The High Economic and Environmental Costs of Taiwan's Proposed Nuclear Phase-Out

The High Cost of
Fear

Calculating the Impacts of a Nuclear to Fossil Fuel
Transition in Taiwan

by: Michael Light, Madison Czerwinski, Mark Nelson, Grace Pratt, and
Michael Shellenberger

The High Cost of Fear Page 1 of 25

Executive Summary

“The High Cost of Fear” uses publicly available data, the best-available peer-reviewed
scientific research and simple methods to calculate economic and environmental
impacts of a nuclear phase-out in Taiwan.

We find a nuclear phase-out would:

• Cost at least $2.85 billion per year for additional natural gas purchases alone, the
equivalent of 119,000 jobs paying Taiwan’s per capita annual average salary of
$23,916 ; 1

• Almost all of the cost would be in the form of payments for fuel, thereby reducing
Taiwan’s trade surplus;

• Require a significant increase in fossil fuel use given Taiwan’s lack of renewable
energy resources;

• Increase premature deaths from air pollution by replacing nuclear plants instead
of coal plants with natural gas;

• If measured against the average U.S. car mileage, replacing all Taiwan’s nuclear
plants with fossil fuels would increase carbon emissions the equivalent of adding
more than 46    million cars to the road—a figure about double the current number
of cars in Taiwan—an amount that would prevent Taiwan from achieving its
emissions reduction commitments.

• Increase electricity rates at least 10 percent percent and more likely much higher,
potentially harming Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.

"High Cost" recommends the Tsai Ing-wen government hold a national referendum on
the future of nuclear energy in Taiwan, similar to that of South Korea’s recent “citizens
jury,” which recommended South Korea pursue new nuclear construction.

The value of a citizens jury process like South Korea’s is that it allows for a large,
representative sample of the public to learn the scientific facts, hear all sides, and
recommend a decision. Taiwan should serve as a model for energy democracy by
lengthening their jury’s decisionmaking time-frame.

1
August, 2017. “National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan),” Directorate General of Budget,
Accounting and Statistics. Available at:
http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=33339&ctNode=3570&mp=5.

About the Authors

Michael Light, Senior Writer, Environmental Progress. Michael is an
investigative journalist and reporter who oversees EP’s reporting and
publications strategy.

Mark Nelson, Senior Analyst, Environmental Progress. Mark created
and manages EP’s Energy Progress Tracker, the most comprehensive
review of nuclear power plants planned, under construction and at-risk
of premature closure around the world.

Madison Czerwinski, Senior Researcher, Environmental Progress. Madi
oversees EP’s historical, qualitative and quantitative research into the
factors driving the construction and cancellation of nuclear power
plants.

Grace Pratt, Research Fellow, Environmental Progress. Grace will
graduate from the University of California, Berkeley with a B.S. in
Society and Environment in 2020.

Michael Shellenberger, Founder and President, Environmental
Progress. Michael Shellenberger is a Time Magazine "Hero of the
Environment" and Green Book Award-winning author and policy
expert.


Introduction

The current Taiwanese government is pursuing an energy policy that aims to abolish
domestic construction and use of nuclear energy. As an independent, not-for-proﬁt
organization, Environmental Progress (EP) is publishing this report to support public
engagement and understanding of a proposed nuclear phase-out.
2

EP views nuclear energy as essential to achieving our mission to lift all humans out of
poverty while reversing humankind’s negative environmental impact. Our view of the
environmental beneﬁt of nuclear is shared by the United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), top
3 4
conservation leaders and the world’s leading climate scientists. We hope that whatever
5
decision the people of Taiwan make, whether to embrace its native nuclear program or
end it, it is informed by a strong understanding of basic energy realities.

As such, this report sets out to do two things:

1. Calculate, quantify and better specify likely economic and environmental impacts of
a nuclear phase-out;

2. Understand why Taiwanese leaders are pursuing energy policy that will result in
more expensive energy, more air pollution, and fewer jobs and/or lower salaries for
the public;

2
EP is entirely supported by individuals and foundations with no interest in our research. In service to transparency,
we publicly list all our donors on our website, and in Appendix A. of this report.
3
IPCC, 2014. “Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.” Pachauri, R., & Meyer, L., (eds.). IPCC,
Geneva, Switzerland.
4
IEA, January 29, 2015. “Taking a fresh look at the future of nuclear power,” International Energy Agency. Available
at: https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2015/january/taking-a-fresh-look-at-the-future-of-nuclear-power.html.
5
EP has over the last several years supported a growing number of climate scientists to advocate for nuclear energy
including James Hansen, Kerry Emanuel, Ken Caldeira, Pushker Kharecha, and Tom Wigley among others.

I. Taiwan’s Proposed Nuclear Energy Phase-out

A. Political Reform and Democratization

With the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, Taiwan entered a new era of
reform. She was selected for office by the largest margin of victory observed since 1996
on a mandate of economic restoration, job creation, and independence, which during
the previous conservative government all saw regression.

Since taking office, President Tsai has doubled down on her campaign promise to
completely phase out nuclear energy’s use in Taiwan by 2025, which will entail
shuttering the country’s three operational nuclear power plants and instituting a
moratorium on new nuclear construction, including on two nearly-complete reactors at
Lungmen, whose total generating capacity is 2600 MW and which have been
mothballed since 2013.   6

The modern Taiwanese backlash against nuclear began in 2000 with the election of
Democratic Progressive Party leader Chen Shui-bian. Chen ran on a campaign promise
to abolish the use of nuclear energy in Taiwan, and his re-election in 2004 led to the
implementation of renewable energy and energy-efficiency projects meant to pave the
way for nuclear’s ultimate replacement. Among Chen’s energy policies was halting
construction on the Lungmen plant, which began in 1999.

