This document discusses whether the burqa should be banned in public spaces. It argues that the burqa ban in France is inappropriate because justifications for the ban have fluctuated over time and definitions of French secularism and its relationship to religious traditions lack consistency. Banning the burqa in public but allowing it in private contradicts the stated objective of protecting women. The document examines authors who argue that bans are driven more by a desire to control Muslim bodies and impose particular standards, rather than addressing concrete harms.

1. Alexandra
Rodgers
POL
309
Paper
#2
Question
#2
April
29,
2015
Q.2.:
Should
the
Burqa
be
banned
in
public
spaces?
The
burqa
should
not
be
banned
in
the
public
sphere.
The
burqa
represents
an
intimate
relationship
between
an
individual
and
their
faith.
Nevertheless,
it
is
fact
that
the
burqa
(and
other
religious
garb)
has
been
banned
in
France.
A
2010
French
legislative
act
confirmed
by
the
nation’s
Constitutional
Council
restricted
facial
coverings
in
public;
however,
years
of
debate
regarding
the
hijab
and
other
condemnations
of
Muslim
practices
preceded
the
decisive
motion.1
John
Bowen’s
explanation
of
the
variety
of
ways
hijabs
and
burqas
have
been
viewed
and
controlled
in
France
prompts
an
argument
against
the
appropriateness
of
such
a
ban
based
on
inconsistencies
in
the
justifications
and
reasoning
for
the
legislation.
Additionally,
Cécile
Laborde
presents
a
supportive
and
convincing
argument
for
a
reconsideration
of
French
secularism,
which
advocates
the
application
of
a
“critical
republicanism
theory”
as
a
means
for
better
understanding
the
relationship
of
status
quo,
domination,
and
religious
neutrality
in
France.2
The
combination
of
fluctuating
justifications
for
the
ban
of
the
burqa
and
a
lack
of
consistent
definitions,
reasoning,
and
relationships
of
French
secularism
with
particular
religious
traditions
best
demonstrates
why
the
burqa
should
not
be
banned
in
public
spaces.
John
Bowen
writes
of
the
emergent
focus
of
French
law
and
politics
on
the
“bodily
attitudes”
of
Muslims.
Moreover,
the
anthropologist
references
the
related
claims
of
1
John
R.
Bowen,
“How
the
French
State
Justifies
Controlling
Muslim
Bodies:
from
Harm-­‐Based
to
Values-­‐Based
2
Cecile
Laborde,
“Secularism
and
Fair
Treatment
for
Muslims,”
in
Multiculturalism
and
Moral
Conflict,
eds.
Maria
Dimova-­‐Cookson
and
Peter
M.
R.
Stirk.
Routledge,
New
York:
2010.
Page
131-­‐2.

2. insufficient
assimilation
and
socialization
made
against
specific
religious
presentations
such
as
hair
and
facial
coverings,
traditional
male
dress,
refusal
to
engage
in
commonplace
physical
exchanges
with
the
opposite
sex,
and
praying
in
public.
Bowen
argues
that
politically
useful
claims
are
increasingly
being
backed
by
the
rule
of
law.3
Illustrated
in
his
argument
is
a
particular
transition
from
harm-­‐based
reasons
to
values-­‐based
reasons
used
as
legal
foundations
to
condemn
specifically
Islamic
practices
and
achieve
political
and
electoral
ambitions.4
The
use
of
a
variety
of
distinctive
justifications
over
time
signals
a
consistent
effort
to
create
and
impose
particular
standards
on
a
group
of
people
despite
a
lack
of
concrete,
constant
cause.
Despite
the
private
legality
of
the
burqa
in
homes
and
mosques,
the
public
use
is
argued
to
present
dangers
of
misrecognition
and
“communalism”
and
to
violate
French
principles
of
gender
freedom
and
equality.
Such
claims
equate
the
donning
of
a
burqa
with
inherent
suspicion
but
also
inherent
inferiority,
victimization,
and
lack
of
autonomy
of
Muslim
women.5
Arguing
that
the
burqa
represents
the
oppression
of
the
wearer
negates
the
autonomy
of
religious
practice
and
experience
and
ignores
the
active
voice
and
choice
of
women
to
be
religious.
Such
a
negation
fails
to
fully
consider
the
internal
diversity
of
Islam
that
is
not
unlike
the
diversity
of
Christian,
Jewish,
and
other
individual
religious
experiences.
Furthermore,
the
support
for
the
burqa
worn
in
private
and
in
places
of
worship
contradicts
the
previously
stated
objective
and
reasons
of
protecting
women.
Bowen
references
the
Stasi
Commission’s
refusal
to
explicate
the
meaning
of
particular
3
Bowen,
“Controlling
Muslim
Bodies,”
325.
4
Ibid.,
326.
5
Ibid.,
328.

