Administrative Law & Judicial Review

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Administrative Law and Judicial Review
By
William Tong
Solicitor
Juris Doctor
Postgraduate Certificate in Laws (PCLL)
MA in Arbitration and Dispute Resolution
MSc(Distinction) in Construction and Real Estate
BSc(1st Class Honours) in Construction Management
Professional Diploma in Insurance
Solicitor of The High Court of Hong Kong
Member of The Law Society of Hong Kong
Member of The Hong Kong Institute of Arbitrators
Member of The Hong Kong Insurance Law Association
Member of the Chartered Institute of Building, UK
Senior Associate of The Australian and New Zealand
Institute of Insurance and Finance

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Contents
1. Hong Kong Legal System
2. Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region
3. Administrative Law
4. Non-Judicial Controls on Government
5. Judicial Review
6. Legal Basis of Judicial Review

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7. The Limits of Judicial Review
8. Remedies
9. Grounds of Judicial Review
10. Human Rights and Judicial Review
11. Application for Judicial Review
12. Issuing a Claim for Judicial Review: Checklist

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What is a legal system?
It is a system within a defined geographical area where
law is created and enforced. It consists of:-
(i) a collection of laws;
(ii) process of creating, interpreting, applying and
enforcing laws;
(iii) institution involved in such process (e.g. the
legislature, courts and police force);
(iv) personnel involved in the process (e.g. the legislators,
judges and lawyers).

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There are two main types of legal systems in the world:
civil law and common law legal systems.
Civil law legal system emphasizes the importance of
statute law (i.e. law made by the legislature). Normally,
it has a written constitution. It inclines to adopt an
inquisitorial legal method (in which the judges will play
a more active role) in the process of a trial. Most
European countries such as France, Germany, Italy,
etc. belong to this legal system.
Common law system emphasizes the importance of
case law (i.e. law made by judges). Normally, it does
not have a written constitution. It inclines to adopt an
adversarial legal method (in which the judges will play
a less active role) in the process of a trial. This system
is used in most commonwealth countries such as
England, Australia, Canada, etc. Hong Kong also
belongs to this system.

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What is law?
“The written and unwritten body of rules largely
derived from custom and formal enactment which are
recognized as binding among those persons who
constitute a community or state, so that they will be
imposed upon and enforced among those persons by
appropriate sanctions.” (as per L.B. Curzon)
Law governs most aspects of life in a community.
Different aspects of law aim to maintain a balance
between different competing interests e.g. employment
law - employers v employees; tenancy law - landlords v
tenants; insurance law – insurers v insureds;
constitutional law & administrative law: state v people.

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Rule of law: everyone in the society has to obey the
law. No one is supposed to be above the law.
In Hong Kong, the concept of separation of powers is
adopted. The judiciary, which is independent of the
executive branch, is responsible for adjudicating civil
and criminal disputes but will not take an active role in
the administration of justice. The Department of
Justice, being part of the executive branch, has the
power to prosecute any person but no power to impose
any sentence. The Legislative Council, being a law-
making body, has no power to enforce the law.
The main purposes of law are to maintain order,
achieve justice and promote the common good in the
society.

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Criminal Law
It concerns the offences against and are punishable by
the state (in the context of Hong Kong, i.e. the
government of the HKSAR).
Title of the proceedings to be used: HKSAR v
Defendant (The accused).
The HKSAR is to be represented by the Prosecution
Division of the Department of Justice. The burden of
proof normally rests with the prosecution unless it is
shifted by an ordinance.

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The standard of proof required is that of a proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in a criminal
case, any benefit of doubt should be given to the
defendant.
The main object is to punish convicted offenders by
means of a fine, imprisonment or some other forms of
punishment such as community service order,
probation order, etc.
Examples: murder, theft, deception.

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Civil Law
It regulates the rights and obligations of persons
towards each other e.g. protects private rights;
resolves disputes between private citizens.
Title of the proceedings to be used: Plaintiff v
Defendant.
Both the plaintiff and defendant have to prove their
case.
The standard of proof required is that of a proof on a
balance of probabilities. Therefore, if the plaintiff’s
case is proved to be more reliable and believable, the
court may give judgment in his favour.

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The main object is to win a judgment in the form of
money called damages by ordering one party to pay
compensation to another or in the form of injunction,
specific performance, etc.
Examples: law of contract, law of tort, law of agency,
insurance law, employment law, etc.

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Public Law - It concerns with the conduct of
government and the relations between government and
private persons.
Examples: constitutional law, criminal law,
administrative law.
Private law – It concerns with the legal relationship
between private individuals, comprises the rules
governing relations between private persons or groups
of persons.
Examples: law of contract, law of tort, company law,
law of trust, law of property, law of succession, etc.

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The Development of Hong Kong’s Legal System
From 1st July 1997, Hong Kong became a Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China.
The HKSAR was established in accordance with the
provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the
People's Republic of China.
A high degree of autonomy is promised.
The concept of "one country, two systems" is adopted.

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The Sources of Law in Hong Kong
PRC Sources
(a) Basic Law
The National People's Congress of the People’s Republic of
China enacted the Basic Law of the HKSAR in 1990.
The Basic Law is the constitutional document of the HKSAR
and the blueprint for Hong Kong’s future development.
It prescribes the systems to be practised in the HKSAR in
order to ensure the implementation of the basic policies of
the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong.

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Article 5
The socialist system and policies shall not be practised
in the HKSAR, and the previous capitalist system and
way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.
Article 8
The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the
common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate
legislation and customary law shall be maintained.
Exceptions: (a) any previous laws that contravene the
Basic Law; and (b) any previous laws that are amended
by the legislature of the HKSAR.

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Article 18
The laws in force in the HKSAR shall be:
(a) The Basic Law of the HKSAR
(b) The laws previously in force in Hong Kong as
provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and
(c) The laws enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR.
Article 19
The HKSAR shall be vested with independent judicial
power, including that of final adjudication.

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(b) National Laws of PRC applicable to HK
Article 18 Basic Law
National laws shall not be applied in the HKSAR except
for those listed in Annex III:
(i) Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem
and National Flag;國都、紀年、國歌、國旗的決議
(ii) Resolution on the National Day;國慶日的決議
(iii) Order on the National Emblem;國徽的命令
(iv) Declaration on the Territorial Sea;關於領海的聲明
(v) Nationality Law;國籍法
(vi) Regulations Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities.外交特權與豁免條例

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UK Sources – The Common Law and Rules of Equity
Common law has its origin in UK. Historically, at the
time of Norman Conquest in 1066, different localities in
England had different local customary rules. The King
at that time asked the judges to develop unified rules
of law which applied throughout the kingdom. These
rules were later developed into a system of common
law and administered by the common law courts.
However, the procedures of common law were
unsatisfactory in that the plaintiff might not obtain
redress for grievances because of some minor
procedural. Moreover, in some aspects, common law
was too rigid and inflexible.

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Later the King asked the Chancellor to deal with the
grievances and the rules on which the Chancellor
decided the case were based on justice and fairness.
The principles of equity were later developed and
administered by the Court of Chancery.
Reports of judgments handed down by judges have,
since at least the 15th century, established in detail the
legal principles regulating the relationship between
state and citizen, and between citizen and citizen.
These 2 different sets of rules were administered in 2
different courts in UK until the 19th century.

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There are a number of differences between common
law and equity:
(i) They have different origins. Common law was
developed by the common law courts while equity was
developed by the Court of Chancery.
(ii) Common law remedies (e.g. damages) are granted
as of right whereas equitable remedies (e.g. specific
performance) are discretionary.
(iii) Common law is a complete system of law while
equity is only supplementary.

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(iv) The time-limits for common law rights are laid
down in the Limitation Ordinance while equitable rights
must be applied for promptly.
(v) When there is a conflict between common law and
equity, equity will prevail.
Judicial precedent
There are now some hundreds of thousands of
reported cases in common law jurisdictions which
comprise the common law. Because it is not written by
the legislature but by judges, it is also referred to as
"unwritten" law. Judges seek these principles out
when trying a case and apply the precedents to the
facts to come up with a judgment.

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Hong Kong Sources
Local Legislation: the Legislative Council in the
HKSAR is the most important law making body in Hong
Kong. The laws passed by it are called Ordinances.
Ordinances govern most aspects of life in Hong Kong.
Subsidiary Legislation: the Hong Kong Legislature may
delegate law-making powers to other bodies, e.g. the
MTR is empowered to make the MTR By-Laws under
the Mass Transit Railway Ordinance. The laws made by
those bodies are called rules, regulations, by-laws, etc.
and their main functions are to supplement ordinances.
Decisions of the Hong Kong Courts: decisions made
by superior courts are binding on inferior courts in
Hong Kong.

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Traditional Sources: Customary Chinese Law
Chinese law and custom is to be found in the Codes of
the Qing Dynasty as supplemented by customary rules.
Chinese customary law has been applied in relations to
land in the New Territories e.g. under New Territories
Ordinance (Cap 97), family law and succession, etc.

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THE HONG KONG LEGAL MACHINE
The Judiciary
It is responsible for the administration of justice in
Hong Kong.
The Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal is the
head of the Judiciary.

