Palestinian American National Research Project

Pa l e s t i n i a n Am e r i c a n
Na t i o n a l Re s e a r c h Pr o j e c t
Report Prepared by
Randa B. Serhan, PhD
Department of Sociology
American University
Washington, DC
June 2015

The Palestinian American National Research Project was undertaken at the request of The
General Delegation of the PLO to the United States, to provide a better understanding and
analysis of the demography of Palestinian-Americans living in the U.S.
Although we could not arrive at a specific number of Palestinian Americans in the U.S.
due to the lack of accurate official census figures by the U.S. Census Bureau, it is our
strong belief that the numbers of Palestinian Americans would easily surpass those listed
by official agencies and other Arab American statistics. Our intention is to build on this
study to provide further analysis of the Palestinian American community in the U.S., and
in particular to provide more accurate number of Americans of Palestinian origins who are
living in the U.S.
In addition to Dr. Randa Serhan of American University (see attached bio), who prepared
and completed this project to provide a macro-level depiction of the Palestinian-American
community, many individuals and organizations played a crucial role as well in supporting
the project and helping in producing this final report.
We acknowledge the support that we have received from various donors and contributors
to fund this project. Without their generous contributions, this project would not have been
possible.
We also express our gratitude to various Palestinian- American communities in the United
States for facilitating focus group sessions in their areas. These areas include:
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Chicago, Illinois
Cleveland, Ohio
Clifton, New Jersey
Columbus, Ohio
Dearborn, Michigan
Houston, Texas
Jacksonville, Florida
Livonia, Michigan
New York City
Raleigh, North Carolina
Sacramento, California
San Francisco, California
Tampa, Florida
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area
In particular, we would also like to thank the American Federation of Ramallah Palestine,
Beitunia Club, United Holy Land Fund, The Mosque Foundation, Arab American Cultural
and Community Center, Deirdebwan Charity, and the Palestinian American Community
Center, for their efforts to organize and facilitate our meetings during our visits.
Finally, we acknowledge the helpful role played by the staff of the General Delegation of
the PLO in conducting the focus groups and collecting the data.
The General Delegation of the PLO to the United States
Washington, D.C.
Preface...
1

2
P a l e s t i n i a n A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h P r o j e c t

2

About
the
author
and
organization
of
the
report:

Randa
Serhan
is
Assistant
Professor
in
the
Department
of
Sociology
and
the

director
of
Arab
World
Studies
at
American
University
in
Washington,
DC.
Randa

previously
conducted
a
seven-‐year
ethnographic
study
of
Palestinian-‐Americans

living
in
the
New
York
metropolitan
region.
She
was
asked
to
join
the
Palestinian

American
National
Research
Project
in
its
second
phase
to
provide
historical
and

qualitative
analysis
of
the
population.
To
this
end,
Randa
brought
her
extensive

expertise
on
Palestinian
immigration
to
the
United
States,
as
well
as
her
sociological

skills
in
survey
construction
and
focus
group
interview
design.
Much
of
this
report

will
be
based
on
her
research
due
to
the
overwhelming
limitations
of
analyzing

census
data
with
respect
to
Arabs
in
general,
and
the
Palestinian
American

population
in
particular.

Phase
One

Phase
One1
of
the
project
began
in
June
2013
with
the
objective
of
using
U.S.

Census
Data
to
provide
a
macro-‐level
depiction
of
the
Palestinian
American

population.
Census
data
offers
detailed
information
about
the
U.S.
population
by

race,
ethnicity,
education
and
income
levels,
and
state
of
residence
among
a
large

variety
of
attributes.
The
census
is
conducted
every
decade
(next
census
will
take

place
in
2020),
but
a
longer
form,
smaller
sample
survey
is
administered
annually

known
as
the
American
Community
Survey
(ACS).
In
the
latter,
language,
household

composition,
college
major,
place
of
birth,
and
ethnic
self-‐identification.
ACS
offers

greater
insight
into
particular
populations,
and
thus
is
considered
a
more
valuable

tool
when
seeking
more
intimate
information.
Accordingly,
the
primary

demographer
chose
to
use
ACS
data
to
provide
a
comprehensive
depiction
of

Palestinian
Americans.
Unfortunately,
the
data
proved
to
be
challenging
the
desired

detailed
information
that
is
more
readily
constructed
for
other
ethnic
groups
was

not
produced.
Eventually,
several
significant
attributes
of
Palestinian
Americans

were
derived
from
ACS,
however
the
size
of
the
population
is
grossly
undercounted.

Limitations
of
Census
Data
for
Analyzing
Palestinian
Americans

Social
and
Political
Limitations

Arab
Americans,
and
even
more
so
Palestinians,
are
greatly
undercounted
in

census
data.
Arab
Americans
were
granted
the
right
to
identify
as

“white/Caucasian”
in
1920,
which
was
a
victory
at
the
time,
but
has
also
made
it

1
All census data
2
In 2015, the Census Bureau will conduct a test survey with the term “Middle Eastern” as a viable
category to capture Arab, Iranian, Israeli, and Turkish Americans. This term was reached as a compromise
between all the national representatives (Arab American Institute and Arab American Anti-discrimination
Committee on behalf of the Arab American community).
3
Information provided by Michael Bader, PhD, assistant professor of sociology at American University.

2

About
the
author
and
organization
of
the
report:

Randa
Serhan
is
Assistant
Professor
in
the
Department
of
Sociology
and
the

director
of
Arab
World
Studies
at
American
University
in
Washington,
DC.
Randa

previously
conducted
a
seven-‐year
ethnographic
study
of

living
in
the
New
York
metropolitan
region.
She
was
asked
to
join
the
Palestinian

American
National
Research
Project
in
its
second
phase
to
provide
historical
and

qualitative
analysis
of
the
population.
To
this
end,
Randa
brought
her
extensive

expertise
on
Palestinian
immigration
to
the
United
States,
as
well
as
her
sociological

skills
in
survey
construction
and
focus
group
interview
design.
Much
of
this
report

will
be
based
on
her
research
due
to
the
overwhelming
limitations
of
analyzing

census
data
with
respect
to
Arabs
in
general,
and
the
Palestinian
American

population
in
particular.

Phase
One

Phase
One1
of
the
project
began
in
June
2013
with
the
objective
of
using
U.S.

Census
Data
to
provide
a
macro-‐level
depiction
of
the
Palestinian
American

population.
Census
data
offers
detailed
information
about
the
U.S.
population
by

race,
ethnicity,
education
and
income
levels,
and
state
of
residence
among
a
large

variety
of
attributes.
The
census
is
conducted
every
decade
(next
census
will
take

place
in
2020),
but
a
longer
form,
smaller
sample
survey
is
administered
annually

known
as
the
American
Community
Survey
(ACS).
In
the
latter,
language,
household

composition,
college
major,
place
of
birth,
and
ethnic
self-‐identification.
ACS
offers

greater
insight
into
particular
populations,
and
thus
is
considered
a
more
valuable

tool
when
seeking
more
intimate
information.
Accordingly,
the
primary

demographer
chose
to
use
ACS
data
to
provide
a
comprehensive
depiction
of

Palestinian
Americans.
Unfortunately,
the
data
proved
to
be
challenging
the
desired

detailed
information
that
is
more
readily
constructed
for
other
ethnic
groups
was

not
produced.
Eventually,
several
significant
attributes
of
Palestinian
Americans

were
derived
from
ACS,
however
the
size
of
the
population
is
grossly
undercounted.

