This document discusses several mitzvot related to justice found in the Torah. It begins by covering mitzvot about civil damages and liability, drawing parallels between Biblical rules and modern tort law concepts. It then discusses mitzvot governing commercial transactions and bailments. Finally, it examines mitzvot concerning proper conduct for kings and leaders, as well as for war. The document analyzes each mitzvah and explores broader ethical principles and duties that can be derived from them.

1. The Mitzvot - Justice 4
Introduction - we come now to a considerationof the mitzvot that deal first
with requirements we might today find in tort actions - disputes involving
allegations of the negligent infliction of damage on another - as well as in
commercial disputes. Also,we will discuss issues related to the demands
of justice related to leadership in the community, here, more specifically,
with respect to matters involving the king. Finally, we will consider key
principles of justice as they relate to the conduct of war.
LVIII-LIX.Read Exodus 21:28,35 and Exodus 22:4. This idea of civil
damage to others is wonderfully illustrated in mitzvot specifically discussing
injuries caused by an ox, a pit, a beast, fire, and other things/actions that
are abnormally dangerous.
In the first instance, if an ox kills a person or animal, and the event was
unforeseeable, the owner is liable only for the loss of his ox and, in the
case of the killed animal, half the damages to its owner. If the killing was
foreseeable, say, for example, where the ox was in the habit of goring, and
its owner was aware, the owner would be fully liable.

2. What’s the principle that underlies these rules? Does it make sense and
seem familiar?
(It appears to be nicely in sync with the American tort law principle of
reasonable foreseeability, that is, if one can reasonably foreseea risk of
damage to another that arises from one’s actions, one must avoid it or be
responsible forthe consequencesof another’s injury that results from it.
First, the owner of an animal has responsibilities as to the behavior of the
animal, specificallyif the animal causes injury to another animal or person.
As we have learned in other contexts, the degree of liability may depend
upon the extent of the damage that was foreseeable as well as the
measure of the damage per se.
These rules seem eminently fair and just. One must take responsibilityfor
directly or indirectly causing damage to another. Liability depends, in part,
upon the degree of foreseeabilityof damage one might cause another,
which corresponds to the caution one should reasonably take to avoid
another’s injury. The other party also bears responsibility, largely to avoid
damage to himself/herself when, where, and however it may be reasonable
to do so.)

3. LX. Read Exodus 21:33-34.This has a similar fact pattern, but it involves a
pit.
Here’s a paraphrase of our US Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo
in the famous Palsgraf case: negligence is conduct that falls below a
standard established by law to protect others against unreasonable risks. It
involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct
unreasonable in proportionto the danger. If a personcould reasonably
foreseeinjury from his action or his conduct is unreasonable in light of what
he could anticipate, he would be liable for such injury.
When I studied this case in law school, I didn’t know of the ancient mitzvot
that teach the same principle. I wonder if Judge Cardozo, who made it
famous and who was Jewish, knew!
LXI-LXIII.Read Exodus 22:5 and Deuteronomy 22:8.

4. A. There is an inclination to find strict liability, that is, automatic liability,
when negligence is so extreme that it leads to an abnormally dangerous
condition with an appreciable chance of causing injury and harm to
another. In early English law, strict liability was imposed in the case of the
escape of fire. Our law, as is the case with these Biblical mitzvot, tends to
require a finding of negligence. You can probably see the arguments for
both sides.
In terms of the parapet on one’s own roof, why might we be inclined to side
with the principle of strict liability if a guest falls and is hurt?
(It’s in one’s own home where, if one invites others to visit, one has a
special duty of care. Further, a homeowner tends to know the dangers in
one’s own home clearly and the visitor typically doesn’t. Plus, as the
example suggests, failing to have a guard rail of sorts on the roof is a
superb example of the sort of inherently dangerous condition that, should
injury occur, give rise to automatic liability.)
B. We’ve been talking about these matters of tort law on the surface. Do
you have any ideas about how we might use these principles to understand
our duties to others more broadly and in other circumstances?

5. (We must show care in how we live with others - what we say, what we do,
and how we affect others. Our actions have consequences, and if there is
reason to foresee harm,we must show care and do our bestto avoid or
limit risk.
The Talmud, for example, uses the case of the spreading fire to teach
about the spreading nature of unethical behavior, even war or hostility, and
the damage a “fire out of control” can cause, the havoc it can wreak. And
once it spreads, it is terribly hard to stop.So, great care must be shown in
understanding the duty not to start or spread such a fire in the first place.)
LXIV.Read Leviticus 25:14.We come now to several mitzvot that teach us
basic principles of justice in the marketplace, that is, how we are to conduct
ourselves and resolve disputes when we have conflict in commercial
interactions.

