We can accomplish more in Afghanistan than you think.

1. Redefining the PossibleRedefining the Possible
Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2008-2011Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2008-2011

2. IntroductionIntroduction
•Southern Afghanistan is one of the most dangerous places in the world today, and it has remained
stubbornly impervious to most efforts to improve it. One aid & development program after another
has failed there.
•A certain NGO with several large contracts in Afghanistan is on record as claiming that their work
can have a real benefit, provided that good security is already in place; only after the military has
taken an area can the civilians come in and do work.
•This presentation seeks to make the opposite argument; that we can operate effectively in southern
Afghanistan independently of the security picture. In the slides that follow, it will be shown that:
1. It is possible to complete a major construction project, even in the middle of a Taliban
logistics corridor
2. It is possible to operate safely and effectively far outside the protective military bubble
3. It is possible to build local cooperation so strong that whole communities are stripped from
Taliban control.
•The aid programs described here suffered zero attacks and were completed successfully. This did
not happen by accident; these programs followed principles that are ignored by most other aid
programs in the country, but which spell the difference between success and failure. Their record
redefines what is possible.

3. #1: Bridging the Arghandab#1: Bridging the Arghandab
•The Arghandab River is a
major Taliban logistics corridor,
especially during the summer
fighting season.
•It is also an obstacle,
hampering efforts by farmers
on one side to reach markets on
the other; a bridge was needed.

4. Pay Respect, Not BribesPay Respect, Not Bribes
•A local construction contractor
was selected through an open
bid process. No bribes of any
kind were involved; bribes
promote undesirable
expectations.
•Good community outreach
and visible, steady progress by
the contractor won popular
support for the project. This
discouraged Taliban
interference.
•The bridge was to be 160
meters long; 1/10 of a mile.

5. Serious ConstructionSerious Construction
•Soil bearing tests, concrete tests,
and steel bar strength tests were all
performed at professional testing
laboratories elsewhere in the country,
and the results of these tests
documented and analyzed.
•Early in the project the drill crews
drilled deeper into the bedrock than
was technically necessary. This
bedrock had turned out to be
shallower than expected, and the
drillers used that opportunity to
prove what they could do. When
properly motivated (no bribery), it is
not uncommon for Afghans to
surpass expectations in this way.

6. Project SuccessProject Success
•The bridge was completed on
time, on budget, and without
being attacked.
•The bridge is in good condition
and remains in use to this day;
these pictures were taken about
two years after project
completion.
•Heavy construction is possible in
southern Afghanistan, and
without an overwhelming security
presence; do not believe those
who claim otherwise.

7. #2: Rebuilding Faqir Well#2: Rebuilding Faqir Well
•Faqir Well is almost
100 miles from
Kandahar, in the
middle of the
Registan Desert.
•Approximately 45
miles north of
Pakistan border.
•Traditionally
controlled by
Baluchi people, but
abandoned due to
lack of water.

8. The WellThe Well
•The original well is
believed to be over 300
years old. It was dug by
hand by Faqir, a
sheepherder, over a nine-
year period.
•Used freely over the
centuries by countless
nomads and pastoralists;
the Faqir family became
legendary for their
generosity.
•The well finally collapsed
due to drought 10 years
ago.
•Without the well, nomads
moved on and smugglers
moved in.

9. The ThreatThe Threat
•Bandits, smugglers, and
Taliban now call the
Registan home.
•Traditionally, Baluchi
family men policed the
Registan, keeping it safe
for their women and
children.
•Without a local water
source, Baluchi families
cannot live at Faqir. Now
it is invested by those with
sinister intentions.
•How to keep such people
out? The well must be
rebuilt.

10. ConstructionConstruction
•Heavy equipment was available,
but could not reach this
particular location due to soft
sand. The well was re-dug by
hand, removing all collapsed
material.
•The well shaft was lined with
brick from the bottom up,
masons at times working from
deep inside the shaft.
•The construction phase lasted
six months and employed 34
laborers. Local enthusiasm for
the project was such that an
additional 12 volunteers worked
without pay.