Limitations
of
Census
Data
for
Analyzing
Palestinian
Americans

Social
and
Political
Limitations

Arab
Americans,
and
even
more
so
Palestinians,
are
greatly
undercounted
in

census
data.
Arab
Americans
were
granted
the
right
to
identify
as

“white/Caucasian”
in
1920,
which
was
a
victory
at
the
time,
but
has
also
made
it

1
All census data
2
3

3

3

difficult
to
enumerate
Arab
Americans
on
the
decennial
census.
For
over
a
decade

(since
9/11)
there
has
been
a
concerted
effort
to
devise
ways
to
measure
the

number
of
Arab
Americans,
but
this
has
met
with
limited
success.
The
best
data

available
is
through
the
shorter
form,
American
Community
Survey,
but
even
then

there
are
numerous
reasons
why
Arab
Americans,
especially
Palestinians,
remain

underrepresented,
namely
political
fears2.
There
is
fear
that
answering
the
census

or
ACS
fully
might
make
them
targets
of
government
surveillance
or
persecution.

Technical
Limitations

In
addition
to
the
hesitation
to
self-‐identify
on
the
ethnicity
question

(voluntary
write
in)
in
the
long
form
ACS,
there
are
also
methodological
reasons
for

undercounting
Arabs.
According
to
the
Arab
American
Institute
(AAI),
which
is
the

sole
organization
approved
to
improve
the
quality
of
Arab
American
data
by
the

Census
Bureau,
Arab
Americans
have
been
undercounted
by
up
to
60%.
In
a
manual

produced
by
the
census
bureau,
researchers
are
warned
that
the
ACS
is
designed
to

provide
detailed
characteristics
of
the
population
and
not
an
accurate
count
because

of
the
representative
sampling
used.

A
problem
arises
with
this
type
of
subsampling
because
the
sample
size
in

any
given
year
is
too
small
to
provide
precise
estimates
of
characteristics
in
the

subsample.
A
single
year
of
data
in
small
areas,
like
neighborhoods,
will
not
sample

enough
residents
declaring
Palestinian
origin
to
create
an
accurate
estimate.
To

overcome
this
problem,
the
Census
pools
data
collected
across
successive
years
to

develop
estimates.
As
a
result,
the
Census
releases
1-‐year,
3-‐year,
and
5-‐year

estimates
for
different
size
areas.3

The
Census
Bureau
is
also
concerned
with
protecting
respondent

confidentiality,
especially
of
small
subsamples
of
the
population.
The
Bureau
is

concerned
that
releasing
data
with
very
small
subsamples
might
allow
the

respondents
of
that
subsampled
to
be
identified.
For
example,
if
only
one
Palestinian

family
lived
in
a
neighborhood
and
the
Census
Bureau
released
economic
data
for

Palestinians
in
that
neighborhood,
then
any
neighbor
who
knew
the
family
would
be

able
to
determine
their
earnings,
home
value,
family
structure,
and
other
potentially

sensitive
information.
As
a
result,
the
Census
only
reports
data
if
a
sufficient
number

of
respondents
of
a
particular
group,
Palestinians
in
this
case,
are
present
in
the

area.4

2
3
4
Ibid.

4

4

Data
within
these
limitations

To
contend
with
these
challenges
and
limitations,
5-‐year
ACS
estimates
were

utilized
to
increase
the
accuracy
of
the
data
on
Palestinian
Americans.
The
greatest

details
possible
were
extracted
on
major
characteristics
of
the
population,
which

will
be
delineated
at
the
end
of
the
following
section.
The
reader
is
reminded
that

the
total
population
will
be
undercounted,
but
that
this
will
not
compromise
the

quality
of
the
data.
In
other
words,
the
census
data
in
this
report
will
accurately

represent
Palestinian
Americans
even
if
only
a
fraction
of
Palestinian
Americans

were
included
in
the
samples.
The
total
population
derived
from
the
ACS
5-‐year

estimate
is
83,241,
which
translates
into
208,103
by
AAI
estimates.
The
author

contends
that
the
estimates
are
even
higher
if
Jordanian
Americans
are
included
in

the
calculations.
Many
Jordanian
Americans,
but
certainly
not
all,
are
of
Palestinian

origin.
They
were
not
included
in
this
pilot
study,
because
there
was
no
discernable

method
to
disaggregate
Palestinians
from
Jordanians
within
the
Jordanian
identified

sample5.

Nonetheless,
the
information
obtained
from
census
data
is
crucial
to

understanding
the
position
of
Palestinian
Americans.
At
minimum,
it
will
inform
us

of
the
age
and
income
distributions
and
educational
attainment.

Phase
Two

Beyond
the
limitations
discussed
above
about
ACS
data,
census
data
for
any

group
cannot
inform
us
about
a
population’s
sentiments
and
political
and
ethnic

attitudes.
This
reality
made
phase
two
of
the
project
imperative
to
arrive
at

information
about
Palestinian
Americans’
sense
of
belonging,
place
of
origin
(or

ancestral
home),
their
aspirations,
political
engagements,
and
their
social

surroundings.
A
survey
and
focus
groups
interviews
were
conducted
to
supplement

and
explain
Palestinian
Americans’
incorporation
in
their
surroundings.

Organization
of
the
Report

The
report
will
be
organized
into
the
following
sections:

Part
One:
Introduction

I.

Significance
of
Study

II.

Chronology

III.

Background
and
historical
overview

IV.

Causes
and
Waves
of
Migration

V.

Demographic
data

5
It is not uncommon for Palestinians born in Jordan or whose parents were born in Jordan to list Jordan as
their ethnicity because of political considerations and by logic of the passports used to enter the U.S.

5

5

Part
Two:
Survey
results

I. Design
of
Survey

II. Demographics
of
respondents

III.

Villages
of
origin/ancestry

IV.

Self
Identification

V.

Connections
to
Palestine

VI.

Connections
to
the
United
States

Part
Three:
Focus
Group
Interview
Results

I. Design
of
Focus
Group
Interviews

II. Demographics
of
participants

III. Self
Identification

IV. Connections
to
Palestine

V. Connections
to
the
United
States

VI. Life
post-‐9/11

Part
Four:
Summary
and
Conclusions

6

6

PART
ONE:
INTRODUCTION

I.
Significance
of
Study:

Palestinians
have
been
immigrating
to
the
United
States
since
the
1880s,
and

yet
we
have
remarkably
little
documentation
of
the
communities
they
established,

the
relationship
they
have
to
each
other
and
to
the
United
States
as
their
country
of

birth
or
citizenship.
It
is
only
the
few
outliers
in
the
Palestinian
American

community
that
become
noteworthy
or
identified
as
Palestinian
American,
namely

the
few
extremely
successful
or
those
who
have
been
implicated
in
activism
and

politics.
The
late
Edward
Said,
professor
of
comparative
literature,
was
one
of
the

most
recognized
Palestinian
Americans
for
his
scholarly
success,
while
the
LA-‐8

were
known
for
being
members
of
the
Popular
Front
for
the
Liberation
of
Palestine

and
were
either
deported
or
entangled
in
decades
of
legal
battles,
and
most
recently

Sami
Al-‐Arian
who
was
deported
to
Turkey
after
spending
more
than
a
decade
in

prison.
Beyond
such
individuals,
Palestinian
Americans
have
largely
remained

invisible.
Part
of
this
invisibility
stems
from
the
fact
that
Palestinians,
like
all
Arabs,

have
been
categorized
as
“white”
on
the
US
census.
Thus
numerically
they
have
been

virtually
impossible
to
identify.
Secondly,
Palestinian
Americans
have
not
formed

any
enclaves
and
are
widely
dispersed
across
the
50
states
further
making
their

presence
less
evident.
Finally,
some
Palestinian
Americans
have
consciously
decided

to
maintain
a
low
profile
given
the
designation
of
the
PLO
as
a
terrorist
organization

until
quite
recently
and
the
overwhelming
support
for
Israel
in
public
opinion
polls.