Nuclear saw a brief period of government support after the Nationalist Party took
power from Chen in 2008, when Lungmen’s construction was restarted, but the deep
roots of the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan that had been calling for an end to
domestic nuclear use continued organizing against the country’s plants throughout
much of the administration’s first term.

Then, the 2011 accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan created a wave of public panic
around the world when three reactors melted down on the country’s coast, triggering
hydrogen gas explosions and the release of radioactive particles. A total of 164,865
people were evacuated from a roughly 20 km area surrounding the plant, resulting in
7
the deaths of more than 1,600 people.
8

Support for nuclear energy among Taiwanese citizens has always been mixed. In the
1980s, only about 60 percent of Taiwanese citizens viewed nuclear energy as a
6
August, 2017. “Nuclear Power in Taiwan,” World Nuclear Association. Available at:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/nuclear-power-in-taiwan.aspx.
7
Kunii et al., 2016. "Severe Psychological Distress of Evacuees in Evacuation Zone Caused by the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: The Fukushima Health Management Survey." PLoS
ONE 11(7).
8
February 20, 2014. "Fukushima stress deaths top 3/11 toll." The Japan Times. Available at:
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/20/national/post-quake-illnesses-kill-more-in-fukushima-than
-2011-disaster/.

necessary or very necessary energy source to the country, and in the 1990s, the
construction of the plant at Lungmen never received more than 60 percent of public
support. Public support of nuclear’s necessity jumped over 10 percent, however, in 9
1999 after a magnitude 7.3 earthquake in central Taiwan knocked out power for the
majority of the country’s residents, damaging non-nuclear power stations and key
infrastructure.

In response to the earthquake, Taiwan’s three nuclear power stations were
automatically shut off, and resumed operation two days later as the country began to
return electricity to its residents. Paradoxically, despite this successful disaster
response, one national poll taken after the earthquake showed a dip in public
confidence in nuclear safety, with only about 55 percent of respondents saying they
had confidence in the safety of Taiwan’s nuclear power plants. 10

While polling data is influenced in part by the political orientation of the polling
organization, after Fukushima, as high as 92 percent of respondents to one poll said
they feared the risks associated with nuclear power plants.   11

Seizing on this public sentiment, which remained consistent in the years following
Fukushima, then-candidate Tsai campaigned for the phase-out of nuclear power and
reduced reliance on coal plants — and for the transition toward natural gas and
renewables like solar and wind, as well as greater energy efficiency in response to
increased public support for the
government to take action on
climate change. 12

B. Challenges and
Opportunities

The share of Taiwan’s electricity
coming from fossil fuels has been
steadily on the rise since 2000, and
in 2016, fossil fuels accounted for
about 82 percent of Taiwan’s
9
Hsue, C., 1995. Nuclear Communication and Negotiation: Public Participation and Opinion. National Chung-hsing
University, Institute of Public Policy Research. p. 161-178.
10
    Yu, H., and Hwang, K. “Nuclear Power Development and Public Acceptance in Taiwan.” Taiwan Power Company.
Available at: http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/36/034/36034521.pdf
11
    Grano, S. 2014. “Perception of Risk towards Nuclear Energy in Taiwan and Hong.” Taiwan in Comparative
Perspective, Vol. 5. P. 60-78. Available at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/TaiwanProgramme/Journal/JournalContents/TCP5Grano.pdf
12
Lin, S., May 9, 2015. “Public wants climate action: poll,” Taipei Times. Available at:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/05/09/2003617864

electricity mix. This increasing reliance on fossil has corresponded with a reduction in 13
nuclear's contribution to Taiwan’s electricity mix from about 19 percent in 2000 to 12
percent in 2016.
14

Nuclear power currently accounts for 90 percent of percent of Taiwan’s clean energy,
down from 96 percent a decade ago. Solar and wind, by contrast, provide four percent
of Taiwan’s clean energy, up from about one percent in 2006, according to the R.O.C.’s
Bureau of Energy. 15

While Taiwan is committed to generating more of its electricity from solar and wind,
geography, cost, and reliability pose significant barriers. While Taiwan’s solar panel
manufacturing industry is the second largest in the world, it is geographically unsuited 16
for utility-scale solar construction.

Moreover, since solar and wind in Taiwan generate electricity at just 13 and 24 percent
of their rated capacity over the course of a year, as of 2016, even a vast fleet would 17
require the burning of coal or natural gas in the times of the day or seasons when the
sun isn’t shining or the wind isn’t blowing.

And indeed, Taiwan plans for coal to account for 50 percent of its electricity generation
by 2020, before cutting that number back to 30 percent by 2025, when 50 percent of 18
its electricity generation will be comprised of natural gas.   19

Taipower has already begun building the infrastructure to support this increased
reliance on gas, expanding one of Taiwan’s two existing regasification terminals at
Taichung while constructing an entirely new, third regasification terminal that Taipower
plans to have in service by 2025.   20
13
    2017. “Power Generation (by Fuel) and Electricity Consumption (by Sector),” Energy Statistical Annual
Reports, Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. Available at:
http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ecw/english/content/contentlink.aspx?menu_id=1540.
14
ibid.
15
    2017. “Energy Supply (by Energy Form) & Total Domestic Consumption (by Sector),” Energy Statistical
Annual Reports, Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. Available at:
16
Hu, M., Mathews, J.,October 1, 2016. “Taiwan’s Green Shift – prospects and challenges,” Japan Focus:
The Asia-Pacific Journal, 14 (19). Available at:    http://apjjf.org/2016/19/Hu.html .
17
2017. “Net Electricity Produced & Purchased of Taiwan Power Company,” Energy Statistical Annual
Reports, Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. Available at:
18
Chia-nan, L., November 8, 2017. “Greenpeace slams lack of emissions-cutting map,” Taipei Times.
Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/11/08/2003681881.
19
Miaojung, L., Lianting, T., June 18, 2017. “Taiwan Lays Plans for $59 Billion in Renewable-Energy
Finance,” Bloomberg. Available at:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-18/taiwan-lays-plans-for-59-billion-in-renewable-ene
rgy-finance.
20
EIA Beta, October, 2016. “Taiwan Analysis,” Energy Information Agency. Available at:
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TWN.

