2. Jason E. Luckasevic
Education
Received a bachelor‟s degree in 1997
from Washington & Jefferson College
Received a J.D. from Duquesne
University School of Law, in 2000
Bar Admissions (state/federal):
Pennsylvania, 2000
Arizona, 2010
Michigan, 2010
Supreme Court of the United States,
2010
Admitted in Federal Court in
Pennsylvania and Nevada.
3. Jason E. Luckasevic
Legal Practice Areas
Toxic Torts involving asbestos
exposures
Personal Injury
Medical Malpractice
Discrimination Cases
Membership in Legal Associations
American Association for Justice
American Bar Association
Pennsylvania Association for Justice
Western Pennsylvania Association for
Justice
State and County Bar Associations
ACLU
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
Super Lawyer
In 2011 and 2012, Jason
Luckasevic was named a
Pennsylvania Super Lawyer
Rising Star. Awarded to less
than 5% of lawyers in the State
under the age of 40.
Jason also was named to The
National Trial Lawyers
Association Top 40 Under 40.
Membership is "by invitation
only and is extended
exclusively to those individuals
who exemplify superior
qualifications, trial results, and
leadership as a young lawyer
under the age of 40."
4. Football Concussion Litigation
On July 19, 2011, seventy-five plaintiffs filed a mass action
lawsuit in the Superior Court of California in Los Angeles for
cognitive Injury from multiple concussions received during play
in the NFL.
5.
6.
7.
8. In 2002, Dr. Bennett
Omalu, found CTE in
the brain of Mike
Webster.
By 2007, Dr. Omalu
found four cases
linking CTE to the
death of former NFL
players.
By 2011, neuroanatomists
had conducted thirteen
autopsies on thirteen
former NFL players who
showed signs of
degenerative brain
disease.
Twelve of those thirteen
deceased players suffered
from CTE.
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
(CTE)
9. Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
(CTE)
CTE is a type of
neurodegenerative
disease or dementia
caused by repeated
concussive of sub-
concussive blows (hits
just below the force
required to cause
concussion).
Also known as Punch-Drunk
Syndrome, Dr. Harrison
Stanford Martland stated in the
October 13, 1928 issue of the
Journal of the American
Medical Association:
“[S]ome time fight fans and
promoters have recognized a
peculiar condition occurring among
prize fighters which, in ring
parlance, they speak of as "punch
drunk." Fighters in whom the early
symptoms are well recognized are
said by the fans to be "cuckoo,"
"goofy," "cutting paper dolls," or
"slug nutty." Frequently it takes a
fighter from one to two hours to
recover from a severe blow to the
head or jaw.”
13. Law firm information
11.5 million dollar verdict for
OJ McDuffie in a medical
malpractice suit against the
Miami Dolphins and their
team physicians.
14. Lawsuits and the NFL
From 1976 to 2012
the NFL has been
sued many times, but
thirty-five of those
cases have judicial
decisions.
Of those Thirty-five
times, there are three
lawsuits which were
helpful to this case.
The great majority of
lawsuits against the
NFL are Anti-trust
actions.
15. Stringer v. NFL
Moreover, the Court refused to grant Riddell summary
judgment on the failure to warn claim, because Riddell
failed to adequately warn players of the risk of heat-
related illnesses.
On August 1, 2001 Korey Stringer died of
heatstroke during a Minnesota Vikings‟ training
camp. His widow, Kelci Stringer, filed a wrongful
death action on July 28, 2003 against the NFL,
NFLP, Riddell and the Minnesota Vikings.
The Court refused to grant summary judgment to
the NFL regarding their “duty to ensure that the
equipment and materials it required players such
as Korey Stringer to wear was of the highest
possible quality and sufficient to protect players
from the risk of injury.”
16. Stringer v. NFL
In Plaintiff‟s complaint she argued that “the NFL had and
has the duty to use ordinary care in overseeing,
controlling, and regulating the member clubs‟ practices,
policies, procedures, equipment, working conditions, and
culture, insofar as they pertain to and subject players to
heat-related illness, including, but not limited to, the duty
to institute acclimatization requirements and to regulate
training camp practices, other practices, games,
equipment, and medical care so as to minimize the risk of
heat-related illness.” (Complaint, pp. 14.)
