Research PAPER_Experimental_Psychology

Running head: INTUITION OR REFLECTION: WHAT IS MORE FAVORABLE? 1
Intuition or Reflection: What is More Favorable When It Comes to Beliefs in God?
Iuliia Klymenko
Hunter College

INTUITION OR REFLECTION: WHAT IS MORE FAVORABLE? 2
Abstract
The purpose of our study was to examine the relationship between intuitive and reflective
thinking abilities and a belief in God. Fifty-five Hunter College students completed the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily
solvable, have intuitively persuasive incorrect answers. CRT results were then compared to
beliefs in God’s existence. Females were more likely to believe in God and had greater intuitive
scores than males, who had greater reflective scores. It appears that gender and type of thought
process play a role in determining one’s belief in God.
Keywords: Cognitive Reflection Test, Religious beliefs, Intuitive reasoning, Reflective
reasoning

Intuition or Reflection: What is More Favorable When It Comes to Beliefs in God?
.
A New Harris Poll (2013) finds that a strong majority (74%) of U.S. adults believe in God.
An explosion of recent research suggests that religious beliefs and behaviors are universal, arise
from deep-seated cognitive mechanisms, and were favored by natural selection over human
evolutionary history (Johnson, 2004). The term "cognition" refers to all processes by which the
sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. According to
Ulric Neisser, it is apparent that cognition is involved in everything a human being might
possibly do; that every psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon. At the same time,
logic and reasoning skills are the abilities to reason, prioritize, and plan.
Most contemporary psychological studies have explored the competing concepts of
cognitive ability performance, as it is not always clear-cut that those who are more analytic in
thinking are prone to rejecting God (Pennycook & Cheyne, 2012). Considerable research in
recent decades has focused on two contrasting styles of problem-solving and decision-making,
often formalized as distinct reasoning types or systems (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, ).
The first, sometimes referred to as Type 1 processing, is characterized as intuitive, fast,
unconscious, associative, and heuristic. Alternatively, problem solving and decision-making
proceed in a more analytic manner, sometimes called Type 2 processing, which tends to be more
time consuming, deliberative, and effortful.
The studies conducted by Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977) showed that intellectualism has
been found to be an important predictor of religious apostasy among college students. The
studies conduct by Pennycook and colleagues suggest that individuals with an analytic cognitive
style are more likely to reject religious beliefs simply because such beliefs are vulnerable to

being evaluated in a more analytic, logical manner (2012). Participants who gave more intuitive
answers on the CRT reported a stronger belief in God. It is therefore hypothesized that when
intuitions conflict with reasoning, less religious people will display a more analytic cognitive
style than more religious people. Demographics have been shown to be poor predictors of
religious and paranormal beliefs. The only exception is gender. Women have consistently been
shown to have more paranormal (Vyse, 1997) and religious beliefs (Stark, 2002) than men, and
we expected to find women to also have more religious beliefs in the present study. According to
Frederick (2005), women were also found to have lower scores on the CRT, with lower scores
indicative of a more intuitive, and less reflective and analytical, thought process.
In our study we decided to replicate the research of Shenhav, Rand, & Greene (2012) to
determine the connection between cognitive thinking type and a belief in God. Therefore, the
purpose of our study was to examine the relationship between the cognitive thinking styles
(intuitive versus reflective), and whether females have a higher intuitive score (i.e. a lower CRT
score) and a lower reflective score than males higher beliefs in God. We hypothesize that males
will score better on reflective style, and females will have higher intuitive score. As a result,
females will have higher beliefs in God.

Method
Participants
Fifty-five students on the Hunter College campus (38 females, 13 males, while 4 did not
specify their gender, M age = 23.55, range 18 – 41) were asked to complete a survey without
compensation.
Setting and Materials
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT: Frederick, 2005) was provided to students to measure
whether they preferred to answer cognitive math questions in an intuitive and spontaneous
fashion (resulting in an incorrect answer) versus in a more reflective way (resulting in the correct
answer). The CRT consisted of three items, which are math problems with intuitively attractive
but incorrect answers. For example: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” The response $0.10 springs immediately to
mind, but the correct answer is $0.05. Choosing the attractive but incorrect answer signals
greater reliance on intuition and less reliance on reflection. Students were also asked to complete
three questions about their belief in God’s existence, such as “How confident are you in your
belief in God?”
Experimental Design and Procedure
Participants were given an unlimited amount of time to take the CRT and religiosity survey.
After the survey, students were debriefed and explained the purpose of the study.

