1) Jeffrey Blackwell appealed a partial summary judgment granted in favor of CSF Properties 2, LLC on his negligence claim related to injuries sustained from a fall off the front porch of a rented property.
2) The trial court's judgment did not resolve Blackwell's separate claim of negligence per se, leaving issues still pending for determination.
3) As the judgment was not final and did not dispose of the entire judicial unit, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
This order grants summary judgment to defendant Hawaii Family Forum and defendant Fuddy, denies summary judgment for plaintiffs, and denies defendant Abercrombie's motion for summary judgment as moot. The order also denies Hawaii Family Forum's motion to dismiss defendant Abercrombie. The court finds that plaintiffs' claims that Hawaii's laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate due process and equal protection are foreclosed by the Supreme Court's dismissal in Baker v. Nelson. Alternatively, the court finds plaintiffs' claims fail on the merits, and that Perry v. Brown does not control this case due to differences in California and Hawaii's same-sex marriage histories. The court concludes Hawaii's laws are rationally related to legitimate government interests.
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding cross-motions for summary judgment in a case involving a plaintiff who was imprisoned at a halfway house operated by the defendant. The court provides background on the case, including that the plaintiff sued over alleged unlawful seizure of his property and constitutional violations. The court evaluates the motions using the standard for summary judgment, granting the defendant's motion and denying the plaintiff's motion.
This document is Penguin Group (USA) Inc.'s preliminary pretrial statement in a lawsuit filed against it and other defendants related to inaccuracies in two books published by Penguin. The statement addresses the required topics including a brief factual outline of the case, issues concerning jurisdiction and venue, the factual basis of claims and defenses, the legal theories underlying claims and defenses, computation of damages, related litigation, proposed stipulations, proposed deadlines, and controlling issues of law.
Federal Court Denying Motion by Satish Vuppalapati, Madhavi Vuppalapati and A...mh37o
Federal court denied the motion by Satish Vuppalapati, Madhavi Vuppalapati and Anandhan Jayaraman. Court confirmed that PISL India and PISl PA are one and the same companies.
The document is a legal memorandum analyzing whether an appeals court would likely find in favor of the opposition appealing a premises liability case or the client considering a cross appeal. Regarding the opposition's appeal claiming insufficient evidence, the summary finds the appeals court unlikely to rule this way as the plaintiff provided probative evidence supporting the jury's finding. Regarding the cross appeal, the summary finds it unlikely to succeed as the trial court properly submitted the defendant's claim of the plaintiff's negligence given supporting evidence and did not abuse its discretion in denying the gross negligence claim.
'Madhavi Vuppalpati & Anandhan Jayaraman defeated in their attempt to derail ...mh37o
Madhavi Vuppalpati and her husband Anandhan Jayaraman are defeated in their attempt to derail the trial in Washington Court with this denial by Hon Madam Justice Marsha j. Pechman
The Court of Appeals affirms the lower court's granting of summary judgment to CitiMortgage in a foreclosure action. Maria Potvin argued she was entitled to relief under the Home Affordable Modification Program and that foreclosure was inequitable, but the court found the mediation was non-binding and she did not sign the modification agreement or make payments. The court also found the affidavit from CitiMortgage in support of summary judgment met evidentiary rules for records of regularly conducted business activities. Therefore, the appeals court denied all of Potvin's assignments of error and upheld the foreclosure.
SC Opinion and Order - motion for comtemptJRachelle
The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for contempt and sanctions. The court found Susan Brown, the attorney, in contempt for violating a consent order requiring her to turn over all copies of estate property. However, the court did not find Ben Thompson, Brown's former client, in contempt as there was no clear evidence he violated the order. As a sanction, the court ordered Brown to pay the plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs for bringing the contempt motion, but no other punitive sanctions. The court also ordered Brown and Thompson to turn over any remaining estate property.
This order grants summary judgment to defendant Hawaii Family Forum and defendant Fuddy, denies summary judgment for plaintiffs, and denies defendant Abercrombie's motion for summary judgment as moot. The order also denies Hawaii Family Forum's motion to dismiss defendant Abercrombie. The court finds that plaintiffs' claims that Hawaii's laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate due process and equal protection are foreclosed by the Supreme Court's dismissal in Baker v. Nelson. Alternatively, the court finds plaintiffs' claims fail on the merits, and that Perry v. Brown does not control this case due to differences in California and Hawaii's same-sex marriage histories. The court concludes Hawaii's laws are rationally related to legitimate government interests.
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding cross-motions for summary judgment in a case involving a plaintiff who was imprisoned at a halfway house operated by the defendant. The court provides background on the case, including that the plaintiff sued over alleged unlawful seizure of his property and constitutional violations. The court evaluates the motions using the standard for summary judgment, granting the defendant's motion and denying the plaintiff's motion.
This document is Penguin Group (USA) Inc.'s preliminary pretrial statement in a lawsuit filed against it and other defendants related to inaccuracies in two books published by Penguin. The statement addresses the required topics including a brief factual outline of the case, issues concerning jurisdiction and venue, the factual basis of claims and defenses, the legal theories underlying claims and defenses, computation of damages, related litigation, proposed stipulations, proposed deadlines, and controlling issues of law.
Federal Court Denying Motion by Satish Vuppalapati, Madhavi Vuppalapati and A...mh37o
Federal court denied the motion by Satish Vuppalapati, Madhavi Vuppalapati and Anandhan Jayaraman. Court confirmed that PISL India and PISl PA are one and the same companies.
The document is a legal memorandum analyzing whether an appeals court would likely find in favor of the opposition appealing a premises liability case or the client considering a cross appeal. Regarding the opposition's appeal claiming insufficient evidence, the summary finds the appeals court unlikely to rule this way as the plaintiff provided probative evidence supporting the jury's finding. Regarding the cross appeal, the summary finds it unlikely to succeed as the trial court properly submitted the defendant's claim of the plaintiff's negligence given supporting evidence and did not abuse its discretion in denying the gross negligence claim.
'Madhavi Vuppalpati & Anandhan Jayaraman defeated in their attempt to derail ...mh37o
Madhavi Vuppalpati and her husband Anandhan Jayaraman are defeated in their attempt to derail the trial in Washington Court with this denial by Hon Madam Justice Marsha j. Pechman
The Court of Appeals affirms the lower court's granting of summary judgment to CitiMortgage in a foreclosure action. Maria Potvin argued she was entitled to relief under the Home Affordable Modification Program and that foreclosure was inequitable, but the court found the mediation was non-binding and she did not sign the modification agreement or make payments. The court also found the affidavit from CitiMortgage in support of summary judgment met evidentiary rules for records of regularly conducted business activities. Therefore, the appeals court denied all of Potvin's assignments of error and upheld the foreclosure.
