MD-11 Checklist & Procedures Quickview v0.1.pdf

The MD-11 FCOM Bulletin provides information concerning technical /
operational issues resulting from in-service experience.
Additionally, instructions may be provided to handle long-lasting
deficiencies in the fleet or on specific aircraft until the problem has
been resolved or appropriate procedures have been established.
The Bulletin is required reading matter and must be filed in
FCOM Volume II after the bulletins TAB until it has been cancelled.
MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 18 NOV 2010
000 VALID MD11 FCOM BULLETINS
The following FCOM Bulletins are valid:
Nr. Title Issue date:
000 Valid MD11 FCOM Bulletins 18 NOV 2010
001 Crosswind Conditions 08 JAN 2007
002 QFE Operation in Russian Federation and CIS Airspace 08 JAN 2007
009 PEGASUS 04 FEB 2008
013 FMC 921 (PEGASUS) Magnetic variation errors 02 OCT 2008
014 Additional information on LINTOP 02 OCT 2008
015 Carbon Brakes 28 MAY 2009
016 Landing distances for Alternates 18 FEB 2010
017 Emergency Power test after APU start 18 FEB 2010
018 Center Landing Gear Brake (Re)Activation 1 FEB 2010
019 GE CF6-80 Transient Power Vibration 22 MAR 2010
020 GNSS Approaches 22 MAR 2010
021 MetS Descent Trial (Re-Issue) 01 AUG 2010
022 New TL-Table Layout 28 OCT 2010
023 Windshear Procedures 28 OCT 2010
024 ADS-B 18 NOV 2010

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 08 JAN 07
001 CROSSWIND CONDITIONS
Operation of an aircraft during maximum crosswind condition can be challenging. The MD-11
requires a lot of skill to fly a perfect take-off or landing under unfavorable wind conditions. The
flight control design of the MD-11 is considerably different from the Boeing North aircraft. As a
result of this different design also the flight technique differs.
Roll-control
KLM operates the MD-11 with RCWS and deflected ailerons. Both systems result in different
behavior in roll control when compared with the basic design without both features. RCWS will
reduce the maximum roll rate with 2 degrees/second and deflected ailerons with another 3
degrees/second.
This means that KLM operates the MD-11 with a maximum roll rate of 27 degrees/second
whereas the basic design has a maximum roll rate of 32 degrees/second. However the aircraft
still meets all certification criteria for roll control and crosswind capability. The ailerons are
deflected down (inboard 11.5 and outboard 15 degrees) during take-off and therefore the
down-going ailerons will reach their physical stops earlier. This will happen at about 50-60
degrees control wheel input. The up-going ailerons and spoilers still have a long way to go
after this point. Passing 50-60 degrees control wheel input override clappers have to be
opened in order to deflect the up-going ailerons and spoilers any further. This requires an
increased control wheel force. Additionally more control wheel input is needed for a certain roll
rate increase when the down-going ailerons have reached their physical stops.
Take-off
On the ground RCWS operates in a basic direct control law. Aileron deflection is directly
proportional to control wheel deflection. When airborne the RCWS will respond to a
commanded roll rate generated by pilot force on the control wheel. The transition phase can
create the feeling that roll control is less than optimal. This feeling can be increased when at
the same time a firm rudder input change is made. The effect of rudder input on roll control is
high on the MD-11.
During the take-off run only a limited aileron input is required. The pilot should begin to release
the rudder input, required to track the runway centerline, as soon as the nose gear is lifted
from the runway. This allows the aircraft to weathercock into the wind and results in minimum
rudder input when the aircraft becomes airborne. This will benefit roll control dramatically.
Landing
The deflected aileron system is not active in the landing configuration. Start to reduce the
existing crab-angle between 200ft and 100ft RA and finalize the forward slip technique below
100ft RA.
The WCF may not give you sufficient speed margin under all circumstances. For example a
steady crosswind of 30 kts results in the same WCF as wind calm. Therefore in windy
conditions and when shear can be expected (e.g. CCS or AUA), increase the WCF generously
to realize sufficient flight control response.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
002 QFE OPERATION IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND CIS AIRSPACE
In Russian / CIS airspace meters instead of feet are used for vertical separation, referenced
either to 1013 standard (flight levels) or below the transition level to meters/QFE (height). KLM
policy is to convert flight levels in meters to flight levels in feet, and heights in meters/QFE into
altitudes in feet/QNH by means of the conversion tables published in the navigation
documentation.
The altimeter of the MD-11 allows display of altitude in feet or meters, referenced to either
QNH or QFE, so this would appear to make the conversion unnecessary. However that is not
the case, as the altitude selector on the FCP is always linked to QNH altitude - when operating
with the QFE altitude mode selected QNH altitude is presented in the box below the Precision
Altitude Readout. The system is only designed for QFE operators in a QNH air traffic
environment, and not for approaches to airports using clearances only based on QFE.
An example best illustrates the problem. The aircraft is operating to an airport that is located
1000m above sea level. Below transition level QFE mode is selected on the altimeter and a
clearance to descend to 700m/QFE is followed, with 700m set in the altitude selector. The
aircraft will descend to 700m but relative to QNH. That setting is likely to be 1013, the last
setting when from operating at a flight level. Presuming a standard atmosphere this will be
300m lower than the airport elevation, not 700m above airport elevation. The conclusion is that
the QFE mode on the MD-11 altimeter should never be used.
Therefore the following altimeter procedures must be used during operation in Russian / CIS
airspace:
− En route Flight Levels
The meters setting for altimeter and FCP can be used for Flight Levels, with standard
altimeter setting, and cross checked with the feet / standard value in the conversion table.
− Operating to a Russian airport included in KLM route documentation
• When descending below the transition level all clearances are in meters/QFE.
• Set altimeter and FCP to feet (not meters). QNH altimeter mode remains selected.
• Cleared heights in meters/QFE are converted to feet/QNH by means of the conversion
tables on the STAR or Approach charts, and entered as such on the FCP altitude
selector. This ensures that at all times the aircraft altitude in relation to the published
approach procedure and MSA / ESA can be cross-checked, as these are all in
feet/QNH.
• Clearances and calls for maintaining / leaving of heights are read back in meters/QFE.
• Never use a QFE altimeter setting at airports with KLM route documentation because of
the lack of terrain clearance information.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
− Emergency diversion to an uncharted Russian airport
• In an emergency situation ATC may provide radar guidance to an uncharted airport.
However as no route documentation will be available this is only to be considered as a
last case resort.
• Below the transition level use meters instead of feet, and set the QFE pressure as a
QNH altimeter mode setting. This ensures that the altitude selector on the FCP is
referenced to the meters/QFE as displayed on the primary altitude display.
• Use the Manual Cabin Pressurization Control Procedure, as the cabin altitude will be off
schedule due to the incorrect aircraft altitude signal sent to the Cabin Pressure
Controllers.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 04 FEB 08
009 PEGASUS
“FROM” WAYPOINT ANOMALY
For aircraft with Pegasus FMS (921), when NAV mode is
engaged, or if engaged then exited, the displayed TIME, SPEED and
ALTITUDE on the FROM waypoint line of the ACT F-PLN Page will
update to reflect the referenced data as of the time the NAV
engagement, or exit, is executed. The erroneous TIME and ALTITUDE
is also displayed on the FROM waypoint line of the PROGRESS Page.
Position Reports:
Whenever sequencing a compulsory reporting point, record the actual
TIME and ALTITUDE at that waypoint. Do not rely on the accuracy of
the FROM waypoint ATO time or altitude displayed in the ACT F-PLN,
or the PROGRESS pages. Confirm actual ATO with manually logged
data.
NOTE: The established time en route for subsequent waypoints is
not affected.
“DIR TO” with ABEAM POINTS
For aircraft with Pegasus FMS (921), ETAs and associated en route predictions
were reported to be incorrect when selecting a DIR TO with ABEAM
POINTS. An arbitrary distance error occurs between the first and second
ABxxx waypoints causing all subsequent waypoint ETAs and predictions
to be in error. Predictions that may be in error are Time, Altitude, Speed,
and Fuel On Board.
Instructions:
After selecting a DIR TO with ABEAM POINTS, the crew should
immediately perform a DIR TO to the first “ABxxx” waypoint. If a leg
distance/time error exists, this procedure will correct all ETAs and
predictions.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 02 OCT 08
013 FMC 921 (PEGASUS) – MAGNETIC VARIATION ERRORS
Introduction
The purpose of this FCOM Bulletin is to provide background information concerning
magnetic variation errors which may occur in the FMS 921.
Caution: This variation error exists for all latitudes between 0 degrees and 6 degrees
west longitude.
At this moment the MD11 has no destinations within 0 degrees and 6 degrees west
longitude. But it may occur due to e.g. diversions etc.
Background information
The FMS 921 calculation of the internal magnetic variation (magnetic declination) tables
has been found to contain variation errors of up to 15 degrees. This variation error exists
for all latitudes between 0 degrees and 6 degrees west longitude and affects many
navigational bearing references.
Consequently, any FMC “bearing” or course information dependent on magnetic variation
from the FMC will be in error. This will affect a number of FMS functions. It will preclude
crew from using the FMS NAV mode to conduct NDB approaches, and from flying any
published holding patterns unless the holding fix is co-located at a VOR, VOR-DME or
VORTAC navaid.
The MAP and PLAN displays, if affected by MAGVAR error, will show misaligned tracks
and courses. If FMS NAV mode is engaged, guidance will reflect these errors. Crew
should always check FMS Flight Plans by comparing the PLAN mode displayed route and
MCDU route with ATC clearance and the appropriate charts. Route misalignment in the
PLAN mode indicates a segment affected by the MAGVAR error. Such misalignment is
best detected by reducing the PLAN mode range to 5 NM.
Operational consequences (within 0° to 6° West longitude)
- Place/Bearing/Distance (PBD):
When defining a PBD waypoint, always ensure that the “PLACE” (P) is referenced to a
VOR type navaid.
- FIX INFO page:
Crews must be aware when referencing FIX INFO page data that only waypoints
based on VOR type navaids will provide reliable information.
When using non-VOR based waypoints as the referenced fix, use only the DIST
(distance) in line 1 of the FIX INFO page.
- Non-Directional Radio Beacon (NDB) Procedures and Approaches:
NDB approaches must only be conducted with reference to the NDB navaid (raw data).
Do not fly FMS NAV or use FMS displayed course.
- Navigation Anomalies:
Use navigation charts and PLAN mode display to check FMS courses. When

