Magnin v Teledyne Continental Motors

Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (1996)
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91 F.3d 1424
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Oliver Dominique Gerard Marin Anthille
MAGNIN, as personal representative of
the estate of Dr. Dominique Jean Louis
Lachiver, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, a Division
of Teledyne Industries, Inc.; Teledyne Industries,
Inc.; and J.B. Smith, Defendants–Appellees.
No. 95–6384.
|
Aug. 15, 1996.
|
Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1996.
Estate of pilot killed in crash of American-made plane
in France brought products liability and wrongful
death action in state court against engine manufacturer
and inspector employed by manufacturer. Defendants
removed case to federal district court. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, No.
CV–94–0913–BH-C, William Brevard Hand, J., denied
plaintiff's motion to remand, and granted defendants'
motion to dismiss on basis of forum non conveniens.
Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carnes, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) removal was proper under federal
officer removal statute because plaintiff's claim against
inspector arose from inspector's issuance of airworthiness
certification while performing federal duties as designated
manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR), and (2)
district court did not abuse discretion in dismissing case on
forum non conveniens grounds in view of availability of
alternative forum in France and hardships on defendants
and district court if case were tried in Alabama.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (19)
[1] Removal of Cases
Actions against or for acts of United
States officers
Right of removal under federal officer
removal statute is made absolute whenever a
suit in state court is for any act under color
of federal office, regardless of whether the suit
could originally have been brought in federal
court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
12 Cases that cite this headnote
States officers
Purpose of federal officer removal statute
is to permit the removal of those actions
commenced in state court that expose a federal
official to potential civil liability or criminal
penalty for an act performed under color of
office. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
Federal officer removal statute is an incident
of federal supremacy, and one of its purposes
is to provide a federal forum for cases where
federal officials must raise defenses arising
from their official duties. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1442(a)(1).
States officers
Test for whether defendant is entitled to
remove case to federal court under federal
officer removal statute should be broader, not
narrower, than test for official immunity. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).

States officers
Proper removal of an action under federal
officer removal statute requires satisfaction
of two separate requirements: first, defendant
must advance a colorable defense arising out
of his duty to enforce the law, and second,
defendant must establish that there is a causal
connection between what he has done under
asserted official authority and the action
against him. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
Colorable defense arising out of a defendant's
duty to enforce federal law, as one of
two requirements that must be satisfied for
removal under federal officer removal statute,
need only be plausible; its ultimate validity is
not to be determined at time of removal. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
Absent assertion of a federal defense, a
state court action against a federal officer is
not removable under federal officer removal
statute. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
Defendant wishing to remove a state
court action against him under federal
officer removal statute sufficiently satisfies
requirement of a causal connection between
what he has done under asserted official
authority and the action against him if he
shows that his relationship to the plaintiff
derived solely from his official duties; if
question raised by plaintiff is whether
defendant was acting in contravention of his
duties, parties will have opportunity to present
their versions of the facts to a federal court. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
District court properly exercised federal
jurisdiction, under federal officer removal
statute, over action against airplane inspector
arising from his signing of airworthiness
certificate for plane that later crashed; part
of defendant's defense was that he was
acting within scope of his federal duties
as a designated manufacturing inspection
representative (DMIR), and that defense
raised a federal question justifying removal,
even if case also involved other issues not of a
federal character. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
If one question of federal character exists in
state court action against a defendant deriving
from his official federal duties, it is sufficient
for federal jurisdiction under federal officer
removal statute. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
Removal of Cases
Allegations in Pleadings
Averments in wrongful death complaint
brought in state court, that defendant

who issued airworthiness certificate for
airplane that later crashed was a designated
manufacturing inspection representative
(DMIR), did not merely identify defendant
as a factual matter without attaching legal
significance to his status as a DMIR;
such identification indicated claim was being
asserted against defendant for violating
federal law duties imposed on him as a
DMIR, thus supporting removal to federal
court under federal officer removal statute. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1).
States officers
Removal of Cases
In general;service on adverse party and
filing in state court
Removal jurisdiction under federal officer
removal statute over wrongful death
action against a designated manufacturing
inspection representative (DMIR) who issued
airworthiness certificate for airplane that
later crashed was not precluded by fact that
defendant failed to identify by name an
individual United States officer under whom
he was acting at time he issued certificate;
defendant's removal notice stated that his
certificate of designation as a DMIR had been
issued by direction of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) administrator, who
had delegated inspection and certification
authority to defendant. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)
(1); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 314, 49
U.S.C.App. (1988 Ed.) § 1355.
