The document discusses Pennsylvania's economic development policies and outlines a report assessing job creation programs amid a recession and high unemployment rates. It emphasizes the need for a strategic update to focus on growing local businesses and ensuring accountability in subsidy distribution, while also recommending improvements to targeting and transparency in subsidy programs. Key findings indicate the importance of investing in established communities and maintaining high job quality standards for businesses receiving state support.

1. 1
March 2010
GOOD JOBS, STRONG INDUSTRIES,
A BETTER PENNSYLVANIA:
Towards a 21 st-Century State Economic Development Policy
Maria Cristina Herrera
Stephen Herzenberg
Michael Wood
Keystone Research Center
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

2. 1
About Keystone Research Center
The Keystone Research Center (KRC) was founded in 1996 to broaden public discussion on strategies to achieve
a more prosperous and equitable Pennsylvania economy. Since its creation, KRC has become a leading source of
independent analysis of Pennsylvania’s economy and public policy. The Keystone Research Center is located at
412 North Third Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101-1346. Most of KRC’s original research is available from
the KRC website at www.keystoneresearch.org. KRC welcomes questions or other inquiries about its work at
717-255-7181, or toll free at 888-618-2055.
About the Authors
Maria Cristina Herrera has been a Research and Policy Assistant at Keystone Research Center since 2008,
focusing on workforce and economic development projects. She holds a BA in Political Science from Swarthmore
College.
Stephen Herzenberg is Executive Director of the Keystone Research Center and holds a PhD in Economics from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Before joining Keystone, Steve taught at Rutgers University and worked
at the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the U.S. Department of Labor. He has written
extensively about economic and workforce development in Pennsylvania, including as a contributor to the recent
Good Jobs First report, Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy: Choosing Effective Investment. Steve’s
publications for national audiences include Losing Ground in Early Childhood Education (2005); New Rules for
a New Economy: Employment and Opportunity in Postindustrial America, Cornell/ILR press (1998); and U.S.–
Mexico Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?, Office of Technology Assessment (1992).
Michael Wood has been Research Director of the Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center, a project of KRC,
since 2007. He received a Master of Public Administration degree from The Pennsylvania State University and
a BA in Accountancy from Western Michigan University. Michael has more than 10 years of prior experience in
Pennsylvania tax research and local government budgeting. Prior to joining PBPC, he was the Budget Manager
for the City of Harrisburg and served as a Revenue Forecasting Analyst for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s
Department of Revenue and as a Pennsylvania Management Intern. As PBPC Research Director, Michael
analyzes budget and tax law proposals and evaluates their impact on Pennsylvanians.
Acknowledgments
KRC gratefully acknowledges support for this project from the William Penn Foundation. The Keystone
Research Center thanks the staff of the Pennsylvania Departments of Community and Economic Development
(DCED), Environmental Protection, and Revenue, and the staff of the Pennsylvania Office of the Budget and
the Commonwealth Financing Authority for their extensive cooperation during the preparation of this report,
including their responsiveness to requests for interviews, for information on program funding, and for their
feedback on a draft of the report. We owe a special thanks to Rich Overmoyer of GSP Consulting, and John Sider
and Deborah Nifong of DCED, for helping us confirm the accuracy of the numbers in Tables 1–4 of the report.
We also owe thanks to John Blake, Kerry Campbell, George Cornelius, Brian Deamer, Joanne Denworth, Scott
Dunkelberger, Theresa Elliott, Dan Hassell, Dee Kaplan, Carmen LaRosa, Eric Menzer, Jared Lucas, Bryce
Maretzki, Cathy Onyeaka, Tom Rathbun, Jake Rouch, Charles Scheidler, and Steve Swalm. Phil Durgin of the
Legislative Budget and Finance Committee, the research staff of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, and
Sharon Ward, Director of the Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center, provided helpful comments on an earlier
draft of the report. Mary Fusco (Fusco Design) laid out the report and Andrea Wilkinson (Wilkinson Wordsmith)
expertly proofread it. Any remaining errors in the report are the responsibility of the authors.

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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................ 3
Report Scope and Methodology.............................................................................................................................. 9
Three Waves of Economic Development Assistance ............................................................................................ 10
Trends in Pennsylvania Economic Development Assistance Over Time ............................................................. 13
Traditional Subsidies .................................................................................................................................. 16
Grow-Your-Own Programs ........................................................................................................................ 17
Regional, Community, and Industry Programs .......................................................................................... 18
Discretionary Subsidies .............................................................................................................................. 20
Proliferating Tax Credits ............................................................................................................................ 22
Cuts in the 2009–10 Budget ....................................................................................................................... 23
Targeting and Accountability of Pennsylvania Traditional Subsides ................................................................... 24
Are Traditional Subsidies Well Targeted (by Industry, Location, and Job Quality)? ................................. 25
Accountability After Subsidies Are Distributed ......................................................................................... 30
The Return on Investment in Grow-Your-Own Programs .................................................................................... 34
Legislative Proposals to Strengthen Accountability ............................................................................................. 36
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................. 38
Appendix A ........................................................................................................................................................... 41

4. 3
Executive Summar y
The Big Picture of This Report
Pennsylvania lawmakers today face two challenging and difficult-to-reconcile pressures: a) a deep recession that
has eroded state revenues, leading to careful scrutiny of all state spending and deep cuts in some programs, and
b) high unemployment rates that have brought new urgency to state efforts to boost job creation. In the context of
these twin pressures, this report contains an overview and assessment of current programs in Pennsylvania that
aim to create jobs and promote economic growth.
The report suggests that today’s economy, together with a gubernatorial campaign and transition, provide a chance
for policymakers to step back from 50 years of incremental expansion of state economic development programs,
and to implement a strategic updating of Pennsylvania’s approach to stimulating economic growth.
This new approach would be based on three key principles:
• First, instead of handing out checks to lure new • Second, any future distribution of subsidies
businesses to the state (or retain existing ones), a and tax breaks to individual businesses must be
dominant practice to date, Pennsylvania should accompanied by commonsense accountability.
strengthen its efforts to grow its own companies Since most companies don’t receive special
by investing in the public goods of a 21st-century subsidies from state or local governments,
economy. These 21st-century public goods start those that do must comply with transparency
with education and traditional infrastructure but requirements, pay decently, and deliver on jobs and
also include technological infrastructure and wages promised.
amenities, cultural assets, and natural endowments
that make Pennsylvania an attractive place to • Third, Pennsylvania should focus its job-creation
live and work. Today’s public goods also include dollars on already-developed rural towns, inner-
institutions that support specific industry sectors, ring suburbs, and cities, where new jobs will rely
such as training partnerships and sector-specific on existing infrastructure and be accessible to
innovation centers that build on Pennsylvania’s families and communities that most need good
higher-education institutions. jobs.
These three principles, basic to strategically updating the state’s approach to economic development, are hardly
controversial. In fact, they are embraced by the most respected economic-development practitioners and academic
scholars who study regional economies, by conservative advocates of transparent and accountable government
as well as liberal critics of sweetheart deals for politically connected corporations, by leading legislators in both
parties and the economic development agencies of Pennsylvania state government, by advocates for low-income
neighborhoods in cities, and by proponents of open-space preservation in affluent exurbs. These three principles
build on accountability improvements already made by Pennsylvania’s lead economic development agency, the
Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED). Now is the time to put these three principles
more forcefully into practice, ensuring that Pennsylvania will enjoy a higher return on its future investment in job
creation.

5. 4
Overview of Pennsylvania Economic Development Programs
Pennsylvania spent over $1 billion on economic development (defined broadly) in 2008–09, the last year before
revenue shortfalls led to deep program cuts. (Our exact definition of “economic development” is described in the
“Report Scope and Methodology” section of this report.) Drawing on scholarly research that examines different
ways other states promote economic growth, we divide this $1 billion total into four components: Traditional
Subsidies; Grow-Your-Own Programs; Regional, Community, and Industry Programs; and Discretionary
Subsidies. While the allocation of individual programs into these four categories is not an exact science, the
exercise nonetheless provides a better analytical sense of where Pennsylvania puts its job creation dollars than
does either looking at the grand total by itself or looking at the laundry list of 89 separate programs. Breaking
the total into four categories also allows us to see which components have felt most keenly the budget-cutters’
scalpels over the past two years.
1. Traditional Subsidies induce new facilities to 3. Regional, Community, and Industry Programs
locate in Pennsylvania or, in some cases, help account for 44% of the $1 billion total. These
retain existing jobs. We estimate that these subsidies pay for regional capital projects (e.g.,
subsidies accounted for nearly $250 million of the construction of convention centers, hospitals, or
$1 billion total in FY 2008–09. new stadiums); for community improvements (such
as subsidies for upgrading Main Street and Elm
2. Grow-Your-Own Programs provide assistance Street); and for subsidies to groups of companies
to homegrown Pennsylvania businesses and (e.g., grants to industry training partnerships).
accounted for about $215 million annually, on Assistance in this category operates at a broader
average, for the three years ending in 2008–09. level than does a subsidy to an individual company.
Grow-Your-Own Programs pay for a range of
activities in the life cycle of a company, from 4. Discretionary Subsidies, our final category of
the initial generation of ideas with commercial “other” DCED programs, accounted for $145
potential, to the incubation of new companies, to million in FY 2008–09, and consists largely of
the further growth of new start-ups. For mature discretionary grants—sometimes criticized as
companies, Grow-Your-Own Programs may help “Walking Around Money” or WAMs—that often
pay for the improvement of company processes or go to local nonprofits and fire departments.
the development of new marketing strategies and
identification of new markets.
With state revenues declining during the recent recession, the programs analyzed here absorbed overall cuts of
about 28% in the FY 2009–10 state budget. Looking within our four categories and at the entire decade from
2001–02 to 2009–10, we found the following trends:
• Until recent cuts, spending on Traditional Subsidies Technology Partnership and the Industrial Resource
grew the most in the last decade, from $115 million Centers—have seen cuts from a combined annual
to $260 million at its height. The deal-making core total of at least $65 million for five years leading
of Pennsylvania’s economic development approach up to FY 2008–09 to the governor’s request of only
remains extremely powerful. The tax credit for $27 million in 2010–11.
making films in Pennsylvania explains part of this
increase. • Changes each year in funds for Regional,
Community and Industry Programs are driven
• Grow-Your-Own Programs increased from the partly by annual allotments for capital projects to
FY 2001–02 to 2008–09 period, but declined by the Redevelopment Assistance Capital Program
$100 million in 2009–10, to below the level at the (RACP), which fluctuated between $163 million
start of the decade. Pennsylvania’s two “flagship” and $284 million in the last decade. Regional,
Grow-Your-Own Programs—the Ben Franklin Community, and Industry Programs spiked

6. 5
most with the implementation of the state’s • In part because tax credits don’t increase state
Economic Stimulus in 2004–05. This stimulus spending (but instead cut state revenues), there
included additional RACP funds plus two new has been a substantial increase in the use of tax
programs subsidizing business-site and real-estate credits to promote job growth over the past decade.
development—Business in Our Sites and Building Tax credits for economic development jumped
PA. While the 2009–10 budget cut most Regional, from less than $100 million in FY 2001–02 to
Community, and Industry Programs, spending on a peak of $260 million in 2008–09. This jump
the category as a whole did not decrease due to a contributed to increased scrutiny from the state
$100 million increase in RACP. legislature in 2009, including performance audits
by the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee,
• In the FYs 2006–07 and 2007–08, there was an resulting in a $130 million cut to tax credits in the
increase in discretionary subsidies from around 2009–10 budget.
$100 million to $158 million. These grants were
then virtually zeroed out in the 2009–10 budget.
Targeting of Traditional Subsidies
Nationally, best economic-development practice emphasizes the importance of targeting Traditional Subsidies
based on industry (by asking: would the new business fit with the regional economy?), community (by asking:
would the business site rely on existing infrastructure, and, is it in an area of high unemployment or accessible
to unemployed and low-income workers?), and job quality (by asking: what does the company pay, and does it
provide healthcare benefits?).
This report examines to what extent nine Pennsylvania Traditional Subsidy Programs target their dollars based on
industry, community, and job quality. We found:
• Good data is not routinely collected and publicly analyses of program guidelines, and the Rendell
disclosed on how well programs target Traditional Administration’s 2005 adoption of principles (the
Subsidy dollars to good jobs, to industries that “Keystone Principles”) that endorse investment in
make sense, or to places with existing infrastructure good jobs and older communities.
accessible to high-unemployment communities.
• Even now, however, a majority of the nine
• Nearly a decade ago, painstaking collection of programs reviewed do not give high priority
data by Keystone Research Center indicated that in program guidelines to high-unemployment
significant numbers of subsidies went to companies communities or to communities close to public
with low-quality jobs or business sites in outlying transit.
communities where they could reinforce sprawl.
• None of the program guidelines examined contain
• Over the past decade, targeting of subsidies strong job-quality standards that would ensure
based on industry, community, and job quality promotion of good jobs with public dollars. At best,
may have increased. We base this tentative program guidelines require wages equal to at least
conclusion on interviews with economic one-and-a-half times the federal minimum wage of
development policymakers and practitioners, $7.25 per hour (i.e., $10.88 per hour).