Results
With the collected data, the alpha level used was .05. From the survey, a total intuitive
and total reflective score was calculated based on the number of incorrect and correct answers
students provided on the CRT. Overall, using Spearman’s rank order correlation, total intuitive
and total reflective scores were negatively correlated, rs (53) = -.756, p < .001. Total intuitive
score was positively correlated with a student being female, rs (49) = .336, p < .05 while total
reflective score was correlated with a student being male, rs (51) = -.377, p < .01.
Given these correlations, an independent t-test was conducted between males and females
on their total intuitive scores. Females (M = 2.32, SD = 0.84) had significantly higher intuitive
scores then males (M =1.538, SD = 1.13), t (49) = -2.631, p < .05. A t-test was also conducted
between males and females on their total reflective scores. As a Levene’s test for equality of
variances was significant, we did not assume equal variances. Males (M =1.15, SD = 1.34) had
significantly higher reflective scores than females (M = 0.26, SD = 0.64), t(13.933) = 2.30, p <
.05.
Regarding belief in God’s existence, an independent t-test was conducted on total
intuitive scores on whether participants said they did or did not have an experience that
convinced them of God’s existence. While those who said yes had an overall higher intuitive
score (M = 2.28) than those who said no (M = 1.82), the difference was not significant, t(53) = -
1.754, p = .085. An independent t-test on this question on total reflective score was also not
significant.

An independent t-test was also conducted on question 6, which asked whether a
participants’ belief in God has increased or decreased since childhood. There was no significant
difference between total intuitive score on how one answered the question. However, total
reflective score was also looked at as Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, we
did not assume equal variances. Those who reported that their belief in God had decreased since
childhood (M = 0.83, SD = 1.19) had significantly higher total reflective scores than those who
reported that their belief in God had increased since childhood (M = 0.27, SD = 0.64), t (31.61)
= 2.04, p = .05.
As the scale testing a range from completely believing God’s exist to completely
believing God does not exist was on an ordinal scale, a Mann-Whitney U test was used instead
for between males and females. Males (mean rank = 32.69) were significantly more likely to not
believe in the existence of God than females (mean rank = 23.71), U = 160.00, p < .05.
To test the predictability power of gender and age on the likelihood of saying they had an
experience that convinced them of God’s existence, a logistic regression was conducted, because
question 5 only had two choices as answers, and not a continuous score. Age was not a
significant predictor, but gender was (p = .040), although the model only explained 13.2% of the
variance and only approached significance (Nagelkerke R2), χ2 (2) = 5.174, p = .075. A 1-unit
increase in gender (from male to female) was associated with a 1.395 increase in the logistic
variable (likelihood of being convinced of God’s existence via an experience). In addition,
looking at the odds ratio, controlling for individual differences in age, there was a 4.034 greater
likelihood of females saying “yes” than “no”. Therefore, gender is a helpful predictor in looking
at belief in God.

We also looked at the relationship between total intuitive scores and gender, and total
reflective scores and gender. A regression found gender significantly predicted intuitive scores, b
= .777, t(48) = 2.60, p < .05, but overall did not account for a large amount of the variance (R2 =
.089). Another regression using gender to predict reflective scores was also significant, b = -.891,
t(48) = -3.16, p < .01, R2 = .144.
Discussion
Gender seems to have a small but significant effect on predicting total intuitive and
reflective scores, and as well as on predicting whether someone believes in God. Gender
differences can also be seen between whether someone believes or does not believe in God’s
existence and in total intuitive and reflective scores, with females higher in the first and males
higher in the second. Those who reported a decreased belief in God since childhood tended to
have higher reflective scores, also based on the results of Shenhav, Rand, & Greene (2012). The
finding that females had higher intuitive scores while males had higher reflective scores supports
my hypothesis.
However, our study had a few limitations that may have affected its results. The first
limitation of our experiment was that for question 6 “Has your belief in God increased or
decreased since childhood?”, the only options available were a) increased or b) decreased. In the
future it could be improved by providing the option: c) ‘hasn’t changed’, since without it people
are left making a clear choice, when maybe they do not really know, like in agnosticism. We did
not also look at ethnic group and income, which may have affect on religious beliefs. Also, other
studies has been suggested that more highly educated individuals may be less likely to accept
specific religious beliefs than less educated individuals at equivalent levels of religious