States officers
Designated manufacturing inspection
representatives (DMIR) are sufficiently
controlled by federal government officials
to qualify as persons acting under a
federal officer within the meaning of
the federal officer removal statute; federal
regulations provide that DMIRs act within
the limits prescribed by, and under the
general supervision of, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) administrator. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1); 14 C.F.R. § 183.31.
[14] Federal Courts
Forum non conveniens
Court of Appeals reviews a dismissal based
on forum non conveniens only for abuse of
discretion.
[15] Federal Courts
Forum Non Conveniens
Federal Courts
Availability and adequacy
Federal Courts
Amenability to process
Federal district court in Alabama did not
abuse discretion in dismissing, on basis of
forum non conveniens, an action against
United States engine manufacturer and an
Alabama citizen who issued airworthiness
certificate for airplane which was exported to
France and later crashed there; France was
available as alternative forum, and trying case
in Alabama would impose heavy burdens on
defendants and local district court, since most
witnesses were in France, were presumably
French speaking, and would not be subject to
compulsory process, since aircraft wreckage
was in France, and since parties had agreed
that French substantive law applied.
[16] Federal Courts
Burden placed on court and public
Federal Courts
Availability and adequacy

Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds
is within the district court's range of discretion
when trial in plaintiff's chosen forum would
impose a heavy burden on the defendant or
the court and an adequate alternative forum
is available.
[17] Federal Courts
Plaintiff's choice of forum
Plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater
deference when plaintiff has chosen the home
forum, but when plaintiff is foreign, this
assumption is much less reasonable, so that a
plaintiff's choice deserves less deference.
[18] Federal Courts
Alternate Forum
Estate administrator who brought wrongful
death action in federal district court arising
from fatal crash of American-made plane in
France could not avoid dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds by asserting that
if case were tried in France, he would not
receive a jury trial or be able to obtain counsel
through a contingency fee arrangement.
[19] Federal Courts
Conditions precedent
In dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds a wrongful death action arising
from airplane crash in France, district court
avoided unnecessary prejudice to plaintiff by
attaching dismissal conditions under which
defendants agreed to submit to jurisdiction of
French court, waive any statute of limitations
or jurisdictional defenses, satisfy any final
judgment, and conduct any discovery that
occurred in United States in accordance with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*1426 James J. Thompson, Jr., Bruce J. McKee, Hare,
Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.
Patrick H. Sims, Mobile, AL, Matthew Haberkorn,
Kirtland & Packard, Los Angeles, CA, for appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama.
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, and FAY and
GIBSON *
, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
On November 12, 1992, Dr. Dominique Jean Louis
Lachiver, a French citizen, died in the crash of a private
plane he was piloting in France. This appeal is an
outgrowth of a products liability and wrongful death
action brought by Oliver Dominique Gerard Marin
Anthille Magnin, the French personal representative of
Lachiver's estate. The complaint was filed in Alabama
state court against two defendants: Teledyne Industries,
Inc., the manufacturer of the airplane's engine; and J.B.
Smith, a Teledyne employee and Alabama citizen.
The complaint alleged that Lachiver's fatal crash was
proximately caused by Teledyne's and Smith's negligent
inspection and wrongful certification of the aircraft's
engine as airworthy, and it expressly described Smith
as “a designated manufacturing inspection representative
(DMIR) that certified engines ‘airworthy’ or safe
for exportation and installation on aircraft.” After
describing the alleged defect in the aircraft engine, the
complaint stated that, “Smith, as the DMIR (Designated
Manufacturing Inspection Representative) signed the
‘Export Certificate of Airworthiness' for the aforesaid
aircraft engine so that it was allowed to be exported
in the defective condition set out hereinabove.” The
complaint asserted against both Smith and Teledyne a
claim of negligence in failing “to properly inspect or detect
the defects associated with the engine,” and breach of
express or implied warranty claims in connection with
issuance *1427 of the Expert Certificate of Airworthiness
certifying that the aircraft engine was airworthy and safe
for export.

The defendants removed the case to federal district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the Federal
Officer Removal Statute. In their petition for removal,
the defendants characterized the complaint as alleging
that Smith was liable for damages, because he was a
DMIR who issued an Export Certificate of Airworthiness
for an allegedly defective engine. The removal petition
further stated that Smith's duties and responsibilities
in connection with the inspection and certification of
Teledyne aircraft engines arose solely because he had
been designated by the Director of the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) as a DMIR, and as such he was
a representative of the FAA with authority to perform
its inspection and certification functions. The defendants
contended in their petition that removal was proper
because, “Smith was acting on behalf of the FAA, under
the authority granted to him by the FAA, and within the
limits prescribed by the FAA, when he did the act for
which he is being sued.” After the case was removed to
federal court, Magnin moved to remand it to state court.