7. 6
Subsidy Accountability and Transparency
This report examines three dimensions of accountability once companies receive subsidies: public disclosure
of basic information on projects funded; monitoring of companies that receive awards; and so-called recapture
provisions (i.e., do companies that fail to deliver promised jobs and wages repay subsidies?)
• At present, Pennsylvania has no public disclosure jobs projects create. DCED also acknowledges the
requirements that mandate public reporting on need for greater monitoring in general but does not
whether businesses that receive subsidies actually currently have the resources to create an adequately
create jobs and, if they do, what the wages and staffed monitoring unit.
healthcare benefit coverage of those jobs are.
• The Opportunity Grant program has more than
• In response to recent performance audits by the doubled its recapture of subsidy money from
Auditor General and the Legislative Budget companies that do not deliver on promised jobs—
and Finance Committee, Pennsylvania has to 30% in 2007 from 13% between 2000 and 2005.
strengthened its monitoring of companies that No public information exists on whether recapture
receive subsidies—for example, by auditing the has increased more generally.
accuracy of some company reports of how many
Return on Investment of Grow-Your-Own Programs
The return-on-investment in Traditional Subsidies is very difficult to estimate, because no one can answer the
“but-for” question—i.e., how many jobs businesses might have created without a subsidy. As a result, the most
that is ordinarily done to measure the “performance” of Traditional Subsidy programs is to add up all of the
(self-reported) jobs at business sites receiving assistance. By contrast, Grow-Your-Own Programs have been the
subject of somewhat more rigorous performance evaluations. These evaluations have found that Grow-Your-Own
Programs have a high return on investment. For example, a recent study of the Ben Franklin Technology Program
(one of Pennsylvania’s best known Grow-Your-Own Programs) by the Economy League of Greater Philadelphia
concluded that Pennsylvania’s Ben Franklin Technology Program increased state tax revenues by $517 million
from 2002 to 2006, compared to a state investment of $140 million over those five years.
Another critical point to keep in mind when the state decides how much to invest in Traditional Subsidies vs.
Grow-Your-Own Programs is that most new jobs result from the expansion of businesses already in the state. For
example, a 2010 Good Jobs First study found that, over a period of 16 years in a broadly defined group of high-
tech industries (including advanced manufacturing), net job growth of in-state companies was 28 times larger than
net movement of jobs across state lines. (See Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy, online at www.good
jobsfirst.org.) In sum, growing your own companies is where the action is and industrial attraction is not.

8. 7
Conclusion
Reinventing Pennsylvania’s approach to economic development, with the goal of maximizing return on state
investments, will take a joint effort by the state’s entire economic development team—professionals in the field as
well as legislators and the executive branch. The final section of this report details six recommendations to help
the state get started:1
1. Better Target Traditional Subsidies: be as disempowering as having too little. To make
Pennsylvania has taken tentative steps away from the Investment Tracker a more functional tool, the
the 50-year-old idea that “any job is a good job” state should improve its disclosure requirements
and toward the idea that businesses that receive and website to fill these data gaps and fix this
subsidies should meet criteria based on job quality, download flaw. DCED or another entity should also
on whether recruited businesses make sense for be provided with resources necessary for better
the regional economy, and on whether the jobs monitoring once companies receive subsidies.
will be in the right place. To move further in
this direction, DCED should engage economic 3. Create a Unified Development Budget:
development practitioners in the development To complement an enhanced deal-specific
of practical ways to give additional emphasis disclosure system, we also recommend a Unified
to community, job quality, and industry. Would Development Budget (UDB), an annual report to
practitioners, for example, favor block-granting the state legislature which catalogs and analyzes all
portions of Traditional Subsidy dollars to counties forms of state spending for economic development,
or multicounty regions that submit strategic plans including tax breaks. Similar to the present
outlining effective targeting? DCED, the next report—which is a template for a Pennsylvania
gubernatorial administration, and the legislature UDB—UDBs are intended to enable legislators
should also give consideration to setting aside to see the big picture, as well as the patterns and
a portion of Traditional Subsidies for specific trends within it, making it easier to set economic
communities (as done by Montgomery County in a development priorities via the budget.
new county economic development program). 4. Enact Economic Development Accountability
2. Improve Transparency and Public Disclosure Legislation: Since FY 2003–04, a bipartisan group
by Making the “Investment Tracker” a More of Pennsylvania lawmakers from both chambers of
Functional Tool for Analysis: The Pennsylvania the General Assembly have supported legislation to
Department of Community and Economic strengthen job quality standards and accountability
Development’s “Investment Tracker” website (public disclosure, monitoring, and recapture
(http://www.dced.state.pa.us/investmenttracker/) of subsidy money if companies don’t deliver
reports on more than 240 state programs. In a promised job creation) of Traditional Subsidies in
2007 report by Good Jobs First, Pennsylvania Pennsylvania. With the state facing tight revenue
was ranked 12th among the states for on-line constraints and the public concerned that lack
information about job subsidies (only 23 states had of transparency opens the door to politicized
any online reporting). But there are critical gaps distribution of business subsidies, now is the time
in the Investment Tracker reports: For example, to enact this accountability legislation.
information is inadequate or lacking on wages 5. Grow-Your-Own Businesses Rather Than
and benefits, on where the money is applied Recruit From Other States: Pennsylvania should
geographically, on the industry of the recipient use this time of budget cuts to shift its economic
company, and on whether companies actually development portfolio toward Grow-Your-Own
deliver on promised job creation. The Tracker’s and strategic Regional, Community, and Industry
format also makes it difficult to download the Programs (which also grow Pennsylvania’s own
mountain of (flawed) information into a data set for companies). Generous budgets for Traditional
analysis. Being inundated with too much data can Subsidies play into the hands of site-selection

9. 8
companies that stoke the war between the states companies too often deliver only private benefits
and extract public money even when companies with little or no public benefit.
have already made up their mind to move or to
stay. From the perspective of economic theory, 6. Change the Business Model and Mindset of
moreover, it is easier to justify investments in Economic Development Organizations: Upton
Grow-Your-Own and Regional, Community, and Sinclair once said, “It is difficult to get a man to
Industry Programs. In the case of Grow-Your- understand something, when his salary depends
Own Programs, the private sector underinvests upon his not understanding it.” This statement
in innovation because companies cannot capture captures, in part, the challenge of updating the
all of the benefits of their innovation. Some of state’s approach to job creation when economic
these benefits spill over to other (often nearby) development organizations make money cutting
businesses. This market failure creates a strong Traditional Subsidy deals. A partial answer might
rationale for the public sector to invest. Regional be to give economic development organizations a
and community assets also are appropriate stake in effective “Grow-Your-Own” approaches,
targets for public investment because they are including initiatives to support innovation in
“public goods” that benefit many businesses and regional industry clusters. The paragraph below
individuals. By contrast, handouts to individual suggests one way to do that.
At present, even though we live in a global, knowledge-based “network economy,” the state of Pennsylvania
invests very little in helping industry clusters respond to global competition. The state could remedy this shortfall
by adapting to the economic development sphere the flexible approach the Department of Labor and Industry uses
to distribute Industry Partnership grants.2 While Industry Partnership grants support industry-specific training,
an analogous economic development initiative could provide grants for upgrading technologies, developing
new products, exploiting new markets, or otherwise improving performance to head off foreign competition. To
give economic development organizations a stake in this process, they could be eligible—along with industry
associations and Industry Partnerships—to submit proposals for such grants. (In several parts of the state,
economic development organizations have staffed Industry Partnerships.)
Another way to change the mindset of economic development practitioners might be to block-grant to regions
resources from all economic development programs—Traditional Subsidies, Grow-Your-Own Programs, and
Regional, Community, and Industry Programs. The reason a broad block grant might help shift the balance
away from Traditional Subsidies is that it would confront regions with “opportunity costs” when they offer big
subsidies—i.e., they would have less money from their block grant to spend on industry cluster or strategic
community development programs. Today, when a community helps a newly recruited company win state
subsidies, the region does not lose any resources for other economic development initiatives.
Looking forward, Pennsylvania is recognized nationally as a leader in economic development policy and practice.
The state has a richer and more balanced repertoire of economic development programs than many states. The
state also has some of the nation’s most respected Grow-Your-Own Programs. Now, in the wake of the Great
Recession, Pennsylvania has a chance to step to the forefront again. It has a chance to become the first state to
implement a comprehensive 21st-century state economic development policy. The state’s future prosperity and
quality of life depend on it.
1 These recommendations, especially numbers 2 and 3, borrow liberally from the recommendations of Greg LeRoy, (2005). Growing
Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy: Choosing Effective Investments. Washington DC: Good Jobs First.
2 This suggestion was triggered by a comment of State Representative Scott Boyd of Lancaster that the applicability of the Industry
Partnership model extends beyond workforce development to economic development as a whole. The suggestion was made in February 24,
2010, hearings in the Pennsylvania House Labor Relations Committee. For more on the state’s Industry Partnerships, see http://www.portal.
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=514&objID=575072&mode=2

10. 9
Report Scope and Methodology
The Scope of “Economic Development” in This Study
While much of state government spending, including for education and traditional infrastructure, contributes to
economic growth, in this report we define “economic development” more narrowly. We analyze (1) programs
that directly assist businesses, and (2) programs that invest in communities and regions to enhance quality of life
and boost economic growth. In practice, this working definition of economic development includes most of the
programs funded by the Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED), plus programs funded
by Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Financing Authority (CFA) and the state’s capital budget, as well as business
assistance programs funded by other state agencies.
Methodology
The findings and recommendations of this report rely on five main research methods:
1. A review of trends in economic development by the Office of the Auditor General and the
spending from 2001 forward, with information Legislative Budget and Finance Committee, and
drawn primarily from each year’s Governor’s prior research by Keystone Research Center on the
Executive Budget, as well as reports on specific quality of jobs promised by subsidized companies
programs, online DCED data, other online and on the geographical location of subsidized
documents, and interviews with program officials. business sites.
2. A review of the program guidelines of nine of the 4. A review of the scholarly literature in the United
most important Pennsylvania business subsidy States on state economic development.
programs, which specify eligibility and criteria for
receiving funds. 5. Approximately 80 interviews with economic
development policymakers, program officials, and
3. A review of the sparse literature on the actual regional practitioners, both in the Harrisburg area
impact of Pennsylvania economic development and in six other regions of the state.
programs, including performance audits conducted
The next section sets the stage for the remainder of the report by extracting from scholarly literature a set of
distinctions regarding different ways that states seek to promote job creation. Armed with those distinctions, we
can then analyze Pennsylvania’s economic development programs and the extent to which these programs have
emphasized one or another approach to job creation over the past decade.

11. 10
Three Waves of Economic
Development Assistance
Over the last half-century, three distinct waves of state economic development practice can be identified across
the United States as a whole (Box 1). The first wave focused on inducing outside companies to locate in the state
by offering subsidies. Even today, such Traditional Subsidies are a major component of economic development
in many states, with one modification being the increased use of such subsidies to retain existing businesses as
well as attract new ones. In the 1980s, a second wave of state programs helped birth or grow local technology
companies. These Grow-Your-Own strategies paid for research and development, product innovation, or process
improvement. A third set of programs lift their sights above the individual company. Some of these third-wave
programs bolster regional assets (such as cultural, educational, infrastructural, or natural assets) that attract top
companies, top managers, or highly skilled professionals. Another third-wave approach invests in specialized
groups of companies—industry clusters—within which a region may have a current or potential advantage.
Box 1. Three Waves of Economic Development Strategy
Each generation or wave of state economic development strategies emphasizes a core set of ideas about how state
and local officials could and should stimulate economic growth and job creation, along with an accompanying set of
public policies. Explicit policies intended to attract manufacturing plants seem to have begun in Mississippi in the late
1930s.3 Other states have chased federal government facilities, including defense plants, prisons, and military bases.
In the past decade, southern states account for many of the most high-profile subsidy deals, recruiting new auto and
auto parts plants to Kentucky, Alabama, South Carolina, and elsewhere.
The objective of “chasing” is to attract outsiders to the state—employers who will create new jobs for local residents.
The objective of second-wave strategies is to “Grow-Your-Own.” Instead of relying solely on recruitment of firms from
the outside, practitioners seek to spur development by encouraging the formation of new firms and the growth and
retention of existing firms. Second-generation strategies often focus on technology-based sectors, such as computers
and telecommunications (Austin, Texas, in the 1980s) or biotechnology (San Diego in the 1990s). Policies may
begin with chasing—e.g., Austin put together an attractive package of incentives to land the microelectronics R&D
consortium Sematech—but extend to support for business incubators, state venture capital funds, export assistance,
technical assistance and technology transfer, and firm-specific training.
The third generation of economic development practice began to take shape during and after the recession of the
early 1990s. Because it is still emerging, third-generation practice can be difficult to distinguish from the second-
wave approach. A central feature of third-generation practice is a focus above the level of the individual firm. One
component of this approach is investment in “regional assets” that benefit many firms, which may be educational,
cultural, infrastructural (e.g., an airport), or natural. A second component of third-generation approaches has been
efforts to strengthen industry clusters and flexible manufacturing networks, with the goal of triggering or strengthening
self-reinforcing dynamic growth within the clusters. Industry cluster investments can be rationalized based on the
idea that they build industry-specific “public goods” (institutions or initiatives that benefit multiple firms at once)
such as joint marketing efforts (e.g., furniture fairs) and Pennsylvania’s new industry-specific training partnerships.
Effective industry cluster initiatives strengthen enabling structures for technology diffusion and technological learning.4
They accelerate through peer interaction the development of creative new ideas and the diffusion of existing best
practices—in other words, they foster innovation.
One caveat with respect to waves is that practitioners who embrace ideas of the second and third wave do not
necessarily abandon the tactics associated with earlier waves. What takes place instead is an expansion of the
repertoire of economic development tactics along with a shift in emphasis towards newer directions.