The NFL denied these claims and filed a motion to
dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff‟s claims were
preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 because in order to
resolve this claim the CBA would need to be interpreted.
17. Stringer v. NFL
Plaintiff answered the NFL‟s motion by explaining that the
CBA would not have to be interpreted, and the duty breached
was a duty that arose from state tort law.
The Sixth Circuit explained that “if the plaintiff can prove all
of the elements of his claim without the necessity of contract
interpretation, then his claim is independent of the labor
agreement.” Decoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3 212, 216
(6th Cir. 1994) citing Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F. 2d 766,
770 (6th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff contended that she would not use the CBA because
the duty that the NFL breached was a “common-law duty of
care [and] is that degree of care which an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises, or is accustomed
to exercising, under the same or similar circumstances.”
(Plaintiff‟s Memorandum, pp. 23).
18. Stringer v. NFL
Plaintiff also argued in the complaint that “Riddell had a
duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
design, manufacture, testing, sale, quality assurance,
conveyance and/or distribution of its helmet and shoulder
pads into the stream of commerce, including a duty to
assure that the products did not pose a significantly
increased risk of personal injury and death.” (Complaint,
pp. 18).
Plaintiff continued arguing that “Riddell also failed to
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in that it failed to
issue adequate warnings of the risk of serious bodily
injury or death due to the use of its helmets and shoulder
pads.” (Complaint, pp.18).
19. Stringer v. NFL
Riddell denied these allegations and requested a judgment
on the pleadings based on the argument that in order to
prove Plaintiff‟s allegations that Riddell‟s equipment was
league mandated, the CBA would have to be interpreted.
(Judgment on the Pleadings, pp. 2).
Plaintiff answered this by stating that none of the claims
against Riddell would need to be resolved by interpretation of
the CBA. Plaintiff relied on the 1988 Supreme Court
decision, which held that, “[E]ven if dispute resolution
pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one
hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim
can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the
claim is „independent‟ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption
purposes.” See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399, 409-410 (1988).
20. Stringer v. NFL
On February 1, 2007 the Court issued it‟s opinion.
Regarding Plaintiff‟s fourth claim, the negligence claim
against NFL and NFL Properties, the Court held that:
“Plaintiff‟s claim does not arise out of the
CBA. Neither the NFL nor NFL Properties
is a party to the CBA. While both
Defendants are mentioned in the CBA, the
CBA imposes no duty on either of them to
ensure that the equipment used by NFL
players adequately protects from risk of
injury or illness. And such duty, if it exists,
clearly has its course in the common law.”
(Opinion, pp. 28).
21. Stringer v. NFL
On July 1, 2009, the Court denied summary judgment to
Riddell for Plaintiff‟s failure to warn claim. The Court
explained that:
“There is no evidence in the record that Stringer had any
knowledge of the heightened risk of developing heat
stroke, as opposed to the general risk of becoming hotter,
associated with wearing Defendants‟ helmet and shoulder
pads in the extremely hot and humid conditions of the
Vikings‟ training camp. Additionally, the question of
whether a user‟s knowledge of the risks posed by a
product will excuse the manufacturer‟s duty to warn is
generally a question of fact that is not properly resolved
on summary judgment. The Court concludes that the risk
was not obvious.” (Opinion 2, pp. 12).
The parties reached an undisclosed settlement in August
2011.
23. On December 19, 1999,
Orlando Brown was playing
for the Cleveland Browns
against the Jacksonville
Jaguars when a referee threw
a flag that struck Brown in the
eye, temporarily blinding him.
In 2001, Brown filed suit
against the NFL seeking
damages for the NFL‟s
negligence. The NFL claimed
that Brown‟s claim was
governed by the CBA and
should be sent to arbitration.
The Court disagreed.
“In this case, however, the duty
asserted by Brown is based on
state tort law, and would protect
any member of the public. The
NFL owes no greater duty to
Brown than to any bystander
(and Brown does not claim that it
does) to train its employees in
the safe use of their equipment
or to respond in damages if one
of its employees in the course of
his work carelessly throws
something into someone's eye.”
Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d
372, 382 (SDNY 2002).
The case was settled and the
NFL paid Brown between $15-
25 million.
Brown v. NFL
24. Brown v. NFL
Plaintiffs, Orlando and
Mira Brown, filed a
complaint against the
NFL alleging that the
“NFL was liable for his
injuries, both in its own
right for negligent hiring
and training of Triplette,
and vicariously, as
Triplette's employer, for
his negligence in
throwing the flag.” Brown
v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d
372, 376 (SDNY 2002).
Mira Brown also brought
two claims against the
NFL “for loss of services,
society, companionship
and consortium resulting
from her husband's
injuries.” Brown v. NFL,
219 F. Supp. 2d 372,
376 (SDNY 2002).
25. Brown v. NFL
“Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that this is a garden-variety
tort action invoking a general duty to avoid negligently
causing harm, owed by the NFL not only to its players but
also to any other person in society who could possibly have
been threatened by Triplette's weighted projectile. They
contend that a fan, member of the press, or other bystander
could equally bring such a claim had he or she been injured
in the same manner. On this view, whether Triplette or the
NFL was negligent, or whether the NFL has a valid defense
that Brown assumed the risk of such an injury by playing
professional football (or any other defense to the action), are
simply ordinary issues of state tort law that, in the absence of
diversity of citizenship, should be adjudicated in state court.”
Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002).
26. Brown v. NFL
The NFL responded
to the claim by
asserting that
Brown‟s claims are
preempted by § 301
of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a)
because the CBA
would have to be
interpreted.
The Court
27. Brown v. NFL
The Court explained that:
“It does not follow, however, that any state tort suit brought
by an employee covered by a CBA is preempted by the
LMRA. Federal preemption is driven by the need to ensure
"that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be
subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions
relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed,
and what legal consequences were intended to flow from
breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference
to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the
context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging
liability in tort." Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-
377 (SDNY 2002) quoting, Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at
211.
28. Brown v. NFL
Furthermore, the Court explained that:
“Tort claims that do not implicate these federal
interests are not preempted. The test is whether
the tort claim is "inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract."
Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002) quoting
Allis-Chalmers 213, 220.
The LMRA does not preempt a claim that
merely "relates in some way to a provision in a
collective-bargaining agreement." Brown v. NFL, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002) quoting Allis-Chalmers 213, 220.
29. Brown v. NFL
The Court found that the NFL rules are not part of the CBA, and in
fact are not even mentioned within the agreement. Brown v. NFL, 219
F. Supp. 2d 372, 386 (SDNY 2002).
Moreover the Court explained that:
“Accordingly, even if the references in Plaintiffs' complaint to the
content of specific NFL Rules, or to the various instruction
manuals for referees, are seen not merely as evidence of
professional standards, but as sources that define the ordinary
nature and risks of football and thus define the duties of care
owed to Plaintiffs, these documents are not part of the CBA.”
Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 387 (SDNY 2002).
Therefore, the Court denied Defendants‟ motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration. The Court granted Plaintiff‟s cross-motion to remand to state
court.
30. Williams v. NFL
NFL players are "employed by a member club of the National Football League[.]"
CBA, Preamble. Appendix C to the CBA contains the "NFL Player Contract,"[11]
which provides that the contract "is between ... [the] `Player,' and ... `Club,' ... as
a member of the National Football League." Id. App. C at 248. The contract
further states: "Club employs Player as a skilled football player. Player accepts
such employment."Id. None of these references require interpretation, only mere
consultation, which is insufficient to warrant preemption of an otherwise
independent state law claim. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124-25, 114 S.Ct. 2068;
Trustees, 450 F.3d at 330. Furthermore, the Players' contracts, likely dispositive
in determining who their employer is, are actually separate documents from the
CBA such that there is no need to reference the form contract contained in
Appendix C of the CBA to examine them.[12]
The NFL does not point to a specific
provision of either the CBA or the Policy
which must be interpreted. The CBA's
Preamble provides that
31. Williams v. NFL
Finally, the NFL argues that denying preemption and subjecting the Policy to divergent
state regulations would render the uniform enforcement of its drug testing policy, on
which it relies as a national organization for the integrity of its business, nearly
impossible. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has rejected a similar argument. See
Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695 n. 9 (9th Cir.2001) (en
banc). In Cramer, the employer, a large trucking company, "argue[d] that the terms of
CBAs affecting employees in multiple states should supersede inconsistent state
laws." Id. at 688, 695 n. 9. The Ninth Circuit observed, "This contention overreaches,
however, because *878 the LMRA certainly did not give employers and unions the
power to displace any state regulatory law they found inconvenient." Id. at 695 n. 9.