SC Opinion and Order - motion for comtemptJRachelle
The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for contempt and sanctions. The court found Susan Brown, the attorney, in contempt for violating a consent order requiring her to turn over all copies of estate property. However, the court did not find Ben Thompson, Brown's former client, in contempt as there was no clear evidence he violated the order. As a sanction, the court ordered Brown to pay the plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs for bringing the contempt motion, but no other punitive sanctions. The court also ordered Brown and Thompson to turn over any remaining estate property.
Angela Kaaihue, Motion in Opposition to NECA's Summary Judgement- Hearing Jul...Angela Kaaihue
This document is a memorandum filed by Angela Kaaihue and Yong Fryer in opposition to a motion for summary judgment filed by Newtown Estates Community Association (NECA). It argues that NECA's motion should be denied for several reasons: (1) Petitioners' property is not part of Newtown Estates and is therefore not subject to NECA's rules; (2) there are errors in the property's title and warranty deed regarding its inclusion in Newtown Estates; and (3) Petitioners have developer rights over the property according to the master declaration. The memorandum also notes that the land court has jurisdiction over NECA's claims, as determined in a previous hearing.
This document is a declaration by Richard Miyamoto in support of a judgment creditor's opposition to a debtor's motion to avoid a judicial lien. It summarizes a long legal dispute between the parties involving multiple bankruptcy filings by the debtor designed to hinder and delay collection of the judgment. It details the procedural history of the case, including previous court rulings against the debtor for failure to comply with discovery orders. Exhibits are attached documenting the lien and various court orders in the case.
This document is a transcript from a court case between Darrell Hatcher and Bouchra Hadiddou regarding custody of their two children. The court determined that New Jersey did not have jurisdiction over the child custody determination because the children had not lived in New Jersey for over six months prior to the custody application, as required by New Jersey law. As such, the New Jersey court's order asserting jurisdiction over custody was reversed. The court noted that custody disputes must be addressed in the state where the children currently reside.
This document is the defendants' closing argument in response to the plaintiffs' closing argument regarding trust documents presented in a real estate dispute. It argues that the plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent conduct by the defendant are unsupported and illogical. It asserts that the trust documents in question have no relevance to the legal issues being tried, which involve the interpretation of purchase and sale agreements for two properties. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have presented no valid legal basis to rescind the agreements and that the evidence shows the plaintiffs were unable to complete the purchase for financial reasons.
This document is a motion for a stay of the mandate pending a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. It was filed by Howard K. Stern on behalf of Vickie Lynn Marshall's estate following the 9th Circuit's denial of rehearing. The motion argues that substantial questions will be presented in the cert petition regarding the scope of bankruptcy courts' power over compulsory counterclaims. It contends the 9th Circuit's new test conflicts with other circuits and Supreme Court precedent. The declaration also asserts the petition raises important issues of bankruptcy practice that require uniformity.
This appeal concerns discovery disputes in an adversary proceeding brought by Sulphur Mountain Land & Livestock, LP against John and Maureen Redmond regarding their bankruptcy filing. Sulphur Mountain had previously sued the Redmonds over a commercial lease guaranteed by their daughter. The bankruptcy court granted Sulphur Mountain's motion to compel discovery from the Redmonds and later issued terminating sanctions against them for alleged noncompliance, even though the Redmonds had produced documents and been deposed. The Redmonds are appealing these rulings.
This document summarizes a court case regarding a dispute over land use jurisdiction between the City of Tontitown, Arkansas and landowners Jay and Connie Potter. The Potters purchased 19 acres outside Tontitown city limits and sought approval to build an RV park. They withdrew their application to Tontitown and received approval from the Washington County Planning Board, but the approval stated it would be void if Tontitown had jurisdiction. Tontitown claimed jurisdiction and sought an injunction to stop construction, arguing it had properly designated its planning area boundaries. The circuit court granted the injunction, finding Tontitown likely to succeed on the merits. The Potters appealed.
This document is an appellant's opening brief for a case in the California Court of Appeal regarding a trust. Robert Quick (the appellant) alleges that Andrea Pearson (the respondent), as trustee, breached the trust by concealing its existence from him and failing to provide him distributions as a beneficiary. The brief argues that Quick sufficiently alleged facts to state a cause of action and overcome defenses of statute of limitations and laches. It maintains the trial court erred in sustaining Pearson's demurrer without leave to amend.
This document is a petition for divorce filed by Sandra Carroll against Kenneth Carroll. It provides basic information about the parties and the marriage. It states that there are no children and the marital assets are valued at under $50,000. It requests that the court grant the divorce and divide the marital assets and debts in a just and equitable manner.
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge Theresa Holmes-Simmons from 01/01/2014 to 05...Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding motions to dismiss filed by defendants Darren Chaker and Nicole Chaker in a civil RICO lawsuit brought by plaintiffs Scott McMillan and The McMillan Law Firm. The order summarizes the allegations in the plaintiffs' amended complaint, which claims the defendants engaged in a pattern of extortion, harassment, and other unlawful acts as part of a RICO enterprise. The order analyzes the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), considering whether the plaintiffs have adequately alleged predicate acts of racketeering, cognizable damages, and other elements of RICO and state law claims.
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge James Nugent from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
This appeal involves post-judgment orders from a legal malpractice case brought by Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., Malibu Broadbeach L.P., and Pacific Coast Management against Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and several individuals. The trial court granted Sulphur and Malibu's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied the defendants' motion for fees and motion to tax costs, finding Sulphur and Malibu were the prevailing parties. The defendants appeal, arguing: 1) the trial court failed to properly determine the prevailing party under Civil Code §1717 before considering C.C.P. §998; 2) even if it had, it abused its discretion in finding Sulphur and
This memorandum supports plaintiff Carol Broad's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant Herb Hancock from demolishing and reconstructing his property. The memorandum argues that Broad is likely to succeed on the merits because Hancock's construction plans violate the governing documents of their homeowners association and Broad's express easement for air and light. It asserts that Broad will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction and that the balance of hardships weighs in her favor. The memorandum concludes that both a preliminary and permanent injunction should be granted to prevent Hancock from breaching the covenant and violating Broad's property rights.
When Plaintiff Offers for Defendants to Validate Plaintiff's "Lease" and "Cas...jamesmaredmond
This supplemental declaration was submitted by David Chatfield, an attorney representing Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co. LLC, in opposition to a motion to compel further deposition of Stephen Gaggero. Chatfield states that he previously offered to show opposing counsel a document establishing Sulphur Mountain's right to lease the premises in question, without copying it, but received no response. Chatfield offered again by letter on August 26th and again received no response. The declaration aims to show Chatfield attempted to resolve the issue without further court action.