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The Courts of Law in Hong Kong
The Court of Final Appeal
It is the highest appellate court in Hong Kong. It only
has appellate jurisdiction but no original jurisdiction.
It normally hears appeals on civil and criminal matters
from the Court of Appeal. However, in some
circumstances, the Court of Final Appeal may hear
appeals from the Court of First Instance directly.
It has unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction but no
jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and
foreign affairs.

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In civil matters: (a) monetary claims involved must be
not less than HK$1 million or (b) matters of public
importance.
In criminal matters: normally more serious offences
heard in the Court of First Instance will be appealed to
the Court of Final Appeal.
It comprises five judges –
- the Chief Justice,
- three permanent judges, and
- one non-permanent Hong Kong judge or one judge
from another common law jurisdiction.

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The High Court
It consists of the Court of Appeal and the Court of First
Instance.
The Court of Appeal of the High Court
It hears appeals on civil and/or criminal matters from
the Court of First Instance, District Court and Lands
Tribunal.
It has unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction.
It normally comprises three judges.

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The Court of First Instance of the High Court
It has unlimited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal
matters.
It has both original and appellate jurisdiction.
It exercises civil jurisdiction (normally by one judge
without jury) in disputes relating to breach of contract,
tort, bankruptcy, company winding-up, intellectual
property, probate and mental health matters, etc.

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Most serious criminal offences, such as murder,
manslaughter, rape, armed robbery, trafficking in large
quantities of dangerous drugs and complex
commercial frauds are tried by a judge of the Court of
First Instance together with jury.
It hears appeals from the Magistrates’ Courts and other
tribunals (except the Lands Tribunal).

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District Court
Civil jurisdiction
It hears monetary claims up to $1,000,000 or,
Where the claims are for recovery of land, the annual
rent or ratable value does not exceed $240,000.
Criminal jurisdiction
It tries more serious cases, with the exception of
murder, manslaughter and rape.
It may sentence offenders to imprisonment for a
maximum of 7 years.

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The District Court has been assigned special
jurisdiction to hear cases relating to employees’
compensation under the Employees Compensation
Ordinance and cases for discrimination under various
anti-discrimination ordinances
The Family Court, which is part of the District Court,
deals with family-related matters such as divorce,
maintenance, custody, etc.
Appeals will go to the Court of Appeal.

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The Magistrates’ Courts
Permanent Magistrates exercise criminal jurisdiction
over a wide range of summary offences including petty
theft, common assault, road traffic offences,
possession of drugs.
The maximum sentencing power of a Permanent
Magistrate is 2 years’ imprisonment (or 3 years’
imprisonment if two or more consecutive sentences
are imposed) and a fine of $100,000.

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Where an accused is charged with an indictable
offence, he will be brought in the first place before a
Permanent Magistrate for committal proceedings(初級
偵訊). The function of the Magistrate is not that of
finding the accused guilty or not guilty but to
determine whether a prima facie case has been made,
and if this is the case, the accused will be transferred
to the District Court or the Court of First Instance for a
formal trial.
A Magistrate has power to issue a warrant for the
apprehension of any person or to grant or refuse bail.

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Some minor offences such as hawking, traffic
contraventions and littering are heard by Special
Magistrates who do not have the power to impose
imprisonment. Their jurisdiction is limited to a
maximum fine of $50,000.
The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to hear charges
against children (aged under 14) and young persons
(aged between 14 and 16) for any offences other than
homicide.
Appeals to the Magistrate Court’s decisions go to the
Court of First Instance of the High Court.

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The Appeal System
The Court of Final Appeal hears appeals on civil and
criminal matters from the Court of Appeal and Court of
First Instance.
The Court of Appeal hears appeals on civil and/or
criminal matters from the Court of First Instance,
District Court and Lands Tribunal.
The Court of First Instance hears appeals on civil
and/or criminal matters from the Magistrate's Court,
Labour Tribunal and Small Claims Tribunal.

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The Jury System
The most serious criminal offences are tried by a judge
of the Court of First Instance, sitting with a jury
consisting of seven or, where a judge so orders, nine.
It is the jury which decides whether the accused is
guilty or not guilty and a majority vote is required.
The system of jury may be used in some civil cases
such as libel.
Also if a coroner decides to hold an inquest with a jury,
a jury of three will be appointed.

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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
1. Introduction
The custom of following already decided cases is
called the doctrine of judicial precedent or stare
decisis (Latin phrase meaning to stand by previous
decisions).
In certain circumstances the judge has no option but to
apply the law as previously pronounced whether he
agrees with it or not.

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2. Case law
2.1 Ratio decidendi: “the reason for decision”. It
consists of 3 parts:
- material facts of the case;
- statement of law applied to the legal problems
disclosed by the facts upon which the decision is
based; and
- final decision.
2.2 Obiter dictum: “thing said by the way”
Statement of law made by the way, not based on the
facts as found.
Only the ratio decidendi of a case is strictly binding,
obiter dictum is only persuasive.

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3. The ranking of courts and the doctrine of judicial
precedent
The decisions made by higher courts are normally
binding on lower courts.
The decisions made in tribunals have no binding
effect. However, all decisions made by the court are
persuasive even though they are not binding.

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The Process of Legislation
Initially, there will be consultation with interested
parties.
A bill will be prepared by the Law Drafting Division of
the Department of Justice and submitted to the
Executive Council for discussion.
Normally, approval from the Chief Executive in Council
is needed to introduce a bill into the Legislative
Council. However, any member of the Legislative
Council is also entitled to introduce a private bill.
The bill will be published in the Government Gazette
for further consultation.

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The bill will be given a short title (setting out the name
of the bill), a long title (setting out the purposes of the
bill in general terms) and an explanatory memorandum
(stating the contents and objects of the bill in non-
technical language). The bill shall be presented in the
Chinese and English languages.
First Reading is a mere formality. The clerk reads the
short title of the bill after which the Council shall be
deemed to have ordered the bill to be set down for a
second reading.
Second Reading: a debate is held during which
legislators can voice their opinions. Then, there will be
a vote to decide if the bill should be passed.

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If the bill is defeated, no further proceedings will be
taken.
If the bill is passed, it may go through a committee
stage during which more details will be worked out.
The bill will then be proceeded to Third and Final
Reading.
A copy of every bill passed by the Legislative Council
shall be submitted to the Chief Executive for his
signature and the bill will formally become an
ordinance.

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An ordinance shall be published in the Gazette again
and it generally commences at the beginning of the day
on which it is published or commences on a day to be
announced.
Law enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region must be reported to the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
for record. The reporting for record shall not affect the
entry into force of such law. (Article 17 of the Basic
Law)

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The Delegated Legislation
Legco is not able to deal directly or specifically with all
of the details of its statutes.
A great deal of legislation is made under delegated
powers called subsidiary or delegated or subordinate
legislation.
The ‘parent’ ordinance gives powers to some institutes
to make the delegated legislation. For example, the
Companies Ordinance provides that the Chief Justice
may, with the approval of Legco, make rules for the
winding up of companies.

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THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION
1. Problems associated with interpreting statutes
Language is in some respects an imperfect means of
communication and sometimes the intention of
legislature is not completely clear in the legislation
which it passes.
The function of judges in relation to legislation is to
apply and interpret it in the case before them.

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Statutory aids to interpretation
The Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance
Section 7:
‘the male includes the female gender, and vice versa’
‘writing includes printing, photography and other
methods’
‘person includes corporations’
‘singular includes the plural, and vice versa’
Section 19:
An Ordinance shall be deemed to be remedial and shall
receive such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as will best ensure the object of the
Ordinance is attained according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit.

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Common Law Approaches
(a) The literal rule
Where words of an Ordinance are themselves plain and
unambiguous, no matter how unjust they might be,
they must be interpreted according to their literal and
grammatical meaning.
The duty of the judges is to explain the words in their
natural and ordinary sense, even if the result appears
to be contrary to the intention of the legislature.

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(b) The golden rule
Where the statute permits of two or more interpretations, the
court must adopt that interpretation to avoid any “manifest
absurdity” and the language may be varied or modified only
so much as is to remove the absurd result.
(c) The mischief rule
The courts try to find out the true reasons of the legislation.
The courts will ask the following questions: (i) what was the
common law before the statute; (ii) what was the mischief for
which common law did not provide; (iii) what remedy has
Parliament resolved so as to cure it; and (iv) what is the true
reason of that remedy?

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(d) The ejusdem generis rule
Where general words follow particular words, the
general words must be taken as referring to things of
the same kind as the particular words, e.g. "dogs, cats
and other animals" – the phrase “other animals”
should not be interpreted to include lions and tigers
which are not domestic animals. Similarly, a reference
to “house, office, room or other place” was held not to
include an outdoor racecourse, for “other place”
created a genus of indoor places only.

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The Department of Justice
The Department of Justice plays a significant role in
our legal system. The Department gives legal advice to
other bureaux and departments of the Government,
represents the Government in legal proceedings, drafts
government bills, makes prosecution decisions, and
promotes the rule of law. It is an important policy
objective of the Department to enhance Hong Kong's
status as a regional centre for legal services and
dispute resolution.

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Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region

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Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region
The Executive – The provisions of the Basic Law ensure
a strong Chief Executive who would take on a role much
like that previously held by the Governor of Hong Kong.
Under the Basic Law, the Chief Executive is to hold office
for a term of not more than five years and is appointed by
the Central People’s Government.
The Basic Law also provides that the Chief Executive is
to be assisted by an Executive Council. It exists to assist
the Chief Executive in making policy decisions and
should indeed be consulted by the Chief Executive
before she makes any major policy decisions.
The Chief Executive should also consult the Council
before he introduces Bills into the Legislative Council.

