Although an easement can arise in a variety of ways, any easement can be extinguished by the easement’s abandonment by the owner of the dominant estate. In order to prove abandonment, it is necessary to establish not only an intention by the dominant estate holder to abandon the rights to the easement, but also some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. However, the act must unequivocally reference the intent to abandon the easement and clearly demonstrate that the dominant estate owner is permanently relinquishing all right to the easement and not merely deserting it for some temporary period. Mere nonuse is not enough to constitute abandonment, even if for a long period.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
Application: Defendant laid a natural gas pipeline four feet under the ground across plaintiff’s lands. Id. at 374, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 444. Defendant justified his act on the basis that he had a right pursuant to an easement to lay and maintain such a pipe. Id. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to remove pipelines on the basis that easement was abandoned. Id. Plaintiff’s nonuse of land from 1932 to 1957, which was when the defendant constructed the pipeline over plaintiff’s land, does not constitute abandonment. Further, there was no intention to abandon the easement or any affirmative conduct inconsistent with the desire to use the easement. Thus, the easement was not terminated.
Easement by grant, express or implied, can only be extinguished by abandonment, conveyance, condemnation, or adverse possession. Id. at 330, 680 N.E.2d at 180, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 163. In order to prove abandonment it is necessary to establish both an intention to abandon and also some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. Id. at 331, 680 N.E.2d at 181, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 164. Acts evincing an intention to abandon must be unequivocal. Id. The acts must clearly demonstrate the permanent relinquishment of all right to the easement. Id. The “mere use of the easement for a purpose not authorized, the excessive use or misuse, or the temporary abandonment thereof, are not of themselves sufficient to constitute an abandonment.” Id. at 331, 680 N.E.2d at 181, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 164 (citing Roby v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 142 N.Y. 176, 181, 36 N.E. 1053, 1055).
Application: Plaintiffs and defendant were owners of adjacent residential properties that are separated by a lot called a ‘lane. When originally divided, the lane was the only possible avenue to a public street from the defendant’s property.. Defendant constructed a patio and built fences and enclosures on this land. Plaintiff commenced action against defendant to remove these encumbrances. The lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Court of Appeals held that encroachments may either be found to show a present intention not to use the easements so as to unequivocally demonstrate an abandonment or a deferred use, which would be consistent with a reliance upon the continued existence of a property right of way.
Conclusion: Yes. Defendant might be able to prove that the easement was abandoned.
Although an easement can arise in a variety of ways, any easement can be extinguished by the easement’s abandonment by the owner of the dominant estate. In order to prove abandonment, it is necessary to establish not only an intention by the dominant estate holder to abandon the rights to the easement, but also some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. However, the act must unequivocally reference the intent to abandon the easement and clearly demonstrate that the dominant estate owner is permanently relinquishing all right to the easement and not merely deserting it for some temporary period. Mere nonuse is not enough to constitute abandonment, even if for a long period.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
An easement once granted may be ended by merger. Under the merger doctrine, an easement will terminate when the dominant and servient estates become vested in one person. To satisfy this, there must be a comple te unity of the dominant and servient estates, meaning that one person or entity owns the entire plot of land. When only a portion of the servient or dominant estate is acquired, there is no complete unity of title. Therefore, the easement still stands. In other words, in order for such an abolition of the easement to take place, the entire burdened property and the entire dominant property must come under the ownership of the same entity.
Will v. Gates, 89 N.Y.2d 778, 784, 680 N.E.2d 1197, 1200, 685 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (1997).
Id.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
Although an easement can arise in a variety of ways, any easement can be extinguished by the easement’s abandonment by the owner of the dominant estate. In order to prove abandonment, it is necessary to establish not only an intention by the dominant estate holder to abandon the rights to the easement, but also some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. However, the act must unequivocally reference the intent to abandon the easement and clearly demonstrate that the dominant estate owner is permanently relinquishing all right to the easement and not merely deserting it for some temporary period. Mere nonuse is not enough to constitute abandonment, even if for a long period.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
Easements created by necessity terminate when the necessity comes to an end. The most common example of easement by necessity will illustrate the difference. Imagine a land owner has a fairly substantial piece of acreage and decides to subdivide it into lots and one of the lots the owner creates is completely landlocked inside the other lots. As the owner sells off those lots, the sale creates an easement of access on those lots enabling the owner of the landlocked lot to access the highway. This is an easement of necessity. Even when no agreement exists as to the right of access, the owner requiring access has a right to it. But when a new means of access comes available and the original necessity perishes, the land owner loses its right of access.
