Presentation to TechChange course 'Technology for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding' (January 28th 2014)

1. RUMOURS & RIOTS IN
MYANMAR (BURMA)
Policy and Program
Frameworks to
Address Escalating
Communal
Polarisation
Gerard McCarthy, ANU
Presentation to TechChange course, ‘Tech for Conflict
Management & Peacebuilding’ (January 28th 2014)

2. About me
• Program Director (Asia-Pacific) at
TechChange.
• PhD Candidate at Australian National
University: researching intersection of
democratization, social polarisation and
information communication technologies.
• Previously worked for NGOs, CSOs in Sri
Lanka, Myanmar, South Sudan, US and
Aus.
• Spent a month in Myanmar (Nov-Dec 2013)
conducting initial research (now working on a
related policy paper).

3. Myanmar: Fast facts
• Population: C. 65 million
• Economy: GDP $52B USD in 2011
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(Thailand $365B in 2011)
Religion: Around 80% Buddhist, 8%
Christian, 3% Muslim.
Military rule (1962-2010), semidemocratic rule (2010-present).
Elections set for Nov 2015.
Electricity: 13% (2011)
Mobile coverage: <10% (2011)
Internet: <2% (2011)

4. What’s the problem?
• Communal violence is spreading across the country from
Rakhine State (west) to Meiktila (central) to Lashio (China
border). Issue is metastasizing from a communal to a
broader religious conflict, led by anti-Muslim „969‟
movement.
• Rumours and images of violence are spreading through
social media (online and word-of-mouth), cultivating
localised social polarisation.

5. Why does it matter?
• Democratic threat: Communal violence between Muslims & Buddhists
could impact democratisation process (elections Nov 2015) & justify
military role in politics.
• Refugee crisis: Muslims are planning to flee Myanmar to other SE Asian
nations (Indonesia and Malaysia) - potential regional refugee crisis akin
to Partition.
• Stoking terrorism: Religious element of the violence has become
pronounced, creating fears that regional jihadi terrorist networks such as
Jemaah Islamiyah could become involved in Myanmar.

6. Legacies of censorship
• Trust of rumour: There is little trust in official news
sources (a legacy of censorship), so rumours and wordof-mouth are how most people hear of current affairs.
• Insular social networks: BBC Media Action study found
that people are extremely reluctant to discuss political
opinions with outsiders. This means highly insular
information sources, which compounds polarisation.

7. What’s the role of technology? (1)
• No filtering of information or imagery shared online: the
suppression of expression and information during censorship
has resulted in limited personal self-censorship.
• “Internet and Facebook have effectively merged in the
eyes of most Burmese” (InterNews). Twice as many people
have a Facebook account (600,000 in 2012, >1M 2014) than
read the most popular weekly newspaper (300,000).
• With new mobile network operators commencing in April 2014,
projection of 80% mobile ownership by Nov 2015.

8. What’s the role of technology? (2)
• Social media has become a platform to spread
nefarious rumour. As information was such a commodity
during censorship, malicious hate speech spreads rapidly
online (especially once it leaves initial outlet pages).
• Exposure online to
external frames (eg.
religious warfare) and
info/images from West
Myanmar may be
exacerbating pessimism
about religious conflict
during the transition.

9. Questions (practical & ethical)
• How is info consumption impacting pessimism? (Catie
Bailard)
• How should rumour and hate speech be dealt with in this
context? (Moderation, takedowns?)
• How can extremism or false rumours be mediated within
social networks? (Local CSOs?)
• What potential role is there for
alternative narratives eg nonviolence?
• How could potential patterns in
regime involvement in violence be
detected? (Mapping?)

10. 8 Potential Policy & Program Responses
1.
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7.
8.
Research info consumption habits (old, new media,
rumour) and their effect on political behaviours.
Support conflict-sensitive media training, especially in
monitoring and take-downs of hate-speech (USIP).
Work with local CSOs to disconfirm or mediate rumours
with messages of peace (USIP radio initiative; online?).
Support groups disseminating on alternative narratives to
extremism (eg. pacifism)
Train police in crisis response and riot control (EU).
Ensure media access in conflict areas (Rakhine).
End impunity for perpetrators and condemn 969 movement.
Clarify the place of minorities in Myanmar through highlevel Presidential speech.