Advocates of the Taiwanese nuclear phase-out point to the large deployment of
renewables in places like California and Germany, which are phasing out their nuclear
plants, as evidence of its feasibility. Japan’s significant reduction of energy
consumption through energy efficiency and the rapidly declining cost of lithium
batteries for storage are also cited as evidence for the feasibility of the phase-out.

But each example raises significant challenges. Both Germany and California have seen
their emissions rise in recent years, despite deploying record-levels of solar and wind
capacity, since both required the increased use of coal or natural gas as their nuclear
plants closed and economic growth occurred off-grid with cheap liquid fossil fuels.

And while Lithium batteries have become cheaper, they remain unable to store large
quantities of electricity over several months except at extreme cost. In addition, lithium
batteries would help coal or nuclear plants run more constantly, increasing the demand
for their operation; if nuclear plants were removed while batteries were added to the
grid, coal consumption would increase. 21

Moreover, an analysis of historic data finds no correlation between solar or wind
deployment and the carbon intensity of energy at an aggregated level, effectively
meaning that no addition of solar and wind to a given nation’s energy mix, with the
exception of an addition of wind in Denmark, has ever shown a correlation with a
reduction in national carbon intensity of energy.

C. Economic and Environmental Costs of a Nuclear Phase-Out

1. Methodology

Environmental Progress has made a set of simple, easy-to-reproduce economic and
environmental calculations without use of any modeling. We chose this method for
several reasons.

First, simpler calculations make obvious the basic assumptions and are easier to
replicate. Because claims made by private-sector energy promoters are often
exaggerated, policymakers, journalists and the public are rightly skeptical of economic
and environmental claims. As such, we have created calculations that any Taiwanese
citizen with a basic understanding of arithmetic can complete.

Second, no modeling is required to understand the broad impact a given set of
policies would have on the economy and the environment. While some econometric
studies are useful for calculating impacts on jobs, too often they rely on unwarranted
assumptions that are often hidden behind unnecessary complexity.
21
Hittinger, E., Azevedo, I. January 28, 2015. "Bulk Energy Storage Increases United States Electricity System
Emissions." Environmental Science and Technology, 49 (5). pp. 3203–3210. Available at:
Ehttp://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es505027p.

Third, and ﬁnally, modeling too often creates a feeling of “false precision,” which
serves to both mask uncertainties and distract from well-established facts, such as that
replacing nuclear with fossil fuels and renewables must increase pollution, and that
raising energy prices must result in slower growth, lower wages and/or job loss.

2. Findings

1. Coal and natural gas, not solar and wind, are the most likely replacements for
nuclear.

Replacing nuclear with solar and wind would require a prohibitively large amount of
land and investment to be feasible. For Taiwan to replace all of its nuclear plants with
solar, it would need to build 617 solar farms the size of one of the country’s largest
proposed solar farm, which would cost around $71 billion and cover an area 80 percent
larger than Taipei.


The map of Taiwan above shows the general suitability of the country’s land for vast
increases of solar panel areas, based on land use. Only four out of the more than 350
22
ten kilometer-by-ten kilometer squares is predominantly suitable for extremely large
solar projects. Of course, solar farms can be and in fact are today built in areas
designated on this map as "unsuitable," but these farms in Taiwan today require the
loss of fertile farmland or cutting down of wooded areas. A substantial area of Taiwan is
considered urban land and thus could integrate solar energy production with rooftop
panels, but urban solar generally has much low capacity factors than utility-scale solar.

Currently, rural opposition to wind farms is considered a limiting factor by the 23
Taiwanese government to expanding beyond the country’s current installed onshore
wind electricity capacity of 682 MW. And the high cost of electricity storage and 24
maintaining back-up fossil energy generation would add up significantly only after the
initial stages of expansion are surpassed.

The recent experience of Germany underscores the unreliability of national solar and
wind fleets. Germany installed 1.5 GW (3.9 percent) more solar panel capacity but got
1.2 TWh (3 percent) less electricity from solar in 2016 because it was less sunny than in
2015. And Germany installed 5 GW (11 percent) more wind turbine capacity but
electricity from wind decreased 1.4 TWh (2 percent) because it was less windy than
2015.
25

In recognition of these realities, Taiwan put into place the “Million Solar Rooftop PVs”
and “One Thousand Wind Turbines” policies for solar and wind development by 2030,
which call for the installation of 3,100 MW of rooftop PV systems and 1,000 wind
turbines, with 600 offshore turbines and 450 onshore turbines. Taiwan currently has 26
just two installed offshore wind turbines as part of its first offshore wind farm, which will
22
The data, obtained from the Land and Water Division of Food and Agriculture Organization, divided land into
eight major categories: forest, grasslands, shrubs, agriculture, urban land, wetlands, sparsely vegetated areas and
bare areas. Most of these categories were further divided based on livestock density, agricultural activity and
government protection. Each square in the grid represents a 10 KM by 10 KM area of land. Forests, wetlands and
agricultural land are in this map deemed unsuitable sites for large contiguous solar farms, as construction would
require significant ecological damage or loss of food production capability. Any protected land or land with
moderate or high livestock density is removed from the possibility of solar expansion for the same two reasons. Any
grasslands, shrubby land, sparsely vegetated areas or bare areas that are unmanaged or have low livestock density
are left as possible solar-farm-suitable land. Urban land is denoted in orange. Uncolored areas, particularly on small
islands and the coast, did not have land use data available and are not included in this analysis.
23
Ferry, T., October 20, 2016. “Taiwan’s ‘Energiewende’ – Developing Renewable Energy,” AmCham
Taiwan. Available at: https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2016/10/taiwan-developing-renewable-energy/.
24
    2017. “Structure of Installed Capacity and Structure of Electricity Generation (by Fuel) (2016) (1),”
Energy Statistical Annual Reports, Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. Available at:
25
Nelson, M. and Deng, M. June 17, 2017. “Germany.” Available at:
http://www.environmentalprogress.org/germany/.
26
    Bureau of Energy Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan. 2013. “Policy for Promoting Renewable Energy & Current
Status in Taiwan.” Available at:
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/2508/111035/2e9e6ebe-d594-4d46-822b-1110f07f8482.pdf

