SmartCard Forum 2010 - Secured Access for enterpriseOKsystem
Gemalto presented an overview of their identity and access management (IAM) solutions for enterprises. Their solutions include smart cards, tokens, readers, drivers, applications and authentication servers. Smart cards securely store digital certificates, user PINs, one-time passwords and encryption keys. Gemalto has several smart card families including .NET, TPC and IAS cards that provide different features like PKI, OTP authentication and certification levels. Their solutions help enable strong multi-factor authentication for secure access to enterprise networks, applications, data and facilities. Gemalto also discussed their management systems and middleware to integrate their solutions.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Mobile financial servicesOKsystem
This document discusses mobile financial services and payments. It begins by outlining different types of mobile payments like in-shop, online, P2P, loyalty programs, and ticketing. It then discusses three emerging models for point of sale mobile payments: in the device, in the cloud, and hybrid approaches. Several companies adopting each model are described like PayPal, Google Wallet, and Square. The document also discusses new related services like offers, discounts, and social aspects. Finally, it provides an overview of Bitcoin, how the blockchain works, mining incentives, and challenges.
SmartCard Forum 2010 - Secured Access for enterpriseOKsystem
Gemalto presented an overview of their identity and access management (IAM) solutions for enterprises. Their solutions include smart cards, tokens, readers, drivers, applications and authentication servers. Smart cards securely store digital certificates, user PINs, one-time passwords and encryption keys. Gemalto has several smart card families including .NET, TPC and IAS cards that provide different features like PKI, OTP authentication and certification levels. Their solutions help enable strong multi-factor authentication for secure access to enterprise networks, applications, data and facilities. Gemalto also discussed their management systems and middleware to integrate their solutions.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Mobile financial servicesOKsystem
This document discusses mobile financial services and payments. It begins by outlining different types of mobile payments like in-shop, online, P2P, loyalty programs, and ticketing. It then discusses three emerging models for point of sale mobile payments: in the device, in the cloud, and hybrid approaches. Several companies adopting each model are described like PayPal, Google Wallet, and Square. The document also discusses new related services like offers, discounts, and social aspects. Finally, it provides an overview of Bitcoin, how the blockchain works, mining incentives, and challenges.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Cards going mobileOKsystem
Mobile payments are evolving in three key ways: 1) the role of mobile is expanding as phones and devices replace plastic cards; 2) implementation requires educating cardholders and merchants on new contactless and digital payment options; 3) convergence is occurring as payments integrate with other services in virtual wallets across devices. MasterCard is leading this change by enabling mobile wallets and partnerships to increase adoption through convenience and choice for consumers.
This document introduces Gemalto and their solution called Armored Office. It discusses how static passwords are no longer enough for security and compliance with regulations. Armored Office provides a solution for strong authentication and encryption to securely access networks and data from any device. It offers a single credential to log in to endpoints, access networks remotely, and encrypt files/emails. The target market is security-sensitive organizations for executives and users with access to sensitive information. It aims to protect data and enable secure access from any device while meeting compliance requirements.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Security on mobileOKsystem
The document discusses how mobile devices can be leveraged for strong identity authentication in a more convenient, secure, and cost-effective way than traditional authentication methods. It analyzes traditional authenticators like passwords, hardware and paper tokens, biometrics, smart cards, and PKI certificates. It then outlines how mobile devices, which are always with users and connected, can be provisioned with additional authenticators and used for multi-factor authentication for a variety of identity use cases including physical and logical access, VPN access, and cloud applications. The conclusion is that mobile represents the next generation of identity and authentication should leverage its capabilities.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Wi-fi protected setupOKsystem
The document summarizes Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) and discusses vulnerabilities in its use of a static PIN for device authentication. It describes how WPS and similar Bluetooth protocols use bit commitment and splitting the PIN to enable mutual authentication, but how this opens them to online and offline brute force attacks. It then proposes a "Swamp Walk" approach for the access point to transition to after initial connection attempts to restore security by reintroducing exponential complexity to the PIN cracking problem.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - [NFC@Telefonica CZ] Near Future CasesOKsystem
Telefónica Czech Republic has been a leader in NFC adoption, being the first to launch NFC-enabled transport payments in 2009 and merchant payments in 2013. They see the NFC SIM card as uniquely positioned to serve as a "one card to rule them all" for various use cases like payments, transportation, loyalty programs, IDs and access control due to its online and multi-application capabilities. Telefónica is developing a "SIM.me" identity service that stores personal information and credentials on the SIM, enabling it to securely authenticate users for remote services and authorize transactions like document signing through a mobile device.
