This document provides background on religious favoritism, pluralism, and tax exemptions for religious institutions in late Tang China and discusses potential applications to modern debates in the United States. It outlines how Buddhist institutions enjoyed legal tax exemptions from the Tang government due to their large numbers of adherents. However, this led to abuses by "monks in name only" who took advantage of exemptions without sincere religious belief. The An Lushan rebellion in the 8th century weakened central government control and allowed provinces to illegally ordain more monks, expanding this issue. Efforts to curb it did not occur until the 9th century under Emperor Wuzong, whose favoritism of Daoism undermined religious pluralism

1. Late Tang China and Buddhism: A Case Study in Religious Favoritism, Religious
Pluralism, and Tax Exemptions for the Twenty-First Century United States of America
Aaron Garrett
History 490: Senior Thesis
July 20, 2016

2. 1
Introduction
The relationship between the Buddhist faith and the Late Tang Dynasty Chinese state
centered around the three issues of religious favoritism, religious pluralism, and tax exemptions
for religious institutions. How these two groups interacted provides a case study applicable to
current state/faith debates in The United States of America. Existing literature offers no modern
applications for the events during this time in Tang Chinese history. Although limited in its
scope, this paper offers a necessary contribution to this effort.
From the inception of the Tang Dynasty, the central government created laws that
especially benefitted the Buddhist faith due to its higher number of adherents and the religious
favoritism it enjoyed due to the preceding dynasty’s rulers. These laws took the form of
exemptions and enforcement of exemptions from certain taxes. The first of these, the equal-field
(chün-tien) system, provided land tax exemptions to many classes, including monks and nuns of
the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. The second, the Tang Code, enforced the chün-tien system as
well as all tax exemptions for the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. Together these provided the legal
groundwork for the both the Buddhist and Daoist faiths to operate in Tang China. However, it
also opened up the system to abuses by those who never espoused sincere belief in either faith.
Since Buddhism constituted the majority faith during this time period most of those who abused
the tax exemptions became Buddhists. The individual monks and nuns in Buddhism formed an
illegal class unto themselves, called in this paper Monks In Name Only (MINO). This class
became a particular problem for the Tang government starting in the mid-eighth century.
In the mid-eighth century, the Tang forever changed because of the An Lushan rebellion.
It fundamentally restructured Tang society and government. The central government no longer
possessed the power it once enjoyed, allowing the provincial governments to act beyond or

3. 2
above the central government. Once the rebellion ended, the provincial governments acted
quickly to not only remedy themselves economically, but to assert their power as autonomous
entities. Whereas before the rebellion, the central government controlled and legitimized all
ordinations of Buddhist and Daoist clergy, the provinces after the rebellion began to ordain
Buddhist and Daoist monks and nuns themselves for a monetary price. The majority of these
ordinations went to the Buddhist faith, greatly expanding the MINO. The illegal status of the
MINO class began to undermine the entire legitimacy of the Buddhist faith. After the An Lushan
rebellion this shifting status of the faith caused many within the upper echelons of the Tang to
question the usefulness and necessity of even having the faith in China altogether. However, no
efforts began to curtail the MINO class and restore order to Tang society until the mid-ninth
century. The reasons for this come from the powerful Eunuch class which ruled the Tang after
the rebellion, and their dealings with the Buddhist faith.
By the mid-ninth century the eunuchs lost power over the Tang, and the Huichang
persecution became the first effort to end the MINO. The Huichang persecution forever altered
Buddhism in China. The emperor during that persecution, Emperor Wuzong, displayed clear
religious favoritism towards Daoism, the main minority faith in China. His favoritism went to the
point of undermining religious pluralism, or the ability for different faiths to coexist. Through
imperial edicts, Wuzong targeted the MINO with the goal of ending their illegal tax evasion
practices. However, he quickly expanded his curtailment of the faith to the point that he nearly
eliminated Buddhism from China. Through his efforts he effectively reasserted central
government control over the provinces while persecuting a faith that long enjoyed religious
favoritism codified in Chinese law.
Equal-Field (chün-tien) System and the Tang Code