6. We considered Leviticus 25:24 when we talked about how and by what
standards we should treat others we encounter in the marketplace. Beyond
basic notions of fairness, we learn that, from that verse, regulations
followed that, among other things, lead to various means and forms for
acquiring property.
Today, our first mitzvah in this group creates the basis for the determination
and resolution of rights between the vendor and vendee, especially as to
ways in which one party may aggrieve another and what the appropriate
consequences should be for it. Essentially, it establishes that right and fair
dealings are important not only to the parties involved directly but also to
the community as a whole.
As one can tell from the precise words in the verse, there is a special
concern here about fraud as well as exorbitant profit. We see these
concerns addressedin multiple ways in subsequent interpretations and
requirements, and these fundamental notions of fairness and justice play
themselves out to this day in our own laws and policies.

7. LXV-LXVII.Let’s look more closely at the specific guidance we get in terms
of the duties of those who care for another’s property. Read Exodus 22:6,
9, and 13.
A. What is the basic idea here?
(Generally speaking, there’s a higher degree of care expected of a bailee if
he/she is paid to safeguard property than if not. That stands to reason.
Assuming no special or different understanding, part of the consideration
for payment is the return duty of, so to speak, professional safeguarding.
So, the unpaid bailee is only liable if there is clear neglect. The paid bailee
operates under the higher standard of a paid caretaker, liable exceptfor
loss due to unavoidable circumstances. The borroweris in yet a different
position. He/she has taken the property typically for an even richer fee, and
assumes virtually full liability for any loss to the property (except if it dies or
is broken in the normal course of operation). In other words, he/she takes,
pays, and agrees to return what’s taken in the shape in which it’s taken.)

8. B. Does this make sense? If so, why? Further, let’s broadenout from the
commercial arena and discuss whether, and if so, how, these principles
might guide us more generally in our lives, in our encounters with others.
(Discussionof differing responsibilities based upon the varying obligations
we take on in our different roles.)
LXVIII-LXX.Read Leviticus 19:11 (the part about dealing falsely), 13 (not
withholding).
A. What are the instructions here? How do you think the sages generally
interpret these mitzvot?

9. (While the language here is nominally about theft or taking things that are
not ours, there’s a type of inappropriate holding of property that is a
significant concern of these mitzvot. We expectour debts to be paid, and
so must we pay ours. While we desire propertyfor ourselves, we are not
due that which is not ours. If we have an honest argument about the status
of property, we may make our case with another and/or in court. But we’re
duty-bound to God and those with whom we do business to be honest
about our debts and to pay them fully and on a timely basis.)
B. Again I want us to explore the purpose of these mitzvot more
expansively. What does this guidance teach us about other, broader duties
we bear to ourselves, our God, and others with whom we live?
(Discussion: e.g., 1) a concernabout avoiding other, maybe even subtle,
forms of dishonesty, 2) a concernwith any sort of violation by inappropriate
taking from another, 3) the importance of honest dealing and
thoroughgoing integrity. These mitzvot appear in the Holiness Code of
Vayikra, so it involves more than rules for court dispositionof debts;they
are integral to our understanding of what it means to be holy.)

10. LXXI-LXXII.Read Deuteronomy17:15.We now come to the first of the
mitzvot that guide about the selectionof the sovereign as well as the
conduct of the sovereign. The core notions of justice that we have been
considering undergird this discussionas well.
I want us to think about these mitzvot on multiple levels - how they might
apply to the actual kings of Israel so many years ago, how they might apply
to leaders in our own day, and finally how they apply to each of us who are
indeed sovereigns in many ways of our own lives.
A. A little background first. Our tradition suggests much hostility to the idea
of a king. Having kings was the practice of heathen lands. There was
resistance to a monarchy early in our story, for example, even apparently
from the prophet, Samuel. In the mitzvot, mostargue (though Chinuch
disagrees) the appointment of a king was not mandatory, and, as we have
already discussed and will discuss more, there is great care to limit and
discipline the authority of the king.
Yet, the mitzvot do sanction a king, and one gets the sense that there is
both a Divine and human purpose for a king (and, in later times perhaps,

11. some other form of sovereignor extended civil government). Do you see
that? If so, what are such purposes?
(We have communal needs for leadership that go beyond the work of
priests and judges.We may require a more central authority that can
uniquely unite people, provide discipline, and keep a nation stable and
growing. Further, this sovereigncould play a vital role in defending the
nation and conducting war, if needed.
The mitzvot do not delve much into the precise role of the king or details of
his functions and how they are to be handled. The best we get is a sense of
the purpose of the sovereignand perhaps some notions about the
relationship betweenthe sovereignand the people. Crucially, again, we do
see more explicitly the importance of the limitations and constraints that are
to be placed on the sovereign, and we’ll discuss why in a moment.)
B. Let’s recall our discussionof the requirement that the king is expected to
write, keep and observe a Scroll of the Law. Even, and especially, the
sovereignmust know and live true to the understanding that there is a

