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Invest in security
to secure investments
13 Real ways to destroy business by breaking
company’s SAP Applications and a guide to
avoid them
Alexander Polyakov
CTO ERPScan, President EAS-SEC
CYBERSECURITY in Oil and Gas
Tunde Ogunkoya (Partner, DeltaGRiC)
About Me
2
• Consulting Partner, DeltaGRiC Consulting – Leading Consultancy in the SAP
Africa Ecosystem, focusing on mitigating cyber Risk and Compliance
violations in SAP run organizations
• Enterprise Application Security Enthusiast/Evangelist – Focused on SAP and
Open Source Software Security.
• Delivered first ever SAP cybersecurity project on the African Continent -
RSSC, Swaziland with ERPScan team
• Respected opinion on SAP Security matters / OSS Security matters (Times
News, ITWeb)
• Advocate of “Compliance is only but a check-in-the-box” and does NOT really
mitigate the actual Security Risks.
• Participated in the Curriculum content development for the Graduate
Program in Cyber Security & Intelligence at the Ontario College of
Management and Technology, Canada (OCMT).
• I am not an Expert  !.I know one thing: that I know nothing … Apology
29d Socrates
About ERPScan
3
• The only 360-degree SAP Security solution - ERPScan Security
Monitoring Suite for SAP and Oracle
• Leader by the number of acknowledgements from SAP ( 250+ )
and Oracle (40+)
• 80+ presentations key security conferences worldwide
• 35+ Awards and nominations
• Research team – 20+ experts with experience in different areas
of security from ERP to ICS and Mobile
• Offices in Palo Alto, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Sidney
4
Trends
SAP Security
How does traditional VAPT works
5
• A company hire experts for VAPT service or Product
• Those specialists run some pentesting tools
• They (may) manually test vulnerabilities, escalate
privileges and as a result write report about
vulnerabilities
• Report looks like
“we found vulnerability X on the server Y
look at the black screenshot with command line”.
Common VAPT report
6
Why?
7
• Everybody know that there are vulnerabilities in
almost every system
• The question now
– how dangerous are they
– how easy is to exploit them
– what can happen after the exploitation?
– and what kind of REAL risks to YOUR organization it
provides.
Risks are different
8
Why Oil and Gas?
9
Why Oil and Gas?
10
Competitive market – Risky market
Oil and Gas 101
11
Upstream: Critical processes and systems
12
• Extraction (Drilling)
• Gathering (From earth to separators)
• Separation (Separate oil, gas and water)
• Gas compression (Prepare for storage and
transport)
• Temporary Oil Storage (Temporarily store before
loading)
• Waste disposal (Water disposal)
• Metering (Calculate quantity before loading)
Midstream: Critical processes and systems
13
• Terminal management (Obtain oil from upstream)
• Gas Processing (Separate natural gas and NGL)
• Gas Transportation (Transfer gas to storage via pipelines)
• Oil transportation (Transfer oil to storage via
pipeline/Truck/Barge/Rail)
• Base load Gas storage (Temporary and long-term)
• Peak load Gas Storage
• LNG Storage
• Oil Storage (Long-term oil storage)
Downstream: Critical processes and systems
14
• Refining (Processing of Crude Oil)
• Oil Petrochemicals (Fabrication of base
chemicals and plastics)
• Gas Distribution (Deliver gas to utilities)
• Oil Wholesale (Deliver petrol to 3rd parties)
• Oil Retail (Deliver petrol to end users)
Why should we care
15
What can happen?
16
What can happen?
17
Plant Sabotage/Shutdown
Equipment damage
Utilities Interruption
Production Disruption (Stop or pause production)
Product Quality (bad oil and gas quality)
Undetected Spills
Illegal pipeline taping
Compliance violation (Pollution)
Safety violation (Death or injury)
Three aspects of Oil and Gas Cyber Security
18
When we speak about securing oil and gas
companies we should cover
– Operational Technology security
– Enterprise Application security
– Connections security
Three aspects of Oil and Gas Cyber Security
19
20
ICS Security in Oil and Gas
SAP Security
Oil and Gas Cyber-Security (OT part)
21
3 Areas:
Upstream
Midstream
Downstream
20+ processes:
Separation
Drilling
………
100+ System Types:
Burner Management
Fiscal Metering
….