Smart Card and Strong Cryptography for instant securityOKsystem
- OKsystem is a Prague-based software company with over 200 employees that provides cryptography and smart card solutions.
- They offer products like BABEL for encrypted messaging, OKsmart for smart card usage, and OKbase for key management, certificate management, and card management.
- Their solutions provide strong encryption using proven algorithms like AES and Diffie-Hellman to securely transmit and store encrypted messages and keys.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Cards going mobileOKsystem
Mobile payments are evolving in three key ways: 1) the role of mobile is expanding as phones and devices replace plastic cards; 2) implementation requires educating cardholders and merchants on new contactless and digital payment options; 3) convergence is occurring as payments integrate with other services in virtual wallets across devices. MasterCard is leading this change by enabling mobile wallets and partnerships to increase adoption through convenience and choice for consumers.
This document introduces Gemalto and their solution called Armored Office. It discusses how static passwords are no longer enough for security and compliance with regulations. Armored Office provides a solution for strong authentication and encryption to securely access networks and data from any device. It offers a single credential to log in to endpoints, access networks remotely, and encrypt files/emails. The target market is security-sensitive organizations for executives and users with access to sensitive information. It aims to protect data and enable secure access from any device while meeting compliance requirements.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Security on mobileOKsystem
The document discusses how mobile devices can be leveraged for strong identity authentication in a more convenient, secure, and cost-effective way than traditional authentication methods. It analyzes traditional authenticators like passwords, hardware and paper tokens, biometrics, smart cards, and PKI certificates. It then outlines how mobile devices, which are always with users and connected, can be provisioned with additional authenticators and used for multi-factor authentication for a variety of identity use cases including physical and logical access, VPN access, and cloud applications. The conclusion is that mobile represents the next generation of identity and authentication should leverage its capabilities.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - Wi-fi protected setupOKsystem
The document summarizes Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) and discusses vulnerabilities in its use of a static PIN for device authentication. It describes how WPS and similar Bluetooth protocols use bit commitment and splitting the PIN to enable mutual authentication, but how this opens them to online and offline brute force attacks. It then proposes a "Swamp Walk" approach for the access point to transition to after initial connection attempts to restore security by reintroducing exponential complexity to the PIN cracking problem.
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2013 - [NFC@Telefonica CZ] Near Future CasesOKsystem
Telefónica Czech Republic has been a leader in NFC adoption, being the first to launch NFC-enabled transport payments in 2009 and merchant payments in 2013. They see the NFC SIM card as uniquely positioned to serve as a "one card to rule them all" for various use cases like payments, transportation, loyalty programs, IDs and access control due to its online and multi-application capabilities. Telefónica is developing a "SIM.me" identity service that stores personal information and credentials on the SIM, enabling it to securely authenticate users for remote services and authorize transactions like document signing through a mobile device.
Smart Card and Strong Cryptography for instant securityOKsystem
- OKsystem is a Prague-based software company with over 200 employees that provides cryptography and smart card solutions.
- They offer products like BABEL for encrypted messaging, OKsmart for smart card usage, and OKbase for key management, certificate management, and card management.
- Their solutions provide strong encryption using proven algorithms like AES and Diffie-Hellman to securely transmit and store encrypted messages and keys.
BI Forum 2012 - Analýza nestrukturovaných dat pomocí Oracle Endeca Informatio...