12. 11
In Pennsylvania, traditional industrial recruitment as an economic development strategy began in 1956 with the
establishment of the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority (PIDA), which responded to sudden and
drastic job losses in Pennsylvania’s mining sector (a core industry at the time). Today, we identify 11 Traditional
Subsidy programs in Pennsylvania. Though all of these programs are run slightly differently, most disbursement
decisions are made at the state level, either by agency staff or a program-specific board or, for programs financed
by the Commonwealth Financing Authority, by a seven-member board that includes representatives designated
by the four legislative caucuses and the executive branch (http://www.newpa.com/find-and-apply-for-funding/
commonwealth-financing-authority/index.aspx). In the case of a major attraction deal, the request for funds
may be initiated at the state level and overseen by a “Governor’s Action Team” that puts together a package of
assistance from multiple programs and also coordinates the state sales pitch. For smaller deals, requests for funds
often are initiated at the local level and are processed or assisted by local industrial development corporations.
In the 1980s, Pennsylvania became one of the leaders of second-wave Grow-Your-Own strategies when it
established the Ben Franklin Technology Partnership Program under Governor Richard Thornburgh and then the
Industrial Resource Centers (IRCs) under Governor Robert P. Casey. With the Commonwealth in a deep recession
and facing growing competition from Japanese imports, the 1982 Ben Franklin program sought to overcome a
perceived deficiency in the transfer of technology to industry by Pennsylvania’s world-class university-based
engineering and science institutions.5 Pennsylvania’s IRCs, created in 1988, provide “manufacturing extension”
services—technical assistance—to small- and medium-sized manufacturers.
In the last decade, the state has developed a few third-wave programs that invest in industry clusters and regional
and community assets. Examples include:
• the state’s training grants to industry partnerships, • the “Pennsylvania Wilds” program, which aims to
which seek to strengthen Pennsylvania’s higher- promote the tourism industry through improving
wage, competitive industry clusters through skills the natural assets and amenities in a swath of North
development and other workforce investments that Central Pennsylvania that caters to outdoor recreation.
benefit multiple firms;6
• the Main Street and Elm Street programs which seek
to revitalize the downtowns of older communities; and
3 The typology in this box is adapted from Stephen A. Herzenberg, Suzi Teegarden, and Howard Wial (2005). Creating Regional Advantage in
Rural Appalachia: Towards a Strategic Response to Global Economic Restructuring. Report prepared for the Appalachian Regional Commission.
Online at http://www.arc.gov/images/reports/2006/keystone2005/keystonereport.pdf. The typology is a modification of that originally presented
by Andrew W. Isserman (1994). “State Economic Development Policy and Practice in the United States: A Survey Article” International Regional
Science Review, (1994), 16, 49–100.
4 Howard Wial (1995). “Rethinking the Microeconomic Foundations of Worker Representation and Its Regulation,” Proceedings of the 47th
Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, WI: IRRA, 414–421.
5 For a fascinating and highly readable history of the successful advocacy to land a Ben Franklin Technology Partners regional office in the
Lehigh Valley, see Sean Safford (2009), Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown: The Transformation of the Rust Belt, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
6 For analyses of how Industry Partnerships fit with industry-specific revitalization strategies, see the Workforce Choices reports at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=514&objID=575508&mode=2
7 In his testimony on the 2010 budget before the House Appropriations Committee, DCED Secretary George Cornelius pointed to Virginia’s
proposed doubling of a “Governor’s Opportunity Fund”—despite the recession—as a reason for Pennsylvania to maintain its own adequate
attraction and retention subsidies. Online at http://wallaby.telicon.com/pa/library/2010/20100216tn.pdf

13. 12
Despite the rise of Grow-Your-Own and Regional, Community, and Industry Programs, traditional industrial
attraction and retention subsidies remain major components of Pennsylvania economic development strategy.
Politicians and economic development entities are reluctant to abandon Traditional Subsidies, equating this to
“unilateral disarmament” in the competition for jobs. As a result, the “war between the states” and the “war
between the localities” continue, and businesses and site location consultants play communities off against each
other to maximize incentives.7
The more subsidies grow, the more the economic benefits shrink for the state or community that “wins” the fight
for a particular company. This competition continues despite strong evidence that state and local subsidies and
taxes are small compared with the total costs most businesses face, and that factors other than subsidies (such as
proximity to customers and suppliers, transportation infrastructure, and workforce skills) drive location decisions.8
This competition also continues despite the fact that it is often difficult to answer the “but for” question—what
the business would have done “but for” the incentive. When businesses would have chosen their final location
anyway, the incentives are, literally, a giveaway.
8 See, for example, Greg Leroy (2005), The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax Dodging and the Myth of Job Creation. San
Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.

14. 13
Trends in Pennsylvania Economic
Development Assistance Over Time
Using the idea of three distinct waves of economic development practice, we categorize Pennsylvania economic
development programs into four different groups.
1. Traditional Subsidies: These subsidies induce 3. Regional, Community, and Industry Programs:
businesses to move to, stay in, or expand in These programs benefit multiple businesses by
Pennsylvania. investing in regional/community assets (e.g.,
cultural and educational institutions, attractive
2. Grow-Your-Own Programs: These programs natural and recreational sites, or brownfield
help existing Pennsylvania companies grow by redevelopment—turning a liability into a potential
subsidizing their research and development, asset), and industry-cluster initiatives (e.g.,
innovation and product commercialization (e.g., farmers’ markets, industry training partnerships).
the life science and digital greenhouses), worker
training, or expansion within the renewable energy 4. Discretionary Subsidies: These funds ordinarily
or energy efficiency sectors. subsidize nonprofit entities, including local
governments, school districts, and fire companies.
As noted when we described the scope of this report, to keep our subject manageable, we exclude some components
of state government spending pivotal to long-term economic growth, such as investments in transportation, other
infrastructure, and education. Instead, we focus more narrowly on the repertoire of investments that leading
economic development practitioners currently regard as central to their mission. (Based on our definition, we
could have left “discretionary subsidies” out of our analysis. We decided to keep them in because they account for
significant money and because their inclusion permits readers to see how much these programs have been cut in the
last two years.)
One final note before we examine spending trends: Once we established our four categories, we still had to exercise
judgment in deciding which state programs to include and into which category to place each program. In the text
below, we note a few cases in which we considered classifying programs differently. We hope our analysis stimulates
more explicit discussion about how to classify programs and, in conjunction with that, more discussion on the merits
of Grow-Your-Own Programs, Regional, Community, and Industry Programs, and Traditional Subsidies.
In 2008–09, all programs in our four categories accounted for a combined $1.07 billion in state spending or lost
tax revenue. As Figure 1 demonstrates, counting General Fund Appropriations, Tax Credits, and “Other Funds”
(such as the Tobacco Settlement Fund, or the Growing Greener Bond Fund) DCED accounts for 58% of economic
development assistance. Another 11% of economic development funds are funneled through the Commonwealth
Financing Authority, which DCED also staffs. Both “Other Departments” and the Redevelopment Assistance Capital
Program (RACP, the state’s capital budget) accounted for about 15–16% of the total.

15. 14
Figure 2 shows that 44% of economic development funding in 2008–09 was spent on Regional, Community, and
Industry Programs. Traditional Subsidies accounted for 23%, Grow-Your-Own Programs 20%, and Discretionary
Subsidies 13%.

16. 15
Figure 3 shows the trends over time in spending within the four categories. From FY 2001–02 to 2008–09,
economic development assistance in all four categories trended upwards. Assistance then plummeted in the
2009–10 budget except in the Regional, Community, and Industry Programs category. The governor’s request for
2010–11 would, for the most part, maintain recent cuts.
In FY 2008–09, more than half of the taxpayer dollars spent on economic development financed grants, and another
24% tax credits. Less than 15% were allocated to loan funds. (Since a dollar of state subsidy to a loan fund may
finance $10 to $20 of loans, of course, total assistance in the form of loans was a much higher share of the total.)

17. 16
Traditional Subsidies
Table 1 shows spending on Traditional Subsidies from FY 2001–2002 through 2009–2010. In 2008–09 Pennsylvania
spent $242 million on Traditional Subsidies.9 This dipped by 32%, to $164 million, in the 2009–10 budget. The increase
in spending on Traditional Subsidies from only $90 million in 2002–03 to $242 million in 2008–09 was driven by the
Film Production Tax Credit, the expansion of the Keystone Opportunity Zone program, and the First Industries Tourism
Agriculture and Tourism program. Virtually all individual programs have seen significant cuts from their peak funding
level.
Table 1: Annual Authorized Spending for Traditional Subsidies, 2001-02 to 2010-11
(Figures in $ Thousands)
Program 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
Film Production Tax Credit a
$0 $0 $0 $0 $10,000 $0 $74,900 $74,300 $42,000 $60,000
Keystone Opportunity $14,200 $9,900 $13,200 $38,000 $40,400 $38,600 $39,000 $58,900 $21,000 $18,800
Zone b
First Industries Agriculture $0 $0 $0 $0 $28,905 $28,905 $28,905 $28,905 $28,905 N/A
and Tourism (Loans and
Planning Grants & MELF) c
Infrastructure and Facility $0 $0 $0 $5,000 $5,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,500 $28,000 $30,000
Improvement Program
Infrastructure Development $29,905 $29,350 $25,000 $25,000 $22,500 $22,500 $22,500 $21,000 $15,000 $19,000
Program
Job Creation Tax Credit a $22,500 $22,500 $22,500 $21,300 $22,500 $22,500 $20,000 $20,400 $11,300 $10,100
Opportunity Grant Program $35,000 $28,000 $50,000 $50,000 $49,000 $49,000 $25,000 $13,268 $18,268 $25,000
Film Grant Program $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $10,000 $5,000 $0 $0 $0
General Fund Transfers to $13,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Pennsylvania Industrial
Development Authority
Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Loans d
Transfers to Machinery $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $73,934 $0 $0 $0 $0
(MELF) e
TOTAL $114,605 $89,750 $110,700 $139,300 $178,305 $260,439 $235,305 $242,273 $164,473 N/A
a Amounts for 2008—09 and prior years are based on actual usage. Amounts for d Small Business First annually makes low-interest loans to small businesses. As
2009–10 and 2010—11 reflect the program cap. Program caps are lower than past these funds are revolving loans, we do not include them in this analysis. During
credit usage; therefore, the program cap is utilized in place of an average of past the 2001–02 to 2010–11 period, Small Business First did not receive transfers from
credit usage. the General Fund or other non-revolving fund programs.
b Program amounts appear to be based on past credit usage. Amounts for 2009—10 e Act 22 of 2004 requires the Commonwealth Financing Authority to transfer $75
and 2010—11 reflect the program cap, which is used because it is lower than past million in bond proceeds to the Department of Community and Economic Develop-
credit usage. ment for deposit in the Machinery and Equipment Loan Fund. This is reflected in
c The First Industries Fund is financed through $150 million in bond proceeds from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2004–05 and
the Commonwealth Financing Authority. Thus, annual program totals are not avail- 2005–06 under “Available” and “Estimate”; however, not in the Commonwealth
able in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget. The CFA of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2006–07. In the Commonwealth of
document, “Commonwealth Financing Authority Approved Projects (excluding H20 Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2006–07, an amount for $73,934 (thou-
and Energy Programs),” dated 3/4/10, and available on the CFA website, was used sands) appears under “Miscellaneous.”
to obtain fiscal-year totals. First Industries Loan Guarantees were excluded from Source. Except where noted, spending levels come from the Commonwealth of
this total. Program totals are obtained by taking cumulative amount approved and Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2003–04, 2004–05, 2005–06, 2006–07,
dividing by number of years the program has been approving projects, which, ac- 2007–08, 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11.
cording to Richard Overmoyer of GSP Consulting, is five, starting FY 2005—06.
9 For revolving loan funds, such as the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority Fund and Machinery Equipment and Loan Fund
in Table 1, we record budget transfers to these funds not the amount of loans these programs give out each year. The reason is that we are
analyzing and comparing the cost of different programs to the state not the scale of their assistance to businesses.

