Copy of Order issued by U.S. District Court suspending AB 219, a new statute which made deliveries of ready-mix concrete subject to California Prevailing Wage Law.
Trial Strategy: Using "Other Paper" in a Motion to Remand a Coverage Action t...NationalUnderwriter
A recent decision by a federal district court in Pennsylvania highlights the importance of understanding the phrase “other paper” – for both insurance companies and policyholders – to decide the timeliness of a notice of removal.
USA SALT Alert: South Dakota Supreme Court Holds Law Challenging Quill’s Phys...Alex Baulf
On September 13, 2017, the South Dakota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a circuit court’s decision that a law requiring certain remote sellers that do not have a physical presence in South Dakota to collect sales tax on sales made in the state is unconstitutional. The collection and remittance duties are triggered if certain gross revenue or transaction thresholds are met. In affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court agreed that the law violates the physical presence requirement for sales and use taxes under Quill v. North Dakota and its application of the Commerce Clause. This is the first time that a state’s highest court has considered the constitutionality of legislation that disregards the physical presence requirement.
Copy of Order issued by U.S. District Court suspending AB 219, a new statute which made deliveries of ready-mix concrete subject to California Prevailing Wage Law.
Trial Strategy: Using "Other Paper" in a Motion to Remand a Coverage Action t...NationalUnderwriter
A recent decision by a federal district court in Pennsylvania highlights the importance of understanding the phrase “other paper” – for both insurance companies and policyholders – to decide the timeliness of a notice of removal.
USA SALT Alert: South Dakota Supreme Court Holds Law Challenging Quill’s Phys...Alex Baulf
On September 13, 2017, the South Dakota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a circuit court’s decision that a law requiring certain remote sellers that do not have a physical presence in South Dakota to collect sales tax on sales made in the state is unconstitutional. The collection and remittance duties are triggered if certain gross revenue or transaction thresholds are met. In affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court agreed that the law violates the physical presence requirement for sales and use taxes under Quill v. North Dakota and its application of the Commerce Clause. This is the first time that a state’s highest court has considered the constitutionality of legislation that disregards the physical presence requirement.
Order denying Abbott Labs Motion for Summary Judgment and finding in favor of...Mark Briggs
Ray Dieppa Raymond Dieppa Ray Dieppa Raymond Dieppa personal injury employment discrimination abbot labs settlement verdict attorney raymond dieppa attorney lawyer attorney federal diversity
at will employment breach of employment
411 N.J.Super. 236Superior Court of New Jersey,Appellate Divis.docxalinainglis
411 N.J.Super. 236
Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division.
J.T.'s TIRE SERVICE, INC. and Eileen Totorello, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED RENTALS NORTH AMERICA, INC.,1 Defendant-Respondent,
and
Harold Hinkes, Defendant.
Argued Dec. 7, 2009.Decided Jan. 6, 2010.
Synopsis
Background: Tire seller and seller's owner brought action against customer under Law Against Discrimination. The Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, granted customer's motion to dismiss complaint for failure to state claim on which relief could be granted, and plaintiffs appealed.
Holding: The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Reisner, J.A.D., held that plaintiff's allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment that resulted in termination of contract stated claim for discriminatory refusal to do business in violation of Law Against Discrimination.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes (4)Collapse West Headnotes
Change View
1Civil Rights
Contracts, trade, and commercial activity
Tire seller's allegation that customer's business manager tried to extort sexual favors from seller's owner as condition of continuing business with seller, and that customer terminated contract with seller when owner refused manager's advances, stated claim for discriminatory refusal to do business in violation of Law Against Discrimination. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(l).
0 Case that cites this headnote
2Pleading
Statement of cause of action in general
A complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action where one is suggested by the facts. R. 4:6-2(e).
0 Case that cites this headnote
3Civil Rights
Threats, intimidation, and harassment
Civil Rights
Sexual Harassment; Work Environment
Although the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) does not specifically mention sexual harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination, it is well-established that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates both Title VII and the LAD. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
4Civil Rights
Threats, intimidation, and harassment
Civil Rights
Evidence
Where harassment consists of sexual overtures and unwelcome touching or groping, it is presumed that the conduct was committed because of the victim's sex, and thus, when a plaintiff alleges that she has been subjected to sexual touchings or comments, she has established under the Law Against Discrimination that the harassment occurred because of her sex. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(l).