3. Islamic
symbols.6
This
refusal
represents
a
lack
of
information
gathering
and
care,
and
it
demonstrates
decisive
and
manufactured
calculations
of
a
minority
and
unfamiliar
tradition.
Bowen
argues
that
the
growing
fear
of
“communalism”
threatening
French
society
reflects
a
“fundamental
French
ambivalence
concerning
intermediate
groups.”7
Even
without
evidence
of
Islamic
practices
harming
women
in
ways
the
courts
suggested,
the
values-­‐based
argument
grew
along
such
claims.
He
states
that
in
2011
a
new
campaign
supported
by
the
center-­‐right
majority
worked
to
restrict
Islamic
practices
specifically
because
they
prevented
necessary
social
integration.
The
campaign
pushed
to
regulate
sacred
Islamic
Friday
rituals,
restrict
social
movement
of
women
in
hijabs
and
burqas,
and
impose
new
marriage
inspections.
Such
legal
moves
coincided
with
political
events
that
focused
on
“true”
French
identity
and
immigrants.8
This
convergence
of
law
and
politics
is
problematic
for
Bowen,
and
it
represents
trends
of
those
in
power
to
subjectively
name
and
critique
values
held
by
minorities
from
particularistic
and
hierarchical
positions.
Political
theorist
Cécile
Laborde
also
writes
of
the
particularities
of
the
Muslim
experience
with
French
secularism
and
history.
In
setting
out
to
answer
whether
Western
liberalism
is
fit
and
fair
for
Muslim
minorities,
Laborde
concludes
the
two
are
compatible
but
only
with
a
proper
understanding
of
the
term
“secularism.”9
She
presents
a
middle
ground
position
compared
to
those
who
argue
for
a
strict
adherence
to
a
non-­‐religious
social
sphere
and
the
privatization
of
religion
and
those
who
support
evenhanded
6
Ibid.,
329.
7
Ibid.,
337.
8
Ibid.,
341-­‐2.
9
Laborde,
“Treatment
for
Muslims,”
131.