We think this is the proper result in light of the Supreme Court‘s observation that:
[T]here [is not] any suggestion that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished
to give the substantive provisions of private agreements the force of
federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law
would delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt
themselves from whatever state labor standards they disfavored.
Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a [CBA] the ability to contract
for what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of
§ 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with
congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that
proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a
32. Williams v. NFL
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added); see Livadas,512 U.S. at 123, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (cautioning that section
301 "cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on
individual employees as a matter of state law"); see also Karnes, 335 F.3d at
1194 (noting that "the fact that the CBA incorporated Boeing's anti-drug policy is
irrelevant because `§ 301does not grant the parties to a [CBA] the ability to
contract for what is illegal under state law'" (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212,
105 S.Ct. 1904)). Therefore, the NFL's national uniformity argument fails.
In sum, the Players' DATWA claim is
predicated on Minnesota law, not the CBA or
the Policy, and the claim is not dependent
upon an interpretation of the CBA or the
Policy. Thus, the Players' DATWA claim is
not preempted by section 301.
33. The Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) governs
disputes concerning working
conditions. If a player‟s claim
falls under the CBA, then the
claim is preempted by
Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185.
However, if the claim arises
from a state-law claim, and
the CBA does not have to be
interpreted, then federal law
does not preempt the claim.
The NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement
34. The NFL‟s Negligence:
Publications that the NFL failed to acknowledge. To name a
few…
1890
Admiral Joseph Mason “Bull” Reeves, played football for the Naval Academy.
He suffered so many blows to the head that the Navy doctor warned him if he
suffered another hit he was at risk for death or insanity
1913
Glenn “Pop” Warner stated that he had “many times seen cases when hard
bumps on the head so dazed the player receiving them that he lost his memory
for a time and had to be removed from the game.”
1928
The first case of “Punch Drunk” syndrome in boxers was published in the
American Association Journal by Dr. Harrison Stanford Martland.
1937
The U.S. Navy published an article on “Dementia puglisistica” in the U.S. Navy
Medical Bulletin.
1952
The American Medical Association Journal published an article on
“Electroencephalographic changes in professional boxers.”
35. 1952
The New England Journal of Medicine Article Vol. 246, pp. 554-556
suggested a three strike rule for concussions in 1945. They suggested
that after three concussions you should retire from football.
1959
An article was published in the Journal of Mental Science on the
“Observations of the pathology of insidious dementia following head
injury.”
1973
A disabling condition occurring when someone suffers a concussion
shortly after the first concussion would termed the Second Impact
Syndrome.
1974
And article about delayed recovery after mild head injury was
published in the Lancet.
1975
An article on the cumulative effect on concussions was published in
the Lancet.
The NFL‟s Negligence:
Publications that the NFL failed to acknowledge. To name a
few…
40. The NFL‟s Actions?
The NFL did not start
their own Mild
Traumatic Brain
Injury Committee
until 1994, and
appointed a
rheumatologist as
the committee chair
with no certification
regarding brain
injuries or
concussions.
In 2004 this Committee
published their findings
that showed “no
evidence of worsening
injury of chronic
cumulative effects” from
multiple concussions.
In fact, the Committee
concluded that “many
NFL players can be
safely allowed to return
to play” on the same
day they sustain a
concussion if a doctor
clears them.
41. The NFL‟s Actions?
In the October 2004 edition
of Neurosurgery, the
Multiple Traumatic Brain
Injury published a paper
stating that the Committee
found that there was not a
risk of repeated
concussions in players
with previous concussions.
They also concluded that
there was not a “7-10 day
window of increased
susceptibility to sustaining
another concussion.”
