2. • The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a truly modern multi
domain operation in progress which opened with a Russian multi-
pronged offside into Ukraine.
• Russia is making a bid to reach Kyiv to topple the current
Government and install its own.
• Initially shock and awe of the Russian blitz predicted that it was
game, set and match to Russia.
• To recount the sequence of events, the kinetic battle commenced
on 24 Feb at dawn with heavy firepower delivered through long
range guns, rockets, missiles and airstrikes synergistically.
INSIGHTS
3. • However what did happen was that, Russia did not carry out
follow up air operations to knock out Ukrainian air power or anti-
aircraft assets.
• Till date Ukraine air assets have been able to operate with
some degree of freedom and effect.
• By the evening of 28 Feb, Russian forces had advanced on
three thrust line and had established three distinct enclaves
around Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson.
• The first cycle of this conflict has been dominated by battlefield
transparency, firepower, movement and people’s resistance.
INSIGHTS
4. • Ukrainians, despite being outnumbered were contesting the
Russian advance along all thrust lines.
• Common citizens have joined in the fight with Molotov Cocktails
and AKs. Ground fighting and air strikes were continuing
intermittently.
• Ukrainian President has become an underdog and a leading
example for the whole world with his outstanding leadership and
commitment towards his land and people.
INSIGHTS
7. • Leaders matter in war. Mr Putin comes across as a cold
calculating aloof leader who has planned his moves and
prepared accordingly with clear-cut objectives regarding the
outcomes of this conflict he initiated.
• Mr Zelensky on the other hand seemed unsure in the
beginning. He is however leading bravely from the front. When
offered a ‘Ghani’ like exit by USA, he has galvanised his
people by simply saying that he ‘needs ammunition and not a
ride’.
• We are witnessing it in Ukraine where a democratically elected
popular ‘leader’ is rallying his ‘people’ around.
LEADERSHIP
8. • When brave leaders stay put with their people on the streets, to
lead from the front victory is assured.
• Take your mind back. A cold calculating Xi Jinping unleashed
Eastern Ladakh on us. At that time our PM went to Leh and the
RM went to Lukung to be with our troops and raise their
morale.
• We witnessed the result of this visit in Eastern Ladakh when it
seemed that China was walking all over us till we got our act
together and occupied Kailash Range and made them retreat.
LEADERSHIP
9. • The power of Intelligence and Information in a modern-day
battlefield is doubly reinforced in this conflict.
• US intelligence and information operations uncovered each
move by the Russians well in time.
• If heeded in time by Ukraine, the situation might have been
different.
• Russia also used misinformation at strategic and tactical levels
to conceal real deployments and actual movement.
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
10. • Russia was able to mount a sudden attack despite being under
constant US watch to achieve a high degree of operational
surprise.
• The real surprise is Ukrainian information operations. Without
much fanfare their President could communicate with his
population and rally them around.
• His communication ability though social media short clips is
something to really learn from.
• India has to get its act together. China and Pakistan will come
hammer and tongs at us during the next conflict situation.
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
11. • Chinese lay a lot of emphasis on ‘Informatised’ battlefields.
They are now looking at ‘Intelligentised’ battlefields
• On the other hand our experience in Kargil and Eastern Ladakh
indicates intelligence failures of a monumentally high order.
• Overall this conflict will teach us more about the increasing
value of Information Operations in war. India has to get its act
together.
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
12. • Much is made of the Cyber domain. Both sides have carried out
cyber-attacks on each other’s networks( civilian and military), either
directly or through proxies/ allies/ supporters.
• There is a view that cyber weapons are mostly deployed short of war
tools, in the grey zone between peace and war. They are cheap,
effective and often difficult to trace back to the state behind them in
comparison to boots on the ground, making retaliation complicated.
• Indian Armed forces need to rethink realistically the use of the cyber
domain in battle.
• China lays a lot of emphasis on Informatisation and cyberwarfare.
They are increasingly network dependent. This is a vulnerability
waiting to be exploited.
CYBER WARFARE
13. • Disrupt Chinese information operations and they are done. As
and when the CDS gets appointed, he needs to seriously think
about this along with the Service Chiefs.
• Conversely, own networks need cyber-proofing .The way to go
forward is to be light on battlefield networking and data
dependence.
• Better to be strong on communication. Use tactical acumen
rather than rely on innate lifeless data.
• The issue is that while we can have a layered architecture to
withstand a cyber-attack what do we do with the Chinese
hardware which floods our national networks?
CYBER WARFARE
14. • Will someone seriously think of cyber Atmanirbharta ? At
national levels the issue becomes more complicated and
definitely needs attention. However, if we have banned Chinese
apps, we can find ways to ban their hardware too.
• India has a lot of ground to cover. We cannot be Atamanirbhar
without intelligence. Unless we get our act together now, we
might not be able to catch up.
CYBER WARFARE
15. • This battle has shown the increasing value of precision long
range firepower employed in an integrated manner.
• Time to wake up out of our slumber. Long-range firepower
delivered by rockets, cruise missiles, airplanes and drones in
the initial stages opened up space for maneuver and created
condition for further operations.
• In our context, adopting integrated firepower delivery will pay
handsome dividends in the flat Tibetan plateau where
movement is predictable in time, space and locational
dimensions and camouflage is almost non-existent.
LONG RANGE WEAPONS
16. • Coordinated long range firepower from ground or air, manned
or unmanned, with suitable battlefield transparency and close
observation (manned or unmanned) will paralyze our
adversaries.
• On the other hand the Chinese firepower will not be that
effective since on our side of the LAC , the terrain is
relatively more broken and steep.
• We are in the danger of having long-range firepower in
“Dhritarashtra” mode. What is worse, when the future lies in
extending ranges of firepower volumetrically, Indian Army has
been reducing its requirement of long range rockets.
LONG RANGE WEAPONS
17. • Further, Ukraine employed long range firepower in an ambush
role innovatively.
• It appears from reports that Ukrainian forces kept a few
Smerch launchers in hides. From these hides they have been
able to redeploy and bring down devastating fire upon
advancing Russian columns as and when they entered pre-
prepared killing fields.
• India needs to study this better. An important aspect which has
emerged is that both sides have shown clarity in ensuring tight
sensor-shooter linkages.
LONG RANGE WEAPONS
18. • Russia could not integrate its ground based firepower with
airpower to knock out Ukraine forces
• Was it a case of poor training, faulty planning or inadequate
ammunition? In the event, the gaps in firepower planning and
delivery opened a window of opportunity to Ukrainian forces to
retaliate.
• The maxim that firepower must be delivered seamlessly across
the length and depth of the battlefield in an integrated manner
is an important lesson for the future, in Indian context.
INTEGRATION OF FIREPOWER
19. • The multipronged offensive carried out by the Russians looks
great on paper. However each prong is widely separated from
the other without mutual support.
• In addition the leadership and the resistance put up by the
Ukrainians indicates that a numerically inferior forces can tie
down large forces through a coordinated an tactically planned
ground innovation. This is something we should never lose
sight of in the Sino Indian situation.
• Advancement in indigenous cyber and information warfare
technologies needs to be focused upon.
• The macro lesson from this phase is that selection and
maintenance of aim, strategy for war according to terrain and
enemy resistance and concentration of force are important
principles of war and hard to ignore.
CONCLUSION
