This document summarizes New Jersey state law passed in response to the Kelo v. New London Supreme Court decision. The 2013 law aimed to increase transparency and public involvement in the eminent domain process. It requires municipalities to hold public hearings and designate a planning board to determine if an area qualifies as a condemnation redevelopment area. The law also includes a 45-day period for property owners to challenge such a designation in court. However, the document argues the law is insufficient because it does not clearly define "blight" and the Kelo decision allowed takings for economic development regardless of blight.
RETROSPECTIVE APPROVALS, CONSENTS AND CERTIFICATES IN NEW SOUTH WALESDr Ian Ellis-Jones
First Published: (2008) 25 EPLJ 449 - All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication does not constitute legal advice of any kind. The author Ian Ellis-Jones does not guarantee or warrant the current accuracy, legal correctness or up-to-dateness of the information contained in the publication.
THE GREAT LEAP BACKWARDS: RETROSPECTIVE APPROVALS, CONSENTS AND CERTIFICATES ...Dr Ian Ellis-Jones
A Paper Presented at the Inaugural Property and Planning Law Conference of The Commercial Law Association of Australia Limited, Sydney NSW, 1 March 2013. Copyright 2013 Ian Ellis-Jones. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication does not constitute legal advice of any kind. The author Ian Ellis-Jones does not guarantee or warrant the current accuracy, legal correctness or up-to-dateness of the information contained in the publication.
The Supreme Court considered whether a lawsuit filed by Mississippi against LCD manufacturers qualified as a "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act. The Court held that because Mississippi was the only named plaintiff, the suit did not constitute a mass action under CAFA, which requires monetary claims by 100 or more persons proposed to be tried jointly. The Court examined the text and context of the mass action provision and determined Congress intended the provision to apply only to suits involving 100 or more named plaintiffs, not unnamed individuals. As Mississippi was the sole named plaintiff, the suit must be remanded to state court.
The Supreme Court's 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision allowed eminent domain to transfer private property to other private entities for economic development purposes. This was a major expansion of eminent domain power and prompted widespread criticism. Over 40 states subsequently passed new laws restricting eminent domain use in response to Kelo. The federal courts have generally upheld Kelo in subsequent cases but distinguished it in some instances.
Motion Filed in US District Court of Eastern OH Against Texas Eastern Eminent...Marcellus Drilling News
This memorandum opposes the plaintiff's motion for immediate possession of the defendants' property on the grounds that:
1) The Ohio Constitution prohibits "quick-take" eminent domain proceedings for non-road projects unless compensation is determined by a jury first.
2) Neither the Natural Gas Act nor federal eminent domain rules preempt the Ohio Constitution's limitations, as they do not conflict or make compliance with both impossible.
3) As such, the plaintiff cannot take immediate possession of the property without a prior jury determination of compensation, as required by the Ohio Constitution.
International Jurisdiction and Worldwide Pre-emptive OrdersShu Xie Lim
This document discusses whether a common law court has jurisdiction under public international law to issue a worldwide pre-emptive order. It argues that a court has such jurisdiction if it has (1) personal jurisdiction over the person against whom the order is sought and (2) subject matter jurisdiction. The document examines case law from England that has established these jurisdictional requirements and granted worldwide pre-emptive orders when these requirements are met, even if no cause of action has been filed.
Anton Piller order
Assignment of Choses in Action
Effect of Section 6 Civil Law Act 1956 in respect to equity
Fusion of Law and Equity
Meaning of maxims and illustrations from cases
Perpetual injunction
Promissory Estoppel
Reception of Equity in Malaysia
RETROSPECTIVE APPROVALS, CONSENTS AND CERTIFICATES IN NEW SOUTH WALESDr Ian Ellis-Jones
First Published: (2008) 25 EPLJ 449 - All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication does not constitute legal advice of any kind. The author Ian Ellis-Jones does not guarantee or warrant the current accuracy, legal correctness or up-to-dateness of the information contained in the publication.
THE GREAT LEAP BACKWARDS: RETROSPECTIVE APPROVALS, CONSENTS AND CERTIFICATES ...Dr Ian Ellis-Jones
A Paper Presented at the Inaugural Property and Planning Law Conference of The Commercial Law Association of Australia Limited, Sydney NSW, 1 March 2013. Copyright 2013 Ian Ellis-Jones. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication does not constitute legal advice of any kind. The author Ian Ellis-Jones does not guarantee or warrant the current accuracy, legal correctness or up-to-dateness of the information contained in the publication.
The Supreme Court considered whether a lawsuit filed by Mississippi against LCD manufacturers qualified as a "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act. The Court held that because Mississippi was the only named plaintiff, the suit did not constitute a mass action under CAFA, which requires monetary claims by 100 or more persons proposed to be tried jointly. The Court examined the text and context of the mass action provision and determined Congress intended the provision to apply only to suits involving 100 or more named plaintiffs, not unnamed individuals. As Mississippi was the sole named plaintiff, the suit must be remanded to state court.
