The documents discuss issues with international aviation regulation and safety standards. Specifically: 1) The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) lacks enforcement authority, making it difficult to implement standardized safety regulations across countries. 2) Airlines have become more proactive on safety than regulatory bodies, but ICAO still serves as an important forum for discussion. 3) Checking ICAO ratings is recommended to evaluate an airline's adherence to safety standards. 4) New technologies like cabin pressure monitoring and emergency locator beacons could help with accident response but face adoption challenges. 5) There is a need to change aviation's safety culture from reactive to preventative to better address risks before accidents occur. International

1. File 001
TC 00:35-00:45
It hasn’t been mandated, there is not enforcement authority that said, you have to have this yet.
So while it’s there and people talked about it and saying yes, we can do this.
TC 00:46-00:56
We have been talking about what you can do, since Air France 447 more than 4, 5 years ago, and
yet none of those thing has actually been implemented and backed by regulation.
File 002
TC 00:19-00:39
The airline themselves are being much more proactive than the regulatory authorities are. Right
now what’s happening is the regulatory bodies have become so overwhelmed with what’s
happening, the complexity of the air space, the complexity of the equipment, the complexity of
just cultural mix between what’s happening between the airlines.
TC 00:40-00:58
This all challenges that the ICAO, the international civilization organization face. And so getting
a regulation, push through, actually getting it done has become extremely difficult for them. But
luckily as I mentioned, the airline has step forwarded, they start to make some improvements
already without that regulatory push.
TC 01:00-01:31
I really do believe we need ICAO, but it becomes more a centralized communication, a
centralized place forum which you can discuss all the problems that you have whether you are
from the United Air Emirates, whether you are from Malaysia, wherever you are, the ICAO can
service that centralized regulatory body. Although they have no regulations, they sets standards
and practices among its members, and they all make the agreement they all meet the auditory
requirement, they will meet those standards.

2. File 003
TC 00:18-00:35
I would agree with that. However, there are some foreign carriers that are actually better than the
United States carriers. But right now what we are looking at is the fact that each carrier has its
operated by their dominated country, or by the country that they are certified in.
TC 00:36-01:03
So your point about whether they are all the same or not, they are trying to be that, but they are
really not getting there. So the best way to determine whether or not the air carrier you are going
to fly on is meeting those standards, is by the ICAO regulation themselves, and be able to go to
the ICAO website, and see what the rating is for the particular airline that you are going to flying
on. If it’s not a top rated carrier, you may want to get a second thought to whether you want to
fly on that or not.
TC 01:21-01:49
Well, I believe the ICAO, the Chicago convention needs to be revisited. At the Chicago
convention which is what kind of formulated current ICAO standards, that group or that body
that put that together agree the piece standard practices would be putting into place. What they
didn’t do is give the ICAO any kind of regulatory authority they can’t write regulations, they
can’t say what they have to do or don’t have to do in their individual member state.
TC 01:49-02:07
Now trying to get the states to agree to say while we are going to allow this universal body, like
the United Nations to set regulations for us, that’s a hard sell. So really what has to be happen I
believe is the ICAO has to have the investigated authority.
TC 02:07- 02:40
The ability something like what in the United States, the national transportation safety board
does, they do the extend investigations, and they look at what caused of the extend was, and then
they reported that back to the federal aviation administration the regulatory body. And that
regulatory body then plans rules or develop those rules. So similarly the ICAO needs to have this
extended arm, they need to be more involved in the extend investigations themselves. And in the
audits, the actual, what they are doing in the airlines, that I think our first step towards making
them a little bit more standards.

3. File 004
TC 00:17-00:37
Well there is two things on the technical level that needs to be done, and need to be done right
way. One of those, both of them I mentioned in this new book. But one of them is to have the
equipment on board on the aircraft, communication equipment, send information about the cabin
altitude. The altitude of the pressure inside where the passengers are.
TC 00:37-01:06
We don’t have that information, the air traffic controller don’t have that information, and a lot of
times what we seeing now, that the first investigation something going wrong. They are may or
may not be sensed by the people on board, If that were to be reported, to the air traffic control
center, they can focus their energy and their time on that aircraft knowing that the emergency is
there or about to happen, and they can respond appropriately and track the aircraft right down to
where may got down or even maybe interfere with aircraft in the meantime.
TC 01:45-02:05
Well you can tell that to about 3 different airline accidents that I can name, and in all 3 of those,
they had warnings. But by the time you get that warning, if it’s slow pressurization lead, by the
time you get that warning, you are not in the mental capacity to even understand what that
warning means.
TC 02:05-02:29
So that’s the problem when you flying 35000 feet, you only have about a minute and half of
starvation of oxygen to have recognizable cognizance. So to be able to say I will know, don’t
worry, we will get the warning, so we will know, we will be able to do something. In the
meantime, the aircraft is lost or no longer on the radar screens, and no longer being watched, the
aircraft is crashing.
TC 02:29-02:52
So for those captain to say that, I understand why they would say that, because all the pilots,
every airline pilot is concern about the information that’s going on the cockpit, skipping the
cockpit and getting on the eye and ears those people who might be judging them, so to be able to
say we don’t need that is just your responsible.
File 005
TC 00:04-00:24