FindLaw | Court of Appeals Reverses Entry Bar to Islamic ScholarLegalDocs
This document summarizes a United States Court of Appeals case regarding the denial of a visa for Tariq Ramadan, an Islamic scholar. The three organizational plaintiffs claimed the denial violated their First Amendment right to have Ramadan share his views in the US. The government denied the visa because Ramadan had contributed funds to a charity that supported Hamas, which the government deemed material support to a terrorist organization. The Court of Appeals concluded that the consular officer who denied the visa did not properly confront Ramadan with the allegations, which prevented Ramadan from demonstrating that he did not know the charity supported terrorism. The Court vacated the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
This newsletter summarizes recent court cases related to reinsurance:
1) The Third Circuit ruled that a reinsurer did not need to demonstrate prejudice from late notice of loss given by the reinsured in order to be relieved of indemnity obligations, applying New York law.
2) A New York federal court confirmed multiple arbitration awards in favor of a cedent, rejecting the reinsurer's arguments to vacate the awards.
3) A Wisconsin federal court transferred a dispute over arbitrator selection and consolidation to New York based on forum selection clauses in the reinsurance contracts.
The document provides an outline for a presentation on motions practice in Maryland state courts. It discusses mandatory motions, permissive motions, general motions like motions for summary judgment and discovery motions. It then covers the specific grounds for various dismissal motions including lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process or service. The document reviews the timing of summary judgment motions and the requirements for supporting and opposing such motions with affidavits and evidence. It also lists several common affirmative defenses that can be raised in motions.
SMLLC v Geraldine Redmond US BK CT Transcript - Case No. NDO3-12487 - 4-20-05jamesmaredmond
The court denied a motion to amend a complaint objecting to the discharge of debt in a bankruptcy case. The original complaint alleged the debtor failed to disclose assets like a corral and horses in bankruptcy filings. The proposed amendment alleged rental property fraud. The court found the proposed amendment did not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c), as the facts alleged were different. A two-day trial was scheduled for May 31st and June 1st to resolve the original complaint.
Defendants motion for summary judgment, incorporated memorandum of law in sup...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, Traian Bujduveanu, against his residential reentry center Dismas Charities Inc. and three employees. The motion argues that the plaintiff cannot maintain any causes of action because he violated terms of his release by driving without permission and possessing a cell phone, so the Bureau of Prisons properly returned him to prison to serve the rest of his sentence. It also argues the individual employees did not commit any tortious acts and the plaintiff has no evidence to support his legal claims against them. The defendants are requesting summary judgment to dismiss all claims.
Alistair Jones Motion for Summary JudgmentAlistair Jones
Fred Northrop filed a motion for summary judgment against Acme Insurance in a lawsuit alleging sexual discrimination by Northrop's supervisor Helen Redmond. Northrop claims that Redmond offered him a promotion in exchange for sexual favors, and then denied him the promotion and spread false rumors about him after he refused. Northrop argues that as Redmond's actions were in her official capacity as his supervisor for Acme, Acme is liable for sexual discrimination. Northrop is seeking damages, back pay, reinstatement to the denied position, and attorney's fees if found to have experienced discrimination as a motivating factor in being denied the promotion.
Angela Kaaihue, Motion in Opposition to NECA's Summary Judgement- Hearing Jul...Angela Kaaihue
This document is a memorandum filed by Angela Kaaihue and Yong Fryer in opposition to a motion for summary judgment filed by Newtown Estates Community Association (NECA). It argues that NECA's motion should be denied for several reasons: (1) Petitioners' property is not part of Newtown Estates and is therefore not subject to NECA's rules; (2) there are errors in the property's title and warranty deed regarding its inclusion in Newtown Estates; and (3) Petitioners have developer rights over the property according to the master declaration. The memorandum also notes that the land court has jurisdiction over NECA's claims, as determined in a previous hearing.
This document is a declaration by Richard Miyamoto in support of a judgment creditor's opposition to a debtor's motion to avoid a judicial lien. It summarizes a long legal dispute between the parties involving multiple bankruptcy filings by the debtor designed to hinder and delay collection of the judgment. It details the procedural history of the case, including previous court rulings against the debtor for failure to comply with discovery orders. Exhibits are attached documenting the lien and various court orders in the case.
This document is a transcript from a court case between Darrell Hatcher and Bouchra Hadiddou regarding custody of their two children. The court determined that New Jersey did not have jurisdiction over the child custody determination because the children had not lived in New Jersey for over six months prior to the custody application, as required by New Jersey law. As such, the New Jersey court's order asserting jurisdiction over custody was reversed. The court noted that custody disputes must be addressed in the state where the children currently reside.
This document is the defendants' closing argument in response to the plaintiffs' closing argument regarding trust documents presented in a real estate dispute. It argues that the plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent conduct by the defendant are unsupported and illogical. It asserts that the trust documents in question have no relevance to the legal issues being tried, which involve the interpretation of purchase and sale agreements for two properties. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have presented no valid legal basis to rescind the agreements and that the evidence shows the plaintiffs were unable to complete the purchase for financial reasons.
This document is a motion for a stay of the mandate pending a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. It was filed by Howard K. Stern on behalf of Vickie Lynn Marshall's estate following the 9th Circuit's denial of rehearing. The motion argues that substantial questions will be presented in the cert petition regarding the scope of bankruptcy courts' power over compulsory counterclaims. It contends the 9th Circuit's new test conflicts with other circuits and Supreme Court precedent. The declaration also asserts the petition raises important issues of bankruptcy practice that require uniformity.
This appeal concerns discovery disputes in an adversary proceeding brought by Sulphur Mountain Land & Livestock, LP against John and Maureen Redmond regarding their bankruptcy filing. Sulphur Mountain had previously sued the Redmonds over a commercial lease guaranteed by their daughter. The bankruptcy court granted Sulphur Mountain's motion to compel discovery from the Redmonds and later issued terminating sanctions against them for alleged noncompliance, even though the Redmonds had produced documents and been deposed. The Redmonds are appealing these rulings.
This document summarizes a court case regarding a dispute over land use jurisdiction between the City of Tontitown, Arkansas and landowners Jay and Connie Potter. The Potters purchased 19 acres outside Tontitown city limits and sought approval to build an RV park. They withdrew their application to Tontitown and received approval from the Washington County Planning Board, but the approval stated it would be void if Tontitown had jurisdiction. Tontitown claimed jurisdiction and sought an injunction to stop construction, arguing it had properly designated its planning area boundaries. The circuit court granted the injunction, finding Tontitown likely to succeed on the merits. The Potters appealed.