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
discrepancies are identified, fly those navigation procedures with reference to basic
flight modes or raw data only. Do not fly in FMS NAV mode.
- Holding patterns and Approaches:
Except for holding patterns located over a VOR type navaid, all holding patterns must
be flown with reference to a ground-based radio navaid. FMS NAV mode should not be
used for these procedures because the holding pattern displayed on the MAP will be
misaligned by the amount of magnetic variation error.
- RNAV (GPS) Approaches:
It is recommended that any RNAV (GPS) approach that requires a holding procedure
(i.e. holding in lieu of procedure turn or missed approach holding) that cannot be flown
with reference to a radio navaid should not be conducted.
- Runway Alignment on ND MAP display:
Crews should be aware of this anomaly and should not use the displayed runway
orientation or the cyan runway extension line for guidance.
- F-PLN page 2/2 CRS field in line 2:
May be in error between any waypoints. Crew should not depend on this data.
- Course/Heading Legs and INTCPT Waypoints:
Fly course legs using navaid raw data and heading legs in FCP heading mode. Do not
use FMS NAV mode. Disregard associated INTCPT waypoints.
Summary
- All basic and auto flight modes of compass heading and track are usable.
- All localizer and ILS approaches are valid.
- Missed Approach HOLDS associated with all approaches must not be flown in
NAV due to misalignment of the HOLD pattern, unless they are referenced to
holding fixes located at VOR-type navaids.
FMS NAV mode Usable:
Routes constructed of unmodified FMS NAV Data Base waypoints will provide accurate
FMS NAV guidance, as the geographic location of these waypoints is correct. Data which
uses VOR, VOR-DME or VORTAC’s have correct station declination values and are
considered to be fully usable.
FMS NAV mode Unusable:
Non-Directional Radio Beacon (NDB) procedures/approaches, course and heading legs,
and holding patterns referenced to any non-VOR type waypoint should not be flown in
FMS NAV mode.
Note: Boeing is requested to correct this anomaly in the near future.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
014 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON LINTOP
Introduction
The purpose of this FCOM bulletin is to provide background information on LINTOP.
Content
• “Black box” of LINTOP
• Takeoff speeds
• Takeoff data card
• Flaps Optimum and Packs Off
• Runways and intersections
• Preparation Procedure LINTOP
• New calculation LINTOP
• Future
“Black box” of LINTOP
ATM inserts a runway and/or intersection in LINTOP database system including all the obstacles related to this
runway. Flight Technical has to validate a runway/intersection before a calculation can be made. When a request
is made via ACARS, Lintop will obtain the runway information from the database and run the original Boeing
software to calculate the appropriate output. This output will then be sent to the ACARS engine and presented as
an ACARS printout.
When a calculation is requested by pilots there is no manual interference except for the input made by the pilots
on the ACARS Performance page.
Takeoff speeds
The V1 calculated by LINTOP can be lower than we are used to. This is due to the fact that LINTOP uses a V1
min policy. The software finds the lowest V1 at which all requirements can be met. LINTOP uses the margin
between Actual TOW (TOGW) and performance limited TOW (PLTOW) to lower the V1 and in doing so increases
the accelerate-stop margin. If there is a large difference between TOGW and PLTOW, V1 can be as low as VMCG.
With Lintop, stopway and/or clearway are used to improve the takeoff performance. Because of this, also VR and
V2 can differ from the FMS or FCOM IV Performance speeds.
As mentioned in bulletin 010, the takeoff speeds V1, VR and V2 from the LINTOP output, must be inserted
manually on the FMS Takeoff page. You cannot compare the LINTOP speeds with the speeds mentioned in
FCOM IV or FMS speeds.
It is important to realize that the takeoff speeds are valid for the Actual TOW and not for the Performance Limited
TOW.
Why no check on the VSR/VCL speeds?
In the past we had to compare these FMS speeds with FCOM IV takeoff speeds. This was because of an
anomaly in the FMS at that time. Nowadays, if you have to use the TL-tables you don’t have to check these
speeds anymore.
Takeoff Data Card
The ACARS print output can be used as a Takeoff data card. You can fold the print in such a way that all the
relevant information is in front of you, including the engine failure procedure.
Flaps Optimum and Packs Off
FLAPS
MD-11 is developed to use flapsettings for takeoff in the range from 10 to 28 to optimise every takeoff. To make
the TL-tables user-friendly and because of restrictions of the TL-table system we were forced to use only a small