18. 17
Grow-Your-Own Programs
In FY 2007-08, Pennsylvania spent a total of $214 million on this category of programs. By FY 2009-10, this
total had been slashed almost exactly in half. Table 2 shows the funding history of Grow-Your-Own Programs
since 2001–02. The five largest programs each received at least $10 million every year from 2001–02 to 2008–09.
As a group, these programs accounted for 70% of total spending on all Grow-Your-Own Programs in 2008–09.
These five programs included Pennsylvania’s two most renowned Grow-Your-Own Programs, the Ben Franklin
Technology Partnership and the Industrial Resource Center program. Two other large Grow-Your-Own Programs
are the Research and Development Tax Credit and the Employment Incentive Payments Tax Credit. The latter
subsidizes the hiring of public assistance recipients or individuals receiving vocational rehabilitation assistance.
The fifth large Grow-Your-Own Program is Customized Job Training (CJT). While CJT grants are sometimes
packaged with Opportunity Grants and other subsidies to attract new companies to Pennsylvania, other CJT funds
train the workforce of existing companies. For the latter reason, we classify CJT as a Grow-Your-Own Program.
Table 2: Annual Authorized Spending for Grow-Your-Own Programs, 2001-02 to 2010-11
(Figures in $ Thousands)
Program 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
General Fund Transfer $51,937 $53,397 $53,500 $53,000 $50,300 $50,200 $51,700 $50,700 $20,000 $20,000
to Ben Franklin Technology
Development Authority Fund
Research and Development $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $30,000 $30,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $20,000 $18,000
Tax Credit a
Employment Incentive $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $24,900 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $12,500 $0
Payments Tax Credit a
Customized Job Training $37,500 $37,000 $32,500 $32,500 $30,000 $30,000 $22,500 $18,240 $9,000 $11,000
Program (Guaranteed Free
Training Included)
Industrial Resource Centers $11,203 $11,203 $10,200 $15,200 $15,200 $15,200 $15,200 $14,100 $7,650 $6,885
New PA Venture Capital $0 $0 $0 $0 $10,130 $10,130 $10,130 $10,130 $10,130 N/A
Investment Program b
Keystone Innovation Zone $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $6,000 $6,900 $9,600 $7,500 $7,500
Tax Credit c
Rail Freight Assistance $4,890 $4,089 $4,250 $8,500 $8,500 $10,500 $11,000 $9,153 $8,500 $9,500
Energy Harvest Grants d $0 $0 $0 $5,000 $5,000 $6,000 $5,000 $7,100 $0 $0
Small Business $6,000 $6,000 $6,400 $6,750 $6,750 $8,000 $7,376 $6,788 $4,000 $3,600
Development Centers
Alternate Fuels Incentive $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $6,500 $7,000 $6,000
Grants e
Life Sciences Greenhouse $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000
Minority Business $0 $0 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $3,000 $3,000 $2,600 $1,000 $0
Development Projects
Digital and Robotic $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $3,500 $2,500 $1,700 $224 $0
Technology
Crop Insurance $0 $1,200 $2,000 $2,000 $1,000 $3,000 $1,500 $1,146 $600 $1,000
Emergency Tax Credit $300 $300 $300 $1,000 $1,200 $1,000 $1,100 $1,100 $0 $0
(Brewers) f
Transfers to Pennsylvania $0 $0 $0 $10,000 $42 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Energy Development Fund
Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Community Economic
Development Loans g
Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
EDA Loans g
Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Pollution Prevention Loans g table con’t on next page...
New PA Venture Guarantee $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Program h
Second Stage Loan $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
h

19. (Brewers) f
Transfers to Pennsylvania $0 $0 $0 $10,000 $42 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Energy Development Fund
18 Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Community Economic
Development Loans g
Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
EDA Loans g
Small Business First: $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Pollution Prevention Loans g
New PA Venture Guarantee $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Program h
Second Stage Loan $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Program h
Transfers to Minority $0 $0 $200 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Business Development
TOTAL $157,330 $158,689 $155,850 $207,480 $191,622 $223,030 $213,906 $211,083 $112,529 N/A
a Amounts for 2008–09 and prior years are based on actual usage. Amounts for Deployment, at Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, which states
2009–10 and 2010—11 reflect the program cap. Program caps are lower than past that the program disbursed $7.1 million in 2008–09. For 2008–09 and 2009–10, data is
credit usage; therefore, the program cap is utilized in place of an average of past obtained from Kerry Campbell.
credit usage.
e Data was obtained from an Alternative Fuels Incentive Grant document titled
b The New PA Venture Capital Investment Program is financed through $60 million in “FAQs,” dated 10/02/09 and available online at <http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/
bond proceeds from the Commonwealth Financing Authority. Thus, annual program enintech/cwp/view.asp?a=1412&q=502176>. Unclear if totals are based on calendar
totals are not available in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Execu- year or fiscal year.
tive Budget. The CFA document, “Commonwealth Financing Authority Approved
Projects (excluding H20 and Energy Programs),” dated 3/4/10, and available on the f Amounts for Emergency Tax Credit appear to reflect program caps rather than past
CFA website, was used to obtain fiscal-year totals. Program totals are obtained by credit usage.
taking cumulative amount approved and dividing by number of years the program has g Small Business First makes low-interest loans annually to small businesses. As these
been approving projects, which, according to Richard Overmoyer is five, starting FY funds are revolving loans, we do not include them in this analysis. During the 2001–02
2005—06. to 2010–11 period, Small Business First did not receive transfers from the General
c KIZ Program cap for in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Fund or other non-revolving fund programs.
Budget 2009–10 is significantly higher than past credit usage; therefore, an average h These programs are loan guarantee programs. Therefore, though the Common-
of past credit usage is utilized rather than the program cap. wealth has not disbursed any funds to date, it has guaranteed $197,500,000 for New
d For 2004–05 through 2007–08, data for Energy Harvest is obtained from each Com- PA Venture and $2,685,000 for the Second State Loan Program as of March 4, 2010.
monwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget for those years, Depart- Source. Except where noted, spending levels come from the Commonwealth of Penn-
ment of Environmental Protection Summaries under “Sustainable Energy.” Not sylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2003–04, 2004–05, 2005–06, 2006–07, 2007–08,
consistent with data from Kerry Campbell, Division of Energy Policy and Technology 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11.
Regional, Community, and Industry Programs
This category accounts for 44% of all economic development dollars distributed in FY 2008–09, $468 million.The
largest program, the Regional Assistance Capital Program (RACP), provides matching funds for local capital projects,
such as stadia, convention centers, and healthcare facility improvements. Local governments and businesses provide the
balance of the funding for projects. RACP funding has varied from $163 to $284 million depending on the year.
The next-largest programs in this category, Business in Our Sites and Building PA, were established by the state
economic stimulus program in 2004-05 and pay for business site or real estate development. These two programs fall on
the border between Traditional Subsidies and community and regional development programs. Looking forward, these
programs have now spent their original economic stimulus bond allocations and could shrink to zero in the upcoming
budget.
Three other Regional, Community, and Industry Programs have reached $20 million in at least one year:
• the Agricultural Conservation Easement Purchase in Pennsylvania’s key regional industries. Funding
Fund enables state, county and local governments to for Industry Partnerships and Industry Partnership
purchase conservation easements (sometimes called Training equaled $20 million beginning in 2005–06
development rights) from owners of quality farmland, but was cut to $9.2 million in the 2009–10 budget;
keeping the land from being developed; and
• the state’s Industry Partnership and Industry • the Gaming Subsidy to the Pennsylvania Breeders
Partnership Training programs provide funds to Fund provides subsidies to increase horse-race purses
identify and meet the common training needs of and other incentives to encourage owners to race
groups of businesses with overlapping skill needs Pennsylvania-bred horses in Pennsylvania.

20. 19
Table 3. Spending for Regional, Community, and Industry Programs, 2001-02 to 2010-11
(Figures in $ Thousands)
Program 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
Redevelopment Assistance $284,000 $263,040 $199,379 $273,257 $163,054 $249,252 $218,040 $167,124 $269,306 $241,056
Capital Program (RACP) a
Business In Our Sites Grants b $0 $0 $0 $0 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 N/A
Business in Our Sites Loans b $0 $0 $0 $0 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 N/A
Building PA (Loans and $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $15,160 $15,160 $15,160 $15,160 N/A
Grants) b
Transfers to Agricultural $34,115 $20,485 $49,670 $36,985 $31,164 $28,490 $27,408 $26,951 $31,139 $25,394
Conservation Easement
Purchase Fund
Gaming Subsidy to $9,586 $9,979 $8,411 $8,345 $7,134 $8,973 $16,085 $21,545 $18,415 $22,000
Pennsylvania Breeders Fund c
Neighborhood Assistance $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $13,500 $13,500 $16,000 $17,000 $17,700 $9,000 $8,100
Tax Credit d
Industry Partnership $2,500 $2,240 $2,250 $2,250 $17,025 $17,025 $17,025 $15,754 $7,200 $6,500
Training Activities
PennPORTS $11,733 $14,053 $15,246 $16,112 $18,800 $20,302 $17,250 $15,535 $9,402 $9,354
Community and Regional $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $16,400 $14,900 $0 $0
Development
Main Street Downtown $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $3,599 $15,234 $13,973 $7,840 $9,354
Redevelopment
Gaming Subsidy to Sire $6,171 $4,260 $4,288 $4,139 $3,825 $5,435 $5,428 $11,209 $12,961 $12,961
Stakes Fund c
Community Conservation $6,193 $7,500 $11,125 $6,250 $11,260 $12,620 $8,572 $9,999 $7,875 $7,193
Grants (C2P2)
Resource Enhancement and $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $3,200 $9,100 $5,000 $4,500
Protection Tax Credit d
Heritage Parks Grants $1,950 $5,250 $6,950 $2,950 $5,350 $8,200 $9,610 $7,668 $0 $0
Gaming Subsidy to PA $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $5,781 $7,574 $7,311 $9,282
Standardbred Breeders
Development Fund
Tourist Promotion Assistance $11,500 $11,500 $11,000 $11,000 $11,000 $11,000 $15,588 $6,677 $8,000 $5,750
Local Development Districts $5,640 $5,640 $5,640 $5,640 $5,050 $6,140 $6,140 $5,606 $3,300 $2,970
Cultural Expositions $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $11,725 $6,345 $5,500 $0 $0
and Exhibitions
Industry Partnerships $0 $0 $0 $0 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $4,613 $2,000 $1,710
Industrial Development $4,500 $4,500 $3,500 $4,500 $4,150 $4,500 $4,326 $3,922 $1,556 $1,540
Assistance
Payments to PA Fairs $4,399 $4,400 $3,400 $4,385 $4,369 $4,000 $4,000 $3,617 $2,000 $0
Weed and Seed $2,326 $3,510 $3,390 $3,340 $3,423 $3,677 $3,185 $3,020 $1,153 $450
Business Retention and $0 $0 $3,996 $3,617 $4,746 $7,021 $1,426 $2,848 $1,000 $990
Expansion Program (BREP) e
Marketing to Attract Business $5,500 $4,830 $2,898 $2,423 $3,985 $3,985 $3,491 $2,593 $895 $886
(Market Access Grants Included)
First Class Cities Economic $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,200 $2,500 $2,800 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500
Development District Tax Credit f
Tourism: Accredited Zoos $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,250 $2,250 $1,900 $1,200 $0
Goods Movement and $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,000 $1,600 $250 $247
Intermodal Coordination
Transfers to Broadband Outreach $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,303 $2,475 $1,197 $1,009 $1,009
Recycling Market Infrastructure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $1,000 $1,200 N/A
Grants g
Community Action Team $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,000 $644 $309 $306
Agile Manufacturing $0 $750 $750 $750 $750 $743 $750 $600 $300 $0
Keystone Innovation Zone $0 $0 $0 $3,300 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $543 $0 $0
Innovation Grants
Product Promotion and $950 $950 $850 $850 $850 $850 $850 $518 $0 $0
Marketing Grant
Fay-Penn $700 $400 $400 $500 $600 $600 $600 $500 $300 $0
Marketing to Attract Film Business $734 $679 $597 $600 $600 $600 $610 $489 $0 $0
Composting Infrastructure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $400 $0 N/A
Development Grants g
PA Nutrient Management Plan $282 $295 $284 $250 $320 $395 $367 $368 $314 $311
Implementation Grants
Powdered Metals $200 $200 $200 $200 $100 $200 $200 $192 $150 $0
PENNTAP $300 $300 $300 $300 $300 $300 $75 $65 $0 $0
Tax Increment Financing $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Guarantee (TIF) h
TOTAL $412,279 $389,261 $359,524 $412,443 $386,605 $518,895 $520,721 $467,803 $488,045 N/A

21. 20
a According to the “Capitol Program Budget Summary” in the Com- e The Business Retention and Expansion Program enhances the growth
monwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget these data of existing businesses by strengthening collaboration among various
presented for this program are fiscal-year estimates of expenditures public, private, state and local economic development organizations.
for capital projects. Actual expenditures usually occur over several This program also has a grants component which is included in Discre-
fiscal years since design, acquisition, and construction of a project are tionary Subsidies. Amounts are calculated by taking the amounts found
not generally completed during the fiscal year in which the project is in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget and
initiated. The estimated expenditures determine the amount of current subtracting the amounts spent fiscally on BREP community revitalization
revenue appropriations required in each fiscal year. grants detailed on the Investment Tracker.
b These programs are financed through bond proceeds of the Com- f Amounts appear to reflect program caps rather than past credit usage.
monwealth Financing Authority. Thus, annual program totals are not Program is not included in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s
detailed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Executive Budget 2010–11. Therefore, for fiscal years 2008–09 and
Budget. Annual program totals are calculated by dividing the amount 2009–10, amounts are based on averages from prior program years.
authorized in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive
g Data is not available for 2001–02 through 2007–08. For 2008–09 and
Budget 2006-07 by the number of years the program has been operating,
2009–10 data was obtained from Recycling Fund Advisory Committee
which, according to Rich Overmoyer of GSP Consulting is five, starting
documents notably “Recycling Fund Shutdown Plan” from December
FY 2005—06. According to the document “Commonwealth Financing Au- 2009 meeting available at <http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/subject/
thority Approved Projects (excluding H20 and Energy Programs),” dated
advcoun/Recycle/Recycle.htm>. Program is facing sunset provision and
3/4/10, and available on the CFA website, these programs have approved
awaiting reauthorization, therefore funding for 2010–11 is not available,
amounts exceeding these initial figures. The cause for this discrepancy
Tom Rathbun, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection,
is unknown. The smaller amounts found in the 2006—2007 budget are
Press Office.
used. For Building PA, data was obtained from Theresa Elliott, Deputy
Press Secretary of DCED, March 8, 2010. This amount represents projects h This program is a loan guarantee program. Therefore, though the
funded, not allocated to fund mangers which is used on the online CFA Commonwealth has not disbursed any funds, as of March 4, 2010, it has
document referenced above. guaranteed $44,911,970.
c Program is not included in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Source. Except where noted, spending levels come from the Common-
Executive Budget 2004–05. Therefore, for FY 2002—03, the “Available” wealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2003–04, 2004–05,
estimate from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive 2005–06, 2006–07, 2007–08, 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11.
Budget 2003–04 is used.
d Amounts for 2008–09 are based on actual usage. Amounts for 2009–10
and 2010—11 reflect the program cap. The program cap is lower than
past credit usage; therefore, the program cap is utilized in place of an
average of past credit usage.
Discretionary Subsidies
Our final category of economic development program is grants made by state governments to local nonprofits
and other institutions. In the vernacular of Harrisburg, these are called “Walking Around Money,” or WAMs.
These programs use General Fund dollars to help local groups fulfill their missions, but there is little oversight or
accountability regarding how funds are distributed. Figure 5 shows that in 2008–09, the two largest discretionary
subsidy programs were the $40 million Community Conservation and Employment Program and the $40 million
Community Revitalization Program.