Smart Cards & Devices Forum 2012 - Autentizace a ochrana soukromí
1. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Z´vˇr
a e
Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
´
Uvod do autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚
ı u
Jan Hajn´
y
Vysok´ uˇen´ technick´ v Brnˇ
e c ı e e
hajny@feec.vutbr.cz
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
2. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Z´vˇr
a e
1 K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
Revokace
2 Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
U-Prove
Idemix
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
3 N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Koncept, model komunikace
Vlastnosti
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
4 Z´vˇr
a e
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
3. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace
Z´vˇr
a e
Pˇıklad bar: ovˇˇen´ vˇku
r´ er ı e
Pro konzumaci alkoholu mus´ b´t z´kazn´ starˇ´ 18 (21) let.
ı y a ık sı
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
4. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace
Z´vˇr
a e
Pˇıklad knihovna: ovˇˇen´ placen´ ˇlensk´ch poplatk˚
r´ er ı ıc y u
Pro pˇıstup do knihovny a p˚jˇov´n´ knih je nutn´ platit ˇlenstv´
r´ uc a ı e c ı.
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
5. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace
Z´vˇr
a e
Ohroˇen´ soukrom´ a digit´ln´ identity
z ı ı a ı
Existuje mnoho sluˇeb kde identifikace nen´ tˇeba k
z ı r
autorizaci.
Identifikace
Naˇe identita je t´mˇˇ vˇdy zveˇejnˇna i pˇesto, ˇe to nen´
s e er z r e r z ı
mnohdy nutn´.e
Sledov´n´
a ı
Vˇechny relace ovˇˇen´ jsou spojiteln´ do jednoho profilu
s er ı e
uˇivatele.
z
Zbyteˇn´ schraˇov´n´ osobn´ informac´
c e n a ı ıch ı.
Ovˇˇovatel˚m poskytujeme v´ informac´ neˇ je nezbytn´.
er u ıce ı z e
Kr´deˇe identity
a z
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
6. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace
Z´vˇr
a e
Ohroˇen´ soukrom´ d´ nov´m technologi´
z ı ı ıky y ım
Elektronick´ doklady
e
Sledov´n´ obˇan˚, uniky osobn´ informac´ sledov´n´
a ı c u ´ ıch ı, a ı
chov´n´ . .
a ı.
Cloudov´ sluˇby
e z
Spojen´ naˇ´ identity a dat uloˇen´ch v cloudu, monitorov´n´
ı sı z y a ı
chov´n´ zbyteˇn´ schraˇov´n´ osobn´ dat. . .
a ı, c e n a ı ıch
Pˇenosn´ zaˇızen´ (Tablety, mobiln´ telefony, NFC)
r a r´ ı ı
Sledov´n´ na z´kladˇ spojen´ ovˇˇovac´ relac´ schraˇov´n´
a ı a e ı er ıch ı, n a ı
osobn´ dat. . .
ıch
...
Tyto hrozby ohroˇuj´ z´kladn´ lidsk´ svobody.
z ı a ı e
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
7. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace
Z´vˇr
a e
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
Poˇadov´no (EU (ENISA), NSTIC):
z a
(Prokazateln´) bezpeˇnost
a c
Anonymita
Nesledovatelnost
Nespojitelnost relac´
ı
Ovˇˇen´ pomoc´ jednotliv´ch atribut˚
er ı ı y u
Nepˇenositelnost
r
Funkˇn´ revokace
c ı
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
8. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
D˚vody k v´voji nov´ch autentizaˇn´ syst´m˚
u y y c ıch e u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Z´sadn´ funkce pro ochranu soukrom´
a ı ı
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace
Z´vˇr
a e
Revokace ve sch´matech na ochranu soukrom´
e ı
Revokace je velmi tˇˇko dosaˇiteln´, existuje v´ variant:
ez z a ıce
Revokace autentizaˇn´ token˚
c ıch u
Token je odebr´n ze syst´mu, uˇivatel nem˚ˇe b´t ovˇˇen, ale
a e z uz y er
z˚st´v´ anonymn´
u a a ı.