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
part of the possibilities of the MD-11. Flaps 20 were used for takeoff because this flapsetting covers most of the
normal situations. Only in case we needed more performance we used different flapsettings.
LINTOP is capable of making (fast) calculations for any optimum takeoff flapsetting. In combination with our
familiarity with different flapsettings we changed to Optimum as primary flap setting.
PACKS
Packs Off is the default setting for takeoff according Boeing FCOM. This gives the MD-11 in most take off’s an
increased performance, so we can give the engine a more flex derate. With a working environmental system
controller (ESC) we do not have to make selections before or after the takeoff. In case the ESC is unserviceable
we start with Packs On, refer to MEL.
Runways and intersections
As noted before, every runway and/or intersection has to be validated by Flight Technical. Initially we started with
validating the runways and intersections which are mentioned in the TL-tables. At this moment we are also
validating other airports, runways and intersections. Not every intersection will be validated. It depends on the
usability of the specific intersection.
The difficulty with intersection names is the big variety in names and limitation of only 3 input fields in the ACARS
performance page. Solutions had to be found, for example FUL or BT.
At Curacao unfortunately, we started with an anomaly. Intersection A-west of RW11 was stored in the data base
with an underscore “_” which is not on the MCDU panel. In cases like this you can receive LINTOP performance
calculations by using 11/ALL. This option gives you all intersection possibilities for this runway. This ‘bug’ will be
corrected in the future.
Preparation Procedure LINTOP
Before the loadsheet is presented during the preparation procedure you can ask for a LINTOP calculation in
advance. If you ask for a calculation without entering the actual takeoff weight (TOGW) the ACARS printout gives
you information about the maximum performance limited takeoff weight and the engine failure procedure with
engine out acceleration height. After receiving the loadsheet you complete the preparation procedure with a
calculation using the actual weight.
New calculation LINTOP
In some cases you’ll have to make a new LINTOP calculation because the circumstances have changed, e.g. a
new runway/intersection during taxi-out. Also in this case, both pilots have to check the ACARS input and output.
LINTOP calculates the most optimum situation for the new inputs. The output can have different speeds,
flapsettings, but also a different stabilizer trim setting due to a different flapsetting.
Future
In the near future, planning is spring-summer 2009, MEL items which have effect on the takeoff performance will
be incorporated in LINTOP.
When LINTOP is completely integrated the next step is to remove the TL-tables from the nav bags on board.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 28 MAY 09
015 CARBON BRAKES
Introduction
A description will be given on how carbon brakes work and how to use it.
General
An airplane’s braking system is designed so that the airplane can stop safely on the runway.
While braking utilizes factors/features including thrust reversers, ground spoilers, opposing wind, runway slope,
and rolling friction, it is the airplane’s brakes that are designed to stop the airplane safely, even when all of the
other braking factors are unavailable.
The capacity of a brake to stop the airplane is in the brake’s ability to absorb energy in the form of heat.
A brake will continue to absorb energy and come to a stop as long as its energy absorbing capacity has not been
exceeded.
If the capacity is exceeded, the brake will no longer be able to absorb energy and the required stopping distance
will be increased.
Therefore, it is important to protect a brake’s energy (heat) capacity.
(Carbon) Brake Technique
Carbon brakes behave differently than steel.
When a carbon brake is cold, the wear rate is significantly. This is especially true for the first taxi of the day.
The goal is to warm the carbon quickly.
Carbon functions best when the friction surfaces are warm, approximately 250 degrees C.
Additionally, unlike steel brakes, carbon wear is sensitive to the number of pedal inputs.
Carbon is not sensitive to the intensity of each pedal input.
To maximize carbon brake life, use fewer pedal inputs and avoid riding the carbon brakes.
Cold brake taxi accounts for approximately 79% of carbon brake wear.
The landing phase consumes only 19% and the hot taxi-in consumes a mere 2% of the total carbon brake wear.
Use of Runway Length
Maximizing brake life involves adequate use of the runway’s length during landing roll-out.
Stopping the airplane in a relatively shorter distance requires higher deceleration rates and more brake energy
when compared to braking over a longer distance.
Shorter stopping distances cause higher brake temperatures.
When traffic conditions permit, select the more distant runway exit instead of the closer exit.
Using more runway will help to manage brake temperatures and maximize brake life.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 2 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 28 MAY 09

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
016 LANDING DISTANCES FOR ALTERNATES
On short runways, the dispatch landing distances can be limiting on a MD11. Therefore for the following
fields/runways the dispatch landing distances for the MD11 are calculated more precise and may be used for
flightplanning.(as addition on FCOM Performance 4.4.1).
DEST DRY WET LDA
-----------------------------------------
RTM 06 184300 154300 2000
RTM 24 184300 154300 2000
SXM 10 201500 169100 2150
YYJ 09 199300 167200 2133
YYJ 27 199300 167200 2133
YUL 10 199100 167100 2134
YUL 28 199100 167100 2134
When planning as an alternate, the landingweight may be calculated
By subtracting the alternate fuelweight from the estimated
Landingweight on the destination.
When planning RTM as an alternate for AMS, the following method may be used:
- when the estimated landing weight for AMS is less than 186500 kg, RTM/dry may be used as an alternate.
- when the estimated landing weight for AMS is less than 156500 kg, RTM/wet may be used as an alternate.
- when the estimated landing weight for AMS exceeds 186500/156500, check if RTM can be used with actual
alternate fuelweight.
When planning YYJ as an alternate for YVR, the following method may be used:
- use YYJ as an alternate when dry.
- when the estimated landing weight for YVR is less than 169000 kg, YYJ/wet may be used as an alternate.
- when the estimated landing weight for YVR exceeds 169000, check if YYJ/wet can be used with actual
alternate fuelweight.
Note that the weights are based on flaps 50, autobrakes Max or Manual, no autoland, operative antiskid/brakes
and thrust reversers, zero wind, QNH=1013hpa and the provided LDA.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
017 EMERGENCY POWER TEST AFTER APU START
Following an APU start and prior to engine start, the APU starter relay status
must be checked. This can be accomplished by performing an emergency power
test after the “BATTERY CHARGING” alert has extinguished.
Due to the Fuel awareness of the flight crew or other operational reasons, APU starts, in the preparation phase
before flight, are SCD delayed until a moment closer to engine start.
In this situation it is possible that the standard flow and order of actions according FCOM 2.3.2.2 , FO’S COCKPIT
PREPARATION PROCEDURE is not followed and the APU is started after the EMER PWR Selector is placed to
the ARM position and the emergency power test is initiated.
Unfortunately after an APU start an APU starter relay fault may occur that could result in draining the
main aircraft battery with no associated alert. A successful Emergency power test assures that no fault has
occurred in the APU starter relay.
This must be accomplished by placing the EMER PWR Selector from OFF to ARM (and thus performing an
emergency power test) when the “BATTERY CHARGING” alert has extinguished AFTER the APU start.
As an extra reminder for the EMER PWR Selection from OFF to ARM, the level 1 Alert on the EAD “EMER PWR
SW OFF” can be used.
This will be implemented in the FCOM by normal amendment in due time.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
018 CENTER LANDING GEAR BRAKE (RE)ACTIVATION
Introduction
The purpose of this FCOM Bulletin is to provide background information concerning the
activation of the Center Landing Gear brakes.
In the early years of the MD11 operation, we encountered some problems in the Center
Landing Gear (CLG) area due to vibration. With several modifications these problems were
solved. One of these modifications incorporated the activation of the CLG Brakes off
feature. This feature meant that while braking with less then 1500 psi, the CLG brakes will
not be activated. Only with pressures more than 1500 psi the CLG brakes will be activated.
In day to day operation this means that the CLG brake only will be activated with the AUTO
BRAKE Selector in T.O. or MAX position.
Reason to modify CLG brakes off feature
This winter and the one before we had some incidents regarding blocked CLG wheels.
This has lead to severe damage to not only the tires but also to some brake assemblies.
Not to mention the impact on the time schedule of our operation.
After thorough investigation it is presumed that the cause of these blocked wheels are
caused by moisture/ice build up on the carbon brake discs, consequently freezing up
during flight.
All our MD11’s will be modified so that the CLG brakes are activated under all braking
conditions.
The benefit of this modification will be that the water/ice build up will evaporate due to
temperature rise of the CLG carbon brake discs during braking, this prevents freezing up.
After modification the Aircraft Briefing Card will be updated accordingly.
Operational consequences after modification
- The temperature of the CLG brakes will rise during any braking condition.
- This modification has no impact on any performance calculations.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 22 MAR 10
019 GE CF6-80 TRANSIENT POWER VIBRATION
Introduction
The purpose of this FCOM Bulletin is to provide background information concerning the
posibility of a vibration alert during certain throttle transients.
The Engine Vibration Monitoring System continuously monitors the vibration levels of the
Low Pressure (N1) and High Pressure (N2) rotor systems.1
The Low Pressure Rotor system consists of the Fan and Low Pressure Turbine. The High
Pressure Rotor system consists of the High Pressure Compressor and High Pressure
Turbine.
Normally all KLM MD-11 engines (CF6-80C2D1F) have High Pressure Rotor system (N2)
vibration well below the operation limit. Some engines however show high N2-vibration
(above 4 units) during deceleration (transient power) when e.g. passing top of descent.
Peak vibration response, on the CF6-80C2 engine in the deceleration mode, usually
occurs in the 70-80% N2-range.
The severity of the deceleration peak is dependant on the engine rpm from which the
deceleration is performed. The higher the rpm the greater the unbalance and the higher
the peak vibration level on deceleration to idle.
A “ENGINE__VIB HI” level 1 alert is presented on the ENG SD when engine vibration is
4.0 units or greater.2
The Aircraft Maintenance Manual limit for transient power vibration above 4 units is 30
seconds. However in consult with General Electric, Engineering & Maintenance can
approve transient power vibration above 4 units for a maximum time of 60 seconds,
provided the exceedance is recorded and monitored by Maintenance Control.
Crews are informed via the Aircraft Briefing Card if Transient Power Vibration situation
exists on a specific engine.
In that case the Aircraft Briefing Card (ABC) will read:
“Engine #1/2/3: vibrations limit exceedance may be expected during N2 deceleration.”
Note: Make a log entry every time a “ENGINE__VIB HI” level 1 alert is presented.
-oOo-
1 Ref. FCOM III, System Description, ENGINES, Engine Vibration Monitoring System.
2 Ref. FCOM II, 2.8 Level 1/0 alerts.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
020 GNSS APPROACHES
Introduction
The purpose of this FCOM bulletin is to provide background information on GNSS and
GPS approaches.
This bulletin is a summary of the information which will soon be added in OM – A, RG, but
is written for all aircraft types.
The relevant text in FCOM TR 2.2.5-08 will overrule the information in this bulletin for the
MD11 when applicable.
RNP Approach procedure (RNP APCH)
RNAV(GNSS) approaches are approach procedures utilizing the Flight Management
Navigation capability. When use is made of the barometric VNAV function, the approach
procedure classification APV (Approach Procedure with Vertical guidance) is used. As the
GNSS system provides for an internal monitoring and alarming system, it is also called
RNP Approach (RNP APCH). However the approach chart title remains RNAV(GNSS).
Benefits of RNP Approaches
Given the increased accuracy and integrity of the GNSS system and the integration into
the FMS’s it is now possible to achieve a position accuracy high enough to enable us to
use GNSS as a primary means of navigation during the final and missed approach phase
of flight. The main advantage is the independence from (in certain areas unreliable)
ground based radio navigation systems. Standardization of approach flight techniques
through the application of vertical guidance versus the non-precision approaches without
vertical guidance and future decommissioning of ground based navigation systems are
important benefits.
RNAV and the use of the RNP capability
RNP approaches are designed and flown using the RNAV capability of the aircraft.
ICAO defined the navigation specifications in RNAV and RNP. The difference between
RNAV and RNP has been defined by ICAO as the capability to monitor and alert the
navigation accuracy in case of the RNP specification.
All KLM aircraft are RNP capable and therefore, for the monitoring requirement of the final
approach accuracy the RNP capability can be used.
Since RNP values can be manually entered in the FMS, the navigational accuracy can be
monitored during the approach. The ANP value must be monitored and the “UNABLE
RNP” level 1 Alert must be used as a tool allowing to monitor navigational accuracy.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
System Accuracy
The FMC position is constantly displayed on POS REF 1/3 of the FMS. Refer to FMS
GUIDE 30.91. The FMC current computed position accuracy is called ANP. In the FMS,
unreliable navaids can be inhibited for position updating as described in FMS Guide 40.23.
The ANP shall meet the automatically loaded or manually entered RNP for the designated
airspace. Default RNP values are specified for various phases of flight and are displayed
on POS REF 1/3.
When selecting an RNP approach the required RNP value has to be checked or set to
RNP 0.3. This RNP value and the ANP shall be checked prior to commencement of the
approach. The position of the IAF has to be checked before commencing the procedure,
from that point the track and distance to the next waypoint has to be monitored.
The source currently used for FMS position updating is constantly displayed on the ND.
RNP Approach Procedure with barometric VNAV (APV Baro-VNAV, LNAV/VNAV
(NOT APPLICABLE FOR MD11 because the PROF mode will automatically revert to
altitude hold upon capturing the MIN PROF altitude selected above and should therefore
not be used ufn.)
The concept of RNP applies to the lateral element of the approach procedure. The vertical
element of the approach is stored in the FMS as a 3 degree slope to a point 50 ft above
the threshold. This kind of approach is called an APV Baro-VNAV approach since the
slope is a barometric derived path (and not on e.g. GPS). This path uses the Vertical
Navigation function of the FMS, and can be flown in vertical speed or Flight Path Angle
(PROF mode will automatically revert to altitude hold upon capturing the MIN PROF
altitude selected above and should therefore not be used).
The approach procedure design is based on the down sloping obstacle clearance surface,
taking the vertical (barometric) and longitudinal (FMC position) inaccuracies of the
systems into account.
Currently many of the non-precision approaches flown are already flown using the RNP
capability and accuracy, crosschecked with conventional navigation aids.
RNP approach without barometric VNAV (LNAV only)
RNP approach procedures can also be designed as an RNP Non Precision Approach. In
that case, the PROF function is not used for the design, although it can be used during the
approach as advisory information and as long as the minimum crossing altitudes at step
down fixes (if applicable) are adhered to.
In case of an RNP NPA, the minima entry line will be LNAV and an MDA is applicable.
In both cases the chart will be annotated RNAV with GNSS as the sensor indication where
applicable: RNAV(GNSS).

