it extremely simple to bring up servers and get started • Creating firewalls is easy, too – Security groups – Network ACLs in VPCs – WAFs • IAM is extremely granular for portal/api access
  • 18. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved But more is needed, especially at the machine level • AWS defaults to public-private SSH key on non-root user (ubuntu, ec2-user) which encourages sharing of the private key • Sharing a private key is not a best practice – If an employee leaves, now you have to rotate that key on every server – This is annoying – This is dangerous and can lead to lockouts • AWS defaults to a single user on each Linux machine – Sharing user accounts is (usually) not a best practice • AWS does not give you a bastion host or a VPN – It’s up to you
  • 19. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved How do I improve this? • Bare minimum: – Update the authorized_keys file for your common user (ubuntu, ec2-user) with the public ssh key(s) of each employee who can log in – Every device should have a separate keypair: ubuntu@staging:~$ cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ssh-rsa AAAAB3... 7EFqEu aren@aren-macbook ssh-rsa AAAAB1... 8EcZXy aren@aren-ipad ssh-rsa AAAAB8... HG2AZ6 dave@laptop . . . . . .
  • 20. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved How do I improve this further? • Get rid of shared user accounts – See who exactly is on a machine – See what they are doing – Assign different permissions to different users • Who can log in • What can they see/do when they log in – Auditable
  • 21. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Ok, how? • Add by hand with useradd command – Works fine for one machine, does not scale (user id numbers don’t line up) • Use configuration management like Chef, Puppet, OpsWorks • Use centralized directory server (LDAP) – Run your own – Use a SaaS provider
  • 22. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved SSH access to production • Don’t keep port 22 open to the world to every host • Instead: – Use a bastion host • Users SSH to the bastion host (jump box) and from there can access another host via the private IP (10.x.x.x) – Use a VPN server • Makes employee laptop a part of the production network • OpenVPN (opensource and Access Server) – Requires special client • Ipsec-based can use built-in client – Foxpass gives one of these away in the marketplace • No matter which you choose, requiring 2-factor for access to your production infrastructure is critical – Google Authenticator – Duo
  • 23. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved IT security • Easiest way to break into a company is by tricking the employees – Two-factor authentication reduces attack surface and should be required for email accounts • Laptop security – SSH keys should be created with passwords (use ssh-add so you don’t have to re- type the password) – Enforce laptop disk encryption from day 1 – Turn on locking screen savers
  • 24. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved IT security, continued • Network security – If your office IP is whitelisted into production anywhere, you need to secure your office wireless • Consider not whitelisting it: treat your office like any coffee shop • Whitelists to back-office apps are the worst, many app security holes • Make p/w hard to remember and do not write it on whiteboards (for example) • Rotate the password frequently, especially after an employee leaves – Or set up 802.1x • 802.1x forces the OS to ask a user for his/her name and password before granting access to the WiFi network • Needs a RADIUS server. Run your own or use a SaaS provider
  • 25. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Have an employee departure checklist • Servers • VPN • Google Apps account • AWS account • Domain Registrar • DNS
  • 26. © 2016 AWS and affiliates, all rights reserved Thank you! aren@foxpass.com

Editor's Notes

  1. Control access by CIDR, security group. Why is that important? Auto scaling. Security group live in a VPC, but can span AZs
  2. VPC gets a default Security Group when created but you need to customize it or use multiple We create a security group that only allows TCP traffic to port 80 (knows nothing about HTTP!) By default Security Groups allow nothing in, so we have to poke some holes (e.g. port 80/443) for web traffic) Our HTTP Beer order gets through The NTP Buffer Overrun exploit gets stopped at the gate, as NTP uses port UDP/123 and there’s no access allowed for that sort of traffic NO PORT SCANNING OF MISCONFIGURED HOSTS
  3. The default Network ACLs (stateless) are to ALLOW everything By adding a explicit DENY rule for Klingon.org we block all traffic from that source IP address Klingon.com
  4. Domain resolves to cloudfront not to the origin, but only for web traffic Resolving ftp will give the ELB’s ip addresses allowing it to be attacked.
  5. Non-cacheable content, or non web traffic can benefit from additional layers of security controlling access. There’s A LOT of high quality commercial offerings in the marketplace, Firewalls, IPS/IDS, WAF, UTMs, SIEMs tools. A multi layer strategy is required as there’s no silver bullet
  6. Also scrub out the badness Scale to absorb large attacks ALB can isolate different backend services
  7. Separate out services to ensure that there’s no collateral damage between servers hosting different types of applications (Best Practice, one service, one endpoint) Here our malicious character has failed to find the origin using a DNS request for www.buildabeer.com, so instead he makes a DNS request for mail.buildabeer.com. The applications live on the same servers and as CDNs don’t generally handle mail traffic, the request resolves to the server IP addresses. Slpit out the services t protect cross contamination. 1 application, 1 set of IPs/ELBs. Customerize your security