In response to this article a doctor
wrote that “the article sends a
message that it is acceptable to
return players while still
symptomatic, which contradicts
literature published over the past
twenty years suggesting that
athletes be returned to play only
after they are asymptomatic and in
some cases for seven days.”
Between 2002 and 2005 many
studies performed by independent
scientists found that multiple NFL
induced concussions cause
cognitive problems such as
depression, early on-set dementia
and CTE and its related
symptoms.
42. The NFL‟s Actions?
In 2006 this
committee concluded
that the “mild TBIs in
professional football
are not serious
injuries,” because
many players
returned to play within
a week.
The NFL told players
who suffered
concussions not to be
overly concerned.
In 2007 Rodger
Goodell admitted that
the Committee had
been studying the
effects of traumatic
brain injury for “close
to 14 years.”
Not until 2010 did the
NFL acknowledge
that concussions can
lead to dementia,
memory loss, Chronic
Traumatic
Encephalopathy
(CTE), and other
43. NFL Fraud
In 2002 through 2007, Dr.
Omalu examined players
including Mike Webster, Terry
Long, Andrew Waters and
Justin Strzelcyk. He
concluded in Neurosurgery
that CTE was triggered by
multiple NFL concussions and
was partially responsible for
their deaths
The NFL responded to this by
writing a letter to
Neurosurgery asking that the
article be retracted.
Dr. Julian Bailes a WVU
neurosurgeon explained Dr.
Omalu‟s findings to the NFL
Committee. The Committee
refused the findings and Dr.
Bailes explained “the
Committee got mad…we got
into it. And I‟m thinking, „This
is a …disease in America‟s
most [popular sport and how
are its leaders responding?
Alienate the scientist who
found it? Refuse to accept the
science coming from him?”
44. NFL Fraud
In 2006, ESPN The
Magazine had an
article which described
how the MTBI
Committee failed to
include hundreds of
neuropsychological
tests done on NFL
players when studying
the effects of
concussions.
Furthermore, the article
disclosed that a
neuropsychologist for
the New York Jets, Dr.
William Barr, was fired
after bringing attention to
the fact that the
Committee‟s research
only included results that
would downplay the
effects of concussions.
45. NFL and Congressional
Hearings
At the October 2009
Congressional hearings of the
House Judiciary Committee,
Linda Sanchez, a committee
member, said that the NFL
denying the connection between
concussions and cognitive
decline is similar to the Tobacco
industry‟s denial of the link
between cigarette consumption
and ill health effects.
At the same hearing Rep.
Maxine Walters stated, “I believe
you are an $8 billion organization
that has failed in your
responsibility to the players. We
all know it‟s a dangerous sport.
Players are always going to get
injured. The only quesiton is, are
you going to pay for it? I know
that you dearly want to hold on to
your profits. I think it‟s the
responsibility of Congress to look
at your antitrust exemption and
take it away.”
46. January 2010
The House Judiciary Committee also held
hearings on football player head injuries. The
chairman of the committee, Rep. John Conyers,
Jr., said that “until recently, the NFL minimized
and disputed evidence linking head injuries to
mental impairment in the future.”
NFL and The House Judiciary
Committee
47. A Must Read for NFL Players
In the summer of
2010 the NFL
produced a poster
that alerts its players
to the long-term
effects of
concussions, using
words like
“depression” and
“early onset of
dementia”
51. Riddell
The official helmet manufacturer of the NFL
In 2002, Riddell introduced the “Revolution” helmet, which they
claimed reduced concussions by 31%.
However, the study Riddell conducted with UPMC to get the 31%
figure was highly criticized because new Riddell Revolution helmets
were compared to used helmets.
Also, the study was co-written by Thad Ide, Riddell‟s Vice President
of Research & Product Development.
Furthermore, the neurosurgeon who co-wrote the study, Joe
Maroon, stated that he disagreed with Riddell‟s marketing that the
Revolution could reduce concussions by 31%.
For these reasons, Senator Tom Udall of New Mexico formally
requested that the FTC investigate these “misleading safety claims
and deceptive practices” by helmet manufacturers, specifically
Riddell.
