1. OFFICE MEMORANDUM
To: Jonathon C. McGovern, Esq.
From: Maggie Xuemei Yang
Date: December 2, 2008
Re: Whitpain File #245-03
ISSUE
Under Delaware law, is hockey coach negligent when his/her student gets injured
while skating on the ice without a helmet, which is under the coach’s acknowledge?
BRIEF ANSWER
Yes.
Delaware law holds that a hockey coach negligent when his/her student gets
injured while skating on the ice without a helmet, which is under the coach’s
acknowledge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Our client, Meredith, a minor, is a hockey team member of Rehoboth Frozen
Pond. Several weeks ago, after Meredith has been played hockey for 6 months, she went
to practice without her helmet. Her coach, Guy Pellbergh, acknowledged them as they
skated on the ice ready to begin their shooting drills. As Meredith slated patterns down
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2. the ice, she skated into her teammate. As a result the collision, Meredith fell striking her
head on the ice. She lay unconscious as she was sent to Rehoboth Beach Memorial
Hospital. Meredith suffered a broken fibula that protruded out from the skin to the right
of her knee, and concussion and swelling of the brain. When she regained consciousness,
her speech was slurred and difficult to understand. Due to the seventy of damage, she is
expected to need continuing care and therapy, also after several weeks of treatment, the
doctors fear that Meredith will lose the use of her leg for hockey and dance and maybe
more. Meredith’s parents, Tom and Marci, would like to know whether they could make
a claim against the hockey coach due to his negligence.
DISCUSSION
The case interprets duty of care is Adams v. Kline, 239 A.2d 230, (Del. Super,
1969). In this case, Plaintiff Adams was a 19 years old student at the University of
Delaware, and he is also a member of the University’s soccer team. Id. at 232. Loren
Kline was the coach of the soccer team. Id. On November 13, 1964, the team prepared to
attend a game at Temple University in Philadelphia, PA. Id. Two vans were to carry the
team members and equipment. Id. Each car was driven by Plaintiff and Defendant. Id.
The can had a carry capacity of 900 lbs, but on this day, the van carried approximately
1300 to 1400 pounds of bodies and equipment. Id. at 233. When the Defendant’s vehicle
slowed at a busy intersection, Plaintiff’s vehicle did not stop before colliding with
defendant’s vehicle. Id. Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of this crash. The court held
that the University of Delaware had a duty to exercise due care under all circumstances.
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3. Id. In addition, “in his role as a teacher, Kline had a duty to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.” Id. The court also held that if a teach allows his pupil to use an
instrument or equipment which is under the control of the teach and which the teacher
knows or should know is unsuitable for such use and could foreseeable cause, the teacher
is liable for any harm proximately resulting from the pupil’s use of the unsuitable
equipment or instrument. Id.
In our case, just as in the Adams case, our client was allowed by her coach
Pellebergh to skate without a helmet. The coach should know without helmet is
dangerous for skating and could foreseeable cause harm. The injuries our client suffered
due to the coach breaching the duty of care. Therefore, according to Adams, the coach
was negligent and should be liable for the harm resulting from our client’s non-use of
proper equipment on ice.
Another case on point is James v. Laurel School District, 1993 WL 81277, (Del.
Super. 1993). Plaintiff James was a member of Laurel High School’s cheerleader team
and was injured in a cheerleading accident and filed suit against the school and the
school’s cheerleading coach. Id. at 2. The plaintiff alleged the coach’s negligent failure to
put protective mates over the wooden gymnasium floor contributed to the severity of the
plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The court held that Defendant made an error in judgment in
allowing an inexperienced participant to perform the pyramid without any protective
mats. Id. at 5.
In our case, just as in the James, the coach Pellebergh also made an error in
judgment in allowing our client, just 6 month experience minor, to practice on the ice
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4. without proper protective equipment. Obviously, coach Pellebergh breached his duty to
protect his pupil from particular harm. If our client had been wearing the helmet, she
probably would not have suffered this severity of damage. Therefore, if the court follows
the James, the coach was negligent and should be liable for our client’s damage.