4. accommodation.
Laborde’s
“secular
impartiality,”
as
she
calls
it,
argues
that
a
baseline
for
the
practical
and
equal
application
of
demands
on
citizens
can
be
established
in
order
to
uphold
the
republican
ideal
of
“non-­‐domination.”10
This
concept
is
important
to
ensure
minority
members
are
not
subject
to
the
dominating
effects.
However,
in
her
argument,
Laborde
illustrates
the
religious
bias
demonstrated
in
France
that
is
related
to
its
history
as
a
Christian
state
and
that
manifestly
disadvantages
Muslim
minorities.
11
Laborde
emphasizes
a
practical
need
to
focus
not
on
idealized
or
normative
conceptions
of
secularism
and
multiculturalism
but
on
the
real
and
actual
interactions
of
governing
principles.
She
asserts
that
two
major
double
standards
are
at
play
in
the
French
situation.
The
state
makes
demands
on
Muslims
that
it
does
not
on
other
citizens,
and
the
state
imposes
the
application
of
principles
on
Muslims
that
it
does
not
itself
fully
uphold.12
Focusing
on
the
second,
it
is
important
to
note
that
the
French
state
does
hold
specific
church-­‐state
relations
with
mostly
Catholic
institutions
that
contradict
explicit
declarations
of
neutrality
and
separation.
The
author
references
Marxists’
critiques
of
this
contradiction
as
a
problematic
instance
of
“directly
and
uncritically
applying
rules
of
neutrality
under
non-­‐neutral
institutional
conditions.”13
In
this
framework,
minorities
suffer
as
they
are
held
to
commonly
violated
principles
and
ideas
of
status
quo.
When
Muslims
are
required
to
obey
principles
of
French
secularism,
as
such,
they
are
forced
into
unfair
and
unequal
applications
of
political
and
legal
demands,
and
as
Laborde
says,
this
“perpetuates
the
status
quo
and
legitimizes
existing
inequalities
between
dominant
and
minority
groups.”14
10
Ibid.,
131-­‐2.
11
Ibid.,
132.
12
Ibid.
13
ibid.,
133.
14
Ibid.

5. Accordingly,
the
burqa
ban
can
be
situated
into
an
overall
attempt
to
apply
abstract
and
inconsistent
burdens
on
the
faith
as
a
whole.
Laborde
is
also
useful
in
that
she
argues
that
official
republican
separationism
is
not
always
sufficient
to
institutionalize
equal
respect.15
In
relation
to
bans
on
the
hijab,
and
extended
to
the
burqa,
she
argues
that
official
republicanism
does,
at
times,
fail
to
treat
religious
believers
fairly
by
imposing
unreasonable
burdens
on
the
exercise
of
basic
religious
rights,
especially
when
endorsing
forms
of
status
quo
neutrality
that
do
not
affect
majority
religions.16
It
is
the
historical
relationship
between
church
and
state
that
continues
to
advantage
particular
faiths
over
minority
ones
by
continuing
existing
entitlements
and
privileges
of
the
historically
dominant
church.17
Laborde’s
overall
solution
to
religious
inequalities
is
to
critically
interrogate
the
nature
of
general
rules
and
areas
where
some
religions
are
privileged
over
others,
even
if
based
on
relations
lost
in
history.
This,
she
argues,
is
because
“customary
rules
have
implications
for
fairness
when
they
unreasonably
favor
the
preferences
and
values
of
the
historical
majority
and
infringe
the
basic
religious
rights
of
minorities.18
The
accounts
presented
by
John
Bowen
and
Cécile
Laborde
reflect
an
already
uneven
relationship
between
majority
and
minority
populations
across
time
and
space.
Religion
in
the
secular
French
state
offers
constant
challenges
to
articulating
and
establishing
norms
of
private
and
public
expression
and
identity.
In
the
case
of
Islam
and
French
Muslim
citizens
the
challenges
seem
exacerbated
by
a
lack
of
understanding
and
15
Ibid.,
137.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.,
134.
18
Ibid.,
143.

6. attention
to
the
diversity
of
Islamic
expression
and
the
value
of
particular
practices
and
symbols
for
individual
adherents.
The
failure
to
understand
an
entire
growing
population
has
led
to
a
variety
of
manufactured
images
and
assertions
regarding
private
and
public
expressions
of
faith
and
meaning.
Bowen
usefully
demonstrates
how
such
claims
combine
deficient
social,
legal,
and
political
factors
that
ultimately
work
to
impose
authoritative
restrictions
on
particular
citizens.
Laborde
effectively
illustrates
the
additional
neglect
of
the
government
to
adequately
account
for
inequalities
rooted
in
history
and
used
to
uphold
contradictory
status
quos
in
contemporary
settings.
Both
readings
show
a
disrespect
and
lack
of
commitment
to
information
and
citizens
on
behalf
of
politicians
and
courts
that
is
more
dangerous
to
social
stability
and
equality
than
is
dutifully
wearing
a
symbol
of
religious
devotion.