need to increase its capacity by 1,500 percent over the next two years to meet its
expansion goals.   27

But replacing all of Taiwan’s nuclear energy alone with solar energy would cost about
$71 billion, given the expected cost of the country’s largest planned solar project.

2. Replacing nuclear with natural gas would cost $2.85 billion annually, immediately,
with long-term losses higher and unknown.

Replacing Taiwan’s nuclear plants with natural gas would require $2.85 billion per year
at current low LNG prices to pay for gas imports. , , 28 29 30

If that $2.85 billion were instead spent on direct job creation, 119,000 jobs could be
created paying Taiwan’s per capita annual average salary of $23,916. Even if the
overhead cost of administering the new jobs was 50% of the amount of average salary,
this would amount to 60,000 additional jobs.

However the actual economic value lost or created by using gas or nuclear would be
higher given the indirect impact of electricity costs on jobs and the loss of a valuable
export industry. A study from the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, found that the
net GDP increase from producing electricity from Japan's idled nuclear reactors instead
of from imported fossil fuels was 50 percent higher than the cost alone paid for the
imported fossil fuels.
31
27
August 6, 2017. “Taiwan's 1st offshore wind farm to boost capacity 1,500% by 2019,” Focus Taiwan.
Available at: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201708060010.aspx.
28
For cost of imported natural gas, the price of imported liquefied natural gas in Japan in 2016 is used.
The figure comes from BP Statistical Review 2017, and is $6.94 per million BTU (British Thermal Unit)
[http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-sta
tistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-natural-gas.pdf]. The U.S. Energy Information Agency’s outlook for
the assumed heat rate of new combined-cycle gas turbines of 6,600 BTU per kWh is followed
[https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=KR].
29
Taiwanese nuclear energy generation to be replaced with natural gas derived from the capacity of
currently operating and under-construction reactors from IAEA’s Power Reactor Information System
database in addition to the Lungmen 1 and 2, whose work has presently been halted by the new
administration, assuming an 88 percent capacity factor for all plants in line with the average of the last
five years of Taiwanese nuclear plant capacity factors
[https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=TW].
30
The overnight capital cost to build replacement natural gas turbine plants assumes a capital cost of
$923 USD per kilowatt-electric of capacity
[https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/table_8.2.pdf], under the conservative assumption
that new Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plants will have the same 87 percent capacity factor
[https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=TW] of the nuclear plants
being replaced. All nuclear capacity is replaced one-to-one by natural gas turbine capacity is assumed,
with nuclear capacity including all Taiwanese operating and under-construction reactors in addition to
Lungmen 1 and 2.
31
M. Aoshima et al. 2017. “Economic and Energy Outlook of Japan Through FY 2018“. Institute of
Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) . Available at: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/press/press170725.pdf

3. Replacing nuclear plants with natural gas could threaten electrical grid security,
stability and reliability.

The recent shutdown of nuclear reactors in Japan has resulted in energy insecurity and
grid unreliability. Economists at Japan's leading energy economics research
organization have priced the direct, immediate link between nuclear plants staying
offline and loss of GDP, finding that losing four reactors about the size of those in
Taiwan’s second and third nuclear power plants will lead to $1.8 billion of increased
fossil fuel expenditures for next year alone, and the loss of $2.7 billion dollars of GDP.
32
While identifying an exact number is impossible and would create “false precision,”
some rough estimates are possible.

On August 15, 2017, a mistake at a natural gas plant in Taiwan caused 4.2 GW of
power to be lost in the country's north, leading to grid failure that affected six million
homes and 151 manufacturing companies. Had the Taiwanese government not
33
decided to keep nuclear plants offline in preparation for future decommissioning, 4.8
GW of power from three nuclear plants would have been available in the same part of
the country as the gas plant failure and prevented the resulting five-hour outage that
disrupted both residential electricity access and shut down assembly lines. The incident
occurred in the late afternoon, meaning that increased solar energy would not have
avoided the blackout.

4. Replacing Taiwan’s nuclear plants with fossil fuels risks has already increased the risk
of death from air pollution.

Taiwan is one of the 10 worst countries in terms of the percentage of its citizens who
are exposed to unsafe levels of air pollution, according to an international study
published by Yale University last year.   34

Replacing electrical generation from nuclear with natural gas could threaten to public
safety. Just three years ago, gas explosions in the city of Kaohsiung killed 25 people
and injured 267 others. By contrast, nuclear energy is the safest way to make electricity
according to the prestigious medical journal Lancet, and to date has saved 1.8 million 35
lives.   36
32
M. Aoshima et al. 2017. Economic and Energy Outlook of Japan Through FY 2018. Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan (IEEJ) . Available at: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/press/press170725.pdf.
33
Yu, Jess Macy. August 17, 2017. "Taiwan power outage affected 151 companies, caused $3 million in
damages." Reuters. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-power-outages-idUSKCN1AX0S3?il=0.
34
2016. “Environmental Performance Index: Taiwan,” Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy.
Available at: http://epi.yale.edu/country/taiwan.
35
Markandya, A., & Wilkinson, P. 2007. “Electricity generation and health.” The Lancet, 370(9591), pp.
979-990.
36
Kharecha, P., Hansen, J. 2013. “Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical
and Projected Nuclear Power,” Environmental Science & Technology. 47 (9), pp. 4889-4895.