J.T.'s Tire Serv., Inc. v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 236, 985 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 2010)
Attorneys and Law Firms
**212 Elizabeth Zuckerman, Princeton, argued the cause for appellants (Zuckerman & Fisher, L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Zuckerman, on the brief).
David I. Rosen, Newark, argued the cause for respondent (Littler Mendelson, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Rosen and Jacqueline K. Hall, on the brief).
Before Judges REISNER, YANNOTTI and CHAMBERS.
Opinion
The opinion of the court was.
Motion to Dismiss Claims for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets and Tortious Interference under Florida law. Tampa, Florida. Hillsborough County Circuit Court - Complex Business Litigation Division.
Pollard PLLC
P. 954-332-2380
The authors will attempt to give an overview of the litigation by compulsive gamblers against Canadian gaming entities, and especially the litigation concerning class action suits.
Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding in Eleventh Circuit Court, Florida. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief for Dischargeability under Section 523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Defendant is a Pro Se Litigant. Defending against allegations made from an ex-boyfriend who was using his business to escape liability. Tax avoidance, collusion, conflict of interest, abuse of power.
Sample Bail Bond Related Criminal Law MotionsSamuel Partida
A list of common motions filed in a criminal case related to the bail bond are provided. Six sample motions are provided that a prosecutor may typically file. Seven sample motions are provided that a defense attorney may typically file over the span of a typical criminal case.
WINDING UP of COMPANY, Modes of DissolutionKHURRAMWALI
Winding up, also known as liquidation, refers to the legal and financial process of dissolving a company. It involves ceasing operations, selling assets, settling debts, and ultimately removing the company from the official business registry.
Here's a breakdown of the key aspects of winding up:
Reasons for Winding Up:
Insolvency: This is the most common reason, where the company cannot pay its debts. Creditors may initiate a compulsory winding up to recover their dues.
Voluntary Closure: The owners may decide to close the company due to reasons like reaching business goals, facing losses, or merging with another company.
Deadlock: If shareholders or directors cannot agree on how to run the company, a court may order a winding up.
Types of Winding Up:
Voluntary Winding Up: This is initiated by the company's shareholders through a resolution passed by a majority vote. There are two main types:
Members' Voluntary Winding Up: The company is solvent (has enough assets to pay off its debts) and shareholders will receive any remaining assets after debts are settled.
Creditors' Voluntary Winding Up: The company is insolvent and creditors will be prioritized in receiving payment from the sale of assets.
Compulsory Winding Up: This is initiated by a court order, typically at the request of creditors, government agencies, or even by the company itself if it's insolvent.
Process of Winding Up:
Appointment of Liquidator: A qualified professional is appointed to oversee the winding-up process. They are responsible for selling assets, paying off debts, and distributing any remaining funds.
Cease Trading: The company stops its regular business operations.
Notification of Creditors: Creditors are informed about the winding up and invited to submit their claims.
Sale of Assets: The company's assets are sold to generate cash to pay off creditors.
Payment of Debts: Creditors are paid according to a set order of priority, with secured creditors receiving payment before unsecured creditors.
Distribution to Shareholders: If there are any remaining funds after all debts are settled, they are distributed to shareholders according to their ownership stake.
Dissolution: Once all claims are settled and distributions made, the company is officially dissolved and removed from the business register.
Impact of Winding Up:
Employees: Employees will likely lose their jobs during the winding-up process.
Creditors: Creditors may not recover their debts in full, especially if the company is insolvent.
Shareholders: Shareholders may not receive any payout if the company's debts exceed its assets.
Winding up is a complex legal and financial process that can have significant consequences for all parties involved. It's important to seek professional legal and financial advice when considering winding up a company.
Order denying Abbott Labs Motion for Summary Judgment and finding in favor of...Mark Briggs
Ray Dieppa Raymond Dieppa Ray Dieppa Raymond Dieppa personal injury employment discrimination abbot labs settlement verdict attorney raymond dieppa attorney lawyer attorney federal diversity
at will employment breach of employment
411 N.J.Super. 236Superior Court of New Jersey,Appellate Divis.docxalinainglis
411 N.J.Super. 236
Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division.
J.T.'s TIRE SERVICE, INC. and Eileen Totorello, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED RENTALS NORTH AMERICA, INC.,1 Defendant-Respondent,
and
Harold Hinkes, Defendant.
Argued Dec. 7, 2009.Decided Jan. 6, 2010.