The Supreme Court's 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision allowed eminent domain to transfer private property to other private entities for economic development purposes. This was a major expansion of eminent domain power and prompted widespread criticism. Over 40 states subsequently passed new laws restricting eminent domain use in response to Kelo. The federal courts have generally upheld Kelo in subsequent cases but distinguished it in some instances.
Motion Filed in US District Court of Eastern OH Against Texas Eastern Eminent...Marcellus Drilling News
This memorandum opposes the plaintiff's motion for immediate possession of the defendants' property on the grounds that:
1) The Ohio Constitution prohibits "quick-take" eminent domain proceedings for non-road projects unless compensation is determined by a jury first.
2) Neither the Natural Gas Act nor federal eminent domain rules preempt the Ohio Constitution's limitations, as they do not conflict or make compliance with both impossible.
3) As such, the plaintiff cannot take immediate possession of the property without a prior jury determination of compensation, as required by the Ohio Constitution.
International Jurisdiction and Worldwide Pre-emptive OrdersShu Xie Lim
This document discusses whether a common law court has jurisdiction under public international law to issue a worldwide pre-emptive order. It argues that a court has such jurisdiction if it has (1) personal jurisdiction over the person against whom the order is sought and (2) subject matter jurisdiction. The document examines case law from England that has established these jurisdictional requirements and granted worldwide pre-emptive orders when these requirements are met, even if no cause of action has been filed.
Anton Piller order
Assignment of Choses in Action
Effect of Section 6 Civil Law Act 1956 in respect to equity
Fusion of Law and Equity
Meaning of maxims and illustrations from cases
Perpetual injunction
Promissory Estoppel
Reception of Equity in Malaysia
547 2018 03 01 edmonton (city) v can-west corporate air charters ltdPaul Barrette
The Alberta Land Compensation Board was considering an application by the City of Edmonton to dismiss a claim by Can-West Corporate Air Charters Ltd. for compensation relating to an expropriation by the City. Can-West was a lessee of the land at the time it received notice that the City intended to expropriate, but was no longer a lessee when the certificate of approval was registered. The Board had to determine if these facts alone prevented Can-West's claim, except for potential costs under sections 35 or 39 of the Expropriation Act. The Board also considered whether expropriation should be viewed as a process rather than just the moment title transfers, and what compensation may be owed if the expropri
The Second Circuit's decision in In re BGI, Inc. extended the doctrine of equitable mootness to Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings. Previously, the doctrine had only been applied to Chapter 11 reorganizations in the Second Circuit. The decision recognized that substantial interests favor preventing tardy disruption of confirmed and substantially consummated Chapter 11 liquidation plans, just as with reorganization plans. While other circuits have also applied equitable mootness to liquidations, its application varies between circuits, with some being more favorable to creditors and others more favorable to debtors.
The document analyzes two recent cases where relief from sanctions was granted despite failures to comply strictly with court orders and procedures. In the first case, relief was granted when a costs budget was filed without a fully completed statement of truth. In the second case, relief was granted when disclosure was provided 46 minutes late. Both cases illustrate that courts are willing to consider the circumstances of non-compliance and grant relief even for minor failures to comply, as long as there is no prejudice to the other party and the failures are merely procedural rather than substantive.
The document discusses Jual Janji, a Malay customary security transaction. It begins by outlining the objectives and introduction. It then explores the origins and literal meaning of Jual Janji, describing it as a contract where a borrower transfers land to a lender in exchange for a loan. The document outlines the characteristics and rationale of Jual Janji transactions. It examines judicial views, including recognizing Jual Janji as a security transaction or applying equitable mortgage principles. The document concludes by discussing Jual Janji in the context of the National Land Code and differing views on its application.
This document summarizes several recent court cases related to landlord liability and tenant harassment. It discusses how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Francis v. Kings Park Manor expanded landlord liability under the Fair Housing Act to include failing to address a racially hostile environment created by one tenant targeting another. It also discusses how New York common law typically shields landlords from liability for injuries caused by one tenant to another, unless the landlord had control over the assailant. The document then provides more details on these cases and decisions.
The document discusses several maxims of equity, which are general principles that govern how equity operates and illustrate its qualities of being more flexible than common law and taking into account parties' conduct. The maxims establish that equity can intervene with common law if justice requires, acts on parties' consciences to treat obligations as done, and makes orders directly against individuals. Equity aims to provide remedies for wrongs and ensure fairness between parties.
The document summarizes several recent changes to Colorado law:
1) New rules for calculating filing deadlines take effect in 2012 and practitioners should check for updates. 2) The Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 changes federal removal and venue rules. 3) The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a new public domain citation format for its opinions to make them more accessible.