5. A nuclear phase-out would increase carbon emissions and prevent Taiwan from
achieving its targets made in its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution in 2015.

Given the intermittency of solar and wind, and Taiwan’s land scarcity, replacing the
nation’s nuclear plants would require a signiﬁcant increase in coal and/or natural gas,
which would increase air pollution in Taipei and prevent Taiwan from meeting its
commitments made during the 2015 through its Greenhouse Gas Reduction and
Management Act and Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.

In July, 2015 before the Paris Climate talks, Taiwan passed the Greenhouse Gas
Reduction and Management Act which promised to reduce carbon emissions by 50
percent below 2005 levels by 2050, to 134 tonnes of carbon equivalent . That year, 37
Taiwan also passed an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution with an
intermediate goal of reducing emissions by 50% below BAU emissions by 2030, or 214
million tonnes of carbon equivalent . Given the high cost of renewables though, if 38
Taiwan proceeds to replace its nuclear plants, it would likely do so with a mix of coal,
natural gas and oil.

Replacing Taiwan’s remaining nuclear plants with natural gas would produce carbon
pollution the equivalent of adding 46 million U.S. cars to the road.

37
       K. Y. Wei. 2015.Taiwan on track to greenhouse gas reduction. Environmental Protection Administration, Taiwan.
Available at:http://enews.epa.gov.tw/enews/fact_Newsdetail.asp?InputTime=1041117174044.
38
    Ibid.

II. The Origins of Anti-Nuclear Fear

A. Why Prosperity Breeds Paranoia

At the end of World War II, Taiwan was in a state of disorientation. The territory was
transferred from Japanese control to that of the Republic of China, which was
entrenched in a civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) government and Mao
Zedong's Communist forces. The conflicts resulted in compounded economic distress.
Inflation, made worse by catastrophic reform and wide-scale corruption, was so severe
that bills were issued in denominations of one-million Taiwanese dollars. To counter
hyperinflation and jumpstart the economy, the Taiwanese government invested heavily
in industrial production, which required a significant amount of electrical energy.
In 1955, the Republic of China established the China National Nuclear
Corporation (CNNP) to oversee all aspects of China’s civilian and military nuclear
programs at the same time the KMT government established its own Atomic Energy
Council (AEC).
Part of Taiwan’s push for the construction of a nuclear energy sector was their
rapid industrialization and increased demand for cheap energy. To meet new demand,
the state-owned Taiwan Power Company (Taipower), began development of the
Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant, the country’s first, in Shimen, New Taipei in 1971. By
1978, one of the plant’s reactors was commercially operable, and both reactors were
generating electricity by 1979. The second and largest plant in Taiwan, the Kuosheng
Nuclear Power Plant in Wanli, New Taipei, began construction shortly after did
Chinshan, and Taiwan’s third nuclear power plant at Maanshan began construction in
1978.
The electricity market in Taiwan remained regulated by Taipower into the 1990s,
when public opinion on nuclear power was relatively positive. Educational campaigns
led by Taipower and the AEC were active in promoting the country’s power stations as
the cleanest and safest form of energy production for the continued development of
the island’s economy, and utilized public support to further plans for a fourth nuclear
plant at Lungmen.
Despite nuclear’s contribution to development, some members of Taiwanese
society came out strongly against the country’s plants. The disposal of nuclear waste
stimulated opposition from students and Taiwanese scholars who had left for the
country for the United States to pursue university degrees. These American-trained
professionals questioned the KMT’s nuclear expansion plans and argued for a renewed
discussion on the subject of energy production.
In the early 1980s, a turbine blade failure in the plant at Maanshan led to a
reactor trip and fire that took over two hours to extinguish. News of the fire as well as

the accident at Cherynobl in the former Soviet Union delivered a serious blow to KMT’s
plan to build reactors at Lungmen. Soon after, the Homemakers United Foundation,
one of Taiwan’s earliest anti-nuclear organizations, held debates with Taipower officials
on the safety of planned new nuclear power plants. These debates brought increased
attention and scrutiny to the nuclear sector.
By 1988, the locus of anti-nuclear opinion shifted from academia and intellectual
circles to communities of residents who believed themselves to be endangered by
continued nuclear operation. Once martial law had been abolished, media outlets
began to increasingly voice discontent with nuclear energy, in part as a form of
resistance to the previously authoritarian state.
The emergence of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU)—an
organization established by a group of university professors and students, also
demonstrated growing tension between citizens and the Taiwanese government
regarding nuclear energy. Today, newer organizations like the GCAA and No Nuke
Cultural Activism Group have become leading anti-nuclear voices.
These groups have been heavily active in opposing the construction of the
nuclear plant at Lungmen, whose cost has increased with its lead times to about $10
billion and will be permanently cancelled under the Tsai government’s energy plan.
As the delays at the Lungmen plant stretched on, Taiwan’s total final energy
consumption has increased by a factor of 2.35, from 48.04 million kiloliters of oil
equivalent (KLOE) in 1989 to 113.09 KLOE in 2009, with an average annual growth rate
of 4.37 percent.   39

B. The Truth About Fukushima

Fukushima is the proximate cause of Taiwan’s most recent anti-nuclear backlash, but
more than six years after the accident, the science is unequivocal: nobody has gotten
sick much less died from the radiation that escaped from three meltdowns followed by
three hydrogen gas explosions. And there will be no increase in cancer rates.
40