22. 21
Table 4. Annual Authorized Spending for Discretionary Subsidies, 2001-02 to 2010-11
(Figures in $ Thousands)
Program 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
Community Conservation $5,500 $7,000 $20,999 $24,869 $15,000 $29,000 $44,000 $40,000 $0 $0
and Employment
(Community Services
Block Grant)
Community Revitalization $84,660 $70,000 $50,000 $51,800 $56,754 $44,300 $40,220 $39,550 $0 $0
Urban Development $10,000 $9,500 $8,500 $8,500 $7,000 $18,900 $20,110 $18,750 $0 $0
Economic Advancement $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $18,000 $16,800 $0 $0
Program (EAP)
Regional Development $0 $0 $0 $300 $900 $19,370 $13,500 $12,000 $0 $0
Initiative
Economic Growth and $0 $0 $0 $2,500 $1,000 $7,000 $7,000 $6,200 $0 $0
Development Assistance
Business Retention and $0 $0 $0 $3,670 $7,530 $7,558 $1,800 $100 $4,050 N/A
Expansion: Community
Revitalization Grants a
Community and Municipal $0 $0 $0 $2,500 $2,500 $6,000 $5,800 $5,500 $0 $0
Facilities Assistance
Cultural Activities $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $9,175 $4,000 $3,400 $0 $0
Community and Business $0 $0 $2,300 $2,500 $2,500 $5,125 $2,744 $2,000 $0 $0
Assistance
Manufacturing and $1,500 $3,000 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $3,000 $1,000 $900 $0 $0
Business Assistance
TOTAL $101,660 $89,500 $84,299 $99,139 $95,684 $149,428 $158,174 $145,200 $4,050 N/A
a Amounts obtained from fiscal-year based inquiries of the Investment Tracker conducted in March 2010. In 2009–10, the grants in this program ex-
ceeded the budget appropriation. We assume a carryover amount of $4,050,000 from 2006–07 through 2009–10 which was used to fund the grants in
2009–10.
Source. Except where noted, spending levels come from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor’s Executive Budget 2003–04, 2004–05, 2005–06,
2006–07, 2007–08, 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11.

23. 22
As Figure 6 demonstrates, after increasing sharply in 2006–06, and peaking 2007–08, this category was virtually
wiped out due to budgetary shortfalls in FY 2009–10.10
Proliferating Tax Credits
As Figure 7 shows, until the FY 2009–10 budget, tax credits to businesses had been growing over time.11 Between
2001–02 and 2008–09, tax credits rose from $95 million to $259 million. Even adjusting for inflation, this is more
than a doubling. Then tax credits decreased substantially in the 2009–10 budget, due to the decline in the Film
Production Tax Credit to $42 million from a high of $75 million in 2008–09 (Table 1); the decline in the Research
and Development Tax Credit by $20 million (Table 2); and declines of over $10 million in the Job Creation Tax
Credit (Table 1) and the Employment Incentive Payments Tax Credit (also Table 2).
10 Table 4 and Figure 2 provide funding totals only for the 11 Discretionary Subsidy programs specifically listed in Table 4. These
programs were categorized as Discretionary Subsidy Programs based on the kinds of recipients of the program as seen on the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development’s “Investment Tracker.” Table 4 and Figure 2 do not display the grand total of all
WAMs across all Departments and all legislative accounts.
11 For some state tax credits (e.g., the Research and Development Tax Credit), the maximum cost is known, as the total credit is capped.
In other cases, such as the KOZ program, the cost is an estimate.

24. 23
Cuts in the 2009-10 Budget
With state revenues declining during the recession, total spending on economic development across all four of
our categories fell from $1.13 billion in the 2007–08 budget to $769 million in the 2009–10, a 32% decline.
Over this period:
• Funding for Discretionary Subsidies absorbed Program, cuts of $32.5 million in the two major
nearly 40% of this drop, $141 million. Grow-Your-Own tax credits, a decline of $13.5
million in funding for Customized Job Training,
• Traditional Subsidies absorbed a cut of $71 million, and a decline of $7.6 million in state funding for
or 30%. Industrial Resource Centers
• Grow-Your-Own Programs experienced a cut of • Regional, Community, and Industry Programs
$101 million, or 47%. This overall decline reflected absorbed the smallest cuts, only $33 million, or
reductions of $32 million in the Ben Franklin 6%.
These spending cuts, which are likely to persist in at least the next two budgets, represent an opportunity of sorts.
State policymakers have an opportunity to step back from 50 years of incremental and often ad-hoc expansion
of economic development programs, and to implement a strategic updating of the state’s economic development
approach. With that longer-term goal in mind, we now turn to a discussion of the targeting and accountability of
the oldest portion of Pennsylvania’s economic development portfolio: Traditional Subsidy Programs.

25. 24
Targeting and Accountability of
Pennsylvania Traditional Subsidies
Most companies don’t receive subsidies when they first open or expand an operation. This fact makes many
conservatives suspicious of Traditional Subsidies as a distortion of the free market. Fear also exists that political
manipulation influences the distribution of Traditional Subsidies, awards being driven by campaign contributions
and not just by what makes economic sense for the state.12
A final concern with Traditional Subsidies stems from the experience of past subsidy deals gone sour. In 1978, for
example, Governor Milton Shapp and local officials crafted an incentive package worth nearly $100 million to
attract a Volkswagen plant to New Stanton, Pennsylvania, only to see the plant shut down 10 years later when the
tax incentives ran out.13 In 2004, Dell received $279 million in state and local subsidies to locate a new assembly
plant in North Carolina. In October, 2009, the company announced it would close the plant.14 Late last year,
Harley-Davidson in York County, Pennsylvania, received a commitment of $15 million in state assistance while
cutting its workforce from about 2,000 to 1,000.15
Given theoretical concerns and practical experience, it is critical that Pennsylvania intelligently target its
Traditional Subsidies and also ensure transparency and accountability when companies receive subsidies. To
assess the targeting and accountability of Pennsylvania Traditional Subsidy Programs, we reviewed performance
audits of economic development programs conducted in the past decade. In addition, we examined the program
guidelines of nine different programs: the Opportunity Grant Program, the Pennsylvania Industrial Development
Authority, the Infrastructure Development Program, the Job Creation Tax Credit, the Machinery & Equipment
Loan Fund, the Infrastructure & Facilities Improvement Program, the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, the
Film Production Tax Credit, and the Customized Job Training (CJT) program. The first eight of these programs
were classified earlier as Traditional Subsidy Programs. While we classified CJT as a Grow-Your-Own Program,
we also noted that it is partly used as a component of Traditional Subsidy Programs. Hence, we evaluated the
targeting and accountability of the CJT program along with the other eight programs.
As a group, these nine programs offer subsidies to businesses for costs such as site development, plant
construction, equipment purchase, infrastructure development, production costs, or worker training.
12 To see who has received subsidies from Pennsylvania economic development programs, go to the Investment Tracker at http://www.
dced.state.pa.us/investmenttracker/
13 See John Holusha, “Volkswagen to Shut U.S. Plant,” The New York Times, November 21, 1987; and Robin Acton, “Local Workers
Recall East Huntingdon Plant Closing,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, August 24, 2008.
14 For details on the Dell case and other recent case studies, see Greg LeRoy (2010), Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy:
Choosing Effective Investments (Washington, DC: Good Jobs First. Online at www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/PAhightech2010%20-%20
FINAL.pdf
15 Patriot-News, “Harley-Davidson Announces It’ll Keep Plant in York County,” December 03, 2009. Online at http://www.pennlive.
com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/12/harley-davidson_says_itll_keep.html

26. 25
Are Traditional Subsidies Well Targeted (by Industry, Location,
and Job Quality)?
Nationally, best economic-development practice emphasizes the importance of targeting Traditional Subsidies
using three criteria: industry, job quality, and community/location.
1. Industry: Subsidies should go to companies 2. Job quality: Subsidies should go to jobs that pay
in industry sectors in which economic regions family-supporting wages and that pay decently by
have actual or potential competitive strength. the norms for their industry and location.
Conversely, subsidies should not go to businesses
in industries within which regions have little 3. Community/location: Subsidy programs should
prospect of competitive strength, because this give higher priority to jobs in older communities
also means regions do not have the specialized with high unemployment, existing infrastructure,
skills, suppliers, or other supports needed to and close proximity to public transit, and,
attract a critical mass of businesses in the industry. therefore, easy accessibility to low-income people.
Attracting an isolated branch plant that does They should discourage subsidies in sites that chew
not reinforce any “agglomeration economies” up scarce land and might reinforce the outward
diminishes the prospect that public subsidies will movement of people and jobs.
generate a virtuous circle of self-reinforcing growth
within the sector.
One of the potential benefits of establishing specific industry, location, and job-quality criteria is that it makes it
easier for state and local economic development officials to become more discriminating: to say “no” or at least to
offer more limited assistance if a company seeking subsidies makes little sense for the region.
At the level of economic development philosophy, these three targeting criteria are accepted by the Rendell
Administration and the Department of Community and Economic Development. For example, with help from
IBM, DCED has sought to base its industrial recruitment efforts on an understanding of the industrial strengths
of each economic region.16 In addition, both community/location and job quality are incorporated into “The
Keystone Principles & Criteria for Growth, Investment, and Resource Conservation,” (or Keystone Principles),
adopted through an interagency process by the Rendell Administration on March 31, 2005, (see Box 2).
Box 2. Pennsylvania’s Keystone Principles & Criteria for Growth, Investment,
& Resource Conservation (or “Keystone Principles” for short)17
1. Redevelop First
2. Provide Efficient Infrastructure
3. Concentrate Development
4. Increase Job Opportunities
5. Foster Sustainable Businesses
6. Restore and Enhance the Environment
7. Enhance Recreational and Heritage Resources
8. Expand Housing Opportunities
9. Plan Regionally, Implement Locally
10. Be Fair

27. 26
Community/location is a major component of the first three Keystone Principles: “redevelop first,” “provide
efficient infrastructure” (or “fix-it-first”), and “concentrate development.” The importance of job quality is
recognized in Keystone Principle 4, which notes the importance of investing in “businesses that offer good
paying, high quality jobs.”
More difficult to evaluate is whether or not the idea that subsidies should be targeted by industry has been
translated into actual practice, changing which companies receive state assistance. The central challenge in
evaluating targeting is the lack of good and easily accessible data on the industry, location, and job quality of
subsidy recipients. This lack underscores the need for greater transparency, a point we return to later.
Lacking (for the most part) data, the best we can do is to evaluate targeting based on our review of program
guidelines, supplemented by interviews with DCED officials. Based on these sources, we assessed on a four-
point qualitative scale (defined in Table 5) to what extent different business subsidy programs took into account
industry, location, and job quality.
Table 5: Ratings Used to Evaluate Whether Traditional Subsidies Are Well Targeted
by Industry, Community/Location, and Job Quality
Rating Definition
Strong Subsidies are restricted to projects that meet industry, community/location, or job quality requirements.
Moderate Projects that meet industry, community/location, or job quality requirements are given substantial preference.
Projects that meet industry, community/location, or job quality requirements are given some additional
Limited consideration (e.g., job quality standards are weak or industry focus is too broad—so most companies in
broad sections of the economy qualify).
None Criteria are not mentioned at all.
Source. Keystone Research Center
Industry Targeting: The Governor’s Action Team now identifies four priority industries in the state as a whole:
energy, manufacturing, life sciences, and technology.18 Manufacturing and technology, however, are very broad
categories. The industry criteria for distributing funds in most individual programs (see Table 6) are similarly
broad, with the result that a very wide range of businesses would meet the criteria. The only program evaluated that
has narrow targeting is the Film Tax Credit. In this case, the problem is that Pennsylvania has no demonstrable or
potential competitive strength in the film industry, so it’s not clear why it is being targeted for subsidies.
To the best of our knowledge, DCED has never evaluated in detail the allocation by industry of Traditional Subsidies
and how this allocation has, or hasn’t, changed based on the IBM studies and subsequent efforts to take into greater
account the specific industry of subsidy applicants.
16 The IBM study considered how attractive a “prospective investor” (who is currently considering where to expand or locate its
operations) in each of 11 industries would find 11 Pennsylvania’s economic regions compared to competitor regions (across the country and
internationally). See IBM Business Consulting Services, Identifying Opportunities for Pennsylvania to Compete in the Global Economy—
Summary Report: Action Plan for Investing in a New Pennsylvania. Online at www.newpa.com/files/ibmexternalreport05.pdf. See also
Team Pennsylvania Foundation (October 2007), Pennsylvania’s Global Competitiveness Initiative: An Investor Oriented Approach to
Economic Development. Available at http://www.newpa.com
17 The full text of the principles is available at http://www.newpa.com/find-and-apply-for-funding/keystone-principles/index.aspx. This
same web page also includes criteria for implementing the Keystone Principles.
18 Interview with Lisa Elliot, Governor’s Action Team, August 2009.