Revokace nespojitelnosti relac´
ı
Vˇechny pˇıstupy uˇivatele jsou odhaleny, je moˇno je
s r´ z z
analyzovat, ale uˇivatel z˚st´v´ anonymn´
z u a a ı.
Revokace anonymity
´ c ık
Utoˇn´ je plnˇ odhalen a m˚ˇe b´t st´ an za sv´ chov´n´
e uz y ıh´ e a ı.
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
9. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚ pro atributovou autentizaci
r ıc´ e u
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
10. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Koncept, model komunikace syst´mu U-Prove
e
U-Prove, syst´m pro ochranu soukrom´ firmy Microsoft
e ı
(Credentica):
Vydavatel atributů Ověřovatel
ol
Vy
(Pk, Sk)
ok
TOKEN
dá
ot
va
TI, PI
pr
cí
A1, A2, …, An
cí
pr
va
SigI
ot
řo
ok
vě
ol
O
Uživatel
(Token, Sk)
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
11. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Kl´cov´ vlastnosti U-Prove1
ıˇ e
Bezpeˇnost: DL v DSA grupˇ, FS-heuristika
c e
Anonymita
Nesledovatelnost
Selektivn´ odhalen´ atribut˚
ı ı u
Nepˇenositelnost
r
Revokace na z´kladˇ ID tokenu
a e
Navrˇeno pro klasick´ poˇ´ ce
z e cıtaˇ
Chyb´ Nespojitelnost relac´ revokace
ı: ı,
1
U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1 08/09/2011
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
12. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Revokace u U-Prove
Revokace token˚: pouze zneplatnˇn´ zn´m´ch token˚.
u e ı a y u
Revokace nespojitelnosti: nespojitelnost nen´ podporov´na.
ı a
Revokace anonymity: ?pomoc´ ovˇˇiteln´ho ˇifrov´n´
ı er e s a ı?
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
13. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Koncept, model komunikace syst´mu Idemix
e
Idemix (Identity Mixer) je syst´m pro ochranu soukrom´ vyvinut´
e ı y
IBM:
Vydavatel atributů Ověřovatel
ol
(Pk, Sk)
ok
Token
ot
Vy
Epocha
pr
dá
A1, A2, …, An
cí
va
va
SigI
řo
cí
vě
pr
ot
O
ok
ol
Uživatel TTP
(Token, Sk)
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
14. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Kl´cov´ vlastnosti Idemixu2
ıˇ e
Bezpeˇnost: sRSA, DDH v RSA groupˇ, FS-heuristika
c e
Anonymita
Nesledovatelnost
Nespojitelnost ovˇˇovac´ relac´
er ıch ı
Selektivn´ odhalen´ atribut˚
ı ı u
Nepˇenositelnost
r
Revokace pomoc´ epoch
ı
Navrˇeno jak pro poˇ´ ce tak smart-karty
z cıtaˇ
Chyb´ Off-line aktualizace, revokace
ı:
2
Specification of the Identity Mixer Cryptographic Library 2.3.4, 10/2/2012
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
15. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Revokace v Idemixu
Revokace tokenu: pomoc´ expirace tokenu.
ı
Revokace nespojitelnosti: nen´ podporov´no.
ı a
Revokace anonymity: ?pomoc´ ovˇˇiteln´ho ˇifrov´n´
ı er e s a ı?
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
16. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
U-Prove
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Idemix
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
Z´vˇr
a e
Slabiny existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
ıc´ e u
U-Prove
Chyb´ nespojitelnost: je moˇn´ profilovat uˇivatele.
ı z e z
Chyb´ revokace: nen´ moˇn´ odstranit utoˇn´ neplatiˇe atd.