4. Well the second recommendation is to have an emergency position indicator radio bacon on
board the aircraft. What that does, is it actually float on the water. Imaging that we can actually
have an airplane has an emergency locator transmitter that actually locates the airplane. That’s
we are talking about here.
TC 00:25-00:44
What they have on the airplane now is design to locate the airplane if it lands on ground, or if it
crashes on the ground. Once that emergency locator transmitted, the existence lane goes under
the water, it’s no use what so ever. So the emergency position indicator radio bacon, they are on
every triangulate ship, it’s on the water right now.
TC 00:45-01:12
If that’s ship goes down, the system in place 17 side lights float around the earth, looking for the
signal, when that signal sent within minutes, sometimes even seconds, those signals are
triangulated, and we know exactly where that position is. The fact we don’t have those on the
tens of thousands and even millions flights they go triangulate on it, in fact we don’t have a way
trace those aircraft when they go down is again their responsible.
TC 01:14-01:49
The pushback on that I believe is just the fact that isn’t a new technology, I think it’s the ability
to have on the exterior, the aircraft eject pilot to an accident. There is some new technology
there. They are pattern to devices, they are ready to be installed, but I think it’s matters of
money, I think it’s a matter of how much money do you want spend to find an aircraft that has
crush in the middle of ocean, that’s not something you want to put in your plan and explain to
your boarder director that we need to spend hundred millions dollars putting in a piece of safety
equipment in case the airplane crashes, it’s a hard sell.
File 6
TC 00:10-00:42
When we were going through a painful process of listening to the pain we thought we are
coming from the image 370. Each of the investigator thought that was what we listening to is the
underwater locator beacon, which put out of pause every second, now that the pause is about
frequency of the dog whistle, so it come out, but you have to specialize the equipment hear it.
But at that dog whistle frequency, it’s really loud, it’s about as loud as shot gun going off, 160
decibels.
TC 00:43-01:03

5. So that is the loud sound we thought we had narrow down. What we found out subsequently is
that there is a lot of thing in the ocean that produces frequency like that, and a sound like that.
For example, you have a shark tracking devices, varies type of whale devices. Use of similar
frequency, and the similar pose.
TC 01:06-01:38
The previous recommendation after France 447 was increase the underwater locator beacon
range, increase the number of times and days can be transmitted. Right now there is 30 days.
They recommend after Air France 447 to go to 90 days. And they are doing that slowly, there are
still 25,000 aircrafts that don’t have that. But even if it was 90 days, even we were hearing that
beacon, it’s a matter of deciding is that from airplane, is it from a whale, or is it from the fishing
net.
TC 01:38-01:56
We really don’t know, so the recommendation is to them put a pattern on that underwater locate
beacon. So it’s a distinguishable pattern. It’s a pattern that may even being able to like a more
code situation that tells us what aircraft is that came from or at least that was from that aircraft.
File 7
TC 00:21-00:44
What that refers to is the fact it take so many deaths for us to do anything significant in the area
of safety. Because how do you weigh safety, that’s a challenge. In the world of safety, you never
know what you did right, you only know what you did wrong. So how can you say if we do this,
we are going to result this many fewer deaths. It’s really impossible to do.
TC 00:44-01:15
So for years the only way we in FAA and her in the department transportation could actually get
something through congress, and get congress to move forward to provide the money to make
changes. Was if we can go there say look we have lost 200 some lives in this accident, we have
lost 200 some lives in that accident. How many lives does it take to make change. So that’s how
for years the FAA will respond that way and the only thing that really got attention were the one
who had a lot of deaths behind them.
TC 01:15-02:08
So what I am trying to do is to change that perspective, measure of safety is not how many
people have dead, that’s not measure of safety. Because there are so few deaths, you really can’t
use that as a reason. Because if you do, all those going to happen is you wait until deaths, and