Synopsis
Background: Tire seller and seller's owner brought action against customer under Law Against Discrimination. The Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, granted customer's motion to dismiss complaint for failure to state claim on which relief could be granted, and plaintiffs appealed.
Holding: The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Reisner, J.A.D., held that plaintiff's allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment that resulted in termination of contract stated claim for discriminatory refusal to do business in violation of Law Against Discrimination.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes (4)Collapse West Headnotes
Change View
1Civil Rights
Contracts, trade, and commercial activity
Tire seller's allegation that customer's business manager tried to extort sexual favors from seller's owner as condition of continuing business with seller, and that customer terminated contract with seller when owner refused manager's advances, stated claim for discriminatory refusal to do business in violation of Law Against Discrimination. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(l).
0 Case that cites this headnote
2Pleading
Statement of cause of action in general
A complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action where one is suggested by the facts. R. 4:6-2(e).
0 Case that cites this headnote
3Civil Rights
Threats, intimidation, and harassment
Civil Rights
Sexual Harassment; Work Environment
Although the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) does not specifically mention sexual harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination, it is well-established that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates both Title VII and the LAD. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
4Civil Rights
Threats, intimidation, and harassment
Civil Rights
Evidence
Where harassment consists of sexual overtures and unwelcome touching or groping, it is presumed that the conduct was committed because of the victim's sex, and thus, when a plaintiff alleges that she has been subjected to sexual touchings or comments, she has established under the Law Against Discrimination that the harassment occurred because of her sex. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(l).
J.T.'s Tire Serv., Inc. v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 236, 985 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 2010)
Attorneys and Law Firms
**212 Elizabeth Zuckerman, Princeton, argued the cause for appellants (Zuckerman & Fisher, L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Zuckerman, on the brief).
David I. Rosen, Newark, argued the cause for respondent (Littler Mendelson, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Rosen and Jacqueline K. Hall, on the brief).
Before Judges REISNER, YANNOTTI and CHAMBERS.
Opinion
The opinion of the court was.
Motion to Dismiss Claims for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets and Tortious Interference under Florida law. Tampa, Florida. Hillsborough County Circuit Court - Complex Business Litigation Division.
Pollard PLLC
P. 954-332-2380
The authors will attempt to give an overview of the litigation by compulsive gamblers against Canadian gaming entities, and especially the litigation concerning class action suits.
Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding in Eleventh Circuit Court, Florida. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief for Dischargeability under Section 523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Defendant is a Pro Se Litigant. Defending against allegations made from an ex-boyfriend who was using his business to escape liability. Tax avoidance, collusion, conflict of interest, abuse of power.
Sample Bail Bond Related Criminal Law MotionsSamuel Partida
A list of common motions filed in a criminal case related to the bail bond are provided. Six sample motions are provided that a prosecutor may typically file. Seven sample motions are provided that a defense attorney may typically file over the span of a typical criminal case.
Similar to Tenth Circuit Affirms President Trump (20)
WINDING UP of COMPANY, Modes of DissolutionKHURRAMWALI
Winding up, also known as liquidation, refers to the legal and financial process of dissolving a company. It involves ceasing operations, selling assets, settling debts, and ultimately removing the company from the official business registry.
Here's a breakdown of the key aspects of winding up:
Reasons for Winding Up:
Insolvency: This is the most common reason, where the company cannot pay its debts. Creditors may initiate a compulsory winding up to recover their dues.
Voluntary Closure: The owners may decide to close the company due to reasons like reaching business goals, facing losses, or merging with another company.
Deadlock: If shareholders or directors cannot agree on how to run the company, a court may order a winding up.
Types of Winding Up:
Voluntary Winding Up: This is initiated by the company's shareholders through a resolution passed by a majority vote. There are two main types:
Members' Voluntary Winding Up: The company is solvent (has enough assets to pay off its debts) and shareholders will receive any remaining assets after debts are settled.
Creditors' Voluntary Winding Up: The company is insolvent and creditors will be prioritized in receiving payment from the sale of assets.
Compulsory Winding Up: This is initiated by a court order, typically at the request of creditors, government agencies, or even by the company itself if it's insolvent.
Process of Winding Up:
Appointment of Liquidator: A qualified professional is appointed to oversee the winding-up process. They are responsible for selling assets, paying off debts, and distributing any remaining funds.