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The Legislature – The main work of the Legislative
Council under the Basic Law is to make and amend
legislation, to examine and approve budgets presented
by the government, to approve taxation and public
expenditure, to raise questions concerning the work of
the government, to engage in debate on matters of public
interest.
The Basic Law provides for ‘check and balance’
mechanisms between the executive and the legislature.
For example, it is provided that if the Chief Executive
refuses to assent to a Bill passed by LegCo, he may refer
it back for reconsideration. If LegCo then passess the
original Bill again by a two-thirds majority, the Chief
Executive must either sign the Bill into law or dissolve
LegCo. If LegCo is dissolved and the subsequently
elected LegCo again passes the Bill by a two-thirds
majority, the Chief Executive must either sign it or resign.

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The Judiciary – The Basic Law resulted in significant
changes to the judicial branch of power. Article 81
established a Court of Final Appeal within Hong Kong,
replacing the privy Council in London as the final court
of appeal for Hong Kong; and Art 82 gave the Court of
Final Appeal the power of final adjudication.
Furthermore, the Basic Law, in Art 85, explicitly
maintains the principle of an independent judiciary.
In terms of appointment and tenure of judges, Art 88 of
the Basic Law has provided that the Chief Executive has
the power to appoint judges but he may do so only on
the recommendation of an independent commission
composed of local judges, persons from the legal
profession and eminent persons from other sectors.

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However, these provisions have to be balanced against
Art 158 which confers the power of final interpretation of
the Basic Law in matters concerning relations between
the Hong Kong SAR and PRC to the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC).
This latter provision, especially when it is given a broad
interpretation, may be said to have potential to result in a
considerable diminution of the Hong Kong courts’ power
of final adjudication and at the same time invite the
substitution of the political perspective of the NPCSC for
the judicial perspective of the Hong Kong judiciary.

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Administrative law is the law that provides the legal
power and the legal duties of individual public bodies
and public authorities, e.g. local authority powers and
duties, of government departments.
Administrative law is the legal framework within which
public administration is carried out. It derives from the
need to create and develop a system of public
administration under law.
Since administration involves the exercise of power by
the executive arm of government, administrative law is
of constitutional and political, as well as juridical,
importance.

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There is no universally accepted definition of
administrative law, but rationally it may be held to
cover the organization, powers, duties, and functions
of public authorities of all kinds engaged in
administration; their relations with one another and
with citizens and nongovernmental bodies; legal
methods of controlling public administration; and the
rights and liabilities of officials.
One of the principal objects of administrative law is to
ensure efficient, economical, and just administration.
Red light theories – Red light theories are those which
see the aim of administrative law as being to curb state
activity so as to protect the individual.
Red light theories believe (1) that law is superior over
politics; (2) that the administrative state needs to be
kept in check; and (3) the best way to do this is
through rule based adjudication in the courts.

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Green light theories – Green light theories see
administrative law as existing to help the state meet
certain policy objectives.
They emphasize the role allotted to political institutions,
i.e. taking a ‘functionalist approach’ to the allocation of
functions.
They want to encourage efficiency in the governing
process. It basically comes down not to resisting
interventionism, but to make the policy efficient and
provide justice for individuals.
Green light theories say (1) that law is merely a type of
political discourse and is not superior to administration;
(2) that public administration is not a necessary evil but a
positive good; (3) that administrative law is not to stop
bad practices but to promote and facilitate good
administrative practices and that rule based adjudication
is not necessarily the best way to do this, and (4) that
liberty is to be promoted.

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In reality, there are many shades in between red and
green light theories, and most people occupy a middle
ground.
The focus of the discussion on red and green light
theories may give the impression that legal systems can
be described in such definite terms. However, there is
also a view put forward by some academics that systems
will usually display characteristics of both red and green
light theories. These kind of theories are categorized as
amber light theories.
Amber light theorists say that (1) law is superior to
politics – same as red; (2) that the state can successfully
be limited by law, but that it ought to be given a
controlled area of discretion; (3) that the best method of
control is through broad judicial principles such as
legality; and (4) that liberty amounts to the protection of
specific human rights.

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Moving beyond the purposes of control and facilitation,
there are other purposes behind administrative law that
help shape its scope and development:
(1) administrative law serves to command the
performance of public functions. This will often be the
case where an Ordinance places a legal duty on a
decision-maker to meet certain obligations.
(2) administrative law serves the purpose of holding the
executive accountable for the decisions they make.
(3) administrative law provides a mechanism for
participation in the processes of government.
(4) and perhaps the most important for an aggrieved
resident, administrative law serves to provide remedies
for wrongs committed by public authorities.

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Non-Judicial Controls
on Government

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Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS)
It is a system whereby all principal officials, including the
Chief Secretary for Administration, Financial Secretary,
Secretary for Justice and head of government bureaux
would no longer be politically neutral career civil
servants. Instead, they would all be political appointees
chosen by the chief executive.
Principal officials under the accountability system will
accept total responsibility and in an extreme case, they
may have to step down for serious failures relating to
their respective portfolios. They may also have to step
down for grave personal misconduct or if they cease to
be eligible under the Basic Law.

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Access to Information
Access to information is fundamental for promoting
accountability and transparency on the part of the
executive. This is regulated through the code on Access
to Information introduced in March 1995.
The Code on Access to Information provides a formal
framework for access to information held by government
departments. It defines the scope of information that will
be provided, sets out how the information will be made
available either routinely or in response to request, lays
down procedures governing its release, as well as
procedures for review or complaint.

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Public consultations and engagement
If conducted properly and with proper access to an
appropriate cross-section of the public and relevant
stakeholders, the public consultation process can:
(1) Improve the overall decision-making process
through input from a wider range of sources than are
available within the government.
(2) Improve the participative legitimacy of decisions
made on key policy areas.
(3) Improve the chances of a more rounded and
researched decision a the end of the process.

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Statutory Advisory Bodies
In certain areas of government there exist statutory and
advisory bodies which provide advisory support to the
government. These bodies may have been created by
statute or by the executive body they are assisting:
By statute – For example, the Antiquities Advisory board
古物諮詢委員會 is established pursuant to section 17 of
the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance古物及古蹟條
例(Cap. 53) provides the Antiquities Authority with
advice on the historical grading of a building or site.
By executive bodies they advise –Telecommunications
Regulatory Affairs Advisory Committee 電訊規管事務諮詢
委員會 of the telecommunications Authority and the
Transport Advisory Committee 交通諮詢委員會 of the
Transport and Housing Bureau.

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Tribunals委員會
Tribunals are intended to make up for certain limitations
that affect the operation of judicial review.
Judicial review can be expensive and time-consuming to
obtain. Judges can only review the legality or lawfulness
of a decision and not the merits of the decision, and at
the conclusion of a judicial review the judge must remit
the decision back to the original decision-maker to
reconsider.
Tribunals are intended to provide a less costly and less
time-consuming alternative to judicial remedies through
a simpler procedure. In addition, tribunals are intended
to provide a specialized form of redress as tribunals
tend to be staffed by specialists in various areas of
government and not just lawyers.

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Tribunals
Two main categories of tribunals: general and specialist.
The main general tribunal is the Administrative Appeals
Board 行政上訴委員會 which hears appeals against
government decisions made under a variety of
legislation.
Key specialist tribunals include the Immigration
Tribunal, the Social Security Appeals Board社會保障上訴
委員會and the Appeal Board Panel (Town Planning)上訴
委員團﹝城市規劃﹞.

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Office Of The Ombudsman 申訴專員公署
Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of The Ombudsman Ordinance
empowers The Ombudsman to initiate investigations of
his own volition even no complaint has been received if
he considers that any person may have sustained
injustice in consequence of maladministration of an
organisation under his purview. Such investigations are
called direct investigations.
Under the Ordinance, The Ombudsman has a wide range
of investigative powers: conducting inquiries, obtaining
information and documents, summoning witnesses and
inspecting premises of organisations under complaint.

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Office Of The Ombudsman
The Ombudsman has powers to:
(1) investigate complaints from aggrieved persons about
maladministration by the Government
departments/agencies and public bodies.
(2) investigate complaints against Government
departments/agencies for non-compliance with the Code
on Access to Information.
(3) initiate direct investigation, of his volition, into
issues of potentially wide public interest and concern.

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Direct Investigation is a proactive approach to problems
of public interest and concern. It aims at:
(1) following through matters with systemic or
widespread deficiencies which investigation of a
specific complaint may not resolve.
(2) nipping problems in the bud.
(3) resolving repeated complaints by addressing the
fundamental problems which may not be the subject of
any complaint but which may be the underlying reasons
for deficiencies.

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A direct investigation may be prompted by topical
issues of community concern, implementation of new or
revised Government policies or repeated complaints on
particular matters.
The main considerations for launching a direct
investigation include:
(1) whether the matter involved is of public interest and
concern.
(2) whether a complaint will otherwise not be actionable,
e.g. it is made anonymously or not by an aggrieved
person, where the matter is nevertheless of significant
concern to The Ombudsman because of the magnitude
or seriousness of the maladministration that may be
involved.