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5. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Criminal Code 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1 establishes a rule for using of
force in defense of person, which states that a person is justified in use of force when he
reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself. In our case, Bing knew Geller’s explosive temper since they attended
college six years ago. Two or three times of violent fights happened before, as a result of
one fight, Bing sustained a black eye. This time, when Geller became angry, and
continued to advance on Bing, under this circumstance, it is likely that if Geller reached
Bing, Bing would die or get great bodily harm. Consequently, Bing reasonably believed
that use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself. Therefore, it is reasonable for Bing to use deadly force as self-defense under 720
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1.
In the case of People v. S.M., the court held that a person, who makes him reasonably
apprehensive that he will suffer great bodily harm, has the right to kill his assailant to
save his own life. Id. at 1215. In our case, evidence shows that Geller did not stop beating
Bing even Bing apologized. Geller threatened and still charged towards Bing even Bing
waved the gun at him and warned him. Under this circumstance, Bing feared for his life if
Geller charged him again. Bing shot Geller because he believed that was necessary to
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. Therefore, if People v. S.M. is
followed, Bing was reasonably has the right to kill his assailant to prevent from death.
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6. The case of People v. Shipp., provides that, with knowledge of the evidence of the
decedent’s violent disposition and threats, self defense can be used when the defendant
reasonably believed that employment of defense was necessary to prevent from killing or
great bodily harm. Id. at 970. In our case, Bing and Geller were close friends since
college. Geller was well known to have an explosive temper. During college, their
arguments escalated into violent fistfight two or three times, as result of one fight, Bing
suffered a black eye. On the day Geller was shot, he threatened Bing that he wanted kill
Bing, and kept charging towards Bing with a hunting knife. Bing shot Geller because
Bing was knowledge of Geller’s explosive temper and violent disposition, and reasonably
believed that use of deadly force was necessary to prevent from getting killed. In the light
of holding in People v. Shipp., it appears that there is sufficient basis to support that Bing
reasonably used deadly force for self-defense.
In the case of People v. Moore., the court held that a person is not justified in the use of
deadly force when he reasonably believes he is not in imminent danger of suffering death
or serious harm. Id. at 570. By contrast, in our case, at first, Bing got beaten by Geller,
and the two continued to circle each other. When Bing was waving the gun at Geller,
Geller still attempted to charge and tackle Bing. Bing had no chance to escape from the
beginning to the end. At this circumstance, the danger was apparent and deadly force was
vital requirement of imminence. Therefore, Bing reasonably believed the anticipated
harm is imminent and capable of causing death or great bodily harm.
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7. The case of People v. Shipp., provides that, with knowledge of the evidence of the
decedent’s violent disposition and threats, self defense can be used when the defendant
reasonably believed that employment of defense was necessary to prevent from killing or
great bodily harm. Id. at 970. In our case, Bing and Geller were close friends since
college. Geller was well known to have an explosive temper. During college, their
arguments escalated into violent fistfight two or three times, as result of one fight, Bing
suffered a black eye. On the day Geller was shot, he threatened Bing that he wanted kill
Bing, and kept charging towards Bing with a hunting knife. Bing shot Geller because
Bing was knowledge of Geller’s explosive temper and violent disposition, and reasonably
believed that use of deadly force was necessary to prevent from getting killed. In the light
of holding in People v. Shipp., it appears that there is sufficient basis to support that Bing
reasonably used deadly force for self-defense.
In the case of People v. Moore., the court held that a person is not justified in the use of
deadly force when he reasonably believes he is not in imminent danger of suffering death
or serious harm. Id. at 570. By contrast, in our case, at first, Bing got beaten by Geller,
and the two continued to circle each other. When Bing was waving the gun at Geller,
Geller still attempted to charge and tackle Bing. Bing had no chance to escape from the
beginning to the end. At this circumstance, the danger was apparent and deadly force was
vital requirement of imminence. Therefore, Bing reasonably believed the anticipated
harm is imminent and capable of causing death or great bodily harm.
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