ı ı z e ´ c ıky, c
Chyb´ identifikace utoˇn´ u: nen´ moˇn´ poˇadovat n´hrady
ı ´ c ık˚ ı z e z a
ˇkod.
s
Idemix
Chyb´ revokace: nen´ moˇn´ odstranit utoˇn´ neplatiˇe atd.
ı ı z e ´ c ıky, c
Chyb´ identifikace utoˇn´ u: nen´ moˇn´ poˇadovat n´hrady
ı ´ c ık˚ ı z e z a
ˇkod.
s
Implementace: relativnˇ pomal´, vyˇaduje on-line aktualizace.
e e z
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
17. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
18. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Koncept, model komunikace naˇeho n´vrhu
s a
Syst´m pro atributovou autentizaci s revokac´ anonymity,
e ı
nespojitelnosti a token˚.
u
Revokace
Vydavatel atributů Ověřovatel
(Pk, Sk) Vy TOKEN
l
dá ko
va oto
A1, A2, …, An
cí SigI pr
p ro a cí
to ov
Revokace
k ě ř
ol Ov
ko l
pr oto
áv ací
Vyd Uživatel
Veřejná autorita (Token, Sk)
(Pk, Sk)
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
19. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
A tribut V ýz nam (příklad)
A1 O b čan EU
A2 S tarš í 1 8 let
Uživatel 1 A3 Řid ičs k ý p rů k az B
DLRepU1(A1) A 1, A 8
.
DLRepU1(A2)
.
.
DLRepU1(An) An V d an ý /á
A1, A8
Důkaz vlastnictví A1
Důkaz vlastnictví A8
Uživatel 2
DLRepU2(A1) A8
DLRepU2(A2)
. A8
DLRepU2(An) Důkaz vlastnictví A8
Ověřovatel
Uživatel n
DLRepUn(A1) A x, A y
DLRepUn(A2) A x, A y
. Důkaz vlastnictví Ax
DLRepUn(An) Důkaz vlastnictví Ay
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
20. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Kl´cov´ vlastnosti naˇeho n´vrhu
ıˇ e s a
Bezpeˇnost: DL v grupˇ Okamoto–Uchiyama (OU),
c e
faktorizace n = r 2 s, FS-heuristika
Anonymita
Nesledovatelnost
Nespojitelnost relac´
ı
Selektivn´ odhalen´ atribut˚
ı ı u
Nepˇenositelnost
r
V´
ıcestupˇov´, efektivn´ revokace
n a ı
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
21. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu 1
s a
Revokace je okamˇit´, netˇeba ˇekat na ukonˇen´ epochy.
z a r c c ı
Po revokaci nen´ tˇeba aktualizovat tokeny.
ı r
Revokace je k dispozici pouze kdyˇ v´ entit spolupracuje.
z ıce
ˇa a
Z´dn´ entita nem˚ˇe pouˇ´ revokaci sama.
uz zıt
Revokace je provedena off-line.
V´poˇetn´ sloˇitost nez´vis´ na mnoˇstv´ revokovan´ch
y c ı z a ı z ı y
uˇivatel˚.
z u
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
22. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu 2
s a
Revokace token˚: autentizaˇn´ token m˚ˇe b´t revokov´n
u c ı uz y a
bez identifikace vlastn´
ıka.
Revokace nespojitelnosti: dvˇ ˇi v´ ovˇˇovac´ relac´
e c ıce er ıch ı
uˇivatele mohou b´t spojeny v jeden profil bez identifikace
z y
uˇivatele.
z
Revokace anonymity: v nejhorˇ´ pˇıpadech poruˇen´
sıch r´ s ı
pravidel m˚ˇe b´t utoˇn´ zcela identifikov´n.
uz y ´ c ık a
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
23. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Ovˇˇen´ uˇivatele vyˇaduje:
er ı z z
6 modul´rn´ mocnˇn´
a ıch e ı,
6 modul´rn´ n´soben´
a ıch a ı,
4 modul´rn´ sˇ´ an´
a ıch cıt´ ı.