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(3) whether the time is opportune, weighing against the
consequences of not doing so and the public
expectations of this Office.
(4) whether there is duplication of the efforts of other
organisations.

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While The Ombudsman’s investigation shall not affect
any action taken by the organisation under complaint or
the organisation's power to take further action with
respect to any decision which is subject to the
investigation, the Ombudsman may report his findings
and make recommendations for redress or improvement
to the organisation.
Heads of organisations have a duty to report at regular
intervals their progress of implementation of The
Ombudsman's recommendations.

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Judicial Review is a review of administrative decisions or
determinations made by someone who has the power
and authority to make a certain set of decisions of
determinations.
Judicial review is a procedure by which the Court of First
Instance of the High Court exercises its supervisory
jurisdiction over the activities of administrative bodies
and inferior courts. The administrative bodies concerned
are usually government departments and those public
bodies which were set up according to certain
ordinances.
The party who applies for a judicial review is called "the
Applicant" and the party who made the decision under
dispute is called "the Respondent".

77
The first important note is that judicial review does not
aim at reviewing the merits of an administrative decision.
Instead, the court will review the relevant decision-
making process . In other words, the court will not
examine whether the decision under challenge is right or
wrong, but it will check whether there was any error
made during the decision-making process.
The second note is that the decision under review must
affect the public interest . If the subject decision only
undermines your own interest, or it is only a personal
dispute between you and the decision-maker, the court
will reject your application. An example of a personal
dispute would be an argument between you and the
decision-maker in relation to a contract term.

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The third note is that a judicial review is normally
brought to the court on at least one of the following
grounds:
The decision was made by a person who does not have
the relevant statutory authority.
The decision was made under an improper or incorrect
procedure. (For example, the decision-maker did not
observe the procedural rules as written in a particular
ordinance.)
The decision was unreasonably made. (For example, the
decision-maker failed to take into account a relevant
matter when making the decision).

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Legal Basis
of
Judicial Review

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The legal basis has a major bearing on the scope of
judicial review. If the legal basis for the court’s role
necessarily implies a limited role for judicial review, then
the courts would be unable to subject decision-makers to
a searching standard of scrutiny. If, by contrast, the legal
basis imply a broad role for the courts, then the courts
would be free to develop judicial review principles in a
way that could lead to considerable legal restriction on a
decision-maker’s discretion.
Linked to the scope of judicial review, the legal basis
should also indicate the method by which the court
approaches the task of review.
Identifying the legal basis for judicial review is important
in order to provide a justification for the court’s role.

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The ultra vires doctrine
The legislative intention approach, known as the ultra
vires doctrine, represents the proposition that a decision-
maker, on whom legislation has conferred legal powers,
must not exceed these powers.
In determining whether the decision-maker exceed their
powers, the courts will ascertain from an examination of
the legislative intent the applicable principles that define
the scope of these legal powers.
Common amongst these principles: a decision-maker
cannot act in bad faith, act with an improper statutory
purpose, ignore relevant considerations, take into
account irrelevant considerations, or behave irrationally.

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Problems with the ultra vires doctrine
First, the ultra vires doctrine is premised on there being
ascertainable legislative standards to guide the court in
establishing whether a decision-maker acted beyond
their powers. The difficulty, however, is that many
ordinances are drafted in vague and imprecise terms.
Often, statutory provisions are of such open texture that
they do not place any limits on the court’s role.
Second, the ultra vires doctrine is unable to account for
the development of judicial review over time. If the courts
are applying the intention of the legislature in each case,
then what accounts, for example, for the sudden
development of substantive legitimate expectations or
proportionality review?

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Problems with the ultra vires doctrine
Third, the ultra vires doctrine does have some semblance
of truth with respect to how the courts supervise the acts
and decisions of statutory bodies exercising statutory
powers. However, there are significant areas of
administrative activity which do not derive from a
statutory source. In this regard, the courts have also
applied principles of judicial review to (a) non-statutory
bodies and (b) bodies exercising non-statutory powers.
Fourth, if the courts are really applying legislative
intention, then how can they justify their disregard of
those statutory clauses that seek to ‘oust’ judicial review.

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The common law theory of judicial review
It is against the backdrop of the criticism of the ultra
vires doctrine that various commentators have
developed an alternative, competing foundations for
judicial review: one based on the common law
methodology of judicial decision-making and common
law values.
The common law principles are justified by reference to
the rule of law.
Implicit in the rule of law are substantive ideals such as
justice, fairness and respect for rights.

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Further development to the common law theory of
judicial review
(1) The rights-based approach – the judicial intervention
is no longer premised on the idea that the courts are
simply applying the legislative will. Their role is to
articulate principles, which should guide the exercise of
administrative action. A common element of a rights-
based approach is that the courts should whenever
possible interpret the exercise of administrative
discretion to be in conformity with fundamental rights.

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judicial review
(2) Abuse of power
When it is accepted that the public authority had the
power, however there is something about the doing it in
an individual circumstance that constitutes an abuse of
the power.
There has three grounds of review:
(a) the exercise of power for an improper purpose
(b) taking account of the irrelevant considerations or
failing to take into account of relevant ones and
(c) it must be true that no reasonable person, who was
acting in a reasonable manner at the moment in question,
could have possibly performed the action.

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judicial review
(3) Fairness
(a) Procedural fairness – The fundamental
requirements of procedural fairness are that a hearing
or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before
any decision is made.
(b) Substantive fairness – this concerns the principle of
legitimate expectation. If a representation has been
expressly made that a benefit of a substantive nature
will be granted or if any person is already in receipt of
any benefit, it will be continued and will not be
substantially varied to the disadvantage of the
recipient.

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The Limits
of
Judicial Review

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Constitutional Limits on Judicial Review
Act of State
Under Article 19 of the Basic Law: “The courts of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have no
jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and
foreign affairs.”
The rationale for excluding acts of state from judicial
review is that they are matters of policy and not of law,
with the executive in a better position than the courts to
determine where the balance lies.

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Prerogative of mercy
Article 48(12) of the Basic Law empowers the Chief
Executive ‘To pardon persons convicted of criminal
offences or commute their penalties.’ This prerogative
power can have the effect of relieving a prisoner from
the punishment, either freely or conditionally, which
may follow criminal conviction.
This prerogative is used as a means of correcting
miscarriages of justice when the appellate courts could
not, such as where exculpatory evidence was
inadmissible, or for summary convictions, which at that
time circumstances where the criminal trial and appeal
system produces a result that the public interest cannot
sustain.

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Policy formulation
Article 62 of the Basic Law confers constitutional
authority on the executive ‘To formulate and implement
policies’, which includes the power to ‘To conduct
administrative affairs’.
In formulating policy, especially that which has broad
social and economic implications, the executive will
have to take into account a wide range of factors and
interests to arrive at the chosen policy.

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Statutory Limits on Judicial Review
Time limit clauses
Time limit clauses serve the purpose of limiting the
period of time to seek a remedy for a public law breach.
If the applicant failed to seek judicial redress within the
required time then their application will be statute-
barred. An application for judicial review must be made
promptly and in any event within three months after the
grounds to make a claim first arose.
Yet, time limit clauses that appear in legislation will
often shorten this period, taking into account the needs
for expeditious and final decisions in a particular area of
public decision-making. For example, there is a seven-
day statutory time limit to lodge a petition to challenge
the validity the Chief Executive’s election.

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Statutory Limits on Judicial Review
Ouster clauses – An ouster clause is a statutory
provision that seeks to remove the court’s power to
review and grant remedies.
Examples:
Housing Ordinance (Cap. 283), Section 19(3): No court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any application for relief
by or on behalf of a person whose lease has been
terminated under subsection (1) in connection with such
termination.
Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap.
380), Section 20: No decision of the Commissioner or
the Board made in exercise of any discretion under this
part shall be challenged in any court.

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Certiorari (Quashing Order)
A quashing order nullifies a decision which has been
made by a public body. The effect is to make the
decision completely invalid. Such an order is usually
made where an authority has acted outside the scope of
its powers (‘ultra vires’). The most common order made
in successful judicial review proceedings is a quashing
order.
If the court makes a quashing order it can send the case
back to the original decision maker directing it to
remake the decision in light of the court’s findings. Or,
very rarely, if there is no purpose in sending the case
back, it may make the decision itself.

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Prohibition (Prohibiting Order)
A prohibiting order is similar to a quashing order in that
it prevents a tribunal or authority from acting beyond
the scope of its powers. The key difference is that a
prohibiting order acts prospectively by telling an
authority not to do something in contemplation.
Examples of where prohibiting orders may be
appropriate include stopping the implementation of a
decision in breach of natural justice, or to prevent a
local authority licensing indecent films, or to prevent the
deportation of someone whose immigration status has
been wrongly decided.

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Mandamus (Mandatory Order)
A mandatory order compels public authorities to fulfil
their duties. Whereas quashing and prohibition orders
deal with wrongful acts, a mandatory order addresses
wrongful failure to act. A mandatory order is similar to a
mandatory injunction as they are orders from the court
requiring an act to be performed. Failure to comply is
punishable as a contempt of court.
A mandatory order may be made in conjunction with a
quashing order, for example, where a local authority’s
decision is quashed because the decision was made
outside its powers, the court may simultaneously order
the court to remake the decision within the scope of its
powers.

