Ph.d. probation report v18 submission

Expanding the boundaries of organisational change:
Transforming relationships by engaging change agents in systemic
learning conversations
Ph.D. Probation Report
Jitse van Ameijde
Department of Communication and Systems
July 2008
Jitse van Ameijde Ph.D. Probation Report Page 1

Reflections on writing this probation report
In a sense, I started writing this report thinking I would describe the various ideas
that had developed over the last eight months. Little was I aware of the learning that I
would derive from the process of writing itself and the attempt to consolidate the various
literatures I had engaged with, weaving them into a coherent story. In retrospect, it feels
like I have not written down my research ideas, but actually developed them as I engaged
in the process of writing. Grateful though I am for the many insights that this process has
given me, it also makes me realise that the report in its present form is in many senses an
inaccurate representation of how I now see my research.
I realise that I have written my report with the wrong audience in mind. Coming
from a positivist education, my writing is still largely based on the style that I had come so
used to: these are the facts, this is how they fit together, and these are the conclusions I
draw from them. Over the last year, I had to an extent overcome this style of writing,
thanks to my supervisors who encouraged me to write my actual thoughts rather than
engaging in a mere academic exercise of critically reviewing the literature 'out there.' This
led to a number of literature reviews written in the course of the year in which my focus
consisted of my own process of sense-making. However, as my supervisors pointed out
and I had to admit in embarrassment, my probation report no longer flowed from the
same 'voice' that I had found over the last year. As the first 'formal' step in the Ph.D.
process, I feared that my proposal had to be a solid and defensible research question,
based firmly in the literatures from which I draw. As such, in many ways this report opens
the doors to the literatures I draw from and then closes these same doors. Instead, I now
wish that the report was more of a conversation with these literatures rather than a set of
conclusions derived from them.
I feel that this report lacks the courage that I thought I had found, the courage to
speak my own mind and place my own ideas in relation to the literature. Instead, it now
feels like my report forms a fortress to defend my ideas, drawing on the literatures that I

respect without being critical of them as I am to the literatures that oppose that in which I
believe. The report therefore conceals the fact that I am deeply uncertain regarding the
validity and relevance of my ideas, and speaks from the voice of a research student who
feels he has to know what he is talking about in order to pass the probation, while actually
hiding the fact that his ideas are still embryonic and and have not yet found their full
voice. Therefore, I do not see the voice that speaks in this report as the voice that really
represents my drive to find out how I can contribute to a more positive approach to
organisational change. In this reflection, I would therefore try to reveal my 'hidden
agenda', the force that really drives my thoughts, fears, and hopes, the force that seeks to
find legitimacy within me and the audience to which I wish to speak.
In the last year, I have started to realise that my true frustration springs from the
way we as the human species, as a collective, seem to relate to one another and our world,
which to me seems like a slowly disintegrating fabric which appears to have lost all
notions of human purpose and human value. I feel like we live in a world where we are
multiple partial selfs, and somehow it feels like these multiple partial selfs are expected to
remain separated from one another. We are professionals, subordinates, managers, or
'leaders' at work, we are parents, husbands, wives, or children at home, we are customers
in the supermarket, we are citizens in our country. In each of these roles, we feel different
expectations around how we are to be and act appropriately. I don't know whether to be
angry or depressed by the fact that I am constantly bombarded by attempts of private
companies to sell me their products, who treat me like a potential 'client' or 'customer,'
adopting the latest marketing tricks to make me feel like they have my interests at heart
but at the same time are ready to screw me over (excuse my English) once I buy their
product. I feel a similar anger when organisations come with the latest fad-based change
initiative, treating employees like children who need to have consultants tell them how to
behave. When I look at the OU and the number of staff who care about students and want
to make a difference to their lives, I don't understand why these staff need to be monitored

or performance managed to make sure that they do what they are supposed to do. Many
people at the OU come to work to make a difference, yet often seem to be treated like
children who need to be told what difference they should make. If we come together for a
common purpose, isn't it only just if we together decide what this purpose means and how
to work towards it? And who decided that it shouldn't be? I recognise quite a level of
cynicism within the OU, and relate this to a quote I once read which said 'a cynic is
nothing more than a disillusioned idealist.' I agree, and think there are too many
disillusioned idealist that deserve to have their true voices heard.
As such, my core question is: what prevents people in a professional context from
relating more to each other as people, with unique hopes, dreams, and desires, rather than
as pre-defined partial roles? As I want to focus my research within the context of
organisational change, this question becomes: why do those with the formal responsibility
for change not engage with those involved in and affected by change as human beings,
rather than as support staff, managers, academics, resistors, difficult people, or similar
distinctions which reinforce the idea that people at work are only partial people, not to be
recognised in full? And how can I engage with people in such roles to allow these partial
ways of relating to extend beyond their present boundaries?
After reading some work of Maslow and Rogers from the humanistic psychology
school of thought, I felt that there is a real legitimacy in asking this question. Both Maslow
and Rogers saw the positive in human nature, and their views stood in stark contrast to
prevailing ways of looking at human nature. Their views led them to interact with their
clients in ways which recognised them as full human beings rather than as partial ones,
and both observed the strong human tendency for growth and fulfillment that arose from
being accepted in full, a tendency that Maslow and Rogers agree is so often frustrated in
present-day society. They observed that this therapeutic relationship allowed their clients
to grow, become more true to themselves, more realistic, happier, more effective, more
social, less judgemental, in their words, more human. But this observation to me seems to

remain within the context of therapy, and I have not seen it recognised in either the
organisational change or the systems literature. Especially within the organisational
change literature, the only influence from the humanistic school of thought seems to lie in
the recognised need to treat employees decently and to involve them, yet this recognition
seems to be functional in nature, and respecting and involving employees as such serves
as a means to an end (gaining 'buy-in' or something similar) rather than an end in itself.
However, I believe that these views are highly relevant to these literatures,
especially for those people who want to practice in an ethical way. What is more ethical
than allowing human beings to be full human beings, to grow and lead fulfilling lives?
And why do neither the organisational change nor the systems literature seem to ask
themselves how their work relates to this purpose? This question, I believe, cannot be
answered from the perspective of systemic thinking and systemic practice alone, but
involves the notion of systemic being. I believe that by its mere emphasis on thinking and
practice, the systemic literature lacks an important aspect preventing it from being truly
systemic. I think if we claim to be systemic thinkers or practitioners, we are not coherent
unless we recognise the need to also relate systemically, in the sense that the relationships
in which we engage recognise the full legitimacy of others as full human beings rather
than just as clients, owners, victims, actors, and so on.
I now realise that in writing my probation report I have fallen in the same trap
which I hope to change in others, namely seeing myself only as a Ph.D. student rather than
as a full human being. As a result, I have written from the perspective of a Ph.D. student,
thereby limiting my argument to those aspects I believe to be legitimate within the context
of a Ph.D. proposal. I believe this has impoverished my argument and concealed the voice
behind the thoughts.
I hope that these reflections will allow the reader to interpret the argument
presented in this proposal more in line with the broader context from which it flows. As
such, where the propositions which I make seem reified or dogmatic and treated as 'truth',

what I mean is that these propositions form a way of seeing which I have come to believe
is useful in the context of my research topic. Unfortunately, I do not have the time to
rewrite the complete report before the submission deadline, but hope that despite its
shortcomings the dedication which went into its formulation can nevertheless be
recognised. I have made some alterations throughout the report to integrate some of these
reflections within the main body of text. As such, there is some incoherence in the sense
that some parts use a different 'voice' than others.
Based on these reflections, I have also made some alterations to my research
question, although I aim to use the next month to further refine it based on my own
reflections, conversations with my supervisors, and feedback from the assessors.
Regarding the use of language, I aim to further improve the coherence of the language
used with the principles which I see as underpinning my research question and approach.
Furthermore, I wished I would have had more time to include a number of
literatures which I have read, partly read or am still engaged in reading. Specifically I still
aim to include insights from the work of Carl Rogers, Martin Buber, Jürgen Habermas,
and Mikhail Bakhtin in relation to dialogue; additional work by Lackoff and Johnson in
relation to metaphors; insights from Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, and Ronald Laing in
relation to being and relating; insights from Abraham Maslow, Antonio Damasio, and
Candace Pert in relation to the link between cognition and emotion; and Etienne Wenger
as well as others in terms of knowledge and social learning. As I am still in the process of
engaging with many of these authors, I have not yet found the opportunity to include
them in my probation report. However, I see their work as a great source for enriching my
understanding of my research and intend to further immerse myself in their work and
other work which will prove relevant in the process of my Ph.D. both in terms of
engagement and sense-making. It seems to me to be both a blessing and a curse that there
is so much relevant literature, and I hope I will not drown in it as I have sometimes felt in
the last year.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction...........................................................................................................11
1.1. Personal background to my research interest...........................................................11
1.2. Development of my research question......................................................................13
1.3. Research question.....................................................................................................19
2. Literature review....................................................................................................20
2.1. Philosophical position..............................................................................................21
2.2. Popper's philosophy of science.................................................................................24
2.3. Criticisms against Popper's philosophy of science...................................................25
2.3.1. Habermas' three interconnected ontological domains...................................................26
2.3.2. Kelly's Personal Construct Theory...............................................................................28
2.3.3. Maturana and Varela's biological epistemology............................................................29
2.4. Integration and implications for my research..........................................................32
2.5. A brief history of Systems........................................................................................35
2.5.1. Systems approaches emphasising the technical interest................................................37
2.5.2. Systems approaches emphasising the social interest.....................................................38
2.5.3. Systems approaches emphasising the critical interest...................................................41
2.6. Systems and the nature of purpose..........................................................................42
2.6.1. Purpose inherent to systems approaches emphasising the technical interest................42
2.6.2. Purpose inherent to systems approaches emphasising the social interest.....................43
2.6.3. Purpose inherent to systems approaches emphasising the critical interest...................45
2.7. Purpose and humanistic psychology........................................................................46
2.7.1. From experimental and behavioural to humanistic psychology....................................47
2.7.2. Self-actualisation...........................................................................................................52
2.7.3. Integration and implications for my research................................................................54
2.8. Perspectives on the nature of thought......................................................................55
2.8.1. Thought as a system......................................................................................................56
2.8.2. Thought and fragmentation...........................................................................................59
2.8.2.1. Abstraction.............................................................................................................60
2.8.2.2. Idolatry...................................................................................................................60
2.8.2.3. Certainty................................................................................................................62
2.8.2.4. Violence..................................................................................................................62
2.8.3. Thought and metaphor .................................................................................................63
2.9. Dialogue...................................................................................................................69
2.9.1. Listening and the principle of participation..................................................................71
2.9.2. Respecting and the principle of coherence.....................................................................71