28. 27
Table 6: Assessment of Industry Targeting Criteria in Nine Pennsylvania Business Subsidy Programs
Program Industry Criteria Rating
Agriculture, industrial activities, manufacturing, research and development,
Opportunity Grant Program export or “any other enterprise that offers a significant economic impact… Limited
determined solely by DCED.” 19
Pennsylvania Industrial Manufacturing, industrial activities, agribusiness, computer or clerical
Development Authority operations, office buildings for national or regional headquarters, research and Limited
development, or a Keystone Innovation Zone Company.
Infrastructure Development Agricultural enterprise, industrial enterprise, manufacturing, research and
Limited
Program development, export service, or commercial enterprise.
Job Creation Tax Credit None Limited*
Manufacturing, industrial processes, mining, production agriculture,
Machinery & Equipment
Loan Fund information technology, biotechnology, services as a medical facility, or other Limited
industrial or technology sectors as defined by the Secretary [of DCED].
Infrastructure & Facilities Eligible entities include industrial enterprise, manufacturer, retail enterprise,
Improvement Program research and development enterprise, convention center authority, hospital, Limited
or hotel.
Keystone Opportunity Zone None None
Program
Film Production Tax Credit Restricted to film industry. Limited**
Priority consideration given to agribusiness, advanced manufacturing, life
science, biotechnology, biopharmaceutical manufacturing and healthcare,
Customized Job Training environmental technology, alternative energy, information technology, building
and construction, logistics and transportation, lumber, wood and paper. Also Limited
priority consideration given to projects addressing targeted industries defined
by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry.
*This rating is based on the individual program guidelines. Discussions with DCED indicated that higher preference is given to projects in certain indus-
tries. Although this criterion remains one of five to eight factors and hence is “limited,” it still seems a reasonable assessment of the weight placed on
industry focus.
**Though the program is restricted to the film industry, it is rated as having limited criteria because there is no evidence that Pennsylvania has a com-
petitive advantage in the film industry.
Source. Keystone Research Center
Community/Location. When it comes to community and location, there has been only one empirical study of
where subsidies go.20 That study (by Keystone Research Center) found that PIDA, OGP, and IDP subsidies
distributed between 1998 and 2003 were all over the map, both literally and metaphorically: Second-class
townships received the same per-capita assistance as did older communities (cities, boroughs, and first-class
townships). Moreover, second-class townships received more per capita of the most valuable assistance—grant
dollars—than did older communities. (An update of this study will be published later this spring.)
Consistent with this empirical evidence, our review of program guidelines reveals that five of the nine programs
placed limited emphasis on location and one placed no emphasis on that factor (see table 7). The remaining three
programs—the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority, the Infrastructure and Facilities Improvement
19 Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (October 2008), Opportunity Grant Program Guidelines, 2.
20 See Dennis Bellafiore, Stephen Herzenberg, Megan Myer, and Allan Rothrock (2003), Economic Development Subsidies in
Pennsylvania: Do They Fuel Sprawl?, Harrisburg,PA: Keystone Research Center; background paper for the Brookings Institution Center
on Urban and Metropolitan Policy report Back to Prosperity: A Competitive Agenda for Renewing Pennsylvania. In conjunction with this
report, KRC also developed an online subsidy map. Both the report and the subsidy map can be accessed at www.keystoneresearchmap.org.

29. 28
Program, and the Customized Job Training Program—emphasize location more strongly. The PIDA program, for
example, offers lower interest rates on PIDA loans to counties with higher unemployment rates (e.g., Philadelphia
County PIDA recipients pay lower interest rates on PIDA loans than do PIDA recipients in the suburban
Philadelphia counties).
Consistent with PIDA’s “moderate” community/location emphasis, our earlier empirical study found that more
PIDA loan dollars (on a per capita basis) went to cities and to older communities as a group than did OGP and
IDP grants.21
We rated the Keystone Opportunity Zone program as emphasizing location to only a limited extent despite
legislative language that targets “deteriorated” areas.22 This rating reflects the fact that state policymakers and
local economic development practitioners both say that, as new KOZs have been defined, the definition of
“blighted” has become broader. In the view of one official in a local Chamber of Commerce, a program that could
have had a powerful impact on distressed cities if KOZs had remained tightly targeted, has been diluted (see
Box 3). An LB&FC audit also concluded that KOZ designations are too broad, giving KOZ status to greenfield
locations and other locations that are not blighted, but merely underutilized.23 Before we end our discussion of
KOZs, it is worth underscoring the desperate need for actual data and acknowledging that such data might show
the distribution of KOZ tax breaks, on average across the state, to be reasonably targeted to older communities
(Box 3).
Table 7. Assessment of Community/Location Targeting Criteria in Nine Pennsylvania
Business Subsidy Program
Program Community/Location Criteria Rating
Opportunity Grant Program “Economic conditions for the region where the project is located”24 Limited
Pennsylvania Industrial Greater award amounts for areas designated as distressed. Lower loan rates
25
Moderate
Development Authority applicable for areas with higher unemployment.
Infrastructure Development Special consideration for areas with adverse economic factors. 26
Limited
Program
Job Creation Tax Credit DCED considers whether project addresses Keystone Principles (see p. 21). Limited
Machinery & Equipment Loan DCED considers the “geographic impact of the project” when evaluating an Limited
Fund application. 27
Infrastructure & Facilities DCED considers unemployment, declining population, brownfields, low to Moderate
Improvement Program moderate household income of project location when evaluating applications.
The Legislative Budget and Finance Committee, in their June 2009 audit, found
Keystone Opportunity Zone
that greenfield sites have been designated as KOZ sites. The program has Limited
Program
strong criteria on paper but has limited criteria in practice. 28
Film Production Tax Credit None None
Priority consideration given to distressed areas including those with
Customized Job Training unemployment above the state average, state enterprise zone, Keystone Moderate
Opportunity Zone, Keystone Innovation Zone, area with high job loss due to
major plant closings, layoffs, or natural or man-made disasters.
Source. Keystone Research Center

30. 29
Box 3. A Case Study of Keystone Opportunity Zones in York County 29
When Pennsylvania first passed its KOZ law, all KOZ parcels designated in York County fell in the city of York. These
parcels included a carefully selected group of blighted and vacant commercial properties. If a property was generating
minimal tax income before designation as a KOZ, the city signed payment-in-lieu-of-taxes agreements: that way, the
city would not lose money but the tax incentive for further development would remain. Since the first round of KOZ
designations, very few additional KOZ sites have been designated in York County.
One of the original KOZ sites in York became of the most significant private developments in the city in the last 50
years, anchored by a $30 million, 200,000 square foot new commercial development and a parking structure to
support those buildings. The project brought in an estimated 200 net new jobs and the city of York will now become a
“huge winner” in property taxes with the 10-year KOZ tax break now phasing out.
This was the only significant KOZ development in York County, however. One local developer notes that York
County’s experience puts in perspective the limits of what KOZs can do: “KOZs were touted as the most powerful
economic development tool Pennsylvania has ever created and what did they produce? They were certainly a useful
tool, but KOZs put the lie to the idea that there’s a silver bullet. Let’s get real about permanently reforming local
government and tax structure. You are in a municipality with crime, low-quality education, high taxes, blight, and
easily buildable land on the edge of the city. You single out taxes and then you’re shocked when that doesn’t work.
KOZs are a finite benefit that goes away, not a permanent change in the landscape.”
Job Quality: Table 8 shows that all nine programs have limited or no job-quality criteria. Examples of weak
criteria include the requirement within the Job Creation Tax Credit that jobs pay at least 150% of the Federal
Minimum Wage (FMW). With the federal minimum wage currently at $7.25 per hour, 150% of the minimum
wage is $10.88 per hour.
Our assessment of job-quality criteria as being relatively weak is consistent with the one empirical study of the
quality of jobs promised on PIDA projects. That study found that two out of every five PIDA subsidies go to
companies that expect to pay less than 80% of the industry average wage in the county where the investment is
applied. 30
21 Bellafiore et al., Economic Development Subsidies in Pennsylvania: Do They Fuel Sprawl?
22 According to the LB&FC report, the legislation defines “deteriorated property” as “any blighted, impoverished area…that is
abandoned, unsafe, vacant, undervalued, underutilized, overgrown, defective, condemned, demolished, or which contain economically
undesirable land use.” (p. 11)
23 Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (June 2009). An Evaluation of the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, Harrisburg, PA,.
127 and 131.
24 Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (2008). Opportunity Grant Program Guidelines, 6.
25 Distressed areas include state enterprise zones, state Act 47 municipalities, federal empowerment zones, federal enterprise
communities, brownfield sites, Keystone Opportunity Zones, and Keystone Opportunity Expansion Zones.
26 Includes, but is not limited to, enterprise zones, distressed communities, federal empowerment zones, or enterprise communities.
27 Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (February 2009). Core Industries/Machinery and Equipment
Loan Fund Program Guideline, 6.
28 Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (June 2009). An Evaluation of the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, Harrisburg, PA, 131.
29 This box is based on an interview with Eric Menzer, Senior Vice President of Wagman Construction in York County and Chair of the
Board of Director of 10,000 Friends of Pennsylvania.
30 David Bradley (2002), Many Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority Loans Create Low-Quality Jobs, Harrisburg, PA:
Keystone Research Center

31. 30
Table 8: Assessment of Job Quality Criteria in Nine Pennsylvania Business Subsidy Programs
Program Job Quality Criteria Rating
Opportunity Grant Program At least 150% of the minimum wage.31 Limited*
Pennsylvania Industrial None None
Development Authority
Infrastructure Development
None Limited**
Program
Job Creation Tax Credit At least 150% of federal minimum wage excluding benefits. Limited*
Machinery & Equipment
DCED considers “job quality” when evaluating an application. 32 Limited
Loan Fund
Infrastructure & Facilities DCED considers “job quality” when evaluating an application. Limited
Improvement Program
Keystone Opportunity Zone
None None
Program
Film Production Tax Credit None None
Customized Job Training Job quality in terms of wage level of trainees considered in evaluation process. Limited*
* This rating is based on the individual program guidelines. Discussions with DCED indicated that higher preference is given to projects with wages from
200% to 250% of the federal minimum wage. However, this criterion remains one of five to eight factors and is not binding (as some projects that pay
below 200 or 250% receive funds). Hence, “limited” still seems a reasonable assessment of the weight placed on job quality.
**Interviews revealed that wages are given consideration in practice in a manner similar to other programs with limited job quality criteria.
Source. Keystone Research Center
Accountability After Subsidies Are Distributed
The previous section considered how well business subsidies are targeted. This section will consider the current
state of accountability once the state gives out subsidies. We define three dimensions of post-grant accountability:
• Public disclosure: Is basic information on subsidies publicly available?
• Monitoring: Are companies that receive subsidies monitored, and is the information companies provide to
the state audited for accuracy?
• Clawbacks: Does the state recapture subsidies if companies fail to deliver promised jobs?
Our review of accountability relies on our own program reviews, on DCED interviews, and on audits of DCED
programs by the Auditor General and the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee.33
31 The Opportunity Grant Program guidelines did not specify whether this referred to the federal minimum wage or the state minimum wage.
32 Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (February 2009). Core Industries/ Machinery and Equipment
Loan Fund Program Guidelines, 6.
33 Office of the Auditor General (October 2007), Opportunity Grant Program: A Special Performance Audit of The Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development. Legislative Budget and Finance Committee(June 2009), An Evaluation of the
Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, Harrisburg, PA. Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (2000), Department of Community and
Economic Development, Economic Development Programs: A Performance Audit Report in Response to Act 1996-58, Harrisburg, PA.
The following programs were reviewed in the 2000 LB&FC Audit of DCED: Customized Job Training, Industrial Sites, Reuse Program,
Infrastructure Development Program, Machinery and Equipment Loan Fund, Opportunity Grant Program, Pennsylvania Industrial
Development Authority, PennPorts, Small Business Development Centers, Small Business First Loans, Team Pennsylvania, Job Creation
Tax Credit, and Keystone Opportunity Zone Program.

32. 31
Public Disclosure. Information disclosed on subsidies should make it possible to determine whether or not
taxpayer dollars are being used effectively. In particular, were subsidies well targeted (e.g., based on industry,
location, and job quality), and did companies actually create the number and quality of jobs that they promised
initially? Answering these questions requires information such as the name of the company that received money,
the number of jobs promised, the wages promised, whether or not the company promised to provide healthcare
benefits, the address of the business site where the money was used, the industry of the company, how many
jobs were actually created, and the wages and healthcare benefits actually paid. For companies relocating within
Pennsylvania, the address of the previous business site should also be included. This is not a great deal of
information—it could fit on a well-designed single side of paper. In addition, all information disclosed should be
easy to download into a data set suitable for research and analysis.
So how does Pennsylvania’s actual current practice compare to this public disclosure ideal? The answer is, better
than in many states but certainly not well enough.
The state does well compared to other states because of an online “Investment Tracker” database, established
during the Ridge Administration. The Investment Tracker reports all subsidies, the name of the applicant for
assistance, the county, jobs existing, jobs pledged, and award amounts. As a result of the Investment Tracker,
Good Jobs First, the national nonprofit clearinghouse on subsidy accountability, ranked Pennsylvania 12th in the
nation for online business subsidy disclosure. (The specific criteria used by Good Jobs First to evaluate public
information online were searchability, level of detail, and thoroughness.34)
The Investment Tracker, however, does not make it possible to analyze whether subsidies were well targeted or
whether companies delivered on promises. It provides no information on
• industry,
• promised wages and benefits (for most subsidies), or
• actual wages and benefits.
While the Tracker does specify a “county” for each subsidy, it is not always clear whether this is the county of the
applicant for assistance or the business site where money was actually used. More importantly, there is no street
address which allows pinpointing of exactly where subsidies are applied.
Disclosure is especially sparse for companies receiving tax breaks. The Investment Tracker does not specify
which companies receive KOZ tax breaks from the state. Nor does it report local tax exemptions.35 Finally,
information from the Investment Tracker cannot easily be uploaded into a data set, making it difficult to analyze.
In addition to maintaining the Investment Tracker, the Commonwealth publishes an annual report for programs
under the auspices of the Commonwealth Financing Authority, and DCED develops an Annual Financing Strategy
with job creation figures and private investment. As with the Tracker, however, these annual reports do not
analyze whether money is well targeted, distributed in accordance with the Keystone Principles, or otherwise
is a good use of public funds. Rather, these reports are descriptions of the program activities, with aggregate
information on variables such as jobs pledged, jobs actually reported, and private dollars leveraged. This summary
information makes it difficult for the public to determine if the dollars are being used effectively.
34 Philip Mattera, Karla Walter, Julie Farb Blain and Michelle Lee (2007). The State of Disclosure: An Evaluation of Online Public
Information About Economic Development Subsidies, Procurement Contracts and Lobbying Activities, Washington DC: Good Jobs First,
2–3.
35 Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (June 2009). An Evaluation of the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, Harrisburg, PA, 76.