The law requires that such an implied easement be actually necessary for the use and enjoyment of the property, not merely convenient to the owner of the dominant estate. Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385 (1892).
Will v. Gates, 89 N.Y.2d 778, 784, 680 N.E.2d 1197, 1200, 685 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (1997).
Id.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
Easements created by necessity terminate when the necessity comes to an end. The most common example of easement by necessity will illustrate the difference. Imagine a land owner has a fairly substantial piece of acreage and decides to subdivide it into lots and one of the lots the owner creates is completely landlocked inside the other lots. As the owner sells off those lots, the sale creates an easement of access on those lots enabling the owner of the landlocked lot to access the highway. This is an easement of necessity. Even when no agreement exists as to the right of access, the owner requiring access has a right to it. But when a new means of access comes available and the original necessity perishes, the land owner loses its right of access.
The law requires that such an implied easement be actually necessary for the use and enjoyment of the property, not merely convenient to the owner of the dominant estate. Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385 (1892).
Will v. Gates, 89 N.Y.2d 778, 784, 680 N.E.2d 1197, 1200, 685 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (1997).
Id.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
Although an easement can arise in a variety of ways, any easement can be extinguished by the easement’s abandonment by the owner of the dominant estate. In order to prove abandonment, it is necessary to establish not only an intention by the dominant estate holder to abandon the rights to the easement, but also some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. However, the act must unequivocally reference the intent to abandon the easement and clearly demonstrate that the dominant estate owner is permanently relinquishing all right to the easement and not merely deserting it for some temporary period. Mere nonuse is not enough to constitute abandonment, even if for a long period.
Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
This doctrine arises out of 357 East Seventy-Sixth St. Corp. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,, a case involving a party wall. Parties were adjacent property owners. Plaintiff demolished the building on its property except for the party wall. Plaintiff intended to use the party wall for support of a garage. . Before plaintiff built the garage, defendant demolished its building and the entire party wall. Consequently, plaintiff built an independent wall on its own premises, even though the party wall was suitable for continued use. The Court found that when plaintiff demolished its building, it put an end to the necessity of support on its side of the wall. Defendant put a definitive end to the easement when it demolished its entire building and put an end to the necessity of the support on its side of the wall. By demolishing his structure, he demolished his need for the easement and therefore, in effect, demolished the easement.
263 N.Y. 63, 188 N.E. 158 (1933).
A government can create an easement by way of condemnation. However, Strnad v. Brudnicki notes that a governmental agency can also abolish an easement by condemning it. This could take a number of forms, depending on the facts of the situation. One such set of facts would be when the government has condemned a plot of land, which plot is subject to an easement in favor of the adjoining property owner, and the government removes the easement by condemning it.
200 A.D.2d 735, 606 N.Y.S. 913 (2009), accord Zutt v. State, 99 A.D.3d 85, 949 N.Y.S.2d 402 (2d Dept. 2012).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, claim of right shall not be required if the owner or owners of the real property throughout the statutory period cannot be ascertained in the records of the county clerk, or the register of the county, of the county where such real property is situated, and located by reasonable means.
The Courts in the Second Department have come to different conclusions regarding the application of the new law. To date, three decisions in the second department have applied the new law.
84 AD3d 734 (2d Dept. 2011)(Full disclosure: Adam Leitman Bailey, P.C. represented the prevailing party in Hartman v. Goldman).
Hartman v. Goldman, 84 A.D.3d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011)
“Under the plain terms of RPAPL 543 as amended, the plaintiffs' plantings of foliage and shrubbery, and landscaping and lawn maintenance are de minimis and deemed permissive and non-adverse (see Sawyer v Prusky, 71 AD3d 1325, 1327, 896 NYS2d 536 [2010]). Further, the driveway lights installed by the plaintiffs, which are approximately four feet high and six inches in diameter, are also governed by RPAPL 543, which applies to all de minimis, non-structural encroachments "including, but not limited to," those expressly listed in the statute.”
Hartman v Goldman, 84 A.D.3d 734, 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011)
83 AD3d 758 (2d Dept. 2011).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
The Third Department has also issued conflicting decisions on the retroactive application of the 2008 RPAPL amendments to cases filed after July 7, 2008 but where title allegedly vested prior to that date.