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Date: 22 MAR 10 Issued by: SPL/NP - MD-11 Page: 3
Pressure and Temperature Effects
Since the vertical path is based on barometric altitude, flight crews have to be aware of the
effects of temperature and pressure on the vertical path.
One of the factors to be taken into account is that ATC always transmits QNH to the pilots as
whole HPa units rounded downwards. Reason is that the aircraft then may be higher than
indicated altitude. In figure 1 it is shown how this deviation will be constant during the whole
approach and consequently the angular deviation, compared to a PAPI will increase as the
aircraft approaches the runway. This QNH effect may cause being high on the vertical path to
the runway. A landing can only be made within normal margins other wise a go-around shall be
made.
Figure 1. Example of how a fixed linear QNH error translates in larger visual angels as the
aircraft approaches the runway.
An important factor to be taken into account is the effect of temperature on the vertical path.
Reason for this is the lower true altitude with cold temperature. On the other hand a high
temperature will cause the vertical path to the runway to be steeper than normal.
For example, a temperature of ISA +15˚C results in an approach angle of 3.20 degrees, and a
temperature of ISA -15˚C results in an angle of 2.80 degrees.
The effects of temperature and pressure on obstacle clearance are accounted for in the APV
Baro-VNAV approach design. Therefore, on the approach plates a minimum and/or a maximum
temperature is published below or above which the approach can not be flown.
Visual angle at 1500 ft = 3,05 °
Final approach fix
Baro-VNAV VPA = 3,00
THR Runway 32
Terrain and obstacles
Visual angleat 300
ft
3,31º
Fixed error of 1
hPa =29 feet
Visual angle at 1500 ft = 3,05 °
Final approach fix
Baro-VNAV VPA = 3,00
THR Runway 32
Visual angleat 300
ft
3,31º
Fixed error of 1
hPa =29 feet
Fixed error of 1
hPa =29 feet

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
RNP Approach Charts.
RNP approaches are flown as any other non-ILS instrument approach (Non- ILS Instrument
Approaches).
The initial approach segment of the approach procedure (from the IAF to the IF) has been
standardized making use of a standard “T” concept. In stead of a conventional standard design
with an overhead procedure turn or baseturn the standard route is “T” shaped
The final approach trajectory must be intercepted prior to the FAF and at or above the last
altitude constraint in order to be correctly established on the final approach course before
starting the descent.
Direct to clearances or radar vectors may be accepted up to the FAF provided that the resulting
track change at the FAF is less than 15 degrees.
Prior to commencing the approach, approach procedure must be selected and the IAF
navigation point from the database shall be checked with the waypoint coordinates and/or tracks
and distances as well as altitude and speed constraints, as published in the approach booklet.
The minimum temperature for use of the RNP approach shall be checked prior to
commencement of the approach.
Confirm that the correct approach clearance is received (“cleared for the RNAV approach
runway…”)1.
All APV Baro-VNAV approaches consist of a continuous vertical path from at least the FAF to a
point approximately 50 feet above the runway threshold. This path is approximately a 3 degree
path, considering the temperature and pressure effects previously mentioned. No step down
altitudes are used in APV Baro-VNAV approaches therefore obstacle clearance is guaranteed
above the DA, from the FAF to the MAPt.
The vertical path shall be flown in V/S or FPA to the published minima. Distances versus
altitudes shall be monitored to check the vertical path being flown. The lateral and vertical flight
path between the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) and the Missed Approach Point (MAPt) shall not be
revised by the flight-crew under any circumstances.
1 Note that the clearance uses the term RNAV and not RNP.
IAF
IAF
IAF
IF
FAF
5 NM