2.9.3. Suspending and the principle of awareness...................................................................72
2.9.4. Voicing and the principle of unfolding..........................................................................73
2.9.5. The evolution of dialogue...............................................................................................73
2.9.6. Field I – Instability of the field.......................................................................................76
2.9.7. Field II – Instability in the field.....................................................................................76
2.9.8. Field III – Inquiry in the field........................................................................................77
2.9.9. Field IV – Creativity in the field....................................................................................78
3. Research Problem...................................................................................................78
4. Methods and activities...........................................................................................82
4.1. The nature of Action Research.................................................................................83
4.1.1. Different approaches to Action Research.......................................................................84
4.1.2. Validity in Action Research...........................................................................................88
4.2. Research process and methods..................................................................................94
4.2.1. Rich Pictures.................................................................................................................97
4.2.2. Cognitive mapping........................................................................................................98
4.2.3. Dialogue sessions...........................................................................................................98
4.2.4. Semi-structured interviews...........................................................................................99
4.3. Data and analysis..................................................................................................100
4.4. Participants...........................................................................................................100
4.5. Ethical considerations............................................................................................102
5. Timetable for completion......................................................................................104
6. Skills Audit..........................................................................................................106
7. References.............................................................................................................107

List of Figures
Figure 1: Elements relevant to any piece of research (adopted from Checkland
& Holwell, 1998)
24
Figure 2: Habermas' three ontological worlds 27
Figure 3: Autopoietic Systems 31
Figure 4 The structure of an appreciative system (adopted from Checkland
and Casar, 1986)
44
Figure 5 The dynamics of an appreciative system (adopted from Checkland
and Casar, 1986)
44
Figure 6 Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 50
Figure 7 Argyris' ladder of inference (adapted from Senge, 1994) 58
Figure 8 My attempt to integrate the views on thought of Bohm, Isaacs,
Morgan, and Lackoff & Johnson
67
Figure 9 The movement of conversation through the four fields (adopted from
Scharmer, 1998 in Senge, 1994)
74
Figure 10 The evolution of dialogue (adapted from Senge, 1994) 75
Figure 13 Proposed research process 95
Figure 11 Dimensions of a participatory worldview (adopted from Reason &
Bradbury, 2001a)
88
Figure 12 The process of Action Research (adopted from Checkland and
Holwell, 1998)
89

Acknowledgements
Luckily, the development of my research question has not been entirely a solitary process,
and I feel indebted to a number of people for their support, ideas, contributions, feedback, and
conversations which have helped me develop my ideas and maintain my sanity.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors for their great support and for taking the
time to meet me every two weeks. I would like to thank Rose for always being there with a
willingness to listen and think together, for drawing out my thoughts and helping me to make
them clear, for her hospitality in organising supervision dinners at her house and for her great
cooking skills.
I would like to thank Sue for asking the simple but important questions (such as 'why
should I or anyone else be interested in what you have to say?') which stimulate my thought
beyond its normal boundaries and help me in articulating what I actually mean and for the sparkle
in her eyes when we talk about research ideas in the context of bringing about positive change in
the world.
I would like to thank Martin for engaging me in stimulating discussions and providing me
with prompt and immensely useful comments, allowing me to bring more focus in my research
question, for dragging me back to the ground when too much reading has made my head float off
into alternative dimensions.
I would like to thank Steph for providing me with unconditional positive support and for
listening with interest to my attempts to formulate my embryonic ideas, for relating them to her
own experience, and for being an endless source of connections, both in terms of ideas and people.
I would like to thank Bill for bringing to my attention the original work of Abraham
Maslow, which has significantly shifted my original ideas and placed them within a wider context.
I would also like to thank the people who attended my presentations at the OU and
providing me with helpful feedback, as well as showed an interest in what I sometimes
feel to be remote and random ideas.
Finally, I would like to thank Patrick for together sharing ideas as well as frustrations, for
providing me with feedback on my first draft, and for now and then allowing me to distance
myself from the pressures inherent to Ph.D. study over the enjoyment of a pint of lager.

1.Introduction
1. Introduction
“Divide each difficulty into as many parts as is feasible and necessary to resolve it.”
René Descartes, Le Discours de la Méthode (1637)
“Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such authority over us that we
forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens”
Albert Einstein, Physikalische Zeitschrift (1916)
1.1. Personal background to my research interest
This research proposal arises from a deep sense of confusion and dissatisfaction
around the notion of organisational change. My father recently retired from being a
mental health professional working with drug abusers and gambling addicts most of his
life. He spend his last couple of working decades becoming increasingly frustrated as
organisational change initiatives took away most of his capacity for helping his clients.
Increasingly, everything had to be based on fixed procedures, everything had to be
measured, everything had to be evidence-based, and everything had to be documented.
The clients lost the centre stage somewhere along that road, delved under a continuous
stream of organisational restructures. My mum managed to stay optimistic while she
observed the same sort of thing happening in education. At least she had a couple of hours
a week in which she felt that she made a difference to her students. The rest of her time
she spent battling bureaucracy, managing ever growing classes and increasingly alienated
students. Her school merged and reorganised several times. None of these brought any
improvements. Then I have two very good friends who are teachers. They are enthusiastic
and passionate about making a difference to students. One of them recently left education
due to frustration with the educational system. The other is hanging on, enjoying the small
difference he can now and then make to his students' lives. Then there is my partner. She
works in Higher Education, and quite keen to make a difference to the life of students.

1.Introduction
Despite her relatively senior position, she is constantly faced by having to implement
changes that seem to have no purpose outside of being another attempt to clean up the
mess caused by previous changes. These changes are usually short lived, as other changes
are on the way. Why does organisational change seems to be a source of so much misery?
It is during my B.Sc. and M.Sc. in organisational psychology that I encountered a
whole different perspective on organisational change. Much literature seemed to indicate
that planned change was something good and positive, something organisations had to
engage in in order to survive. This perspective seemed to stand in stark contrast to the
understanding I had based on the frustrations of those affected by change initiatives. One
aspect that the experiences of those around me affected by change and the change
literature seemed to agree on was that most organisational change initiatives seemed to
fail for one reason or another (e.g., Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990; Kotter, 1995; Dent &
Goldberg, 1999). Much of this literature around the failure of organisational change
referred to the concept of 'resistance to change' as one of the main determinants of change
failure (e.g., Waddell & Sohal, 1998; Maurer, 1996). Indeed, the concept of resistance to
change seemed so entrenched in the change literature that most if not all management
textbooks elaborate on resistance to change and the strategies for overcoming it (Dent &
Goldberg, 1999). I therefore became interested in the notion of resistance to change.
Much of the literature on resistance to change perpetuated idea that failure of
change projects can be attributed to employee resistance (e.g., Maurer, 1996; Spiker &
Lesser, 1995; Reger, Mullane, Gustafson, & DeMarie, 1994; Martin, 1975; O’Conner, 1993), a
view that was echoed by Waldersee and Griffiths (1997), who found that employee
resistance to change was the problem most frequently cited by managers engaged in the
implementation of change. The view that seemed to emerge from much of this literature
was that resistance to change essentially equals dysfunctional employee attitudes which
needed to be overcome by change agents if change is to be successful (Pilderit, 2000).
However, what this mindset seemed to result in was the belief that change agents should

