Clyde Beck is accused of making a slanderous comment at a political rally. The plaintiff initially filed a defamation claim, but it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff is now trying to pursue an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on the same facts. The document analyzes whether the plaintiff can avoid the statute of limitations by recasting the claim, and whether a slander claim satisfies the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

1. TO: John Doe and Jane Doe
FROM: Alissa Katz
RE: Client: Clyde Beck—Defending an Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claim
INTRODUCTION
Clyde Beck is accused of making a slanderous comment at a political rally in
Henry County. Initially the plaintiff pleaded an insufficient claim under a theory of
defamation (slander). Barred by the one-year statute of limitations, plaintiff’s cause of
action has now morphed into intentional infliction of emotional distress, proposing a new
and unbarred avenue for relief. Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33.
ISSUE
1.
Can a plaintiff recast his cause of action from slander to intentional infliction of
emotional distress for a more advantageous statute of limitations?
2.
Does a cause of action framed under a theory of slander satisfy the elements of
intentional infliction of emotional distress?
BRIEF ANSWER
1.
A plaintiff cannot evade the statute of limitations governing their original claim
by recasting their cause of action under a different theory with a more favorable statutory
period. Davis v. Hosp. Auth. of Fulton Cty., 154 Ga. App. 654, 656, 269 S.E.2d 867, 870
(1980); see Jahannes v. Mitchell, 220 Ga. App. 102, 106, 469 S.E.2d 255, 258 (1996).
Even if the plaintiff’s claim for relief satisfies the elements of the secondary theory, the

2. Georgia courts will not tolerate such an abuse of the judicial system. Id. at 656, 269
S.E.2d at 870.
2.
Although both slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress share
common elements, intentional infliction of emotional distress adds a “threshold of
outrageousness,” which conduct plead under a theory of defamation does not necessarily
satisfy. Lively v. McDaniel, 240 Ga. App. 132, 134, 522 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1999); Moses
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 222, 224, 369 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1988) (“It is a well-
established general rule in this state that in order to sustain a cause of action for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant’s actions must have been so
terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.”);
Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121, 404 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1991) (“The law
intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it.”) (internal citation omitted).
ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO SUPPORT
1. A plaintiff cannot avoid an unfavorable and already exhausted statute of
limitations by pursuing the same claim under a different theory of law.
In Jahannes v. Mitchell, 220 Ga. App. 102, 469 S.E.2d 255 (1996), a professor
brought a variety of claims including libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) against his employer university and individual employees. The trial court
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both the slander and libel claims,
but denied summary judgment on the IIED claim. Id. at 106, 469 S.E.2d at 258. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed and granted the motion for summary judgment in

3. favor of defendants on the IIED claim. The court recognizes and rejects plaintiff’s
attempt to recast his cause of action under a new theory reasoning that, “judicial economy
dictates that we recognize the preclusive effect of the undisputed facts and law on this
claim.” Id. at 106, 469 S.E.2d at 258 (“… the undisputed facts show that the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was premised on the same alleged libelous and
slanderous acts upon which the statute of limitations has run.”)
In Davis v. Hosp. Auth. of Fulton Cty., the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all defamation claims.
Davis’ complaint alleging slander and libel was time barred and filed in excess of the
one-year statute of limitations. Davis v. Hosp. Auth. of Fulton Cty., 154 Ga. App. 654,
656, 269 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1980). The court recognized plaintiff’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim to be, “premised upon the same allegedly libelous and
slanderous acts (the underlying tort complained of) upon which the statute of limitations
ha[d] run.” Id. at 656-57, 269 S.E.2d at 870. In a secondary effort to bring his action as
timely, Davis blatantly framed the same conduct that the court had already cast as time-
barred under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). In unwavering
support for the defendant, the court affirmed a subsequent motion for summary judgment
dismissing the IIED claim.
2. Slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress are distinct causes of
action and cannot merely be interchanged.
A. Slander has a lower threshold: Mere “publication.”
Slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress have overlapping qualities
but diverge at the elements of “publication” and severity. “Publication is indispensable to

4. recover for slander.” Walter v. Davidson, 214 Ga. 187, 190, 104 S.E.2d 113 (1958).
Publication is simply the communication of the slanderous commentary to anyone other
than the person being slandered. Kurtz v. Williams, 188 Ga. App. 14, 371 S.E.2d 878.
B. Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) requires that the slander be
directed personally at the plaintiff.
To the contrary, intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that the
slanderous commentary be directed to the slandered person in particular. Lively v.
McDaniel, 240 Ga. App. 132, 134, 522 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1999) (“Defamatory remarks
made to others or to the public in general are classic examples of conduct that, though
harmful to the plaintiff, was directed toward the hearer of the statements, not to the
plaintiff, and thus is not actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress.”);
Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828, 829 (412 S.E.2d 826) (1992) (“… malicious, willful
or wanton conduct will not warrant a recovery for the infliction of emotional distress if
the conduct was not directed toward the plaintiff.”); MARTA v. Mosley, 280 Ga. App.
486, 491, 634 S.E.2d 466, 470 (2006) (Court of Appeals found that defendant’s conduct
was both too brief and occurred in public rather than personally). The courts then impute
a “threshold of outrageousness,” which the Court of Appeals describes as “stringent”.
Lively, 240 Ga. App. at 134, 522 S.E.2d at 714; Ingram v. Jik Realty Co., 199 Ga. App.
335, 336, 404 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1991).
In Peoples v. Guthrie, the Court of Appeals recognized emotional distress as any
of the following conditions: “…all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright,
horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry,
and nausea.” Guthrie at 121, 404 S.E.2d at 444 (internal citation omitted). The court
further stipulated that these reactions “must be reasonable and justified under the

5. circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and
unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such
distress of which the actor has knowledge.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Even if a
plaintiff appears to suffer the aforementioned symptoms as a reaction to defendant’s
conduct, a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not absolute.
The state of Georgia uses a totality of the circumstances approach in determining
whether or not a plaintiff has sustained severe emotional distress as to support a theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Moses, 187 Ga. App. at 225, 369
S.E.2d at 544. In Moses v. Prudential, the Court of Appeals considers the particular
language of the allegedly offensive conduct, the means by which it was delivered, and the
relationship of the parties. Id. at 225, 369 S.E.2d at 544. The court grants summary
judgment in favor of the defendant concluding that, “the threatening and offensive
language used in this instance could not have reasonably and foreseeably resulted in the
mental distress of which appellant complains because the offending message did not, as a
matter of law, rise to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness.” Id. at 225,
369 S.E.2d at 544.
In Kramer v. Kroger Co., 243 Ga. App. 883, 534 S.E.2d 446 (2000), Kramer
makes claims under various tort theories such as libel, slander, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED)—he succeeds on none. The Court of Appeals found that
Kramer’s former assistant manager Rouse’s comments, although offensive, were
insufficient to be actionable under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court specifically distinguishes between mere defamatory remarks and those which
can support an IIED claim: “Defamatory remarks made to others or to the public in

6. general are classic examples of conduct that, though harmful to the plaintiff, was directed
toward the hearer of the statements, not to the plaintiff, and thus is not actionable as
intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 889, 534 S.E.2d at 452.
CONCLUSION
If a claim presented under a theory of slander or libel is time barred, the Georgia
courts are likely to recognize a plaintiff’s identical claim under a different theory of law
as untimely alike. Additionally, the Georgia courts differentiate between slander and libel
and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) because they are not
interchangeable theories of law. The Georgia courts will not tolerate a slander claim
disguised as an IIED claim.