As
such,
this
present
project
was
conceived
and
designed
as
a
pilot
study
to

explore
the
parameters
of
the
Palestinian
American
population
through
census
data

and
surveys.
The
findings
from
this
limited
study
are
intended
to
inform
future,

more
comprehensive
studies
of
Palestinian
Americans.
This
should
not
diminish
the

results
of
the
study,
but
rather
is
a
recognition
that
this
is
the
first
study
of
its
type

and
has
the
potential
for
incorporating
a
larger
segment
of
the
Palestinian
American

population
in
the
future.
The
results
reported
here
are
intended
to
serve
as
an

entrée
to
the
discussion
of
Palestinian
Americans
to
be
used
by
organizations,

7

7

universities,
government
officials,
and
individuals
interested
in
who
Palestinian

Americans
are
and
their
place
in
the
US
polity.

II.
Chronology6:

1880s-‐
“Syrians
from
Asia”-‐
Palestinians,
Lebanese,
and
Syrians
travel
to
the
United

States
as
merchants,
adventurers,
and
economic
immigrants.
Predominantly

Christian,
no
national
identity

1917-‐
Balfour
Declaration
by
Lord
Arthur
Balfour
of
Britain
promising
a
Jewish

homeland
in
Palestine

1921-‐
Britain
given
mandate
power
over
Palestine,
Transjordan,
and
Iraq
by
the

League
of
Nations

1936-‐39-‐
Peasant
Revolt
against
the
British
colonial
powers
in
response
to

increased
Zionist
presence
in
Mandate
Palestine

1936-‐1939-‐
Increase
in
migration
of
families
to
the
United
States
from
Mandate

Palestine

1946-‐
Emirate
of
Transjordan
is
renamed
the
Hashemite
Kingdom
of
Jordan

1947-‐1949-‐
Another
spike
in
family
migration
to
the
United
States
from
Mandate

Palestine
during
the
“war
of
independence”
(Israel)
and

“Nakba/catastrophe”
(Palestine)

1947-‐
U.N.
passes
Resolution
181
to
partition
Palestine
to
create
a
Jewish

state/homeland
on
56.47%
of
the
land
and
the
remainder
for
an
Arab

state

1948-‐
State
of
Israel
is
established
on
most
of
the
land
of
Mandate
Palestine,
beyond

that
allocated
by
U.N.
Resolution
181

1948-‐
750,000
Palestinians
flee
or
are
expelled
from
their
homes
end
up
in
refugee

camps
in
neighboring
Lebanon,
Syria,
and
Jordan

1949-‐
Armistice
Agreement
between
Israel,
Jordan,
and
Egypt
giving
Jordan
control

over
the
West
Bank
and
Egypt
control
over
Gaza

-‐Palestinians
naturalized
as
Jordanians

1948-‐1967-‐
Limited
immigration
from
the
West
Bank
and
to
a
lesser
extent
Gaza
to

Arab
Gulf
States
and
Latin
and
North
America

1967-‐
Israel
occupies
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
and
places
them
under
military
rule

1967-‐
Census
conducted
by
the
State
of
Israel
in
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza,
only

considering
those
present
at
the
time
of
the
census
as
residents
of
the

territories

1967-‐
350,000
new
Palestinian
refugees
flee
or
are
expelled
to
neighboring

countries,
including
Jordan

6
Adapted from Serhan, Randa. 2011. “Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants,” in Bayor, Ronald (ed).
Multicultural America: An Encyclopedia of the Newest Americans. ABC-CLIO Publishers Inc. pp. 1695-
1730.

8

8

1967-‐
Israel
gains
the
support,
moral
and
financial,
of
American
Jews

1967-‐
West
Bank
Palestinians
immigrate
to
the
Americas
to
join
single
males

already
working
there

1967-‐
Palestinian
economic
immigrants
become
exiles

1987-‐
First
Intifada
or
popular
uprising
by
Palestinians
in
the
West
Bank
against
the

Israeli
occupation

1991-‐
New
wave
of
Palestinians
immigrate
to
the
United
States

1993-‐
Oslo
Accords
were
signed
between
Israel
and
the
Palestinian
Authority
under

U.S.
auspices
towards
the
creation
of
an
independent
Palestinian
state

1994-‐
Immigrants
in
the
United
States
started
relocating
their
families
to
the
West

Bank

1994-‐
PLO
is
taken
off
the
US
terror
organization
list

1998-‐
Tension
rising
between
Palestinians
and
Israeli
forces,
immigrants
begin

returning
to
the
United
States

2000-‐2005-‐
Second
Intifada
or
popular
uprising
by
Palestinians
in
the
West
Bank

against
the
Israeli
occupation;
much
bloodier
and
more
costly
than

previous
conflicts

2003-‐
Israel
begins
construction
of
“security
fence/wall”
along
the
Green
Line
and

within
the
West
Bank
to
block
access
of
Palestinians
to
Israel

2006-‐
Hamas
(considered
a
terrorist
organization
by
the
United
States)

democratically
won
control
of
the
government
in
the
Palestinian

territories
(2nd
election)

2008,
2014-‐
Israel
bombards
Gaza

III. Background
and
historical
overview

Geography
of
Palestine

Palestine
has
experienced
great
change
to
its
boundaries
and
sovereignty

over
the
past
century.
It
was
under
Ottoman
rule
until
shortly
after
World
War
I,

when
the
League
of
Nations
granted
Britain
a
mandate
over
Palestine
(now

Palestinian
territories
(Pappe,
2004;
Toukan,
1994).
Mandate
Palestine
was
broken

up
into
parts
to
establish
the
State
of
Israel
in
1948,
with
the
remaining
land
of
the

West
Bank
and
Gaza
going
to
Jordan
and
Egypt,
respectively,
under
the
Armistice

Agreement
of
1949
in
cooperation
with
Israel
(Massad,
2001).

Israel
occupied
the
territories
without
annexation,
which
became
the

Palestinian
territories.
Since
1967,
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
have
been
cut
off
from

one
another,
and
Israeli
settlements
and
roads
have
been
built
reducing
the
areas

9

9

open
and
claimable
by
Palestinians.
By
2000,
the
Palestinian
Authority
had
control

over
18%
of
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
(Usher,
2005).
The
West
Bank
and
Gaza
were

divided
into
three
enclaves,
Jenin
and
Ramallah,
Bethlehem
and
Hebron,
and
Gaza

(Usher,
2005).
According
to
the
CIA
Factbook
(2007)
there
are
400,000
Israeli

settlers
in
the
West
Bank
alone,
and
the
official
geographic
territory
is
5,860
sq
km

between
Israel
and
Jordan.
Gaza
lies
between
Israel
and
Egypt
and
has
a
total
area
of

360
sq
km.

Israel
began
building
the
“security
fence/wall”
in
2003
as
a
barrier
between

Israel
and
the
West
Bank.
This
construction
further
appropriated
West
Bank

territory.
Today,
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
have
increasingly
restricted
access
to
land.

History
of
Palestine7

Much
of
Palestinian
history
is
intertwined
with
its
geography.
Palestine

experienced
foreign
rule
under
the
Ottoman
Empire
followed
by
Britain.
Palestine

(Mandate
and
territories)
has
been
mired
by
unceasing
conflict
and
violence
making

documentation
of
its
history
a
convoluted
and
oft-‐contested
task.
Accordingly,
this

segment
will
only
cover
the
most
prominent
dates
and
events
that
affected

migration.
Until
the
end
of
World
War
I
and
the
fall
of
the
Ottoman
Empire,
Syria

Lebanon,
and
Palestine
were
under
Ottoman
rule.
Migration
out
of
the
Ottoman

Empire
was
limited
to
adventurers
and
merchants,
or
those
who
had
heard
about

the
offerings
of
America
through
American
missionaries
in
Jerusalem
and
Beirut.