1000+ Solutions
from hundreds of vendors:
Emerson
Rockwell
Siemens
….
Lets look at those systems
22
• Metering System (Fiscal Metering)
• Tank Inventory System (Oil Storage )
Metering
23
• Risks:
– Product Quality, Monetary loss
• Details
– Analyzes density, viscosity of content, temperature, and
pressure
– Divided into several runs
• Systems
– Fiscal Metering System
– Liquid Flow Metering
– Gas Flow Metering System
– Wet Gas Metering System
Fiscal Metering
24
• Description
– Custody transfer, or fiscal metering, occurs when fluids or gases
are exchanged between parties.
– Payment is a function of the amount of fluid or gas transferred.
– A small error in measurement leading to financial exposure
–Over a year, the 0.1% error
would amount to a difference of
$50m.
– The engine of a custody transfer or fiscal metering installation is
the flow computer.
OIL STORAGE
25
• Risks
– Plant Sabotage/Shutdown, Equipment damage, Production Disruption,
Compliance violation, Safety violation
• Description
– Consist of 10-100+ tanks with 1-50m barrels
– Tank Inventory Systems (TIA) collects data from special tank gauging systems
– Accurate records of volumes and history are kept for Forecasting for stock
control
– Tank level deviations can result in hazardous events such as a tank overfilling,
liquefied gas flashing, etc.
• Systems
– Terminal Management Systems, Tank Inventory Systems, Tank Management
Systems
Tank Inventory Systems
26
Terminal Management
– Honeywell Enfaf TM BOX (connected with IT)
– Emerson Syncade Terminal Logistics (connected with IT)
– Emerson Rosemount TankMaster WinOpi
• View and control commands
• Change alarm (Level, Temperature, Pressure)
• Send management commands servo tanks (Freeze, Lock)
27
Enterprise Applications Security in Oil and Gas
Enterprise usage: Business Applications
28
85% of Fortune 2000 Oil and Gas
companies use SAP
Enterprise usage: Business Applications
29
70 million barrels per day of oil are produced by companies using
SAP solutions
(75% of total Oil production)
Enterprise applications VS Oil And Gas processes
30
• PPM (Project portfolio management)
• ALM (Asset Lifecycle Management)
• LIMS (Laboratory Information Management System)
• PAS (Production Accounting System)
• ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning)
• + HR, CRM, PLM, SRM, BI/BW, SCM
Enterprise applications
31
• PPM <-> Exploration
• ALM <-> Refinery, Separation, etc.
• LIMS <-> Refinery, Separation
• PAS <-> Tank Inventory, Metering
• ERP <-> Tank Inventory, Metering
• + HR, CRM, PLM, SRM, BI/BW, SCM
Enterprise apps security
Ways to compromise ERP/Business Application
• Vulnerabilities
– 3500+ in SAP, 3000+ in Oracle
• Misconfigurations
– Thousands
• Unnecessary privileges
– Hundreds for every type of system
• Custom code issues
– Hundreds vulnerabilities for each system that we analyzed
Vulnerabilities in SAP and Oracle
33
Only one vulnerability would suffice to jeopardize ALL business-critical data
Misconfigurations in SAP
34
• ~1500 General profile parameters
• ~1200 Web applications to configure
• ~700 web services to secure
• ~100 specific management commands to filter
• ~100 specific parameters for each of the 50 modules (FI, HR,
Portal, MM, CRM, SRM, PLM, Industry solutions…)
http://erpscan.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/EASSEC-PVAG-
ABAP.pdf
• 2012
• 2013
• 2014
• 2015
35
SAP Security Incidents
36
The latest SAP Security Incident (2015)
37
Security of Connections between IT and OT
IT/OT connection looks like this
38
Or like this
39
IT and OT, SAP example
40
SAP SAP xMII overview
41
• Connects manufacturing with enterprise business processes, provides
information to improve production performance
Attack Surface (SAP xMII Security):
42
SAP Plant Connectivity
43
Hacking SAP Plant Connectivity
44
45
Now they are inside your OT network
and can do whatever they want. there
is no Air Gap!