4. 3
Two laws created the foundation of religious favoritism for Buddhism in Tang China, the
first comes in the form of land tax privileges. In 624 CE the Tang first codified a land tax system
under the name of the equal-field (chün-tien) system. It divided the population into five
categories: baby, infant, adolescent, male adult, and old person. The adult classes paid taxes on
the land they received from the state.1 This system provided Tang China with an excellent means
of ensuring every adult male paid their fair share of taxes. However, the Tang government
quickly provided exemptions to this land tax. The following five groups became exempted from
taxes associated with the chün-tien system:
1. Direct relatives of imperial, military, and civil officials.
2. Close relatives of rulers in provinces.
3. Victims of certain natural disasters.
4. The elderly, sick, widowed, and slaves.
5. Monks and nuns.2
The fifth exemption, that of monks and nuns, included Daoist monks and nuns. However, the
Buddhist monks and nuns took most advantage of it. It became dangerous to give tax exempt
status over lands to a faith with significant monastic holdings. In their collaborative examination
of Tang China, Arthur Wright and Denis Twitchett quantify the number of Daoist and Buddhist
monasteries. They mention that, “At the height of the T’ang’s glory3…Taoists had 1,687
monasteries and nunneries as against 5,358 for the Buddhists.”4 The trend of higher numbers of
Buddhist monasteries only continues throughout the Tang. Along with a vastly higher number of
monasteries, Jacques Gernet mentions that the Buddhist clergy “comprised only 1 percent at
1 Kenneth Ch’en, “The Economic Background of the Hui-ch’ang Suppression of Buddhism,” Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies 19, no. 1/2 (June 1956): 69-70, accessed April 30, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2718490.
2 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 71-72.
3 Reign of Emperor Taizong (627-649 CE).
4 Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds., Perspectives on the T’ang (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1973), 23.

5. 4
most of the total population of China” yet held two percent of arable lands.5 This significant
amount of land holdings allowed for extensive benefits for all who wished to join the faith during
that time period.
In addition to tax benefits for land ownership, once people chose to become ordained a
Buddhist or Daoist monk or nun they fell under the protection of the Tang Code. This code
remains one of the earliest legal codes that survives to this day and formed the foundation for all
Chinese legal codes to follow. Wallace Johnson gives the reader of English the only full
translation of this extensive code. Three particular articles of note within the code that enforce
tax exemptions for the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. The first one, Article 172.1, stated that “All
cases of not allowing rightful exemption from taxes and labor services, or allowing such
exemption improperly, are punished by two years of penal servitude.”6 This article provides two
conditions that, if violated, necessitate a punishment. First, the denial of tax exemptions and
labor. If anyone denied a Buddhist or Daoist monk or nun their right to tax free lands they
violated the law and became subject to punishment. Second, improperly granting tax exempt
status also carried punishment. This became a problem for the Tang starting in the mid-eighth
century and continuing throughout the ninth century with the rise of the MINO. The second one,
article 217.1, mentioned that “In all cases of required payment of taxes or other articles that
should be turned over to the government…what is lacking is calculated and punished as
comparable to robbery.”7 This article excludes officially ordained monks and nuns of either the
Buddhist or Daoist faiths since they paid no taxes. It includes the MINO whose tax exempt status
5 Jacques Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society:An Economic History from the fifth to the tenth centuries (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 140.
6 Wallace Johnson,trans., The T’ang Code Volume II: Specific Articles (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1997), 148.
7 Johnson,trans., The T’ang Code Volume II, 205. Punishment for robbery was up to life sentence but did not
include the death penalty.

6. 5
came from illegal means. Wisely the Tang created another article that dealt with illegal
ordinations. This article, 154.1a, codified punishment for a MINO type of problem long before it
occurred. It stated that “All cases of unauthorized ordainment as a Buddhist or Taoist Priest
punish both the person who is ordained as well as the person who performs the ordainment by
one hundred blows with the heavy stick.”8 While evidence for this specific punishment used
against the MINO never occurs in the literature, the idea of punishing those who became illegally
ordained nevertheless existed. According to the best evidence available, a MINO problem never
reached extensive numbers in the Tang until after the destabilizing events of the mid-eight
century.
The An Lushan Rebellion (755-763 CE)
The issue of the MINO began after the An Lushan rebellion and continued into the ninth
century. In order to better understand the context for the MINO’s rise one needs to first examine
the effects of the rebellion of An Lushan. The rebellion radically changed the governmental
structure of Tang China. In Stanley Weinstein’s examination of Tang Buddhism, he states that
the An Lushan rebellion dramatically effected Tang China, particularly the Buddhist teachings
and religious institution in China.9 He also mentions that the rebellion “weakened the authority
of the imperial government.”10 The governmental structure changed in ways unseen since Sui
reunification in 581 CE. For almost two centuries China operated under a strong centralized
government. When the Tang dynasty succeeded the Sui this stable structure continued.
Throughout China’s ancient history it periodically experienced instability, such as after the Qin
and Han dynasties. After the Qin and Han, numerous independent countries formed within
8 Ibid., 128.
9 Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 59.
10 Weinstein, Buddhism underthe T’ang, 61.