6. then you will do something about it. That’s not the way to do it. That’s what you create the tune
stone agency with. What we need to do is change the caliper, change the way in which we
measure the safety. What we need to be looking at is what types the thing has the potential to be.
The Precursors, we need moving from diagnosing a problem, and fixing it, to actually prognosis.
If we continue what will happen, and use very detail prognosis problems, so we can see the value
of doing something for safety and predicting the next accident before it happens, and preventing
it.
02:20-03:03
I think he is moving forward. I think one of the problems is that there is a culture, and there is
culture that is being there for years and years and years. And one person can do a lot. Nick
Subtiny did a lot when he was the director of flight standard. And he moved forward when he
was the associate of administer move this idea prognosis forward. We did a lot of work on that,
in our C set, which is our commercial safety evaluation team. And CPS, the commercial process
study of how we build aircraft, and how to certified aircraft. Very much moving forward, but it’s
really hard to put the culture, and way the culture against it.
TC 03:03-03:35
Demin, one of my favorite scientist I ever worked with, and brilliant, brilliant business man. I
asked him in a lecture one time many years ago, how long does it take a culture to change. And
he very stodgily just told me, 17 years. I asked him why, he said well that because that’s how
long that take them to die. That culture, that management culture is very strong, and that’s how
long it may take before FAA really sees the shift from diagnosis to prognosis.
File 8
00:43-01:23
The World Aviation Forum is design to do this. Most of the board members other than myself
has been in ICAO, the have been administrator in ICAO, and some of them have been leaders of
ICAO. And this group is getting together to see and really analyze what ICAO can do to move
forward to this type of culture. And bring along with it, the cultures of their particular countries
where they are from. Whether it be the UK, whether it be the United Air Emirates. What
Malaysia, Asia, wherever it might be. This group is got together and we will be over next several
months working on that. Revisiting the Chicago convention as I mention before in April or in
May.
01:23-01:59

7. So there are a lot of concerns about this, there has been a lot of deaths that brings a lot of light
and a lot of tensions to this. And so that’s why it has to be done. I think the culture is right now.
And people are very receptive to trying to see what we do wrong, what we missing here. Let’s
take a look at ourselves. Not just what the airline was doing, but let’s look at ourselves as
regulated. Let’s look at ourselves as the authority in aviation and see what it is we are missing.
Maybe there is something we don’t see, we need to find out.
File 9
00:35-01:09
The fact that the fire scenario is very likely, the commandeer is likely as well. The reason that I
vacillated between the mostly was because where it happened, where it actually disappeared,
where disappeared was between 2 regional control areas. So that’s the most likely time if I was
going to commandeer an aircraft. That’s the most likely time that would be done. Because at that
time, the region that you are exceeding has kind of lost their tension, they have handed you off,
and ask you to call the other place, the other region.
01:09-01:31
And the other region hasn’t quite receive the call yet, so they expect a little bit delay in there.
And they are really not calling their tension to it on the screen itself. So to think of that
coincidence, think of it as coincidence, it’s just not right. But subsequently I did some analysis
on what’s going on the aircraft, the probability of the failure during that time.
01:31-01:57
And that too, is likely time for a failure. Because that’s where so much activities going on
electrically, we are changing from one frequency to another. The relay have to happen, when you
swamp those frequencies from one radio to the other. All those things are happening, the
communication between the pilots is the highest. During that time as well, when you
transitioning. So because of that, they really balanced out very evenly, very evenly.
02:01-02:26
At this point, I think that it was a fire. I think the fire would cause this. Because the fact that’s
happened before. It was happened before on the ground thankfully, and we did lose a lot of
people. But I do think that’s what happened, and I think there is something specific to the
maintenance repair, the air witness directive which is about how they row the wires, how they
row the oxygen lines. What type of oxygen lines installed the aircraft?