Case 5.6Kelo v City of New London545 U.S. 469 (2005)Ye.docxannandleola
Case 5.6
Kelo v City of New London
545 U.S. 469 (2005)
Yes, Actually, They Can Take That Away From You
Facts
In 1978, the city of New London, Connecticut, undertook a redevelopment plan for purposes of creating a redeveloped area in and around the existing park at Fort Trumbull. The plan sought to develop the related ambience a state park should have, including the absence of pink cottages and other architecturally eclectic homes. Part of the redevelopment plan was the city’s deal with Pfizer Corporation for the location of its research facility in the area. The preface to the city’s development plan included the following statement of goals and purpose:
To create a development that would complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of the city’s waterfront, and eventually “build momentum” for the revitalization of the rest of the city, including its downtown area.
The affected property owners, including Susette Kelo, live in homes and cottages (15 total) located in and around other existing structures that would be permitted to stay in the area designated for the proposed new structures (under the city’s economic development plan) that would be placed there primarily by private land developers and corporations. The city was assisted by a private, nonprofit corporation, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), in the development of the economic plan and piloting it through the various governmental processes, including that of city council approval. The central focus of the plan was getting Pfizer to the Fort Trumbull area (where the homeowners and their properties were located) with the hope of a resulting economic boost that such a major corporate employer can bring to an area.
Kelo and the other landowners whose homes would be razed to make room for Pfizer and the accompanying and resulting economic development plan filed suit challenging New London’s legal authority to take their homes. The trial court issued an injunction preventing New London from taking certain of the properties but allowing others to be taken. The appellate court found for New London on all the claims, and the landowners (petitioners) appealed.
Judicial Opinion
STEVENS, Justice Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpos.
Case 5.6Kelo v City of New London545 U.S. 469 (2005)Ye.docxjasoninnes20
Case 5.6
Kelo v City of New London
545 U.S. 469 (2005)
Yes, Actually, They Can Take That Away From You
Facts
In 1978, the city of New London, Connecticut, undertook a redevelopment plan for purposes of creating a redeveloped area in and around the existing park at Fort Trumbull. The plan sought to develop the related ambience a state park should have, including the absence of pink cottages and other architecturally eclectic homes. Part of the redevelopment plan was the city’s deal with Pfizer Corporation for the location of its research facility in the area. The preface to the city’s development plan included the following statement of goals and purpose:
To create a development that would complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of the city’s waterfront, and eventually “build momentum” for the revitalization of the rest of the city, including its downtown area.
The affected property owners, including Susette Kelo, live in homes and cottages (15 total) located in and around other existing structures that would be permitted to stay in the area designated for the proposed new structures (under the city’s economic development plan) that would be placed there primarily by private land developers and corporations. The city was assisted by a private, nonprofit corporation, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), in the development of the economic plan and piloting it through the various governmental processes, including that of city council approval. The central focus of the plan was getting Pfizer to the Fort Trumbull area (where the homeowners and their properties were located) with the hope of a resulting economic boost that such a major corporate employer can bring to an area.
Kelo and the other landowners whose homes would be razed to make room for Pfizer and the accompanying and resulting economic development plan filed suit challenging New London’s legal authority to take their homes. The trial court issued an injunction preventing New London from taking certain of the properties but allowing others to be taken. The appellate court found for New London on all the claims, and the landowners (petitioners) appealed.
Judicial Opinion
STEVENS, Justice Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpos ...
This document summarizes important redevelopment case law from New Jersey, New York, and other states. It discusses cases such as Berman v. Parker, Kelo v. City of New London, Gallenthin Realty v. Paulsboro, and Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose. The document also discusses legislative responses to Kelo, debates around defining "blight," challenges to stated public purposes for takings, and issues of notice and property owners' ability to challenge redevelopment plans.
The document provides an overview of the eminent domain process under Utah law. It discusses:
1) The history of eminent domain law dating back to the Magna Carta and how it is established in the US Constitution and Utah Constitution to allow the taking of private property for public use with just compensation.
2) The requirements for "public use" and "necessity" to legally take property through eminent domain.
3) The pre-litigation steps that must be taken, including reasonable negotiations with property owners and disclosure of their rights.
4) The process for filing an eminent domain lawsuit, obtaining immediate occupancy of the property, determining just compensation at trial, and entering a final judgment.
The document discusses the importance of the court system in upholding the supreme law of the land, the U.S. Constitution, by protecting citizens' constitutional rights and controlling crime through fair trials and punishment of law violations. It describes how the author had the opportunity to observe court cases and outcomes firsthand. While agreeing with the judge's rulings overall, the author believes some penalties should have been harsher to better deter repeat criminal behavior.
This document summarizes several recent land use law cases from 2015. It provides brief summaries of cases related to noise ordinances, regulatory takings, zoning exemptions, sign codes, environmental regulation cost considerations, conflicts of interest for zoning board members, religious land use, defining public parks, conditions of zoning approvals, defamation claims, procedural requirements for land use boards, subdivision exceptions, conservation easement tax deductions, and disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act. Key lessons learned are highlighted for each case. The document is intended to provide a fast-paced national perspective on recent land use law developments and lessons.