Cease Trading: The company stops its regular business operations.
Notification of Creditors: Creditors are informed about the winding up and invited to submit their claims.
Sale of Assets: The company's assets are sold to generate cash to pay off creditors.
Payment of Debts: Creditors are paid according to a set order of priority, with secured creditors receiving payment before unsecured creditors.
Distribution to Shareholders: If there are any remaining funds after all debts are settled, they are distributed to shareholders according to their ownership stake.
Dissolution: Once all claims are settled and distributions made, the company is officially dissolved and removed from the business register.
Impact of Winding Up:
Employees: Employees will likely lose their jobs during the winding-up process.
Creditors: Creditors may not recover their debts in full, especially if the company is insolvent.
Shareholders: Shareholders may not receive any payout if the company's debts exceed its assets.
Winding up is a complex legal and financial process that can have significant consequences for all parties involved. It's important to seek professional legal and financial advice when considering winding up a company.
Military Commissions details LtCol Thomas Jasper as Detailed Defense CounselThomas (Tom) Jasper
Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Notice of the Chief Defense Counsel's detailing of LtCol Thomas F. Jasper, Jr. USMC, as Detailed Defense Counsel for Abd Al Hadi Al-Iraqi on 6 August 2014 in the case of United States v. Hadi al Iraqi (10026)
A "File Trademark" is a legal term referring to the registration of a unique symbol, logo, or name used to identify and distinguish products or services. This process provides legal protection, granting exclusive rights to the trademark owner, and helps prevent unauthorized use by competitors.
Visit Now: https://www.tumblr.com/trademark-quick/751620857551634432/ensure-legal-protection-file-your-trademark-with?source=share
NATURE, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.pptxanvithaav
These slides helps the student of international law to understand what is the nature of international law? and how international law was originated and developed?.
The slides was well structured along with the highlighted points for better understanding .
ALL EYES ON RAFAH BUT WHY Explain more.pdf46adnanshahzad
All eyes on Rafah: But why?. The Rafah border crossing, a crucial point between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, often finds itself at the center of global attention. As we explore the significance of Rafah, we’ll uncover why all eyes are on Rafah and the complexities surrounding this pivotal region.
INTRODUCTION
What makes Rafah so significant that it captures global attention? The phrase ‘All eyes are on Rafah’ resonates not just with those in the region but with people worldwide who recognize its strategic, humanitarian, and political importance. In this guide, we will delve into the factors that make Rafah a focal point for international interest, examining its historical context, humanitarian challenges, and political dimensions.
In 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs established a committee led by Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, former Vice Chancellor of National Law University (NLU), Delhi. This committee was tasked with reviewing the three codes of criminal law. The primary objective of the committee was to propose comprehensive reforms to the country’s criminal laws in a manner that is both principled and effective.
The committee’s focus was on ensuring the safety and security of individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole. Throughout its deliberations, the committee aimed to uphold constitutional values such as justice, dignity, and the intrinsic value of each individual. Their goal was to recommend amendments to the criminal laws that align with these values and priorities.
Subsequently, in February, the committee successfully submitted its recommendations regarding amendments to the criminal law. These recommendations are intended to serve as a foundation for enhancing the current legal framework, promoting safety and security, and upholding the constitutional principles of justice, dignity, and the inherent worth of every individual.
1. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
SAMUEL K. GILES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALTO PARTNERS LLLP,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 19-1381
(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-00467-RBJ)
(D. Colo.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Samuel K. Giles lives in a subsidized-housing complex that is owned by Alto
Partners, LLLP (“Alto”) and operated by Adams County Housing Authority
(“ACHA”).1
Giles, who is African American, filed this housing-discrimination
lawsuit against Alto after it denied his application to move to a different unit. Alto
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
ACHA is the sole member of Alto GP, LLC, which is the general partner of
Alto. Alto and ACHA frequently acted together during the events underlying this
lawsuit. To the extent they acted collectively, we refer to them as “Alto” like the
district court did.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 14, 2020
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 1
2. 2
told Giles that he did not qualify for the unit based on his income, but Giles questions
Alto’s motivation—certain that race, not finances, motivated its decision. The
district court held that Alto presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision and rejected Giles’s argument that the proffered reason was pretextual. The
district court then granted summary judgment to Alto. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
Giles lives in a low-income housing community in Westminster, Colorado
called Terrace Gardens Apartments. In 2017, ACHA notified residents of a possible
redevelopment in the coming years and gave them information on relocation
assistance in anticipation of that event. Shortly thereafter, Giles applied to transfer to
a specific unit at Alto Apartments, a new complex run by the same owner and
management team. Giles had to requalify financially in order to transfer.