Shortly
after
the
war,
France
and
Britain
divided
the
areas
among
themselves;

France
took
control
of
Syria
and
Lebanon,
and
Britain
took
control
of
Palestine
and

Transjordan
(Beinin
and
Hajjar,
MERIP;
Makdisi,
MERIP).
Palestine
was
the
only

mandate
to
have
not
made
the
transition
into
a
post-‐colonial
state.
Prior
to

assuming
the
mandate
over
Palestine,
Britain’s
Lord
Arthur
Balfour
in
1917

promised
that
a
Jewish
homeland
would
be
established
in
Palestine.
This
led
to

7
1730.

10

10

unrest
among
Palestinians
culminating
in
the
Peasant
Revolts
of
1936-‐1939

(Swedenburg,
1999).
During
these
years,
Palestinians
experienced
the
first

persecution-‐based
migration.
The
next
large
flight
or
expulsion
occurred
during
and

after
the
creation
of
the
State
of
Israel
in
1948.
750,000
Palestinians
fled
or
were

forced
to
leave
their
homes
to
become
refugees
in
neighboring
countries
(Usher,

2005).
Some
of
these
individuals
traveled
from
northern
Mandate
Palestine
to
the

West
Bank
and
Gaza,
where
they
also
became
refugees.

In
1949,
an
Armistice
Agreement
was
signed
between
Israel
and
Jordan
and

Egypt,
which
gave
control
of
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
to
their
neighboring
Arab

countries
(Massad,
2001).
Egypt
administered
Gaza
and
granted
Palestinians

Egyptian
travel
documents,
but
not
passports.
This
has
continued
to
make
travel
for

Gazans
extremely
difficult
and
has
limited
their
ability
to
send
remittances
from

work
abroad
back
to
their
families.
The
situation
of
West
Bankers
was
less

cumbersome
for
they
were
allowed
to
travel
east
into
Jordan
for
employment
and

education
between
1949-‐1967.
They
were
also
issued
Jordanian
IDs
and
many
were

naturalized
as
Jordanian
citizens.

After
the
occupation
in
1967,
Palestinians
fleeing

from
the
West
Bank
to
Jordan
were
deemed
refugees.
In
total,
between
300,000-‐
350,000
Palestinians
were
exiled
in
the
aftermath
of
the
1967
Israeli
occupation

(Pappe,
2004;
Usher,
2004).

The
Intifada
or
popular
uprising
interrupted
the
military
rule
in
1987
when

Palestinian
women
and
children
went
out
into
the
streets.
The
latter
started
the

process
that
resulted
in
the
1993
Oslo
Accords,
when
the
United
States
helped

broker
an
agreement
between
Israel
and
the
PLO
to
create
the
Palestinian
Authority

and
gradually
give
it
autonomy
over
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
(Beinin
and
Hajjar,

MERIP).
The
interim
government
was
intended
to
remain
in
control
for
five
years

before
full
transfer
of
powers
was
given
to
the
PA.
When
this
failed,
tensions

increased
and
in
turn
so
did
out-‐migration.
In
2000,
a
second
Intifada
broke
out,

albeit
more
violent
and
costly
than
the
first
(Ajluni,
2003).
This
once
again
propelled

more
Palestinians
to
find
avenues
out
of
the
West
Bank
and
to
a
far
lesser
extent

Gaza
(their
access
was
severely
circumvented).
While
the
Intifada
ended
in
2005,

11

11

the
repercussions
and
Israeli
military
response
continue
today.
The
most
significant

of
these
measures
was
the
building
of
the
“security
fence/wall”
separating
the
West

Bank
from
Israel
(Usher,
2005).
In
the
last
decade,
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
have

come
under
greater
military
control
with
Hamas,
the
Islamic
Movement,
being
voted

into
government
by
a
majority
vote.

The
state
of
Palestine
is
as
far
from
realization

as
ever
at
this
moment
in
history
with
the
populations
of
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza

experiencing
further
pauperization
and
in
turn
pressures
to
leave
the
territories
to

join
family
members
elsewhere
in
the
Arab
Gulf
and
the
Americas.
Gazans
are
worse

off
given
that
they
are
unable
to
travel
and
have
experienced
extensive

bombardment
intermittently
since
2008,
which
has
meant
virtual
immobility
for

most.

IV. Causes
and
Waves
of
Migration8

Early Migration

Palestinians
first
began
to
arrive
in
the
late
nineteenth
century.
Their

numbers
were
limited
and
they
were
mainly
Christian
traders
from
Ramallah
and

Jerusalem
(Hitti,
1924;
Naff,
1985;
Orfalea,
1988;
2006).
They
had
learned
about

opportunities
here
through
American
Christian
missionaries
(Hitti,
1924;
Kayal
and

Kayal,
1975;
Younis,
1995).
At
the
time,
all
individuals
were
considered
“Turkish

from
Asia”
because
of
Ottoman
rule
over
the
territory
(Gualtieri,
2009;
Hooglund,

1987;
Naff,
1985).
Later,
a
separate
Syrian
category
was
established,
however
it

incorporated
Syrians,
Lebanese,
and
Palestinians
(Younis
and
Kayal
1995;
Orfalea,

2006).
Most
sources
confer
that
the
greater
component
of
that
early
migration

stemmed
from
Syria
and
Lebanon
based
on
the
cities
and
towns
of
origin.
Samir

Khalaf,
a
Lebanese-‐American
sociologist,
estimated
that
80%
of
the
first
wave
was

from
present-‐day
Lebanon
(1987).

8
1730.

12

12

The
majority
was
of
peasant
origin
and
worked
as
peddlers
upon
arrival.

Although
New
York
and
Boston
were
gateway
cities
for
many,
peddling
took
them
in

numerous
directions
(Aruri,
1969;
Kayal
and
Kayal,
1975;
Naff,
1985;
Younis
and

Kayal,
1995).
This
early
migration
of
Christians
from
“Syria”
was
the
bulk
of
Arab

migration
to
the
United
States
until
the
change
in
immigration
laws
in
1965

(Marvasti
and
McKinney,
2004).
It
has
been
noted
that
90%
of
the
first
wave
was

Christian,
compared
to
the
70%
Muslim
since
1965
(El-‐Kholy,
1969).
It
is

unremarkable
that
Arabs
today
are
spread
across
the
continent
following
the
trends

set
by
the
earliest
immigrants,
albeit
that
New
York,
New
Jersey,
Massachusetts,

Michigan,
Ohio,
and
California
remain
primary
hubs
of
settlement9.

Immigrant
culture/early
issues
of
assimilation
and
separatism

There
were
two
main
types
of
immigrants
at
the
time:
young
men
looking
to

raise
funds
to
return
to
their
villages
to
get
married,
and
families
who
were
in

pursuit
of
the
American
life
of
opportunity
and
freedom
as
described
to
them
by

American
missionaries
in
the
Levant.
The
former
often
returned
when
their
goals

were
reached
or
to
marry
women
from
their
villages.
The
families
that
moved
to
the

United
States
did
so
with
the
intent
of
assimilating.
Churches
helped
them
integrate

into
their
new
surroundings
and
they
were
quick
to
anglicize
their
last
names
and

immerse
themselves
in
the
local
culture.
By
1920,
“Syrians”
had
won
a
legal
case
to

ascertain
their
status
as
“white.”
The
second
generation,
born
and
raised
in
the

United
States,
intermarried
with
other
white
Americans.

Second Wave Migration

Palestinian
migration
did
not
become
a
distinct
entity
until
the
late
1930s

after
the
Peasant
Revolts
in
Mandate
Palestine
(Al-‐Tahir,
1952;
Naff,
1985).
The

Zionist
movement
had
been
gaining
strength
in
the
previous
decades
and
sharecrop

9
In the migration literature, it has long been established that new migrants tend to settle where previous co-
ethnics once established communities or continue to live. This is factored into what is known as “chain
migration” (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Tilly, 1990).