In Ziegler v. Serrano, the Court applied the new law to a case where adverse possession had vested in 1995. In Ziegler, Defendant and her husband owned property as tenants by the entirety from 1972-1984, at which point the defendant abandoned her husband and left the property. Defendant’s husband received judgment for divorce and partition of the property due to defendant’s default. Defendant’s husband, now having fee title in the property, deeded the property to plaintiffs in 1985. The plaintiffs then continued to occupy the premises as their residence. In 1991, upon motion made by the defendant and her husband, both the divorce and partition judgments against the defendant were vacated for improper service. In 1992 defendant sued plaintiffs, challenging their title to the property. The action was dismissed due to failure to prosecute. However, in 2008, plaintiff’s moved to quiet title.
74 AD3d 1610 (3d Dept. 2010).
Specifically mentioning RPAPL §§501(3) and 511 as amended in 2008, the Ziegler Court held that plaintiffs’ claim of right was based on a “reasonable basis” as it was pursuant to a written instrument -- a deed. Because the plaintiffs entered with a reasonable claim of right and possession and occupation was continuous for the statutory period, adverse possession was upheld. The Court acknowledged the holding in Franza and recognized that title would also have vested under pre-2008 law, but noted that the parties did not question the propriety of applying the 2008 legislation, and, therefore, the Court declined to address the issue. The Court held that a claim of right based on a deed is a reasonable basis for a claim of right under both the new law and the old law.
In Sawyer v. Prusky, an action commenced in September of 2008, where the alleged acts of adverse possession occurred “between 1997 and 2008,” the Court applied the new law without hesitation. Plaintiffs acquired the disputed property in 1997. At that time, a common walkway and pipeline marked the property line. Later, plaintiffs’ built a rock wall on the property line. In 2008, defendants surveyed their property. Defendants found that certain land formerly believed to belong to plaintiffs, including the property upon which the rock wall lay, actually belonged to the defendants. Subsequently, defendants removed plaintiffs’ rock wall and erected a fence on the boundary line found by the 2008 survey. Plaintiffs sued to quiet title. Plaintiffs’ claim of right to the disputed strip of land was based upon a written instrument, the deed received by the plaintiffs at the time of purchase. Applying RPAPL §512 as amended in 2008 and newly enacted RPAPL §543, the Court found the rock wall to be “de minimis” and “non-adverse,” and, on that basis, plaintiffs’ claim for adverse possession was dismissed.
71 A.D.3d 1325 (3d Dept. 2010)
In contrast, in Barra v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., a case commenced in March of 2009, the Third Department applied the old law because title by adverse possession would have vested before the adverse possession statute was amended. Plaintiffs owned land adjacent to railroad tracks owned by the defendant. In March 2008, defendant closed the middle crossing. Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that they acquired a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over the northern crossing. The Court held that when all of the elements of a prescriptive easement are present, except express hostility, hostility is generally presumed, shifting the burden to the defendant to show that the use was in fact permissive. As defendant failed to sufficiently prove that permission was implied from the beginning, the Court held that summary judgment for the defendant was inappropriate.
75 A.D.3d 821 (3d Dept. 2010)
In discussing the application of the 2008 amendments to this case, the Court held that because “the plaintiffs prescriptive period commenced and concluded prior to the effective date,” and the “right to an easement by prescription, as with adverse possession, vests upon expiration of the statute of limitations for recovery of real property,” that plaintiff’s claims “may not be disturbed retroactively by newly-enacted or amended legislation.” The Court therefore held (citing Franza) that the “plaintiffs are entitled to have their claims measured in accordance with the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the 2008 amendments.”
The Third Department has applied pre-2008 adverse possession law to two other cases commenced after July 7, 2008, but where the alleged vesting of title occurred prior to that date. In Wilcox v. McLean and in Quinlan v. Doe, the Court panels in those cases, citing Barra, held that the 2008 RPAPL amendments were not applicable to adverse possession claims that allegedly vested prior to the effective date of the amendments.
90 AD3d 1363 (3rd Dept. 2011)
107 AD3d 1373 (3rd Dept. 2013)
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
110 AD3d 989 (2013).
This article aims at setting the law straight on easements and their termination. With every inch of New York City and other parts of New York being sought for fertile building ground, easement problems have reached a new plateau and too many misinformed professionals and their clients have been taking actions without any basis in law. Because the termination of an easement is one of the most misunderstood areas of real estate law, the number of cases on the subject has spiked. Thanks to the courts and the title industry’s vast wisdom in advising the real estate industry, many potential problems have been prevented or litigated justly during the real estate boom. Many other easements have gone unprotected and lost. Either way, never before has our land provided real estate professionals with so much excitement.