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Declaration
A declaration is a judgment by the Administrative Court
which clarifies the respective rights and obligations of
the parties to the proceedings, without actually making
any order. Unlike the remedies of quashing, prohibiting
and mandatory order the court is not telling the parties
to do anything in a declaratory judgment.
For example, if the court declared that a proposed rule
by a local authority was unlawful, a declaration would
resolve the legal position of the parties in the
proceedings. Subsequently, if the authority were to
proceed ignoring the declaration, the applicant who
obtained the declaration would not have to comply with
the unlawful rule and the quashing, prohibiting and
mandatory orders would be available.

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Injunction
An injunction is an order made by the court to stop a
public body from acting in an unlawful way. Less
commonly, an injunction can be mandatory, that is, it
compels a public body to do something.
Where there is an imminent risk of damage or loss, and
other remedies would not be sufficient, the court may
grant an interim injunction to protect the position of the
parties before going to a full hearing. If an interim in
injunction is granted pending final hearing, it is possible
that the side which benefits from the injunction will be
asked to give an undertaking that if the other side is
successful at the final hearing, the party which had the
benefit of the interim protection can compensate the
other party for its losses.

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Damages
Damages are available as a remedy in judicial review in
limited circumstances. Compensation is not available
merely because a public authority has acted unlawfully.
For damages to be available there must be a recognised
‘private’ law cause of action such as negligence or
breach of statutory duty .

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Discretion
The discretionary nature of the remedies outlined above
means that even if a court finds a public body has acted
wrongly, it does not have to grant any remedy.
Examples of where discretion will be exercised against
an applicant may include where the applicant’s own
conduct has been unmeritorious or unreasonable, for
example where the applicant has unreasonably delayed
in applying for judicial review, where the applicant has
not acted in good faith, where a remedy would impede
the an authority’s ability to deliver fair administration, or
where the judge considers that an alternative remedy
could have been pursued.

102
Grounds
of
Judicial Review

104
What is procedural fairness?
Procedural fairness is concerned with the procedures
used by a decision-maker, rather than the actual
outcome reached. It requires a fair and proper procedure
be used when making a decision.
The rules of procedural fairness do not need to be
followed in all government decision-making. They
mainly apply to decisions that negatively affect an
existing interest of a person or corporation. For
instance, procedural fairness would apply to a decision
to cancel a licence or benefit; to discipline an employee;
to impose a penalty; or to publish a report that damages
a person’s reputation.
Procedural fairness also applies where a person has a
legitimate expectation. It protects legitimate
expectations as well as legal rights. It is less likely to
apply to routine administration and policy-making.

105
The duty to accord procedural fairness consists of three
key rules:
(1) the fair hearing rule – which requires a decision-
maker to accord a person who may be adversely
affected by a decision an opportunity to present his or
her case;
(2) the rule against bias – which requires a decision-
maker not to have an interest in the matter to be
decided and not to appear to bring a prejudiced mind
to the matter; and
(3) the "no evidence" rule – which requires a decision
to be based upon logically probative evidence.

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When should the rules of procedural fairness be observed?
 There is a presumption in law that the rules of procedural
fairness must be observed in exercising statutory power that
could affect the rights, interests or legitimate expectations of
individuals. However, it is good practice to observe these
rules whether or not the power being exercised is statutory.
 If action being taken by a public official or by or on behalf of a
public sector agency will not directly affect a person’s rights
or interests, there is no obligation to inform the other person
of the substance of any allegations or other matters in issue.
 However, if an investigation will lead to findings and
recommendations about the matter, the investigator should
provide natural justice to the person against whom allegations
have been made. Similarly, the person who ultimately makes a
decision on the basis of the investigation report must also
provide natural justice, by allowing the person adversely
commented upon to make submissions regarding the
proposed decision and sanction.

107
What are the rules of procedural fairness?
 Any person who decides any matter without hearing both
sides, though that person may have rightly decided, has not
done justice. Any person whose rights, interests or legitimate
expectations will be affected by a decision or finding is
entitled to an adequate opportunity of being heard. In order to
properly present their case, the person is entitled to know the
grounds on which that decision or finding is to be taken.
 Depending on the circumstances which apply, natural justice
may require a decision-maker to:
• inform any person:
– whose interests are or are likely to be adversely affected by
a decision, about the decision that is to be made and any case
they need to make, answer or address
– who is the subject of an investigation (at an appropriate
time) of the substance of any allegations against them or the
grounds for any proposed adverse comment in respect of
them.

108
• provide such persons with a reasonable opportunity to put
their case, or to explain to the decision-maker, whether in
writing, at a hearing or otherwise, why contemplated action
should not be taken or a particular decision should or should
not be made.
• consider those submissions.
• make reasonable inquiries or investigations and ensure that
a decision is based upon findings of fact that are in turn based
upon sound reasoning and relevant evidence.
• act fairly and without bias in making decisions, including
ensuring that no person decides a case in which they have
direct interest.
• conduct an investigation or address an issue without undue
delay.

109
Benefits for persons whose rights or interests may be
affected
Procedural fairness allows persons whose rights or
interests may be affected by decisions the opportunity:
(a) to put forward arguments in their favour.
(b) to explain why proposed action should not be taken.
(c) to deny allegations.
(d) to call evidence to rebut allegations or claims.
(e) to explain allegations or present an innocent
explanation.
(f) to provide mitigating circumstances.

110
Benefits for investigators and decision-makers
While procedural fairness is, at law, a safeguard
applying to the individual whose rights or interests are
being affected, an investigator or decision-maker should
not regard such obligations as a burden or impediment
to an investigation or decision-making process.
Procedural fairness can be an integral element of a
professional decision-making or investigative process –
one that benefits the investigator or decision-maker as
well as the person whose rights or interests may be
affected.

111
Fair Hearing Rule
The hearing rule requires a decision-maker to inform a person
of the case against them and provide them with an
opportunity to be heard. The extent of the obligation on the
decision-maker depends on the relevant statutory framework
and on what is fair in all the circumstances.
Components of a ‘fair hearing’:
1. Right to notice;
2. Right to present case and evidence or right for a ‘hearing’;
3. Right to know the evidence against him;
4. Right to challenge the opposing case;
5. Legal Representation; and
6. The duty to provide adequate reasons.

112
Right to notice
The parties likely to be affected by a decision are given
sufficient advanced notice of any proposed action taken by
the authority.
The basic principle underlying the notice requirement is that
persons affected by decisions should not be taken by
surprise. Notice is required so that affected persons can at
least attend the hearing, and if they wish to argue their case.
This entails knowing the case against them or their interests,
including the disclosure of all materials that are relevant to the
charges made against them.
The notice should be sufficiently clear so that the affected
parties can prepare their case, which may include disclosure
of all documents pertinent to the authority’s case.

113
Right to present case and evidence or right for a
‘hearing’
The adjudicatory authority must provide the party a
reasonable opportunity to present his case. This can be
done either orally or in written. The requirement of
natural justice is not met if the party is not given the
opportunity to represent in view of the proposed action.
In this respect, the most obvious way for individuals to
participate in the decision making process is through an
oral hearing.
An oral hearing provides an affected individual with an
important mechanism to put their case effectively and is
often a prerequisite for other procedural safeguards,
including the right to cross-examination.

114
Right to know the evidence against him
Every person appears before an administrative authority
exercising adjudicatory powers has right to know the
evidence to be used against him.
The principle of natural justice is so fundamental that it
is not to be construed as a mere formality. Where the
material relied upon are not enclosed in an order issued
for explanation on the incident, misconduct etc, there is
no sufficient opportunity.

115
Right to challenge the opposing case
The fair hearing rule also requires that an affected party
be able to challenge the opposition case, including the
right to cross-examination witnesses.
Denying an accused a fair opportunity of cross-
examining as to credit of a witness was a form of
‘procedural impropriety’ sufficiently serious to justify
the court coming to the conclusion that there had been
a substantial denial of natural justice.

116
Legal representation
Whether legal representation is permitted depends on
the circumstances of each case. The issues to be taken
into account include:
1. Seriousness of the sanctions;
2. Difficult points of law exist;
3. The respondents are laymen who will not be able
properly to present their own cases;
4. There is no equality of arms;
5. There is a material dispute of facts so that cross-
examination is required.

117
The duty to provide adequate reasons
Reasons help demonstrate that the authority has acted
properly and taken into account all relevant considerations.
Reasons promote accountability and enhance consistency in
decision-making. Where the authority does not give reasons
for its decisions, it would prevent the affected party from
detecting any faults in the reasoning process that may in turn
support a claim for administrative or judicial review.
Further, providing reasons is also of benefit to the authority
itself in that it serves to concentrate its attention on the
relevant issues.
If there is a duty to give reasons, it is necessary that they are
adequate, intelligible and address the substantial points that
have arisen in making the decision.

118
Rule Against Bias
Bias means an operative prejudice, whether conscious or
unconscious, as result of some preconceived opinion or
predisposition, in relation to a party or an issue. Dictionary
meaning of the term bias suggests anything which tends a
person to decide a case other than on the basis of evidence.
This principle of natural justice consists of the rule against
bias or interest and is based on the following maxims:
(1) No man shall be a judge in his own cause.
(2) Justice should not only be done, but manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done.
(3) Judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.