1.Introduction
engage in overpowering, forcing, or manipulating employees to 'buy into' or 'go along
with' a change initiative.
There was a small amount of literature which seemed to argue that people do not
resist change per se, but do resist the uncertainties and possible negative outcomes of
change such as loss of status, pay, or comfort (e.g., Waddell & Sohal, 1998). This view
seemed more in line with my own understanding of change from the perspective of those
affected. Still other literature argued that the frequent failure of change initiatives was not
the result of resistance but could instead be attributed to a fundamentally flawed
understanding of the process of change (e.g., Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Kotter,
Schlesinger, & Sathe, 1986), and that the notion of resistance to change could essentially be
seen as a powerful self-serving attributional bias in management sense-making (Miller &
Ross, 1975), allowing them externalise the reasons for change failure.
1.2. Development of my research question
As such, I started my Ph.D. with a keen interest in the nature of organisational
change and why it so often seems to bring so much misery to those affected. My initial
idea evolved around the idea of working with (rather than against) resistance to change,
by making use of it as a useful source of information, based on the view that employees
resist change for well-founded and legitimate reasons. I argued that by surfacing the
mental models which employees use to make sense of change, concerns can emerge which
can then serve as an input to better-informed changes and more employee involvement.
However, in the process of my literature study, my initial ideas have significantly changed.
Below I will provide a brief description of the some of the insights that led me to change
my understanding of my research question.
I started out with the idea systems approaches could be used to inform more
constructive approaches to organisational change as they did not take the reductionist
approach that seemed to be inherent to many mainstream approaches to organisational

1.Introduction
change. However, I also became increasingly aware that systems approaches depend on
systems practitioners in order to facilitate systemic change. As such, I wasn't sure to what
extent systems practitioners were capable of transferring systemic thinking to those
involved in change initiatives, which would allow stakeholders not to depend on systems
practitioners to solve their problems. There is evidence that certain systems approaches
reach relatively large audiences. However, Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology, as one
of the most widely adopted methodologies of soft OR (Pala, Vennix, & van Mullekom,
2003), has been found to be largely misinterpreted and uncritically adopted as a simplistic
problem solving model used within the same functionalist and positivist world-view that
its development managed to transcended (Checkland, 2000; Holwell, 2000). Peter Senge's
The Fifth Discipline (Senge, 1990; Senge, Kleiner, & Roberts, 1994) is another work that has
achieved enormous popularity, but has been criticised from within the systems community
due to its lack of appreciating systems approaches besides Systems Dynamics, for lacking
theoretical rigour, and for being based on conflicting philosophical positions (Flood, 1999;
Jackson, 1995, 2000a). It thus seemed that although systems approaches could be very
effective in bringing about change, they do not seem to result in wide spread
improvements in the capacity for change independent of skilled systems practitioners.
It was Capra (1983) who made me realise that perhaps an important factor in the
lack of transfer of systemic thinking was related to notions of human perception. Capra
argued that many of the social problems we face are but surface symptoms of a much
deeper, single problem: a crisis of human perception and communication. The
fragmentary way of seeing the world, rooted in 18th
to 20th
century science and exemplified
in the thinking of Descartes and Newton, seems to be still deeply embedded in human
sense-making in Western society, even though modern science has pointed out the
inherent shortcomings and limited applicability of this world-view (Capra, 1983). Despite
attempts of different voices reminding us that our present ways of thinking will not aid in
the overcoming of our messes (e.g., Wheatly, 2000), established world-views seem so

1.Introduction
strongly embedded that large scale transformation appears to remain a distant vision.
Capra (1983) as well as Bohm (1980) argue that advancements made in fields like systems
science, relativity theory, and quantum physics have transcended traditional reductionist
and functionalist ways of thinking, yet the larger implications they pose on the need to
fundamentally change the prevailing world-view seem to remain largely under
appreciated. I therefore started to read into different literatures relating to sense-making
and thought.
In reading literature around metaphors as ways of understanding organisations
(e.g., Morgan, 1986), I realised that metaphor can be seen as a powerful way in which
change agents and employees (unconsciously) make sense of organisations and
organisational change. It seemed that much of the literature on organisational change and
resistance to change that I had read took for granted the notions of organisations as
machines and organisations as political systems. The machine metaphor informed the idea
as change as a temporal and spatially bound event of (structural) change to certain parts of
an organisation. The political system metaphor seemed to inform much of the notion of
strategies for overcoming change through force, manipulation, 'buy-in,' or token-
participation. Additional reading on metaphor (Lackoff & Johnson, 1980) led me to believe
that metaphor is actually much more than a way of understanding organisations, as
proposed by Morgan, but instead could be seen as forming the basis of almost all of
human understanding as metaphorical in some way.
This understanding was further enriched as I engaged with the literature on Soft
Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981, 1985, 2000; Holwell, 2000) and literature around
second-order cybernetics (Maturana, 1988; Maturana & Varela, 1992). I realised that when I
started my Ph.D., I still adopted the notion of organisations as ontological systems which
could be analysed and changed. However, a deeper appreciation of 'soft' thinking as an
epistemological shift towards understanding complexity using systems concepts (i.e.,
systems metaphors), rather than as a way of thinking about the 'soft' aspects of

1.Introduction
organisational systems made me realise that much thinking about organisational change
rests on the idea that there is an organisation 'out there' which is in relative equilibrium
and which can be changed using the appropriate strategies. Vickers' notion of relationship
maintenance (Checkland, 1981, 2000) helped me to start thinking more of organisations as
patterns of relationships which are constantly changing rather than as stable entities, while
Vickers notion of 'appreciation' together with Maturana's notion of making 'distinctions'
made me reflect on the way people in organisations frame their experiences in terms of
certain perceptual categories, and that perhaps the way forward to more sustainable
organisational change could lie in changing the distinctions that change agents and those
affected hold. Also, Vickers' notion of relationship maintenance changed my
understanding of organisational change, not as the implementation of change objectives,
but as changes in the relationships between organisational actors. Also, the appreciation of
learning as the source of change as inherent to SSM made me aware that an attempt at
organisational change could be much more successful if it was based on a social learning
process rather than a planned process of implementation.
The notion of learning then led me to the literature on organisational, social, and
team learning (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991; Senge, 1990, 1994; Kasl, Marsick, &
Dechant,1997; Sfard, 1998; Paavola, Lipponen, & Hakkarainen, 2004). This literature made
me realise that the notion of metaphor was also deeply embedded in the learning
literature, and that learning theories (explicitly or implicitly) adopt metaphors ranging
from acquisition to participation (Sfard, 1998). My reading of Kuhn (1991) aided me in
appreciating the different schools of thought within the learning literature as essentially
based on different paradigms, while previous reading of Lackoff & Johnson (1980) helped
me to appreciate these different paradigms as insightful ways of looking at learning,
without forcing me into accepting one certain paradigm as 'true' and others as 'false'. Two
particular themes within the learning literature captured my interest: the notion of power
and how power relates to learning (e.g., Brooks, 1994), and the concept of 'dialogue' as a

1.Introduction
conversational practice aimed at deep – or second order – learning (e.g., Schein, 2003;
Isaacs, 1999a).
My subsequent exploration of the literature on dialogue (e.g., Bohm, 1980, 1994,
1996; Isaacs, 1999b), which contrasts the collaborative exploration of deeper meanings
against other forms of communication such as discussion (shaking apart, rational analysis)
and debate (beating down, the exploration and annihilation of weak points in mutual
argumentation) proved a source of additional insight regarding the nature of learning and
change. Dialogue seemed to link in well with the systemic idea due to its focus
overcoming the sources of fragmentation in thought which often lead to incoherent
thinking and action. It also seemed to link in well with notions of appreciation and the
making of distinctions, as dialogue explores the sources of the way we appreciate our
situation and the distinctions we make within it. In doing so, dialogue seeks to dissolve
problems by exploring them 'upstream' at the level of thought, values, and assumptions,
rather than 'downstream' at the level of attitudes, opinions, and interests. Dialogue also
seemed to link in well with SSM as it seeks to bring about epistemological awareness in
participants which allows them to explore the nature and validity of their knowledge in a
collaborative atmosphere. As such, dialogue appeared to me to be a very useful tool in
facilitating more collaborative approaches to organisational change. Another aspect of
dialogue which seemed of importance was its focus on transcending the fixed role-based
relationships between people and instead facilitate inter-human relationships in which the
full person is seen as the source of knowledge and insight.
The nature of inter-human relationships led me to explore humanistic psychology
through the work of Abraham Maslow (1971, 1987) and Carl Rogers (1961). Both Maslow
and Rogers place great emphasis on personal growth (or self-actualisation) and argue for
the essential role of high quality inter-human relationships as an essential means for
becoming a full human person. As I related this to the literature on organisational change
as well as the systems literature, I realised how the whole question of human purpose