8. 02:26-03:10
There is a lot of variables there, and those variables create the vulnerability. So I do believe
that’s most likely what happened. And I do believe there was someone who survived the initial
depressurization by using the emergency oxygen. Which has also been done before another
airline accident in which the flight attendants survived by using the medical oxygen about the
airplane for two and half hours. That would given plenty of time for whoever was surviving to
have gotten into the cockpit, found a way to navigate that aircraft, keep way from the highly
populated, highly lit area on the ground by flying up to the channel and run outside of Malaysia,
and out to the Indian Ocean. I think that is most probable scenario.
03:22-03:59
I think that was that person did, if it was a flight attendants, most likely a flight attendants for
other reason if you read the book. But because of that, I think this was heroic effort to try to land
air craft, to try to rescue anyone that he could or she. And walking through the cabin trying to
access that they go, but could you imagine being that scenario when you are the only survivor,
there is only one medical oxygen tank in the back of air craft, there is another one in the front of
the aircraft, and you have this on your face, you are surviving. And you are having to make the
decision to take it off yourself and put it on someone else who may or may not help land down
the aircraft.
03:59-04:46
And go through the 200 some people, to check on them to see them still alive, to see do they still
have any chance to survivability. And you make the way all the way through that to the cockpit
door, fumble with your keys, open with the door, try to get into the cockpit. And you get into the
cockpit, and both the captains have expired as well. So try to figure that out, then try to look at
cockpit has being burned, and try to figure half from there, how do you navigate, how do you fly
this airplane now, what am I supposed to do. And then figure out that I don’t want this airplane
to crash in a populated area and kill even more people yet, so I ‘ve got to get over this dark area
that I see blooming which is undoubtedly the ocean. I’ve got steer this aircraft somehow around
all this populated area to prevent further loss of life.
04:51-05:58
All the communication system is out. Because in this fire scenario, all those communication
radios, whether it’s the ADSB, whether it’s the VHF, UHF radio, the transponders, both
transponders also locate in the Iraq, above the area where they had trouble with the wire, it’s
right above that, and it’s right above the oxygen tank as well. Which is how they expose the
fire, right above that, as I mentioned is the radio rank, every piece of communication is on the
left side of the electrical equipment bay, above that, directly above that is the pilots see. So all of
those things, would had been taken out of the one time, which to do that, to have that happened

9. on the board of aircraft, to be able to turn all those off simultaneously, which appear to be
happened, would taken more than one person, because they taken different locations in the air
craft. So to be able to turn all those thing off at once, it would taken incredible amount of
coordination and the exact timing to have it happen when it did. In order to be able to turn all
those things off, thereby it would have involved at least 2 people.
File 10
00:25-00:43
Yes, I am. But I know for sure the Malaysian airline was doing it. I actually witness them do this
training, because we done certification I went to, airbus to do the certification on the airbus 380.
In that case, it was part the training system; they would be at least familiar with the navigation
system on the aircraft.
00:50-00:50
That they can navigate the plane.
00:56-01:21
We are not really talking about taking the aircraft over and being able to fly the plane and
navigate around and land the airplane, that’s not what I am talking about. No, you are right, no
one get that kinds of training other than the pilots themselves. What they are trained is
familiarization with the aircraft, so they know what the heading does, they know what the
altitude hole does. They know how to manage and manipulate the auto pilot controls, and that’s
what I am referring to when I talk about navigating the aircraft.
01:41-02:05
The Inmarsat is a contract, and within that contract, Inmarsat has features that edit or taken away
based on how much you want to pay monthly. So you can let to have it contact you once an hour,
or you can let it contact you every 15 minutes, it just depends on what contract level you
purchase. The contract level they purchased they didn’t feel they need to have every 15 minutes,
or every 10 minutes conversations with the sidelight.
02:05-02:32
So therefore the only communication you will have with satellite other than once every hour
would be for the aircraft to reach out of if there was an emergency condition that met the threat
and meet the threat hold when it was supposed to communicate with satellite. So thereby we did
receive the communication when something happened initially. And then went out for a while,

10. and during that time, the Inmarsat satellite the satcom system which communicates will
rebooted, reset itself.
02:32-03:14
So there was electrical pose of some kind, electrical failure some kind or maybe a bus switch at
that time which reset the computer on the satcom. And they have to relocate themselves, a lot
like the older GPS is used to do, when you turn your GPS on, it said requiring sidelights, that’s
that time period. So they can’t require 3 sidelights. It doesn’t know where that is, it doesn’t know
who to communicate with. So it’s very similar to that, the satcom, which is no more than a
telephone system. Where they make a phone call, and they say Hey I have something to say, the
sidelights verified who they are. So you are image 370, they are for accept the call. All of that
cost money, and that’s why there is various levels which system you can buy.
03:51-04:03
I know at that time this particular aircraft had one hour, because the way the transmission
occurred, that’s how I know that, I don’t have personal knowledge of what contract they have
signed, I just know that how it performed based on the contract level.
File 11
He worked in the FAA for 17 years. They talked about get an interview from a person in the
FAA. Personal interview. They did not anything about the aircraft.