33. 32
Monitoring. The adequacy of DCED monitoring of companies that receive subsidies has been most
comprehensively assessed in audits of the Opportunity Grant Program by the Auditor General, and of the
Keystone Opportunity Zone program by the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (LB&FC).36 Both of
these comprehensive audits contain detailed analyses of DCED monitoring of companies that receive grants or tax
breaks. We will focus here on only a few highlights.
Both audits found that DCED relies for job creation data primarily on self-reported data from grant recipients,
data that is not independently verified. Both audits also documented reporting discrepancies. LB&FC found
discrepancies so great as to make it impossible for the agency to render a judgment regarding the effectiveness
of the program.37 OGP reporting, for its part, excluded companies that failed to report data from its analysis of
program success, thereby inflating its estimates of the share of companies that met job-creation targets.
In response to the OGP and KOZ audits, DCED has implemented many reforms. In fact, DCED agreed to adopt
17 of the 19 recommendations in the OGP report. The department also decided to create a new internal monitoring
division separate from program staff so that monitors would not have a vested interest in determining whether job
creation and wage targets had been met. The director position for that monitoring division has, however, been left
vacant for an extended period of time due to budget considerations and the state’s hiring freeze. Thus, from the
perspective of DCED staff, current monitoring is inadequate, in part because of a lack of resources for monitoring.
Another factor is that greater monitoring isn’t required by the legislature. As one DCED staff stated, “The statute
didn’t require that we collect data, so no one did, but now we are.” 38
Recapture Provisions: Recapture provisions, or “clawbacks,” recover subsidies—or portions of them—when
companies fail to deliver promised jobs and wage levels. There has been no recent in-depth audit of all economic
development programs that would allow us to determine the current extent of recapture.
Back in 2000, the LB&FC committee conducted a departmental audit of DCED and found few instances in
which the department imposed sanctions on companies that didn’t deliver promised jobs. LB&FC indicated that
reluctance to impose clawbacks appeared to stem from a “desire to work cooperatively with ‘clients.’”
The only recent empirical evidence on recapture comes from the audits of the Opportunity Grant and KOZ
Programs. As a result of the Opportunity Grant Program audit, DCED in 2007 increased its recapture to 30% of
subsidies provided to companies that failed to create as many jobs as promised. This compared with 13% in the
2000 to 2005 period.39 In the KOZ program, the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee found a situation more
similar to the 2000 LB&FC audit: no clawbacks of tax benefits at all because 1) the statute does not technically
require many companies to create jobs, and 2) DCED has waived the clawback provision when companies have left
KOZs within five years for circumstances deemed beyond their control. 40
Table 9 includes the recapture provisions in the program guidelines of the nine programs analyzed earlier. On paper, six
other programs in addition to the KOZ and OGP program have strong recapture provisions. A majority of programs,
however, also have waiver provisions which allow DCED to not seek to recapture state funds when companies fail to
deliver on promises. To evaluate what happens in practice, we need actual data on the frequency and extent of recapture.
36 An Evaluation of the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, S-3.
37 An Evaluation of the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, 28; for discussion of the reporting problems in the Opportunity Grant
program, see Opportunity Grant Program, 23–30
38 Interview with DCED staff, August 2008
39 Jack Wagner, Auditor General (October 2007). Opportunity Grant Program: A Special Performance Audit of The Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development, 62–63.
40 Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (June 2009). An Evaluation of the Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, Harrisburg, PA,
84, 59–61.

34. 33
Table 9. Recapture Provisions in Nine Pennsylvania Business Subsidy Programs
Program Recapture Provision in Guidelines
Businesses are liable for penalty up to the full amount plus an additional 10% of the grant amount,
Opportunity Grant Program if the business a) relocates within five years, or b) fails to meet job projections, or c) fails to invest
the required amount of private investment dollars. This penalty may be waived by DCED at its sole
discretion if failure is due to circumstances outside the control of the business.
Pennsylvania Industrial Failure to meet the job projections may result in an increase in the interest rate.
Development Authority
Businesses that fail to meet job projections or to invest amount specified are liable for penalty up
Infrastructure Development to the full amount of the grant. DCED may waive penalty if circumstances outside the control of
Program the recipient cause these failures. An increase in the interest rate of up to two percent (2%) above
the current prime interest rate may be imposed where loans are awarded.
Businesses that relocate outside of Pennsylvania within five years shall be required to refund the
Job Creation Tax Credit credits utilized. Businesses that fail to meet job projections within three years will be required
to refund the credits utilized. Penalties may be waived if DCED determines circumstances beyond
the business’s control caused these failures.
Failure to meet the job projections within three years may result in an increase in the interest rate
Machinery & Equipment Loan Fund
(MELF) up to two percent (2%) above the current prime interest rate unless failure was due to circum
stances beyond the control of the business.
Infrastructure & Facilities The grant recipient shall be required to repay all or any portion of a grant if the project user fails
Improvement Program (IFIP) to use the project for the period of time the grant recipient is receiving grants.
Businesses that relocate outside of the Zone within five years may be required to refund all tax
Keystone Opportunity Zone Program benefits received. Businesses that fail to meet the relocation obligations (job creation, capital
investment, or lease obligations) will be subject to revocation of future benefits and repayment
of benefits previously received.
Film Production Tax Credit None
Businesses that (1) fail to create the number of jobs or make the amount of capital investment,
Customized Job Training or (2) relocate outside of Pennsylvania within five years of receiving the grant, or (3) fail to sub
stantially carry out the training program, must refund grants unless DCED determines failure was
for reasons outside the control of the company.
Source. Keystone Research Center

35. 34
The Return on Investment in
Grow-Your-Own Programs
In considering budget allocations for Pennsylvania’s Traditional Subsidy programs, another factor that should
be taken into account is whether more effective ways exist of creating jobs—for example, through Grow-Your-
Own Programs and Regional, Community, and Industry Subsidies.41 The most carefully evaluated programs in
Pennsylvania in these other categories are Pennsylvania’s most prominent Grow-Your-Own Programs, the Ben
Franklin Technology Partnership (BFTP) and the Industrial Resource Center (IRC) program.
Most evaluations of these programs depend on “quasi-experimental” designs. These designs compare
companies assisted by the BFTPs and the IRCs with a matched group of companies that did not receive program
assistance, but are otherwise the same when measured by variables such as industry, firm size, and location.
This quasi-experimental approach falls short of an actual controlled experiment, which would be practically and
politically difficult to do because it would require randomly denying services to a control group of companies.42
Acknowledging these limitations, the methodologies used to evaluate the BFTP and IRC programs are more
rigorous than the job counts that are used to document success of Traditional Subsidy programs. These job counts
ordinarily attribute all of the jobs at subsidized business sites—whether these are new or retained jobs—to the
program.
Audits of Pennsylvania’s Ben Franklin Technology Partnership—conducted in 1999,43 2003,44 and 2009 45 —
found that companies assisted by the program boosted the Pennsylvania economy by several billion dollars.
The most recent audit found that companies assisted by BFTP boosted the economy by $8.7 billion in inflation-
adjusted dollars from 2002 through 2006 (or $1.74 billion per year), resulting in $517 million in additional state
tax revenues.46 With an investment of $140 million over those four years, the return on investment of state tax
revenues is 3.5 to 1.47
41 Bill Schweke, “Business Incentives Aren’t the Only Growth Policy: A Look At Other Options.” Available at http://www.cfed.org/
ideas/2007/10/business_incentives_arent_the.html
42 The biggest limitations of quasi-experimental designs are what economists call “sample selection problems.” If companies that receive
BFTP or IRC services are systematically different than the control-group companies in ways that are not measured (and controlled for),
those systematic differences rather than the program supports could account for the relative success of assisted (“treated”) companies.
Receiving IRC or BFTP services, for example, may signal that businesses have better information networks than typical firms do, a proxy
for being a high-performance firm. If companies assisted by Grow-Your-Own Programs would have done better than typical firms anyway,
then the quasi-experimental design may attribute to the program too much of the gap in business success between businesses served and
other businesses.
43 Nexus Associates, Inc. (1999). A Record of Achievement: The Economic Impact of the Ben Franklin Partnership. Cambridge, MA.
44 Nexus Associates, Inc. (2003). A Continuing Record of Achievement: The Economic Impact of the Ben Franklin Technology Partners.
Cambridge, MA.
45 Pennsylvania Economy League (PEL) (2009). A Continuing Record of Achievement: The Economic Impact of the Ben Franklin
Technology Partners 2002–2006, Philadelphia, PA.
46 PEL. (2009). A Continuing Record of Achievement, 5.
47 PEL. (2009). A Continuing Record of Achievement, 6.

36. 35
Audits of the IRC program in 1999 and 2004 found that the program had very positive economic impacts. In a
1999 study, Nexus Associates found that between 1988 and 1997, the IRCs increased labor productivity for IRC
clients between 3.6% and 5.0% more per year compared to a comparable group of firms. IRCs boosted the state
economy by an estimated $1.9 billion, resulting in $120 million in additional state tax revenues.48 The program
increased gross state product by an estimated $22 for every $1 of state funding.49
Pennsylvania’s IRCs were also evaluated in the year 2000 as part of a national study of “manufacturing extension
partnerships” (MEPs) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.50 NIST found that eight in 10 MEP
clients improved productivity, that MEP clients increased and retained sales of nearly $10.5 billion as a result of
MEP services, and created and retained 57,000 jobs in 2007 nationwide. 51
48 Nexus Associates (October 1999). The Pennsylvania Industrial Resource Center: Assessing the Record and Charting the Future.
Cambridge, MA.
49 A 2004 study by Deloitte was unable to update estimates of the impact of IRCs due to a lack of access to the federal database used
earlier. Deloitte Consulting, LLP. (January 2004), Manufacturing Pennsylvania’s Future: Regional Strategies That Build From Current
Strengths and Address Competitive Challenges, 248.
50 Legislative Budget and Finance Committee (January 2000). Sunset Audit of the Ben Franklin/IRC Partnership, Harrisburg, PA, 15.
51 National Institute of Standards and Technology (February 2009). The Manufacturing Extension Partnership, Delivering Measurable
Results to Its Clients: Fiscal Year 2007 Results. Gaithersburg, MD.

37. 36
Legislative Proposals to
Strengthen Accountability
Having completed an overview of Pennsylvania economic development programs, of the current state of account-
ability of Traditional Subsidy programs, and of the return on investment in leading Grow-Your-Own Programs,
the rest of this report turns to the question of reforming Pennsylvania’s economic development approach. We start
our discussion with a review of proposals already advanced by Pennsylvania legislators.
In recent years, nationally and in Pennsylvania, support has been building for increased transparency and
accountability across the board when government distributes taxpayer dollars. This movement has also been
evident in the area of business subsidy accountability. Since FY 2003–04, the Pennsylvania Legislature has
introduced and reintroduced 13 bills attempting to strengthen accountability of economic development subsidies.
(For a list of these bills, their session year, and sponsor, see Appendix A.)
Seven of these legislative proposals are variations of one bill first introduced in the Pennsylvania House in 2003–
04 and in the Pennsylvania Senate in 2007–08. All of these bills would enact comprehensive business subsidy
accountability. They provide for:
• Either the Department of Community and • Public disclosure, for each subsidy or tax break,
Economic Development or the Department of of the company being subsidized, its industry, jobs
Revenue (which entity varies depending on the bill) actually created, wages and healthcare benefits
to submit unified economic development budgets paid, and the address of the business site where the
summarizing total state and local tax reductions, assistance is applied.
and business subsidies, provided to promote
economic development. Currently estimating the • Wage standards that would help ensure subsidies
total amount Pennsylvania spends to promote target companies with family supporting jobs.
economic development requires a great deal of • A limit on total assistance, from all programs, of
effort (as we learned in producing this report). $35,000 per job.
Even direct subsidies (through grants and loans)
are spread over many agencies and programs. So- • Recapture of subsidies in proportion to companies’
called “off-budget” revenues, in the form of lost failure to deliver on promised jobs and wage levels.
tax revenues, are even harder to track down and
• The right for individual taxpayers or organizations
validate, even at the state level, and simply are not
representing taxpayers to bring civil action to
available when it comes to revenue losses through
compel enforcement of the bill’s provisions by a
local tax breaks. A unified economic development
granting body.
budget would remedy these basic information gaps;
The House and Senate legislation being reintroduced in conjunction with the release of this report further refines
this basic accountability approach. For example, both revised bills include explicit provisions requiring that data
collected through improved public disclosure be incorporated into a user-friendly database suitable for research
and analysis by outside researchers.