13

13

tenants
were
being
dispossessed
of
the
land
they
lived
on
(Khalidi,
1997).
When

violence
broke
out,
migration
rose
between
1936-‐1939.
This
was
followed
by
a
lull

before
spiking
in
1947-‐1948
when
the
Israeli
war
of
independence
or
Al-‐Nakba

(“catastrophe”
according
to
Palestinians)
took
place
(Al-‐Tahir,
1952;
Cainkar,
1988;

Seikaly,
1999).
This
latest
migration
flow
was
characteristically
different
from

previous
ones,
which
were
mainly
of
young
men
looking
for
employment
and
a
way

to
raise
funds
to
improve
their
lot
in
their
villages
upon
return.
Young
migrant
men

used
to
live
in
singles’
accommodations
and
did
not
belong
to
any
particular

community
(Cainkar,
1988).
Small
communities
arose
in
the
aftermath
of
1948

when
women
and
children
began
to
arrive
to
join
their
male
relatives.
Also,
more

professionals,
students,
and
people
of
different
skills
and
socioeconomic
statuses

appeared
in
the
post-‐1948
flow
(Seikaly,
1999).

Although
migration
reportedly
spiked
during
this
period,
the
numbers

remained
in
the
thousands.
Muslims
and
Christians
were
arriving
in
equal
numbers

(Marvasti
and
McKinney,
2004;
Seikaly;
1999).
It
has
been
documented
that
with

each
migration,
the
newcomers
were
more
politically
conscious
than
those
before

them.
Immigrants
who
arrived
during
Ottoman
rule
arrived
with
parochial

identities,
and
the
Christians
among
them
quickly
assimilated
through
Church

affiliations
(Aruri,
1969;
Hagopian,
1969;
Kayal
and
Kayal,
1975).
Since
World
War
I

and
the
establishment
of
Mandate
Palestine
under
British
rule
Palestinian

immigrants
have
arrived
more
politicized
with
a
national
identity.
Writings
in
each

era
claim
that
their
era
is
when
Palestinian
migrants
became
politicized.
Research

on
usually
followed
a
fresh
flow
of
migration
or
political

developments
in
the
Palestinian-‐Israeli
conflict.
These
junctures
used
to
be
easier
to

pinpoint
and
discern
prior
to
1967.
However,
since
Israel
occupied
the
West
Bank

and
Gaza
Strip
there
have
been
steady
streams
of
migrants
and
political
changes
in

the
conflict,
whether
possibilities
for
peace
or
increased
violence.

14

14

Later
Waves
of
immigration
Leading
up
to
1965
Immigrant
Act

The
number
of
has
grown
steadily
through
natural

childbirth
and
a
continuous
flow
of
new
immigrants.
The
story
of
the
community

selected
for
this
study
followed
a
similar
pattern
to
those
mentioned
in
the

aftermath
of
the
1948
war.
Namely,
the
small
of
number
of
men
who
lived
in
the

United
States
prior
to
1967
were
economic
migrants
looking
to
earn
enough
money

to
return
home
to
a
better
life.
The
Israeli
Occupation
forbade
them
by
law
from

returning
as
legal
residents
of
the
West
Bank
and
made
living
conditions
more

difficult
for
those
who
remained.
More
women
and
children
began
appearing
in

cities
across
the
U.S.
resulting
in
the
emergence
of
communities.

The
differences
between
the
1948
and
post-‐1967
migrations
are

predominantly
numerical.
During
the
1940s
and
1950s,
United
States
immigration

laws
placed
quotas
restricting
the
number
of
immigrants
by
national
origin.
Fewer

Palestinians
could
make
their
way
to
the
United
States.
Secondly,
most
of
the

population
fleeing
in
1948
became
refugees
in
neighboring
Arab
countries.

Conversely,
the
1965
Immigration
Act
had
abolished
national
origin
quotas
making

the
United
States
one
of
the
more
attractive
immigrant
destinations
and
more

accessible
to
the
post-‐1967
Palestinians.
Finally,
many
West
Bank
Palestinians

wanted
to
avoid
the
predicament
of
those
Palestinians
who
had
become
refugees
in

1948,
and
began
to
consider
alternatives
such
as
the
United
States
for
their
families.

The
outcome
was
comparatively
larger
communities,
albeit
still
small
in
relation
to

other
ethnic
groups.

15

15

Immigration
Act
of
1965

The
Immigration
Act
of
1965
virtually
coincided
with
the
1967
Israeli

occupation
of
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza.
By
ignoring
the
circumstances
in
the

Palestinian
territories,
one
may
assume
that
the
1965
Immigration
Act
was
a
flood

gate
that
was
opened
and
people
came
from
all
over
the
world
rushing
to
become

American.
Notwithstanding
that
was
the
case
for
some
or
even
many
individuals,
it

cannot
be
ascertained
for
Palestinian
immigrants
who
began
to
arrive
on
the
heel
of

the
immigration
reform,
but
were
self-‐defined
exiles
(Cainkar,
1988).
The

Immigration
was
timely
and
essential
to
the
wellbeing
of
many
villages
in
the
West

Bank
that
depended
on
remittances
and
sponsorship
from
relatives
in
the
United

States.
One
of
the
primary
stipulations
utilized
by
Palestinians
to
migrate
to
the

United
States
was
the
“family
reunification”
clause.
This
meant
that
many
of
the

newcomers
could
not
speak
English
or
lacked
the
credentials
to
integrate
on
their

own,
and
as
such
came
to
depend
on
their
families
as
much,
if
not
more,
than
they

did
in
their
villages
of
origin.

The
significance
of
the
1965
Act
was
that
it
opened
a
steady
stream
of

migration
rather
than
a
floodgate
as
some
conservative
commentators
cautioned

about
recent
immigrants.
Although
the
immigration
reform
removed
country
quotas

imposed
in
1924,
it
also
kept
the
requirements
for
migrant
applications
demanding

and
inaccessible
to
many.

16

16

V. DEMOGRAPHIC
PROFILE

Based
on
ACS
5-‐year
estimate
for
2010,
the
total
Palestinian
American

population
sampled
was
83,241.
The
gender
gap
between
males
and
females
is

narrowing
reaffirming
the
notion
that
Palestinians
have
built
communities
and

no
longer
travel
as
single
men
for
economic
reasons.
The
percentage
of
males
to

females
is
55
to
45.

Approximately,
one-‐third
of
the
population
is
17
years
of
age
or
younger

(14,342
males
and
13,492
females;
32%
and
30%
respectively).
Just
under

another
one-‐third
is
under
the
age
of
34
years
(12,865
males
and
11,854
females,

28%
and
31%).
Together,
this
indicates
that
the
Palestinian
American
population

is
relatively
young
with
a
majority
under
34.

This
is
a
significant
characteristic

for
the
future
of
the
population
for
many
have
not
completed
schooling
and
have

not
met
their
occupational
and
earning
potentials.

In
Figure
1
below,
the
population
is
distributed
into
5-‐year
cohorts.
It

can
be
deciphered
from
the
pyramid
that
most
of
the
dependent
population
is

minors
and
not
seniors,
who
account
for
6%
of
the
total
population.

In
the

middle
cohorts
from
35-‐64,
is
the
final
third
of
the
population
who
may
be

assumed
to
be
supporting
the
younger
members.

17

17

Figure
1:
Population
Distribution

With
such
a
young
population
and
in
the
context
of
the
immigration
flows,
it
is

not
surprising
that
59%
were
native
born
Americans.
According
to
the
information

in
Table
No.
1,
only
12%
of
all
Palestinian
Americans
are
not
U.S.
citizens.