1.Introduction
seemed to be largely absent within both literatures. Both the organisational change and the
systems literature, though adopting different notions of purpose, still seemed mainly
underpinned by a functionalist worldview in which the achievement of (intersubjectively
agreed) purposes is the prime raison d'être (Churchman, 1979, being a notable exception
to this). This was quite insightful, as I realised that part of the reason I got interested in
organisational change was because of my anger towards organisational change attempts as
often seeming to frustrate attempts of people who wish to make a positive difference. The
whole question of creating positive inter-personal relationships and fostering human
growth seemed not very relevant to many organisational change and systems thinking
scholars, which might well explain part of the misery which I perceived to be an inherent
result of so many change initiatives.
The literature on critical systems thinking (i.e., Midgley, 2000; Ulrich, 1987) and
Churchman's (1979)'s work on systems philosophy provided me with additional insights
by the emphasis they placed on the notion of boundary as central to the idea of systemic
thinking. The notion of boundary judgements allowed me to make sense of other systems
approaches as well as the literature on organisational change in terms of the boundaries
they used in relation to what is relevant and what is not. As such, personal growth and
high-quality inter-human relationships in my understanding clearly lie outside the
boundaries of concern adopted by many systems approaches and thinkers on
organisational change. Also, the literature on resistance to change seemed to uncritically
adopt a boundary judgement of organisational interests as the prime motivator for change
and employees as the main source of resistance.
Another insight emerged as I was trying to make sense of the notion of roles as
adopted in a number of systems approaches, such as Soft Systems Methodology (SSM)
and Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH). Within SSM, the roles which are explicitly defined
as part of the CATWOE mnemonic are client, actor, and owner. CSH includes a wider
range of roles such as client, decision makers, planner, expert, guarantor, and witness. I

1.Introduction
found it useful to actually see these roles or categories as metaphors which seemed to
define different ways of social participation. Essentially, owners, clients, actors, and other
roles all involve different ways of making sense of social participation. As such, an owner
does not 'own' a perceived problem in the same sense that someone owns a car, but the
category structures our understanding of the sort of participation that this actor engages in
in the context of the specific situation. Also, all these categories involve different amounts
and types of power, and often the planner or owner defines the other roles, while the
clients or actors often have their roles assigned for them. In the context of organisational
change, this assignment of social roles seemed to me to actually be a reason for concern, as
the differences in power inherent to the different roles can easily inhibit the learning
necessary for successful organisational change. I therefore started to think that perhaps a
useful way to engage in organisational change is by transcending traditional role
definitions and the the distinctions that they imply, instead adopting roles such as
'learner' or 'participant'. By metaphorically structuring social roles in the context of
organisational change as such, it is also more likely that engaging in organisational change
facilitates higher quality human relationships, as people are not pushed into a role of
client, actor, or witness.
1.3. Research question
Based on the brief account regarding the development of my research question, I
would like to formulate my research question as follows:
How can I engage with change agents in such a way as to bring about
transformations in the thinking, relating, and being of those involved and affected by
organisational change, thereby contributing to more positive experiences of those affected
and involved in terms of quality of interpersonal relationships, positive personal growth,
and quality of outcomes.
I will further elaborate on this question in terms of its underpinning distinctions,

1.Introduction
hypotheses, assumptions, and transformations in Section 3 (Research Problem), but
provide it here as a device for aiding the understanding of the literature review below. In
Section 3, I will draw out the various links between the Literature review section and the
research question, as well as specify which contributions I hope to make to research and
practice.
2. Literature review
The literature review will start with an exploration of my philosophical position I
will first argue for the importance of appreciating philosophical issues as a means to
legitimise and explore issues of methodology, method, and practice. I will then take
Popper's philosophy of science as a starting point, and subsequently draw on a number of
alternative paradigms which have criticised various aspects of Popper's framework. From
the juxtapositions of the various paradigms, I will aim to draw out a number of
conclusions relevant to my research proposal.
After the exploration of my philosophical position, I will provide a brief history of
different systems approaches and relate them to one another and wider discussions
around the nature of systems thinking. This overview will then serve as the background
from which I will explore the various notions of purpose as inherent to these approaches.
Based on this exploration, I will establish an argument for the need to place systems
approaches in a wider context of human purpose, and link this purpose to humanistic
psychology as based on Maslow's and Rogers' work, thereby arguing that there is a need
for Systems as a discipline to concern itself with the transformation of human thinking
rather than as a mere vehicle for seeking improvements in the external world.
Subsequently, I will draw on a number of authors – including Bohm, Lackoff and
Johnson, Isaacs, and Maslow - to explore some perspectives on the nature of human
thought in order to explore the various ways in which thought can be seen as contributing
to the emergence of social problems. I will then go on to explore a number of aspects of

2.Literature review
thought which have been argued to contribute to its fragmentation. This will then serve as
the starting point from which I will discuss dialogue as a potential method for diminishing
this fragmentation and explore more systemic ways of thinking, being, and relating.
2.1. Philosophical position
There are various views regarding the role of philosophy in scientific practice. Some
authors (e.g., Feyerabend, 1978) argue for a utilitarian perspective, stating that anarchism
'while perhaps not the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent medicine
for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science' (ibid, p. 17, original italics). The
methodical and practical constraints imposed by philosophies of science, Feyerabend
argues, unnecessarily restrict us from dealing with real-life complexity which 'demands
complex procedures and defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in
advance' (ibid, p.18). As such, Feyerabend advocates scientific practice devoid from
philosophy as the most effective strategy for the advancement of science. However, this
position of course presupposes the possibility of separating philosophical concerns from
practice. As Checkland, drawing on Keynes, perceptively suggests 'people who described
themselves as practical men, proud to be uncontaminated by any kind of theory, always
turned out to be the intellectual prisoners of the theoreticians of yesteryear.' (Checkland,
1985, p. 758). Checkland points out that any activity is always theory-laden, and is
therefore grounded in philosophical assumptions, regardless of whether or not the
practitioner is aware of these.
Midgley (2000) argues that there are other good reasons for appreciating
philosophy, one of which involves the fact that philosophical assumptions often provide
justification for what counts as valid and legitimate practice. Arguing against anti-
philosophical positions such as posed by Feyerabend, Midgley states that there are both
strategic and practical reasons for considering philosophy. On a strategic level, the
existence of dominant scientific paradigms which are justified with reference to
philosophy, leaves those advocating practices which run counter to orthodox convictions

2.Literature review
vulnerable to defeat unless they can engage in rational argument at the level of
philosophy. However, Midgley also realises that the use of philosophy as a vehicle for
defending our positions is and should not be the most important reason for considering
philosophy.
The second reason why Midgley advocates the exploration of philosophy is that
philosophical arguments are meaningful in relation to discussions around methodology,
method, and practice. Philosophical arguments, he reasons, allows us to see practice from
quite a different perspective, thereby potentially highlighting implications that would
remain concealed without drawing on philosophy. He draws on Spash (1997) to illustrate
this point. Spash argues that in situations of competing objectives, decisions are often
based on a utilitarian philosophy, whereby the right course of action is decided by
determining the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. However,
environmental activist groups often adopt a deontological philosophy in which actions
themselves, rather than their consequences, form the basis on which ethical judgements
are formed. As such, from a deontological perspective, environmental integrity can be seen
as having an absolute value in itself which ought not to be compromised, contrasting with
the utilitarian perspective which could justify environmental damage if this brings the
greatest benefit to the greatest number of people. Without an awareness of the
philosophical pillars underpinning these perspectives, communication between
stakeholders could easily break down resulting in dominant forms of rationality
prevailing over alternative voices.
Another reason why considering philosophy is important can be derived from the
work of Thomas Kuhn (1983, 1996). Kuhn argues that scientific practice cannot be
conceived of without a set of pre-conceived beliefs regarding what the world is like. Any
scientific community thus adopts a set of basic assumptions around the nature of reality,
and firmly bases their practice on these assumptions. Such a set of assumptions regarding
the nature of reality is what Kuhn terms a paradigm. A paradigm defines the areas which

2.Literature review
are relevant for inquiry, the type of questions which can legitimately be asked, and the
methods which are appropriate for seeking the answers to these questions. As such, a
paradigm defines a set of conceptual distinctions which structure the constitution of 'facts'.
Such facts are therefore not objective, but depend for their meaning on the hermeneutics of
discourse within a scientific community. Without an awareness of the philosophical
underpinnings of an adopted paradigm, debates around the appropriateness of certain
research questions and the types of methods which can be used to obtain 'facts' to answer
these becomes difficult.
Having established some important arguments for appreciating philosophy as a
source of legitimacy and meaningful debate regarding methodology, method, and
practice, we can ask what the relationship between philosophy, methodology, method, and
practice should be. Midgley points out that some authors (e.g., Fuenmayor, 1991) take the
view that philosophy should be the fundament on which respectively methodology,
method, and practice rest. This hierarchical view implies that each successive layer in the
pyramid (first philosophy, then methodology, then method, then practice) depends for its
appropriate formulation on the adequate definition of its preceding layer. This means that
getting the philosophy right is a fundamental prerequisite for adequate scientific practice.
As such, from this perspective, the encounter of a problem in practice would not be seen as
a potential signal for the need to revise one's philosophical position. Midgley takes a
different stance, viewing philosophy, methodology, and practice as mutually supportive
areas of study, where encountered problems in one area could potentially lead to a
reformulation of either or both of the other two. A similar argument is posed by
Checkland and Holwell (Checkland, 1985; Checkland & Holwell, 1998; Checkland, 2000),
who argue that any piece of research can essentially be conceptualised in terms of three
mutually dependent elements: a framework of ideas (F), a way of applying these ideas in
terms of a methodology (M), and an area of application (A) (see Figure 1).