7. 6
China. Unlike during those periods, the An Lushan rebellion never broke apart the Tang dynasty.
Instead it destabilized the centralized governmental structure. Denis Twitchett best summed up
the impact of the An Lushan rebellion on the Tang government when he said that, “The rebellion
left the provincial governors more powerful and independent than ever, for during the rebellion
the system of provinces with some degree of financial autonomy was extended to the whole
empire so that after 763 the empire was no longer the strongly centralized state which it had
been.”11 Twitchett brought up two points worth noting. First, he stated that decentralization gave
more power to provincial governments who beforehand operated completely under the thumb of
the centralized imperial government. Second, he argued that after 763 CE the Tang dynasty
never returned to its former state/subject relationship. This changing relationship between state
and subjects equally impacted state/faith relations, especially between the state and the Buddhist
faith.
In response to immediate economic needs after the An Lushan rebellion the local
provinces turned to the Buddhist faith for help. For centuries the Sui and Tang governments
required state approval for all ordinations of clergy in the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. However,
the unstable circumstances after the An Lushan rebellion created a situation where ordinations
occurred on both the state and provincial levels. Since the central government remained
weakened after the rebellion, the local governments created through illegally authorized
ordinations to all with the money to pay for them.12 The vast majority of those ordained at this
time became Buddhist, not Daoist clergy. This influx of numerous illegal ordinations to the
Buddhist faith created the MINO problem that the early Tang leaders prepared for when they
11 Denis Twitchett, “Lands under State Cultivation underthe T’ang,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient 2, no. 2 (May 1959): 182, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3596019.
12 Weinstein, Buddhism underthe T’ang, 59.

8. 7
created the Tang Code. The real issue of the MINO came not only from their illegal status, but
what that status meant to Tang society. It created a class of people ordained who often enjoyed
the privileges that came with the position of Buddhist monk or nun, but rarely espoused the
tenants of the faith. Beginning in the period after the An Lushan rebellion, discussions and
serious debates began over the usefulness and dangers of a growing Buddhist clergy, with their
extensive monasteries, land holdings, and special privileges.13
Post An Lushan Rebellion and the Rise of the MINO
The period after the An Lushan rebellion saw the rise of the MINO, further undermining
the authority of the central Tang state. To provide some context for this growth, the following
statistics show the number of the Buddhist clergy during different periods in the Tang:
By 624 CE: ~ 50,000 officially ordained clergy
650-683 CE: ~ 60,000 officially ordained clergy
700-750 CE: ~ 126,000 officially ordained clergy
By 830 CE: ~ 300,000 illegally ordained MINO14
By 843 CE: ~ 260,000 officially ordained clergy15
Two significant notes from this statistic. First, the growth of legally ordained clergy continued
after the An Lushan rebellion. The central government indeed lost power after the rebellion but
not to the point that they ceased ordinations. Second, by the time of the Huichang persecution of
Buddhism under Wuzong in 845, the MINO outnumbered the officially ordained. However, no
efforts appear before Wuzong to curtail or eliminate this abuse of privilege. As mentioned
before, the Tang Code enforced tax exemptions only to those legally ordained and punished a
MINO class. Two examples show how knowledge of the extent of MINO abuses came to the
13 Arthur Wright, “Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction,” Journal of Asian Studies 17, no. 1 (1957):
37, accessed June 11, 2015, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290508082?accountid=9817.
14 Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society,37. Instead of MINO, the exact language Gernet uses in his book is “false
ordination certificates.”
15 Ibid., 36.

9. 8
attention of the central Tang government long before Wuzong’s reign. In 780 CE, less than
twenty years after the An Lushan rebellion, the eighth century Tang official Yang Yen warned
the central government about the growing MINO problem. He stated that those with enough
money to afford unofficial ordinations became monks or nuns to “evade the various corvée
duties.”16 Corvée duties refer to duties of unpaid labor. He goes on to say generally that the tax
exempt status for monks and nuns brought “the empire to ruin and causes it to be swamped by
vagabonds.”17 Yang Yen correlates the ordinations with the degradation of Tang China. This
became a significant departure from the pro-Buddhist attitude held by most in Tang and earlier
Sui when the early emperors of that dynasty greatly expanded the Buddhist faith.18 Now whether
or not the emperor during Yang Yen’s life, Emperor Dezong, attributed this problem in Tang
society to the tax exempt status of the MINO remains unclear. However, since no enforcement of
the MINO occurred during this time one assumes no correlation existed in his mind. Less than
fifty years later in the year 824 CE, a report from An-hui province (modern day east-central
China) indicates that they ordained clergy for 2,000 cash at the rate of one hundred per day.19
Since this originated from a province all of the ordinations became MINO. How long the
province ordained at this rate remains unknown, however, it provides some perspective on how
quickly the MINO expanded and how much the central government lost in revenue on a daily
basis from just one province. Despite the pattern of no enforcement of the Tang Code continued,
the debates against the Buddhist institution only intensified into the ninth century.
16 Ibid., 57.
17 Ibid.
18 For more on Buddhism’s expansion under the Sui please consult Arthur Wright’s “The Sui Dynasty (581-617)” in
The Cambridge History of China and his larger work entitled The Sui Dynasty. Also consult Victor Cunrui Xiong’s
profile of the second Sui emperor in Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life, Times, and Legacy and his focused
work entitled “Sui Yangdi and the Building of the Sui-Tang Luoyang.”
19 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 80. The term “cash” is per the source.In this case it refers to actual coins,
not paper currency. For more information on Tang Dynasty coins, look up “Kai Yuan Tong Bao,” the name for Tang
China’s coinage system.