Doba ovˇˇen´ je nez´visl´ na:
er ı a a
poˇtu uˇivatel˚ v syst´mu,
c z u e
poˇtu revokovan´ch token˚,
c y u
poˇtu skryt´ch atribut˚.
c y u
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
24. Koncept, model komunikace
K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Princip prokazov´n´ atribut˚
a ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u
Vlastnosti
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Revokace v naˇem n´vrhu
s a
Z´vˇr
a e
Praktick´ poˇadavky
e z
Implementace
Sch´ma je moˇn´ implementovat na ˇipov´ch kart´ch, napˇ:
e z e c y a r
.NET Smart-card
V´konn´, dostatek pamˇti, nepˇıstupn´ interface.
y e e r´ y
5-7s
JavaCard
Rozˇ´ren´, relativnˇ levn´, nepˇıstupn´ interface.
sıˇ e e e r´ y
7s
MULTOS
M´nˇ zn´m´, relativnˇ levn´, rychl´, otevˇen´ interface.
e e a e e e e r y
≤ 1s
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
25. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u Srovn´n´ sch´mat pro atributovou autentizaci
a ı e
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a Reference
Z´vˇr
a e
Srovn´n´ sch´mat pro atributovou autentizaci
a ı e
U-Prove Idemix N´ˇ n´vrh
as a
Bezpeˇnost
c DL sRSA DL
Anonymita • • •
Atributy • • •
Nesledovatelnost • • •
Nespojitelnost O • •
Selektivn´ odhalen´
ı ı • • •
Smart-karty O • •
Praktick´ revokace
a O O •
Identifikace utoˇn´ u
´ c ık˚ O O •
Rychlost (1+u) exp.3 (9+u) exp.4 6 exp.
3
U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1, 2011
4
Bichsel, Camenisch, Groß, 2009
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
26. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u Srovn´n´ sch´mat pro atributovou autentizaci
a ı e
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a Reference
Z´vˇr
a e
Dˇkuji za pozornost!
e
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
27. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u Srovn´n´ sch´mat pro atributovou autentizaci
a ı e
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a Reference
Z´vˇr
a e
Patrik Bichsel, Jan Camenisch, Thomas Groß, and Victor Shoup.
Anonymous credentials on a standard java card, 2009.
Stefan Brands, Liesje Demuynck, and Bart De Decker.
A practical system for globally revoking the unlinkable pseudonyms of unknown users, 2007.
Stefan A. Brands.
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy, 2000.
Jan Camenisch and et Al.
Specification of the identity mixer cryptographic library, 2010.
Technical report.
Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Claudio Soriente.
An accumulator based on bilinear maps and efficient revocation for anonymous credentials, 2009.
Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Claudio Soriente.
Solving revocation with efficient update of anonymous credentials, 2010.
Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya.
A signature scheme with efficient protocols, 2003.
Anna Lysyanskaya.
An efficient system for non-transferable anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation, 2001.
Wojciech Mostowski and Pim Vullers.
Efficient u-prove implementation for anonymous credentials on smart cards, 2011.
Christian Paquin.
U-prove cryptographic specification v1.1, 2011.
Technical report.
Jan Hajn´y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı
28. K ˇemu autentizace pomoc´ atribut˚?
c ı u
Pˇehled existuj´ ıch syst´m˚
r ıc´ e u Srovn´n´ sch´mat pro atributovou autentizaci
a ı e
N´ˇ n´vrh
as a Reference
Z´vˇr
a e
Appendix A - The Scheme with Crypto-Primitives
Public
User Organization
Authority
Issuing Issuing
(PK, VE) (Comm, PK)
Token
Smart-card
Proving
(VE, PK)
Revocation
(Comm, VE)
PK: Discrete Logarithm (DL) Proof of Knowledge
Comm: DL commitment
VE: Verifiable Encryption of Discrete Logarithm
Jan Hajn´
y Autentizace a ochrana soukrom´
ı