The district court denied that remand motion.
Thereafter, the defendants moved to dismiss the case
altogether on the basis of forum non conveniens. The
district court granted that motion, subject to certain
conditions designed to protect Magnin, and dismissed
the case. Magnin filed this appeal. He contends that the
district court erred in denying his motion to remand.
Alternatively, he contends that if removal jurisdiction
does exist, the district court erred in dismissing the case
on the basis of forum non conveniens. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Removal Jurisdiction
[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the Federal Officer Removal
Statute, allows removal of any civil or criminal action
against “[a]ny officer of the United States or any agency
thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under
color of such office.” The right of removal “is made
absolute whenever a suit in a state court is for any act
‘under color’ of federal office, regardless of whether the
suit could originally have been brought in a federal court.”
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813,
1816, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). If the statutory prerequisites
are satisfied, section 1442(a)(1) provides an independent
federal jurisdictional basis.
[2] [3] [4] The purpose of section 1442(a)(1) is to
“permit[ ] the removal of those actions commenced in
state court that expose a federal official to potential civil
liability or criminal penalty for an act performed ... under
color of office.” Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103, 107 (5th
Cir.1980). In Willingham, the Supreme Court noted that
“the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy,
and that one of its purposes was to provide a federal
forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses
arising from their official duties.” 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S.Ct.
at 1815. “[T]he test for removal should be broader, not
narrower, than the test for official immunity.” Id.
[5] [6] [7] Proper removal of an action under section
1442(a)(1) has historically required the satisfaction of two
separate requirements. First, the defendant must advance
a “colorable defense arising out of [his] duty to enforce
federal law.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133,
109 S.Ct. 959, 966–67, 103 L.Ed.2d 99 (1989) (quoting
Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406–07, 89 S.Ct. at 1816). That
defense need only be plausible; its ultimate validity is not
to be determined at the time of removal. Id. at 129, 109
S.Ct. at 964. However, absent the assertion of a federal
defense, a state court action against a federal officer is not
removable. Id.
[8] Second, the defendant must establish that there is
a “causal connection between what the officer has done
under asserted official authority” and the action against
him. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33, 46 S.Ct. 185, 190,
70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (interpreting predecessor statute);
see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S.Ct. at 1817.
However, the Supreme Court has held that, in a civil
suit such as this, it is sufficient for the defendant *1428
to show that his relationship to the plaintiff “derived
solely from [his] official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S.
at 409, 89 S.Ct. at 1817. In such a case, the causal
connection requirement “consists, simply enough, of the
undisputed fact that [the defendant was] on duty, at [his]
place of federal employment, at all the relevant times.”
Id. If the question raised by the plaintiff is whether the
defendant was engaged in “some kind of frolic,” or acting
in contravention of his official duties, the parties will have
the opportunity to present their versions of the facts to a
federal court. Id.

[9] In this case, the complaint specifically named Smith
as a DMIR. A DMIR is an authorized agent of the FAA.
In creating the office of Federal Aviation Administrator
and defining the powers and duties of that office, Congress
authorized the Administrator to delegate some of those
duties. 49 U.S.C. § 1355 (repealed in 1994 and replaced
by 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)). In particular, the Administrator
may:
delegate to any properly qualified
private person ... any work,
business, or function respecting (1)
the examination, inspection and
testing necessary to the issuance of
certificates under subchapter VI of
this chapter, and (2) the issuance of
such certificates in accordance with
standard established by him.
Id. The Administrator has made such delegations to
DMIRs around the country, one of whom is Smith.
Magnin's complaint alleged that Smith proximately
caused the fatal crash by signing the export certificate.
Smith signed that export certificate only in his capacity as
an agent of the FAA, i.e., as a DMIR, and the complaint
itself pleads that connection. The defendants removed the
case to federal court, contending that Smith's connection
with the wrong allegedly done was in his official capacity
as a DMIR.
The removal petition avers that “[i]n his capacity as
a designated manufacturing inspection representative
(DMIR), and in executing the airworthiness certificate,
Mr. Smith was acting under an officer or agency of
the United States and was acting under color of such
office within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).” It
further states: “Smith's actions as DMIR were performed
in accordance with the Certificate of Designation ... and
Certificate of Authority.... Smith was acting on behalf of
the FAA, under the authority granted to him by the FAA,
and within the limits prescribed by the FAA, when he did
the act for which he is being sued.” (emphasis added.)