10. 9
Early Ninth Century Tang/Buddhist Relations and Daoism
The ninth century brought mixed emotions towards Buddhism. In general, religious
favoritism of Buddhism still continued into the ninth century. Every group from the imperial
elites to the lowest classes supported the faith for the most part. By this time Buddhism already
established itself as one of the major three faiths of China with Daoism and Confucianism.20
However, the mixed feelings towards Buddhism came from the growing MINO and equally from
age old arguments against its existence. Unlike Daoism and Confucianism, Buddhism originated
from outside China. Buddhism permeated China during the first couple centuries CE from its
origins in India. By the time of the Han Dynasty (206-220 CE) and especially by Sui
reunification, Buddhism became a completely Sinicized faith broadly referred to as Mahayana
Buddhism.21 As soon as Buddhism first entered China questions arose about its usefulness to
society. One of the most common arguments against the faith arose from its celibate monks and
nuns, who took people away from contributing to society. In the ninth century, Tang courts
brought this same argument against Buddhism back. In their viewpoint, Buddhism damaged
China because it took people away from contributing to society and granted them certain
privileges for this status.22 This reveals two points about Tang society at this time. First, a
climate developed after the An Lushan rebellion and into the ninth century of distrust and
general malaise towards Buddhism. Second, the faith began to lose its legitimacy23 in the eyes of
the ruling elites due to the privileged status of its adherents, a status many enjoyed without any
sincere belief in the faith. The ninth-century Tang central court began to lose its religious
20 Kenneth Ch’en, Buddhism in China:A Historical Survey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 213.
21 For more on early Buddhist penetration into China the dated but still authoritative source on the subject is Erik
Zürcher’s Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation ofBuddhism in Early Medieval China.
22 Edwin O. Reischauer, trans., Ennin’s Travels in T’ang China (New York, NY: The Ronald Press Company,
1955), 29.
23 Legitimacy in this context refers to the power, inherent in the emperor and otherimperial elites, of sanctioning,
supporting,and growing a particular faith.

11. 10
favoritism towards Buddhism, eroding its legitimacy and compromising its position in society.
Also during this time Daoism became the main competing faith to Buddhism.
Although not as numerous in terms of membership, the imperial elites thought highly of
Buddhism’s rival. The royal elite saw themselves as descendants of Laozi, the founder of the
philosophical branch of Daoism and deity figure in religious Daoism to this day.24 By contrast,
nothing indicates that any emperors claimed descent from the Indian Buddha, Siddhartha
Gautama. Since Daoism started in China, the emperors and royal elites justified their positions of
authority by creating a narrative around decent from ancient deities.25 Important to note that
although the imperial elites preferred Daoism for granting them authority, the very fact that
Buddhist monasteries far outnumbered their Daoist counterparts showed religious favoritism
towards Buddhism.26 What set the Buddhist faith apart from the Daoism also came from its
widespread imperial support, allowing it to flourish. Yet that very support created a climate
where abuses of power occurred by the MINO. While no emperor ever sanctioned the creation of
a MINO class, none before Wuzong ever acted to stop those abuses of privilege. One of the main
reasons why such abuses of power went unchallenged centers around the Eunuch class.
The Eunuch Class
The Eunuch class, an often overlooked group in the English translated literature, ruled
Tang China after the An Lushan rebellion. Edwin Pulleybank describes the Eunuch class as a
group that “exerted a precarious suzerainty” over Tang China at that time.27 The reason for their
rule came from the destabilized nature of the dynasty after the rebellion, which also extended to
24 Wright and Twitchett, eds., Perspectives, 23.
25 Around this time in East Asia the Japanese emperors also claimed descent and authority from a multitude of gods
and goddesses.Formore see the creation epic the Kojiki.
26 Wright and Twitchett, eds., Perspectives, 267.
27 Edwin G. Pulleybank, The Background ofthe Rebellion of An Lu-Shan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1995), 1.