2.Literature review
As can be seen in Figure 1, Checkland and Holwell argue that the application of
methodology M does not only yield learning about the area of concern A, but also
generates insights regarding the adequacy of both F and M. The very development of SSM
exemplifies this process. The learning derived from the Action Research project attempting
to apply Systems Engineering to real-world management situations eventually led to a
reformulation of the philosophical principles embodied in Systems Engineering, leading to
Soft Systems Methodology as a framework of ideas underpinned by radically changed
philosophical assumptions.
2.2. Popper's philosophy of science
Without doubt, the most influential philosophical framework of science of the 20th
century has been put forward by Karl Popper (Popper, 1959, 1972 in Midgley, 2000).
According to this framework, any theory which can be considered as scientific needs to
adhere to the principle of falsification. Thus, any scientific theory must be able to translate
itself in a set of testable hypotheses which can be confirmed or disconfirmed through
natural observation. A theory in this sense remains valid only as long as it manages to
Figure 1: Elements relevant to any piece of research (adopted from Checkland
& Holwell, 1998)

2.Literature review
withstand falsification through empirical observation, resulting in the principle of critical
fallibilism – the notion that a theory can never be considered true due to the fact that there
is always the possibility that new observations result in its falsification. As such,
knowledge generated through science needs to always remain open to questioning.
The fact that Popper's framework has been incredibly successful in the natural
sciences has resulted in the fact that it's philosophical underpinnings have remained
largely unquestioned for a prolonged period of time. However, increasing dissatisfaction
with some of the problems and limitations that critical fallibilism imposes on the nature of
research and the appreciation of knowledge has resulted in the emergence of alternative
scientific paradigms. Before appreciating the criticisms that have been raised against
critical fallibilism, it is however first necessarily to clarify its ontological and
epistemological underpinnings, as well as its assumptions about the nature of scientific
knowledge.
Ontologically, Popper's framework assumes the existence of a reality which exists
independent of observation. Epistemologically it assumes that knowledge is in essence a
fallible representation of this reality, and that observation of this reality is always the final
arbiter in the validation of knowledge. The nature of scientific investigation therefore lies
in the pursuit of knowledge which accurately corresponds with the nature of reality,
keeping in mind that exact correspondence is ultimately an ideal which can never be
achieved.
The assumption that Popper made is that scientific knowledge is – and should be -
essentially value-free. Popper argued that a strict divorce of scientific pursuit of truth from
any moral and subjective concerns is essential for an open society in which the pursuit of
truth remains unaffected by political concerns (Midgley, 2000).
2.3. Criticisms against Popper's philosophy of science
The following section will outline a number of criticisms regarding Popper's

2.Literature review
philosophy of science, derived from a variety of schools of thought. I will then discuss
how these relate to one another and how this informs my research.
2.3.1. Habermas' three interconnected ontological domains
One important criticism against Popper's philosophy of science concerns
predominantly Popper's assumption that the physical world is the only ontological
domain and the assumption that flows from it that scientific knowledge can be separated
from moral and subjective concerns. This criticism has been most strongly put forward in
the work of Jürgen Habermas (1970, 1974 in Jackson, 2000a). Habermas assumes that
human beings have two fundamental cognitive interests relating to their pursuit of
knowledge: a technical and a practical The technical interest predominantly concerns the
acquisition of knowledge relating to human activity in the material world. Mastery of the
physical environment, according to Habermas, is one of the essential requirements of
human beings in their strive for survival. The practical interest relates to human
interaction and the need to achieve intersubjective understanding among the members of a
social system. As a social species, the need for human beings to coordinate their activities
and accommodate between conflicting interests is just as essential for survival as
prediction and control of the external environment. However, in understanding social
arrangements, Habermas recognises the importance of power in determining the nature of
human affairs, where power often inhibits the open communication essential for effective
human interaction. As such, Habermas introduces a third - emancipatory – interest
essential for enabling human beings to liberate themselves from the constraints imposed
by power relations which inhibit the achievement of a democratic society. Knowledge
within the emancipatory domain aims to highlight the limitations of knowledge in the
natural and social domains and limit its inappropriate application (Jackson, 2000a).
Based on his distinction between these three interests, Habermas proposes the
existence of three ontological domains - or worlds: the external natural world or technical
domain, the social world or intersubjective domain, and the internal world or subjective

2.Literature review
domain (see Figure 2). He argues that human language is structured in such a way that we
can distinguish between each of these worlds, a premise on which he bases his theory of
communicative action (Habermas, 1984a,b in Midgley, 2000). Broadly speaking, his
argument flowing from this theory is that any claim intended for communication makes
implicit reference to each of these three worlds. As such, according to Habermas, any
rational claim to validity must be open for rational argumentation regarding its content in
terms of truth (referencing to the natural world), social justification (referencing to the
social world), and sincerity (referencing to the internal world). Any claim which does not
allow for such debate must therefore be considered myth or irrational.
The fact that Habermas sees the three ontological domains as inseparable and
interlinked fuels his main criticism against the scientific philosophy as proposed by
Popper and its role in capitalist society. Habermas (1975, in Jackson, 2000a) argues that in
capitalist societies, the technical interest has been granted hegemony over the practical and
subjective interests. As a result, technical knowledge, its production means, and its
associated instrumental rationality have become the dominant legitimising forces in the
regulatory functions of society. This entails that practical questions of what ought to
Figure 2: Habermas' three ontological worlds

2.Literature review
happen are excluded from debate in the public sphere and instead framed as
administrative problems to be decided on by experts from the scientific field. Present
concerns around for instance genetically manipulated crops and nuclear power generation
however, show that there is increased concern from the public domain that these issues
ought not to be left at the judgement of scientific experts.
Regarding the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of Popper's
philosophy of science, Habermas' argument renders explicit the inevitable consequences
of Popper's attempt to neatly separate the scientific production of knowledge from social
and moral concerns. It highlights that such a separation is an artificial one, the ignorance
of which leads to inevitable problems regarding our understanding of scientific
knowledge as value-neutral. Thus, accepting Habermas' argument forces us to recognise
the social and moral implications of scientific claims.
2.3.2. Kelly's Personal Construct Theory
Another criticism, which applies equally to Popper's scientific philosophy and
Habermas' theory of communicative action, can be found in Kelly's (1955, 1970 in Midgley,
2000) Personal Construct Theory. Both Popper and Habermas presuppose the existence of
an objective reality which can be represented - albeit imperfectly – by human knowledge.
Kelly argues against the possibility that knowledge can represent an external reality, on
the basis that knowledge is all we have access to. According to Kelly, all we have access to
is our own subjective knowledge, making the subjective domain of existence the only
ontological reality about which we can make valid claims. This position therefore renders
invalid the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'world', suggesting the logical conclusion
that there are as many unique worlds of knowledge as there are individuals. This radical
constructivist position, as Midgley (2000) rightfully points out, omits from valid inquiry
any notion of truth or the construction of social norms and meanings.

2.Literature review
2.3.3. Maturana and Varela's biological epistemology
A third criticism can be raised against Popper's scientific philosophy as well as
Habermas' theory of communicative action, if we accept Maturana and Varela's (1992)
radical constructivist position based on an understanding of autopoietic systems. Before
explicating the nature of these criticisms, it is however first necessary to provide a brief
account of their theoretical framework.
Maturana and Varela put forward a biological account of epistemology. They refute
notions of understanding based on an objectivist epistemology, whereby knowledge is
seen as a representation of a reality external to an observer. They acknowledge the
circularity inherent to providing an explanation of how we know what we know, due to
the fact that cognition is both the faculty of explanation and the faculty to be explained.
They solve this inherent circularity by proposing a framework based on a biological
understanding of living systems which allows us to explain the phenomenon of cognition.
Rather than defining a living system through listing a number of characteristics of
such a system (i.e., reproduction, metabolism, etc.) as is common in biology, Maturana and
Varela pose a definition of living beings as autopoietic systems. They define autopoietic
systems as systems which realise their own continuous self-production. In other words,
the products of such system are the components that constitute the network of
transformations that together realise it as a system. Producer and product thus constitute
the same entity. Thus, a human cell is seen as an autopoietic system, since its components
are organised in a way to continuously produce the same components, including its cell
membrane, which realise it as a cell.
The concept of boundary plays an important role in such systems. The boundary of
an autopoietic system contains the dynamics that constitute its organisation, while at the
same time being realised by the very dynamics that it contains. Boundary and dynamics
thus constitute interdependent and integral aspects of the unity of an autopoietic system.
In the example of the cell, the cell membrane thus provides not only the spatial enclosure