DEMO
46
Oil and Gas attack vectors
47
Oil market fraud attack:
• Imagine what would happen if a cyber criminal uploads a malware that
dynamically changes oil stock figures for all Oil and Gas companies where
SAP is implemented. Attackers will be able to deliberately understate data
about Oil in stocks.
Plant equipment sabotage attack
• Hackers can spoof a report about equipment status in a remote facility.
Companies will spend a lot of time and money to investigate the incident
Plant Destruction attack
• With access to BMS systems, via SAP Pco and SAP xMII hackers can perform
physical attacks.
48
How does one go about securing it?
SAP Security
Apply
• Step 1 Next Month
– Security Assessment for ERP and Business applications
• Step 2 Next Quarter
– Protect your ERPs and other business applications ( Specific
Scanning and Monitoring tools)
• Step 2 Next 2 Quarters
– Review all connections
• Step 4 by This Year
– Secure connections where possible
• Step 5 next year
– Assess and Protect ICS Systems
How to apply ERP Security
50
Business security (SoD)
Prevents attacks or mistakes made by insiders
Code security
Prevents attacks or mistakes made by developers
Application platform security
Prevents unauthorized access both within corporate network
and from remote attackers
51
• Only 360-degree approach can help in maximizing security
• Full workflow (Identify/Analyze/Remediate)
• Specific checks for Industry modules and solutions
• Fast release cycles to address client needs
ERPScan Strengths
About
52
a.polyakov@erpscan.com
tunde@deltagricconsulting.com
228 Hamilton Avenue, Fl. 3,
Palo Alto, CA. 94301
USA HQ
www.erpscan.com
info@erpscan.com
G17, Pinewood office complex,
33 Riley road ,
Sandton - Johannesburg
South Africa

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Cybersecurity in Oil Gas Industry

  • 1. Invest in security to secure investments 13 Real ways to destroy business by breaking company’s SAP Applications and a guide to avoid them Alexander Polyakov CTO ERPScan, President EAS-SEC CYBERSECURITY in Oil and Gas Tunde Ogunkoya (Partner, DeltaGRiC)
  • 2. About Me 2 • Consulting Partner, DeltaGRiC Consulting – Leading Consultancy in the SAP Africa Ecosystem, focusing on mitigating cyber Risk and Compliance violations in SAP run organizations • Enterprise Application Security Enthusiast/Evangelist – Focused on SAP and Open Source Software Security. • Delivered first ever SAP cybersecurity project on the African Continent - RSSC, Swaziland with ERPScan team • Respected opinion on SAP Security matters / OSS Security matters (Times News, ITWeb) • Advocate of “Compliance is only but a check-in-the-box” and does NOT really mitigate the actual Security Risks. • Participated in the Curriculum content development for the Graduate Program in Cyber Security & Intelligence at the Ontario College of Management and Technology, Canada (OCMT). • I am not an Expert  !.I know one thing: that I know nothing … Apology 29d Socrates
  • 3. About ERPScan 3 • The only 360-degree SAP Security solution - ERPScan Security Monitoring Suite for SAP and Oracle • Leader by the number of acknowledgements from SAP ( 250+ ) and Oracle (40+) • 80+ presentations key security conferences worldwide • 35+ Awards and nominations • Research team – 20+ experts with experience in different areas of security from ERP to ICS and Mobile • Offices in Palo Alto, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Sidney
  • 5. How does traditional VAPT works 5 • A company hire experts for VAPT service or Product • Those specialists run some pentesting tools • They (may) manually test vulnerabilities, escalate privileges and as a result write report about vulnerabilities • Report looks like “we found vulnerability X on the server Y look at the black screenshot with command line”.