12. 11
the emperorship. From the end of the An Lushan rebellion to the reign of Emperor Wuzong, a
period of seventy-seven years, seven emperors ruled China. To put that into perspective, the
previous one-hundred forty-four years, dating back to the beginning of the Tang Dynasty, seven
emperors ruled China. This rather rapid succession of emperors came not from old age, since
most of these emperors died relatively young, especially after about 820 CE. It came from the
reality that although the emperor maintained power, the de facto rulers of Tang China became
the Eunuch class. Their control extended to “every field of government”, with power to control
and influence those in the royal elite, and even power granted unto them over succession.28 The
Eunuch class created the rapid succession of emperors before Wuzong. Even worse, they ruled
from a “totally different power-base,” with an ideology “based on the account-book” instead of
ethics.29 Even worse, right before Wuzong’s reign, during the reign of his older brother
Wenzong, the Eunuch class created an alliance with the Buddhist faith. Wenzong tried to
regulate the Buddhist church in order to lessen the power of eunuchs.30 His efforts proved
unsuccessful. However, the association between the Buddhist church and the Eunuch class
undermined traditional rule in China, creating a condition ripe for persecution.
Emperor Wuzong and the Eunuch Class
Emperor Wuzong successfully wrested power from the Eunuch class during his brief
reign as emperor, reestablishing the sovereign rule of the emperor. As mentioned, the first effort
to reassert institutional superiority occurred during the reign of Wuzong’s older brother,
Wenzong. Once Wuzong took over, he understood the need for a strong emperor in China. He
28 Denis Twitchett, “The T’ang Imperial Family,” Asia Major Third Series 7, no. 2 (1994): 30, accessed July 11,
2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41655507.
29 Denis Twitchett, “Merchant,Trade and Government in Late T’ang,” Asia Major New Series 14, no. 1 (1968): 63-
64, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www2.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/file/1728QArfwvz.pdf.
30 Jesse Dalton Palmer, “Searching for the Law: Ennin’s Journal as a Key to the Heian Appropriation of Tang
Culture,” PhD diss.,University of California – Irvine, 2009: 231, accessed April 30, 2016,
http://search.proquest.com.byui.idm.oclc.org/docview/304856608/458D760E48E24F90PQ/1?accountid=9817.

13. 12
also knew that in order for this to occur he needed to suppress those elements in society that kept
his vision from reality. Wuzong succeeded in what his brother Wenzong tried to accomplish. He
effectively suppressed the Eunuch class that possessed de facto rule in China since the end of the
An Lushan rebellion some eighty years before.31 Since the Buddhists became tied to the Eunuch
class, the faith became increasingly unpopular under Wuzong to the point that he suppressed it.
Emperor Wuzong and Religious Pluralism
Emperor Wuzong also persecuted the Buddhist faith for other reasons. Throughout his
life he showed a consistent level of distrust toward the faith. When he came to power after the
death of Wenzong in 840 CE, he never hid his religious favoritism for Daoism, often referred to
as a “fanatic devotee” of the faith.32 From early on he made a conscious effort to delegitimize
Buddhism. He hosted frequent lectures where Daoists received preferential treatment.33 As
mentioned before, every emperor during the Tang considered themselves descendants of Laozi.
However, no Tang emperor married their religious favoritism to political ends like Wuzong.
Since Wuzong tried to reestablish the authority of the emperorship, he fed his own religious
favoritism for Daoism to destructive ends. It appears from all the translated literature that
Wuzong acted alone in his suppression of the Eunuch class and Buddhist faith. Clearly “apart
from a few of his favorite Taoist monks, he does not seem to have fostered a true Taoist pressure
group…that was hostile to Buddhism as a matter of dogma.”34 Without a large group of
supporters to aid him in his persecution, what occurred becomes judged on his actions alone.
The Huichang Persecution (843-845 CE)
31 Michael R. Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire: A Documentary History (Boston,MA:
Brill, 2005), 201.
32 Reischauer, trans., Ennin’s Travels, 29.
33 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 241.
34 Michael T. Dalby, “Court Politics of late T’ang times,” in The Cambridge History of China,vol. III, eds.Denis
Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 667-68.