119
No man shall be a judge in his own cause
A discretionary authority cannot decide a case in which
he himself is involved, or if he has any personal favour
to be done. He has to be impartial and fair in his
decision-making. His decision should not be affected by
any preconceived views about that matter.
Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done.
This is not about the proceedings being visible from a
public gallery. It means there must be nothing in the
appearance of what happens in a trial that might create
an impression that something improper happened.

120
Judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above
suspicion
This maxim comes from a story that Julius Caesar
divorced his wife because of rumors of opprobrious
behavior. At trial, Caesar said he knew nothing about his
wife’s rumored adultery, but asserted that he divorced
her because his wife “ought not even be under
suspicion”.
In a sense, what Caesar was asserting was that he
would not allow his wife’s suspected behaviors to sully
his status, reputation, and prestige. At the time, Caesar
was a powerful and ambitious political player, and he
did not want his career thwarted by rumors of his mate’s
unreputed behavior.

121
There are three types of bias:
1. Pecuniary bias – the administrative authority
exercising quasi-judicial function should not have any
pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
Even the lease pecuniary interest in the cause will
disqualify the authority from acting as a judge.
2. Personal bias – personal bias may arise by means of
friendship, relationship, enmity, personal grudge or
professional rivalry. A person who is a relative, friend or
enemy of disputing parties is disqualified from acting as
a judge.
3. Bias as to subject matter – if the authority that has the
power to decide a dispute has some general interest in
the subject of the dispute, he is disqualified from acting
as a judge. The quasi-judicial authority should not have
any interest in the subject matter of the dispute.

122
‘Actual Bias’ and ‘Apparent Bias’
‘Actual Bias’
A claim of actual bias requires proof that the decision-
maker approached the issues with a closed mind or had
prejudged the matter and, for reasons of either partiality
in favour of a party or some form of prejudice affecting
the decision, could not be swayed by the evidence in the
case at hand.
Actual bias is assessed by reference to conclusions that
may be reasonably drawn from evidence about the
actual views and behaviour of the decision-maker.
A claim of actual bias requires clear and direct evidence
that the decision-maker was in fact biased. Actual bias
will not be made out by suspicions, possibilities or other
such equivocal evidence.

123
‘Actual Bias’ and ‘Apparent Bias’
‘Apparent Bias’
A claim of apparent bias requires a finding that a fair
minded and reasonably well informed observer might
conclude that the decision-maker did not approach the
issue with an open mind.
Apparent bias is assessed objectively, by reference to
conclusions that may be reasonably drawn about what
an observer might conclude about the possible views
and behaviour of the decision-maker.
A claim of apparent bias requires considerably less
evidence. A court need only be satisfied that a fair
minded and informed observer might conclude there
was a real possibility that the decision-maker was not
impartial.

124
Exceptions to the rule against bias
1. Statutory override – statutory provisions may override the
rule against bias. However, the courts will not readily find
such a statutory override unless this is clear.
2. Necessity – this common law rule principle demands in
reality and in all practicality the impossibility to require
someone else other than the complained person to hear the
matter. Mere administrative inconvenience does not suffice. In
other words, the rule against bias will not apply where the
impugned decision maker is the only one who can make the
decision.
3. Waiver – for waiver to be established there must be (a)
knowledge of the bias and (b) the person affected must be
aware that they are entitled to make an objection. The
objection must be raised as soon as the party is aware of the
nature and extent of the bias. They cannot stand by and wait
until a final judgment is given.

125
Leung Fuk Wah Oil v. Commissioner of Police
CACV 2744/2001
Leung was a sergeant of the Hong Kong Police. He was
in serious financial difficulties. He was charged with two
disciplinary offences, pursuant to section 3(2)(e) of the
Police (Discipline) Regulations for failing to be prudent
in his financial affairs by incurring unmanageable size of
debts whereby his efficiency as a police officer was
impaired.
A disciplinary hearing took place in early 1999. A
Superintendent was appointed as the appropriate
Tribunal. Leung was found guilty of the offence on 28
March 1999.
The Tribunal then referred the punishment to a Senior
Police Officer who imposed a penalty of reduction to the
rank of police constable and dismissal from the force.

126
The Force Disciplinary Officer confirmed the finding of
guilt and penalty.
Leung then appealed to the Commissioner of Police.
The Deputy Commissioner of Police exercising the
delegated authority of the Commissioner dismissed the
appeal.
Leung applied for judicial review to quash the decisions
of the Tribunal, the Senior Police Officer and the Deputy
Commissioner of Police on the ground that certain
documents considered by the Deputy Commissioner
were not disclosed to him.
Decision of the Court of Appeal:
“Fairness requires the material to be disclosed so that
the appellant may have a chance to respond to it.…the
judge was right when he considered that the material
needed to be disclosed as a matter of fairness…The
real question in this appeal is whether the
nondisclosure vitiates the decision of the
Commissioner and requires it to be quashed.

127
…Having considered all the circumstances of this case,
it is abundantly clear that the disclosure of the new
documents to Mr. Leung would not have made the
slightest difference to his petition to the Commissioner…
Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. If the breach of
the principle of fairness does not produce a substantial
prejudice to the applicant, the court is bound to take this
into account in deciding whether relief should be given.
This is consistent with the concept that the court should
not substitute its own decision for that of the decision-
maker.”

128
Lau Tak-pui v. Immigration Tribunal [1992] 1 HKLR 374
The Immigration Tribunal established under the Immigration
Ordinance in exercising its power under section 53D of the
Ordinance determined that Lau had not been born in Hong
Kong, that the removal order made by the Deputy Director of
Immigration was therefore valid and that his appeal against
such orders should be dismissed.
There is no express provision requiring the Tribunal to give
reason.
The Tribunal did make a statement explaining the ground for
its decision as follows:
“After careful consideration of the evidence given by all
parties concerned and by the witnesses presented, the
Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the Appellants,
have not discharged the burden of proof that they were born
in Hong Kong and therefore do not enjoy the right of abode
in Hong Kong under section 2A of the Immigration
Ordinance. The appeal is dismissed.”

129
The issues to be considered:
• Should the principles of natural justice be applicable
in this case?
• Was there a duty to give reason?
• Was that reason an adequate one?
“Hong Kong Immigration Tribunal was and is a fully
judicial and non-domestic body when hearing such
appeals … it exercises powers affecting the liberty and
residential and citizenship rights of appellants
pursuant to statutory provisions of some complexity.
These are special circumstances which…require as a
matter of fairness the provision of outline reasons
showing to what issues the Tribunal has directed its
mind and the evidence upon which it has based its
conclusions.

130
Turning then to the adequacy of the reasons given in
the respective appeals they show that the only issue
…fell for their determination, namely the appellant’s
places of birth, had been addressed and, by necessary
implication, that all the evidence germane to that issue
had been considered.
The conclusion that the applicants had not been born
in Hong Kong was the basis of fact upon which the
Tribunal determined that they did not enjoy a right of
abode in the Colony.
The requirements, being a statement of the grounds
for the findings, and of natural justice, being at least
as stringent as any which may derive from the terms of
s 53D, were met. It is not suggested that either
determination was aberrant on its face.

131
Mohamed Yaqub Khan v. Attorney General [1986] HKLR 922
Khan, a Superintendent of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police
Force, was dismissed by the Commissioner of Police on the
ground of his misconduct. Khan was not informed of the
actual allegations against him.
• Should the principles of natural justice be applicable in
this case.
The Court:
“…in cases where an officer can only be dismissed for
cause…the requirements of natural justice will depend upon
the reason which in fact underlies his dismissal. At the very
least, we would think he is entitled to know the reason for
his dismissal.
…we have come to the conclusion …to dismiss Mr. Khan
were matters of misconduct…we therefore conclude that in
the circumstances Mr. Khan ought to have been informed of
the contents of that memorandum and given the opportunity
to make representations in answer.”

132
Wong Pun Cheuk v. Medical Council [1964] HKLR 477
The Director of Medical and Health Services referred a
case against Wong, a medical practitioner, for
prescribing drugs not required for the purpose of
medical treatment to the Medical Council.
The Medical Council of Hong Kong decided to
withdraw the authorization to prescribe drugs from
Wong after an inquiry.
The Director of Medical and Health Services chaired
the Medical Council in this inquiry.
The issue to be considered by the Court: is there any
Bias?

133
Decision of the Court:
“…it is clear that the Director....is in the position of a
complainant or accuser, having presumably previously
gone into the evidence available in order to form the
relevant opinion, and being of the relevant opinion
refers the case for decision to the Medical Council.
At the hearing of the inquiry the decision on the case
as to whether or not to make the relevant
recommendation is made by the Medical Council, and
therefore the members of the Council are the judges of
the case, and have to adjudge whether or not the
recommendation should be made.
It is also clear that the Director is not only a member of
the Medical Council but he is also its chairman…. This
seems to me to be contrary to the legal principle that a
person should not be a judge in his own cause, ... and
it therefore appears to me to be unjust.”

134
Lam Sze Ming and Another v. Commissioner of Police CACV
912/2000
Lam, Au and Lai, were police officers.
They were arrested together with Cheung and Kong in an
police action against illegal gambling. Lam was charged with
gambling in a gambling establishment.
No evidence was offered against Au and Lai for they were
willing to give evidence as persecution witnesses against
Cheung and Kong who were charged with more serious
gambling related offences.
Lam was acquitted and Cheung and Kong were convicted.
Lam was then charged in the police disciplinary
proceedings that he had committed conduct calculated to
bring the Public Service into disrepute.
The conduct complained of was that he frequented the
premises for the purpose of unlawful gambling.