By contrast, the panicked and unnecessarily large over-evacuation took the lives of
1,650 people , most of whom would have lived had the Japanese government
41
followed normal protocols and order residents to “shelter-in-place.“ In 2013, the
42
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)
39
Chang, Ssu-Li, 2013, “An Overview of Energy Policy and Usage in Taiwan”
40
The World Health Organization (WHO) concluded that, “for the general population inside and outside of Japan,
the predicted risks are low and no observable increases in cancer rates above baseline rates are anticipated.” World
Health Organization, 2013. “Global report on Fukushima nuclear accident details health risks.“ Available at:
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/fukushima_report_20130228/en/.
41
2014. “Fukushima stress deaths top 3/11 toll.” The Japan Times. Available at:
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/20/national/post-quake-illnesses-kill-more-in-fukushima-than-2011-disa
ster/#.WZR2d1GGNhE.
42
International Atomic Energy Agency. 2015. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. IAEA: Vienna.

concluded that the vast majority of the Fukushima evacuation zone is safe and nearly all
residents could have returned long ago — indeed, most should never have left. ,

43 44

There is no evidence of any harm from low doses of radiation and even applying the
debunked linear no-threshold (LNT) measure, , , ,
the lifetime dose of 150 mSv
45 46 47 48
increases the risk of fatal cancer risk by less than one percent.
49

Even following LNT, more lives would have been saved sheltering-in-place than
evacuating. “By avoiding what would have been an average cumulative exposure of 16
mSv,” writes radiation expert George Johnson, “the number of cancer deaths
prevented was perhaps 160, or 10 percent of the total who died in the evacuation
itself.”
50

Fukushima and Chernobyl both show that the impacts of nuclear meltdowns on public
health is far lower than was predicted in the 1950s. In 1957, in a study for the US
Atomic Energy Commission, researchers with Brookhaven National Labs estimated a
nuclear meltdown's worse case scenario would be 3,400 immediate deaths from Acute
Radiation Syndrome (ARS) and 43,000 fatal cancers over 50 years — a report that was
attacked as too conservative by anti-nuclear groups.
51

But the worst nuclear accident in history, Chernobyl, whose reactor was unshielded and
on fire for 14 days, only resulted in the deaths of 28 firefighters, according to the World
Health Organization (WHO), “due to [acute radiation syndrome] ARS. [Others] have
since died but their deaths could not necessarily be attributed to radiation exposure.”
WHO notes that “There may be up to 4,000 additional cancer deaths among the three
43
UNSCEAR calculated radiation doses within the 20-kilometer evacuation zone in the first year after the accident.
The highest was in Tomioka township, at 51 mSv, which on the one hand is 25 times higher than areas of Seoul, but
still far below many regions of the planet where natural radiation can be up to 200 mSv a year without any increases
of cancer. See Ghiassi-nejad, M. et al. 2002. “Very high background radiation areas of Ramsar, Iran: preliminary
biological studies.” Health Physics, 82(1), pp. 87-93.
44
Even more dramatically is the fact that an 80-year lifetime dose — the dose someone who was five years old
during the accident would receive by the time she turned 85 — would be just two to three times the first-year dose.
That’s because radiation levels drop rapidly from weather and radioactive decay. That means the highest dose
residents would have received had they lived their whole lives in the evacuation zone was about 100-150 mSv in the
most contaminated townships — about the same lifetime background dose of a typical American (2.4 mSv per year).
See UNSCEAR. 2014. “SOURCES, EFFECTS AND RISKS OF IONIZING RADIATION." UNSCEAR 2013 Report.
Volume I. REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SCIENTIFIC ANNEX A: Levels and effects of radiation exposure
due to the nuclear accident after the 2011 great east-Japan earthquake and tsunami.“ p. 209, pp. C 154.
45
Calabrese, E. J. 2017. “The threshold vs LNT showdown: Dose rate findings exposed flaws in the LNT model part
1. The Russell-Muller debate.” Environmental Research, Volume 154, pp. 435-451.
46
Calabrese, E. J. and O'Connor, M. K. 2014. “Estimating Risk of Low Radiation Doses – A Critical Review of the
BEIR VII Report and its Use of the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) Hypothesis.” Radiation Research, Volume 182, p.
463-474.
47
Jaworowski, Z. 2010. “Observations on the Chernobyl Disaster and LNT.” Dose-Response, Volume 8, p. 148-171.
48
Socol, Y. et al. 2014. “Commentary: Ethical Issues of Current Health-Protection Policies in Low-Dose Ionizing
Radiation“. Dose-Response, Volume 12, p. 342-348.
49
Insurance Information Institute. 2015. Mortality Risk. Available at: http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/mortality-risk.
50
Johnson, G. 2015. “When Radiation Isn't the Real Risk.” The New York Times. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/science/when-radiation-isnt-the-real-risk.html?_r=0.
51
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 1957. “Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large
Nuclear Power Plants.“ United States Energy Research and Development Administration: Oak Ridge, TN.

highest exposed groups over their lifetime,” but population-wide studies and cohort
52
studies show no increase in cancer rates beyond the children affected by highly
treatable thyroid cancer — for which there is only a one percent mortality rate.
53

As such, even in the worst case scenario — Chernobyl — two orders of magnitude
fewer people died from ARS, and one order of magnitude fewer people will die
prematurely from cancer, than predicted by Brookhaven.

The real damage is caused by anti-nuclear fear-mongering. The WHO concludes that
Fukushima residents have suffered psychological impacts similar to those experienced
by residents near Chernobyl — most tragically by children.
54

C. Fukushima as Panic

On March 3, 2011, a tsunami swept across northern Japan quickly killing an estimated
15,000 individuals, mostly by drowning. This traumatic event undermined public
confidence in the ability of the government to protect its people.