14. 13
Translated imperial records of Wuzong’s Huichang persecution remain scarce, apart from
the edicts of 844 and 845 CE issued by Wuzong. However, outside observations of the Huichang
persecution offers us a detailed, though secondhand account of the events. The record of Ennin
constitutes the foundation for our understanding of this seminal event in the late Tang Dynasty.
Ennin, a Buddhist monk from Japan, grew up under a system where the government regulated
religious institutions. So when he traveled to China he accepted the emperor’s institutional
superiority over Buddhism and Wuzong’s actions in the beginning of the Huichang
persecution.35 Japan at the time of Ennin36 established a governmental structure based, at least in
part, on Tang Chinese law. Ennin knew about this, and therefore he knew the role of the emperor
of China. He understood the immense power over legitimization the emperor possessed. The
Tang emperor regulated the various religions and, through religious favoritism, decided which to
promote above others. Ennin’ s account of the persecution argues that Emperor Wuzong became
irrational in his later persecution of Buddhism. Ennin makes sure never to condemn Wuzong’s
earlier actions and the role of the emperor himself.37 The early stages of the Huichang
persecution focused on ending the abuses of the MINO and any who used the ordination to avoid
taxes.38 Early on Ennin saw Wuzong as justified in his actions of ending abuses that plagued the
Tang dynasty for over eight decades. From what we understand from Ennin’s diary, his shift in
opinion towards the reforms began in 844 CE and intensified through 845 once outright
destruction of Buddhist property and defrocking vast swaths of clergy began.39
35 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 226-27.
36 Heian Period (794-1185 CE).
37 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 225.
38 Ibid., 227-28.
39 Dalby, “Court Politics,” 666.

15. 14
The year 844 CE marked a significant change in the measures used against the Buddhist
faith. From this point onward Ennin considered the persecution an abuse of power by a fanatical
emperor. In 844 an imperial edict stated the intentions of Wuzong towards the Buddhist clergy. It
states that “Those monks and nuns of the destroyed monasteries who were unrefined…regardless
of their age, were sent back to their places of origin…those who were young…were all forced to
return to lay life.”40 The destroyed monasteries refer to the smaller monasteries. A couple points
to consider from this edict. First, the initial steps Wuzong took centered around consolidating the
clergy and monasteries of Buddhism, a worthwhile endeavor given the vast amount of MINO.
Second, the order for all young clergy to go back to civilian life reveals the economic necessities
of the time period. The young constituted those best equipped to contribute to the greater society.
On the surface this edict comes across as justified on the part of Wuzong. Yet the enforcement of
the edict showed the true nature of his persecution. Ennin observed how Buddhist persecution
intensified in 844 after this edict went into effect. He mentioned that “…scriptures and images
were taken…and their bells were sent to the Taoist monasteries. Those monks and nuns of the
destroyed monasteries…were all forced to return to lay life.”41 To make it clear again, Ennin
never condemned the Tang system for carrying out the persecution. His observations indicate the
work of an unstable emperor, prone to justifying his own religious favoritism for Daoism at the
expense of other faiths. The enforcement of this edict clearly showed that religious favoritism.
While Wuzong’s initial actions seemed justified since they targeted the abuses of the MINO,
Ennin made sure his readers understood that once 844 came, the direction of the measures
drastically changed. Wuzong began to go after the wealth of the Buddhist clergy in an effort to
legitimize his own rule and reestablish the supremacy of Daoism. Once 845 came, the measures
40 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 228.
41 Reischauer, trans., Ennin’s Travels, 254.

16. 15
turned into an outright campaign to undermine religious pluralism through wiping out the
Buddhist faith completely from China.
In 845 he issued a famous edict to start curtailing all of the Buddhist clergy. He began
this edict by developing a narrative, using history as the judge of the legitimacy of the Buddhist
faith. It reads, in part, “We have learned that up through the three dynasties [of Hsia (Xia),
Shang, and Chou (Zhou)] there had never been any talk of Buddhism, and only since the Han
and Wei has this idolatrous religion come to flourish.”42 Two things to understand from this part
of the edict. First, Wuzong hearkens back to the ancient past of China to support the expansion
of his persecution. He raises a valid point that Buddhism never existed during any of those
dynasties. In fact, he correctly states that the actual growth and prominence of Buddhism never
surfaced until the Han dynasty. Second, Wuzong specifically calls Buddhism an “idolatrous”
religion. While showing disdain for the idols of Buddhism, between the lines this signifies
something more important. The idols of Buddhism most commonly took the form of statues, art
work, and various ornamental fixtures. By expanding confiscation of idols to all monasteries, not
just those harboring MINO, the amount of potential wealth for the dynasty became far greater.
Wuzong pointed out another old, though still valid, argument against Buddhism. Later on
in the edict it reads that “Now, when one man does not farm, others suffer hunger, and, when one
woman does not weave, others suffer from the cold.”43 This statement connects with an argument
as old as Buddhism itself, that of the dependent non-contributory clergy. Once a man or woman
became a monk and nun they abandoned their working lives to become celibate and dependent
on others for sustainment. While entirely valid to point out this situation in the context of the
MINO who took advantage of the status of monk and nun to abuse tax privileges, Wuzong never
42 Ibid., 225-26.
43 Ibid., 226.