The document provides summaries of several Massachusetts case law decisions related to planning and zoning. The key cases discussed include:
- Collings v. Planning Board of Stow: The planning board could not require an applicant to convey land to the town as a condition of subdivision approval without just compensation.
- Kenner v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham: Abutters did not have standing to challenge a project based solely on impacts to their private ocean views, as the zoning law addressed impacts to the neighborhood visual character.
- Marhefka v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Sutton: Abutters had standing to challenge a project that would increase density and violate zoning provisions related to maintaining a
This document is the defendants' closing argument in response to the plaintiffs' closing argument regarding trust documents presented in a real estate dispute. It argues that the plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent conduct by the defendant are unsupported and illogical. It asserts that the trust documents in question have no relevance to the legal issues being tried, which involve the interpretation of purchase and sale agreements for two properties. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have presented no valid legal basis to rescind the agreements and that the evidence shows the plaintiffs were unable to complete the purchase for financial reasons.
This document summarizes key concepts regarding takings law and groundwater regulation. It discusses the types of takings claims that can be made, including physical takings involving occupation of property and regulatory takings. Regulatory takings can be categorical, involving denial of all economically beneficial use, or can be analyzed under the Penn Central test considering the character of the action, investment-backed expectations, and economic impact. The document reviews how these takings claims have been applied in cases involving groundwater conservation district regulation in Texas.
Due Process Right to a "Clean and Healthful Environment"Jesse Souki
This document summarizes key information about contested cases in Hawaii land use and planning law. It discusses when contested cases are required by the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act and constitutional due process. It provides examples from Hawaii Supreme Court cases that have found a right to a contested case hearing when claiming a property interest protected by the state constitution, such as traditional and customary practices. The document also outlines the requirements for contested case hearings, including the opportunity to be heard, submit evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. It notes some of the government agencies in Hawaii subject to contested cases in their decision-making processes.
547 2018 03 01 edmonton (city) v can-west corporate air charters ltdPaul Barrette
The Alberta Land Compensation Board was considering an application by the City of Edmonton to dismiss a claim by Can-West Corporate Air Charters Ltd. for compensation relating to an expropriation by the City. Can-West was a lessee of the land at the time it received notice that the City intended to expropriate, but was no longer a lessee when the certificate of approval was registered. The Board had to determine if these facts alone prevented Can-West's claim, except for potential costs under sections 35 or 39 of the Expropriation Act. The Board also considered whether expropriation should be viewed as a process rather than just the moment title transfers, and what compensation may be owed if the expropri
The Second Circuit's decision in In re BGI, Inc. extended the doctrine of equitable mootness to Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings. Previously, the doctrine had only been applied to Chapter 11 reorganizations in the Second Circuit. The decision recognized that substantial interests favor preventing tardy disruption of confirmed and substantially consummated Chapter 11 liquidation plans, just as with reorganization plans. While other circuits have also applied equitable mootness to liquidations, its application varies between circuits, with some being more favorable to creditors and others more favorable to debtors.
The document analyzes two recent cases where relief from sanctions was granted despite failures to comply strictly with court orders and procedures. In the first case, relief was granted when a costs budget was filed without a fully completed statement of truth. In the second case, relief was granted when disclosure was provided 46 minutes late. Both cases illustrate that courts are willing to consider the circumstances of non-compliance and grant relief even for minor failures to comply, as long as there is no prejudice to the other party and the failures are merely procedural rather than substantive.
The document discusses Jual Janji, a Malay customary security transaction. It begins by outlining the objectives and introduction. It then explores the origins and literal meaning of Jual Janji, describing it as a contract where a borrower transfers land to a lender in exchange for a loan. The document outlines the characteristics and rationale of Jual Janji transactions. It examines judicial views, including recognizing Jual Janji as a security transaction or applying equitable mortgage principles. The document concludes by discussing Jual Janji in the context of the National Land Code and differing views on its application.
This document summarizes several recent court cases related to landlord liability and tenant harassment. It discusses how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Francis v. Kings Park Manor expanded landlord liability under the Fair Housing Act to include failing to address a racially hostile environment created by one tenant targeting another. It also discusses how New York common law typically shields landlords from liability for injuries caused by one tenant to another, unless the landlord had control over the assailant. The document then provides more details on these cases and decisions.
The document discusses several maxims of equity, which are general principles that govern how equity operates and illustrate its qualities of being more flexible than common law and taking into account parties' conduct. The maxims establish that equity can intervene with common law if justice requires, acts on parties' consciences to treat obligations as done, and makes orders directly against individuals. Equity aims to provide remedies for wrongs and ensure fairness between parties.
The document summarizes several recent changes to Colorado law:
1) New rules for calculating filing deadlines take effect in 2012 and practitioners should check for updates. 2) The Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 changes federal removal and venue rules. 3) The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a new public domain citation format for its opinions to make them more accessible.
