1. THE SEPTEMBER DOSSIER AND SUICIDE: HOW THE FEUD BETWEEN THE BBC AND
ALASTAIR CAMPBELL LED TO THE DEATH OF DAVID KELLY
Kayla Lardner
Politics and the Media
March 9th, 2016
Campbell’s reign as Spin Doctor extraordinaire, the hands and feet of the government,
came crashing down after accusations that he personally sexed up documents which ultimately
led to the invasion of Iraq. This marked the end of his career, but also the end of a life. Dr. David

2. 1
Kelly, “a Ministry of Defence adviser on biological warfare and a former weapons inspector in
Iraq… senior and authoritative enough to have attended Foreign Affairs Select Committee
hearings on WMDs,” was revealed the be the source of a the claim that Campbell purposefully
added sexy information into government dossiers.1 Shortly after, he was found dead in the
woods, having committed suicide. Alan Doig states that “shortly before he described his
treatment as being manipulated by ‘many dark actors playing games.’”2 According to The
Guardian, “As news of his death spread, the normally self-assured Blair seemed stunned when a
reporter cried: ‘Do you have blood on your hands?’”3 Does he? Who is to blame for pushing
Kelly over the edge?
To understand the severity of the situation and of the claims against Campbell, we need
to return to the dossier which started it all. According to Bill Jones and Philip Norton, “In
September 2002, the government published a dossier on Iraqi ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that
embodied a substantial amount of intelligence services information.”4 James Humphries cites
that “in the foreward, the Prime Minister wrote that he wanted ‘to share with the British public
the reasons why I believe this to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest.’”5
Alan Doig finds that “the dossier made a number of specific claims that Iraq continued to
produce chemical and biological weapons [and] had developed its military planning to allow for
some of its WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.”6 At the time the
1
Alan Doig, “45 Minutes of Infamy? Hutton, Blair and the Invasion of Iraq,” Parliamentary
Affairs, 581 (2005) 115-116.
2
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 116.
3
Vikram Dodd, “Dr David Kelly: 10 years on, death of scientist remains unresolved for some”
The Guardian, July 16th, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/16/david-kelly-
death-10-years-on
4
Bill Jones and Philip Norton, Politics UK (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2010) 520.
5
James Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier and the Meaning of Spin” Parliamentary Affairs, 581
(2005) 156.
6
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 111.

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dossier was first presented to the press and the public, Humphreys states that “some papers
splashed on the main new piece of information in the dossier regarding Iraq’s capability to
deploy WMD ‘within 45 minutes,’ but this ‘new fact’ thereafter dropped out of sight… Its
publication was at the time seen by the government as a success.”7 However, after the escalation
of the war and invasion of Iraq, after no WMD were found, this success began to wane. In
essence, Humphreys argues that “the dossier was a form of propaganda intended to build or
consolidate support for the government’s policy of ensuring Iraq’s compliance with UN
resolutions on its disarmament, if necessary by force.”8
It was this propagandic nature of the dossier which caught the attention of the BBC,
inciting a bitter feud. According to Humphreys, “within a year, the dossier had become the focus
of widespread criticism of the decision to go to war in Iraq. The government stood accused of
having lied over the existence of weapons of mass destruction to provide a legal context for
war.”9 Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer cite BBC’s Today programme’s as escalating the
tensions between the BBC and the government, with their accusations that “a defence expert
relayed to the reporter, Andrew Gilligan, that Alastair Campbell… had pressured the UK
intelligence services to provide a more dramatic presentation of the facts about Saddam’s
WMDs… The dossier was re-written to make it sexier.”10 According to Doig, this report claimed
specifically that “the September dossier had been ‘sexed up’ to make it more direct and less
equivocal, particularly by the inclusion of a phrase that the WMD could be unleashed in 45
minutes.”11 This phrase, which had originally been forgotten along with most of the September
7
Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier” 156.
8
Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier” 156.
9
Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier” 156.
10
Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis (London: Sage Publications,
2004) 143.
11
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 115.

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dossier prior to the war, after the war became critical in the eyes of the media. Doig also argues
that Gilligan’s accusations “provoked what was to become an escalating war of words between
the BBC and 10 Downing Street over three issues: the insertion of the 45-minute claim; the
massaging of the report for political ends; and whether or not the government had misled to the
public through the dossier.”12
Did the government knowingly mislead the press and the public? Did Campbell add in
the false 45-minute clause? According to Humphreys, “When early drafts of the dossier were
circulated within No. 10, a number of officials offered their comments, as they would have done
for similar documents crossing their desks”13 However, despite the fact that “Alastair Campbell
acted as a gatekeeper for all comments and ignored most of them… Rather than make the dossier
into the strongest piece of advocacy possible, Campbell appears to have wanted above all else to
ensure that it could be defended as the work of the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee].”14
Humphreys also finds that at the time the dossier was first published, the press and the public did
not believe that the document was “surrounded by a high-powered ‘spin’ operation to hype up
the threat. The prepublication coverage shows No. 10 using briefings to try to avoid overplaying
the dossier, with the Independent talking of ‘no smoking gun’ and the Financial Times saying it
‘wasn’t designed to step up pressure for war.’”15 Campbell, the strong-willed and powerful
Spindoctor he was, was not about to take such claims lightly. Doig says that, “Campbell used his
appearance at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC)... to launch an attack on BBC
journalism, and followed up [with] an impromptu, highly agitated appearance on Channel 4
12
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 115.
13
Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier” 162.
14
Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier” 162.
15
Humphreys, “The Iraq Dossier” 163-164.