17. 16
made this association. Instead he left his persecution open to include all Buddhist monks and
nuns, regardless of status.
With this justification, in 845 Emperor Wuzong began a systematic suppression of the
entire Buddhist faith. This Huichang persecution became the single greatest persecution of the
faith up to that time. After the 845 edicts Ennin knew the intention of Wuzong. He mentioned in
his diary that in 845 the Chinese government began to persecute the larger Buddhist monasteries
and higher class clergy, sparing none, not even the “accredited monks,” forcing all to return and
become contributors to society.44 Ennin realized the purpose of Wuzong’s curtailment of the
Buddhist faith shifted from ending abuses of the MINO to elimination of Buddhism from China.
As shown before, the total number of legal Buddhist monks and nuns and MINO in 843
constituted over half a million. By the end of 844 some 410,500 remained.45 This means that
Wuzong’s initial efforts to curtail the MINO in 844 ended with him defrocking around 100,000
or one third of the total MINO class. So while two-thirds of the MINO still remained, he directed
his efforts in 845 on all monks and nuns. In Wuzong’s 844 edict he mentioned the need to return
the young to civilian life, presumably to acquire jobs and/or land so tax revenue came to the
central imperial government. Once he took it upon himself to eliminate all Buddhist clergy the
following year, the same reasoning remained in place. Adding more than 400,000 monks and
nuns allowed for an enormous source of revenue for the Tang. To put this into perspective, if
successful, this amount of defrocked clergy constituted close to ten percent of the total number of
taxpayers at that time. By defrocking the monks and nuns it added roughly ten percent more
revenue to the dynasty.46 However, the full extent of the Huichang persecution never
44 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 229.
45 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 105.
46 Ibid.

18. 17
materialized. Emperor Wuzong died in 846, but not before defrocking “more than 260,500
monks and nuns,” nearly one half of the total, as a part of his two yearlong suppression of
Buddhism.47
Reasons for the Huichang Persecution
A few areas of general consensus exist about the motivations behind this systematic
suppression of Buddhism exist. The scholar Michael Dalby argues that the persecution occurred
mostly out of economic necessity.48 Jacques Gernet agrees, going further to say that the “great
repressions of Buddhism…presented themselves primarily as measures of economic recovery.”49
On the surface the persecution became an attempt by Emperor Wuzong to defrock multitudes of
MINO and then later all clergy to gain tax revenue from their lay status. However, both Dalby
and Gernet oversimplify the complexities of late eighth and ninth century Tang China. While the
An Lushan rebellion weakened the economy, Wuzong’s clear affection towards Daoism also
factors into the equation. His favoritism towards Daoism seriously undermined religious
pluralism in China. So while he sought to eliminate the Buddhist faith to bolster the economy, he
also tried eliminate what he deemed a foreign faith unfit to remain in China. The scholar
Kenneth Chen agrees with Dalby and Gernet about the economic necessity of the Huichang
persecution. He also argues that the motives behind it centered around acquiring the wealth of
Buddhism, not necessarily to completely end it.50 However, if one adds Ennin’s record to the
debate, Wuzong intended to end the Buddhist faith in China completely. When Ennin mentioned
that Wuzong began to defrock legally ordained monks and nuns, the scope of the persecution
47 Ibid., 81.
48 Dalby, “Court Politics,” 666.
49 Gernet, Buddhismin Chinese Society,21.
50 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 68.

19. 18
became absolutely clear. The wealth tied up in people, land, and objects became far too attractive
to not forcibly acquire it all in the persecution.
More recent research on the subject presents new arguments over the necessity of the
persecution. In a 2009 article on Ennin, Jesse Palmer argued that Wuzong’s persecution
originated from tensions and conflicts of interest, and the economic power of the Buddhist
monasteries constituted a symptom, not a disease.51 However, through destroying the
monasteries and confiscating their wealth he showed the institutional superiority of the imperial
central government. For over eight decades the Tang Dynasty ran as a broken system, with local
governments garnering more influence and power. The totality of Wuzong’s persecution became
to accomplish what no other Tang emperor dared to attempt since the An Lushan rebellion. He
addressed the erosion of centralized government authority, reasserted the power of the
emperorship, curtailed the MINO in the Buddhist faith, and then sought to eliminate the tax
exempt status of all Buddhist adherents.
Conclusion – Modern State/Faith Debates
The Huichang persecution offers a case study applicable in today’s debates over
state/faith relations. Religious favoritism before and during the Huichang persecution showed the
dangers of such a practice. From the time of Sui reunification to the ninth-century, Buddhism
reigned as China’s predominant religion. Religious favoritism for this faith contributed to its
unchecked growth. While Daoism and the Confucian ethic also enjoyed loyal followings, they
never compared to Buddhism. In their recent work on religious persecution, the scholars Brian
Grim and Roger Finke discuss the dangers of religious favoritism. Specifically, they point out the
dangers of minority faith persecution. When a minority faith receives a “dominant religion”
51 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 234.