This loss of trust quickly extended to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, which
resulted in the melting of three reactors, three hydrogen explosions, and the
evacuation of 164,865 individuals. Less than 50,000 of them have returned, despite it
being safe for all but a very small number of individuals to return.
55

There have been two major independent studies of the Fukushima accident. The first
was instigated by the Japanese Diet and led by Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, and the second
56
by the Rebuild Japan Foundation and led by journalist Yoichi Funabashi. Both reports
57
conclude the Japanese nuclear industry and government both overconfident in their
ability to prevent an accident, and deeply fearful of frightening the public. The two
combined to prevent industry and government from implementing adequate
safeguards including disaster preparedness.

Exaggerated fears of radiation — and fears by industry and government officials of
public fears — led officials to withhold information from the public, and not to prepare
for a nuclear accident. “I think we were afraid of a panic,” said an assistant to the prime
minister. Government paternalism resulted in officials failing to conduct routine disaster
52
World Health Organization. 2005. "Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident.“ Available at:
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/.
53
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. 2008. "Sources and Effects of Ionizing
Radiation, Volume II, Scientific Annexes C, D, and E."
54
World Health Organization. 2015. “Fukushima Five Years On.“ Available at:
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/a_e/fukushima/faqs-fukushima/en/.
55
Kunii et al. 2016. “Severe Psychological Distress of Evacuees in Evacuation Zone Caused by the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant Accident: The Fukushima Health Management Survey.“ PLoS ONE 11(7), e0158821.
56
Kurokawa, K., et al. 2012. “The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission.“ The National Diet of Japan: Tokyo.
57
Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 2014. “The Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station Disaster: Investigating the Myth and Reality“. Routledge: London.

preparedness out of obligation to deliver “peace of mind.” And fears of public fears
58
led the industry and government to not upgrade nuclear plants for “fear that any safety
improvement would provoke criticism that existing safety provisions and regulations
were inadequate…”
59

The reports put heavy emphasis on the “micro-management meddling” by former
Prime Minister Naoto Kan. Kan ordered the operator to reduce the amount of water
60
used for cooling the reactors, delayed venting and expanded the size of the
evacuation. ”The Prime Minister’s consequential decision to go to the site and give
directions not only took the time of the on-site operators, but caused a disruption in
the planned chain of command for the nuclear power company, the regulatory
agencies, and the Prime Minister's office,” the Diet investigation concluded. After the
61
accident, Kan accused Tepco leadership of proposing to abandon the plant, but
Kurokawa et al. rejected this accusation as unfounded, and concluded there was never
a plan by plant management nor Tepco headquarter to abandon the plant.
62

Funabashi and others describe Kan’s behavior as an instance of “elite panic” — when
government officials panic in fear of public panic. “The government basically
63
panicked,” explained independent radiation expert and medical doctor, Dr. Mohan
Doss. “When you evacuate a hospital intensive care unit, you cannot take patients to a
high school and expect them to survive. It was the fear of radiation that ended up
killing people.”
64

In addition to being an elite panic, Fukushima was also a “moral panic,” meaning that
the panic was not an instinctual response to fear but rather reflected anxieties broader
than the accident itself. Moral panics involve superstitious fears, widespread societal
consensus, and the identification of scapegoats.
65

Some examples of moral panic include the killing of women healers in 17th
century
North America for being alleged “witches;” the violence directed toward European
Jewry blamed for the Black Death in the 15th
Century; and the mass killing of six
thousand ethnic Koreans blamed for the 1923 Kanto earthquake. After World War II,
many Japanese shunned fellow citizens as “contaminated” for being exposed to
radiation from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki — an eerie foreshadowing of
the shunning of Fukushima residents forced to evacuate.
66
58
Funabashi. 2015, p. 79.
59
Funabashi et al. 2015, p. 182.
60
Funabashi, Y. 2015. “Anatomy of the Yoshida Testimony,” Rebuild Japan.
61
Kurokawa, K., et al. 2011. “The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission.“ The National Diet of Japan: Tokyo.
62
Ibid.
63
Funabashi. 2016, p.48.
64
Johnson, G. 2015. “When Radiation Isn't the Real Risk.” The New York Times. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/science/when-radiation-isnt-the-real-risk.html?_r=0.
65
Thompson, W. E. and Gibbs, J. C. 2016. “Deviance and Deviants: A Sociological Approach."
66
Cleveland, K. 2014. “‘SIGNIFICANT BREAKING WORSE’: The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis as a Moral Panic.” Critical
Asian Studies, 46(3). p. 509-539.

III. Recommendations and Conclusions

A. Recommendations

1. New institutions such as science associations, universities, private
philanthropies and NGOs must defend nuclear and engage the public.

Rising democratization must be embraced by advocates of nuclear who should take
advantage of Taiwan’s proposed nuclear phase-out to engage with and educate the
public about energy choices. Our interviews found significant desire among ordinary
Taiwanese for more information, not just about nuclear but energy in general.

Philanthropies, universities and NGOs should initiate a national dialogue and university
“teach-ins” that involve a wide segment of Taiwanese society, including both pro- and
anti-nuclear voices. The older paternalistic and authoritarian top-down model, where
decision-makers and experts make decisions without public involvement, have been
rejected by publics around the world, including in Taiwan. The sooner pro-nuclear
advocates embrace democratic decision-making and public engagement, the more
time the public will have to learn the truth about nuclear and other technologies.

These new institutions and voices must put the public good — both cheap energy and
clean energy — over private financial gain. They must recognize the human, not just
technological side, to the backlash against nuclear. And they must be leaders in
opening up energy decision-making to new social actors rather than clinging to older,
paternalistic habits.