135
For the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings, Lam
was provided with the charge sheet; a list of
witnesses, a list of exhibits, statements made by Au
and Lai to the police during interrogation and a bundle
of photographs.
However, the following documents were not provided:
(i) statements made by Au and Lai under caution at the
time of their arrest;
(ii) the transcript of court proceedings;
(iii) an immunity document and all negotiation relating
to negotiations between the prosecution and Au and
Lai were not released to Lam.
Lam was found guilty and was dismissed.
Lam applied for judicial review against the decision.
The issue to be considered by the Court: must these
documents be disclosed?

136
“The test to be applied in determining whether
disclosure should be made…material…
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in a
case;
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue, whose
existence is not apparent from
the evidence the prosecution proposes to use;
(3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect
of providing a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or
(2).
The primary duty is to disclose the material which has
been gathered by the prosecution in the course of its
investigation. It does not follow that only such material
need be disclosed. There may be other material.”

137
…applying the primary duty principle to the
documents not disclosed in this case, I am satisfied,
firstly, in relation to (ii) to (iii), that…failure to disclose
does not amount to a breach of natural justice
resulting in an unfair trial.…
The District Court transcript was made available in the
sense that the applicants were fully aware of its
existence and were advised as to how they could
acquire a copy. The immunity documents concerned
only the District Court proceedings.
The terms of the witnesses’ immunity in giving
evidence against four other defendants in different
proceedings could not, in my judgment, be of such
relevance to the disciplinary proceedings to the extent
that a failure to disclose them would or might result in
justice not being done.

138
…in relation to (i) above, I am…satisfied that
nondisclosure does not amount to a breach of natural
justice for the purpose of these proceedings…
the applicants’ complaint amounts to a failure by the
Prosecutor to seek out and collect material which did
not form part of her case. This was not her duty. It
cannot be said, in this case, that her failure to do
something which she was under no duty to do,
amounts to unfair conduct or a breach of natural
justice.

139
Lam Siu Po v. Commissioner of Police FACV No. 9 of
2008
A police constable, Lam, engaged in stock market
dealings. He lost heavily, found himself deeply in debt,
petitioned for his own bankruptcy and was adjudicated
bankrupt in September 2000.
Consequently he was charged in December that year
with a disciplinary offence.
There were two disciplinary hearings.
The first hearing ended in Lam being convicted on 2
March 2001. But that conviction was set aside by the
Force Discipline Officer for procedural irregularity.
The police officer who had represented the appellant
at the first hearing was not available at the second
hearing, which commenced on 14 December 2001.

140
That police officer was replaced by Lam’s another
representative. But Lam lost confidence in that replacement.
And after being told that he could not engage a legal
practitioner to defend him, the appellant appeared in person at
the second hearing.
Regulation 9(11) and (12) of the Police (Discipline) Regulations
provided that:
“(11) A defaulter may be represented by –(a) an inspector or
other junior police officer of his choice; or (b) any other police
officer of his choice who is qualified as a barrister or solicitor,
who may conduct the defence on his behalf. (12) Subject to
paragraph (11), no barrister or solicitor may appear on behalf
of the defaulter.“
On 27 March 2002 Lam was again convicted. The penalty
imposed on him was compulsory retirement with deferred
benefits.
Whether the absolute bar to legal representation is
constitutional?

141
Article 10 of Bill of Rights Ordinance provides that:
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.”
The Court of Final Appeal:
Article 10 protections come into play…when a person
is subject to “a determination of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law”.
When it is engaged, it enables the individual faced with
a determination by a governmental or public authority
which may affect his civil rights and obligations to
say: “I am entitled to the protections of Article 10,
including the right to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law”.

142
In my view, Article 10 is clearly engaged in relation to the
disciplinary proceedings in present case. The
Administrative Instructions…make it clear that
punishment for the disciplinary…which the appellant
was charged is “normally terminatory”. Such was in fact
the nature of the punishment meted out in this case.
Where Article 10 is engaged, the person concerned
becomes entitled to “a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law”.
Regulations 9(11) and 9(12) are therefore systemically
incompatible with Article 10. Pursuant to section 6(1) of
the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the Court is empowered to
make such order in respect of this violation of the Bill of
Rights as it considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.

143
The Court concludes that:
(a) Article 10 is engaged in respect of the appellant’s
disciplinary proceedings.
(b) The requirement of a fair hearing means that the
disciplinary tribunal ought to have considered
permitting the appellant to be legally represented.
(c) Regulations 9(11) and 9(12) are inconsistent with
Article 10 and must be declared unconstitutional, null
and void.
(d) Since the tribunal failed to consider and, if
appropriate, to permit legal representation for the
appellant, he was deprived of a fair hearing in
accordance with Article 10 so that the disciplinary
proceedings were unlawful and the resulting
convictions and sentences must be quashed.

144
Hui Wei Lee v The Medical Council of Hong Kong
CACV114/1993
Hui, a registered medical practitioner, had a charge of
misconduct in a professional respect found proved
against her by the Medical Council. She was removed
from the register for a period of 18 months.
An undercover woman detective police constable, Yu,
gave evidence that, at Hui’s clinic, on the occasion of
the last of her three visits to that clinic, Hui agreed to
perform an illegal abortion on her for $2,000, and had
gone so far as to instruct her to lie down on a bed for
her to be anesthetized for that abortion. Hui denied
agreeing to perform an abortion on Yu. Her reason for
asking Yu to lie on the bed was “trying to cheat her
into permitting me to try to find out what was wrong
with her ...”.
During the disciplinary hearing, the Medical Council
excluded evidence put forward by Hui.

145
The evidence, which was excluded, was of telephone
conversations between Hui and two doctors, one of them a
colleague who used the clinic and the other a surgeon to
whom she from time to time referred patients.
Their testimony, it was said, would have been of telephone
conversations with Hui after Yu’s second visit to Hui’s clinic
but before the last one.
They would say that Hui had told them that she had a
strange patient whom she suspected was not really
pregnant but might have a psychological problem, and that
she intended to induce her to submit to a physical
examination with a view to seeing what the real problem
was.
Apart from the testimony of these two, the excluded
evidence would have included Hui’s own evidence of the
conversations.
Hui applied for judicial review against the decision of the
Medical Council.
The issue to be considered by the court: Is there any breach
of the rule of fair hearing?

146
“It seems to be perfectly legitimate to take the view -
and indeed it may be inevitable to take the view - that a
doctor, in the management of his or her patients, will
sometimes consult colleagues.
The excluded evidence was to be a part of the
explanation which the appellant was offering for rather
strange conduct on her part, which certainly called for
an explanation.
What passed between her and her colleagues in regard
to WDPC Leung would be a part of a course of
dealings. And what passed between her and WDPC
Leung was likewise a part of that course of dealings.

147
In the circumstances, the evidence which was
excluded was admissible as part of the things done. Its
exclusion was therefore wrong in law.
Now, if evidence which was wrongly excluded was
incapable of making any difference to the result, then
of course its exclusion would not affect the result. But
it seems to me quite impossible to say that this
evidence could not have made any difference to the
result. …
Therefore, its wrongful exclusion is fatal to the
Council‘s finding against the appellant and to the
order made against her pursuant to that finding.”

149
A decision is illegal if:
(a) it contravenes or exceeds the terms of the power
which authorizes the making of the decision; or
(b) it pursues an objective other than that for which the
power to make the decision was conferred.
In examining whether the decision-maker has strayed
outside the purposes defined by the enabling statute,
the courts enforce the rule of law which requires
administrative bodies to act within the bounds of the
powers they have been given.

150
Excess of Power
If an applicant challenges a decision as being illegal
because the decision-maker has acted in excess of his
power, the applicant is claiming that the decision-maker
has gone beyond the scope of the powers granted to
him. Thus, even if the decision-maker is acting so as to
achieve the overall purpose of the legislation which
confers power on him, he may only act within the limits
of his statutory powers. To do otherwise is to render his
decision illegal.
The concept of illegality due to acting in excess of one’s
powers sits squarely within the idea of ultra vires: the
decision maker must exercise only the powers which
have been granted to him by law. He may not act outside
of those powers.

151
Improper Purpose
Where a statute confers a power on a decision maker,
the decision maker must use that power for a purpose
intended by the power-conferring statute. If he exercises
the power to achieve a different purpose, the courts may
find that the decision made in the exercise of his power
illegal.
The courts have long upheld the view that a decision
will be illegal if it does not promote the proper purpose
for which the decision-making power was granted. In
doing so, the courts recognize that not only is the extent
of the power significant but the intention of the
legislature in conferring the power is also of relevance
when considering the legality of the exercise of that
power.

152
Relevant and Irrelevant Considerations
In order to exercise power legally, a decision maker
should take relevant considerations into account and
refrain from taking irrelevant considerations into
account when coming to his decision.
If an irrelevant consideration has been taken into
account, this will not automatically result the court
finding the decision to be illegal. Rather, the court will
consider whether the irrelevant consideration resulted
in the decision maker coming to a decision other than
that which he would have made had he not taken the
irrelevant consideration into account. In order to
determine what is a relevant consideration, the courts
will have regard to the power-conferring legislation as a
whole and the specific purposes for which the power
was conferred on the decision-maker.