Case 5.6Kelo v City of New London545 U.S. 469 (2005)Ye.docxannandleola
Case 5.6
Kelo v City of New London
545 U.S. 469 (2005)
Yes, Actually, They Can Take That Away From You
Facts
In 1978, the city of New London, Connecticut, undertook a redevelopment plan for purposes of creating a redeveloped area in and around the existing park at Fort Trumbull. The plan sought to develop the related ambience a state park should have, including the absence of pink cottages and other architecturally eclectic homes. Part of the redevelopment plan was the city’s deal with Pfizer Corporation for the location of its research facility in the area. The preface to the city’s development plan included the following statement of goals and purpose:
To create a development that would complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of the city’s waterfront, and eventually “build momentum” for the revitalization of the rest of the city, including its downtown area.
The affected property owners, including Susette Kelo, live in homes and cottages (15 total) located in and around other existing structures that would be permitted to stay in the area designated for the proposed new structures (under the city’s economic development plan) that would be placed there primarily by private land developers and corporations. The city was assisted by a private, nonprofit corporation, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), in the development of the economic plan and piloting it through the various governmental processes, including that of city council approval. The central focus of the plan was getting Pfizer to the Fort Trumbull area (where the homeowners and their properties were located) with the hope of a resulting economic boost that such a major corporate employer can bring to an area.
Kelo and the other landowners whose homes would be razed to make room for Pfizer and the accompanying and resulting economic development plan filed suit challenging New London’s legal authority to take their homes. The trial court issued an injunction preventing New London from taking certain of the properties but allowing others to be taken. The appellate court found for New London on all the claims, and the landowners (petitioners) appealed.
Judicial Opinion
STEVENS, Justice Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpos.
Case 5.6Kelo v City of New London545 U.S. 469 (2005)Ye.docxjasoninnes20
Case 5.6
Kelo v City of New London
545 U.S. 469 (2005)
Yes, Actually, They Can Take That Away From You
Facts
In 1978, the city of New London, Connecticut, undertook a redevelopment plan for purposes of creating a redeveloped area in and around the existing park at Fort Trumbull. The plan sought to develop the related ambience a state park should have, including the absence of pink cottages and other architecturally eclectic homes. Part of the redevelopment plan was the city’s deal with Pfizer Corporation for the location of its research facility in the area. The preface to the city’s development plan included the following statement of goals and purpose:
To create a development that would complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of the city’s waterfront, and eventually “build momentum” for the revitalization of the rest of the city, including its downtown area.
The affected property owners, including Susette Kelo, live in homes and cottages (15 total) located in and around other existing structures that would be permitted to stay in the area designated for the proposed new structures (under the city’s economic development plan) that would be placed there primarily by private land developers and corporations. The city was assisted by a private, nonprofit corporation, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), in the development of the economic plan and piloting it through the various governmental processes, including that of city council approval. The central focus of the plan was getting Pfizer to the Fort Trumbull area (where the homeowners and their properties were located) with the hope of a resulting economic boost that such a major corporate employer can bring to an area.
Kelo and the other landowners whose homes would be razed to make room for Pfizer and the accompanying and resulting economic development plan filed suit challenging New London’s legal authority to take their homes. The trial court issued an injunction preventing New London from taking certain of the properties but allowing others to be taken. The appellate court found for New London on all the claims, and the landowners (petitioners) appealed.
Judicial Opinion
STEVENS, Justice Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpos ...
This document summarizes important redevelopment case law from New Jersey, New York, and other states. It discusses cases such as Berman v. Parker, Kelo v. City of New London, Gallenthin Realty v. Paulsboro, and Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose. The document also discusses legislative responses to Kelo, debates around defining "blight," challenges to stated public purposes for takings, and issues of notice and property owners' ability to challenge redevelopment plans.
The document provides an overview of the eminent domain process under Utah law. It discusses:
1) The history of eminent domain law dating back to the Magna Carta and how it is established in the US Constitution and Utah Constitution to allow the taking of private property for public use with just compensation.
2) The requirements for "public use" and "necessity" to legally take property through eminent domain.
3) The pre-litigation steps that must be taken, including reasonable negotiations with property owners and disclosure of their rights.
4) The process for filing an eminent domain lawsuit, obtaining immediate occupancy of the property, determining just compensation at trial, and entering a final judgment.
The document discusses the importance of the court system in upholding the supreme law of the land, the U.S. Constitution, by protecting citizens' constitutional rights and controlling crime through fair trials and punishment of law violations. It describes how the author had the opportunity to observe court cases and outcomes firsthand. While agreeing with the judge's rulings overall, the author believes some penalties should have been harsher to better deter repeat criminal behavior.
This document summarizes several recent land use law cases from 2015. It provides brief summaries of cases related to noise ordinances, regulatory takings, zoning exemptions, sign codes, environmental regulation cost considerations, conflicts of interest for zoning board members, religious land use, defining public parks, conditions of zoning approvals, defamation claims, procedural requirements for land use boards, subdivision exceptions, conservation easement tax deductions, and disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act. Key lessons learned are highlighted for each case. The document is intended to provide a fast-paced national perspective on recent land use law developments and lessons.