Alto denied Giles’s application based on his income. Giles is the managing
director of his own company, so Alto first evaluated his application based on his net
earnings from self-employment. Because Giles reported a net loss for his business in
2016, Alto concluded that his self-employment income did not meet the
minimum-income threshold. Alto also looked at whether Giles qualified based on his
gross earnings from wages. But the documentation Giles provided contained
discrepancies, and he repeatedly refused to provide a 2017 profit-and-loss statement
that Alto says was critical to the income-verification process. Alto therefore
concluded that Giles did not qualify under that methodology either.
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 2
3. 3
Giles disagreed with the manner in which Alto calculated his income and
accused Alto of racial discrimination—even though African American and other
minority residents make up a substantial part of the population at Alto Apartments,
and Alto ultimately rented the unit Giles requested to an African American mother
and child. A representative with ACHA offered to personally review Giles’s income
to search for possible grounds to appeal the denial of his application, but he filed this
lawsuit instead. His pro se complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. He
asserts claims under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the “Fair Housing Act” or
“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair housing practices. All of
the claims are predicated on the same alleged discriminatory acts.
This is the second appeal in this case. We incorporate by reference our
decision in the first appeal, which contains a detailed description of Giles’s claims
and the facts underlying them. See Giles v. Alto Partners, LLLP, 762 F. App’x 505,
506-08 (10th Cir. 2019). In that appeal, we affirmed the district court’s order
denying Giles’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Giles had asked the district
court to preclude Alto from renting his desired unit to anyone else pending the
resolution of his lawsuit. The district court denied his motion after concluding that
(1) Giles is not presently at risk of being displaced from his current residence at Terrace
Gardens because any redevelopment will not occur for another five to eight years;
(2) Giles has conceded he has no right to get into a specific apartment; (3) there is no
evidence of racial discrimination; and (4) Giles does not have a viable pretext argument
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 3
4. 4
based on Alto’s alleged deviations from its normal calculation methods. We agreed with
the district court’s reasoning and found no abuse of discretion. See id. at 509-10.
The case then proceeded in district court. During the discovery phase, Giles
resisted providing his complete financial information and filed a motion for a
protective order. But the district court made clear that Giles’s finances are at the
center of this lawsuit and ordered him to produce all documentation related to his
ability to qualify for the new apartment (including his 2016 and 2017 tax returns and
his 2017 profit and loss statement), which he did. Alto ultimately moved for
summary judgment on all of Giles’s claims. The district court granted summary
judgment in Alto’s favor, and Giles filed this timely appeal.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard that the district court applied. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill.,
739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment must be granted if “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Stated otherwise, “[t]he moving party is
entitled to summary judgment where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs.
v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). “When applying this standard, we examine the record and
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 4
5. 5
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Id.
Giles’s claims are based on alleged circumstantial evidence of discrimination,
so the three-part burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), applies. See Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1279
(10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to FHA
claims); see also Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. St. George City, 685 F.3d
917, 919 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework is
“entrenched” in the FHA context).
This means that Giles “first must come forward with proof of a prima facie
case of discrimination,” Asbury, 866 F.2d at 1279. If he does so, the burden shifts to
Alto to produce evidence that it “was motivated by legitimate, non-racial
considerations,” id. If Alto articulates non-discriminatory reasons, the burden shifts
back to Giles to “show there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
proffered reasons are pretextual.” Fassbender v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 890 F.3d
875, 884 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Giles can show pretext
by demonstrating that (1) “the proffered reason is factually false,” Tabor v. Hilti,
Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1218 (10th Cir. 2013); (2) discrimination was a primary factor in
Alto’s decision, as evidenced by the fact that Alto’s proffered reason is so weak and
implausible that a reasonable fact finder could deem it unworthy of credence, see id.;
or (3) Alto acted contrary to a written or unwritten company policy or practice, see
DePaula v. Easter Seals El Mirador, 859 F.3d 957, 970 (10th Cir. 2017).
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 5
6. 6
In resolving Alto’s summary judgment motion, the district court first
concluded that Giles did not show direct evidence of discriminatory intent. It then
conducted a McDonnell Douglas analysis. It did not delve into whether Giles
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence, but instead focused on the second and third steps of McDonnell Douglas.