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
On some approach charts a difference is made in minima when using LNAV/VNAV (777/747),
NAV/PROF (MD11), FINAL APP (A330) or LNAV (Selected Approach-A330) respectively only.
The ‘LNAV” approach is to be seen as a Non Precision Approach.
Conventional ground based navigation aids such as VOR’s and NDB’s are still shown on the
approach chart, but are for situational awareness only.
Another difference from other approach charts is that the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) and
Emergency Safe Altitude (ESA) are based on the aerodrome reference point (the Airport
coordinates in the FMS) instead of on navigation aids at or near the airport.
Apart from the MSA, Terminal Arrival Altitudes (TAA) may be published: a 25 NM minimum
sector altitude centered on each IAF and extended to the IF (refer to the sample chart) below.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
APPROACH PROCEDURES
Non Precision Approach
(NPA)
Approach Procedure with
Vertical Guidance
(APV)
Precision Approach
(PA)
LOC/LLZ
VOR
NDB
SRE
RNAV (LNAV only)
Circling
RNAV (LNAV with barometric
VNAV)
ILS
MLS
GLS
Chart title:
LOC or LLZ
VOR
NDB
SRE
RNAV
Minima line:
(MDA)
LOC or LLZ
VOR
NDB
SRE
LNAV
Circling
Minima line:
(DA)
ILS
MLS
GLS
Minima line:
(DA)
LNAV/VNAV
Chart title:
ILS
MLS
GLS
Chart title 1)
:
RNAV(GNSS)
1)
: Annotation of GNSS indicates that the
approach procedure is based on GNSS as the
required sensor. DMEDME update is not
allowed.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 1 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 1 AUG 10
021 METS DESCENT TRIAL (RE-ISSUE)
Introduction
MetS (Meteorological Service) is an automated weather-information service application
designed to provide cockpit crew with more accurate and recent wind and temperature
information. MetS will deliver more accurate and for your particular flight tailor-made weather
information. The updated weather information will result in an improved flight performance
(and thereby fuel efficiency).
MetS monitors your aircraft while in-flight and analyzes the flight deck system’s settings
and currently loaded weather information. MetS will send descent wind information if
certain criteria are met (estimated difference in fuel burn of 50 pounds or 60 seconds ETA
for example). Pilots are requested to accept the descent forecast wind data into the FMC.
The FMC will calculate a new TOD and descent path.
Trial information
The first MD11 trial for the MetS project will focus on the descent phase at Schiphol.
The descent uplink for this trial is sent automatically, pilots are only required to accept the
weather uplink and it is not required to operate differently.
Boeing estimated savings are 35-50 kg per descent for a B777 and 25 kg for a B737. Fleet
wide savings are calculated to be 2 million Euros for inbound traffic only, annually. Precise
analyses will follow.
The next phase will be en route weather updates (first North Atlantic, at the end of 2010
global). The request functionality and RTE DATA and DES FORECASTS uplinks will be
enabled for route changes early next year.
IMPORTANT - Although it is possible to request an uplink via the FMC, you will NOT
receive a response as the functionality is not yet activated. It will be in 2011. So do not
request an uplink to limit communication costs.
-oOo-
Notes
¾ Data is retrieved through a secured link with KLM post office and only accessible to KLM and Boeing.
¾ During the trial, flights with and without MetS data uplinks will be analyzed and compared. To
accommodate this, it randomly occurs that no data will be sent by MetS although applicable.
¾ MetS automatically takes into account the published ATC speed and altitude restrictions at Schiphol.
¾ MetS provides weather information on variable flight levels depending on your flight’s specific
circumstances. This might include flight level(s) higher than actual cruising level. This is required to let
the FMC correctly calculate the optimal TOD and descent path, for more information see URL posted
below.
¾ For more information contact mets@klm.com or flt.tech.md11@klm.com

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Page: 2 Issued by: SPL/NJ - MD-11 Date: 1 AUG 10
Operational Instructions
You can enter the uplink according to the following steps (displayed in figure 1):
1. You receive the “WIND DATA UPLINK READY” in the scratchpad.
2. Access the Reference Index Page (REF Key).
3. Access the AOC COMM Page (LSK 2R on the REF Index Page).
4. Review the Uplink Wind Data on the AOC COMM Page (LSK 4R on the AOC COMM MENU
Page).
5. Load the Descent Forecast Winds (LSK 6L on the Descent Forecast Page).
Once the descent forecast winds have been loaded they may be reviewed on the Descent
Forecast Page, which is accessible via the PERF Key.
NOTE: Flight plan modifications after descent forecast entry can remove the descent winds.
Figure 1: Entering MD11 Descent Forecast Winds into FMS

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
022 New TL-Table Layout
The current TL-tables are created by the old Mainframe computer system. Because updating the system has
been problematic in the last years, it will soon be decommissioned.
The new TL-tables will be generated by the LINTOP system in the back office.
The new system offers more flexibility to change settings and layout, however it does not offer the optimum flaps
table. Since LINTOP is used as primary take-off performance tool, the layout is changed so it is more in line with
the LINTOP policies. This FCOM Bulletin describes the differences in layout and procedures between the new
and old TL-tables (see FCOM 4.1.2. and FCOM 4.10.2 par. 9).
Due to the decreased number of pages, it has been decided to replace the binder with a booklet. A new booklet
will be issued approximately 2 times a year (or when required). NOTAM’s will normally not be incorporated in the
booklet. If required, temporary TL’s will be attached to the flightplan and a company notam will be issued.
Note that TL-Tables are considered only as a backup for LINTOP.
The main differences are:
1. No optimum flaps available;
2. Dry and Wet calculations are on one page, instead of two separate TL-tables;
3. Flaps and packs settings are moved to the upper right corner;
4. Packs are default OFF, packs ON correction is shown below the table;
5. Correction for Engine Anti-Ice only is removed;
6. Obstacle data is not shown;
7. The ‘*’ sign is also shown below ISA+15;
8. QNH High/Low adjustments are provided in steps of 10 kg;
9. Special TL-tables may be available for performance critical runways;
10. The binder is replaced with a booklet.
1. Take-off configuration
The standard setting for flaps is still 20. However, to optimize performance on some runways, the setting may
differ. The default setting for packs is OFF. A penalty for Packs ON is provided below the table.
On the new TL-tables, the obstacle information is deleted conform LINTOP.
The optimum flaps table is no longer available. This table is replaced by the Flaps 20/Packs OFF WET table. As a
cosequence, the separate WET page will be removed. For a few runways which require performance
optimalization, the layout and configuration can be different (E.g.: a DRY TL for Flaps 20 and Flaps 10, a WET TL
for Flaps 20 and Flaps 10 with 20% Derate, etc) These TL-tables contain the header “SPECIAL CASE”. Some
examples of TL tables have been added to this bulletin.
2. QNH Correction
The QNH correction is provided in steps of 10 kg, instead of steps of 50 kg. Sometimes the correction for high
QNH is null. This is because (one or more of) the provided calculations per temperature are already at the
maximum value.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
3. Take-Off with Flex Thrust
There is no change to the current procedure. In addition, it is now also allowed to use FLEX thrust with Packs
OFF. It is not allowed to use FLEX thrust with a flap setting other than 20.
The tables show an ‘F’ next to the OAT column when the maximum operating temperature is exceeded. These
temperatures may only be used as assumed temperature in case of a FLEX thrust take-off. Some TL-tables are
calculated more precise, this might increase the maximum operating temperature.
If, in case of a FLEX thrust take-off, the runway length does not meet the runway length requirement for
V1=Vmcg, an asterisk (‘*’) is shown behind the tabulated weights. On the old tables, this asterisk was not shown
for temperatures equal to or lower than ISA+15. On the new tables the asterisk might also be shown with
temperatures below ISA+15. Regardless of the asterisk sign, it is still not allowed to use FLEX thrust when the
assumed temperature is equal to or lower than ISA+15.
4. Take-Off on contaminated runway
There is no change to the current procedure. Because the weight correction is based on Flaps 20/Packs ON, the
Packs ON penalty has to be taken into account (in addition to the takeoff weight reduction for contaminated
runway).
5. Take-off with MEL items
For MEL items referring to the Flaps 20/Packs ON takeoff weights, the Packs ON penalty has to be taken into
account.
6. BASIC TL-tables (Deflected Aileron Inoperative)
Normally the BASIC TL-tables will not be available on board. However when the exceptional case occurs that
LINTOP is not available and the deflected aileron is inoperative, these tables can be created. These TL-tables will
be similar to the normal TL-tables except for the following:
• Aircraft type shows ‘MD11-BASIC’ instead of ‘MD11-A1’;
• TL-table will show ‘DEFLECTED AILERON INOPERATIVE’ in the header;
• When the climb limited TOW is not limited, no information is shown on the TL. In this case the climb
limited TOW can be considered as 290.3 t.
• Whenever possible, the TL-tables will be printed on green paper. However, since these tables are
usually provided electronically (either by BST, Fax, Email, etc), white paper may also be used.
When using these BASIC TL-tables, use the green pages of FCOM 4.1.2 and 4.2.
-oOo-