The document provides summaries of several Massachusetts case law decisions related to planning and zoning. The key cases discussed include:
- Collings v. Planning Board of Stow: The planning board could not require an applicant to convey land to the town as a condition of subdivision approval without just compensation.
- Kenner v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham: Abutters did not have standing to challenge a project based solely on impacts to their private ocean views, as the zoning law addressed impacts to the neighborhood visual character.
- Marhefka v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Sutton: Abutters had standing to challenge a project that would increase density and violate zoning provisions related to maintaining a
This document is the defendants' closing argument in response to the plaintiffs' closing argument regarding trust documents presented in a real estate dispute. It argues that the plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent conduct by the defendant are unsupported and illogical. It asserts that the trust documents in question have no relevance to the legal issues being tried, which involve the interpretation of purchase and sale agreements for two properties. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have presented no valid legal basis to rescind the agreements and that the evidence shows the plaintiffs were unable to complete the purchase for financial reasons.
This document summarizes key concepts regarding takings law and groundwater regulation. It discusses the types of takings claims that can be made, including physical takings involving occupation of property and regulatory takings. Regulatory takings can be categorical, involving denial of all economically beneficial use, or can be analyzed under the Penn Central test considering the character of the action, investment-backed expectations, and economic impact. The document reviews how these takings claims have been applied in cases involving groundwater conservation district regulation in Texas.
Due Process Right to a "Clean and Healthful Environment"Jesse Souki
This document summarizes key information about contested cases in Hawaii land use and planning law. It discusses when contested cases are required by the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act and constitutional due process. It provides examples from Hawaii Supreme Court cases that have found a right to a contested case hearing when claiming a property interest protected by the state constitution, such as traditional and customary practices. The document also outlines the requirements for contested case hearings, including the opportunity to be heard, submit evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. It notes some of the government agencies in Hawaii subject to contested cases in their decision-making processes.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Harper v Muskingum Watershed Conse...Marcellus Drilling News
Anti-drilling landowners (backed by Food & Water Watch) claimed the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District had violated the deed to the land it owns by leasing that land for Utica Shale drilling. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the case. The anti-drillers lost.
This Supreme Court of Canada case involves the interpretation of a release agreement between Mary Bailey and the City of Corner Brook. Bailey had been involved in a car accident where she struck a city employee, David Temple, who then sued Bailey. Bailey and the city entered into a settlement agreement and release regarding Bailey's separate lawsuit against the city. However, Bailey later filed a third-party claim against the city in Temple's lawsuit against her. The city argued the release barred this third-party claim. The court had to determine whether there was a special rule for interpreting releases and whether the application judge erred in his broad interpretation of the release to include Bailey's third-party claim.
This case involved a public interest litigation filed by M.C Mehta regarding pollution caused by a chemical factory. The factory was releasing toxic gases without proper safeguards, endangering public health. The Supreme Court found that the factory was violating various environmental laws and regulations. It ordered the factory to pay compensation to those affected by the pollution and to properly handle hazardous waste in accordance with the law to prevent future violations. The case strengthened environmental protection by establishing the polluter pays principle and setting precedents to curb industrial pollution for the benefit of public health.
Franklyn and Kuhn - Owning Oneself in a World of Others - Final Wake Forest LRAdam Kuhn
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Article published in the Journal of Building Survey, Appraisal & Valuation of...Michael Vaughan
This document provides an overview of compulsory purchase valuation principles under UK law. It summarizes that compulsory purchase law originated in the 19th century and allows the government to acquire private land for public projects. It discusses the core valuation rules, including that compensation aims to put owners in the same financial position as if their land had not been taken, and that the valuation date is usually the date of possession. It also summarizes the "no scheme rule" that compensation cannot include increases due solely to the public project, and outlines the six statutory rules governing compensation assessments, particularly rules 2 and 6 relating to market value and disturbance compensation.
By Léna Chiaravalli
In India, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 gives the right for Government authorities to acquire parcels of land for the implementation of development projects.. In the context of a rapid growth of cities, the process of urbanisation shall accompany the needs of increasing populations. Thus, the Government tends to make use of his eminent domain power –the right to acquire land for a public purpose- very regularly. However, in practice, this process can imply the displacement of the affected landowners, whom are sometimes forced to give away their property in exchange of compensations. These events contributed to feed people’s bitterness for this practice, and the proposed Reforms of the Land Acquisition Act got stalled. Moreover, land acquisition can be extremely costly, and this can compromise the well implementation of related development projects.
1. MPA @ UNC
PUBA 760: LAW FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
NEW JERSEY STATE LAW IN
RESPONSE TO KELO V. NEW
LONDON
Presented by: Charles J. Stevens
2. On September 6, 2013, the New Jersey State Legislature passed a statute titled Local
Redevelopment and Housing Law, P.L.2013, c.159 (2013). In doing so, New Jersey became the 45th
state
to pass eminent domain reform in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in Kelo et al. v. City
of New London et al., 545 U.S. 469 (2005). It is also a response to Harrison Redevelopment
Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2008), in which the State appellate court addressed
concerns with the notice provision under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.