At the second step, the district court held that Alto met its burden of showing a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its denial of Giles’s housing application—
namely, it could not verify that Giles met the income requirements based on the
documentation he provided. In reaching this conclusion, the district court discussed
the income-verification process in detail and explained how Alto complied with the
procedures that administrators of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program must
follow. Those procedures are set forth in a manual published by the Colorado
Housing and Finance Authority (“CHFA”), which in turn references subsidized-
housing guidelines, a handbook published by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”), and the Internal Revenue Code.
At the third step, the district court placed Giles’s pretext argument within the
third category discussed above, characterizing it as an argument that Alto had
deviated from the stated or written policy contained in the CHFA manual. The
district court acknowledged that the application process for subsidized housing can
be confusing and that aspects of the minimum and maximum income limitations seem
to “make[] no sense,” R., Vol. II at 103 n.1. But it carefully dissected each of Giles’s
arguments alleging failure to comply with the CHFA manual and concluded that Alto
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 6
7. 7
did its best to adhere to the governing procedures. Thus, the district court held that
Giles failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Alto’s proffered
reason for denying his application was pretextual. It also determined that Giles failed
to produce any evidence whatsoever suggesting that Alto denied his application
because of his race. For all these reasons, the district court granted summary
judgment to Alto.
III.
On appeal, Giles asserts that the district court misinterpreted the Internal
Revenue Code when it found that Alto met its burden of showing a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its denial of Giles’s housing application, and also erred
in rejecting his pretext theory. To support both of these assertions, Giles largely
reiterates the arguments he made below regarding Alto’s failure to comply with the
CHFA manual that spells out how to calculate income. The gist of his contention
seems to be that Alto (and later the district court) should have looked at his annual or
gross income instead of his net income to determine if he qualified for the Alto
Apartments. According to Giles, Alto’s calculations and methodology run so far
afield from the broad definition of “income” in the Internal Revenue Code and
relevant state and federal handbooks that it did not sustain its burden at step two of
the analysis; furthermore, Alto’s reason for denying his application must be a pretext
for racial discrimination at step three.
Giles further asserts that the district court’s order amounts to improper
“judicial legislation” that effectively undoes Congress’s subsidized-housing
Appellate Case: 19-1381 Document: 010110375884 Date Filed: 07/14/2020 Page: 7
8. 8
legislation and its plan to allocate affordable housing to those in need. See, e.g.,
Aplt. Opening Br. at 6, 13, 17, 41. Expanding upon his judicial-legislation argument,
Giles contends the district court’s order violates his constitutional rights by
pronouncing a “facially unconstitutional ex post facto rule,” id. at 28.
We construe Giles’s pleadings liberally because he proceeds pro se. See
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). Even under that
standard, we are not persuaded by his arguments. We agree with the district court’s
careful analysis and affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in its order
granting summary judgment. See R., Vol. II at 102-17.2
IV.
Last, we consider Giles’s “Motion for Judicial Notice” of six categories of
documents. To the extent the motion asks us to “instruct[] the district court and
subsequent jury to accept the noticed fact[s] as conclusive” under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201(f), Aplt. Mot. for Jud. Notice at 19, it is now moot. We deny the
remainder of the motion because Giles has not established that judicial notice is
necessary and appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. We note, however,
2
Because Alto prevails on summary judgment based on the second and third
steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, we need not delve into Giles’s appellate
argument regarding the first step—i.e., that the evidence he presented created a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether he established a prima facie case by
qualifying for housing. And because we agree with the district court’s reasoning and
the result in this case, we need not reach his argument that its summary judgment
order constitutes impermissible judicial legislation and violated his constitutional
rights.
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9. 9
that we were able to fully consider the parties’ arguments without taking judicial
notice of the documents listed in the motion.
In addition to seeking judicial notice, the motion asks us to find that the
district court abused its discretion by failing to rule on a similar, partially
overlapping filing entitled, “Request for Judicial Notice.” Giles did not make this
argument in his principal briefs, so it is not properly before us. See Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(8)(A). “Consistent with [the requirement in Rule 28(a)(8)(A)], we routinely
have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately
presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099,
1104 (10th Cir. 2007).
V.
We deny Giles’s motion for judicial notice. We affirm the district court’s
judgment.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
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