[10] Smith's removal petition demonstrates that the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is proper. At least part
of Smith's defense is that he acted within the scope of
his federal duties, that what he did was required of him
by federal law, and that he did all federal law required.
That defense raises a federal question, which justifies
removal. The extent to which federal law imposes certain
requirements upon Smith as a DMIR, and whether it may
afford him any corresponding protection as a DMIR from
tort liability, are issues of federal law.
To assert that a federal statute
does not impose certain obligations
whose alleged existence forms the
basis of a civil suit is to rely on
the statute in just the same way
as asserting that the statute does
impose other obligations that may
shield the federal officer against civil
suits. Both are equally defensive and
equally based in federal law.
Mesa, 489 U.S. at 130, 109 S.Ct. at 965. Removal
jurisdiction lies because, at least in respect of Magnin's
claim that Smith's issuance of the certificate proximately
caused the crash, Smith's relationship to the plaintiff
“derived solely from [his] official duties,” Willingham, 395
U.S. at 409, 89 S.Ct. at 1817. It is not of “any objection
that questions are involved which are not all of a Federal
character. If one [question of Federal character] exist[s], if
there be a single such ingredient in the mass, it is sufficient.
That element is decisive upon the subject of jurisdiction.”
Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129, 109 S.Ct. at 964 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
[11] Magnin has argued to us that he never intended to
pursue a claim against Smith for violating the federal law
duties imposed upon him as a DMIR, but instead *1429
seeks only a determination that Smith was negligent in
breaching a common law duty, or is otherwise liable
for breaching a duty imposed by products liability law.
Magnin asserts that his complaint identified Smith as a
DMIR only as a factual matter, and not in order to state
a claim against Smith under federal law. Putting aside for
the moment Smith's use of his DMIR status as a defense,
we cannot accept Magnin's post-hoc characterization of
the complaint. The complaint is concise, and it would be
unnatural to read the DMIR averments as unnecessary
to any claim. Moreover, the breach of warranty claim is
tied to the Export Certificate of Airworthiness, and the
complaint avers that Smith signed that certificate in his
capacity as DMIR. We must assess the complaint as it
stood when the removal petition was filed, not as Magnin
may now wish he had crafted it.

[12] [13] This is, of course, not to say that Magnin
cannot prevail against Smith on the merits. The scope of
our inquiry here is only whether Smith has advanced a
colorable federal defense (including an assertion that he
complied with all his federal law obligations), not whether
his defense will be successful. E.g., Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133,
109 S.Ct. at 966–67. In light of the complaint in this case,
which specifically identifies Smith as a DMIR, specifically
alleges that he exercised his official authority as a DMIR
in signing the export certificate when the engine was not
airworthy, and specifically avers that that was a proximate
cause of the crash, removal was proper. 1
B. Forum Non Conveniens
[14] We review a dismissal based on forum non conveniens
only for abuse of discretion. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419
(1981). Magnin contends that the district court did abuse
its discretion in this case. Alternatively, he argues that
the court's explanation for granting the dismissal was
inadequate and that the case should be remanded for
further consideration and for more detailed findings.
[15] [16] The district court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing this case. Dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds is within the district court's range of discretion
when trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum would impose
a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91
L.Ed. 1055 (1947), and an adequate alternative forum is
available, Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n. 22, 102
S.Ct. at 265 n. 22. Here the defendants agreed to submit
to the jurisdiction of an alternative forum (in France),
rendering that forum available. Veba–Chemie A.G. v. M/
V Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.1983); see also Piper
Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 252 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. at 264 n. 18
(“Rules roughly equivalent to American strict liability are
effective in France.”); Mediterranean Golf, Inc. v. Hirsh,
783 F.Supp. 835, 841 n. 6 (D.N.J.1991) (observing that
French law applies “a very broad statutory basis for tort
liability” (citing French Civil Code, Articles 1382–1384)).
As to the hardship inquiry, there are a number of factors
indicating that trying the case in Mobile would impose
a heavy burden on the defendants and the local federal
district court. Witnesses such as the crash investigators,
eyewitnesses to the crash, the owner of the aircraft, those
who maintained it, and the damage witnesses, are all
in *1430 France. 2
Presumably these individuals are
French-speaking and, if the case were tried in Mobile,
their testimony would have to be translated. The aircraft
wreckage, including the allegedly defective engine, is in
France. The parties have agreed that French substantive
law applies. So, if the case were tried in Mobile, a federal
judge in Alabama would have to attempt to divine and
correctly apply French substantive law. And we might
thereafter have to do the same thing, if an appeal is filed.