To understand the intent of this statute, we must first look at the case it (and many other statutes
like it) is a response to. This case arose from a redevelopment plan authorized by the city council of New
London, CT. Following the closure of a nearby Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed
over 1,500 people, New London experienced a sharp economic downturn, resulting in an unemployment
rate double that of the State, and a population count at its lowest point since 1920.
In an effort to revitalize New London, the city council reactivated the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a private non-profit body given condemnation and eminent domain powers. After
the pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. announced it planned to build a $300 million research facility in
New London, the NLDC created an economic redevelopment plan based on the new jobs and commerce
the Pfizer facility would generate. Part of this plan included buying property from current owners and
giving it to Pfizer for facility buildings, parking lots, etc. Although the NLDC negotiated the purchase of
most of the land necessary for the redevelopment proposal, not all of the townspeople were willing to
relocate due to the development planned.
Susette Kelo, along with 8 other petitioners, claimed that the taking of their property did not
satisfy the public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment. One of the key points of contention was that the
government did not plan to use the land for general public use, such as a railway, road, or other tangible
use available to the public. Instead, the argument arose over whether or not the transfer of land from one
private owner to another private owner for economic development and the hopes of increased public good
as a byproduct of that transaction violates the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment.
3. In December 2000, the New London Superior Court granted a permanent restraining order
stopping the taking of some (but not all) of the properties. After this ruling, both sides appealed to the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, which decided that the takings were legal under Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-186
(2005). The court determined that the takings of the properties were reasonably necessary to achieve the
intended public use, while also determining that the planned use of the land had been given reasonable
attention during the planning process. After this ruling, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court determined that the potential economic and non-economic
benefits a community enjoyed from economic growth qualified private redevelopment plans as a
permissible public use. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens expressed that there was not enough
evidence to determine that the resulting benefits of bestowing the privately-owned land to a private entity
(Pfizer Inc.) were the main driving forces behind the condemnations. Additionally, Justice Stevens points
to cases such as Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. V. Bradley, 164 U S. 112, 158-164 (1896) to show precedence
that since the turn of the 20th
century, courts have expanded the limited view of “public use” to the
broader term of “public purpose”. Even though Pfizer’s facility would not be open to the general public as
a whole, New London’s economic redevelopment plan serves a public purpose, thus making the takings
legal.
He also cites more recent cases, such as Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), when the Court
upheld another economic redevelopment plan, this time targeting a blighted area of Washington, D.C. In
that case, a department store owner in the blighted area argued that the redevelopment plan was not a
valid public use. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the taking and the plan as valid public use.
Justice O’Conner, (and many other legal and political scholars), vehemently disagrees with the
Court’s decision. In her dissent, she points out that although the Court has ruled under the broad view of
public purpose in the past, Kelo et al. v. City of New London et al. is different in multiple ways. First,
unlike in Berman v. Parker the properties in question here are not blighted, nor are they causing social
harm (aesthetic or otherwise). Justice O’Conner argues that the decision of the Court effectively approves
4. takings of non-blighted private property used for ordinary means and turning it over to another entity
(whether public or private) solely in the hopes that the new use will create an undefined secondary public
benefit such as higher employment, increased commerce, etc. Therefore, if anticipated positive effects on
the public are enough to approve property transfer through eminent domain from one party to another, the
term “public use” and the Takings Clause become impotent, rendering no constraints on eminent domain
authority.
The obvious concern that one must consider is that, based on the Court’s ruling, no property
(however productive) is safe from condemnation for the purpose of putting it to “better” use. Private
property can now be taken and given to another private owner without proof of concrete public purpose.
Ultimately, this will only serve to hurt those without the ability or monetary means to fight takings being
driven by economic development of larger, more powerful bodies such as manufacturers and
corporations. It is this concern, as well as those mentioned in the previous paragraphs, that prompted New
Jersey to amend their legislation concerning eminent domain.
This statute is an amendment to Section 5 of P.L.1992, c.79 (40A:12A-5), which was an earlier
version of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law. This amendment aims to build upon a decision
rendered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of
Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344 (2007). In this case, the court clarified one of the requirements when designating
redevelopment areas in New Jersey and using eminent domain to acquire property. The court stated that
the land being taken in order to be given to a private entity must be proven to blighted, instead of simply
not being put to its optimal use. Hoping to capitalize on this decision, New Jersey Legislature outlined the
steps required for a municipality to exercise eminent domain, referred to in the statute as Condemnation
Redevelopment Areas (CRA).