engagement. In the future it will be interesting to research this phenomenon. Also, it will be
interesting to observe the tendency of political views, and how it might influence our findings
(will more conservative participants be significantly more religious?). Another possibility for
future research is to look at how education level and college major have an affect, as those with a
higher level degree or a more scientific college major may take a different view on God than the
normal population.

References
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication Manual of the American
Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, D.C: American Psychological
Association.
Americans' Belief in God, Miracles and Heaven Declines. Belief in Darwin's theory of evolution
rises. (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20
Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/1353/Default.aspx
Shane Frederick. Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making. Journal of Economic
Perspectives—Volume 19, Number 4—Fall 2005—Pages 25–42.
Shenhav, Amitai; Rand, David G, Greene, Joshua D. Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences
belief in God. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Vol 141(3), Aug 2012, 423-428.
Stark, R. 2002. Physiology and faith: Addressing the "universal" gender difference in religious
commitment. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41(3), 495-507.
Vyse, S. A. (1997). Believing in magic: The psychology of superstition. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Johnson, D.D.P. The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation. (Harvard
University Press, 2004).

Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J., Seli, P., Koehler, D., Fugelsang, J.(2012). Analytic cognitive style predicts
religious and paranormal belief. Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo,
Canada.

Group Statistics
Q5 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Total_intuitive
no 23 1.8261 1.07247 .22363
yes 32 2.2813 .85135 .15050
Total_reflective
no 23 .7391 1.09617 .22857
yes 32 .3438 .78738 .13919
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error
Difference
Total_intuitive
Equal variances assumed .085 -.45516 .25954
Equal variances not assumed .099 -.45516 .26955
Total_reflective
Equal variances assumed .125 .39538 .25371
Equal variances not assumed .148 .39538 .26761
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
Lower Upper
Total_in
Equal variances assumed -.97572 .06540

tuitive Equal variances not assumed -.99972 .08940
Total_re
flective
Equal variances assumed -.11350 .90426
Equal variances not assumed -.14653 .93729
T-Test
Group Statistics
Q6 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Total_intuitive
decreased 23 1.8261 1.19286 .24873
increased 30 2.3333 .71116 .12984
Total_reflective
decreased 23 .8261 1.19286 .24873
increased 30 .2667 .63968 .11679
Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of
Means
F Sig. t df
Total_intuitive
Equal variances assumed 9.883 .003 -1.928 51
Equal variances not
assumed
-1.808 33.724
Total_reflective
Equal variances assumed 15.406 .000 2.194 51
Equal variances not
assumed
2.036 31.605

Difference
Total_intuitive
Total_reflective
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper
Total_intuitive
Equal variances assumed -1.03550 .02101
Equal variances not assumed -1.07762 .06313
Total_reflective
Equal variances assumed .04750 1.07134
Equal variances not assumed -.00057 1.11941
Group Statistics
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Total_intuitive
male 13 1.5385 1.12660 .31246
female 38 2.3158 .84166 .13654
Total_reflective
male 13 1.1538 1.34450 .37290
female 38 .2632 .64449 .10455

Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of
Means
F Sig. t df
Total_intuitive
Equal variances assumed 2.726 .105 -2.631 49
Equal variances not
assumed
-2.280 16.821
Total_reflective
Equal variances assumed 17.856 .000 3.187 49
Equal variances not
assumed
2.300 13.933
Difference
Total_intuitive
Total_reflective
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper

Total_intuitive
Equal variances assumed -1.37113 -.18352
Equal variances not assumed -1.49734 -.05732
Total_reflective
Equal variances assumed .32914 1.45223
Equal variances not assumed .05968 1.72169
Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Q4 55 3.1818 2.22020 1.00 7.00
Gender 51 .75 .440 0 1
Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks
Gender N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Q4
male 13 32.69 425.00
female 38 23.71 901.00
Total 51
Test Statisticsa
Q4
Mann-Whitney U 160.000
Wilcoxon W 901.000
Z -1.966

Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .049
Nonparametric Correlations
Correlations
Total_intuitive Total_reflective Q5
Spearman's rho
Total_intuitive
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.756**
.222
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .104
N 55 55 55
Total_reflective
Correlation Coefficient -.756**
1.000 -.203
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .136
N 55 55 55
Q5
Correlation Coefficient .222 -.203 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .104 .136 .
N 55 55 55
Q6
Correlation Coefficient .186 -.247 .653**
Sig. (2-tailed) .182 .075 .000
N 53 53 53
Gender
Correlation Coefficient .336*
-.377**
.294*
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .006 .036
N 51 51 51
Age
Correlation Coefficient -.055 .038 -.135
Sig. (2-tailed) .703 .791 .347
N 51 51 51

Q4
.416**
-.653**
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .002 .000
N 55 55 55
Correlations
Q6 Gender Age Q4
Spearman's rho
Total_intuitive
Correlation Coefficient .186 .336**
-.055 -.428
Sig. (2-tailed) .182 .016 .703 .001
N 53 51 51 55
Total_reflective
-.377 .038 .416
Sig. (2-tailed) .075 .006 .791 .002
N 53 51 51 55
Q5
Correlation Coefficient .653 .294 -.135 -.653**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .036 .347 .000
N 53 51 51 55
Q6
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .131 -.052** -.712
Sig. (2-tailed) . .369 .722 .000
N 53 49 49 53
Gender
Correlation Coefficient .131*
1.000**
-.088*
-.278
Sig. (2-tailed) .369 . .541 .048
N 49 51 51 51
Age
Correlation Coefficient -.052 -.088 1.000 .105
Sig. (2-tailed) .722 .541 . .464

N 49 51 51 51
Q4
-.278**
.105**
1.000**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .048 .464 .
N 53 51 51 55
**. Correlation is significantatthe 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significantatthe 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Descriptives
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
Total_intuitive 55 .00 3.00 2.0909 .96748 -.951 .322
Total_reflective 55 .00 3.00 .5091 .94031 1.845 .322
Gender 51 0 1 .75 .440 -1.159 .333
Age 51 18 41 23.55 5.725 1.797 .333
Q4 55 1.00 7.00 3.1818 2.22020 .468 .322
Valid N (listwise) 51
Gender

Descriptive Statisticsa
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Gender 0
Total_intuitive 4 1.00 3.00 1.7500 .95743
Total_reflective 4 .00 2.00 .7500 .95743
Gender = male
Gender 13 0 0 .00 .000
Total_intuitive 13 .00 3.00 1.5385 1.12660
Total_reflective 13 .00 3.00 1.1538 1.34450
Gender = female
Gender 38 1 1 1.00 .000
Total_intuitive 38 .00 3.00 2.3158 .84166
Total_reflective 38 .00 3.00 .2632 .64449

a. Gender = female
Logistic Regression
Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa
N Percent
Selected Cases
Included in Analysis 51 92.7
Missing Cases 4 7.3
Total 55 100.0
Unselected Cases 0 .0
Total 55 100.0
a. If weightis in effect, see classification table for the total number of
cases.
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value Internal Value

no 0
yes 1
Categorical Variables Codings
Frequency Parameter
coding
(1)
Gender
male 13 .000
female 38 1.000
Block 0: Beginning Block
Iteration Historya,b,c
Iteration -2 Log likelihood Coefficients
Constant
Step 0
1 67.352 .510
2 67.350 .521
3 67.350 .521

a. Constantis included in the model.
b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood:67.350
c. Estimation terminated atiteration number 3
because parameter estimates changed byless than
.001.
Classification Tablea,b
Observed Predicted
Q5 Percentage
Correct
no yes
Step 0
Q5
no 0 19 .0
yes 0 32 100.0
Overall Percentage 62.7
a. Constantis included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 0 Constant .521 .290 3.240 1 .072 1.684