This document is an appellant's opening brief for a case in the California Court of Appeal regarding a trust. Robert Quick (the appellant) alleges that Andrea Pearson (the respondent), as trustee, breached the trust by concealing its existence from him and failing to provide him distributions as a beneficiary. The brief argues that Quick sufficiently alleged facts to state a cause of action and overcome defenses of statute of limitations and laches. It maintains the trial court erred in sustaining Pearson's demurrer without leave to amend.
This document is a petition for divorce filed by Sandra Carroll against Kenneth Carroll. It provides basic information about the parties and the marriage. It states that there are no children and the marital assets are valued at under $50,000. It requests that the court grant the divorce and divide the marital assets and debts in a just and equitable manner.
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge Theresa Holmes-Simmons from 01/01/2014 to 05...Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding motions to dismiss filed by defendants Darren Chaker and Nicole Chaker in a civil RICO lawsuit brought by plaintiffs Scott McMillan and The McMillan Law Firm. The order summarizes the allegations in the plaintiffs' amended complaint, which claims the defendants engaged in a pattern of extortion, harassment, and other unlawful acts as part of a RICO enterprise. The order analyzes the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), considering whether the plaintiffs have adequately alleged predicate acts of racketeering, cognizable damages, and other elements of RICO and state law claims.
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge James Nugent from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
This appeal involves post-judgment orders from a legal malpractice case brought by Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., Malibu Broadbeach L.P., and Pacific Coast Management against Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and several individuals. The trial court granted Sulphur and Malibu's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied the defendants' motion for fees and motion to tax costs, finding Sulphur and Malibu were the prevailing parties. The defendants appeal, arguing: 1) the trial court failed to properly determine the prevailing party under Civil Code §1717 before considering C.C.P. §998; 2) even if it had, it abused its discretion in finding Sulphur and
This memorandum supports plaintiff Carol Broad's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant Herb Hancock from demolishing and reconstructing his property. The memorandum argues that Broad is likely to succeed on the merits because Hancock's construction plans violate the governing documents of their homeowners association and Broad's express easement for air and light. It asserts that Broad will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction and that the balance of hardships weighs in her favor. The memorandum concludes that both a preliminary and permanent injunction should be granted to prevent Hancock from breaching the covenant and violating Broad's property rights.
When Plaintiff Offers for Defendants to Validate Plaintiff's "Lease" and "Cas...jamesmaredmond
This supplemental declaration was submitted by David Chatfield, an attorney representing Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co. LLC, in opposition to a motion to compel further deposition of Stephen Gaggero. Chatfield states that he previously offered to show opposing counsel a document establishing Sulphur Mountain's right to lease the premises in question, without copying it, but received no response. Chatfield offered again by letter on August 26th and again received no response. The declaration aims to show Chatfield attempted to resolve the issue without further court action.
FindLaw | Court of Appeals Reverses Entry Bar to Islamic ScholarLegalDocs
This document summarizes a United States Court of Appeals case regarding the denial of a visa for Tariq Ramadan, an Islamic scholar. The three organizational plaintiffs claimed the denial violated their First Amendment right to have Ramadan share his views in the US. The government denied the visa because Ramadan had contributed funds to a charity that supported Hamas, which the government deemed material support to a terrorist organization. The Court of Appeals concluded that the consular officer who denied the visa did not properly confront Ramadan with the allegations, which prevented Ramadan from demonstrating that he did not know the charity supported terrorism. The Court vacated the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
This newsletter summarizes recent court cases related to reinsurance:
1) The Third Circuit ruled that a reinsurer did not need to demonstrate prejudice from late notice of loss given by the reinsured in order to be relieved of indemnity obligations, applying New York law.
2) A New York federal court confirmed multiple arbitration awards in favor of a cedent, rejecting the reinsurer's arguments to vacate the awards.
3) A Wisconsin federal court transferred a dispute over arbitrator selection and consolidation to New York based on forum selection clauses in the reinsurance contracts.
The document provides an outline for a presentation on motions practice in Maryland state courts. It discusses mandatory motions, permissive motions, general motions like motions for summary judgment and discovery motions. It then covers the specific grounds for various dismissal motions including lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process or service. The document reviews the timing of summary judgment motions and the requirements for supporting and opposing such motions with affidavits and evidence. It also lists several common affirmative defenses that can be raised in motions.
SMLLC v Geraldine Redmond US BK CT Transcript - Case No. NDO3-12487 - 4-20-05jamesmaredmond
The court denied a motion to amend a complaint objecting to the discharge of debt in a bankruptcy case. The original complaint alleged the debtor failed to disclose assets like a corral and horses in bankruptcy filings. The proposed amendment alleged rental property fraud. The court found the proposed amendment did not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c), as the facts alleged were different. A two-day trial was scheduled for May 31st and June 1st to resolve the original complaint.
Defendants motion for summary judgment, incorporated memorandum of law in sup...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, Traian Bujduveanu, against his residential reentry center Dismas Charities Inc. and three employees. The motion argues that the plaintiff cannot maintain any causes of action because he violated terms of his release by driving without permission and possessing a cell phone, so the Bureau of Prisons properly returned him to prison to serve the rest of his sentence. It also argues the individual employees did not commit any tortious acts and the plaintiff has no evidence to support his legal claims against them. The defendants are requesting summary judgment to dismiss all claims.
Alistair Jones Motion for Summary JudgmentAlistair Jones
Fred Northrop filed a motion for summary judgment against Acme Insurance in a lawsuit alleging sexual discrimination by Northrop's supervisor Helen Redmond. Northrop claims that Redmond offered him a promotion in exchange for sexual favors, and then denied him the promotion and spread false rumors about him after he refused. Northrop argues that as Redmond's actions were in her official capacity as his supervisor for Acme, Acme is liable for sexual discrimination. Northrop is seeking damages, back pay, reinstatement to the denied position, and attorney's fees if found to have experienced discrimination as a motivating factor in being denied the promotion.
Sample motion for summary judgment by defendant in CaliforniaLegalDocsPro
This sample motion for summary judgment by a defendant in California is filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c on the grounds that summary judgment should be granted as no triable issue of material fact exists in that the plaintiff cannot establish a required element of a cause or causes of action, or that a complete defense to a cause or causes of action exists. The sample on which this preview is based is 18 pages and includes brief instructions, a table and contents and table of authorities with an opening summary of argument, memorandum of points and authorities with citations to case law and statutory authority, separate statement of undisputed material facts, sample declaration, proposed order and proof of service.
Defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs response to defendants’ reply brief i...Cocoselul Inaripat
Defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's response brief to their reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment for the following reasons:
1) The local court rules do not permit a response to a reply brief without court approval, which was not obtained.