153
Fettering Discretion
Fettering of discretion occurs when, rather than exercising its
discretion to decide the individual matter before it, an
administrative body binds itself to policy or to the views of
others.
Although an administrative decision-maker may properly be
influenced by policy considerations and other factors, he
must put his mind to the specific circumstances of the case
and not focus blindly on a particular policy to the exclusion of
other relevant factors.
Fettering of discretion occurs when a decision-maker does
not genuinely exercise independent judgment in a matter. This
can occur, for example, if the decision-maker binds itself to a
particular policy or another person’s opinion. If a decision-
maker fetters its discretion by policy, this can also amount to
an abuse of discretion. Similarly, it is an abuse of discretion
for a decision-maker to permit others to dictate its judgment.

154
Wrongful Delegation of Power
When the decision-making power has been
conferred upon a specific person, any decision will
be illegal if it is instead made by another to whom
that power has been delegated without lawful
authorization.
As a general principle, where power is conferred on
a named person or holder of an office, that person
should exercise the power granted to him, and no
one else.

155
Error of Law and Jurisdiction
Whether a decision-maker has jurisdiction to make a
particular decision will give rise to a consideration of
whether the decision-maker has acted within his
power, that is intra vires, and therefore legal. A
decision-maker may be deemed not to have
jurisdiction to act where he has in fact acted ultra
vires. He may have been ultra vires by virtue of
making an error as to the meaning and scope of the
relevant power conferring law.
If a decision-maker does not have jurisdiction to
make a decision, then any determination he comes
to will bee deemed nullity; that is, his decision will
simply not exist and therefore can have no effect.

156
Error of Fact
The traditional position had been that errors of fact
would not be reviewable by the courts, unless the
error of fact could be said to bring the decision
under challenge within the ambit of one of the three
established grounds for review: illegality,
irrationality or procedural impropriety.
If the error of fact under challenge could not be fitted
into one of these three traditional grounds of review,
then a mistake by the decision-maker as to a fact
traditionally would not of itself constitute a ground
for review, even if injustice occurred as a result.

157
Vallejos Evangeline Banao v. Commissioner of Registration and
Another [2013] HKEC 429
The appellants in Vallejos were two foreign domestic helpers who
have lived in Hong Kong for over 20 years. Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic
Law recognizes non-Chinese nationals as permanent residents if they
meet certain criteria, including if they have “ordinarily resided” in
Hong Kong continuously for at least 7 years.
Ms. Vallejos and Mr. Domingo had applied, unsuccessfully, to obtain
permanent identity cards. In refusing their applications, the
Commissioner of Registration relied on Section 2(4)(a)(vi) in the
Immigration Ordinance which states that foreign domestic helpers
shall not be treated as “ordinarily resident“, with the effect of
preventing them from becoming permanent residents. Ms. Vallejos
and Mr. Domingo challenged the constitutional validity of this
legislation, arguing that it is inconsistent with the meaning of
“ordinarily resided” in Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law.
At its heart, Vallejos called for (i) an understanding of the term
“ordinarily resided” used in Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law and,
applying that understanding, (ii) a judgment as to whether the
applicants in fact ordinarily resided in Hong Kong. If the applicants did
in fact ordinarily reside here, then the immigration legislation would be
invalid for inconsistency with the Basic Law.

158
CFA’s application of its understanding to the facts – helpers
are not ordinarily resident
Taking into account the various immigration controls imposed
on foreign domestic helpers, the CFA found it clear that their
residence is so far-removed from a traditional understanding of
ordinarily resident, as to justify concluding that foreign
domestic helpers are not ordinarily resident in Hong Kong.
Accordingly, it held the immigration legislation is consistent
with Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law and constitutionally valid.
Immigration powers under Article 154 of the Basic Law
The Court did not doubt the legality of any of the immigration
controls imposed on foreign domestic helpers, even though it
described them as “highly restrictive conditions”. It went on to
state that these conditions are consistent with Article 154(2) of
the Basic Law, which provides that the Hong Kong government
“may apply immigration controls on entry into, stay in and
departure from the Region”.

159
Article 154(2) unquestionably permits the immigration
control that helpers must return to their home country at
the end of each contract, as well as similar controls on
their entry, exit, and duration of stay.
In Vallejos, the CFA stated that Article 154(2) enables the
government to “impose conditions on the entry of a
person which will materially affect the quality of his
[lawful] residence in Hong Kong”. Expressed in this
way, Article 154(2) is a potentially powerful limit to
constitutional rights of non-permanent residents,
including and beyond the right of abode in Article 24. It is
important for the Court to indicate the limits of what and
whom the government can control as a matter of
“immigration”.

161
Definition
In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister
for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374), Lord Diplock said
that a decision would be irrational—and so unlawful—if it
were:
“so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived
at it.”

162
Standard of test - Wednesbury unreasonableness test
The term came from the 1948 case of Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. the Wednesbury
Corporation. The test is:
“If a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable
that no reasonable authority could ever had come to it,
then the courts can interfere… but to prove a case of
that kind would require something overwhelming.”
The standard was established as a direct result of the
court’s decision to only correct poor administrative
decisions on the grounds that they were fundamentally
irrational. Lord Diplock, the judge, stated that a decision
will only be corrected when it is “so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the
question would have arrived at it.”

163
Standard of test - Wednesbury unreasonableness test
This unreasonableness test is usually applied to
applications for judicial review featuring a public
authority's decision. In order for a particular act to be
Wednesbury unreasonable, it must be true that no
reasonable person, who was acting in a reasonable
manner at the moment in question, could have possibly
performed the action. Acts which are deemed
Wednesbury unreasonable are thought to be irrational.
Should an act be deemed Wednesbury unreasonable, the
courts may be motivated to correct the act. Only the most
extreme cases of unreasonable acts can pass the
Wednesbury unreasonableness test, so very few courts
have acted to correct the initial decision of the public
official.

164
In the matter of the an application by Ko Mei Chun for
leave to apply for Judicial Review (1996, No. M.P. 1112)
The Applicant was a court reporter. She had been
awarded a long meritorious service certificate after 21
years of service. She was ordered to be compulsorily
retired with deferred pension from the civil service by the
Secretary for the Civil Service (公務員事務局局長). Her
alleged misconduct was failing to comply with her
supervisor's order to report to her supervisor's office for
duty in the morning and after lunch. That misconduct
lasted 2 months. The Applicant was among one of the few
court reporters who were required to report. There was
no evidence showing that The Applicant’s alleged
misconduct had in any way affected her performance as a
court reporter.
Was the decision of the Secretary for the Civil Service
valid?

165
The Court: “…it seems to me manifestly unfair and
unreasonable that the decision compulsorily to retire the
Applicant should be made. A consideration of the matters
which were admitted in the context in which they
occurred, should itself have given rise to a decision to
apply a less serious penalty.
Furthermore, the tenor of the findings and of the
evidence in relation to them suggest that the
investigation committee would not themselves have
concluded that these were, on these facts and in this
context, matters serious enough to justify the second
most serious penalty.
…In my view, it would be entirely unreasonable to impose
the second most serious penalty in respect of that
particular matter…in this case the penalty was wholly
disproportionate to the offence.”

166
Judicial review of administrative discretion
Discretion is the power or right to make official decisions
using reason and judgment to choose from among
acceptable alternatives. Administrative discretion means
to give a decision on a matter with various alternative
available, but the judgment should be with reference to
rules of reason and justice. The administrative discretion
should not be based on personal notions and fancies.
Legislation typically builds in an element of discretion:
the public body or government agency is given broad
parameters within which to act and is provided with
discretion to achieve the aims of their portfolio in the
best way the think possible.

167
Judicial review of administrative discretion
It would be impossible, impractical and inefficient for
legislation that delegates a power to a government
agency to spell out precisely the way in which that
agency is supposed to act and make decision.
The court have traditionally exercised caution in judicially
reviewing exercises of administrative discretion but
especially so where that discretion has been couched in
broad terms in the relevant legislation.

168
Types of administrative discretion
There are mainly 5 types of administrative discretion. Those are:
1. Individual Discretion – where the authority makes
individualizing decisions by applying general rule.
2. Executive Discretion – where the authority has the freedom to
fill gaps in delegate authority in order to execute assigned
administrative functions.
3. Policymaking Discretion – in this type of discretion the
authority has the power to take action for further general
purposes.
4. Unbridled Discretion – if no review is permitted, then the
authority conducting it would be considered to be exercising
unbridled discretion.
5. Numinous Discretion – where the decision cannot by its very
nature be reviewed, the agency is said to be exercising this
discretion.

169
The Abuse of Administrative Discretion
It is general rule that court should not interfere with the
administrative functions and actions taken by
administrative authorities in exercise of discretionary
power. But where the legislature has confided the power
to a particular body, with a discretion how it is to be
used, it is beyond the power of any court to contest the
discretion.
This does not mean that the administrative authorities
should possess unregulated and vast discretionary
powers. If they are left with vast discretion powers, it
leads to mal-administration, corruption, suppression and
atrocities over the poor people. Too much discretion
causes too much abuse of powers.

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