Palestinians,
understandably,
are
among
the
Arab
immigrants
quickest
to
file
for

U.S.
citizenship.
Reasons
for
this
include
a
desire
to
have
a
passport
and
citizenship

other
than
the
one
they
entered
the
U.S.
with
and
to
benefit
from
the
access
an

American
passport
secures
to
the
West
Bank
and
other
Palestinian
areas.

17

Figure
1:
Population
Distribution

With
such
a
young
population
and
in
the
context
of
the
immigration
flows,
it
is

not
surprising
that
59%
were
native
born
Americans.
According
to
the
information

in
Table
No.
1,
only
12%
of
all
Palestinian
Americans
are
not
U.S.
citizens.

Palestinians,
understandably,
are
among
the
Arab
immigrants
quickest
to
file
for

U.S.
citizenship.
Reasons
for
this
include
a
desire
to
have
a
passport
and
citizenship

other
than
the
one
they
entered
the
U.S.
with
and
to
benefit
from
the
access
an

American
passport
secures
to
the
West
Bank
and
other
Palestinian
areas.

18

18

Table
No.
1:

Birthplace
and
citizenship
status
of
Palestinian
Americans
in
the
U.S.
in
2010

Number

Percentage
of
all

people

Percent
of

category

U.S.
Native

48,877

59%

Born
in
state
of
residence

34,831

42%
71%

Born
in
state
other
than
state
of
residence

11,385

14%
23%

Born
outside
the
U.S.

2,661

3%
5%

Born
abroad
of
American
parents

2,129

3%
4%

Foreign
born

34,364

41%

Naturalized
U.S.
citizen

24,652

30%
72%

Not
a
U.S.
citizen

9,712

12%
28%

Note:
Estimates
subject
to
sampling
variability
not
reported
in
table

Source:
American
Community
Survey,
2010
5-‐year
estimates,
Table
CB05002

In
Table
No.
2,
fertility
rates
for
Palestinian
Americans
women
is
roughly

twice
the
U.S.
general
population
average
(10%
vs.
5.4%).
There
were
very
few

teenage
pregnancies
and
the
22
(1%)
who
were
recorded
as
having
given
birth
in

the
previous
12
months,
all
were
married
like
their
counterparts
in
other
age

cohorts.

Table
No.
2:
Births
in
past
year
to
Palestinian-‐American
women
in
the
U.S.
in
2010

Number
of

women
with

child
born

Percentage
of

women
in
age

group
with
child

born

Percent
of

births
to

women
in

age
group

Women
with
births
in
past
year

(all
ages)

2,119

10%

Ages
15-‐19

22

1%
1%

Ages
20-‐34

1,630

15%
77%

Ages
35-‐50

467

7%
22%

Note:
Estimates
subject
to
sampling
variability
not
reported
in
table

Source:
American
Community
Survey,
2010
5-‐year
estimates,
Table
B13002

19

19

It
is
important
to
compare
this
birth
rate
across
generations
to
access

whether
there
is
a
decline
in
Palestinian
American
childbirth,
which
anecdotally
is

the
case
given
that
more
are
American
born
and
the
greater
levels
of
education

among
Palestinian
Americans
as
demonstrated
in
Table
No.
3
below.
Although
exact

figures
are
not
available
at
this
stage,
the
levels
of
educational
attainment
coupled

with
the
age
distribution
suggests
that
those
with
no
school
or
less
than
a
high

school
degree
are
predominantly
among
the
segment
of
the
population
over
50.
The

reader
may
remember
that
a
large
proportion
of
Palestinian
American
immigrants

historically
arrived
with
limited
human
capital10.
The
over
50
population
constitutes

17%
of
the
total
population,
and
the
number
of
those
with
less
than
high
school

education
is
16%.
This
is
not
to
suggest
that
all
Palestinian
Americans
over
50
lack

education
past
high
school,
since
there
were
students
and
professionals
moving
to

the
U.S.
in
earlier
periods
and
there
are
individuals
over
50
who
were
born
and

educated
in
the
U.S.

Table
No.
3:
Educational
attainment
of
ages
25
and
older
in
U.S.
in
2010

Number
Percent
U.S.
Percent

No
Schooling

704

2%
2%

Less
than
High
School

15,058

14%
14%

Nursery
to
sixth
grade

1,371

3%
3%

Seventh
or
eighth
grade

963

2%
2%

Ninth
to
twelfth
grade
(no
diploma)

3,729

8%
9%

High
School
Degree,
G.E.D.,
or
equivalent

8,995

20%
29%

Some
college,
no
degree

7,685

17%
21%

College
degree

21,238

48%
34%

Associate's

3,563

8%
8%

Bachelor's

10,649

24%
18%

Master's

4,196

9%
7%

Professional
or
doctoral

2,830

6%
2%

Note:
Estimates
subject
to
sampling
variability
not
reported
in
table

Source:
American
Community
Survey,
2010
5-‐year
estimates,
Table
B15002

10
I determined 50 and above as a good cut off given that much of the Palestinian immigration started after
the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

20

20

There
are
two
noteworthy
points
about
Palestinian
American
educational

attainment
in
comparison
to
the
general
U.S.
population:
1.
The
no
education
and

less
than
high
school
are
on
average
with
the
general
population,
but
more

importantly,
2.
The
percentage
attaining
college
and
post-‐graduate
degree
is
higher

than
the
U.S.
general
population
(48%
to
34%)
and
triple
in
the
professional
and

doctoral
attainment
(6%
to
2%).
Again,
this
alludes
to
those
who
came
highly

educated
and
to
the
upward
mobility
of
the
population.

To
further
understand
Palestinian
American
mobility
and
motivation
and

usage
of
their
education,
Table
No.
4
below
delineates
the
occupations
of
those
in

the
labor
force
over
the
age
of
16.
The
population
is
not
concentrated
in
any
single

market
niche,
although
there
is
variation
between
the
different
occupations.
The

two
main
occupations
are
in
“management,
business
and
finance”
(5,798/
17%)
and

“sales
and
related”
(9,381/28%).
This
conforms
to
the
literature
on
Arab
Americans

and
the
predominance
of
self-‐employment
in
small
businesses,
often
family
owned.

Entrepreneurial
ventures
are
attractive
to
immigrants
with
limited
language
skills

who
can
rely
on
capital
from
within
their
community.

The
next
three
popular
fields
were
“computer,
engineering,
and
science,”

which
included
architecture,
and
“education,
legal,
community
service,
arts
and

media”
and
“healthcare
practitioners
and
technical.”
The
first
is
self-‐explanatory
and

stood
at
7%
of
the
workforce,
while
the
latter
two
need
some
unpacking.
When

education,
legal,
community
service,
arts
and
media
are
disaggregated,
we
discover

that
education
accounted
for
2,228
of
the
positions
in
this
category
while
art,
design,

and
media
filled
499
positions;
this
translates
into
64%
and
15%
respectively.
While

education
is
a
relatively
popular
field,
it
only
assumed
7%
of
the
occupation

spectrum.
Art,
design,
and
media
comprised
a
mere
1%
of
all
those
occupied.
The

legal
profession
also
only
had
464
or
1%
of
the
employed
population.
Meanwhile,
in

healthcare
practitioners
and
technicians,
1500
were
medical
doctors
comprising

80%
of
this
specialty
and
5%
of
the
total
workforce
among
Palestinian-‐Americans.