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Date: 28 OCT 2010 Issued by: SPL/NP - MD-11 Page: 3

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
023 Windshear Procedures
General
This FCOM Bulletin provides additional information and procedures for windshear.
The most important policy for the flight crew in coping with a windshear is to avoid areas of known windshear.
Severe windshear may be defined as a rapid change in wind direction and/or velocity that results in airspeed
changes greater than 15 knots or vertical speed changes greater than 500 fpm.
Flight Crew Actions
Flight crew actions preparatory to encountering possible windshear events are divided into five areas listed below.
In order to simplify operational windshear decisions, these five areas have also been incorporated into a model
(see following page) for use in every day operation.
1. Evaluate the weather.
2. Avoid known windshear.
3. Consider precautions.
4. Follow standard operating techniques.
5. Windshear recovery technique.
Evaluate The Weather
Detection of windshear is difficult with today's technology. Develop an awareness of the causes and danger
signals of windshear to successfully avoid windshear.
The most dangerous form of windshear is a convective weather microburst of either the dry or wet type.
Convective weather conditions (like thunderstorms, rain and snow showers) have produced the majority of
known windshear accidents.
Danger Signals Of Dry Microbursts
PIREP Caution – Due to the rapid intensification of microbursts, actual windshear may
be up to twice as severe as the PIREP.
LLWAS Caution – LLWAS in its present state of development is not completely
accurate in detecting microbursts and is prone to false alarms.
Virga Rain falling from high based convective clouds evaporating before it reaches
the ground.
Temperature/Dewpoint Watch for the spread of 30°F to 50°F (17°C to 28°C).
Localized Strong Winds Blowing dust, rings of dust, dust devils, other tornado-like features and other
evidence of strong local outflow near the surface.
Turbulence Moderate or greater turbulence may be associated with the outflow from a
microburst.
Airborne Weather Radar Indications of weak (green) cells with bases from 5,000 to 15,000 ft AGL which
indicate weak precipitation, usually virga. In addition, in doppler mode, areas
of red (doppler turbulence) surrounding weak precipitation may indicate
microburst windshear conditions in their formative stages aloft.
Weather Forecast The potential for a mircroburst is indicated by mid-level moisture, very dry
surface conditions and a 30°F to 50°F (17°C to 28°C) temperature/dewpoint
spread.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Danger Signals Of Wet Thunderstorm Microbursts
PIREP Caution – Due to the rapid intensification of microbursts, actual windshear may be
up to twice as severe as the PIREP.
LLWAS Caution – LLWAS in its present state of development is not completely accurate in
detecting microbursts and is prone to false alarms.
Thunderstorms In addition to the well known hazards of thunderstorms, an estimated 5% of
thunderstorms accompanied by heavy rain and/or lighting contain embedded
microbursts.
Localized strong wind Blowing dust, rings of dust, dust devils, other tornado-like features and other
evidence of strong local outflow. (Caution – Visual clues may be obscured by low
visibilities in wet thunder storm microburst situations.)
Turbulence Moderate or greater turbulence may be associated with the outflow from a
microburst.
Airborne weather radar Search the area above and along the takeoff and approach paths for heavy
precipitation.
Weather forecast Although no techniques currently exist to forecast wet microbursts, crews should
consider the thunderstorm forecasts contained in the terminal forecasts and severe
weather advisories as a possible indication of the presence of wet microbursts.
MICROBURST WINDSHEAR PROBABILITY GUIDELINES
The following table (designed specifically for convective weather conditions) provides a subjective evaluation of
various observational clues to aid in making appropriate real time avoidance decisions. Although encountering
weather conditions described in the table above 1000 feet AGL may be less critical in terms of flight path, such
encounters may present other significant weather related risks. Windshear clues should be considered
cumulative. The probability of each single observation is given. However, if more than one windshear clue is
observed, the probability rating may be increased to reflect the total set of observations. Use of the table should
not replace sound judgment in making avoidance decisions. Crewmembers are urged to exercise caution when
determining a course of action.
OBSERVATION PROBABILITY OF
WINDSHEAR
PRESENCE OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER NEAR INTENDED FLIGHT PATH:
• With localized strong winds (tower reports or observed blowing dust, rings of
dust, tornado-like features, etc.)
• With heavy precipitation (observed or radar indications of contour, red or
attenuation shadow)
• With rain shower
• With lightning
• With virga
• With moderate or greater turbulence (reported or radar indications)
• With temperature/dew point spread of 30°F to 50°F (17°C to 28°C)
ONBOARD WINDSHEAR DETECTION SYSTEM ALERT:
• Reported or observed
PIREP OR AIRSPEED LOSS OR GAIN:
• 20 KIAS or greater
• Less than 20 KIAS
FORECAST OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER:
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
HIGH Critical attention needs to be given to this classification. A decision to avoid (e.g. divert or delay) is
appropriate.
MEDIUM Consideration should be given to avoiding. Precautions are appropriate.
LOW Consideration should be given but a decision to avoid is not generally indicated.
Note: These guidelines apply to operations in the airport vicinity (within 3 miles of the point of takeoff or
landing along the intended flight path and below a 1,000 feet AGL). The hazard increases with
proximity to the convective weather. Weather assessment should be continuous.
CAUTION: Currently no quantitative means exists for determining the presence or intensity of
microburst windshear. Crew members are urged to exercise caution in determining a
course of action.
Avoid Known Windshear
The policy is to avoid areas of known windshear. Consider one or more of the following actions as appropriate:
• Delay takeoff until conditions improve.
• In flight, divert around the area of known windshear.
• If windshear is indicated during approach, initiate a go-around or hold until conditions improve.
Consider Precautions
Precautions are recommended whenever possibility of windshear exists.
Takeoff Precautions
• Use maximum takeoff thrust instead of reduced thrust.
• Use the longest suitable runway away from potential windshear.
Approach Precautions
• Achieve a stabilized approach no later than 1,000 feet AGL.
• Avoid large thrust reductions or trim changes in response to sudden airspeed increases as these may be
followed by airspeed decreases.
• Use the longest suitable runway away from potential windshear.
• Consider using the recommended flap setting (recommended landing flap setting is minimum flap setting
authorized for normal landing configuration).
• Consider using increased approach speed (correction applied in the same manner as gusts) up to a
maximum of 20 knots.
• Use the autopilot and autothrottles for the approach to provide more monitoring and recognition time. If
using the autothrottles, manually back-up the throttles to prevent excessive power reduction during an
increasing performance shear.
Follow Standard Operating Techniques
Certain procedures and techniques can prevent a dangerous flight path situation from developing if windshear is
inadvertently encountered. These procedures and techniques are of such importance that they should be
incorporated into each crewmember’s personal standard operating techniques and practiced on every takeoff and
landing whether or not windshear is anticipated. Develop a cockpit atmosphere which encourages awareness and
effective crew coordination, particularly at night and during marginal weather conditions.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Takeoff Standard Operating Techniques
• Be alert for any airspeed fluctuations during takeoff and initial climb.
• Know the all-engine climb pitch attitude.
• Make a continuous rotation at the normal rotation rate to the all-engine climb pitch attitude for non-engine
failure takeoffs.
• Minimize reductions from the initial climb pitch attitude until terrain and obstruction clearance is assured.
• Develop an awareness of normal values of airspeed, attitude, vertical speed and airspeed build up.
• The pilot not flying closely monitor the vertical flight path instruments such as vertical speed and
altimeters and call out any deviations from normal.
Approach Standard Operating Techniques
• Develop an awareness of normal values of vertical speed, thrust and pitch.
• Cross-check flight director commands using the vertical flight path instruments.
• Know the go-around decision criteria and be prepared to execute an immediate go-around if the
parameters are exceeded.
• The pilot not flying closely monitor the vertical flight path instruments such as vertical speed, altimeters
and glideslope displacement and call out any deviations from normal.
Windshear Recognition
The following actions are recommended whenever flight path control becomes marginal below 1,000 feet AGL on
takeoff or approach. As guidelines, marginal flight path control may be indicated by deviations from target
conditions in excess of:
• ± 15 KIAS.
• ± 500 feet/minute vertical speed.
• ± 5° pitch attitude.
• ± One dot displacement from the glideslope.
• Unusual throttle position for a significant period of time.
Windshear Alert and Guidance System Not Available
If the on-board windshear detection system is not operative or is suspect and flight path control becomes marginal
at low altitudes, initiate recommended windshear recovery technique without delay.
Windshear Alert and Guidance System Available
General
The windshear alert and guidance system (WAGS) provides detection, alerting and guidance through hazardous
windshear conditions. The WAGS is enabled for detection and guidance from 80 knots on takeoff roll to 1,500 feet
AGL.
On approach, the WAGS is enabled from 1,500 feet AGL down to 50 feet AGL. The system is part of the
autoflight system (AFS) and it receives information from the central air data computer (CADC), inertial reference
system (IRS), flight management system (FMS), and other components of the AFS. When the WAGS determines
that the hazardous windshear condition exists, it provides windshear alerting on the electronic instrument system
(EIS) and through the central aural warning system (CAWS). Flight director (FD) and autopilot functions are
provided through the AFS. TCAS functions and, under specific conditions, GPWS are inhibited when in windshear
guidance.
WARNING: In the WAGS, the windshear detection and alerting functions operate only between the
surface and 1,500 feet AGL. The guidance function, however, continues to operate in
climbs above 1,500 feet AGL if the aircraft was already in windshear guidance when
passing 1,500 feet and the exit criteria are still not met. For any atmospheric disturbance