Far better that the case be tried in France by one or more
jurists as familiar with French law as we are unfamiliar
with it. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251, 102 S.Ct. at
263 (public interest factors point towards dismissal where
the district court would have to “untangle problems ... in
law foreign to itself” (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at
509, 67 S.Ct. at 843)). Other factors that indicate France
is the better forum for litigation of this case include the
unavailability of compulsory process to secure attendance
of French witnesses in a court in this country, and the cost
of attendance of any French witnesses who agree to come
to this country to testify. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S.
at 508–09, 67 S.Ct. at 843.
[17] Magnin argues that the district court failed to give
sufficient weight to his choice of forum. The Supreme
Court has spoken to that factor in this circumstance,
holding that “a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled
to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the
home forum,” but “[w]hen the plaintiff is foreign ... this
assumption is much less reasonable,” so that “a foreign
plaintiff's choice deserves less deference.” Piper Aircraft
Co., 454 U.S. at 256, 102 S.Ct. at 266. 3
[18] Magnin also points out, almost in passing, that if the
case is tried in France he will not receive a jury trial, nor
will he be able to obtain counsel through a contingency
fee arrangement, because such fee arrangements are not
permitted in France. As cherished as trial by jury is in
our law, and as cherished as contingency fee arrangements
have become to some plaintiffs and their attorneys,
Magnin has not cited us to any Supreme Court or court
of appeals decision giving such considerations substantial
weight in forum non conveniens analysis. The argument
is particularly weak in regard to contingency fees. In
Coakes v. Arabian American Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 576
(5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit held that the ban against
contingency fees in England should not significantly
influence the forum non conveniens determination, and
observed that, “[i]f the lack of a contingent fee system

were held determinative, then a case could almost never
be dismissed because contingency fees are not allowed in
most forums.” The same is pretty much true of trial by
jury. As the Supreme Court noted in Piper Aircraft Co.,
454 U.S. at 252 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. at 264 n. 18, “jury trials are
almost always available in the United States, while they
are never provided in civil law jurisdictions,” and “[e]ven
in the United Kingdom, most civil actions are not tried by
a jury.” Yet, there are numerous decisions dismissing cases
in favor of a civil law jurisdiction forum, and in favor of
the United Kingdom as a forum.
[19] In order to avoid unnecessary prejudice to Magnin,
the district court wisely attached to the dismissal
conditions to which the defendants have agreed. For
example, the defendants agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the French court, waive any statute of
limitations or jurisdictional defenses, and satisfy any final
judgment. They also agreed that to the extent discovery
was conducted in the United States, it would be done
in accordance *1431 with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the case, subject to those conditions. Nor did the district
court abuse its discretion, as Magnin urges, by not issuing
a sufficiently detailed order. We can discern the court's
reasoning from its order and the record, and that is all that
is required in that respect.
II. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court denying Magnin's
motion to remand, and dismissing the case, is
AFFIRMED.
All Citations
91 F.3d 1424
Footnotes
* Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 We reject Magnin's contention that removal jurisdiction does not lie because the defendants did not identify by name an
individual United States officer under whom Smith acted. The statute and regulations make it clear that DMIRs act under
the FAA Administrator, see 48 Fed.Reg. 16176 (1983) (“Private persons selected to act as designees are Representatives
of the Administrator....”); 49 U.S.C. § 1355, and the removal notice stated that Smith's certificate of designation as a DMIR
had been issued by direction of the FAA Administrator, who had delegated inspection and certification authority to Smith.
Likewise, we reject Magnin's contention that DMIRs are not sufficiently “controlled” by any government official to qualify
as persons “acting under” a federal officer within the meaning of § 1442(a)(1). See 14 C.F.R. § 183.31 (“DMIR may,
within the limits prescribed by, and under the general supervision of, the Administrator, do the following....”).
2 Magnin argues that many of the French witnesses will be unnecessary, because, he contends, the French accident
reports and other evidence will establish his averments that engine failure caused the crash. Of course, the cause of the
crash has not yet been conceded, nor has it been established in any court of law. If we were to operate on the assumption
that all of Magnin's averments are true, then there would be little or no need for a trial anywhere.
3 Magnin points out that only four Justice's joined that part of the Piper Aircraft Co. opinion, but he fails to point out that
because two Justices did not participate in the decision, the four Justices were a majority of those who did. Thus, we are
bound by that holding, which we deem to be well-reasoned in any event.
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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