2) Even if permitted, the plaintiff's response brief exceeds the 20-page limit for response briefs and the 10-page limit for reply briefs.
3) The defendants argue the plaintiff's response brief should be stricken from the record.
The document consists of the repeated text "W.ROSESPEAKS.COM" spread over multiple lines without any other words or context provided. It appears to be promoting a website address but provides no other information about the site or its purpose in just three repeated lines of text.
Motion for Summary Judgment by Kanawha Stone containing the deposition and re...Putnam Reporter
Motion For Summary Judgment with exhibit containing the depositions and resumes of the plaintiffs in the case of :
DOLORES HALBURN and MARK HALBURN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF HURRICANE, WEST VIRGINIA,
a municipal corporation, BEN NEWHOUSE,
individually and in his capacity as City Manager
for the City of Hurricane, CLEVELAND
CONSTRUCTION, INC. dba Cleveland
Construction, Inc. Of Nevada, and KANAWHA
STONE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants.
Putnam County WV Civil Action No. 07-C-298
This document provides guidance on drafting trial briefs and memoranda in support of pretrial motions. It discusses including a caption with the parties' names and case information. The statement of facts section should highlight facts favorable to your client's position and be supported by the record. Unfavorable facts should be de-emphasized. The argument section should weave the facts and law persuasively using an organizational structure like CREAC (Conclusion, Rule, Explanation, Application, Conclusion). Multiple claims should be addressed separately following this structure.
Defendant´s memo in support of motion for judgment (Grade 8,4/10) OLGA THEODOROGLOU
This memorandum supports UPS's motion for judgment in a case brought by Istore BENELUX. It argues that: 1) UPS acted as a freight forwarder, not carrier, so it is not liable under the CMR Convention; 2) For the first shipment of watches, no valid contract existed as the value exceeded UPS's terms; 3) For the second shipment of iPads, damage occurred after delivery so UPS is not liable; 4) For the third shipment of a MacBook damaged by rain, water damage is an exoneration ground relieving UPS of liability under the CMR. The memorandum concludes judgment should be granted for UPS.
Summary Judgment Brief - 42 § 1983 - Color of LawMike Kodada
This motion concerns a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Anthony Romano against Michael Kane. Romano and Kane got into a dispute at a football game where Kane was seated behind Romano with his son. Kane, an off-duty police officer, used his handcuffs to trip Romano, causing injuries. Kane moves for summary judgment on the basis that his actions did not satisfy the "color of law" requirement of Romano's § 1983 claim. Kane argues that he was not undertaking official police duties and did not purport to act with state authority during the private dispute with Romano. Therefore, Kane asserts he did not act "under color of law" and the § 1983 claim should
Writing sample (motion for summary judgment- abbreviated) for Martinez, Aaron...Aaron A. Martinez
This motion for summary judgment argues that the plaintiff, Treassa Wren, is not a consumer under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and therefore does not have standing to bring DTPA claims. It asserts that Wren's employer, Aldine Independent School District, purchased the school bus and driver's seat that injured Wren to further its business of transporting students, not primarily for Wren's benefit. Therefore, Wren did not acquire or have ownership of the bus and seat, and any benefit to her was incidental. As a result, the motion argues Wren is not a consumer under the DTPA as a matter of law and the DTPA claims should be dismissed.
Case Brief InstructionsYou will prepare a Case Brief on th.docxmichelljubborjudd
Case Brief Instructions
You will prepare a Case Brief on the provided judicial opinion regarding a criminal justice topic included below , CAVITT v. STATE. DO NOT USE INFORMATION FROM THE CASE BRIEF SAMPLE. The judicial opinion that you will prepare a Case Brief on can be found below. The Case Brief must include the following sections: Caption, Facts, Procedural History, Issue, Rule of Law, Holding, and Rationale. The Case Brief must be 1 page. A heading must be provided for each section of the Case Brief. Save your work as a Microsoft Word document and review the Sample Case Brief provided below.
CAVITT v. STATE Miss. 1199 Cite as 159 So.3d 1199 (Miss.App. 2015) preme court’s notation in Bounds, Bounds asserts that the judge, not the jury, set his sentence at life in prison. Id. Hence, he claims that the imposition of a life sentence by the circuit court judge created an illegal sentence that defeats the statute of limitations on his appeal. ¶ 3. In its order dated January 7, 2014, the circuit court summarily dismissed Bounds’s PCR motion—in part because Bounds failed to seek leave from the supreme court to file the PCR motion and in part because the circuit court found that his case is not excepted from the statute of limitations. On January 21, 2014, Bounds, having reviewed the circuit court’s order, filed a motion for leave from the supreme court to proceed with his PCR motion. On January 27, 2014, Bounds filed the instant appeal. Nonetheless, on June 25, 2014, the supreme court denied Bounds’s request for leave, stating: In the application for leave before this panel, Bounds merely states that his sentence was illegal. He offers no argument and does not support his contention. Bounds’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court, and the mandate issued in 1972. Accordingly, we find that Bounds has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right, and his application for leave should be dismissed as timebarred. Despite the supreme court’s denial of Bounds’s motion for leave to proceed with his PCR motion, Bounds has continued in his appeal of the matter. DISCUSSION [1, 2] ¶ 4. Mississippi law requires that a movant must obtain permission from the supreme court to file a PCR motion in a circuit court if the movant’s conviction has been affirmed by the appellate court on direct appeal or if the direct appeal has been dismissed. Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39– 7 (Supp.2014). ‘‘This procedure is not merely advisory, but jurisdictional.’’ Bownes v. State, 963 So.2d 1277, 1278 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citation omitted). We have consistently held that when a movant fails to obtain the requisite permission from the supreme court, all other courts lack the jurisdiction necessary to review the movant’s PCR motion. See Doss v. State, 757 So.2d 1016, 1017 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct. App.2000); Bownes, 963 So.2d at 1279 (¶ 4). Accordingly, both the circuit court and this Court are without jurisdiction to review Bounds’s appeal. As ...
This motion seeks to preclude the defense from introducing evidence of the plaintiff's prior criminal record from New Jersey. Specifically, it aims to prevent evidence related to an accusation that the plaintiff obtained temporary disability benefits through deception. The plaintiff was accepted into a pretrial intervention program in New Jersey for this accusation but did not plead guilty. The motion argues this evidence should be excluded as it involves a collateral matter unrelated to the issues in the current civil case, and risks unduly prejudicing the plaintiff. Introduction of such extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on a collateral matter is prohibited.