  • 7. Why? 7 • Everybody know that there are vulnerabilities in almost every system • The question now – how dangerous are they – how easy is to exploit them – what can happen after the exploitation? – and what kind of REAL risks to YOUR organization it provides.
  • 9. Why Oil and Gas? 9
  • 10. Why Oil and Gas? 10 Competitive market – Risky market
  • 11. Oil and Gas 101 11
  • 12. Upstream: Critical processes and systems 12 • Extraction (Drilling) • Gathering (From earth to separators) • Separation (Separate oil, gas and water) • Gas compression (Prepare for storage and transport) • Temporary Oil Storage (Temporarily store before loading) • Waste disposal (Water disposal) • Metering (Calculate quantity before loading)
  • 13. Midstream: Critical processes and systems 13 • Terminal management (Obtain oil from upstream) • Gas Processing (Separate natural gas and NGL) • Gas Transportation (Transfer gas to storage via pipelines) • Oil transportation (Transfer oil to storage via pipeline/Truck/Barge/Rail) • Base load Gas storage (Temporary and long-term) • Peak load Gas Storage • LNG Storage • Oil Storage (Long-term oil storage)
  • 14. Downstream: Critical processes and systems 14 • Refining (Processing of Crude Oil) • Oil Petrochemicals (Fabrication of base chemicals and plastics) • Gas Distribution (Deliver gas to utilities) • Oil Wholesale (Deliver petrol to 3rd parties) • Oil Retail (Deliver petrol to end users)
  • 15. Why should we care 15
  • 17. What can happen? 17 Plant Sabotage/Shutdown Equipment damage Utilities Interruption Production Disruption (Stop or pause production) Product Quality (bad oil and gas quality) Undetected Spills Illegal pipeline taping Compliance violation (Pollution) Safety violation (Death or injury)
  • 18. Three aspects of Oil and Gas Cyber Security 18
  • 19. When we speak about securing oil and gas companies we should cover – Operational Technology security – Enterprise Application security – Connections security Three aspects of Oil and Gas Cyber Security 19
  • 20. 20 ICS Security in Oil and Gas SAP Security
  • 21. Oil and Gas Cyber-Security (OT part) 21 3 Areas: Upstream Midstream Downstream 20+ processes: Separation Drilling ……… 100+ System Types: Burner Management Fiscal Metering …. 1000+ Solutions from hundreds of vendors: Emerson Rockwell Siemens ….
  • 22. Lets look at those systems 22 • Metering System (Fiscal Metering) • Tank Inventory System (Oil Storage )
  • 23. Metering 23 • Risks: – Product Quality, Monetary loss • Details – Analyzes density, viscosity of content, temperature, and pressure – Divided into several runs • Systems – Fiscal Metering System – Liquid Flow Metering – Gas Flow Metering System – Wet Gas Metering System
  • 24. Fiscal Metering 24 • Description – Custody transfer, or fiscal metering, occurs when fluids or gases are exchanged between parties. – Payment is a function of the amount of fluid or gas transferred. – A small error in measurement leading to financial exposure –Over a year, the 0.1% error would amount to a difference of $50m. – The engine of a custody transfer or fiscal metering installation is the flow computer.