2.Literature review
which bounds the production process in a given space, it is also a product of this very
process. Although autopoietic systems can vary widely in terms of their structure, they all
share the same autopoietic organisation.
The relationship between such an autopoietic system and its environment forms the
cornerstone of Maturana and Varela’s refutation of an objectivist epistemology. They state
that an autopoietic system is incapable of constructing objective knowledge due to the fact
that such systems are characterised by operational closure. Operational closure entails the
fact that any changes within the system are the product of the previous structural state
and the internal operational dynamics of this system, rather than the direct product of
external influences. Therefore, a system characterised by operational closure is structurally
determined, meaning that its domain of possible perturbations and structural changes are
determined by its internal structure and operational dynamics at any point in time. The
relationship between autopoietic systems and their environment is one of mutual
perturbations. Such perturbations do not specify or direct structural changes in an
autopoietic system, they merely trigger them. Since the environment has no direct
influence on the structure of an autopoietic system, such systems are said to be
autonomous. Structural diversity between autopoietic systems result from their respective
ontogeny, defined as their history of structural changes resulting from external
perturbations as well as internal dynamics, while conserving the autopoietic organisation
of the system. As Mingers (2006) points out, it is important to clarify how Maturana and
Varela use the concepts of structure and organisation. Organisation, as used by Maturana
and Varela, constitutes the abstract configuration that defines a unity as a member of a
certain class. Structure refers to an actual instance of a member of a class which realises
this abstract organisation. Mingers illustrates this with the example of a square. The
organisation of a square is defined as an abstraction of its relationships: four lines of equal
length which connect at the edges at an angle of 90 degrees. An actual square embodies
this organisation, but has other characteristics such as size and colour, the total of which

2.Literature review
constitutes its structure.
Where the mutual perturbations between a system and its environment become
recurrent autopoietic systems become structurally coupled with their environment. In
other words, both the system and its environment develop a structural congruence based
on the exchange of perturbations. Such structural coupling forms the basis of mutual
adaptation between autopoietic unity and environment. As the environment contains
other autopoietic systems, such autopoietic systems can also become structurally coupled
to one another through recurrent interactions, leading to coupled ontogenies. See Figure 3
for a depiction of autopoieitic systems and structural coupling.
Structural coupling forms the basis of how Maturana and Varela define cognition as
the effective behaviour of an autopoietic system within its domain of interactions. Effective
behaviour entails those responses of a system that allow it to conserve its autopoietic
organisation and adaptation. This premise leads Maturana and Varela to pose the
aphorism ‘all doing is knowing and all knowing is doing.’
When we juxtapose Maturana and Varela's biological epistemology with Popper's
scientific philosophy, we see that – as does Kelly – they refute the notion of knowledge as
representational of an external reality. However, in contrast to Kelly, Maturana and Varela
Figure 3: Autopoietic Systems

2.Literature review
do not refute the notion of an external reality, but merely reposition its relationship with
the knowing subject. They frame knowledge as existing in the domain of interactions of an
autopoietic system, resulting from its structural coupling with its environment, thereby
refuting the the notion of truth as accepted by both Popper and Habermas. As a result,
Maturana and Varela do not make a distinction between scientific knowledge and other
types of knowledge. However, the epistemology as put forward by Maturana and Varela –
in contrast to Kelly – allows us to accept the notion of knowledge in the social domain as
does Habermas. Social knowledge for them result from the coupled ontogenies resulting
from the mutual perturbations between autopoietic systems. However, in contrast to
Habermas, for Maturana and Varela the distinction between the natural and the social
domain is an epistemological rather than an ontological one. It is, however, clear that
Maturana and Varela's epistemology does not consider the notion of power in relation to
knowledge.
2.4. Integration and implications for my research
Having reviewed a number of philosophical positions which have informed various
research traditions, one remains with the question of which position to adopt. Based on
Kuhn's (1996) argument of paradigm incommensurability, the choice of adopting a certain
paradigm seems to become essentially a relatively arbitrary matter of preference.
However, that should not negate the possibility of making a rational choice. Questions of
ontology and epistemology essentially entail questions of what entity produces
knowledge and what constitutes the nature of this knowledge (such as its relationship to
the knowledge-producing entity or the external world). The very nature of this question,
however, relies on the distinction between a knowledge-producing entity and the
knowledge it produces. As Midgley (2000) argues, this question creates a traditional
subject-object dualism which is difficult to overcome.
Midgley's answer to this problem involves the development of a process philosophy
which overcomes the subject-object dualism inherent to the question. Midgley therefore

2.Literature review
proposes a process-content distinction rather than a subject-object one. At the core of his
process philosophy lies his emphasis on the notion of boundary. The traditional approach
is to take as the analytical starting point the existence of a knowledge generating system,
and subsequently analyse what the properties of such a system must be in order to
generate knowledge. Midgley takes the opposite approach, and makes the process
analytically prime. More specifically, his starting point is the process of making a
boundary judgement which defines the content, but does not depend on a prior
identification of the content given rise to by this process. Taking this approach, he neatly
overcomes subject-object dualisms, as both subject and object become the content given
rise to by the process of making a boundary judgement. Subject and object are thus treated
in the same way.
Midgley does however recognise the fact that although this approach allows him to
overcome the ontological subject-object dualism, it creates a new analytical process-
content dualism. This results in the fact that this approach does not allow one to construct
any a priori content definitions of the knowledge generating system that gives rise to
boundary judgments, as this would result in the re-introduction of subject-object dualism.
This does, however, not mean that no questions can be asked regarding the originator of
the boundary judgement. Midgley regards questions such as 'who or what is it making the
boundary judgement?' merely as a special case. Drawing on second-order cybernetics
terminology, he makes a distinction between two different types of boundary judgements:
first-order and second-order. A first-order boundary judgement entails an 'outward'
distinction, whereas a second-order boundary judgement entails a 'backward' distinction
of the identity of a knowledge-generating system giving rise to the first-order distinction.
An important implication of this process philosophy is that it allows for theoretical
pluralism. As Midgley states, content philosophies are necessarily mono-theoretical in the
sense that they propose a single theory to account for the existence of knowledge. By
taking a process perspective, the many possible different first- and second-order boundary

2.Literature review
judgment can give rise to a variety of theories regarding the genesis of knowledge. Thus,
different theories can be seen as representing different boundary judgments in terms of
what is seen as valuable regarding the content of inquiry.
When we apply this process philosophy to the various philosophical positions
reviewed before, we see that Popper includes in his boundary judgement of valid
knowledge only those aspects of knowledge which can be tested empirically. Habermas
takes the three knowledge constitutive interests as the source of valid knowledge, and
Kelly, on the other hand, draws a boundary around knowledge generated through
individual experience. Maturana and Varela take a similar approach to Kelly but their
biological epistemology allows for the inclusion of social knowledge as a special kind of
inter-subjective knowledge arising from coupled ontogenies.
I see my own research as taking a special position in relation to the boundary
judgement of what constitutes valid knowledge. First of all there is an important question
around what constitutes valid knowledge that I see as being produced in the course of my
inquiry (this will be elaborated on further in the Methods and activities section). Second of
all, since my research is aimed at changing the way people think and relate to each other
and the world, I necessarily have to deal with notions of knowledge – or world views - as
adopted by people in their own social context. Regarding my own research, I hold the
responsibility for arguing the validity of the knowledge produced. However, I cannot
impose any views of what constitutes valid knowledge on the people involved in my
research. I therefore have to accept the notion that different people or groups will adopt
different boundaries as to what constitutes valid knowledge, and take these different
perceptions as a source of knowledge in itself.
Then there is the question around the knowledge I adopt as a source for developing
and justifying my research and the methodology and methods employed. If I would for
instance base my research on radical constructivist notions of reality, that would
essentially disqualify me from drawing on research based on for instant realist notions of

2.Literature review
reality. As I accept Midgley's notion of knowledge arising from different boundary
judgements, I also reserve myself the right to draw on a variety of literatures emerging
from different philosophical positions, albeit while remaining critical in regard to their
inherent boundary judgements.
2.5. A brief history of Systems
Below I will aim to provide a short historical account regarding the emergence of
Systems as a discipline. I recognise the fact that this historical account is but one (and
inherently partial) way of looking at the emergence of Systems, and I base it on my
understanding of how others have described the history of Systems. I see it as important
as it will provide the background from which I will discuss the notion of purpose in the
next section.
It has been argued that an important factor leading to the development of systems
thinking originated from a realisation of the shortcomings of natural sciences in dealing
with complex, real world social situations (Checkland, 1981, 1985; Jackson, 2000a; Midgley,
2000; Mingers, 2000). The theoretical underpinnings of traditional science, based on a
mechanistic world-view, has been recognised as incredibly successful in the study of
relatively simple and well-structured problems where the phenomena under study are
relatively predictable and controllable. However its reductionist philosophy did not turn
out to be equally successful in dealing with problems that lacked such characteristics. The
emergence of chaos and complexity theories could in many ways be seen as an attack of
this mechanistic world-view, emphasising the rich evidence around the inherent
unpredictability of many aspects of complex real-world phenomena (Midgley, 2000).
The subsequent development of systems theory as a general body of knowledge
that aimed to deal with the complexities of such real-world phenomena has led to a rich
variety of different systems approaches. A comprehensive overview of these different
approaches lies outside the scope of this brief historical account, and for a more in-depth
description the reader is referred to Jackson (2000a) or Midgley (2000). The account