11. The ResultsThe Results
•The well depth was
increased to some 123
meters, ensuring an ample
water supply.
•A double-tank system was
installed for receiving the
water, and concrete troughs
for watering animals.
•A subterranean storeroom
beside the well houses
buckets, cables, and other
items. This room has no
lock; it may be freely used by
any who can reach the site.
•The well was completed on
time, on budget, and
without incident.

12. Faqir Well TodayFaqir Well Today
•Concrete troughs extend from
the main tank for the purpose of
watering livestock. With its
current design, Faqir Well can
provide water for about 9,000
animals.
•Three Bauchi communities have
already established themselves in
the area, maintaining a permanent
presence and guaranteeing local
peace and stability.
•This project created goodwill
between our side and certain
senior Baluchi leaders; goodwill
that could be capitalized upon in
future collaborations.

13. #3 Aid-for-Labor#3 Aid-for-Labor
•This program targeted
11 rural villages in Dand
District, Kandahar
Province: 4 friendly, 5
unknown, 2 hostile. They
would all be on our side
by the time it was over.

14. Building Political CapitalBuilding Political Capital
•We allowed certain village elders to identify projects
needed by their villages. In most cases, they sought
irrigation control structures.
•Elders provided the project management within their
villages, we provided funding and assisted with quality
control.

15. Everyone Gives Something, Everyone Gets SomethingEveryone Gives Something, Everyone Gets Something
•Labor on these projects was
provided by villages residents,
rather than outside contractors.
•Participation was voluntary, and
workers were paid, through their
elders, in sheep. The more work
they performed the more sheep
they would earn.
•This mechanism enabled us to
inject wealth into the communities
without introducing market
distortions or fostering jealousy
among recipients.
•Elders had to manage projects
carefully and pay honestly, lest they
lose political capital.
•Village economies boomed, and
we were welcomed into the first 9
villages.

16. Monara and Kuchnay KarezakMonara and Kuchnay Karezak
•The two hostile villages were
aligned with the Quetta Taliban,
who forbade them to work with us.
•We negotiated secretly with the
leading families of these villages. If
they would nominate official elders
and get the written approval of the
Dand District Governor, we would
bring our program into their
communities. We quietly kept the
Dand battlespace commander
appraised of these negotiations.
•The family patriarch was in
Quetta. He consistently refused the
villages’ requests to work with us,
but he had no aid of his own to
offer in its place.

17. What Victory Looks LikeWhat Victory Looks Like
•March, 2011: Fed up with Quetta,
the family broke and the villages
quit the Taliban and formally sided
with the government of
Afghanistan. They met with the
District Governor who approved
of their village governance
structure and gave us written
approval to begin work in their
villages.
•Work proceeded almost
immediately, and Monar and
Kuchnay Karezak have remained
aligned with the Afghan
government to this day.

18. Success We Can Build OnSuccess We Can Build On
•Thanks to the Aid-for-Labor strategy, we
succeeded in completing 100% of all projects
in all 11 communities. This included 377
irrigation control structures, 2062 meters of
flood protection walls, and 7500 meters of
concrete-lined drainage canals. This was all
accomplished without a shot fired or a life
lost.
•As a side effect to the improved economic
conditions, numerous new jobs and
businesses appeared as well.
•The elders claim that this program improved
the lives of every last person in their
communities, one way or another. Elders
from surrounding communities sent us over a
dozen written requests inviting our program
to their villages. All of them would like to
work with us further.

19. Conclusion: It Can Be DoneConclusion: It Can Be Done
•The three projects presented here demonstrate that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we can
achieve anything in southern Afghanistan that needs achieving. The people can be turned away from
the Taliban; construction projects can be completed professionally and competently; and we can
operate very far from the population centers.
•Furthermore, it is possible to do all this without paying bribes or suffering violence. Aid programs
that result in killed personnel month after month or that pay masked forms of extortion to local
power brokers clearly misunderstand the culture and have guaranteed their own failure.
•Private enterprise seeking to operate in southern Afghanistan should take note of this. The dismal
ROI on foreign aid to Afghanistan to date is misleading; outsized success in Afghanistan is possible,
even in the south. With the proper approach, it is possible to build and pacify the country, resulting
in prosperity for all involved. It can be done.
•The information presented in these slides is current as of August 18, 2012. To learn more, contact
Scott at Alamanach@hotmail.com.