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The latest news in the DNS resolution
Based on our own practical experience
• Whalebone provides DNS
resolution for millions of
people and devices
• Standard compliance, low
latency and stability is a
must
• Added anti-malware and
anomaly detection layer
• Based on Knot Resolver
by CZ.NIC
hacker.com safety.com
Random subdomain attacks
• Also called slow drip attacks
• Targeted domain is attacked through default resolvers
for the botnet devices globally
• Generating many queries to random (therefore non-
existent) subdomains from the whole botnet will
eventually take the domain down
• Eating up the resolver cache and outgoing bandwidth
xyz.ddostarget.com
abc.ddostarget.com
123.ddostarget.com
...
DNSSEC aggressive cache
• No need to contact the authoritative server for the
proof of non-existence
• No need to cache responses for such non-existent
subdomains
• Shielding the authoritative servers (the queries are
handled on the resolver)
• Detailed numbers and simulations: DNSSEC
aggressive cache (RFC 8198), Petr Špaček (CZ.NIC),
https://ripe76.ripe.net/presentations/71-RIPE76-
presentation-RFC8198.pdf
Variant of random subdomain attack
mx2.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx2.webmail.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.webdisk.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.webdisk.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.cpanel.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.cpanel.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.autodiscover.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.autodiscover.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mail.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mail.weaverpublishing.com.
mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mail.weaverpublishing.com.
Targeted domain: weaverpublishing.com
weaverpublishing.com nameserver = ns1.weaverpublishing.com
weaverpublishing.com nameserver = ns2.weaverpublishing.com
DNSSEC aggressive cache - issues
• F5 BIG-IP Load balancer faulty implementation of
proof of non-existence
• Query for non-existent record type get NSEC3
response stating that only TXT records exist ->
Resolver returns NXDOMAIN for ongoing A records
• Workaround and fix provided by the vendor, still not
applied at many organizations
• Issue originally created by Whalebone and analyzed
by CZ.NIC https://github.com/dns-violations/dns-
violations/blob/master/2018/DVE-2018-0003.md
DNSSEC aggressive cache - issues
• F5 BIG-IP balancers are used by banks, government
and large service providers
• Issue emerged randomly and disappeared quickly
making in very hard to analyze
• Error in DNSSEC implementation on F5 BIG-IP load
balancers, Petr Špaček (CZ.NIC),
https://en.blog.nic.cz/2019/07/10/error-in-dnssec-
implementation-on-f5-big-ip-load-balancers/
DNSSEC validation failures monitoring
1. Domains with expired keys
2. Misconfigured domains (even TLDs!)
3. Attacks?
ISP will always be the first one to blame 
.sk DNSSEC deployment
• Overnight TLD DNSSEC deployment with some
issues
• 8 servers with correct configuration
• 6 misconfigured with wrong proofs
• Resolution randomly ended up in validation failure
• Unreachable domains for end users resulting in ISP
helpdesk calls
• Reproduction of the issue unreliable due to majority of
correctly configured servers
• Fixed quickly once we called them directly
• Thanks CZ.NIC and DNSViz for identification!
DNSSEC – is it worth the effort?
• We estimate that DNSSEC validation failures are just
0,01% of all DNS queries in our networks
• Sign, Validate and Monitor!
• DNSViz does a great job at analysis:
• Properly configured DNSSEC:
http://dnsviz.net/d/nic.cz/dnssec/
• DNSSEC issues: http://dnsviz.net/d/szn-broken-
dnssec.cz/dnssec/
Filter threats off your network
Robert Šefr, CTO
robert.sefr@whalebone.io
@robcza
https://whalebone.io

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Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptx

  • 1. The latest news in the DNS resolution
  • 2. Based on our own practical experience • Whalebone provides DNS resolution for millions of people and devices • Standard compliance, low latency and stability is a must • Added anti-malware and anomaly detection layer • Based on Knot Resolver by CZ.NIC hacker.com safety.com
  • 3. Random subdomain attacks • Also called slow drip attacks • Targeted domain is attacked through default resolvers for the botnet devices globally • Generating many queries to random (therefore non- existent) subdomains from the whole botnet will eventually take the domain down • Eating up the resolver cache and outgoing bandwidth xyz.ddostarget.com abc.ddostarget.com 123.ddostarget.com ...
  • 4. DNSSEC aggressive cache • No need to contact the authoritative server for the proof of non-existence • No need to cache responses for such non-existent subdomains • Shielding the authoritative servers (the queries are handled on the resolver) • Detailed numbers and simulations: DNSSEC aggressive cache (RFC 8198), Petr Špaček (CZ.NIC), https://ripe76.ripe.net/presentations/71-RIPE76- presentation-RFC8198.pdf
  • 5. Variant of random subdomain attack mx2.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx2.webmail.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.webdisk.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.webdisk.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.cpanel.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.cpanel.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.autodiscover.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.autodiscover.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mail.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx2.mx2.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mail.weaverpublishing.com. mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mail.weaverpublishing.com. Targeted domain: weaverpublishing.com weaverpublishing.com nameserver = ns1.weaverpublishing.com weaverpublishing.com nameserver = ns2.weaverpublishing.com
  • 6.
  • 7. DNSSEC aggressive cache - issues • F5 BIG-IP Load balancer faulty implementation of proof of non-existence • Query for non-existent record type get NSEC3 response stating that only TXT records exist -> Resolver returns NXDOMAIN for ongoing A records • Workaround and fix provided by the vendor, still not applied at many organizations • Issue originally created by Whalebone and analyzed by CZ.NIC https://github.com/dns-violations/dns- violations/blob/master/2018/DVE-2018-0003.md
  • 8. DNSSEC aggressive cache - issues • F5 BIG-IP balancers are used by banks, government and large service providers • Issue emerged randomly and disappeared quickly making in very hard to analyze • Error in DNSSEC implementation on F5 BIG-IP load balancers, Petr Špaček (CZ.NIC), https://en.blog.nic.cz/2019/07/10/error-in-dnssec- implementation-on-f5-big-ip-load-balancers/
  • 9. DNSSEC validation failures monitoring 1. Domains with expired keys 2. Misconfigured domains (even TLDs!) 3. Attacks? ISP will always be the first one to blame 
  • 10. .sk DNSSEC deployment • Overnight TLD DNSSEC deployment with some issues • 8 servers with correct configuration • 6 misconfigured with wrong proofs • Resolution randomly ended up in validation failure • Unreachable domains for end users resulting in ISP helpdesk calls • Reproduction of the issue unreliable due to majority of correctly configured servers • Fixed quickly once we called them directly • Thanks CZ.NIC and DNSViz for identification!
  • 11. DNSSEC – is it worth the effort? • We estimate that DNSSEC validation failures are just 0,01% of all DNS queries in our networks • Sign, Validate and Monitor! • DNSViz does a great job at analysis: • Properly configured DNSSEC: http://dnsviz.net/d/nic.cz/dnssec/ • DNSSEC issues: http://dnsviz.net/d/szn-broken- dnssec.cz/dnssec/
  • 12. Filter threats off your network Robert Šefr, CTO robert.sefr@whalebone.io @robcza https://whalebone.io