2. "The Tsai Ing-wen government should hold a national referendum on the
future of nuclear energy in Taiwan, similar to that of South Korea’s recent
“citizens jury,” which recommended South Korea pursue new nuclear
construction.

The value of a citizens jury process like South Korea’s is that it allows for a large,
representative sample of the public to learn the scientific facts, hear all sides, and
recommend a decision. Taiwan should serve as a model for energy democracy by
lengthening their jury’s decisionmaking time-frame.


Appendix A: Open Letter to President Tsai Ing-wen

October 23, 2017

Honorable President Tsai Ing-wen
Office of the President
No. 122, Sec. 1, Chongqing S. Rd., Zhongzheng District
Taipei City 10048, Taiwan (ROC)

Dear President Tsai,
As independent scientists, conservationists, and energy experts, we applaud your
commitment to environmental protection and democratic decision-making. In
particular, we strongly support your commitment to reducing deadly air pollution and
fulfilling the commitment Taiwan made at the 2015 United Nations climate talks to
reduce its carbon emissions.
We are writing now to express our concern at Taiwan’s transition away from clean,
nuclear energy to fossil fuels, warn against a misinformation campaign being waged by
financial interests, and encourage a democratic resolution to Taiwan’s energy crisis.

Last August’s electricity blackout stands as a dramatic warning to Taiwan of the
consequences of its nuclear phase-out. Half of all Taiwanese households lost power, as
did over 150 companies, costing millions of dollars.
Some blamed the outage on “human error” at Taiwan’s largest natural gas plant, but
the gap between supply and demand was almost identical to the amount of power
provided by Taiwan’s shuttered reactors.
Energy experts agree that Taiwan cannot replace nuclear and fossil fuels with
renewables. Solar and wind combined provide less than ﬁve percent of Taiwan’s
electricity last year. By contrast, nuclear energy alone provided 13 percent — and
would have provided 23 percent had Taiwan been operating all of its reactors.
As a small, population-dense nation that already imports 96 percent of its energy,
Taiwan is uniquely unsuited for renewables like solar and wind.
Taiwan would need to build 617 solar farms the size of its largest proposed solar farm
at a cost of $71 billion just to replace its nuclear reactors. And that number does not
include the high cost of storing the energy when the sun isn’t shining, or of purchasing
the land required to cover an area 80 percent larger than the city of Taipei.
Replacing Taiwan’s nuclear plants with fossil fuels has already increased the risk of
death from air pollution. Taiwan is one of the 10 worst countries in terms of the
percentage of its citizens who are exposed to unsafe levels of air pollution, according
to an international study published by Yale University last year.
Replacing electrical generation from nuclear with natural gas could threaten public
safety. Just three years ago, gas explosions in the city of Kaohsiung killed 25 people
and injured 267 others. By contrast, nuclear energy is the safest way to make electricity

according to the prestigious medical journal Lancet, and to date has saved 1.8 million
lives.
Nuclear’s superior safety record is largely unknown to the Taiwanese people due to a
concerted misinformation campaign partially funded by competing energy and
ﬁnancial interests. The high cost of Taiwan’s misinformation-driven fear of nuclear is
economic as well as environmental.
Replacing electricity from Taiwan’s operational and mothballed nuclear plants with
natural gas would cost $2.85 billion per year for the natural gas purchases alone, at
current low prices. That amount of money could instead be used to create the
equivalent of 119,000 jobs paying Taiwan’s per capita annual average salary of $23,916.
If Taiwan goes forward with its planned phase-out of nuclear energy by 2025, electricity
prices will rise at least 10 percent percent and more likely much higher. The prospects
of much higher electricity rates could grievously harm Taiwan’s semiconductor industry,
independent experts warn.
In recent years, voices from within Taiwanese society have called for a national
referendum on the future of nuclear energy. South Korea recently held a “citizens jury”
to recommend to the president the fate of two nuclear reactors currently under
construction.
We encourage you to consider a similarly democratic process. The value of a citizens
jury process like South Korea’s is that it allows for a large, representative sample of the
public to learn the scientiﬁc facts, hear all sides, and recommend a decision. Taiwan
could improve on South Korea’s by allowing more than just three days for the citizens
jury to learn the facts.

As outsiders, we respect Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy, and offer this letter to
encourage you to address Taiwan’s energy crisis in a way that is consistent with your
commitment to democratic decision-making and environmental protection. The future
of Taiwan, and the natural environment, including the climate, are too important to
leave vulnerable to special interests peddling superstition and fear.
Sincerely,
Michael Shellenberger, Time Magazine "Hero of the Environment," President,
Environmental Progress
James Hansen, Climate Scientist, Earth Institute, Columbia University
Kerry Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
David Lea, Professor, Earth Science, University of California
Martin Lewis, Department of Geography, Stanford University
Stephen Pinker, Cognitive Scientist, Harvard University
Pushker Kharecha, Columbia University, NASA
Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize recipient, author of Nuclear Renewal and The Making of
the Atomic Bomb
Mark Boyce, Professor of Ecology, University of Alberta

Erle C. Ellis, Ph.D, Professor, Geography & Environmental Systems, University of
Maryland
Christopher Foreman, author of The Promise & Peril of Environmental Justice, School of
Public Policy, University of Maryland
Norris McDonald, President, Environmental Hope and Justice
Nobuo Tanaka, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
Gwyneth Cravens, author of Power to Save the World
Wolfgang Denk, European Director, Energy for Humanity
Joshua S. Goldstein, Prof. Emeritus of International Relations, American University
Joe Lassiter, Professor, Harvard Business School
Jeff Terry, Professor of Physics, Illinois Institute of Technology
Barrett Walker, Alex C. Walker Foundation


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