Variables not in the Equation
Score df Sig.
Step 0
Variables
Gender(1) 4.401 1 .036
Age .806 1 .369
Overall Statistics 5.211 2 .074
Block 1: Method = Enter
Iteration Historya,b,c,d
Iteration -2 Log likelihood Coefficients
Constant Gender(1) Age
Step 1
1 62.228 .551 1.304 -.043
2 62.177 .682 1.393 -.049
3 62.177 .685 1.395 -.050
4 62.177 .685 1.395 -.050
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 5.174 2 .075

Block 5.174 2 .075
Model 5.174 2 .075
Model Summary
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R
Square
Nagelkerke R
Square
1 62.177a
.096 .132
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 10.827 8 .212
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Q5 = no Q5 = yes Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Step 1
1 4 3.910 2 2.090 6
2 4 3.527 2 2.473 6
3 2 2.320 3 2.680 5
4 1 1.724 4 3.276 5
5 0 1.445 5 3.555 5

6 3 1.084 1 2.916 4
7 3 2.090 5 5.910 8
8 0 .755 3 2.245 3
9 2 1.213 3 3.787 5
10 0 .934 4 3.066 4
Classification Tablea
Observed Predicted
Q5 Percentage
Correct
no yes
Step 1
Q5
no 8 11 42.1
yes 5 27 84.4
Overall Percentage 68.6
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95%
C.I.for
EXP(B)
Lower
Step 1a
Gender(1) 1.395 .680 4.202 1 .040 4.034 1.063
Age -.050 .053 .865 1 .352 .952 .857

Constant .685 1.356 .255 1 .613 1.985
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Upper
Step 1a
Gender(1) 15.305
Age 1.056
Constant
Means
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Included Excluded Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Q4 * Gender 51 92.7% 4 7.3% 55 100.0%
Report
Q4
Gender Mean N Std. Deviation Median
male 4.0769 13 2.32600 4.0000
female 2.6842 38 2.09382 1.5000
Total 3.0392 51 2.21775 2.0000

Regression
Mean Std. Deviation N
Total_reflective .4902 .94599 51
Gender .75 .440 51
Age 23.55 5.725 51
Correlations
Total_reflective Gender Age
Pearson Correlation
Total_reflective 1.000 -.414 -.080
Gender -.414 1.000 .001
Age -.080 .001 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)
Total_reflective . .001 .288
Gender .001 . .497
Age .288 .497 .
N
Total_reflective 51 51 51
Gender 51 51 51
Age 51 51 51
Variables Entered/Removeda

Model Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed
Method
1 Age, Genderb
. Enter
a. DependentVariable:Total_reflective
b. All requested variables entered.
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R
Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1 .422a
.178 .144 .87531
a. Predictors:(Constant),Age, Gender
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1
Regression 7.969 2 3.985 5.201 .009b
Residual 36.776 48 .766
Total 44.745 50
a. DependentVariable:Total_reflective
b. Predictors:(Constant),Age, Gender

Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) 1.464 .564 2.596 .012
Gender -.891 .281 -.414 -3.166 .003
Age -.013 .022 -.080 -.610 .545
Regression
Mean Std. Deviation N
Total_intuitive 2.1176 .97256 51
Gender .75 .440 51
Age 23.55 5.725 51
Correlations
Total_intuitive Gender Age
Pearson Correlation
Total_intuitive 1.000 .352 .038
Gender .352 1.000 .001
Age .038 .001 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)
Total_intuitive . .006 .394
Gender .006 . .497
Age .394 .497 .

N
Total_intuitive 51 51 51
Gender 51 51 51
Age 51 51 51
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed
Method
1 Age, Genderb
. Enter
a. DependentVariable:Total_intuitive
b. All requested variables entered.
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R
Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1 .354a
.125 .089 .92840
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1
Regression 5.921 2 2.961 3.435 .040b
Residual 41.373 48 .862
Total 47.294 50

Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) 1.386 .598 2.318 .025
Gender .777 .298 .352 2.606 .012
Age .006 .023 .038 .282 .779
a. DependentVariable:Total_intuitive

GGraph

Research PAPER_Experimental_Psychology

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