2.Literature review
provided here is to indicate the general developments that are now recognised by some
authors to have occurred within the systems fields since its recognition as a field of
scientific and practical interest, and will therefore focus only on the developments that are
recognised as having achieved a relative strong standing within the field.
There are different ways to classify the various approaches that have emerged over
time within the field. Jackson (2000a) has classified them according to their respective
philosophical underpinnings, resulting in an overview of the approaches based on
functionalist, interpretive, emancipatory, and postmodern philosophies. The system of
systems methodologies that he formulated in the development of his Critical Systems
Thinking subsequently classifies the different approaches according to their ideal context
of application. For this, he organises the approaches along two dimensions: the
relationship between participants - distinguishing between unitary, pluralist, and coercive,
and the nature of the system – distinguishing between simple and complex. Midgley
(2000) classifies them along three waves of systems approaches, with each subsequent
wave addressing some of the issues around the previous one. The waves that Midgley
distinguishes roughly coincide with the unitary, pluralist, and coercive relational
dimension as proposed by Jackson (2000a), and can be seen as relating to the technical,
social, and critical interests as proposed by Habermas. What Midgley describes as the first
wave (coinciding with the unitary relationships between stakeholders as proposed by
Jackson) consists of systems approaches which were developed to deal with situations in
which there is relative agreement between the stakeholders regarding the definition of the
issues to be addressed. What has been termed the second wave (or pluralist relationships
between stakeholders) identifies systems approaches which aim to address contexts in
which there is a lack of agreement between stakeholders regarding the key issues, and
therefore links to the pragmatic or social interest as proposed by Habermas. What has
been termed the third wave (or coercive relationships between stakeholders) involves
systems approaches which aim to address issues of power inherent to the use of

2.Literature review
approaches from the first and second waves, and therefore link to Habermas' critical or
emancipatory interest.
My brief overview will be roughly structured along the lines as proposed by
Midgley. I do, however, recognise that the various systems approaches cannot be neatly
structured around clear-cut boundaries, as doing so would be inherently un-systemic.
However, I do believe that different approaches more or less emphasise the relative
importance of one of the three interests as defined by Habermas. For instance, Soft
Systems Methodology can be conceived as mainly aimed at the facilitation of
accommodations and shared understandings, thereby emphasising the practical interest.
Depending on its use, it can however also cater for more critical dimensions of systemic
intervention, for instance through the critical use of the Client/Victim category as part of
the CATWOE analysis.
In order to simplify the classification of the various systems approaches I adopt
Midgley's terminology of first, second, and third wave. However, I place these terms
between inverted comma's to emphasise the use of these terms as useful labels.
2.5.1. Systems approaches emphasising the technical interest
The initial response to the limitations imposed by natural science in the real-world
complex phenomena could be argued to have led to the development of a general systems
theory (GST) (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and cybernetics (Wiener, 1948). The purpose of GST
was to formulate a set of principles which apply to the behaviour of any type of complex
system, be it a biological, physical, or social one (Jackson, 2000a). Von Bertalanffy
imagined GST as providing a framework for the development of logico-mathematical
models which could be applied in a range of different disciplines, while at the same time
providing a common language for communication between disciplines (ibid).
Cybernetics was formulated by group of scientists from a variety of different
disciplines, with Norbert Wiener at their centre. Cybernetics concerned itself with the
study of problems around communication and control in complex systems and, like GST,

2.Literature review
developed itself as a true interdisciplinary science (Jackson, 2000a). Cybernetics was
further developed and popularised through the work of Ashby (1956), and refined with
insights arising from second order cybernetics and applied within the context of
organisations through the work of Stafford Beer (1972).
Another strand of systems thinking emerged through the work of Jay Forrester
(1961) in his development of Systems Dynamics. Systems Dynamics concerned itself with
quantitative modelling of feedback processes in complex systems. Systems Dynamics was
later on popularised in the context of organisational learning through the work of Peter
Senge (1990, 1994).
To a considerable extent, these systems approaches all concerned themselves with
the quantitative analysis and design of systems, and were relatively successful in dealing
with complex but well-defined problem situations. Especially the initial success of GST
and cybernetics led to the incorporation of systems ideas in a variety of fields, most
notably management science. However, the systems community witnessed increased
criticism from fields such as sociology and organisation theory in the 1970s and 1980s,
attacking the functionalist underpinnings that still characterised most theoretical work in
systems (Jackson, 2000a). The functionalist nature of most of these systems theories led to
problems in the application of systems ideas in areas of ill-defined and strategic problems.
These criticisms fuelled the development of alternative schools of thought within the field
of systems (ibid).
2.5.2. Systems approaches emphasising the social interest
Whereas the 'first wave' of systems approaches could be seen as taking the notion of
systems as literal representations of reality, and therefore concerned themselves with the
development of models which would accurately represent this reality for the purpose of
effective design and control, the 'second wave' of systems approaches concerned
themselves more with systems in relation to the facilitation of inter-subjective
understanding (Midgley, 2000). Thus, the 'second wave' systems approaches regarded

2.Literature review
human beings and their subjective interests and world-views as important aspects of the
design and intervention in systems, in contrast to the 'first wave' approaches which
regarded human beings as merely instrumental in the design of systems (ibid).
The strongest contributions within the 'second wave' of systems approaches were
made by Churchman (1979), Ackoff (1981), and Checkland (1981). Churchman (1979)
argued that the design of any social system inevitably rests on a limited set of assumptions
which cannot be justified merely by reference to their own underlying logic. Thus, the
quest for systemic comprehensiveness starts with a process of questioning the
assumptions inherent to the world-view adopted by planners through the exploration of
different subjectivities, each adopting different assumptions influencing the evaluations of
this world-view. As such, objectivity needs to be established through dialectical debate
between the system planners and the various “enemies” which might oppose the planner's
world-view. Since every perspective having a bearing on the proposal made by system
planners is coherent in relation to its own set of assumptions, Churchman argues that
there are no experts in relation to the aims and objectives relating to a proposal made by
system planners, and their ethical and moral implications therefore need to be discussed
on an equal footing between the stakeholders.
Ackoff (1999) takes a similar position as does Churchman in relation to the notion of
objectivity, arguing that the approximation of objectivity is only possible through the
involvement of a variety of stakeholders holding different value-systems. The
mathematical modelling that was adopted in most of operations research (succinctly
referred by him as “mathematical masturbation”) was, according to him, based on a myth
of purposeful behaviour as value-free. He argued that important social issues of a
generation could never be addressed with a sole emphasis on optimisation and objectivity
(Jackson, 2000a). Where Ackoff distinguishes himself most strongly from Churchman is in
his appreciation of the continuous change relating to society and social and individual
purposes. His Interactive Planning was developed as an approach to planning which took

2.Literature review
such changes into account by emphasising the need for planning to be based on a
continuous process of participative learning and adaptation. Ackoff argued that
organisations must be seen as serving three distinctive but interrelated sets of purposes:
their own purposes as derived from the goals and objectives as set by an organisation, the
goals and purposes of the individuals who together constitute the organisation, and the
responsibility towards the larger environment in which the organisation is embedded. He
argues that all these purposes need to be considered in the process of planning.
The third major contribution to the 'second wave' of systems approaches lies in the
work of Peter Checkland (1981). Checkland, as part of a research team from Lancaster
University, engaged in an action research project aimed at applying systems ideas to ill-
structured management problems. Their initial adoption of systems engineering as a
methodology for intervening in such situations proved to be less than successful due to its
reliance on the clear definition of objectives, which did not rhyme well with the complex
mosaic of interrelated purposes and objectives as experienced in real management
contexts. Extensive reflection on the learning derived from these attempts led to the
eventual development of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), which constituted a profound
transformation of the epistemological underpinnings in relation to systems engineering.
The initial formulation of SSM consisted of a seven-stage inquiry process in which an
initial exploration of the context perceived as problematic by the various stakeholders led
to the formulation of a number of root definitions of relevant systems which would serve
as epistemological devices to learn about the situation (Checkland, 1981). The learning
derived from comparing the conceptual models of purposeful human activity based on
these root definitions, along with their respective explicit definitions of the
Weltanschauungen which justified them as relevant, subsequently formed the input for
discussions around systemically desirable and culturally feasible changes. Subsequent
experiences and reflection on the use of SSM led Checkland to eventually abandon the
seven-stage model and formulate an alternative version which better reflected the iterative