12. greater Sovereign than He, to Whom his knee must bend in duty and
service. How might the sovereignact in accordance with these duties?
(By tradition, he was to show humility, grace, and mercy to all, including
those of the lowest rank, and concern for his subjects and their needs. He
was to speak gently and lead the people tolerantly and patiently as would a
shepherd with his flock.Yet, he was also to live true to the mitzvot in ways
that require strength, discipline, and duty to the principles of justice and
righteousness and adherence to the law. The balance we’ve discussed
throughout our exploration between love and mercy on the one hand and
justice and righteousness on the other would be one the king is especially
bound to maintain in his service to God and nation.)
LXXIII.Read Exodus 22:27.What’s the meaning here?
(This refers both to a judge and a king, according to the sages. The basic
idea is that the nation needs leadership, and leadership requires that the
people be bound to, and respectful of, the leader. This prohibition is against
the emotional and oftenangry nature of a curse, not speechof a rational
sort. Of course, it also assumes that the leader is appointed and serves in a

13. manner consistent with the requirements of the mitzvot. Then, just as one
would not curse God, one should refrain from cursing the leader who
serves God and the people.
What should happen if there is a break in that pattern is open to
considerationand discussion. Surely, we get a good dose of kings straying
from God’s path in Kings as well as subsequently, and to our very day.
We’ll leave for another time a discussionof how exactly this mitzvah is
applied in the case of a king who does not serve in sync with the mitzvot.)
LXXIV-LXXVI.Read Deuteronomy 17:16-17.
A. What is meant here generally, and specifically?

14. (These further restraints are intended to curb the inclination of the powerful
sovereignto grab excessive power or wealth.
Owning many horses, a sovereign could exert inappropriately great power
against the people or others (and be tempted to return to Egypt, literally or
figuratively). Taking many wives, he could show a spouse’s heart to none
and likely be callous to his people as well. Amassing great wealth, a
sovereignwould likely have overtaxed the people and/or become haughty
over his people, thus evidencing again his greater interest in his own
welfare than theirs.)
B. Now that we have reviewed the mitzvot relating to the sovereign, have
you gleaned any guidance that might be helpful to you as the sovereign
over your life and the decisions youmust make within its realm?
(Discussion)

15. LXXVII-LXXX.Read Deuteronomy 20:11,Deuteronomy20:2-9,and
Deuteronomy23:13-14.
We conclude our study of the mitzvot related directly to justice issues by
looking at guidance concerning the conduct of war. We have already
studied certain of these limits in the mitzvot related to the proper treatment
of enemies in war. What more do we learn here? Let’s break it down.
(A. First, the king may move forward immediately in a war of necessityor
emergencybut must get consensus among the leadership to go forward in
“non-obligatory” wars. This sounds a little bit like some of the de facto
requirements in our own nation. How?
(The authority of the king to go forward “when commanded by God”
suggests a need to move quickly on behalf of the safety and welfare of the
community. This is one of the key reasons to have a king, as we have
discussed. But the requirement of consensus or buy-in helps assure that
the commitment to go to war is shared and that the burden is agreed to
across the spectrum in a community. Whether the war turns out well or
poorly, this sense of shared decision-making is surely healthy and right.)

16. B. The idea of the priestpulling off the battlefield soldiers who are not ready
to fight for the reasons mentioned makes sense. We would only want those
strong of heart in battle for purposes of morale and efficacy.
1. It’s fascinating that those who haven’t had the basic experiences ofa
newly mature life are exempt? Why?
(Perhaps they are entitled to it, as the young should, in life. Or they don’t
yet have a full sense of what they’re duty-bound to fight for and thus should
experience the making and living out of these basic commitments before
going to war. Or they should have an opportunity to fulfill the various
mitzvot associated with these key activities of life before facing life and
death moments of battle.)
2. Why does the priest play his designated role?

17. (I suspect soldiers would want and get strength from the fact that a person
of God is there to bring God’s nearness and supportat this difficult time of
challenge, risk, duty, and purpose forthe nation and people/warriors of
faith.)
C. Why, finally, the rules of cleanliness?
(While wars should be waged vigorously and aggressivelyfor the triumph
of our people and way of life in what is inherently a very messyand even
ugly enterprise, we are instructed that even our warriors are human beings
and ought not act like animals. Further, the war is in service of God and the
prayers and comments of the priest in advance of battle are said to God.
One doesn’t conduct such activity in the midst of filth.)
D. Going deeperthan the surface level of these mitzvot dealing with actual
battlefield requirements, what guidance do we get from these directions in
the ways we more generally wage the battles of life?

18. (Discussion)
Conclusion