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News. The FAC subsequently cleared Campbell of substantially altering the dossier.”16 However,
as Doig states, the FAC “pointed out that the 45-minute claim did not warrant its ‘prominence’
and that some language was more assertive ‘than that traditionally used in intelligence
documents.’”17 Doig adds that the Committee “considered that the government should explain
why the 45-minute claim was given such prominence, since it was based on intelligence from ‘a
single, uncorroborated source.’”18
Following the accusations, and the outing of David Kelly as the source of the claims,
which Kuhn argues “indirectly led a few weeks later to the suicide of… Dr. David Kelly, was at
the heart of the inquiry led by Lord Hutton into the circumstances surrounding Kelly’s death.
The Hutton Report… exculpated the government from responsibility and instead directed its fire
at the BBC.”19 Specifically relating to the infamous 45-minute claim, Doig quotes Lord Hutton
as concluding that “‘The 45-minute claim was based on a report which was received by the SIS
from a source which that Service regarded as reliable. Therefore, whether or not at some time in
the future the report on which the 45-minute claim was on is shown to be unreliable the
allegation… was unfounded.’”20 After a thorough investigation, Hutton found the BBC to be
almost completely at fault. Doig adds that “the BBC was wrong in not operating appropriate
editorial controls to validate the story before it went out (and subsequently). The BBC’s initial
error was compounded by its unconditional support for the claim when it was repeated in the
face of demands for a retraction from Campbell and for failing to investigate [them].”21
Nevertheless, Tumber and Palmer note that “in the aftermath of the Gilligan/’Today’ broadcast,
16
Raymond Kuhn, Politics and the Media in Britain. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan) 196-197.
17
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 115.
18
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 115.
19
Kuhn Politics and the Media in Britain 193.
20
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 117.
21
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 117.

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the BBC robustly defended the claims it had made, complaining bitterly about the ‘intolerable
pressure’ put on it by the No. 10 press office throughout the Iraq crisis.”22 Despite the BBC’s
rebuttal, following the Hutton Inquiry, Doig notes that “Andrew Gilligan, the Director General of
the BBC and the Chair of its Board of Governors all resigned.”23
Following the Hutton Inquiry, after more critical reflection on the results, multiple flaws
with the production and the exhibition of Hutton’s findings shine through. Kuhn argues that “ the
main culprit was Gilligan and his flawed report… Gilligan’s broadcast was ‘carelessly done’ and
that ‘it was a grave charge, but it was lightly made.’”24 Kuhn also finds that “The official
position of the BBC in the aftermath of Hutton was that mistakes had been made inside of the
Corporation, notably by Gilligan in the wording of his report: ‘ a core script was properly
prepared and cleared in line with normal production practices in place at the time, but then was
not followed by Andrew Gilligan.’”25 For most critics, including Kuhn “the Hutton Report was
much criticized at the time of its publication for having a ‘whitewash’ pro-government verdict.
One of the sternest critics… was Dyke who [says] ‘it was Lord Hutton, not the BBC, who got it
fundamentally wrong.’”26 Doig also argues that “the Hutton Inquiry is notable for the self-
imposed restriction of its brief - the circumstances surrounding David Kelly’s death. To Hutton
this meant the events following the Gilligan broadcast; it specifically excluded the existence or
non-existence of WMD, the origin and use of the 45-minute claim, or the use of intelligence that
prompted Kelly to speak out to journalists.”27 This narrow view of the events point to a bias, or
at the very least, a misunderstanding of the complexity of the situation. This is what leads most
22
Tumber and Palmer, Media at War 147.
23
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 117.
24
Kuhn Politics and the Media in Britain 198.
25
Kuhn Politics and the Media in Britain 198.
26
Kuhn Politics and the Media in Britain 198.
27
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 117.

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negative commentators to feel justified in their interpretations. Doig continues, saying that “what
concerned some commentators were Hutton’s attempts to make the original Gilligan story the
defining moment in the sequence of events leading to Kelly’s death. To them, the events that
preceded the Gilligan story were crucial and the real focus was whether or not the Prime
Minister… manipulated intelligence to present a misleading justification for the invasion.”28
However, now that Hutton’s narrow view of the situation has been established, the question
seems to be one of intention: was Hutton’s investigation overshadowed by the government’s
intervention? Is his Inquiry purposefully negligent? Doig concludes that “more sceptical
commentators may argue that … Hutton… knew only too well the primacy of policy imperatives
and that [his] report sought as far as possible to mediate between such policy imperatives and
public concern… [the findings] occur in pursuit of the interests of the state.”29
Thus, Hutton’s investigation can either be viewed as intentionally restrictive in the scope
of the inquiry, or honestly completed to the best of his ability. If we take the latter, more
optimistic stance, his findings, that the government also completed the dossier to the best of their
ability with the evidence and the intelligence available at the time, must be plausible. However,
the more pessimistic option inherently claims that Hutton was under the control of the
government, another cog in their propaganda machine. Therefore, with that stance in mind, the
Hutton Inquiry is just one of the many pieces of the conspiracy surrounding the decision to
invade Iraq.
Bibliography:
Dodd, Vikram, “Dr David Kelly: 10 years on, death of scientist remains unresolved for some”
The Guardian, July 16th, 2013.
28
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 120.
29
Doig “45 Minutes of Infamy?” 122.

8. 7
Doig, Alan, “45 Minutes of Infamy? Hutton, Blair and the Invasion of Iraq,” Parliamentary
Affairs, 581 (2005).
Humphreys, James, “The Iraq Dossier and the Meaning of Spin” Parliamentary Affairs, 581
(2005).
Jones, Bill and Philip Norton, Politics UK, Harlow: Pearson Education, 2010.
Kuhn, Raymond, Politics and the Media in Britain. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tumber, Howard and Jerry Palmer, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, London: Sage Publications,
2004,