Fee award dollar general raymond dieppa chris wadsworthRaymond R. Dieppa
This document is a judgment ordering the defendant Dollar General to pay attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff Michele Barry. It summarizes the background of the personal injury case, in which Barry sued Dollar General for injuries from a slip and fall in their store and was awarded $250,087 by a jury. The court found Dollar General's defense counsel engaged in unacceptable and willful misconduct by making false statements in their opening argument that directly contradicted video evidence. As a result, the court sanctioned Dollar General and its counsel under Florida statute 57.105. The court determined the attorney fees and costs requested by Barry's counsel were reasonable.
Sulphur Moutain vs. John Redmond, et al - B238767jamesmaredmond
This document summarizes a court case involving a dispute over the sale of a home to satisfy an unpaid judgment. The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendants and sought to enforce it by selling their home. The defendants claimed a homestead exemption to protect part of the equity in their home. The trial court approved the sale of the home, finding the defendants could not claim the exemption again since they used it in a prior bankruptcy proceeding. The appellate court reversed, finding no basis for the plaintiff's argument that the homestead exemption can only be used once. The appellate court also found the plaintiff's lien on the property was effective as of 2002, not the later date determined by the trial court. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent
FORDHAM #2 of 3; Fordham v Dewsash PL t.as SP&W.Hobson [2012] NSWDC 109Alec Rendell [NBPR-2]
This document summarizes a District Court appeal from a decision of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal regarding a building dispute. The Tribunal found that there was an agreement for the plaintiff to pay $36,000 upon completion of the slab, but the District Court found there was no evidence to support this finding. The District Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's orders, and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for a rehearing in accordance with the District Court's reasons.
This document summarizes an appeal regarding orders appointing a receiver and assigning financial rights to enforce a judgment in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiff had transferred his assets to various entities to avoid paying the judgment, and those entities were found to be alter egos of the plaintiff. After the plaintiff testified he had no ability to pay, the defendants filed motions to appoint a receiver and assign financial rights, which the trial court granted. The additional judgment debtors appealed the orders. The appellate court affirmed the orders, finding that the additional judgment debtors had an opportunity to oppose the motions at a hearing and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the receiver and assigning financial rights given the plaintiff's attempts to avoid paying the
This document is a court opinion from the Supreme Court of New York regarding a lawsuit filed by Jordan DeRose against Bloomingdale's Inc. under New York Labor Law sections 240(1) and 241(6). The court opinion finds:
1) DeRose is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of Bloomingdale's liability under section 240(1) because Bloomingdale's failed to provide DeRose with an adequate safety device (a Baker scaffold) to perform his demolition work, as directed by his supervisor to instead use an inadequate ladder from which he fell and was injured.
2) Bloomingdale's cannot claim the sole proximate cause defense because an adequate safety device was not provided to De
This case involves a homeowner, Lori Ihli, suing a contractor, Anthony Lazzaretto, for allegedly performing negligent remodeling work on her home. After commencing the lawsuit, Ihli learned she was eligible for disaster relief funding to replace her home. Without notifying Lazzaretto, Ihli allowed her home to be demolished. Lazzaretto then moved for sanctions, requesting dismissal due to spoliation of evidence. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Ihli's claims, finding her actions were more egregious than a similar case where dismissal was upheld as she provided no notice to Lazzaretto. Ihli appealed the dismissal.
This document is an order from a federal district court ruling on motions in a product liability case involving a defective attic ladder. The court denied the defendant ladder manufacturer's motion to exclude the plaintiff's expert witness under Daubert. The court found that both the plaintiff's and defendant's experts were qualified and used reliable methodologies, even if they reached different conclusions. The court also granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding factual disputes remained that precluded full summary judgment.
The document discusses two motions in the case of Stephen M. Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen and Clarke, et al.
1) The court partially granted the plaintiff's motion to quash the third deposition notice but ordered that the plaintiff submit to a final deposition of no more than 10 hours on a mutually agreeable date.
2) The court denied the plaintiff's motion to quash the subpoena for production of documents from the plaintiff's previous attorney. The court found that the plaintiff waived privilege by suing both the defendant and previous attorney and putting the attorney's conduct at issue. The documents were ordered to be produced.
Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial GroundsRich Bergeron
Judge James D. O'Neill III denied my motion to dismiss. He had to overlook a great deal of facts and precedent law to come to the conclusion he did. I lay it all out for him in this motion to reconsider. Can he admit he was wrong, or will he keep being an ignorant and unethical disgrace to the bench? See WWW.NHDRUGTASKFORCE.COM to find out.
GS Holistic Court Opinion in Trademark DisputeMike Keyes
This document is a court filing that recommends granting in part a motion for default judgment against two defendants, Haz Investments LLC and Hazim Assaf, in a trademark infringement lawsuit. The plaintiff, GS Holistic LLC, alleges the defendants sold counterfeit products bearing GS's trademarks without authorization. As the defendants failed to respond to the complaint, the clerk entered default against them. The court filing analyzes the applicable legal standards and finds default judgment is warranted procedurally and substantively for some of the plaintiff's claims. It recommends awarding $15,000 in statutory damages, $782 in costs, and injunctive relief to the plaintiff.
This document is a petition in support of a writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction in bail for Anna Gristina. It summarizes that Gristina was arrested and charged with a single count of promoting prostitution in the third degree, a class D non-violent felony, and bail was set at $2 million bond or $1 million cash. It argues the bail is excessive given Gristina has no criminal record, strong community ties, and faces a non-custodial sentence if convicted. It requests the court grant the writ and set reasonable bail.
This document is a petition in support of a writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction in bail for Anna Gristina. It summarizes that Gristina was arrested and charged with a single count of promoting prostitution in the third degree, a class D non-violent felony, and bail was set at $2 million bond or $1 million cash. It argues that this bail amount is excessive and violates constitutional standards given that Gristina has no criminal record, strong community ties, and faces a non-incarceratory sentence if convicted. It requests that the court grant the writ and issue an order setting reasonable bail.
Federal Judge's order of sanctions against Wal-Mart for its failure to preserve videotape in retaliation and discrimination lawsuit in Atlanta, Georgia.
This document discusses a case regarding an insurance claim made by Patricia Allen after a fire at her home. The insurer, Michigan Basic Property Insurance Company, denied the claim based on Allen's failure to submit to an examination under oath and provide documents as required by the insurance policy during the insurer's investigation of the claim. While Allen argued her refusal was due to potential criminal charges related to arson, the court found this constituted willful noncompliance with the policy conditions and justified the insurer's denial of her claim. The court therefore reversed the lower court's denial of the insurer's motion for summary judgment.
1) This document summarizes a court case in Sri Lanka regarding a divorce granted on the grounds of malicious desertion.