38. 37
Two other bills (House Bill 1697 of FY 2007–08 and House Bill 1032 of 2009–10) introduce a simpler but also
lower (in most cases) “living wage” standard linked with distribution of economic development subsidies. These
bills also require employer-provided healthcare with the employer paying at least 80% of the cost.52
Prompted by the audit of the Opportunity Grant Program by the Auditor General, Senator Jane Orie introduced
legislation that would implement several of the recommendations in the Auditor General’s report to improve
monitoring of and reporting on subsidy recipients. Specifically, the legislation would require annual reports from
grant recipients, annual site visits, data verification, comprehensive reporting of program success and failure,
penalty collection, and publication of benchmarks and performance measures of each business subsidy program
on its website. 53
House Resolution 115 of 2007 and Senate Resolution 2009-127 called on the Legislative Budget and Finance
Committee to study the effectiveness of 18 of Pennsylvania’s tax credit programs. The latter resolution led to
the publication of reports on the KOZ program (referenced above), the Film Tax Credit, and the Research and
Development Tax Credit. These reports, in turn, contributed to the cuts in the tax credit programs in the 2009–10
budget.
52 PA House Bill 1032, 2009–2010 regular session
53 PA Senate Bill 697, 2009–2010 regular session

39. 38
Recommendations
This report places its analysis of Pennsylvania’s current economic development programs in the context of the
distinct ways states have sought to stimulate job creation over the past 60 or 70 years. We suggested at the outset
that the current slow economy, which has led to deep cuts in some existing economic development programs,
represents an opportunity to reevaluate and update how the state invests in job creation.
In this final section of our report, the question becomes, how can the state get started on a systemic updating
of economic development investments? Below we outline six ways. Implicit in the range of recommendations
is that state legislation—from changes in budget priorities to transparency and accountability reforms—have
an important place in a comprehensive reform. At the same time, an integrated new approach to job creation in
the state cannot take place without the buy-in of economic development practitioners. For this reason, the first
and the last of our six recommendations emphasize the need to engage practitioners in a dialogue about how to
transcend nontargeted industrial recruitment and to implement industry- and cluster-level efforts that will grow
Pennsylvania’s own businesses and have a bigger bang for the buck.
1. Better Target Traditional Subsidies: Pennsylvania 2. Improve Transparency and Public Disclosure
has taken tentative steps toward the idea that businesses by Making the “Investment Tracker” a More
that receive subsidies should meet criteria based on Functional Tool for Analysis: The Pennsylvania
job quality, on whether recruited businesses make Department of Community and Economic
sense for the regional economy, and on whether the Development’s “Investment Tracker” website (http://
jobs will be in the right locations. To move further www.dced.state.pa.us/investmenttracker/) reports on
in this direction, DCED should engage economic more than 240 state programs. But there are critical
development practitioners in the development and gaps in the Investment Tracker reports: For example,
implementation of practical ways to give additional information is inadequate or lacking on wages and
emphasis to community, job quality, and industry. benefits, on where the money is applied geographically,
Would practitioners, for example, favor block- on the industry of the recipient company, and on
granting portions of Traditional Subsidy dollars to whether companies actually deliver on promised job
counties or multicounty regions that submit strategic creation. The Tracker’s format also makes it difficult to
plans outlining effective targeting? DCED, the next download the mountain of (flawed) information into a
gubernatorial administration, and the legislature should data set for analysis. To make the Investment Tracker
also give consideration to setting aside a portion of a more functional tool, the state should improve its
Traditional Subsidies for specific communities. disclosure requirements and website to fill these data
gaps and should fix this download flaw.
Montgomery County, just outside Philadelphia, recently
developed a strategic economic development plan that 3. Create a Unified Development Budget: To
targets funds (in this case to older communities) and complement an enhanced deal-specific disclosure
that also sets aside a portion of the funds for specific system, we also recommend a Unified Development
communities. The county did this within a seven- Budget (UDB), an annual report to the state legislature
year, $105-million, bond-financed county economic which catalogs and analyzes all forms of state spending
development plan. Of this total, $40 million is for economic development, including tax breaks. The
dedicated to the county’s two “most-challenged” towns present report provides a template for a Pennsylvania
(Norristown and Pottstown). Almost all of the funds UDB, the goal of which is to enable legislators to see
will focus on older communities. (The Montgomery the big picture, and the major patterns and trends in
County economic development program manual can economic development spending. This makes it easier
be found online at http://www2.montcopa.org/planning/ to set economic development priorities via the budget.
cwp/view,a,3,q,71807.asp)

40. 39
4. Enact Economic Development Accountability make money cutting Traditional Subsidy deals. A
Legislation: The previous section noted that, since FY partial answer might be to give economic development
2003–04, a growing and increasingly bipartisan and organizations a stake in effective “Grow-Your-Own”
now bicameral group of Pennsylvania lawmakers has approaches, including initiatives to support innovation
supported legislation to strengthen job quality standards in regional industry clusters. The paragraph below
and accountability (public disclosure, monitoring, and suggests one way to do that.
recapture of subsidy money if companies don’t deliver
promised job creation) when the state distributes At present, even though we live in a global,
Traditional Subsidies. With the state facing tight knowledge-based “network economy,” the state of
revenue constraints and the public concerned that Pennsylvania invests very little in helping industry
lack of transparency opens the door to politicized clusters respond to global competition. The state could
distribution of business subsidies, now is the time to remedy this shortfall by adapting to the economic
enact this accountability legislation. development sphere the flexible approach the
Department of Labor and Industry uses to distribute
5. Grow-Your-Own Businesses Rather Than Industry Partnership grants. While Industry Partnership
Recruiting From Other States:Pennsylvania should grants support industry-specific training, an analogous
use this time of budget cuts to shift its economic economic development initiative could provide grants
development portfolio toward Grow-Your-Own and for upgrading technologies, developing new products,
strategic Regional, Community, and Industry Programs exploiting new markets, or otherwise improving
(which also grow Pennsylvania’s own companies). performance to head off foreign competition.
Generous budgets for Traditional Subsidies play into Successful proposals should demonstrate significant
the hands of site-selection companies that stoke the war engagement of businesses in an industry cluster; the
between the states and extract public money even when cluster’s current and potential economic significance
companies have already made up their minds to move (measured by jobs, wages, investment, profits, supply-
or to stay. chain linkages, etc.); a specific competitive challenge
or opportunity that would be addressed with grant
From the perspective of economic theory, moreover, it funds; projected outcomes; and a willingness to
is easier to justify investments in Grow-Your-Own and collaborate with state evaluation and capacity-building/
Regional, Community, and Industry Programs. In the peer-learning efforts.
case of Grow-Your-Own Programs, the private sector
invests too little in innovation because companies Imagine, for example, that, over the past five years,
cannot capture all of the benefits of their innovation. the state had dedicated $20 million of Opportunity
Some of these benefits spill over to other (often Grant funds annually to an Industry Center of
nearby) businesses. This market failure creates a strong Excellence Program. Could Pennsylvania now have a
rationale for the public sector to invest. Regional and loose learning network of Industry Centers across the
community assets also are appropriate targets for public state (just as it has 70+ Industry Partnerships)? What
investment because they are “public goods” that benefit would this network of Centers mean for the potential
many businesses and individuals. By contrast, handouts dynamism of the state? How much impact on the state’s
to individual companies too often deliver only private economy would have resulted from spending $20
benefits with little or no public benefit. million less for Traditional Subsidies in each of the past
five years?
6. Change the Business Model and Mindset of
Economic Development Organizations: Upton Another way to change the mindset of economic
Sinclair once observed, “It is difficult to get a man to development practitioners might be to block-grant
understand something, when his salary depends upon to entire regions economic development resources
his not understanding it.” This statement captures, in from all economic development programs. A broad
part, the challenge of updating the state’s approach to block grant might help shift the balance away from
job creation when economic development organizations Traditional Subsidies because it would confront

41. 40
regions with what economists call “opportunity Today, when a community helps a newly recruited
costs”—offering big subsidies would cost regions the company win state subsidies, the region does not
opportunity to invest those same resources in industry lose any resources for other economic development
cluster or strategic community development programs. initiatives.
Pennsylvania is recognized nationally as a leader in economic development policy and practice. The state has a
richer and more balanced repertoire of economic development programs than many states. The Commonwealth
also has some of the nation’s most respected Grow-Your-Own Programs. Now, in the wake of the Great
Recession, Pennsylvania has a chance to step to the forefront again. It has a chance to become the first state to
implement a comprehensive 21st-century state economic development policy. The state’s future prosperity and
quality of life depend on it.

42. 41
Appendix A
Economic Development Accountability Legislation Proposed
by the Pennsylvania General Assembly
Regular Session 2003-2004 An Act requiring the Department of Community and Economic Development
House Bill 2390 to submit a unified economic development budget; providing for unified
reporting of property tax reductions and abatements, for application for
economic development subsidies, for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality
standards and for recapture; establishing a private enforcement action; and
providing for public record disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Representative SOLOBAY
Last Action: Referred to COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, March 8,
2004 [House]
Regular Session 2005-2006 An Act requiring the Department of Community and Economic Development
House Bill 146 to submit a unified economic development budget; providing for unified
reporting of property tax reductions and abatements, for application for
economic development subsidies, for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality
standards and for recapture; establishing a private enforcement action; and
providing for public record disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Representative SOLOBAY
Last Action: Referred to FINANCE, Jan. 31, 2005 [House]
Regular Session 2005-2006 An Act requiring the Department of Revenue to submit a unified economic
development budget; providing for unified reporting of property tax reductions
House Bill 521 and abatements, for application for economic development subsidies,
for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality standards and for recapture;
establishing a private enforcement action; and providing for public record
disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Representative LEVDANSKY
Last Action: Referred to COMMERCE, Feb. 15, 2005 [House]
Regular Session 2007-2008 An Act requiring the Department of Revenue to submit a unified economic
development budget; providing for unified reporting of property tax reductions
Senate Bill 784 and abatements, for application for economic development subsidies,
for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality standards and for recapture;
establishing a private enforcement action; and providing for public record
disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Senator BROWNE
Last Action: Referred to FINANCE, May 2, 2007 [Senate]

43. 42
Regular Session 2007-2008 An Act requiring economic development subsidy recipients to meet minimum
House Bill 1697 standards for job quality.
Prime Sponsor: Representative COHEN
Last Action: Referred to LABOR RELATIONS, July 6, 2007 [House]
Regular Session 2007-2008 An Act requiring the Department of Community and Economic Development
to submit a unified economic development budget; providing for unified
House Bill 175
reporting of property tax reductions and abatements, for application for
economic development subsidies, for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality
standards and for recapture; establishing a private enforcement action; and
providing for public record disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Representative SOLOBAY
Last Action: Referred to COMMERCE, Feb. 1, 2007 [House]
Regular Session 2007-2008 An Act requiring companies that receive economic development subsidies
to ensure that subsidies result in improved standards of living for working
House Bill 1554
families.
Prime Sponsor: Representative COHEN
Last Action: Referred to COMMERCE, June 18, 2007 [House]
Regular Session 2007-2008 An Act requiring reports by certain recipients of public funds for economic
development; and providing for powers and duties of the Department of
Senate Bill 1600 Community and Economic Development.
Prime Sponsor: Senator ORIE
Last Action: Referred to COMMUNITY, ECONOMIC AND RECREATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, Nov. 18, 2008 [Senate]
Regular Session 2009-2010 An Act requiring the Department of Revenue to submit a unified economic
Senate Bill 562 development budget; providing for unified reporting of property tax reductions
and abatements, for application for economic development subsidies,
for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality standards and for recapture;
establishing a private enforcement action; and providing for public record
disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Senator BROWNE
Last Action: Referred to FINANCE, March 2, 2009 [Senate]
Regular Session 2009-2010 An Act requiring economic development subsidy recipients to meet minimum
standards for job quality.
House Bill 1032
Prime Sponsor: Representative COHEN
Last Action: Referred to LABOR RELATIONS, March 19, 2009 [House]

44. 43
Regular Session 2009-2010 An Act requiring companies that receive economic development subsidies
House Bill 811 to ensure that subsidies result in improved standards of living for working
families.
Prime Sponsor: Representative COHEN
Last Action: Referred to COMMERCE, March 9, 2009 [House]
Regular Session 2009-2010 An Act requiring the Department of Community and Economic Development
House Bill 157 to submit a unified economic development budget; providing for unified
reporting of property tax reductions and abatements, for application for
economic development subsidies, for reports, for subsidy limit and job quality
standards and for recapture; establishing a private enforcement action; and
providing for public record disclosure.
Prime Sponsor: Representative SOLOBAY
Last Action: Referred to COMMERCE, Jan. 30, 2009 [House]
Regular Session 2009-2010 An Act requiring reports by certain recipients of public funds for economic
development; and providing for powers and duties of the Department of
Senate Bill 697
Community and Economic Development.
Prime Sponsor: Senator ORIE
Last Action: Referred to COMMUNITY, ECONOMIC AND RECREATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, March 27, 2009 [Senate]
Source. Pennsylvania General Assembly Session. Information available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/session.cfm