The bill expressly states that “No area of a municipality shall be determined a redevelopment area
unless the governing body of the municipality shall, by resolution, authorize the planning board to
undertake a preliminary investigation to determine whether the proposed area is a redevelopment
area…Such determination shall be made after public notice and public hearing…The governing body of a
5. municipality shall assign the conduct of the investigation and hearing to the planning board of the
municipality.” This is meant to provide citizens transparency during the redevelopment process, while at
the same time ensuring the planning board (and not an outside private organization) conducts the
investigation. The bill goes on to state that a public hearing must be held if the board determines that the
redevelopment area is a CRA, and thus subject to eminent domain. In addition, the area must be deemed a
blighted area if it is deemed to be a CRA.
Another key addition presented by this statute is the 45-day stoppage of municipality actions once
an area is deemed to be a CRA. During this time, the municipality cannot move to acquire any property
within the CRA, whether it be through eminent domain actions or other means. This 45-day stoppage is
meant to allow property owners in the CRA an opportunity to file legal action challenging the
determination. The owner can apply to the Superior Court, after which the court may permit further
review of the municipality’s discernment by procedure in lieu of prerogative writ.
With this statute, New Jersey attempts to curtail the perceived negative effects on lower and
middle-class private owners. The question we must ask is whether or not New Jersey has succeeded in
this endeavor. Sadly, the answer is no.
First is the issue of the term “blight” as it is written in P.L.2013, c.159. A clear definition of what
parameters determine when and if an area is blighted is not provided, which means municipalities will not
have to clearly define the measures used to determine an area fit to be deemed a CRA. This leaves a lot to
individual interpretation, and invites ethical (and possibly legal) violations of blight determination if there
is the potential for private gain. If New Jersey legislators wanted to ensure municipalities were properly
making blight determinations (and subsequently enacting eminent domain), they should have written
clearly-defined limits to establish what can and cannot be labeled a blighted area.
Of course, the entire issue of whether or not an area is blighted or not is irrelevant due to the
ruling in Kelo et al. v. City of New London et al. Whether or not an area is deemed blighted was a non-
issue in the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, meaning any municipality denied a taking based on their
inability to prove the land is blighted will be able to appeal and successfully have that decision
6. overturned. This effectively means the decision in Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of
Paulsboro has no real weight behind it if challenged. In turn, this also means that the designations of
Non-Condemnation Redevelopment Areas and CRAs borders on pointless. If municipalities already have
free reign to determine their own definition of blight, coupled with the inability of the state legal system
to enact blight requirements for use of eminent domain (if properly challenged), then why would they not
deem every area they want for economic development to be a CRA?
The second issue with the statute is the 45-day limitation on challenges to the CRA
determination. While the statute is written to convey that this 45-day timeline helps prevent municipalities
from enacting eminent domain before citizens can react, it also has the side effect of stopping future
challenges to condemnation. Property development plans can take years to come to fruition. This means
land can be designated a CRA, but the municipality would not have to begin condemnation until months
or years later. Based on how the law is written, if property owners do not file within the first 45 days, a
municipality could come back years later and claim eminent domain. This seems like a horrendous error,
with lower and middle-class property owners being the victims of this oversight.
Finally, based on the above observations, the statute lacks a clause addressing what would occur
if, after being designated a CRA, a property owner elects to sell directly to another property owner.
Would the new property owner now have 45-days to file with the courts challenging the determination?
Or would they be bound by the action (or inaction) of the previous owner, which may have occurred
months or years prior? While this is an unlikely scenario, a hypothetical such as this highlights the flaws
of P.L.2013, c.159.
New Jersey waited 8 years after the Kelo et al. v. City of New London et al. verdict to enact
change to their eminent domain laws. Unfortunately, the change does little to offer additional protection
and peace of mind to private property home owners fearful of their property being taken for another
private entity’s promise of better “public purpose”.
7. References
Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation and/or George A. and Cynthia L.
Gallenthin III, h/w, both jointly and severally, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Borough of Paulsboro, a New
Jersey Municipality and/or Planning Board of Borough of Paulsboro and/or Paulsboro Redevelopment
Agency, jointly and severally, Defendants-Respondents, 191 N.J. 344 (2007). Accessed August 1, 2015.
http://www.heinonline.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/HOL/CaseLaw?cid=5441625&%20cop=&native
_id=5441625&rest=1&collection=journals.
Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2008). Accessed July 29,
2015.
http://www.heinonline.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/HOL/CaseLaw?cid=5714347&%20cop=&native
_id=5714347&rest=1&collection=journals.
Kelo et al. v. City of New London et al., 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Accessed July 28, 2015.
http://www.heinonline.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/HOL/CaseLaw?cid=6386349&%20cop=&native
_id=6386349&rest=1&collection=journals.
Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, P.L.2013, c.159 (2013). Accessed July 31, 2015.
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp.
Samuel Berman and Solomon H. Feldman, Executors of the State of Max R. Morris, Deceased,
Appellants v. Andrew Parker, John A. Remon, James E. Colliflower, et al., 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Accessed
July 31, 2015.
http://www.heinonline.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/HOL/CaseLaw?cid=360406&%20cop=&native_i
d=360406&rest=1&collection=journals.