  • 25. OIL STORAGE 25 • Risks – Plant Sabotage/Shutdown, Equipment damage, Production Disruption, Compliance violation, Safety violation • Description – Consist of 10-100+ tanks with 1-50m barrels – Tank Inventory Systems (TIA) collects data from special tank gauging systems – Accurate records of volumes and history are kept for Forecasting for stock control – Tank level deviations can result in hazardous events such as a tank overfilling, liquefied gas flashing, etc. • Systems – Terminal Management Systems, Tank Inventory Systems, Tank Management Systems
  • 26. Tank Inventory Systems 26 Terminal Management – Honeywell Enfaf TM BOX (connected with IT) – Emerson Syncade Terminal Logistics (connected with IT) – Emerson Rosemount TankMaster WinOpi • View and control commands • Change alarm (Level, Temperature, Pressure) • Send management commands servo tanks (Freeze, Lock)
  • 28. Enterprise usage: Business Applications 28 85% of Fortune 2000 Oil and Gas companies use SAP
  • 29. Enterprise usage: Business Applications 29 70 million barrels per day of oil are produced by companies using SAP solutions (75% of total Oil production)
  • 30. Enterprise applications VS Oil And Gas processes 30 • PPM (Project portfolio management) • ALM (Asset Lifecycle Management) • LIMS (Laboratory Information Management System) • PAS (Production Accounting System) • ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) • + HR, CRM, PLM, SRM, BI/BW, SCM
  • 31. Enterprise applications 31 • PPM <-> Exploration • ALM <-> Refinery, Separation, etc. • LIMS <-> Refinery, Separation • PAS <-> Tank Inventory, Metering • ERP <-> Tank Inventory, Metering • + HR, CRM, PLM, SRM, BI/BW, SCM
  • 32. Enterprise apps security Ways to compromise ERP/Business Application • Vulnerabilities – 3500+ in SAP, 3000+ in Oracle • Misconfigurations – Thousands • Unnecessary privileges – Hundreds for every type of system • Custom code issues – Hundreds vulnerabilities for each system that we analyzed
  • 33. Vulnerabilities in SAP and Oracle 33 Only one vulnerability would suffice to jeopardize ALL business-critical data
  • 34. Misconfigurations in SAP 34 • ~1500 General profile parameters • ~1200 Web applications to configure • ~700 web services to secure • ~100 specific management commands to filter • ~100 specific parameters for each of the 50 modules (FI, HR, Portal, MM, CRM, SRM, PLM, Industry solutions…) http://erpscan.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/EASSEC-PVAG- ABAP.pdf
  • 35. • 2012 • 2013 • 2014 • 2015 35 SAP Security Incidents
  • 36. 36 The latest SAP Security Incident (2015)
  • 37. 37 Security of Connections between IT and OT
  • 38. IT/OT connection looks like this 38
  • 40. IT and OT, SAP example 40
  • 41. SAP SAP xMII overview 41 • Connects manufacturing with enterprise business processes, provides information to improve production performance
  • 42. Attack Surface (SAP xMII Security): 42
  • 44. Hacking SAP Plant Connectivity 44
  • 45. 45 Now they are inside your OT network and can do whatever they want. there is no Air Gap!
  • 47. Oil and Gas attack vectors 47 Oil market fraud attack: • Imagine what would happen if a cyber criminal uploads a malware that dynamically changes oil stock figures for all Oil and Gas companies where SAP is implemented. Attackers will be able to deliberately understate data about Oil in stocks. Plant equipment sabotage attack • Hackers can spoof a report about equipment status in a remote facility. Companies will spend a lot of time and money to investigate the incident Plant Destruction attack • With access to BMS systems, via SAP Pco and SAP xMII hackers can perform physical attacks.
  • 48. 48 How does one go about securing it? SAP Security
  • 49. Apply • Step 1 Next Month – Security Assessment for ERP and Business applications • Step 2 Next Quarter – Protect your ERPs and other business applications ( Specific Scanning and Monitoring tools) • Step 2 Next 2 Quarters – Review all connections • Step 4 by This Year – Secure connections where possible • Step 5 next year – Assess and Protect ICS Systems
  • 50. How to apply ERP Security 50 Business security (SoD) Prevents attacks or mistakes made by insiders Code security Prevents attacks or mistakes made by developers Application platform security Prevents unauthorized access both within corporate network and from remote attackers
  • 51. 51 • Only 360-degree approach can help in maximizing security • Full workflow (Identify/Analyze/Remediate) • Specific checks for Industry modules and solutions • Fast release cycles to address client needs ERPScan Strengths
  • 52. About 52 a.polyakov@erpscan.com tunde@deltagricconsulting.com 228 Hamilton Avenue, Fl. 3, Palo Alto, CA. 94301 USA HQ www.erpscan.com info@erpscan.com G17, Pinewood office complex, 33 Riley road , Sandton - Johannesburg South Africa