52. In May 2011 Virginia Tech released the
findings of their helmet study.
Riddell‟s VSR-4 was given the second lowest
rating of reducing the risk of concussions.
However, nearly 40% of NFL players wore this
helmet in the 2010-2011 season.
Riddell
The official helmet manufacturer of the NFL
53. Riddell
The official helmet manufacturer of the NFL
The warning on Riddell
helmets mentioned nothing
about concussions
throughout the 1980s and
1990s.
In fact, it was not until
Riddell introduced the
Riddell Revolution in 2002
that inadequate
concussion warnings
started to appear on
helmets.
Prior to 2002 the warning
said:
“Do not use this helmet to
butt, ram or spear an
opposing player. This is in
violation of the football
rules and such use can
result in severe head or
neck injuries, paralysis or
death to you and possible
injury to your opponent.
No helmet can prevent all
head or neck injuries a
player might receive while
participating in football.”
54. Riddell
The official helmet manufacturer of the NFL
According to Thad Ide,
Riddell‟s vice president of
Research & Product
Development, Riddell did
not begin using their HITS
system, which is used to
study concussions, until
around 2004.
This system monitors the
severity and incidence of
impacts that the player
endures. The system uses
a small sensor which is
placed inside the helmet.
55. Riddell
The official helmet manufacturer of the NFL
When Richard Lester,
Vice President and
General Counsel for
Riddell, was asked
how many lawsuits
Riddell has been
involved in in the past
30 years, Lester
explained that he had
dealt with over 100
cases.
“The head injuries range from
mild concussions to subdural
hematomas that require
surgery. There is also a head
injury that‟s described as a
second impact syndrome,
which, basically, is two
separate head injuries, one
concussion followed by a
second impact later that
causes swelling in the brain
and permanent injury.”
-Stringer v. NFL, 749 F.Supp. 2d 680
(East. Dist. Ohio 2010) (Deposition of
Richard Lester, pp 17-19).
Lawsuits against Riddell Included in these lawsuits:
56. Riddell
The official helmet manufacturer of the NFL
Richard Lester noted cases where Riddell failed to
put warnings on helmets, resulting in serious
injuries to the players, and lawsuits for Riddell. He
recalled three cases in particular:
“There was a Florida case, the Strange case.
Eldredge was another one. Jaramillo. All three cases
involved quadriplegic injuries. Players were
paralyzed. In the Eldredge case, the young man
subsequently died. And each of them contained the
allegation that the helmet in question did not have a
warning label warning the player that he could be
seriously injured playing football even though he is
wearing a helmet.”
Stringer v. NFL, 749 F.Supp. 2d 680 (East. Dist. Ohio 2010)
(Deposition of Richard Lester, pp 20-22).
57. Riddell
A Product Liability claim against Riddell:
Arnold v. Riddell, 882 F. Supp. 979 (Dist. Kansas
1995).
In 1988, James R. Arnold was a junior at a high school in
Texas. During a football game he collided head first with an
opponent and fractured his spine at the C4-C5 level,
rendering him quadriplegic. Arnold and his parents brought
a product liability action against Riddell.
In this case, the jury found that the Riddell PAC-3 helmet
was defective and assessed Riddell‟s fault at 63%. The
jury found Arnold 21% at fault and his parents 16% at fault.
The Arnolds were awarded 12 million dollars in damages. A
remittitur of Arnold‟s parents‟ damages was ordered
subsequently for out-of-pocket loss to $437,000.
58. Riddell Sues Insurers For Failing To Pay
Concussion Damages
Published: Friday, 13 Apr 2012 | 12:23 PM ET
By: Darren Rovell
CNBC Sports Business Reporter
The dollar figure on concussion-based lawsuits
continues to mount by the day. On Thursday, the
NFL‟s official helmet maker Riddell, filed suit in
California against those that had insured its
business with the league and are failing to
indemnify the company against these claims.
More than 1,000 former NFL players have been
part of concussion-based lawsuits against the
league.
Riddell says it is included in seven of those suits.
61. WHY?
1. Educate future generations on
concussions;
2. Need for medical care for retirees; and
3. Compensation for personal injuries,
care, suffering, loss of spousal services
and future needs.