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
encountered above 1,500 feet AGL, the WAGS is not involved. However, the FD/AFS will
continue to guide to its active pitch mode. The standard mode reversions due to speed
protection will continue to operate as usual. In several upsets outside the WAGS altitude
envelope, the pilot should take positive action to ensure that both the required attitude
and the required power are established.
Detection
When the WAGS detects a windshear condition, it provides both aural and visual cockpit annunciations. A red
windshear warning (decreasing performance windshear) or an amber windshear caution (increasing performance
windshear) will be displayed in the EIS primary flight display (PFD) top left corner under the speed mode window
when the WAGS detects the appropriate windshear condition. CAWS will be enabled to generate an alert tone
followed by the aural message “TAILWIND SHEAR” or “HEADWIND SHEAR” annunciated three times. The flight
mode annunciators will annunciate appropriate windshear modes.
The WAGS provides pitch guidance commands for windshear encounters during takeoff and go-around
operations. Using data provided by the IRS, CADC, and other AFS components, the WAGS provides guidance
commands for the F/D and A/P through the AFS and will be displayed in the PFD.
A visual indication of the relationship between the aircraft angle of attack and stick shaker angle of attack is
provided by the pitch limit indicator (PLI). The PLI is intended as an information indicator and is to be used as a
guidance command.
The PLI provides pitch margin relative to aircraft stick shaker angle of attack. During a windshear, this is very
useful information to the pilot when following windshear guidance commands. The PLI is normally cyan. When the
aircraft approaches stick shaker angle of attack, the PLI turns amber, and at stick shaker angle of attack or
greater, it turns red. It should be noted that the red zipper or underspeed warning indicator will often not coincide
with PLI indications during windshear. The PLI is an angle of attack based presentation which is valid during
windshear guidance conditions. The red zipper is an FMS airspeed based presentation and may not be accurate
during windshear guidance.
Guidance
The WAGS provides guidance to achieve an energy conserving flight path during a windshear. When a
decreasing performance windshear is detected and guidance is activated, and provided sufficient energy is
available, the WAGS provides F/D and/or A/P pitch guidance to achieve and maintain a +1° flight path angle. This
flight path angle provides a near optimal energy conservation flight path through the windshear field while also
providing a positive flight path relative to the ground until aircraft performance is degraded to the point where stick
shaker angle of attack is attained. The system will then provide pitch commands which will, if necessary, sacrifice
altitude to maintain stick shaker angle of attack.
When above 450-feet radio altitude, even when an energy margin is available, the system will allow a zero or
even slightly decreasing flight path in the presence of a strong downdraft to be more energy efficient when
proximity to the ground is not a factor.
When below 450-feet of radio altitude, and degradation of kinetic energy no longer makes maintaining a positive
flight angle of +1° possible, the windshear system will guide to stick shaker angle of attack and loss of altitude will
occur as necessary to prevent a stall.
When and increasing performance windshear is detected and guidance is active, the WAGS provides energy
gaining FD and/or AP guidance during takeoff and go-around. The windshear system will command an initial flight
path angle of +1° until appropriate airspeed is achieved. The WAGS will then command pitch guidance to
maintain this speed. In this case, inertial flight path angle is no longer limited to +1°. During takeoff, this is a speed
of V2 + 30 knots. For go-around, the speed is 1.3 Vs + 20 knots, or higher, as limited by flap placard speed.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
Windshear System Operation
Takeoff Roll
The windshear system is enabled above 80 knots to detect and provide alerting to the presence of windshear.
When windshear is detected, the WAGS will cause the alerts to be displayed in the PFD, in the FMA, and aurally
through the CAWS.
Decreasing performance windshear always have annunciation priority over increasing performance windshear.
When either an increasing or decreasing performance windshear is detected on takeoff, the autothrottles will
remain clamped, except for a flex, derate or alternate takeoff when the autothrottles will unclamp, set maximum
takeoff thrust and reclamp.
The FMA speed, roll, and altitude windows will reflect the changes in WAGS system modes. For a decreasing
performance windshear, the bank angle limit indication will go to 5° and the system will go to heading hold; the roll
and altitude windows will flash “HDG XXX” and “WINDSHEAR” respectively five times. For increasing
performance windshear, the roll window will remain unchanged and the altitude window will flash “WINDSHEAR”
five times.
Transition to windshear guidance is automatic as long as the system is in takeoff mode. If takeoff mode is not
engaged, pushing GA or advancing the throttles to at least 95% of go-around thrust will activate windshear
guidance when windshear is detected.
When a windshear is detected, the windshear warning or caution annunciations will flash three times, then remain
steady. The CAWS activates an aural alert tone followed by three cycles of “TAILWIND SHEAR” or “HEADWIND
SHEAR.”
During a windshear encounter on takeoff roll, the system does not initiate rotational guidance but does provide
increasing or decreasing windshear guidance after nose strut extension.
If the takeoff is rejected by the pilot, retarding the throttles to idle will cancel all windshear functions except for the
FMA annunciations which remain until speed drops below 30 KIAS.
When either an increasing or decreasing performance windshear is detected during the takeoff roll prior to V1, the
takeoff should be aborted.
Takeoff
Detection of windshear after V1requires continuing the takeoff. During a decreasing performance windshear, if Vr
has not been reached prior to 2,000 feet from the end of the runway, rotation should be initiated. Advancing the
throttles beyond the overboost stop is recommended in this situation.
Initial Climb
After rotation, when a windshear is detected, either increasing performance or decreasing performance guidance
will be automatically provided as appropriate. When the windshear condition is exited, the WAGS will transition to
reversionary guidance.
Approach and Go-Around
During approach and go-around, the windshear aural and visual alerts are the same as during takeoff. The thrust
rating mode will automatically be switched to go-around if not already in go-around and “WINDSHEAR” will be
displayed in the FMA speed window. The WAGS is equally effective on all types of approaches. If a windshear is
detected with the F/D turned off, the F/D will automatically come into view and provide windshear guidance when
the pilot pushes the GA button or thrust reaches 95% of go-around thrust.
On approach, when either an increasing or decreasing performance windshear is detected, as indicated by the
CAWS and appropriate indications on the PFD, the speed bug will move to indicate 1.3 Vs + 20 knots if selected
lower. The autothrottles will reference to a minimum of 1.3 Vs + 20 knots or the pilot selected approach speed,