2.Literature review
nature of applying SSM by experienced users who had internalised the methodology.
2.5.3. Systems approaches emphasising the critical interest
The 'third wave' of systems approaches emerged as a response to the criticisms
raised against the 'second wave' (Midgley, 2000). These criticisms mainly concerned the
fact that the consensual nature of the 'second wave' approaches, based on the notion of
participation, did not sufficiently address the notion of power as inherent to any social
situation. As free participation is always restricted by the existence of power-differences,
uncritical adoption of second wave participatory systems approaches runs the risk of
becoming a vehicle for the continuous oppression of less powerful voices. As such,
'second-wave' systems approaches are unlikely to contribute to real social change leading
to the emancipation of oppressed groups in society, due to the fact that they place political
and economic relationships in the 'environment' of the system of concern (ibid).
The development of critical systems thinking, most comprehensively articulated in
the work of Ulrich (1983), has sought to address this limitation by making the system of
concern itself the problem. Ulrich's Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) serves as a practical
framework for considering the ethical implications, or normative content, inherent in the
design of any social system. He also reminds us of the critical insights put forward by
Churchman (1979) that systemic comprehensiveness is ultimately an unachievable ideal to
which we must continually strive through the critical assessment of the boundary
judgements inherent to the articulation of social systems.
CSH is a framework based on practical philosophy, which consists of twelve
boundary questions which can aid planners as well as affected citizens in the assessment
of the normative implications inherent to the design of social systems. The twelve
boundary questions are grouped into four categories: sources of motivation, sources of
control, sources of expertise, and sources of legitimation, each of which is subdivided into
three categories: social roles, role-specific concerns, and key problems in determining the
boundary judgements relating to these roles and concerns (Ulrich, 1987).

2.Literature review
The boundary questions can be answered both in “is” and in “ought” mode, thus
questioning what represents the present state of affairs regarding the sources of
motivation, control, expertise, and legitimation and what what would constitute their
nature in an ideal world. By subsequently contrasting between “is” and “ought”, critical
questions emerge which can serve as the input for reflection or discussion between those
involved and those affected.
2.6. Systems and the nature of purpose
As an applied discipline, systems concerns itself with “rational intervention in
human affairs” (Checkland, 1985). Therefore, regardless of the specific theoretical
underpinnings characteristic of any particular systems approach, there is always an
implied notion of purpose, both in terms of the purpose of the approach and the
purpose(s) relevant to the system in which these approaches are applied. Different
systems approaches differ in their underlying notion of purpose. Below I will review the
notions of purpose as inherent to the three 'waves' of systems thinking reviewed above. I
will then argue that most of these approaches are insufficiently critical in relation to the
notion of purpose itself. In other words, they do not pose the question: in what way does
the purpose we pursue fit in with the broader question of human purpose in itself? I will
then draw on humanistic psychology and its implied purpose of human growth or self-
actualisation, and the importance of human relationships in fostering the conditions which
allow for positive growth.
2.6.1. Purpose inherent to systems approaches emphasising the technical interest
As Checkland (1985) argues, the formulation of the early 'hard' systems approaches
and organisational cybernetics evolved around notions of feedback and control. In the
context of human affairs, the assumption was that any social system could be regarded as
a goal-seeking system. Such systems operate by constructing goals, assessing the gap
between the present situation and the desired goal state, and engaging in activities which

2.Literature review
reduce this gap. The purpose of systems approaches therefore relied on the definition of
the system of concern and its objectives, and subsequently engineer the system to achieve
these objectives using the most efficient means available (ibid). The notion of goal-seeking,
first elaborately formulated in the work of Simon (1960, in Checkland, 1985), is more or
less inherent to all 'hard' systems approaches from the first wave of systems thinking
(Checkland, 1985).
2.6.2. Purpose inherent to systems approaches emphasising the social interest
Viewed from the perspective of the 'second wave' of systems approaches, we see
however that the notion of goal-seeking is fundamentally quite restrictive as a way of
looking at the complex behaviour of humans and social systems. The notion of goal-
seeking takes the existence of pre-defined, unitary, and stable goals as a given, and
therefore does not appreciate how these goals emerge within a social system in the first
place, how social systems often can be observed to contain a rich mosaic of different,
interacting, and often conflicting goals, nor does it appreciate the changes that are inherent
to human purposes. Checkland (1985) suggests that Geoffrey Vickers' notion of
relationship maintenance is a much richer and more realistic way of looking at the
behaviour of humans and social systems.
Vickers rejects the notion of goal seeking as an impoverished explanatory device for
human behaviour, stating that human behaviour can better be understood as the
attainment or maintenance of desired relationships and the avoidance of undesirable ones.
He proposes the notion of appreciative systems as a way of seeing how individuals and
social groups engage in a relationship maintenance and avoidance through an iterative
process of appreciation. This iterative process inherent to an appreciative system operates
from the notion that previous experiences leads us to develop certain standards, norms,
and values, which together generate an individual and collective readiness to notice and
subsequently evaluate certain aspects of our situations against these standards, norms,
and values. Checkland and Casar (1986) depict the structure of an appreciative system as

2.Literature review
shown in Figure 4. This process of noticing and evaluation does not only lead to
regulatory actions, but at the same time changes the very standards, norms, and values on
which the process of appreciation is constituted, leading to different ways of appreciating
future situations. This dynamic process over time is depicted in Figure 5.
Checkland is explicit regarding the nature of SSM as essentially an appreciative
inquiry system. Although Churchman and Ackoff – as the originators of the other two
systems approaches emphasising the social interest – do not relate their respective systems
Figure 5: The dynamics of an appreciative system (adopted from Checkland and Casar, 1986)
Figure 4: The structure of an appreciative system (adopted from Checkland and Casar, 1986)

2.Literature review
approaches to the nature of appreciative systems, I think their approaches can be seen as
largely coherent with Vicker's work. The emphasis Churchman places on the continuous
process of 'sweeping in' alternative subjectivities in order to explore and broaden the set of
assumptions underpinning the world view of the systems planner, could essentially be
seen as a process of appreciation. The world view of the systems planner, underpinned by
various norms, standards, and values, changes over time as a result of appreciating
alternative world views, which could in themselves be seen as resulting from the iterative
process of appreciation.
Ackoff's Interactive Planning seems to show a similar coherence in relation to the
notion of appreciative systems. His emphasis on the changing nature of values and
purposes as a result of and as an input to the process of learning resulting from the
interactions between individuals holding different value systems, is in essence not
different from a continuous process of appreciation in which standards, norms, and values
change over time.
The notion of appreciative systems serves as an explanatory device for
understanding the nature of human behaviour, and thus does not present itself as a
framework for rational intervention in human affairs (Checkland, 1985). However, it does
provide a coherent way of making sense of the different systems approaches as aimed at
facilitating interpersonal understandings through an iterative process of appreciation. We
could thus state that the systems approaches emphasising the social interest take as their
purpose the facilitation of shared standards, norms, and values which lead to purposeful
activity.
2.6.3. Purpose inherent to systems approaches emphasising the critical interest
The 'third wave' of systems approaches can be seen as seeking to overcome the
forces that restrict free participation in the process of constructing inter subjective
understandings (standards, norms, and values) as advocated by the 'second wave' of
systems approaches. It's purpose therefore lies in the emancipation from oppressive forces

2.Literature review
inherent to inequalities in power.
2.7. Purpose and humanistic psychology
As discussed above, each systems approach can be argued as serving certain
notions of purpose, be it goal-seeking, relationship maintenance, or emancipation. The
'second wave' of systems approaches broadens the notion of purpose inherent to the 'first
wave' by arguing that any goal seeking behaviour is embedded within a wider context of
human relationships, and that goal-seeking in itself does not provide an adequate account
of how goals emerge in the context of social participation. The 'third wave' of systems
approaches goes on to question the legitimacy of the purposes served by the 'second wave'
by arguing that any social purpose arises in a context of power relations and therefore
potentially serves to procreate oppressive practices. However, we can go on to question
the legitimacy of the 'third wave' approaches by posing the question what worldview
justifies the pursuit of emancipation as something worthwhile. Challenging existing power
relationships implies that freedom of the individual is in essence a good thing. We might
therefore ask ourselves if human beings are not better off if ruled by a compassionate
tyrant who protects them from themselves rather than pursuing freedom in an open and
democratic society. Also, why would for instance people from one culture have the right to
impose values of equal rights for men and women in another culture? Power imbalance
seems to be inherent to almost every social species of animal, yet most rational humans do
not pose arguments that baboons should pursue democratic relationships rather than
hierarchical ones. Why should we then argue against oppression in human society? Of
course, stating that oppression is a natural aspect of the animal world does not warrant
legitimation of similar practices in human society, for stating so would be falling in the
same irrational trap as exposed by Habermas, that when we claim that competition is a
natural force in evolution and therefore it is justified to engage in competitive behaviour in
human interaction. The “is” is no justification for the “ought.” However, that argument is
in itself not sufficient to state that what we claim ought to be case – freedom and

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