2) The plaintiff claimed the defendant deserted him but did not specify the date of desertion in his pleadings. The defendant denied deserting the plaintiff and claimed he forced her to leave on a specific date.
3) The appeals court found multiple errors in the trial judge's decision, including allowing the plaintiff to introduce a specific desertion date not in the original pleadings, failing to properly analyze the evidence regarding desertion versus constructive desertion, and arriving at a conclusion not supported by the facts presented. The appeals court overturned the decision and dismissed the plaintiff's case.
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No. 18-0230 (Putna...Putnam Reporter
A memorandum decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of Mark Vance Halburn v Dolores J. M. No. 15-0350 (Putnam County 11-D-516) September 9, 2019.
Saud A.H. Khokhar has over 30 years of experience providing legal research, writing, and document preparation services under attorney supervision. He has expertise in areas such as real estate, foreclosure, bankruptcy, matrimonial law, immigration, and landlord/tenant law. Saud has also drafted appeals and legal filings in numerous representative court cases. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Pace University and certificates in internet technology and real estate. Saud is also a licensed real estate broker, mortgage broker, insurance broker, and notary public.
1. In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISON FOUR
JEFFREY T. BLACKWELL, ) No. ED100888
)
Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St. Louis County
vs. )
)
CSF PROPERTIES 2 LLC, ) Honorable Thea A. Sherry
)
Respondent. ) Filed: September 30, 2014
Introduction
Jeffrey Blackwell (Plaintiff) appeals the trial court‟s grant of partial summary judgment
in favor of CSF Properties 2, LLC (Defendant) on Plaintiff‟s action for negligence and
negligence per se. Because there is no final, appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
In April 2009, Defendant owned a house at 6763 Edison in Velda Village Hills. The
house had a front porch enclosed by a brick wall approximately nineteen inches in height. The
western wall of the enclosure abutted a ten-foot drop-off to a concrete driveway.
Defendant rented 6763 Edison to Tonya Dyson. On April 3, 2009, Ms. Dyson invited
Plaintiff to a post-funeral repast at her house. During the repast, Plaintiff engaged in a “scuffle”
with Tommy Anderson, another guest, and Ms. Dyson ordered Plaintiff to leave. Plaintiff exited
the front door and stood on the western end of the front porch, where he intended to call his
parents to request a ride home. Before Plaintiff was able to place the call, Mr. Anderson stepped
2. 2
onto the front porch and pushed Plaintiff, causing him to fall over the brick enclosure to the
driveway below and fracture his cervical spine, resulting in paralysis.
In May 2012, Plaintiff filed a first amended petition alleging that Defendant‟s negligence
in maintaining the porch and porch enclosure in an unsafe condition caused his injuries. Plaintiff
did not separate his petition into counts but rather pleaded broadly that:
[Defendant] failed to exercise reasonable care and was negligent in one or
more of the following respects:
(a) It rented the dwelling with a front porch enclosure that violated applicable
codes and ordinances because the enclosure was not at least 30” or at least
46” in height constituting negligence per se;
(b) It failed to construct the front porch enclosure to a height of at least 30” or
at least 46” when it knew or could have known that the failure to do so
created a significant risk of harm to residents and guests;
(c) It failed to make the porch reasonably safe after it undertook to make the
porch reasonably safe by installing a handrail on the stairs and reinforcing
the bricks around the porch;
(d) It failed to make the porch comply with the applicable codes and
ordinances when it made alterations to the porch;
(e) It failed to warn the Plaintiff of the dangerous condition of the front porch
enclosure;
(f) It rented the dwelling when it knew or could have known that the front
porch enclosure created a significant risk of harm to residents and guests
because it constituted a fall hazard;
(g) It failed to remove and make safe the front porch enclosure when it knew
or could have known that the condition rendered the premises unsafe, in
violation of applicable codes and ordinances constituting negligence per se;
(h) It failed to inspect the front porch enclosure when it knew or could have
known that the enclosure was not reasonably safe; and
(i) It failed to maintain the front porch enclosure when it knew or could have
known that the enclosure was not reasonably safe.
Defendant responded with an answer and denied Plaintiff‟s allegations. Subsequently, on
July 20, 21012, Defendant filed a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” on Plaintiff‟s claim
of negligence per se (“July 20, 2012 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”). In its motion,
Defendant asserted that “the undisputed facts of the case establish that a statute or an ordinance
sufficient to support a claim for negligence per se was not violated by the home located at 6763
3. 3
Edison,” and, even if the property violated a statute or ordinance, “such a violation was not the
proximate cause of the harm alleged here, and negligence per se cannot be established.” In
January 2013, the trial court denied Defendant‟s July 20, 2012 Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
After the trial court denied Defendant partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff‟s
negligence per se claim, Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, denominated
“Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Negligence.” In this motion filed on May 23, 2013,
Defendant asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment “on the negligence claim in
Plaintiff‟s First Amended Petition” because at the time of Plaintiff‟s injury, Plaintiff was a
trespasser to whom Defendant owed no duty. Defendant argued in the alternative, if Plaintiff
was not a trespasser, he was a licensee, and Plaintiff “cannot support a licensee claim here
because [Defendant] did not know or have information that the porch of the property at 6763
Edison was unreasonably safe [sic] for individuals such as Plaintiff” or that “Plaintiff would not
discover this condition or realize its risk of harm.” Finally, Defendant contended that “the
allegedly dangerous condition that Plaintiff is claiming caused his injuries was open and obvious
and cannot thus be used by him to support a claim of negligence as a matter of law.”
After hearing arguments, the trial court granted Defendant‟s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Negligence on November 25, 2013. In its judgment, the trial court found that
Plaintiff was present on Defendant‟s property as a licensee and that Defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed evidence in the record demonstrated that
Plaintiff “knew the condition of the porch and realized the risk of harm prior to his injury.” The
trial court‟s November 25, 2013 partial summary judgment contains no reference to Plaintiff‟s
allegations of negligence per se. The judgment concludes: “ACCORDINGLY, Defendant CSF
4. 4
Properties 2 L.L.C.‟s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Jeffrey Blackwell‟s Petition is
hereby GRANTED. All arguments submitted and not addressed have been considered and
DENIED.” Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the trial court‟s judgment of November 25,
2013 granting Defendant‟s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Negligence.