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
whichever is higher. If the detected windshear dissipates before guidance is initiated, the throttles will reference
back to the pilot selected speed (if lower than 1.3 Vs + 20 knots) at a rate of approximately 1 knot per second.
When a windshear is detected on approach, the F/D and/or A/P windshear guidance can be engaged in three
ways:
1. Pushing the GA button manually.
2. Advancing the throttles to at least 95% of GA thrust manually.
3. The ATS system automatically advances the throttles to at least 95% of GA thrust.
In all cases, initiation of windshear guidance will cause the autothrottle system to advance to GA thrust and
clamp.
Once windshear guidance is activated, the FMA will annunciate the same as a windshear encounter on takeoff.
The autothrottles will set go-around thrust. Windshear guidance continues until the windshear is no longer present
and reversion criteria have been met. The AFS will then revert to normal go-around.
If a windshear is detected after a go-around has been initiated, the aural and visual alerts will be activated and
windshear guidance will be initiated automatically as during takeoff. AFS reversion is as previously described.
On approach, whenever an increasing or decreasing performance windshear is detected, the pilot should
discontinue the approach by pushing the GA button, thereby engaging the windshear guidance. Once the go-
around is completed, the pilot should then carefully reassess the weather situation using all means at his
disposal, then proceed to the alternate airport or make another approach as appropriate.
Windshear Reversionary Guidance
When windshear conditions no longer exist, all windshear detection annunciations cease. Windshear pitch and
roll guidance will continue until safe conditions are achieved. Safe conditions are defined as a minimum rate of
climb of 750 feet per minute and a speed of V2 + 10 knots on takeoff, or go-around reference speed on go-
around. These conditions must be satisfied for at least 15 seconds and the aircraft must have reached 1,000 feet
AGL. At that time, the guidance system will revert to normal AFS modes. Although reversion to takeoff or go-
around modes will occur automatically, other pitch modes and HDG HOLD occur when the pilot deselects
windshear guidance manually. The pilot can exit windshear guidance manually at any time by selecting any other
pitch mode; however, this is not recommended when a decreasing performance windshear is being detected. If
the pilot has manually exited windshear guidance while windshear is being detected, windshear guidance can be
regained by pushing the GA button.
General Information and Recommendations
Configuration
Whenever windshear guidance is activated, aircraft configuration should be maintained until safe flight conditions
are achieved.
Pop Up F/D and Autothrottles
If the WAGS detects a windshear and the F/D and ATS are turned off, windshear pitch guidance and automatic
maximum power functions are still available. If the engine N1/EPR is above 95% of the go-around thrust rating,
the FD will come into view and the ATS will engage to set maximum thrust. If engine N1/EPR is not above 95% of
go-around thrust rating, the pilot is required to either push the GA button or move the throttles to above 95% of
the GA rating to acquire FD and/or autothrottle functions. The FD and ATS will remain engaged throughout the
windshear maneuver and after reversion to takeoff, go-around or other pilot selected AFS modes.
Windshear Guidance
The most demanding windshear is an encounter with a strong microburst which typically has lateral, horizontal
and vertical wind components, often with rapid reversal of direction. It is difficult to comply with FD windshear
guidance commands when the aircraft still has a significant amount of surplus kinetic energy, and is much more
difficult when flying at stick shaker angle of attack. Here, PLI information is very useful. The information presented
to the pilot is the pitch margin to stick shaker angle of attack between the aircraft symbol and the PLI. When the
aircraft symbol and the PLI coincide, the aircraft is at stick shaker angle of attack and the PLI will turn red and the

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
stick shaker will activate. During a steady and/or rapid increase or decrease in aircraft kinetic energy, pitch margin
to PLI will be displayed accordingly and should be monitored while following FD pitch commands. When the
aircraft is at low energy level flying at or near stick shaker angle of attack and has encountered the roll vortices of
a microburst or gust front, rapid and strong reversal of lateral, vertical and horizontal wind components will require
immediate response by the pilot to FD commands.
Further, he/she should not be dismayed to observe the PLI’s rapid movements both above and below the aircraft
symbol. Observing a change in direction of PLI movement relative to the aircraft symbol helps the pilot anticipate
a change or reversal of control force in order to properly follow guidance commands which, in this regime of flight,
will often require much greater and much more rapid control inputs than normal. These control inputs also often
require a greater or lesser force with attendant slower aircraft response than is normally the case.
Windshear guidance will not command the pilot to fly above stick shaker angle of attack; however, strong vertical
wind components may cause the PFD to display this condition to the pilot. The FD command in this situation will
be to pitch down and the rate may be rapid but not abrupt. The pilot should also be aware that commands will be
attenuated when the system senses a reversal of wind direction. This helps prevent what might otherwise become
a pilot induced oscillation (PIO) maneuver with the pilot out of phase with the commands of the FD.
Detection and Escape Maneuver
When a pilot chooses to, or must, attempt a takeoff or landing in questionable weather, he/she will normally be
alert for signs of windshear. In this situation, it is very possible that he/she will recognize the onset of a windshear
before the windshear detection system functions. Even though WAGS cannot provide windshear encounter
guidance unless detection has taken place, it is not recommended that the pilot delay initiation of an escape
maneuver until detection occurs. Upon recognition of a windshear condition, the pilot should immediately apply
full rated thrust and follow the recommendations for a manual escape maneuver, i.e., increase or decrease pitch
as necessary toward a 15° pitch, at a normal rate, and continue following the technique set forth for the manual
maneuver. It is more than likely that detection by the system will occur in short order and programmed windshear
encounter guidance will automatically follow with appropriate aural and visual annunciations. Pilots should be
aware that WAGS has a design feature which may delay windshear warning during sustained banks greater that
15° or while the flaps are moving, depending on the severity of the windshear. The stronger the windshear, the
less the delay.
Thrust
The windshear system will advance to and clamp the autothrottles at maximum rated thrust during windshear
guidance.
This amount of thrust will be sufficient for the MD-11 to survive most windshear encounters. However, if aircraft
performance is such that the pilot judges that ground contact will occur, the throttles should be advanced beyond
the overboost stop as recommended previously.
GPWS and TCAS
The GPWS is inhibited during windshear guidance when F/D commands are being followed within ±5°. The TCAS
system functions are inhibited during windshear guidance.

MD-11 FCOM Bulletin
024 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
This FCOM Bulletin provides information for ADS-B.
Per November 18 2010, ADS-B capability is required to fly through specific Non Radar Airspace (e.g. Canadian
Hudson Bay).
Mode S Transponder on all MD11s is updated with ADS-B.
ADS-B
With the ADS-B capability, the Mode S ATC Transponder automatically and continuously transmits surveillance
data to the ATC ground station without ground interrogation.
The ADS-B surveillance data that are automatically and continuously transmitted are:
In flight:
- Latitude and longitude from the GPS
- Horizontal Integrity Limit (HIL) of the GPS
- Barometric Altitude
- Flight Number (registered on the ATC flight plan and entered in the FMS during cockpit preparation)
- Emergency Situation Indicator (see note)
Note 1: The ADS-B system does not transmit the discrete emergency codes. A generic emergency indicator
(when transponder code 7500, 7600 or 7700 is selected) is only broadcasted.
On the ground:
- Latitude and longitude from the GPS
- Horizontal Integrity Limit (HIL) of the GPS
- Ground Speed and Track
- Flight Number (registered on the ATC flight plan and entered in the FMS during cockpit preparation)
Note 2: Direct ATC controller-pilot VHF voice communications must be available to conduct ADS-B operations
in Non-Radar Areas.
-o0o-

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