21

21

Table
No.
4:
Occupations
of
employed
Palestinian-‐American
civilians
16
and
over
in
2010

Number
of
workers

employed
in

occupation

Percentage

of
total

population

employed

in

occupation

Percent
of

category

employed
in

specialty

Management,
business,
science
&
arts

13,510

41%

Management,
business
&
financial

5,798

17%
43%

Computer,
engineering
&
science

2,375

7%
18%

Education,
legal,
community
service,
arts
&
media

3,471

10%
26%

Healthcare
practitioners
&
technical

1,866

6%
14%

Service

3,647

11%

Healthcare
support

298

1%
8%

Protective
services
(fire,
law
enforcement)

292

1%
8%

Food
preparation
and
serving

1,712

5%
47%

Building
and
grounds
cleaning
and
maintenance

371

1%
10%

Personal
care
&
service

974

3%
27%

Sales
&
Office

12,322

4%

Sales
&
related

9,381

28%
76%

Office
&
administrative
support

2,941

9%
24%

Natural
resources,
construction
&
maintenance

1,532

5%

Farming,
fishing
&
forestry

-‐

0%
0%

Construction
&
extraction

548

2%
36%

Installation,
maintenance
&
repair

984

3%
64%

Production,
transportation
&
material
moving

2,316

7%

Production

888

3%
38%

Transportation

1,200

4%
52%

Material
moving

228

1%
10%

Note:
Estimates
subject
to
sampling
variability
not
reported
in
table

Source:
American
Community
Survey,
5-‐year
estimates,
Table
C24010

This
table
demonstrates
that
Palestinian
Americans
are
in
numerous

occupational
fields,
but
they
are
still
fairly
underrepresented
in
many
positions
of

potential
influence
(legal,
law
enforcement,
media).
However,
this
has
not
meant

that
they
have
suffered
financially.
In
fact,
as
is
evident
in
Table
No.
5
below,
the

household
median
income
is
$55,950
as
compared
to
the
total
U.S.
population,

22

22

which
was
$49,
445
for
the
same
year11.

This
figure
placed
Palestinian
American

slightly
above
White,
non-‐Hispanic
households
with
median
incomes
of
54,620
and

below
Asian
American
household
at
64,308.
Palestinian
American
households
fared

considerably
better
than
blacks
and
Latinos12.

However,
the
table
also
suggests

that
there
are
large
household
income
disparities
among
Palestinian
Americans

when
considering
that
there
are
households
well
below
the
poverty
level
as

indicated
in
the
11%
of
households
with
incomes
less
than
$20,000.

Table
No.
5:
Household
income
of
Palestinian
Americans
in
U.S.
in
2010

Median
Household
Income

$55,950

Number
of

Households

Percentage

of

Households

Cumulative

Percentage

of

Households

Household
Income

Less
than
$10,000
1646
6%
6%

$10,000

to
$14,999

1302
5%
11%

$15,000

to
$19,999

1403
5%
17%

$20,000

to
$24,999

1100
4%
21%

$25,000

to
$29,999

1493
6%
27%

$30,000

to
$34,999

1161
5%
32%

$35,000

to
$39,999

1061
4%
36%

$40,000

to
$44,999

1090
4%
40%

$45,000

to
$49,999

1390
5%
45%

$50,000

to
$59,999

1963
8%
53%

$60,000

to
$74,999

2363
9%
62%

$75,000

to
$99,999

3034
12%
74%

$100,000

to
$124,000

2139
8%
82%

$125,000

to
$149,999

1030
4%
86%

$150,000

to
$199,999

1706
7%
93%

$200,000
or
more

1798
7%
100%

Note:
Estimates
subject
to
sampling
variability
not
reported
in
table

Sources:
American
Community
Survey,
2010
5-‐year
estimates,
Table
B19001
&
B19013

11
One needs to keep in mind that some households would be hesitate to divulge income information out of
fear of drawing attention to themselves.
12
Source: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010 available on the
U.S. Census Bureau website at: http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-
157.html

23

23

Finally,
in
terms
of
geographic
distribution,
the
same
states
that
have

historically
been
primary
settlements
for
Arab
Americans
in
general,
including

Palestinian
Americans:
California,
Ohio,
New
York,
New
Jersey,
Illinois,
Michigan,

and
Florida.
The
top
county
with
a
sizable
Palestinian
American
community
is
in

Illinois
(Cook
County),
while
California
is
the
state
with
the
largest
number
of

counties
with
discernable
counties
(7
in
total).
New
York,
New
Jersey,
and
Michigan,

Texas,
and
Ohio
all
have
roughly
the
same
number
of
Palestinian
Americans
living
in

communities
that
are
large
enough
for
ACS
data
to
capture
without
revealing
the

households
and
individuals’
identities.

Summary
of
Census
Data

As
mentioned
at
the
beginning
of
the
report,
census
data
is
quite
limited
in

terms
of
providing
precise
numbers
on
the
total
population
of
Palestinian

Americans.
However,
it
has
offered
a
general
depiction
of
who
is
included
in
this

population;
namely:
this
is
a
younger
ethnic
group,
both
in
tenure
in
the
U.S.
but
also

in
age.
The
majority
of
the
population
is
under
the
age
of
34
(~60%)
and
native

born.
48%
are
highly
educated,
many
of
them
work
in
management,
sales,
and
retail

(i.e.
entrepreneurial
ventures),
and
their
median
income
in
2010
was
over
$11,000

more
than
that
for
the
general
U.S.
population
at
$55,950.
Women
are
almost
as

numerous
as
men
suggesting
that
there
are
more
communities
and
fewer
single

men
on
their
own.
For
the
remainder
of
the
report,
a
closer
examination
of

Palestinian
American
attitudes,
sense
of
belonging,
political
affiliations,
and

aspirations
will
be
presented.

25

25

PART
TWO:
SURVEY
RESULTS

I. Design
of
Survey

In
this
segment
of
the
report,
the
results
of
an
online
survey
designed,
coded,

and
analyzed
by
Randa
Serhan
will
be
discussed.
The
survey
consisted
of
40

demographic,
identification,
and
biographical
questions.
The
questions
were

constructed
based
on
previous
research
conducted
by
Serhan
in
metropolitan
New

York
between
2001-‐2008,
which
delved
into
the
daily
lives,
community
building,

and
intergenerational
relationships
among
West
Bank
Palestinian
immigrants
and

their
American
born
children
and
grandchildren.

The
original
research
was
ethnographic
allowing
deep
exploration
into

identity
politics
and
internal
family
dynamics,
as
well
as
connections
to
villages
of

origin
across
the
generations.
The
online
survey
for
this
project
benefited
greatly

from
the
knowledge
of
internal
mechanisms
of
reproduction
of
the
community
in

metropolitan
New
York.
In
a
sense,
the
survey
was
both
testing
and
expanding
on

earlier
conclusions
derived
from
a
localized
study
onto
a
national
scale.
As
such,
the

results
will
also
be
contextualized
into
the
historical
and
empirical
data
from
the

New
York
ethnography.
In
other
words,
the
survey
results
will
be
analyzed
with

particular
attention
paid
to
generational,
regional
origin,
and
post-‐9/11
experiential

differences.

Serhan
designed
the
survey
in
June
2015,
and
it
went
live
online
in
July
2015

through
Survey
Monkey.
College-‐aged
individuals
were
the
primary
target
of
this

survey
considering
that
this
cohort
would
be
less
likely
to
participate
in
a
focus

group
and
more
likely
to
be
comfortable
with
responding
to
an
online
survey.

Palestinian
and
Arab
student
groups
were
emailed
across
the
US
asking
them
to

encourage
any
Palestinians
or
Palestinian
Americans
to
participate
in
the
online

survey.
The
individual
was
then
asked
to
add
their
email
to
a
google
doc
where
it

then
would
be
transferred
to
Survey
Monkey.
The
reason
for
this
two-‐step
process

is
to
reduce
the
likelihood
that
any
one
respondent
would
be
identified;
the

respondents
were
not
asked
to
offer
their
full
names
or
respond
to
Survey
Monkey

directly
until
they
had
agreed
to
on
the
google
doc.