20. 19
status they often negatively impact majority religions. If that status becomes coupled with state
limitations on religious freedom, then the persecution only intensifies.52 When Wuzong came to
power he proceeded to undo the centuries long religious favoritism for Buddhism. However,
while doing this he propped up a minority faith in Daoism, granting it status as the dominant
religion. This led to intense persecution of Buddhism even though it remained the majority faith.
In The United States of America today, Christianity remains the majority religion. While
Christianity no longer constitutes a monopoly on faith, it still holds onto a dominant status. Other
faiths such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism claim minority status. However, while
none of these faiths claim dominant status in the United States, denials of religious freedom like
that of Buddhism during Wuzong still occur today. Grim and Finke argue that “to the degree that
governments and societies ensure religious freedoms for all, there will be less conflict between
religions and less violent religious persecutions.”53 So while Christianity claims a dominant
status, the situation never need occur where religious freedom for other faiths becomes
undermined.
Religious pluralism needs to remain in a traditionally religiously-inclined society like the
United States in order to avoid a monopoly of faith. Both Tang China and the history of the
United States reveal many instances where religious pluralism became ignored. During
Wuzong’s reign, the very act of trying to end the Buddhist faith undermined religious pluralism.
In the beginning of the persecution, Wuzong curtailed the faith to get rid of the MINO. Once
Wuzong focused on defrocking all monks and nuns his favoritism for Daoism became apparent.
While the Tang Code justified Wuzong curtailing the MINO, he possessed no right under Tang
52 Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-
First Century (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6.
53 Grim and Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied, 8.

21. 20
law to go the extent of ending an entire faith. In the United States, persecutions of certain faiths
show similar patterns of illegal measures taken to suppress them. One example comes from the
minority faith officially known as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly
called Mormons. This sect of Christanity came under intense persecution in the 1830s when
many of its adherents lived in the state of Missouri. The governor of Missouri at that time,
Lilburn Boggs, issued an extermination order to kill all Mormons. No right under the law of the
United States allowed for this level of persecution. Unless religious freedom remains upheld in a
religiously plural society, nothing but persecutions follow. Another equally relevant issue also
dominates the state/faith debate today, that of taxation and tax exemptions.
Just as the Tang Dynasty codified tax exempt status in the chün-tien system and through
the Tang Code, religious institutions in the United States also receive tax exempt status. This
status, called 501(c)(3), exempts religious and other organizations from taxation if they engage
in charitable works. Every year many Americans enjoy the benefits of this tax exempt status
when they file their taxes. In her discussion on religious exemptions, Leilani Fischer comments
on the issues of allowing such a practice. She states that “some have argued that institutional
exemptions amount to undue preferential treatment of religious organizations” and adds that such
treatment “undermines the efficacy of law.”54 This system of tax exemptions invites abuses of
power similar to that of the MINO in Tang China. While some enjoy the tax benefits out of
sincere devotion and allegiance to their church or organization, others reap the benefits while
never holding true convictions for the principles of their faith or organization. This ultimately
undermines the law by allowing a group to satisfy personal desires, in this case avoiding taxes. In
54 Leilani N. Fischer, “InstitutionalReligious Exemptions: A Balancing Approach,” Brigham Young University Law
Review 2014, no. 2 (March 2014): 416, accessed June 18, 2016,
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.byui.idm.oclc.org/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=21c64a3d-a666-4113-a64e-
72623d93195e%40sessionmgr106&vid=5&hid=125.

22. 21
connection with this, Fischer also mentions that “whereas individual exemptions depend on
proof of a person’s sincerely held religious belief…institutional exemptions are granted more
broadly in order to protect a religious group’s right to self-governance.”55 Just like the MINO
during the late Tang, the United States ought to examine those who hide behind institutional
exemptions from taxation because of the ability of religious institutions to govern themselves.
How to grasp with and ultimately resolve these three issues of religious favoritism, religious
pluralism, and tax exempt status for religious institutions in the United States remains beyond the
scope of this paper. However, the events from the mid-eight to mid-ninth century in China offers
useful insights in how to better navigate these issues in the future.
55 Fischer, “Institutional Religious Exemptions,” 417.

23. 22
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