Discussion
Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant because
it: (1) applied the incorrect law to the facts when it held that Plaintiff was a licensee; and (2)
decided a disputed element of licensee liability as a matter of law. Plaintiff also contends that
the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff‟s entire petition, including his count for negligence
per se, because Defendant‟s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Negligence related solely
to Plaintiff‟s negligence claim. Defendant counters that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment because Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff as: (1) the conditions of the porch and
porch enclosure were open and obvious; and (2) at the time of the injury, Plaintiff was a
trespasser on Defendant‟s property. Additionally, Defendant asserts that this court should affirm
the trial court‟s judgment for Defendant as to Plaintiff‟s negligence per se claim because “the
claim fails as a matter of law” and “[s]o long as the trial court‟s judgment is sustainable on any
ground, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal.”
Before we address the merits of Plaintiff‟s points on appeal, we consider our authority to
review the trial court's ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment.1
Duncan v. Mo.
Alliance for Children & Families, 387 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Mo.App.W.D. 2012). A final judgment
is a prerequisite to appellate review. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.020; Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371
S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc
1
We therefore do not reach the issue of the propriety of summary judgment on Plaintiff‟s
negligence claim.
5. 5
1997)). A partial summary judgment is not a final judgment subject to our review if it leaves
issues for future determination. Dibben v. Shelter Ins. Co., 261 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Mo.App.W.D.
2008). If the trial court‟s judgment was not a final judgment, we must dismiss the appeal.
Ndegwa, 371 S.W.3d at 801 (citing Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244).
A judgment is final when it disposes of an entire claim for relief, or a distinct “judicial
unit.” Gibson, 952 S.W.3d at 244. A distinct judicial unit is “the final judgment on a claim, and
not a ruling on some of several issues arising out of the same transaction or occurrence which
does not dispose of the claim.” Ndegwa, 371 S.W.3d at 801 (quoting Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at
244)). In other words, a judicial unit “comprises all the legal issues raised by a single fact
situation[.]” Blechle v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 28 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000)
(citing Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244)). “[A] ruling on any issue that does not finally „dispose of
the claim‟ is not a „judicial unit‟ for appeal and therefore cannot serve as the foundation for a
final judgment.” Id. at 487 (quoting Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244)).
Rule 74.01(b) provides an exception to the final judgment requirement in cases involving
multiple claims for relief. Talbot v. Union Elec. Co., 157 S.W.3d 376, 378 (Mo.App.E.D. 2005).
Pursuant to Rule 74.01(b), “the court may enter a judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay.”2
Here, the trial court did not certify the partial summary judgment for appeal under Rule
74.01(b).
Even if the trial court had certified the partial summary judgment for appeal under Rule
74.01(b), the judgment in question would not be final for purposes of appeal because it did not
2
We note that a trial court‟s certification of a judgment as final is not conclusive. Duncan, 387
S.W.3d at 391. A trial court‟s designation of a judgment as final “is effective only when the
order disposes of a distinct „judicial unit.‟” Id. (quoting Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244
(Mo. banc 1997)).
6. 6
resolve at least one claim for relief. See, e.g., Talbot, 157 S.W.3d at 378. In his petition,
Plaintiff set forth two legal theories (negligence and negligence per se) seeking damages based
on the same transaction or occurrence (Plaintiff‟s fall from Defendant‟s porch). Because
Plaintiff‟s theories of negligence and negligence per se arise from the same fact situation, they
comprise a single judicial unit. See, e.g., Moreland v. Farren-Davis, 995 S.W.2d 512, 517-18
(Mo.App.W.D. 1999).
The trial court‟s November 25, 2013 judgment disposed of Plaintiff‟s action for
negligence but not his action for negligence per se. Prior to filing its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Negligence, Defendant filed the July 20, 2012 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to negligence per se. The trial court overruled that motion. Defendant
subsequently filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Negligence, in which it
requested the trial court “enter summary judgment in [Defendant‟s] favor on the claims for
negligence in Plaintiff‟s First Amended Petition. . . .” Defendant‟s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Negligence neither pleaded undisputed material facts negating Plaintiff‟s
negligence per se claim nor asserted that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
as to negligence per se. Defendant‟s motion requested partial summary judgment on Plaintiff‟s
“claims for negligence,” and the trial court granted it.
Although Plaintiff asserts that the trial court‟s November 24, 2012 summary judgment
“dismissed the entirety of [Plaintiff‟s] case including his negligence per se claim not at issue in
[Defendant‟s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Negligence],” we conclude that the
language of the judgment is insufficient to dismiss both causes of action. Indeed, the judgment
merely states that Defendant‟s “Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Jeffrey Blackwell‟s
Petition is hereby GRANTED” and “[a]ll arguments submitted and not addressed have been
7. 7
considered and DENIED.” The trial court neither referred to Plaintiff‟s theory of negligence per
se nor analyzed the elements of that claim.
Defendant impliedly addresses the finality of the judgment when it argues that, even
though Defendant‟s motion for partial summary judgment on negligence “did not expressly
embrace [Plaintiff‟s] negligence per se claim . . . [h]is negligence per se claim is necessarily
subsumed by [Defendant‟s] arguments for summary judgment on [Plaintiff‟s] negligence claims
generally.” Defendant cites no authority to support its suggestion that, if Defendant established a
right to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff‟s claim of negligence, it likewise established a
right to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff‟s claim of negligence per se.3
To establish a claim of negligence per se based on the violation of an ordinance, a
plaintiff must plead the following four elements:
(1) . . . a violation of the ordinance; (2) the injured plaintiff was a member of
the class of persons intended to be protected by the ordinance; (3) the
plaintiff's injury is of the type the ordinance was designed to prevent; and (4)
the violation of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the injury.
Mediq PRN Life Support Servs., Inc. v. Abrams, 899 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Mo.App.E.D. 1994). In
contrast, the elements of a negligence claim are: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the
defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) the defendant‟s failure to perform that duty; and
(3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from that failure. Weaks v. Rupp, 966 S.W.2d 387, 392
(Mo.App.W.D. 1998). A review of Defendant‟s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Negligence reveals that Defendant stated facts intended to negate elements of Plaintiff‟s
negligence claim but did not assert any facts intended to negate proof of the material elements of
Plaintiff‟s negligence per se claim. Because, in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
3
In any event, the trial court expressly considered Defendant‟s July 20, 2012 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to negligence per se and declined to grant summary judgment.
8. 8
Negligence, Defendant only addressed Plaintiff‟s negligence claim, the trial court did not grant
summary judgment on Plaintiff‟s entire claim. See Moreland, 995 S.W.2d at 517.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court‟s judgment did not completely resolve
Plaintiff‟s entire claim for relief and is therefore not a final and appealable judgment. In the
absence of a final judgment, this court lacks authority to consider this appeal. Talbot, 157
S.W.3d at 379.
Conclusion
Plaintiff‟s appeal is dismissed.
Patricia L. Cohen, Presiding Judge
Roy L. Richter, J., and
Robert M. Clayton III, J., concur