26

26

In
the
summer
months,
it
was
difficult
to
get
students
to
respond
since
most

student
groups
are
not
active
over
the
summer
break.
In
total,
there
were
187

respondents,
3
of
whom
dropped
out
of
the
survey.

The
results
presented
below

will
be
based
on
the
184
respondents
who
completed
the
survey.

II. Demographics
of
Respondents13

Most
of
the
respondents
to
the
survey
were
between
the
ages
of
18-‐35

(73.76%)
with
a
full
50%
being
between
the
ages
of
18-‐26
or
college
aged.
The
age

distribution
is
displayed
in
Chart
no.
1
below.
If
one
considers
those
who
were

minors
(under
18
in
2001),
more
than
63%
of
the
respondents
have
grown
up
in
the

aftermath
of
the
September
11,
2001
terrorist
attacks
on
the
World
Trade
Center
in

New
York
and
the
Pentagon
in
Washington,
DC.

Chart
No.
1:
Age
Distribution
of
Respondents

13
The demographic data is based on the responses of 156 individuals. It is interesting to note that 28
respondents (15%) refused to reveal their demographic data in spite of being assured anonymity. On a few
questions the response rate rose to between 158-160, but never full responses of the demographic questions.
This relates to and reinforces our knowledge of Palestinian Americans’ reluctance to self-identify as
Palestinian on government forms. Having identified as Palestinian on this survey, they have chosen to leave
out other identifiers. This point will be discussed further in the section of identification and sense of
belonging below.
Between 18-22
31%
Between 23-26
19%
Between 27-30
13%
Berween 31-35
10%
Between 36-40
9%
Between 41-49
10%
Between 50-59
6%
Betweeb 60-69
2%Above 70
0%
What is your age

26

In
the
summer
months,
it
was
difficult
to
get
students
to
respond
since
most

student
groups
are
not
active
over
the
summer
break.
In
total,
there
were
187

respondents,
3
of
whom
dropped
out
of
the
survey.

The
results
presented
below

will
be
based
on
the
184
respondents
who
completed
the
survey.

II. Demographics
of
Respondents13

Most
of
the
respondents
to
the
survey
were
between
the
ages
of
18-‐35

(73.76%)
with
a
full
50%
being
between
the
ages
of
18-‐26
or
college
aged.
The
age

distribution
is
displayed
in
Chart
no.
1
below.
If
one
considers
those
who
were

minors
(under
18
in
2001),
more
than
63%
of
the
respondents
have
grown
up
in
the

aftermath
of
the
September
11,
2001
terrorist
attacks
on
the
World
Trade
Center
in

New
York
and
the
Pentagon
in
Washington,
DC.

Chart
No.
1:
Age
Distribution
of
Respondents

13
The demographic data is based on the responses of 156 individuals. It is interesting to note that 28
respondents (15%) refused to reveal their demographic data in spite of being assured anonymity. On a few
questions the response rate rose to between 158-160, but never full responses of the demographic questions.
This relates to and reinforces our knowledge of Palestinian Americans’ reluctance to self-identify as
Palestinian on government forms. Having identified as Palestinian on this survey, they have chosen to leave
out other identifiers. This point will be discussed further in the section of identification and sense of
belonging below.
Between 18-22
31%
Between 23-26
19%
Between 27-30
13%
Berween 31-35
10%
Between 36-40
9%
Between 41-49
10%
Between 50-59
6%
Betweeb 60-69
2%Above 70
0%
What is your age

27

27

In
addition
to
being
young,
the
majority
of
the
respondents
(99
or
63.46%)
were

female.
Of
these
60%
were
single
and
another
36.25%
were
married,
and
only

slightly
over
1%
were
divorced.

In
terms
of
education,
41.4%
were
either
in
college
or
graduate
school,
and

42.4%
were
working
full
time.
That
means
the
vast
majority
were
engaged
in
the

public
sphere
as
students
or
workers/employees
on
a
daily
basis.

Economically,
most
identified
as
middle
class
(see
chart
no.
2
below
for

details).
Yet,
interestingly
also
considered
themselves
as
the
primary
provider
or
a

contributor
to
their
household
suggesting
perhaps
that
women
were
becoming

bigger
contributors
to
the
household
because
of
changing
gender
norms
or

economic
necessity
of
the
household
(keeping
in
mind
only
around
30%
were

married).

Chart
No.
2:
Self-‐Assessment
of
Socioeconomic
Standing

As
can
be
seen
from
Chart
no.
3,
74%
are
economically
active
with
54%
contributing

to
a
household.
The
large
percentage
of
adults
in
the
workforce
fits
in
with
the
age

cohort
of
the
general
American
population
(according
to
US
Census
data
from

2010).

Upper
class
7%
Upper middle
class
27%
Middle class
47%
Lower middle
clasee
10%
Working class
6%
I am
not
sure
3%
Would you describe yourself/family as

27

In
addition
to
being
young,
the
majority
of
the
respondents
(99
or
63.46%)
were

female.
Of
these
60%
were
single
and
another
36.25%
were
married,
and
only

slightly
over
1%
were
divorced.

In
terms
of
education,
41.4%
were
either
in
college
or
graduate
school,
and

42.4%
were
working
full
time.
That
means
the
vast
majority
were
engaged
in
the

public
sphere
as
students
or
workers/employees
on
a
daily
basis.

Economically,
most
identified
as
middle
class
(see
chart
no.
2
below
for

details).
Yet,
interestingly
also
considered
themselves
as
the
primary
provider
or
a

contributor
to
their
household
suggesting
perhaps
that
women
were
becoming

bigger
contributors
to
the
household
because
of
changing
gender
norms
or

economic
necessity
of
the
household
(keeping
in
mind
only
around
30%
were

married).

Chart
No.
2:
Self-‐Assessment
of
Socioeconomic
Standing

As
can
be
seen
from
Chart
no.
3,
74%
are
economically
active
with
54%
contributing

to
a
household.
The
large
percentage
of
adults
in
the
workforce
fits
in
with
the
age

cohort
of
the
general
American
population
(according
to
US
Census
data
from

2010).

Upper
class
7%
Upper middle
class
27%
Middle class
47%
Lower middle
clasee
10%
Working class
6%
I am
not
sure
3%

27

In
addition
to
being
young,
the
majority
of
the
respondents
(99
or
63.46%)
were

female.
Of
these
60%
were
single
and
another
36.25%
were
married,
and
only

slightly
over
1%
were
divorced.

In
terms
of
education,
41.4%
were
either
in
college
or
graduate
school,
and

42.4%
were
working
full
time.
That
means
the
vast
majority
were
engaged
in
the

public
sphere
as
students
or
workers/employees
on
a
daily
basis.

Economically,
most
identified
as
middle
class
(see
chart
no.
2
below
for

details).
Yet,
interestingly
also
considered
themselves
as
the
primary
provider
or
a

contributor
to
their
household
suggesting
perhaps
that
women
were
becoming

bigger
contributors
to
the
household
because
of
changing
gender
norms
or

economic
necessity
of
the
household
(keeping
in
mind
only
around
30%
were

married).

Chart
No.
2:
Self-‐Assessment
of
Socioeconomic
Standing

As
can
be
seen
from
Chart
no.
3,
74%
are
economically
active
with
54%
contributing

to
a
household.
The
large
percentage
of
adults
in
the
workforce
fits
in
with
the
age

cohort
of
the
general
American
population
(according
to
US
Census
data
from

2010).

Upper
class
7%
Upper middle
class
27%
Middle class
47%
Lower middle
clasee
10%
Working class
6%
I am
not
sure
3%

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